It Takes Two To Tango Autocratic Underbalancing, Regime Legitimacy and China's Responses To India's Rise

Journal of Strategic Studies
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It Takes Two to Tango: Autocratic underbalancing,

regime legitimacy and China’s responses to India’s
rise
Oriana Skylar Mastro
To cite this article: Oriana Skylar Mastro (2019) It Takes Two to Tango: Autocratic
underbalancing, regime legitimacy and China’s responses to India’s rise, Journal of Strategic
Studies, 42:1, 114-152, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2018.1485567
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1485567
Published online: 02 Jul 2018.
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THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
2019, VOL. 42, NO. 1, 114–152
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1485567
ARTICLE
It Takes Two to Tango: Autocratic underbalancing,

regime legitimacy and China’s responses to India’s
rise
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA
ABSTRACT
What factors do autocracies evaluate when responding to perceived threats
and why might they fail to balance appropriately? I posit that autocratic
leaders may choose greater exposure to an external threat if, by doing so, it
preserves regime legitimacy. Specifically, the desire to promote a positive
image to one’s domestic public creates incentives to publicly downplay a
rival’s military progress, which then affects the state’s ability to mobilize
resources to respond to the growing threat. I test this theory in the case of
China’s response to India’s military rise. This research contributes to balancing
theory and empirical work on East Asian security.
KEYWORDS Balancing theory; rising powers; autocratic regimes; regime legitimacy; China; India
What unique factors do autocracies evaluate when responding to perceived

threats, and why might they make suboptimal balancing decisions?
Balancing theory largely ignores the ways autocracies may behave differ-
ently in the context of balancing, largely because of the structural realist
assumption that ‘the international system creates the same basic incentives
for all great powers.’1 Although this assumption suggests that regime type
should not be a factor in determining balancing behavior, in practice,
research in this area almost exclusively evaluates when and how democra-
cies balance. When autocracies make an appearance in balancing theory,
they are mostly treated as expansionist powers that need to be balanced
against, not as states making balancing decisions themselves.2
CONTACT Oriana Skylar Mastro om116@georgetown.edu Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC
1
John Mearsheimer, ‘Structural Realism’, in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (eds.), International
Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP 2013), 72.
2
For some examples, see Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance
of Power (Princeton: Princeton UP 2006); Paul A. Papayoanou, ‘Economic Interdependence and the
Balance of Power’, International Studies Quarterly 41/1 (March 1997), 113–140; Richard Rosecrance
and Chih-Cheng Lo, ‘Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napoleonic
International System’, International Studies Quarterly 40/4 (December 1996), 479–500.
© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 115
Additionally, work on underbalancing, which occurs when ‘threatened

countries have failed to recognize a clear and present danger or, more
typically, have simply not reacted to it or, more typically still, have responded
in paltry and imprudent ways,’ often blames democratic institutions and
practices for this suboptimal behavior.3 Randy Schweller posits four factors
at the domestic–political level of analysis that may inhibit balancing: lack of
elite consensus or elite cohesion can hurt a state’s willingness to balance, and
weak social cohesion and high regime vulnerability can hurt its ability to do so.
Schweller admits that these mechanisms are more prevalent in democracies,
and therefore he concludes that autocracies are better positioned to mobilize
appropriate balancing resources to address perceived threats.4 But neglecting
the prevalence of failures in autocratic balancing behavior is problematic; 75%
of the interstate wars since the end of the Cold War were started by democ-
racies against an autocracy, and over 70% of all interstate wars since WWII
include an autocracy that did not instigate the conflict. These figures suggest
that autocracies fail to mobilize adequate resources to deter potential adver-
saries, potentially even more often than democracies do – a phenomenon that
deserves careful consideration.5
To explain instances of autocratic underbalancing, I propose an additional
mechanism through which domestic political factors may prevent appropriate
balancing: regime legitimacy. This mechanism is particularly prevalent in
autocracies. The basic premise is that leaders interpret their external environ-
ment in a way that supports their right to power at home. This dynamic
creates two pathways to underbalancing. First, when prioritizing threats, a
government may choose greater exposure to an external threat if, by doing
so, it preserves the legitimacy of the regime. This raises the threshold of the
threat a state would have to pose before we would observe traditional
balancing behavior. Second, the desire to promote a positive image of the
regime to one’s domestic public can create incentives to publicly downplay a
rival’s military progress. This, in turn, affects the state’s ability to extract and
mobilize the resources necessary to respond to the growing threat.
To test the regime legitimacy factor’s explanatory power, I conduct a plausi-
bility probe of China’s response to India’s military modernization. India presents a
crucial case; while China may view the USA, Japan or even the Philippines as
potential adversaries, the achievements of these countries do not threaten the
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy in the same way that India’s do. This
is because the CCP’s legitimacy is centered on ensuring China’s successful rise to
3
Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 1. In Schweller’s case studies, the only clear autocracy evaluated was
Paraguay in the War of the Triple Alliance in South America, 1864, but not as a case of
underbalancing.
4
Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 21.
5
Figures derived from the COW data set, in which the initiator is defined as the state that made the
first move by threatening, displaying or using force.
116 O. S. MASTRO
major power status; only India is currently undergoing a parallel attempt to rise
and modernize its military. In other words, a direct comparison to India can send
a message to the Chinese public about China’s progress.
If regime legitimacy is influencing Chinese behavior, we would expect (1)
an absence of proportionate change in China’s force posture in response to
India’s increasing threat, and (2) significant messaging to the public that
understates the capabilities and military advances of a potential adversary,
even if that country is perceived to have dangerous intentions. To address
the first prediction, I evaluate how India’s threat to China has grown in
recent years according to the parameters of balance of threat theory, and
show that China has not responded in kind. To evaluate the second predic-
tion, I turn to two types of sources. First, I analyze the content of articles on
the Indian military published in major state-sponsored media outlets: the
People’s Daily, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily, Xinhua and the Global
Times.6 These media sources are useful precisely because they are biased –
their content represents Party attempts to ‘mobilize public support for the
implementation of official policies.’7 Moreover, they tend to be nationalistic
publications, the Global Times in particular, so any downplaying of Indian
military capabilities lends strength to the argument that China is purposely
minimizing the threat for the benefit of domestic audiences.
This research contributes significantly to theoretical, empirical and policy
debates. First, introducing regime legitimacy as a factor that could cause
autocracies to respond to threats in ‘paltry or imprudent ways’ adds to the
efforts to amend significant international relations theories so as to extend
their explanatory power to autocracies.8 Second, I contribute to the ongoing
debates about balancing theory and its application to the evolving security
environment in East Asia. The most recent contributions have focused
heavily on how the USA and secondary states are responding to China’s
rise – specifically whether they are balancing, bandwagoning or hedging.9
Balancing theory posits that the decisions of major powers have the greatest
impact on peace and stability, but none of this work addresses how a rising
China builds and allocates its resources to balance against perceived threats.
6
I used the search terms India’s rise (印度崛起) Indian military (印度军队) and the time period
2013–2017. This yielded 19, 145, 34 and 79 articles in the People’s Daily, the Global Times, the PLA
Daily and Xinhua, respectively.
7
John Garver, ‘Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions’, Journal of Strategic Studies 25/4
(2002), 121.
8
Jessica L.P. Weeks, ‘Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve’, International
Organization 62 (2008), 35–64; Jessica C. Weiss, ‘Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist
Protest in China’, International Organization 67/1 (2013), 1–35; Alexandre Debs and H.E. Goemans, ‘Regime
Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War’, American Political Science Review 104/3 (2010), 430–445.
9
David C. Kang, ‘Hierarchy, Balancing and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations’, International
Security 28/4 (2004), 165–81; Robert Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation
and Balancing in East Asia’, Security Studies 15/3 (2010), 355–395; Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper,
‘Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia’, Security Studies 24/4 (2015), 696–727.
Third, I contribute to a long-standing debate among area specialists, who

have long identified China’s lukewarm response to India’s military rise as a
notable phenomenon.10 John Garver argues that China is not balancing
because it does not see India as a threat.11 M. Taylor Fravel agrees, writing
that China largely views India’s rise as a positive development that promotes
Chinese core interests more than it threatens them.12 Susan Shirk suggests that
the lack of balancing is a question of resources, not threat perceptions – Beijing
is strategically focused on countering US influence in the Asia-Pacific.13 Others
contend that China has largely set the border dispute aside, instead focusing on
a Taiwan contingency or territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas.14
I demonstrate in this article that these arguments rely on problematic
assumptions about China’s threat perceptions or latent power. With its rapidly
modernizing military, large defense budget and over a million people in
uniform, China has the resources to balance India’s military buildup while
still meeting its other regional goals. Moreover, Indian power (consisting of
population, industrial and military capability and economic resources), offen-
sive capabilities and geographic proximity coupled with an outstanding
territorial dispute create a credible external threat that China recognizes,
and therefore theoretically necessitates a Chinese response.15
Lastly, this research is of great policy relevance. Although war is rare, we
know it becomes more likely when states do not balance appropriately. The
Sino-Indian dynamic is of particular concern in this respect. The intermittent
flare-ups along the border, which has been disputed for almost seven decades,
have recently increased in frequency and intensity.16 Tensions in the Indian
Ocean are also cause for concern, as each power contends for regional influ-
ence at the expense of the other. Moreover, the USA has been courting India as
part of its strategy to counterbalance against Chinese influence. The failure on
each side to build up military forces or seek external alliances could result in an
armed conflict between these two nuclear powers.
10
Garver, ‘Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions’; Susan Shirk, ‘One-Sided Rivalry: China’s
Perceptions and Policies Toward India’, in Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding (eds.), The India-
China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know (New Delhi: Oxford UP 2004), 75–100; M.
Taylor Fravel, ‘China Views India’s Rise: Deepening Cooperation, Managing Differences’, in Ashley J.
Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough (eds.), Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers – China and India
(Washington, DC: Strategic Asia 2011), 65–100.
11
Garver, ‘Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions’.
12
Fravel, ‘China Views India’s Rise’.
13
Shirk, ‘One-Sided Rivalry’.
14
Ashton B. Carter and Jennifer C. Bulkeley, ‘America’s Strategic Response to China’s Military
Modernization’, Harvard Asia-Pacific Review 9/1 (2007), 51. Potential instabilities with other countries
in East Asia countries also drive Chinese military modernization.
15
Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1996), 19.
16
The number of Chinese border violations rose from 180 in 2011 to more than 400 by September
2012. ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013’, U.S.
Department of Defense (2013), 22.
118 O. S. MASTRO
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. First, applying balance of

threat theory, I assess the objective threat India poses to China. I then
show that China does not seem to be responding by reallocating its vast
resources to adequately address the threat. I discuss in more detail how
concerns about regime legitimacy may impact balancing decisions and
present the observable implications of the theory. I conclude that significant
evidence suggests that the CCP finds it necessary to downplay India’s
military progress in ways that strengthen its own legitimacy.
Balancing theory and India’s threat to China

Balance of threat theory argues that states primarily balance against threats
that are a function of power, geographic proximity, perceived intentions and
offensive capabilities.17 There is no doubt that with India’s vast territory,
massive population and impressive economic growth since the reforms
launched in the 1990s, the country’s aggregate power is on the rise.18 In
terms of geographic proximity, not only do China and India share a 2100-mile
border, but the border has been disputed since it sparked a war in 1962.
Although threat perceptions are discussed more in the following section,
my point here is that the territorial dispute heightens Chinese perceptions of
the Indian threat. India currently occupies 90,000 square kilometers of terri-
tory that China considers a rightful part of South Tibet.19 Additionally, China
currently occupies Aksai Chin and the Trans-Karakoram Tract, territory India
believes is hers. As recently as 2016, the Indian Foreign Ministry announced
that ‘China continues to be in illegal occupation of approximately 38,000
square kilometers. In the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir.’20
According to Beijing, India presents an additional threat to Chinese territorial
integrity in the form of secret support for separatist activities in Tibet. These
Chinese suspicions are largely fueled by mistrust of India’s relationship with the
Dalai Lama and of the way India allows the Tibetan Government in Exile to
function in India.21 India has not recognized Tibet as an ‘alienable’ part of China,
and the current Dalai Lama has even gone so far to say that Tibet has closer ties
17
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1987), vi. While Walt was addressing
systemic balancing, these factors can also explain balancing as a foreign policy strategy. In the case
of China, this has primarily taken the shape of internal balancing, as China currently claims to be
ideologically opposed to formal alliances.
18
In 2016, India was the fastest growing economy in the world. CIA, ‘The World Factbook: India –
Economy – Overview’, Central Intelligence Agency, 17 Jun. 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/pub
lications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html>.
19
Reuters, ‘China admonishes the U.S. for visit to disputed India–China border’, Reuters, 24 Oct. 2016,
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-india-security-usa-idUSKCN12O0WP>.
20
Ministry of External Affairs – Government of India, ‘Question No .3037 illegal occupation of Indian
territory’, 16 Mar. 2016, <http://www.mea.gov.in/loksabha.htm?dtl/26541/QUESTION_NO3037_
ILLEGAL_OCUPATION_OF_INDIAN_TERRITORY>.
21
Sutirtho Patranobis, ‘India behind Tibet Problem’, Hindustan Times, 7 Aug. 2012, <https://www.
hindustantimes.com/world/india-behind-tibet-problem/storyagt7XlEVnSeWspKqXJvw6O.html>.
to India than to China. Such statements fuel Chinese insecurities about India’s
role in delegitimizing the ‘One China’ promise upon which the CCP’s legitimacy
is founded. Consequently, China has continued to harden its stance against
Tibet, from claiming the whole Arunachal Pradesh region as part of China since
2006 to building its military presence in the region.22
In terms of offensive capabilities, India has leveraged much of its eco-
nomic growth to modernize its army, air force, navy and nuclear forces, with
many improvements designed specifically to counter China. In terms of
ground forces, the Indian Army has increased personnel and upgraded its
armor and air mobility over the past two decades. While the Indian Army
has historically focused on meeting the Pakistani threat, the increasing
tensions with China and the breakneck pace of Chinese military moderniza-
tion have been cited as reasons for the Indian Army’s expansion along the
Chinese border.23 India has increased the number of mountain troops in its
order of battle since 1996, adding two additional mountain infantry divi-
sions to the Eastern Command responsible for defense of the Sino-Indian
border in 2009 and announcing the formation of a 90,000-strong mountain
strike corps in 2013.24 In 2015, 9 of the Army’s 36 divisions were oriented
toward the borders with China, Bangladesh or Burma, compared with 18
divisions stationed in the states bordering Pakistan.25 Recent border ten-
sions have led India to allocate more and more of its limited resources to
addressing a potential threat from China; the potential creation of a moun-
tain strike corps by 2021 to be based in Ladakh, Uttarakhand and Sikkim is
only one such example.26 Chinese commentators have noted that India has
many more troops along the border than China does; India also has the
world’s largest mountain forces, which are particularly useful along such a
mountainous-disputed border.27
The Indian Air Force is recognized as a crucial component of any
defense against China and has been steadily modernized in the last
20 years as a result. The lack of air force participation in the 1962 Sino-
22
Rajiv Sikri, ‘The Tibet Factor in India–China Relations’, Journal of International Affairs 64/2 (2011), 55–71.
23
Kapil Patil, ‘India’s New Mountain Strike Corps: Conventional Deterrence’, The Diplomat, 8 Aug. 2013,
https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/indias-new-mountain-strike-corps-conventional-deterrence/2/.
24
Rajat Pandit, ‘No Budget, Army Struggles to Raise Mountain Strike Corps’, The Times of India, 7 Mar.
2016, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/No-Budget-Army-struggles-to-raise-mountain-strike-
corps/articleshow/51283303.cms; John Pike, ‘Indian Army Divisions’, Global Security.org, 25 Jul.
2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/divisions.htm.
25
Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia’,
Journal of Strategic Studies 38/5 (2015), 27.
26
International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Asia’, in The Military Balance 2016 (London: Routledge
2016) 219.
27
Huanqiu Shibao, ‘Is India Really Ready for War against China at 10,000 ft?’ [Zai 10,000 Yingchi Haiba
Tiaodong Dui Hua Zhanzheng, Yindu Zhen Zhunbei Haole Ma?]’, Global Times, 16 Jul. 2017, http://
world.huanqiu.com/article/2017-07/10987372.html; Tang Bohu, ‘Cutting India’s Chicken-neck, It’s Not
So Easy [Zhongguo Qia Duan Yindu Bozi? Bushi Zheme Hui Shi]’, Fenghuang Xinwen, 13 Jul. 2017,
http://inews.ifeng.com/51425168/news.shtml?&back.
120 O. S. MASTRO
Indian War proved an embarrassing and dangerous weakness in Indian

military capability, and subsequently the Indian Air Force shifted from an
air defense role to a role more focused on offensive air power.28 The
Indian Air Force has consistently focused its modernization efforts on
replacing its third-generation fighter aircraft with more advanced fourth-
and fifth-generation platforms, increasing airlift and aerial refueling capa-
city and developing airborne early warning capability.29 Much of this
modernization is clearly directed against China – a detachment of
fourth-generation MiG-29s and five of the ten active squadrons of its
most advanced multirole fighter aircraft, the Su-30MKI, are stationed
within reach of the Chinese border. A total of 7 of 17 squadrons of Mi-
8 and Mi-17 medium-lift helicopters are also positioned in areas near the
Chinese border to better enable combat logistics in mountainous areas.30
Indian upgrades to military airports on the border area may now allow
for the deployment to the area of not only SU-30MKI fighter jets, but also
transportation aircraft such as the US-made C-17 and C-130.31 India also
recently deployed BrahMos cruise missiles along the frontier in Arunachal
Pradesh, for improved access to Chinese targets.32
The Indian Navy has historically enjoyed steady public support, but has
been unable to offer forthright solutions to challenges from China.33
Though the size of the Indian Navy fleet has not shifted dramatically in
the past 20 years, significant modernization efforts have been underway
with a focus on indigenous shipbuilding efforts, resulting in the commis-
sioning of three Shivalik-class stealth guided missile frigates in 2012 and
three Kolkata-class stealth guided missile destroyers by 2016.34 Other
major shipbuilding projects include India’s first indigenously built aircraft
carrier, INS Vikrant, to be completed by 2023, and India’s first
28
Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization, 2nd ed.
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press 2013), 72–73, 76–83.
29
Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘India To Upgrade Sukhoi Fleet With Russia’s Help’, Defense News, 27 Jul. 2016,
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asia-pacific/2016/07/27/india-sukhoi-rus
sia-upgrade-su-30mki-fgfa/87609150; Rajat Pandit, ‘India Eyes Direct Purchase of Six Refueling
Aircraft’, The Times of India, 31 Jul. 2016, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-eyes-direct-
purchase-of-six-refuelling-aircraft/ articleshow/53471222.cms.
30
Dutch Aviation Society, ‘India Air Force Armed Forces Overview’, Scramble, 14 Aug. 2017, http://www.
scramble.nl/orbats/india.
31
Jiangyue Shi, ‘Can India Bear the Cost of Going to War with China? [Yindu neng chengshou duihua
zhanzheng de daijia ma?]’, Asia Pacific Daily, 17 Jul. 2017, http://zh.apdnews.com/news/701235.html?
node=698.
32
Sutirtho Patranobis, ‘Nervous India’s move to deploy BrahMos missile in Arunachal threat to China:
PLA’, Hindustan Times, 22 August 2016, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/nervous-india-
s-move-to-deploy-brahmos-missile-in-arunachal-threat-to-china-pla/story-yF6J5r1vRPpG7drSXIIVXN.
html.
33
Cohen and Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming, 94–95.
34
Naval-Technology, ‘Shivalik Class Frigates, India’, Naval-Technology.com, 2018, http://www.naval-
technology.com/projects/shivalik-class-friga; Naval-Technology, ‘Kolkata class guided missile
destroyer, India’, Naval-Technology.com, 2018, http://www.navaltechnology.com/projects/Kolkata-
class-guided-missile-destroyers.
(indigenously produced) ballistic missile submarine, INS Arihant.35

Additionally, India has committed to building 24 submarines over the
next 30 years in an attempt to keep up with Beijing.36
Lastly, India’s nuclear arsenal has undergone steady modernization and
diversification in terms of delivery systems to ensure India’s nuclear strike
capability against China, though it remains limited in range, delivery meth-
ods and numbers.37 The 5000 km-range Agni-V Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM) is in development and 3500 km-range K-4 and 5000 km-
range K-5 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) are reportedly in
testing, both of which can reach any city in China.38 India is likely to use its
recently ordered Rafale fighters in a nuclear delivery role – and to deploy
them to bases near the Chinese border.
China’s underwhelming response to India’s military rise

According to balance of threat theory, India’s power, geographic proximity,
improving offensive capabilities and threat to China’s territorial integrity
should inspire Beijing to accept the burden of deterring and to commit
substantial resources to doing so.39 Evaluating whether China is ‘adequately’
balancing is tricky because the balancing literature, for a number of reasons,
does not provide a baseline against which scholars can analyze countries’
decisions. First, ‘appropriate’ balancing is rarely measured independently
from outcomes – underbalancing is identified ex post when deterrence
fails and conflict breaks out. But measuring underbalancing by outcomes
makes it difficult to evaluate destabilizing trends before conflict erupts,
something that scholars and practitioners alike aspire to do. This measure-
ment strategy also truncates the dependent variable only to the extremes,
which could hinder attempts to explain the phenomenon. Adam P. Liff takes
a step in the direction of operationalizing ‘balancing’ by laying out seven
metrics for force development and five metrics for force deployment to
better measure internal balancing.40 While these metrics help to identify
35
Jayana Gupta, ‘Aircraft Carrier INS Vikrant Will Be Delivered to Navy On Time: Cochin Shipyard Chief’,
The Times of India, 15 Oct. 2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Aircraft-carrier-INS-
Vikrant-will-be-delivered-to-Navy-on-time-Cochin-Shipyard-chief/articleshow/49392647.cms; Samuel
Osborne, ‘INS Arihant: India Nears Completion of Nuclear Submarine “Slayer of Enemies” – So
What Does It Mean For the World?’ The Independent, 27 Feb. 2016, http://www.independent.co.
uk/news/world/asia/india-nears-completion-of-nuclear-submarine-named-slayer-of-enemies-
a6899881.html.
36
Elias Groll and Dan de Luce, ‘China is Fueling a Submarine Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific’, Foreign
Policy, 26 Aug. 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/26/china-is-fueling-a-submarine-arms-race-in-
the-asia-pacific/.
37
Cohen and Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming, 107.
38
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2016, 301.
39
Walt, Revolution and War, 19.
40
Adam P. Liff, ‘Whither the Balancers: The Case for a Methodological Reset’, Security Studies 25/3
(2016), 427, 436.
122 O. S. MASTRO
general balancing behavior, the framework is less useful for identifying

underbalancing, because it still does not provide a threshold for what
constitutes ‘appropriate’ balancing. Moreover, these metrics do not include
a component of directionality; for example, China may be making quantita-
tive increases in weapons acquisitions (metric #3) or qualitative improve-
ments to weapons systems and technologies (metric #4) to address the
challenge of the USA, not to balance against India. If a country is facing
multiple diverse threats, it is hard to determine whether it is allocating
resources proportionally to a particular threat.
While it does not completely solve the problem, consideration of propor-
tionate balancing may make it possible to determine more rigorously
whether a country is underbalancing ex ante and contributes to the current
approaches by adding directionality. A proportionate balancing framework
asks: Is a country directing balancing efforts rationally relative to the threats
it faces? Specifically, if a potential adversary is building up its military and
seeking alliances, does it respond proportionally and in kind? If Chinese
were balancing proportionate to the Indian threat, we would observe China
building more capability and targeting a greater proportion of its military
hardware against India in preparation for a potential war in which India may
seize territory China considers its own.41 We should see China dedicating
ground, air, naval and strategic forces that are roughly equal to those India
dedicates to countering China.
Instead, China has responded with surprising mildness to recent Indian
military improvements. The PLA Army, the largest ground force in the world,
dedicates only approximately 1000 Chinese soldiers to the Sino-Indian
border, although this is China’s only land border under dispute and
although the PLA Army’s increasing emphasis on air and mechanized mobi-
lity has made Chinese forces more potent.42 In terms of nuclear forces,
although India’s policy is designed primarily to deter China, most of the
PLA Rocket Force’s strategic nuclear missiles remain targeted at the USA and
Russia, not India.43 In terms of airpower, none of the bases closest to the
Sino-Indian border host permanent PLA Air Force (PLAAF) air regiments.44 In
total, the PLAAF could likely have around 15–25 fourth-generation fighter
aircraft at bases near the border, and on short notice could probably muster
41
42
Most Chinese ground forces in the Western Theater Command are oriented to the east, away from
the border. Peter Wood, ‘China’s Western theater command’, Jamestown Foundation, Dec. 2016,
https://www.p-wood.co/2016/12/18/chinas-western-theater-command.
43
Survival, ‘Book Review: The China–India Nuclear Crossroads: China, India, and the New Paradigm’,
Survival 55/4 (2013) 214. Calculations derived from information in IHS Jane’s, ‘China’s Strategic
Weapons Systems’, in Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment (Washington, DC: Jane’s 2012), 8.
44
Gonggar Air Base and Shigatase Air Base in Xizang (Tibet) and Hotan Air Base in Xinjiang only host
rotational detachments of around 5 J-10 or J-11 aircraft from the 98th Air Regiment (J-11) based at
Chongqing-Baishiyi and 131st Air Regiment (J-10A/S) based at Luliang in the Chengdu MR. IHS
Jane’s, China – Air Force: Jane’s World Air Forces (Washington, DC: IHS Jane’s 2015), 16.
only 72 fourth-generation J-11/Su-27UBK and J-10, along with 72 third-

generation J-7 aircraft.45 This is a miniscule number, given that the PLAAF,
as the largest air force in Asia and the third largest in the world, currently
has an inventory of 2700 aircraft (not including Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAVs)) and 2100 combat aircraft.46
Lastly, the fact that the Western Theater Command in charge of dealing
with India is landlocked, and therefore does not have an associated navy,
suggests that China is not optimizing its naval force reorganization with
India in mind. Although China has long recognized the strategic need for a
presence in the Indian Ocean, its navy has begun only recently to venture
into those waters. In May 2016, China conducted interdiction training there
and made its first port call in South Asia – in Karachi, Pakistan – by a nuclear
submarine.47 China has also begun to think about building the logistics and
intelligence support infrastructure necessary to operate in the Indian Ocean,
starting with the establishment of its first overseas base in Djibouti in 2015.
But to date, its naval forces are still dedicated almost exclusively to opera-
tions in the South China Sea and the East Sea and to potential contingencies
on the Korean peninsula.
In terms of external balancing, Beijing does have a long-standing rela-
tionship with Pakistan that was initially formed over mutual security con-
cerns about India. But today the relationship with Pakistan is not primarily
driven by a perceived threat from India; instead, China leverages it primarily
to expand its economic influence in the region, deal with Islamic extremists
in its Western provinces, build infrastructure to connect the oil and gas fields
of the Middle East to its cities, and gain greater access to the Indian Ocean.48
However, some commentators note that China could eventually modify its
commercial port in Gwadar, Pakistan to be used for military purposes, such
as basing navy vessels and submarines for future regional operations.49
While still not a perfect measure, this review suggests that China has not
adequately changed its force posture to account for India’s military moder-
nization and buildup directed at China even though it has the resources
available to do so, and therefore Beijing’s approach to India can be best
characterized as underbalancing.
45
Calculations derived from information in China – Air Force: Jane’s World Air Forces, 8. Each air
regiment is estimated to have around 36 aircraft in operation.
46
Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China’, Department of Defense, May 2017, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/
1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF.
47
‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China,’ 3, 19.
48
Andrew Small, The China–Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (New York: Oxford UP 2015), 1–3.
49
The Times of India, ‘Chinese Navy Ships to be Deployed at Gwadar: Pak Navy Official’, The Times of
India, 25 Nov. 2016, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Chinese-navy-ships-to-be-
deployed-at-Gwadar-Pak-navy-official/articleshow/55622674.cms.
124 O. S. MASTRO
Explaining autocratic underbalancing

What factors could cause an autocratic country to underbalance against an
increasing threat? I posit a mechanism broadly applicable to autocracies through
which domestic political factors may prevent sufficient balancing even if threats
are identified: regime legitimacy.50 Leaders in autocratic countries find it impera-
tive to interpret their external environment in a way that enhances their legiti-
macy at home. A government may choose to underbalance if publicly
recognizing a threat would undermine the foundational principles of its domestic
political legitimacy. But by understating the threat, the government is creating
domestic hurdles to extracting resources for balancing purposes. In other words,
it is risking external security for the sake of internal security. This mechanism
builds on previous research that suggests that autocracies may be more sensitive
to ideological and political threats to their regimes than to threats based on
aggregate power, geographic proximity and offensive capabilities.51
Theoretically, this tendency to underbalance to protect regime legitimacy
can manifest itself in all countries regardless of domestic political system. But
this need is less prevalent in democracies because the legitimacy of democra-
tically elected leaders is more likely to be based on the process through which
they were placed in power. The mechanism may also work differently in
authoritarian and democratic governments due to variation in the groups
autocrats must co-opt to remain in power – some autocrats focus on shaping
public perceptions, while others need only worry about the views of elites or
the military. How leaders promote their interpretation of the external environ-
ment and to whom depends on their sources of legitimacy and their strategies
for staying in power.
In the case of contemporary China, the CCP believes it needs the tacit agree-
ment of the Chinese people to rule. The CCP has relied on various factors over the
past 67 years to ensure the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the people, and
consequently social stability. In the 1950s and 1960s, Maoist communist ideology
and its revolutionary fervor formed the core of the Party’s legitimacy. After the
10 years of chaos during the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping came to power
and changed course to rely on economic growth as the source of Party legitimacy.
China’s rise became a rallying point. Today, as economic growth slows down, the
Party is pushing the narrative that only with the Party in charge can China achieve
its ‘national rejuvenation,’ in the words of current leader Xi Jinping. Taking their
50
Schweller’s government vulnerability factors starts with the same premise that some regimes are
concerned about legitimacy. However, the mechanism connecting this to underbalancing differs – he
argues that states focus resources on repression and do not build armies that can turn against them.
51
Mark L. Haas, ‘Ideology and Alliances: British and French External Balancing Decisions in the 1930s’,
Security Studies 12/4 (2003), 34–79; F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Balancing What? Threat Perception and
Alliance Choice in the Gulf’, Security Studies 13/22 (2003), 273–305; Steven R. David, ‘Explaining Third
World Alignment’, World Politics 43/2 (1991), 233–256.
lead from Xi, and likely inspired by the ninety-fifth anniversary of the Party’s
founding, many articles in official media expound on the CCP as the cornerstone
of national rejuvenation, a necessary condition for the Chinese people’s return to
greatness. This narrative of return to a rightful place of regional preeminence
contributes to Party legitimacy by appealing to the public’s sense of Chinese
exceptionalism and civilizational pride.52
To guard jealously its carefully cultivated status as the sole savior of China
and the Chinese people, the Party regularly warns the public of the perils of
Western ideology and portrays the spread of Western constitutional democ-
racy as a deliberate threat to Party leadership. The most glaring example of
this is a confidential internally circulated CCP communique that specifically
identified the promotion of Western constitutional democracy as ‘an
attempt to undermine the current leadership and the socialism with
Chinese characteristics system of governance.’53 Xi Jinping relies heavily
on promoting the idea that without the Party, China cannot become a
major power in the international system. He has also made public state-
ments to the effect that democracy would not be a good fit for China and
that China ‘needs to follow a development path that suits its own reality.’54
Xi often argues that his proposed China dream depends on the Party’s
maintenance of complete control – the concentration of power in the
system allows China to do important things quickly and efficiently.55
To bring it back to underbalancing, the preservation of this stark choice –
revitalization of the Chinese nation to its natural greatness or democracy and
failure – lies at the foundation of regime legitimacy for the CCP. Internal stability
depends on the Chinese people’s continued belief in the often-heard argument
that ‘there is no developing country in the world that achieves prosperity and
stability under Western-style democracy.’56 Any policy position that suggests
that the arduous process of rising from a poor, weak country to a rich, powerful
one can be managed equally well by a democracy presents a real threat to the
Party’s hold on power.57 Therefore, to preserve regime legitimacy, China has to
underestimate the progress India has made, to include the modernization of its
52
For an example, Wenhai Li, ‘The Fundamental Guarantee for Implementing the Great Rejuvenation of
the Chinese People’ [Shixian zhonghuaminzu weida fuxing de genben baozheng] People’s Forum 8
(2001): 7–8, http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/paper85/4118/482479.html.
53
ChinaFile, ‘Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation: How Much Is a Hardline Party Directive Shaping
China’s Current Political Climate?’ ChinaFile, Asia Society, 8 Nov. 2013, http://www.chinafile.com/
document-9-chinafile-translation.
54
‘Democracy Doesn’t Suit China: President Xi Jinping’, The Times of India, 2 Apr. 2014.
55
Bi Jingjing, ‘To Achieve the Great Chinese Rejuvenation, We Must Uphold the Party’s Leadership”
[Shixian zhonghuaminzu weida fuxing bixu jianchi dang de lingdao]’, Qiushi, 3 Jul. 2016, http://www.
qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-07/03/c_1119153303.htm.
56
Wenlin Tian, ‘Western-Style Democracy Will Not Work in China [Xishi minzhu zai zhongguo xingbu-
tong]’, Qiushi, 15 Dec. 2014, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2014-12/15/c_1113618154.htm.
57
This point comes out in most discussions with Chinese scholars on the topic. See also Justin Sommers
(ed.), The India–China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know (Washington, DC: Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars Conference Report 2001), 17.
126 O. S. MASTRO
military, which in turn encourages underbalancing. This does not mean China
cannot criticize India’s intentions, but its leadership must make clear to its
people that India does not have adequate capabilities to challenge China and
the reasons for India’s weakness lies at least in part in its democratic nature.
There are a few important caveats to the regime legitimacy approach. First, as
per its definition, underbalancing may occur if a country does not correctly
recognize a threat, or if it does not mobilize adequately to counter that threat.
The regime legitimacy mechanism seeks to explain only the second type of
balancing failure – why a state may underbalance even if it perceives a threat.
Research has shown that incorporating economic and political engagement as
components of security strategies confounds concepts and inhibits a deeper
understanding of security behavior.58 Therefore, the regime legitimacy thesis
does not address how an autocracy may perceive and respond to the economic
development of a potential adversary.59
Second, one may question the connection between regime legitimacy con-
cerns and underbalancing. What prevents a country from publicly stating that an
adversary is not a threat, but then making appropriate balancing decisions
anyway? The simple answer is this does occur, but in extreme situations of
repression and control. For example, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un can insist
through state media that North Korea’s military is vastly superior to that of South
Korea and the USA, while simultaneously taking active measures that clearly
demonstrate a need to deter and prepare to fight a vastly superior adversary.60
According to Polity, only North Korea and Saudi Arabia fall at the extremes of
autocracy61; most nondemocratic countries cannot guarantee the control of
information to such a degree. Moreover, autocracies still require support from
co-opted elites and the public to effectively mobilize resources. Downplaying a
threat may create a positive image for the regime, but makes it much more
difficult to secure such support.
Third, might not concerns about regime legitimacy create incentives for
leaders to overplay (rather than downplay) a threat, believing that a foreign
conflict will create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect that will boost their political
popularity? There are reasons to doubt the applicability of a diversionary war
mechanism. First, a great amount of empirical work suggests that leaders rarely
58
Lim and Cooper, ‘Reassessing Hedging’.
59
Though China does understate India’s economic progress. For one example, see Song Yu, ‘India’s
Economic Growth is Overtaking China? Experts: The Numbers Don’t Conform to Reality’ [Yindu cheng
jingji zengzhang chao zhongguo, zhuanjia: shuju yu shiji qingkuang bufu], Cankao Xiaoxi, 15 Feb.
2016, http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/finance/20160215/1075896.shtml.
60
‘North Korean People’s Army is a strong army with a certain victory that is invincible and revolutionary
[Chosun inmingooneun moojeok pilseungeui hyukmyeong ganggooniida]’, DPRK Today, 25 Apr. 2017,
http://dprktoday.com/main.php?type=201&no=19857; ‘American empire’s tragic end will be hastened’
[jaegookeui bigeukjuck jongmalii apdangkyeojil geotiida’], Chosun Joongang Tongshin, 13 Aug. 2017.
61
Data current as of 2013. For polity scores and coding rules, see ‘Polity IV Individual Country Regime
Trends’, The Center for Systemic Peace, 6 Jun. 2014, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.
htm.
use force to divert attention away from domestic issues, and those that do show
some effect do so only in the context of democracies.62 Second, this mechanism
cannot be used to explain underbalancing because it predicts, if anything,
hyperbalancing. Third, the theory requires a weak economy or lagging approval
from which a leader hopes to divert attention – neither of which is currently
applicable in China. Lastly, in the case of China and other autocracies, leaders are
less concerned about inspiring expressions of support than about avoiding
expressions of dissent. Thus, creating a rally effect is risky for an autocrat; such
leaders do not want to give their people any reason to organize, even in support.
In the next section, I conduct a plausibility probe of regime legitimacy as an
explanation for China’s underbalancing in response to India’s rise by evaluating
two observable implications derived from the regime legitimacy approach.
First, we would expect China to downplay in its public messaging about
Indian capabilities in ways that make China’s military modernization seem
more successful than India’s efforts, perhaps even blaming India’s democratic
system for those weaknesses. Second, if the media argues that in spite of these
weaknesses, India poses a threat to China, this presents compelling evidence
against the main competing explanation that China is simply not balancing
because it does not recognize India as a threat. Portraying Indian intentions as
nefarious does not threaten the narrative of China’s rise – if anything, doing so
creates more distance and more critical views of democracy.
China’s public portrayal of India’s military modernization

Security studies have long identified the tendency of states to build up their
own militaries in response to quantitative and qualitative changes in the force
posture, weapons and equipment of their neighbors. But China has not
responded as strongly to the improvement and expansion of Indian military
capabilities as we would expect, given the nature and degree of the perceived
threat. What makes China’s underbalancing even more puzzling is that Beijing
has the resources to respond more forcefully to India without sacrificing its
efforts against other threats. In this section, I evaluate Chinese official media
and defense white paper coverage of India’s changes, designed in both cases
for public consumption. If Beijing has merely failed to recognize the improve-
ments in India’s military capabilities, or has objectively assessed that only some
merit a response, then we should see either minimal coverage of these trends
or a balanced assessment of both India’s progress and its setbacks. Instead, if
we see public media coverage of India’s military rise, but a consistent under-
stating of those capabilities largely because of institutional factors (read:
62
James Meernik and Peter Waterman, ‘The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American
Presidents’, Political Research Quarterly 49/3 (September 1996), 573–590. For a comprehensive review
of the literature, see Karl DeRouen, ‘Presidents and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Research Note’,
International Studies Quarterly 44/2 (2000), 317–328.
128 O. S. MASTRO
democracy), this provides evidence for the regime legitimacy argument. To

assess these arguments, I dissected all the articles on India’s military moder-
nization and rise published since 2013 in the four largest state-sponsored
media outlets – People’s Daily, Xinhua, the Global Times and PLA Daily.
China recognizes India’s increasing power and offensive capabilities

A content analysis of Chinese media demonstrates a clear recognition that India
is currently modernizing and building up its military. All of the articles pub-
lished in People’s Daily and the Global Times on the Indian military since 2012
have mentioned either India’s arms procurement or the development of indi-
genous systems. Many pieces quote independent statistics about increases in
Indian defense spending and warn that India could become the world’s great-
est arms importer, with its purchases constituting 14% of the world’s total.63
Notable purchases that received extra media attention include: Su−30MKI and
MiG−29K fighter jets, Mi-17 helicopters and T-90MS tanks from Russia; 10 C-17
transport aircraft, 6 C-130J transport aircraft and 12 P-8I reconnaissance aircraft
from the USA; and Rafale fighters from France, as well as more than 8000 ‘Spike’
anti-tank missiles, 300 launchers, the Phalcon Airborne Early Warning System
and Barak-8 air defense weapons system from Israel.64 The Chinese media
recognizes that such procurement has led to improvements in India’s surface
and sub-surface capabilities and in its ability to support operations beyond the
region.65 Special emphasis is placed on India’s attempts to improve its position
on the border by upgrading equipment, increasing the frequency and scale of
military exercises, and using satellites and cyber technologies to monitor its
borders.66 But the state-sponsored media is largely neutral on these develop-
ments. While it rails against other countries for propagating the ‘China Threat
63
Xiaoyun Ma, ‘India Imports More Arms and Cooperates with US to Counterbalance China [Yin wuqi
jinkou zeng 12 bei jiakuai yu meiguo junshihezuo zhiheng zhongguo]’, Xinhua, 28 Apr. 2016, http://
news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-04/28/c_128938390.htm.
64
For example, Jibei Zhang, ‘A Change in Big Purchases [Dashoubizhong you xin bianhua]’, People’s
Daily, 14 Apr. 2015, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2015-04/14/content_1553666.htm;
Guo Qian, ‘India Purchases Four Maritime Patrol Aircraft from the US Worth Approximately 1
Billion USD [Yindu xiang mei goumai sijia haishang zhenchaji, jiazhi yue shiyi meiyuan]’, Xinhua,
29 Jul. 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-07/29/c_129186064.htm; Qu Song and Yuan
Jirong, ‘India and Russia expand economic cooperation [Yin E mouqiu kuoda jingmao hezuo]’,
People’s Daily, 5 Jun. 2017, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2017-06/05/nw.D110000renmrb_
20170605_9-21.htm; Lei Wang, ‘India’s active military diplomacy [Yindu junshi waijiao huoyue]’,
People’s Daily, 20 Nov. 2009, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/10413177.html.
65
Zhen Wu, ‘Indian military modernization: ambition and reality [yindu junshi zhuanxing de
xiongxin yu xianshi]’, PLA Daily, 2 Apr. 2016, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-04/02/content_
6989175_2.htm.
66
Jiangsheng Li, ‘Are China and India involved in an arms race in border areas?’ [Zhongyin
zhenfengxiangdui zai bianjing diqu gao ‘zhanbei’?]’, Huanqiu Shibao, 17 Jul. 2017, http://
hqtime.huanqiu.com/article/a-XCWT684875616988CAA20F; Quanhua Zhang, ‘India is using
satellites to strengthen border monitoring [Yindu yong weixing jiaqiang bianfang jiance],
Global Times, 5 Sep. 2017, http://mil.huanqiu.com/world/2017-09/11213747.html; Yang He,
‘India uses 13 satellites to monitor its competitors [Yinjun yong 13 ke weixing jianshi duishou]’,
Global Times, 27 Jun. 2017, http://mil.huanqiu.com/world/2017-06/10902066.html.
Theory,’ it rarely mentions that India is building up arms to counter China,

instead pointing to Pakistan as the main driver.67 A review of the 11 articles
published in 2016 in Xinhua about India’s military buildup reveals only three
that mention that aspects of the arms procurement or indigenous develop-
ment are directed at China.68
Chinese media coverage consistently downplays Indian military

capabilities
Chinese media coverage of India’s military is clearly skewed to underplay
India’s progress, usually by making an unfavorable comparison to Chinese
military modernization.69 It is almost a mantra that (1) the Indian military
relies heavily on other countries for its weapons; (2) different weapons from
different countries are less effective, hard to maintain and exhibit poor
interoperability; (3) the weapons India produces are such of low quality
and its defense industry is so backwards that India will never catch up and
(4) no nation can become a strong military power if it must purchase
equipment and weapons from the outside.70
India poses real challenges to China – especially in the Indian Ocean, where
India enjoys major advantages over China resulting largely from geography. But
when India revealed its first indigenous carrier, an op-ed in the nationalistic Global
Times argued that India’s capacity to hurt China was still very limited, and
emphasized that the Vikrant was less powerful than, for example, the Japanese
carrier.71 In one article on Indian nuclear submarine development, instead of using
67
Hanghui Chen, Wei Wu and Xiaoning Wang, ‘Refine the strategic capabilities for pre-emptive strikes
[duanzao xianfa zhirende zhanlue daji liliang]’, PLA Daily, 27 Feb. 2015, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-
02/27/content_6369148.htm; Yunfeng Wei, ‘India procured 500 Russian T90 tanks [Yindu kuangmai jin 500
liang ezhi T90 tanke]’, Global Times, 9 Nov. 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/world/2016-11/9652980.html.
68
Only 5 out of 23 People’s Daily articles and 14 out of 31 Global Times articles reviewed in the first
stage of research even mention that China is a part of India’s calculus.
69
Lin Hai, ‘Russia: Pakistan’s JF-17 Aircraft Are Ordered for Export, India’s LCA Is Still Not Combat
Ready [Emei: xiaolong yihuo chukou dingdan yindu LCA hai weixingcheng zhanli]’, Global
Times, 23 Jul. 2015, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2015-07/7070918.html; Huanqiu
Shibao (Global Times), ‘Russia Evaluates India’s Agni-4 Missile Test: Capability Inferior to the
Chinese [Emei ping yindu shishe liehuo 4 daodan: xingneng yuanyuan luohou zhongguo]’,
Global Times, 22 Jan. 2014, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2014-01/4778997.html.
70
For example, see Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), ‘India’s defense industry is “hollowing” and military buying
cannot bring India to a big military power [Yindu guofang gongye ‘kongxinhua’ jungou maibulai junshi
qiangguo]’, People’s Daily, 10 Jun. 2014, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2014/0610/c1011-25125805.html;
Xulong Lu, ‘Indian Defense Acquisition on a Balance Beam [Pinghengmu shangde yindu jungou]’, PLA Daily,
11 Nov. 2015, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2015-11/21/content_129893.htm; Zhenhua Wen, ‘India’s
defense industry: Relying on “buying outside” will not make a strong military power [yindu guofang gongye:
nalai zhuyi chengjiu buliao junshi qiangguo]’, PLA Daily, 10 Jun. 2014, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2014-06/10/
content_5951323.htm.
71
Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), ‘Op-ed: India Operates Its First Indigenous Aircraft Carrier, China Should
Not Fall Behind [Sheping: yindu guochan hangmu xiashui, zhongguo bie tailuohou]’, Global Times, 13
Aug. 2013, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2013-08/4236740.html. See also Pengfei Li, ‘India
launches its own domestically built aircraft carrier [Yindu shousou guochan hangmu xiashui]’, People’s
Daily, 13 Aug. 2013, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2013/0813/c1002-22541207.html.
130 O. S. MASTRO
advancements as a rallying call, the author argues that claims of the superiority of
India’s nuclear submarine technology over China’s are an exaggeration – the
countries are on par and the Arihant nuclear submarine is still easily detectable.72
The People’s Daily adds to the debate, arguing that even if India procured nuclear
submarines, this would not enhance its ability to carry out nuclear attacks because
Delhi does not have the capability to put a weapon on the platform.73
Chinese media also downplays clear advancements in another strate-
gically sensitive area: missile development. On the Brahmos missile, one
piece argues that India developed the system because of its weak fighter
force, but that it would remain ineffective without an expanded
Command, Control, Computers, Communication, Intelligence,
Surveillance, Reconnaisance (C4ISR) infrastructure.74 Most recently, when
India tested for the fourth time the Agni-5, an ICBM capable of hitting
every major target in China, media sources noted that much testing is
still needed before it becomes operational and that it must be fired at a
high speed to constitute a credible threat.75 While there is some rela-
tively neutral coverage of India’s missile development, it insinuates that
Pakistan is the main motivation behind India’s missile program.76
This is not to say these critiques are wholly inaccurate, only that there is a
bias toward focusing on Indian weaknesses and vulnerabilities and the most
pessimistic evaluations of Indian capabilities.77 Moreover, the Chinese media
focuses on direct comparisons between India and China to argue that China’s
military modernization has been a greater success. When the India media
72
Kun Liu, ‘India Plans to Develop Four Arihant Class Nuclear Submarines Before 2020 [Yindu 2020 nian
qian jiang zhuangbei 4 sou ‘jiandizhe’ ji heqianting]’, Global Times, 22 Feb. 2016, http://military.
people.com.cn/n1/2016/0229/c1011-28158538.html.
73
Lei Wang, ‘India Receives Nuclear-Engine Submarines from Russia [Yindu cong eluosi jieshou zujiede
hedongli qianting]’, People’s Daily, 25 Jan. 2012, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2012-01/25/
nw.D110000renmrb_20120125_9-03.htm.
74
‘How big are the military gaps between China and India?’ [Zhongyin junshi chaju you duoda?] Sina,
29 November 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2016-11-29/doc-ifxyawmp0524985.shtml.
75
Suning Li ‘India Re-launches Agni5 ICBM, Claims to Cover Northeastern China [Yindu zaishe ‘liehuo 5‘
zhouji daodan haocheng neng dadao zhongguo dongbei],’ Global Times, 27 Dec. 2016, http://mil.
huanqiu.com/observation/2016-12/9866248.html.
76
Yan Ren, ‘India works to develop new missiles [Yindu dali yanzhi xinxing daodan]’, People’s Daily, 20
Jul. 2008, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2008-07/20/content_63857.htm.
77
When India has made undeniable progress, for example, in the cases of Rudra helicopters, India’s
ability to operate fighters off a carrier, its progress toward the nuclear triad, and potential U.S.–
India cooperation in anti-submarine warfare, the media downplays the implications without
making a direct comparison, since such a comparison would inevitably put China in an unfavor-
able light. See, for example, Zhaorui Zhou, ‘India successfully tests missiles from a submarine, will
soon acquire nuclear triad [Yindu qianshe dandaodaodan shishe chenggong jianghuo sanweiyiti
hedaji nengli]’, People’s Daily, 2 Dec. 2015, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/1202/c1011-
27881754.html; Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), ‘India equips first indigenous armed helicopter;
to be stationed near the Sino-India border [Yindu zhuangbei shoukuan guochan qingxing wuzhi
huojiang bushu zhongyin bianjing]’, Global Times, 22 Jan. 2013, http://mil.huanqiu.com/world/
2013-01/3568462.html; Dongdong Min, ‘India’s indigenous carrier-based aircraft tests its first take
off, Russia provides support’ [Yin guochan jianzaiji wancheng shouci luji huayueqifei e tigong
zhichi]’, People’s Daily, 24 Dec. 2014, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2014/12-23/6903967.shtml.
claimed the opposite, the Global Times published a treatise explaining how
each claim, from India’s numeric advantage in military personnel to its com-
parative advantage in towed cannon or the Indian Ocean, was inaccurate.78
An explanation of underbalancing that relies on regime legitimacy
can best explain why Chinese scholars are also quick to point out that
India relies heavily on outside countries for equipment, while China
produces the vast majority of its military items domestically – making
its modernization more impressive.79 Many Chinese articles question
the point of Indian attempts to build indigenously, but even then
claim that India’s use of ‘indigenous’ is a mischaracterization, because
Delhi depends heavily on foreign technological assistance in all stages
of development.80 Moreover, domestic production often fails either to
meet the production deadlines or to stay within budget, leaving India
to procure 70% of its arms.81 According to Xinhua, the costs of weap-
ons and equipment imports are expected to reach $130 billion over the
next 7 years.82 Also, so much of India’s defense spending must go to
buying systems that the military cannot conduct proper training or
adequate maintenance, leading to accidents and the deterioration
even of India’s most advanced equipment. The reliance on foreign
suppliers also complicates India’s attempts to devise a coherent and
integrated strategy and slows down India’s development of its own
defense industry.83
The Chinese official media often downplays Indian achievements in
ways that criticize India’s domestic political system and emphasize its
78
Yunfeng Wei and Ma Jun, ‘Indian media listed “India has a stronger military than China”, ridiculous
[Yinmei lieju ‘junli youyu zhongguo’, kexiao]’, Global Times, 7 Aug. 2017, http://mil.huanqiu.com/
observation/2017-08/11088329.html.
79
Author’s interviews, Shanghai, May 2012; ‘Where does the self-confidence of India come from? [Yindu
de mizhizixin congheerlai?]’ Military of China, 6 Dec. 2016, http://mil.eastday.com/a/
161206210111650.html?qid=wwweastday.
80
One example is the development of the Arjun tank, in which India ended up buying Russian
tanks. Kun Liu, ‘India’s tank Arjun faces another setback, what is the point of this indigenous
development? [Yindu aqiong tanke zai shoucuo zheyangde ‘guochan’ youheyiyi?]’, Global Times,
1 Apr. 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-04/8795005.html. Another is the Arkash air
defense system; Kun Liu, ‘Indian military calls 32-year-long missile development a failure after
comparing to China [Yindu 32 nian yan yi daodan bei junfang tucao yu zhongguo bi gaoxiali-
pan]’, Global Times, 22 Mar. 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2016-03-22/doc-
ifxqnskh1088515.shtml; Lixi Chen, ‘After 33 years, India’s first indigenous fighter jet is put into
service [Lishi 33 nian yindu shoukuan guochan zhanji zhengshi fuyi]’, Xinhua, 3 Jul. 2016, http://
news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-07/03/c_129110187.htm.
81
Chun Bai, ‘How strong is the Indian military? Big defense budget, difficult military modernization
[Yindu junli you duoqiang? guofang yusuan daguo jundui xiandaihua hen jiannan]’, Global Times, 27
Jan. 2016, http://www.cannews.com.cn/2016/0127/146477.shtml.
82
Ruiqing Zhu and Jian Du, ‘India’s tejas lca reveals the impatience of India’s military development
[Cong ‘guanghui’ zhanji kan yindu fazhan junshi duo ‘houji’]’, Xinhua, 18 Mar. 2016, http://news.
xinhuanet.com/world/2016-03/18/c_128810724_2.htm.
83
Zhengjun Liao, ‘India diversifies its purchases, Russian tanker aircraft eliminated from the short list’
[Yindu jundui jiasu jungou duoyuanhua eluosi jiayouji zao taotai], People’s Daily, 10 Jan. 2013, http://
www.chinanews.com/gj/2013/01-10/4476126.shtml.
132 O. S. MASTRO
inherent inefficiency, which lends support to a regime legitimacy expla-

nation. One People’s Daily article from February 2016 notes that the
Indian defense department has approved a purchase list of $45 billion,
but that bids have not been placed on these items because of bureau-
cratic infighting and laziness.84 China reports that India’s own defense
experts say its defense budget will not allow the Indian military to meet
its basic needs, let alone modernize to meet China’s rising military
power.85 Furthermore, India’s military budget is highly imbalanced to
favor the army over the navy and air force, due, according to Chinese
analysts, to the Pakistan threat.86
Just as the Chinese media downplays Indian military capabilities, it
tends to react mildly, if at all, to Indian military training and exercises.
This is the case even when these exercises have direct application to the
Sino-Indian border dispute or when major exercises are conducted with
the USA.87 For example, the Indian parliament has approved in March
2016 budget plans to build up its mountain corps by 80,000 soldiers and
infrastructure in the border areas to facilitate mobility in a conflict – a
plan that will cost approximately $9.4 billion.88 Even China’s most natio-
nalistic publication, the Global Times, failed to offer a critique of the plan,
choosing only to mention the fact that India was improving its defense
and combat capabilities in Arunachal Pradesh most likely because of the
earlier intrusion of 250 Chinese soldiers. The Indians had also conducted
an exercise there and issued a stern warning to China that they were
learning Chinese to prepare to chase out the Chinese the next time.89 The
84
Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News), ‘Unreasonable goals impede India’s military modernization, purchas-
ing demands are not pragmatic [Haogaowuyuan kunrao yindu junshi xiandaihua caigou yaoqiu bu
shiji]’, Cankao Xiaoxi, 9 Feb. 2016, http://military.china.com.cn/2016–02/09/content_37761666.htm.
85
Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), ‘Indian military is unsatisfied with insufficient defense budget, expert says
double the amount to match the Chinese [Yindu junfang baoyuan junfei taishao zhuanjia: fanfan caineng
kangheng zhongguo]’, Global Times, 6 May 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-05/8863988.
html.
86
Generally, there is consistent coverage of the territorial disputes between India and Pakistan. For a
recent piece, see Ji Wei, ‘Conflict between Pakistan and India at Kashmir [Bajisitan junfang shuo bayin
zai Keshimier diqu zaici fasheng jiaohuo]’, Xinhua, 21 Jul. 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/
2017-07/20/c_1121347645.htm.
87
Yudh Abhyas is a joint military training exercise in Uttarakhand, an area less than 100 km from the
Chinese border. See ‘The U.S. AND India will hold a combined military exercise, the location is
approximately 100 kilometers from the Sino-Indian Border [Meiyin Jiang Juxing Lianhe Junyan,
Didian Ju Zhongyin Bianjie Yue 100 Gongli]’, Global Times, 12 Sep. 2016, http://world.huanqiu.
com/exclusive/2016-09/9429338.html.
88
Liya Tan, ‘India and Indonesia will hold a joint military exercise to counter insurgency threat [Yindu
yu yinni jiang juxing lianhe junshi xunlian yingdui panluan fenzi weixie]’, Global Times, 9 Mar. 2016,
http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016–03/8679660.html.
89
Wen Yu, ‘Indian media report that the Indian military conducted military exercises along Sino-India border
[Yinmei cheng yinjun zai zhongyin bianjie shidan yanxi]’, Global Times, 6 Jul. 2016, http://world.huanqiu.
com/exclusive/2016-07/9128221.html. For more on Chinese coverage of Indian military exercises, see Oriana
Skylar Mastro, ‘China’s lukewarm response to India’s military modernization’, China Brief, Jamestown
Foundation, 13 Jan. 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-lukewarm-response-indian-military-mod
ernization/.
Global Times reported these developments with no trace of nationalist ire

or even commentary. The People’s Daily went a bit farther in an August
2017 story, during the Doklam crisis, stating that India was actively and
positively responding to calls for greater US–Japan–Australia–India coop-
eration because it understood the goal to be containing China, which is
not a primary focus of the Modi administration.90 In November 2017,
when India conducted a series of naval drills near the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands, Chinese media commented on their purpose without
mentioning the possibility of aggression toward China, although Xinhua
and the Global Times noted that the location of those islands was
strategically critical for India to counter China’s expanding influence in
the Indian Ocean. 91
China’s media coverage of Indian exercises in the Indian Ocean follows a
similar pattern of downplaying India’s sophistication.92 Even in the case of
India’s participation in a naval exercise along with Japan and the USA in the
East China Sea, and area currently under dispute between Japan and China,
Chinese media coverage was tepid, stating only that India needed the exposure
and training.93 In February 2016, India dispatched four vessels to Vietnam and the
Philippines in order to,
in the words of a Chinese official, demonstrate its growing military capability

and implement the Act East policy. The article concludes only that military
activities are good diplomatic activities, but perhaps India should have been
more careful about its timing.94
90
Hong Zhang, ‘India, don’t overestimate yourself [Yindu bietai ba ziji danghuishi]’, People’s Daily, 12
Aug. 2017, http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0812/c1002-29466233.html.
91
Xinhua News, ‘Indian Media: Indian armed forces had military exercise in the Andaman and Nicobar
islands targeting on China [Yinmei: Yinjun zai Andamanqundao juxing daxing junyan jinding
Zhongguo]’, Xinhua Net, 27 Nov. 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-11/27/c_129750541.
htm; Jiang Shu ‘The Indian army, navy, and air force holding massive military exercise, targeting
China’s activities in the Indian ocean [Yindu hailukongjun daguimo yanxi cheng yingdui Zhongguo
zai Yinduyang huodong]’, Global Times, 25 Nov. 2017, http://world.huanqiu.com/article/2017-11/
11401205.html.
92
Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, ‘The security situation in the Indian ocean and the
“cooperation dilemma” faced by China and India [Yinduyang anquan jushi yu zhongyin mianlin de
'hezuo kunjing']’, Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, 15 Feb. 2015, http://www.cctb.net/llyj/
lldt/qqzl/201502/t20150215_318265.htm; Liangchen Zhou‘ China and Sri Lanka place increased
weight on cooperation [Zhongsi wei hezuo jiama, fazhan quantianhou youyi, yindu danxin]’,
Global Times, 11 Apr. 2016, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016-04/8804065.html; Weimin
Wu, ‘Indian Media: India purchases 4 Patrol aircrafts “Staring intently at China just like an eagle’s
eye” [Yinmei: yindu mai 4 jia xunluoji, 'xiang ying de yanjing yiyang jinding zhongguo'’]’, Global
Times, 29 Jul. 2016, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016-07/9238187.html.
93
Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), ‘Experts: American, Indian, and Japanese Military Exercises exert
pressure against Diaoyu Islands, India is being used by Japan [Zhuanjia: meiyinri junyan zhendui
diaodao shiya, yindu beiri liyong], People’s Daily, 16 Jun. 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/
2016-06/9047406.html; Zhixin Li, ‘The sword of the “malabar 2016” combined military exercises
points at the East China Sea’ [Malabaer 2016 lianhe junyan jian zhi zhongguo donghai], China Youth
Daily, 23 Jun. 2016, http://world.huanqiu.com/hot/2016-06/9072894.html.
94
‘Foreign media: Indian warships enter the South China Sea at a sensitive moment, will participate in
exercises with the Philippines and Vietnam” [Waimei: yindu junjian mingan shike shiru nanhai, jiang
134 O. S. MASTRO
Additionally, even though both China and India participated in the US-led naval
exercise RIMPAC, Chinese media entirely overlooked India’s presence and
lauded China’s participation.95 Chinese media tends to present India’s attempts
at external balancing as a sign of weakness. India is said to be insufficiently
strong to pose a threat to the Western countries’ interests in the region, so they
find it easy to use India as a ‘pawn’ in their geopolitical competition with
China.96 The rhetoric demeaning India’s capabilities continued through the
border standoff at Doklam over the summer of 2017. Editorials strongly criti-
cized India for its arrogance in thinking it could challenge China, which the
media emphasizes is stronger militarily and economically.97 The theme that
China’s military is superior because, unlike India, it does not have to import
most of its weapons was also voiced in this case.98
Official Chinese sources such as the seven defense white papers also
follow this pattern of downplaying India’s military modernization.
References to India’s military modernization, buildup along the border and
presence in the Indian Ocean are entirely absent. In the 2010 White Paper,
India is not mentioned at all in the section on safeguarding borders – the
only mention of the border disputes comes in a discussion of the successful
implementation of confidence-building measures.99 Moreover, in the mar-
itime realm, India is mentioned mostly in the context of Chinese engage-
ment with many countries on military and defense cooperation to protect
the sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The white papers refrain from
calling attention to India even when it challenges China’s most sensitive
core interest, territorial integrity, although the two countries were engaged
in a three-week standoff along the border in the month the 2013 White
Paper was released.
yu feitye yanxi]’, Global Times, 2 Jun. 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0602/c1011-

28406409.html. See also Mastro, ‘China’s Lukewarm Response to India’s Military Modernization.’
95
Yifang Huang and Ying Xue ‘Naval Drills Conclude in the “2016 Pacific Rim” Exercises [‘Huan
taipingyang 2016’ yanxi haishang yanlian jieshu]’, Xinhua, 4 Aug. 2016, http://military.people.com.
cn/n1/2016/0804/c1011-28611560.html; Jiefang Ribao (PLA Daily), ‘45 warships from 26 nations
participate in the Pacific Rim Exercises. Why do foreign militaries call our navy a “Little Navy”? [26
Guo 45 sou jianting canjia huan taipingyang junyan. Waijun weihe cheng haijun wei ‘xiaohaijun’?]’,
PLA Daily, 7 Aug. 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0807/c1011-28616972.html.
96
Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), ‘Editorial: China has many more cards to play than India [Sheping:
zhongguo keyi dade pai bi yindu duo de duo]’, Global Times, 10 Jul. 2017, http://opinion.huanqiu.
com/editorial/2017-07/10955505.html; Cuiping Zhu, ‘Why is India tangling between great powers?
[Yindu yuanhe zai daguo zhi jian zuoyoufengyuan?],’ Shijie Zhishi, 14 Aug. 2017, https://www.sohu.
com/a/155995194_170375 .
97
Cuiping Zhu, ‘Why is India Tangling Between Great Powers?’; Zhang Hong, ‘India Can’t Wait to Move
Forward to its “Great Power Dream”’ [Yindu Tuijin Daguo Meng Ji Buke Nai]’, Renmin, 20 Jul. 2017,
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2017-07/20/content_1792076.htm.
98
Xuetong Yan, ‘China and India are destined for war? [Zhongguo he yindu bi you yizhan? zheyang
xiang ni jiu cuole],’ 14 Aug. 2017, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2017-07-10/doc-ifyhweua4557431.
shtml; Huanqiu Shibao, ‘Is India Really Ready for War against China at 10,000 ft?’
99
‘China’s National Defense in 2010’, Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 31
Mar. 2011.
Competing explanations: underbalancing due to lack of threat or

recognition of rising power?
In summary, the Chinese media clearly understates India’s capabilities in
sources intended for public consumption, with an emphasis on the weaknesses
of a democratic political system. While this finding lends support to a regime
legitimacy rationale for underbalancing, there are two simpler competing
explanations for China’s security behavior, derived from balance of threat
theory: China may not be aware of India’s increasing military power or Beijing
may not recognize these trends as threatening.
On the first point, the previous section demonstrated that Indian military
modernization is covered extensively in Chinese state-controlled media.
Moreover, the general trend in Chinese international relations and the defense
scholarly community is an intensifying interest in Indian military modernization,
Moreover, the general trend in Chinese international relations and the defense
scholarly community is an intensifying interest in Indian military modernization,
as findings from Lora Saalman’s study on the topic illustrates She argues that
Chinese analysts clearly recognize the strategic significance of Indian military
procurement and military modernization for China and its territorial interests.-
100
And with 472 references to army systems, 680 to the air force, 531 to the
navy, 532 to aerospace systems and 808 to nuclear systems in trade journals
1991–2009, it is difficult to argue that China has not responded in kind because
of a failure to recognize changes in the balance of power.101
Elite perceptions captured in Chinese writings also cast doubt on the
competing explanation that China is not fully balancing because it does not
perceive India as a threat. The message here is consistent as well – not only the
official media but also (less-biased) experts warn of Indian ambitions and
policies that threaten Chinese interests and security.102 One prominent India
specialist at the Shanghai Institute for International Affairs, Zhao Gaocheng,
writes that India’s rise should be the most important factor in determining
China’s border strategy and that Beijing needs to hedge in case the bilateral
relationship takes on a confrontational and negative nature.103 Three main
points are made consistently in Chinese scholarly writings. First, India has a
‘great power complex’ and aspires to become an Asian power and eventually a
global power.104 It seeks to dominate South Asia and then Southeast Asia with
100
Lora Saalman, ‘Between “China Threat Theory” and “Chindia”: Chinese Responses to India’s Military
Modernization’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 4 (2011), 87–114.
101
Saalman, ‘Between “China Threat Theory” and “Chindia”’.
102
Author’s meetings, Shanghai, May 2014.
103
Gaocheng Zhao, ‘The India Factor in China’s Border Strategy [Zhongguozhoubian zhanlvezhong de
yindu yinsu]’, Guoji Guanxi 2 (2014), 34–46.
104
Zhen Wu, ‘The ambition and reality of Indian military modernization [yindu junshi zhuanxing de xiongxin
yu xianshi]’, PLA Daily, 2 Apr. 2016, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-04/02/content_6989175_2.htm. For
more Chinese sources arguing this point, see Manjeet S. Pardesi, ‘Understanding (Changing) Chinese
Strategic Perceptions of India,’ Strategic Analysis 34/4 (2010), 572.
136 O. S. MASTRO
hopes of undercutting China’s influence.105 Domination of the Indian Ocean is

an important step, and then India will launch itself into the South China Sea and
beyond.106 A deviation in this approach appeared recently when India con-
ducted military drills in the Indian Ocean to demonstrate its ability to effectively
combat Chinese influence there and protect the Malacca Strait.107 The Global
Times was critical of the exercises, quoting a naval expert’s position that
‘targeting China’s right of passage in international waters was irresponsible
and narrow-minded.’108 The expert continued, ‘It should be stressed that the
Indian Ocean belongs to all mankind, and India’s actions are an attempt to turn
the ocean into India’s territorial waters, which is a violation of International
Law.’109 During the 2017 summer standoff, Xinhua News repeatedly mentioned
that India’s ‘Great Power Dream’ had contributed to Indian recent interactions
in the region, such as the Sino-Indian border incident, military confrontation
with Pakistan, Indian–ASEAN Delhi dialogue and the recent high-profile recep-
tion of the Myanmar military’s Commander-in-Chief.110
It is not only India’s broad ambitions that threaten China. Chinese sources
indicate that the Indian public is anti-China and that Indian elites see China
as their primary threat, which combine to create policies unfavorable to
Beijing.111 According to Chinese media, Indian leaders exaggerate the China
threat to gain favor with the West, using it as an excuse to pursue their
hegemonic designs.112 India is allegedly cozying up to the USA and Japan
because it has its eye on the Asia-Pacific to help it achieve the twin goals of
countering China and achieving regional hegemony through dominance of
the Indian Ocean.113
105
Xin Yu and Wei Du, ‘India, Who Wants a “Prolonged War”, is Wooing These Countries [Yangyan yao
zai zhongyin bianjie da chijiuzhan de yindu, zhengzai jili lalong zhexie guojia]’, Cankao Xiaoxi, 11 Jul.
2017, http://ihl.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2017/0711/2181401_3.shtml.
106
Yao Guan, ‘Why does India want to intervene in the South China Sea? [Yindu yaozai nanhai chayijiao
de mudi shi shenme?]’, Indian China Web, 26 Nov. 2013, http://www.indiancn.com/news/junshi/
22028.html; Jian Li and Liye Du, ‘The Great Power Dream: A road to dominating the Indian Ocean and
a road mingled with hope and fear for the Indian Navy [Daguo mengxiang: rang yindu haijun xiyou
canbande zhudao yinduyang zhilu]’, PLA Daily, 16 Aug. 2013, http://navy.81.cn/content/2013-08/16/
content_5443183.htm; Li, ‘India launches its own domestically built aircraft carrier.’
107
Rajat Pandit, ‘India conducts major exercise in strategically-located Andaman and Nicobar Islands’,
The Times of India, 24 Nov. 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-conducts-major-
exercise-at-the-strategically-located-andaman-nicobar-islands/articleshow/61784692.cms.
108
Zhang Hui, ‘Indian Ocean military drill irresponsible: experts’, Global Times, 26 Nov. 2017, http://
www.globaltimes.cn/content/1077287.shtml.
109
Zhang, ‘Indian Ocean military drill irresponsible: experts’.
110
Xin Yu and Wei Du, ‘India Who Wants a “Prolonged War”, is Wooing These Countries;’ Huanqiu
Shibao (Global Times), ‘Editorial: China has Many More Cards to Play than India.’
111
Liu, ‘Analysis on the Two Faces;’ Wang, ‘India’s Ocean Strategy and Its Implications for Sino-Indian
Relations’.
112
Zongjian Yuan, ‘India Emerging as a Power: Its Implications for Sino-Indian Relations [Qianxi yindu
de jueqi dui zhongyinguanxi de yingxiang]’, South Asian Studies Quarterly, 4 (2004), 89–95.
113
Jie He and Mingjie Xie, ‘India’s Military Looks East; Strengthens Security Cooperation with US, Japan,
Vietnam and Australia [Yindu junli xiangdongzou qianghua yu meiriyueao anquan hezuo]’, PLA Daily,
27 Feb. 2015, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2015/02-27/7083603.shtml.
India’s policies are seen as proof of India’s desire to enhance its power
and influence at China’s expense. India’s ‘Act East’ strategy is reportedly
designed to enhance India’s control of important sea lanes such as the Strait
of Malacca increase its influence in regional and international affairs and
balance China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia.114 India has also made
several adjustments to its South China Sea policy to counter China’s role
there, including expanding its military influence by improving defense ties
with Southeast Asia countries, reinforcing cooperation with ASEAN countries
and promoting relations with the USA and Japan.115 Some think India is
attempting to spread its influence into East Asia to gain more leverage over
China in the Sino-Indian territory dispute.116 China is also concerned that if
conflict broke out in the South or East China Sea, India would take the
opportunity to launch an attack on the border – or would be called in to
disrupt China in the Indian Ocean to help the USA gain an advantage.117
China has also taken note of Indian infrastructure changes along the border,
with a Global Times article highlighting that India has ramped up road-
building to ensure better mobility for its troops.118 Some media sources
note that India’s military modernization is designed to deter China and
improve its force posture along the border.119
But Chinese writers are quick to point out that even though India has
lofty ambitions for its military that would be detrimental to Chinese inter-
ests, India will fail to rise to greatness largely because of inefficiencies in
governance.120 India relies too heavily on others to aid its modernization,
especially through the acquisition of foreign weapons.121 Chinese writings
portray India’s domestic military industry as inefficient, claiming that India is
investing too heavily in its ground forces.122 The Modi government is trying
to push a series of reforms, but given its weak administrative capacity,
114
Yanbing Ma, ‘The Strategic Intentions of India’s “Look East” Policy [Yindu ‘dongxiang’ zhanlve de
yitu]’, Peace and Development, 5 (2011), 42–43; Zhiyong Hu, ‘Why are India and Vietnam getting
closer [Yindu yuenan weihe zoujin]’, Jiefang Daily, 18 Aug. 2011, http://newspaper.jfdaily.com/jfrb/
html/2011-08/18/content_637250.htm.
115
Xiaozhi Fang, ‘Strategic Analysis and Future Forecast of India’s South China Sea Policy [Dui dangqian
yindu nanhai zhengce de zhanlve jiexi ji qianjing zhanwang]’, International Forum 15/1 (2013), 66–71.
116
Guan, ‘Why Does India Want to Intervene in the South China Sea?’ India is allegedly using closer
relationships with countries like Vietnam and Australia to help it break into that area.
117
You Ji, ‘China’s Emerging Indo-Pacific Naval Strategy’, Asia Policy 22 (2016), 11–12.
118
Zhang, ‘Indian Ocean Military Drill Irresponsible: Experts’.
119
Li Li and Qian Feng, ‘How much military capabilities do the major military big powers have? [Shijie
zhuyao junshi daguo you duoshao bingli]’, Global Times, 17 Apr. 2013.
120
Xing Zheng and Wang Hengjun, ‘India’s aircraft carrier will face which direction? [Yindu ‘hangmu’
jiang shixiang hefang?]’, People’s Daily, 9 Jun. 2012, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/
2012-06/09/content_1064571.htm.
121
Haochen Xiao, ‘India’s path to great power status still long [Yindu daguo zhilu rengran manchang]’,
Chinese Social Science Net, 13 Jul. 2016, http://www.cssn.cn/dybg/gqdy_gqcj/201607/t20160713_
3120905.shtml.
122
Bing Zhao, ‘Modernization is Difficult and the Three Military Services Are Not Balanced [Xiandaihua
jiannan, sanjun bupingheng]’, Xinhua, 17 Jan. 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-01/27/c_
128671966.htm.
138 O. S. MASTRO
significant progress will be difficult.123 The Chinese media claims that with
an economy one-fifth the size of China’s, India will never be able to compete
with China, let alone contain it militarily.124 The Global Times points out that
India is consumed by its many serious domestic social issues, and therefore
Delhi is unlikely to confront China militarily on the border issue.125 In short,
China’s media argues that India has hegemonic ambitions, but that largely
domestic factors will keep Delhi from achieving them.126
Theoretical and practical implications

In this article, I argue that concerns about regime legitimacy can prevent
autocracies from balancing appropriately in proportion to the threats they
face. Specifically, in the case of China, I demonstrate that the CCP is actively
downplaying Indian capabilities to its public in ways that enhance sources
of Party legitimacy. If the Indian military can present a challenge to the
Chinese military, then the Chinese government must tacitly acknowledge
the possibility that another country, and a democratic one at that, can rise
successfully without the CCP at the helm – an admission that would under-
mine the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the people. As one high-
level Indian official commented, ‘both [India and China] think that the future
belongs to us. We can’t both be right.’127
In short, China has chosen to underbalance against India, thereby assum-
ing some risk in external security for the sake of ensuring internal security.
However, the need to protect regime legitimacy is merely a countervailing
force, raising the level of threat India must pose before a more serious
Chinese military response is required. The fact that China has not responded
to date does not mean it will not respond in the future if the quality and
nature of Indian capabilities, especially along the border and in the Indian
Ocean, reach an alarming level that cannot be ignored. Regime legitimacy
123
Wu, ‘The ambition and reality of Indian military modernization’.
124
‘India is getting close to US, Japan, Australia and Vietnam to contain China [Waimei: yindu wei
‘fengsuo zhongguo’ xunsu yu meiriaoyue deng jiejin]’, Caokao Xiaoxi, 17 Apr. 2016, http://www.
cankaoxiaoxi.com/world/20160417/1129920.shtml; Yongnian Wu, ‘The concerns behind India’s weap-
onry procurement [Yindu jungou beihou de jiujie], Jiefang Daily, 28 Dec. 2012, http://opinion.cntv.cn/
2012/12/28/ARTI1356663466515225.shtml.
125
Zhen Yuan, Qing Mu, Zhong Ren, Yuandan Guo, and You Ma, ‘Indian secretary of defense visiting
Sikkim has aroused speculations [Yin Fangzhang tufu xijin yu zhongguo junren youhao jiaoliu zai
shifang hezhong xinxi]’, Global Times, 9 Oct. 2017, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2017-10/
11313144.html.
126
One of the four limiting factors discussed was problems in external relations, mainly with Pakistan
and India’s limited soft power influence with smaller countries in Southeast Asia. Jianhua Yu, ‘The
zig-zagging course for a stronger India [Wanyan qianxing de Yindu qiangguomeng]’, Jiefang Daily, 12
Dec. 2013, http://newspaper.jfdaily.com/jfrb/html/2013-12/12/content_1125329.htm.
127
Bill Emmott, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India, and Japan Will Shape Our Next
Decade (Orlando: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Co. 2009), 14.
concerns merely raise the threshold of threat at which China would balance
to the degree predicted by traditional balance of threat theory.
This article contributes to balancing theory in two ways. First, I present a
new metric for evaluating balancing behavior, proportionate balancing,
which encourages scholars to evaluate whether a country is adjusting the
allocation of its resources in proportion to an increasing threat. This is an
improvement on past metrics because it includes directionality, or attention
to which particular threat a country is balancing against when it builds up its
military forces or seeks alliances. Moreover, it avoids the problem of being
able to measure underbalancing only once a conflict breaks out. The second
theoretical contribution is the introduction of an additional mechanism,
particularly applicable to autocracies, that encourages underbalancing
even if a country perceives a threat – the need to promote regime legitimacy.
This approach may explain other cases of autocracies that failed to balance
against emerging threats, even those exacerbated by rivalry, such as in the
cases of Iran against Iraq, Egypt against Israel and Russia against China.
This research also sheds light on contemporary trends in Sino-Indian
relations. In the case of China’s response to India’s military rise, I show
that China purposefully trivializes India’s military achievements to support
its public narrative that Party control is necessary to usher in an era of
Chinese greatness.128 This explains puzzling behavior like China’s denial of
India’s role in a jointly conducted anti-piracy operation in April 2017.129
Underplaying Indian capabilities is not without its costs – doing so will
make it harder for China to mobilize resources to counter the Indian threat
if it becomes prohibitively costly to delay. Moreover, some worry that
China’s arrogance is making it blind to reality, causing many in the country
to truly underestimate India’s economic and military potential.130 This could
embolden China to undertake actions that could push the two countries
into a war. Yuan Peng, the vice-President of Chinese Institutes of
Contemporary International Relation (CICIR), a major think tank with govern-
ment ties, thinks that Xi’s nineteenth Party Congress speech suggests that
‘in the past, we thought we would shelve differences. Now, we will face
disputes squarely.’131
The need to show military superiority to domestic audiences likely extends
to any encounters with Indian forces. This could create some dangerous
128
Author’s interviews, Shanghai, May 2014.
129
Yuandan Guo, ‘The first time! Chinese navy rescued foreign merchant ship from Somali pirates’
[Diyici! zhongguo haijun cong suomali haidao shouzhong duohui waiji huochuan], Global Times, 9
Apr. 2017, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2017-04/10447308.html.
130
Author’s interviews, Beijing, July 2016.
131
The India Times, ‘China under Xi’s 2nd term might deal with instances like Doklam head-on: Chinese
expert’, India Times, 15 Nov. 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/china-under-xis-
2nd-term-might-deal-with-instances-like-dokalam-head-on-chinese-expert/articleshow/61661348.
cms.
140 O. S. MASTRO
incentives for China to escalate in a crisis in an attempt to convey its superior

military might instead of attempting to defuse the issue and offer off-ramps.
These escalation pressures create a unique degree of crisis instability in which
China may be tempted to resort to force instead of relying on diplomatic
means to resolve the issue.132 Even if China does not want to fight a war with
India, displays and maneuvering of military forces to convey a strong message
to India to back down could have the opposite effect.
The 2-month military standoff at Doklam, sparked by the Chinese mili-
tary’s attempts to extend a road through territory disputed by China and
Bhutan, demonstrates some of these problematic escalatory dynamics. First,
China’s underestimation of the Indian military was likely a factor that led to
Beijing’s surprise when Indian troops entered the disputed territory, with at
least the tacit consent of Bhutan, and physically impeded the construction
of the road.133 Second, China leveraged its government-controlled media to
highlight its narrative and issue threats and warnings to India not under-
estimating Chinese resolve and the Chinese people’s determination to
protect their sovereignty just because China has restrained itself so far.
The Chinese media was replete with such articles, warning India, for exam-
ple, not to ‘play with fire’ lest it ‘get burned.’134 They cautioned the Indian
government not to be driven by nationalism and arrogance, to avoid mis-
calculation and repeating the mistakes of the 1962 war.135 This is not just a
war of words; research shows that escalating threats in the media can be a
precursor to China’s use of force.136 While in the case of Doklam both sides
militarily disengaged from the area in the end, the episode demonstrates
that China’s response to India’s military modernization causes it to miscal-
culate, and when crisis erupts, to escalate in part to convey its superior
position to domestic audiences.
China’s unique response to India’s military modernization has important
implications for US policy. The USA has prioritized ties with China while
simultaneously striving to build comprehensive and deep relations with
132
Such crisis instability also exists in the US–China relationship, though for different reasons. Avery
Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.–China Relations,
International Security, Vol 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), 49–89. Additionally, after a conflict erupts,
China may be unwilling to talk to India for fear of looking weak. See Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘The
Theory and Practice of War Termination: Assessing Patterns in China’s Historical Behavior,’
International Studies Review, Feb. 2018, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix061.
133
Sections of this paragraph come from Oriana Skylar Mastro and Arzan Tarapore, ‘Countering Chinese
Coerfion: The Case of Doklam’, War on the Rocks, 29 Aug. 2017. https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/
countering-chinese-coercion-the-case-of-doklam/.
134
Curtis Stone, ‘Op-ed: India is playing with fire, and it could get burned’, People’s Daily, 10 Aug. 2017,
http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0810/c90000-9253612.html.
135
‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Yan Shugang Regular Press Conference, 6 Jul. 2017’ [Waijiao bu
fayan ren geng shuang zhuchi li xing jizhe hui],” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 Jul. 2017, http://www.
mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1475878.shtml.
136
Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller, China’s Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation
Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-American Confrontation (Washington, DC: Institute for
National Strategic Studies, 2013).
India.137 Because of Beijing’s concern over regime legitimacy, the threshold

that the Indian threat must reach to spark traditional Chinese balancing
behavior is higher than that of other regional actors. This means that US
attempts to aid Indian military modernization are less risky than originally
thought – China will continue to understate the impact to preserve its
domestic legitimacy. This is a critical point given the new US Indo-Pacific
strategy and its emphasis on encouraging a greater Indian role in counter-
ing Chinese assertiveness in East Asia.
This research has clear implications for the Trump administration’s US Free
and Open Indo-Pacific strategy announced in 2018, which among other things
required India to play a more weighty role.138 One of the drivers of the strategy
is to bring together like-minded democracies to defend against Chinese
attempts to disrupt the international rules-based order, universal liberal values
and free access to the maritime global commons.139 Notably, previous US
presidents have also attempted to convince New Delhi to take on a more
proactive role in balancing against China. The hope is that India’s active
involvement will force China to divert and spread more thinly its resources,
efforts and capabilities from its eastern borders to its western borders.
China’s need to inadequately balance against India’s military progress
casts doubt on the effectiveness of this strategy. First, it suggests that a US
competitive strategy of building Indian partner capacity is unlikely to have
the desired effects. First, a strategy that relies on increased Indian military
presence along the Sino-Indian border to goad China to invest more in
ground capabilities at the expense of maritime ones is unlikely to succeed
because China will not respond in a traditional balancing fashion to progress
in Indian ground capabilities.140 The upside is that arming India is less risky
than originally thought – China will continue to understate the impact in
order to preserve its domestic legitimacy. But the USA has to do so dis-
creetly because the more Indian efforts are tied to the USA, the more likely
China is to react strongly and negatively. This is because the US role would
allow China to recognize the military threat without implying that India is
successfully undergoing military modernization. Therefore, to minimize a
destabilizing Chinese reaction, the USA should think of ways to help
improve Indian capabilities without being involved directly in operations
with the Indians in the region.
137
For more on India and China’s role in the rebalancing, see David Shambaugh, ‘Assessing the US
“Pivot” to Asia’, Strategic Studies Quarterly (Summer 2013), 14–17.
138
Alex N. Wong, “Briefing on the Indo-Pacific Strategy, U.S. Department of States, 2 April 2018, https://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/280134.htm.
139
Michael D. Swaine, “Creating an Unstable Asia: The ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy, Foreign
Affairs, 2 Mar. 2018.
140
Evan Montgomery, ‘Competitive Strategies Against Continental Powers: The Geopolitics of Sino-
Indian-American Relations’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 1 (2013), 76–100.
142 O. S. MASTRO
Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this paper was presented at APSA (2016), ISA (2018), the
University of Pennsylvania, Center for Contemporary China Speakers Series and
Georgetown’s Asia In Depth Speaker Series. The author would like to thank Danni
Song, Danni Wang, John Chen and Annie Kowalewski for their excellent research
support as well as anonymous reviewers for their comments on previous drafts.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Oriana Skylar Mastro is an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University where her research addresses critical
questions at the intersection of interstate conflict (in particular military strategy and
operations), great power relations and the challenges of rising powers – with a focus on
China and East Asian security. From 2017 to 2019, she is also a Jeane Kirkpatrick Scholar at
the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). She is the author of the forthcoming Cornell
University press book, The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime. She
holds a BA in East Asian Studies from Stanford University and an MA and PhD in Politics
from Princeton University. More at: www.orianaskylarmastro.com.
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It Takes Two To Tango Autocratic Underbalancing, Regime Legitimacy and China's Responses To India's Rise

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Journal of Strategic Studies

ISSN: 0140-2390 (Print) 1743-937X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20

It Takes Two to Tango: Autocratic underbalancing,

Oriana Skylar Mastro

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1485567

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It Takes Two to Tango: Autocratic underbalancing,

What unique factors do autocracies evaluate when responding to perceived

CONTACT Oriana Skylar Mastro om116@georgetown.edu Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign

Additionally, work on underbalancing, which occurs when ‘threatened

Third, I contribute to a long-standing debate among area specialists, who

The rest of this article proceeds as follows. First, applying balance of

Balancing theory and India’s threat to China

Indian War proved an embarrassing and dangerous weakness in Indian

(indigenously produced) ballistic missile submarine, INS Arihant.35

China’s underwhelming response to India’s military rise

general balancing behavior, the framework is less useful for identifying

only 72 fourth-generation J-11/Su-27UBK and J-10, along with 72 third-

Explaining autocratic underbalancing

China’s public portrayal of India’s military modernization

democracy), this provides evidence for the regime legitimacy argument. To

China recognizes India’s increasing power and oﬀensive capabilities

Theory,’ it rarely mentions that India is building up arms to counter China,

Chinese media coverage consistently downplays Indian military

inherent ineﬃciency, which lends support to a regime legitimacy expla-

Global Times reported these developments with no trace of nationalist ire

in the words of a Chinese oﬃcial, demonstrate its growing military capability

yu feitye yanxi]’, Global Times, 2 Jun. 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0602/c1011-

Competing explanations: underbalancing due to lack of threat or

hopes of undercutting China’s inﬂuence.105 Domination of the Indian Ocean is

Theoretical and practical implications

incentives for China to escalate in a crisis in an attempt to convey its superior

India.137 Because of Beijing’s concern over regime legitimacy, the threshold

Military, 4 Aug. 2016, <http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0804/c1011-

Lu, Xulong, ‘Indian defense acquisition on a balance beam [pinghengmu shangde

Pandit, Rajat, ‘India conducts major exercise in strategically-located Andaman and

Schweller, Randall L., Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of

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