G.R. No.

117401 October 1, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR., accused-appellant.

Facts: Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. He owned sixteen
hectares of coconut land in the area.

Bernardo, accompanied by his son, herein accused-appellant, and two hired hands, Reynaldo Malita and
Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of copra. After selling the copra, Bernardo paid the
Malita brothers for their labor, who thereafter left.

According to Gina Quidato, on the evening of the next day, September 17, 1988, accused-appellant and
the Malita brothers were drinking tuba at their house. She overheard the trio planning to go to her father-
in-law's house to get money from the latter. She had no idea, however, as to what later transpired because
she had fallen asleep before 10:00 p.m.3 

Accused-appellant objected to Gina Quidato's testimony on the ground that the same was prohibited by
the marital disqualification rule found in Section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 4 The judge,
acknowledging the applicability of the so-called rule, allowed said testimony only against accused-
appellant's co-accused, Reynaldo and Eddie.

The body of Bernardo was discovered the next day by accused-appellant's son, who had gone there to call
his Lolo for breakfast.

Leo Quidato confronted his brother regarding the incident and learned that Reynaldo and Eddie Malita
were the ones responsible for Bernardo's death. The two were promptly arrested by the police. Aside
from arresting the latter two, however, the police also arrested accused-appellant.

On September 29, 1988, the Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman Lucrecio Mara at the
Kaputian Police Station. When Mara apprised them of their constitutional rights, including their right to
counsel, they signified their intent to confess even in the absence of counsel. Aware that the same would
be useless if given in the absence of counsel, Mara took down the testimony of the two but refrained from
requiring the latter to sign their affidavits. Instead, he escorted the Malita brothers to Davao City and
presented them, along with their unsigned affidavits, to a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom. 6

Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie, again advising the two of
their constitutional rights. The CLAO lawyer explained the contents of the affidavits, in Visayan, to the
Malita brothers, who affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same. Only then did Reynaldo
and Eddie affix their signatures on the affidavits.7

In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the Malita brothers.

Trial Court: WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds the accused, Bernardo
Quidato, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal in the offense of Parricide which falls under
Article 246 (of the Revised Penal Code),

From the aforesaid judgment of conviction, appellant interposed the present appeal
Issue:1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS OF REYNALDO MALITA (EXH. C) AND EDDIE MALITA (EXH. D) IN CLEAR
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO CONFRONT
WITNESSES.

Held: Yes

In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and
Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extra-
judicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. I t is
hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments
in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible
hearsay. 10 The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence
against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-
examine him.11

Also,The confessions were made after the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation of the
crime. Hence, it cannot be said that the execution of the affidavits were acts or declarations made during
the conspiracy's existence.

Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the same inadmissible in
evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial
confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and  in the presence of
counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. 12 It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their statements to
Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the same in the presence of counsel the
next day.

WIFE TESTIOMONY:

With regard to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be disregarded, accused-appellant having
timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As correctly observed by the court a quo,
the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it
involves other parties or accused. 14 Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case against
Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-appellant's case. This testimony cannot,
however, be used against accused-appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of the
proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital disqualification rule. "What cannot be done
directly cannot be done indirectly" is a rule familiar even to law students.

Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidato's testimony, as well as of Reynaldo and Eddie's
extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment unfavorable to
accused-appellant.

ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DE LA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS REYES, respondents.

Facts: It appears from the records that Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant Olympio Mendoza, is
the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106 Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and
cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff-respondent Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on
September 25, 1979.
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of
the subject lots; that between July 7 to July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other
defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and
stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the instant case,
defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff
therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction in the meantime.

Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly elected and/or appointed barangay
officials of Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing
between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter's farm lots.

For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without
his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the
government, as his defenses.

During the pendency of the case in the lower court, Mendoza was in possession of the subject lots and
had cultivated the same. Upon motion of plaintiff, the court directed its Deputy Sheriff to supervise the
harvesting of the palay crops, to cause the threshing thereof and to deposit the net harvest (after
deducting from the expenses incurred), in a bonded warehouse of the locality subject to the disposition of
the court. 3

CA: Court rendered judgment affirming the appealed agrarian court's decision with the modification that
Lot 106 is not covered by it.

d) Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.

It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable jointly and severally with Olympio Mendoza and
Severino Aguinaldo because the present petition involves Lot No. 46, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the bahay
Pare Estate, bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga and not Lot No. 106 of the estate, which lot was purchased
by petitioner Romeo Reyes from Olympio Mendoza's father, Juan, and which he later donated to the
barangay Bahay Pare of Candaba, Pampanga, for the construction of the Bahay Pare Barangay High
School. 6 As to their supposed participation in the dispossession of private respondent from the disputed
landholding, petitioners present the September 30, 1987 Resolution of Investigating Fiscal Jesus M.
Pamintuan, as approved by Pampanga Provincial Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon, in I.S. No. 8576, 7 wherein
private respondent's complaint against petitioners and the other defendants in the agrarian court for
violation of P.D. 5838 was dismissed, to show that private respondent's "point is already settled and
considered closed." 9 lastly, petitioners claim that they were included in the present controversy so that
their political career would be destroyed.10

Issue: WON trial court erred when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson
(Annexes "B" and "C") although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination.

Held: No.

Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina
and Efren Tecson (Annexes "B" and "C") although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-
examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in
agrarian cases even in a suppletory character." The same provision states that "In the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be
allowed and are admissible in evidence".

Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. This
substantial evidence rule was incorporated in section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976
(Castro vs. CS, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226,
the Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is:

Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary
civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on
record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for
that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to
belief.14

G.R. No. 137757               August 14, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODEGELIO TURCO, JR., aka "TOTONG", accused-appellant.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka "Totong") was charged with the crime of rape

At his arraignment on November 8, 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial
ensued.

The prosecution's version of the generative facts, as gathered from the testimony of its witnesses -
Alejandra Tabada, mother of the victim; PO3 Celso Y. Tan Sanchez, the police officer who investigated
the case; Orlando Pioquinto, brother-in-law of the victim; Escelea Tabada, the 13-year-old victim; and
Felicitas delos Santos Timorata, the medical record clerk who used to be the medical officer under Dr.
Rimberto Sanggalang, the physician who physically examined the victim after the incident - is abstracted
in the Appellee's

The defense presented Leonora Cabase, neighbor of accused-appellant; her granddaughter Corazon
Macapili, and accused-appellant himself. Accused-appellant denied the charge. The defense that the
victim and him were sweethearts was also advanced. Leonora Cabase mentioned this in her direct
testimony.

TC: WHEREFORE, under the above circumstances and evaluation, this court finds the accused "GUILTY"
of rape

He particularly argues that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt
considering that other than the written statement of the complainant before the Police Station of Isabela
and before the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court, and her testimony during direct examination,
no other evidence was presented to conclusively prove that there was ever rape at all; that she only
presumed that it was accused-appellant who attacked her since she admitted that immediately upon
opening the door, the perpetrator hastily covered her face with a towel; that nothing in her testimony
clearly and convincingly shows that she was able to identify accused-appellant as the perpetrator; that
complainant implicated accused-appellant only because her father forced her to do so; and lastly, that no
actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although
a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in
court to explain the same.

Accused-appellant argues that no actual proof was presented that the rape actually happened since the
medico-legal officer who prepared the medical certificate was not presented in court to explain the same.

Issue: WON THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
GUILTY OF RAPE BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANT ESCELEA TABADA
AND HER WITNESS.

No

In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued by
the examining physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the certificate could be admitted
as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records (under Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of
Court) constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must
first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who
issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. We place emphasis on the distinction between
admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to
the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is
competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence,
admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such
evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133
and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be
entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be
inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II,
1998 ed., p. 550).

Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence,
it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be
said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate (stating that there was "[h]ymen rupture,
secondary to penile insertion" as well as "foul-smelling discharges." The diagnosis was "[r]uptured hymen
secondary to rape" [p. 68, Record]). In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself
which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to convict (People vs.
Topaguen, 369 SCRA 601 [1997]). It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the
prosecution of rape (People vs. Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17, 1999; People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA
55 [1996]; People vs. Venerable, supra). The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not
disprove the occurrence of rape (People vs. Taneo, supra). It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces
the court that conviction is proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In the instant case, the victim's testimony
alone is credible and sufficient to convict.

G.R. No. 152807            August 12, 2003

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S. SABANPAN, RENE S. SABANPAN,

DANILO S. SABANPAN and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ
TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA. BELEN SAEZ and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF
CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ JR., petitioners,
vs.
ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO,1 REMEDIOS
COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO,1a BELINDA M. COMORPOSA and ISABELITA H.
COMORPOSA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts

A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against [respondents] before
the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.

The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot No. 845, Land 275
located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2 hectares. In 1960, he died leaving all his
heirs, his children and grandchildren.

In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated from his job. The
termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a close family friend of
[Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos Saez's son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband
of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed
Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his
neighbors and transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed
by several people, among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a portion
of Marcos Saez' property without paying any rental.

Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the respondents who
likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through petitioners' tolerance.

On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter
refused to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the legitimate claimants and the actual and
lawful possessor[s] of the premises.

A [C]omplaint was filed with the barangay office of Sta. Cruz[,] Davao del Sur, but the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement. Thus, the corresponding Certificate to File Action was issued by the said
barangay and an action for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents.

MTC:The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor of petitioners

RTC: Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision. x

Court of Appeals: Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the right of respondents as
claimants and possessors. The appellate court held that -- although not yet final -- the Order issued by the
regional executive director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) remained
in full force and effect, unless declared null and void. The CA added that the Certification issued by the
DENR's community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral
survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person.

Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because the
signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite  Garvida v. Sales
Jr.17 and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents for the first time on
appeal.
Issue: 1.

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the Regional Trial Court's
ruling giving weight to the CENR Officer's Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged
signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it is a new matter raised for the first time on appeal?

2. WON CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting that the Rule on Summary
Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim that the failure of respondents to file their
position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.

Held

1. No.

"A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and
graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or
tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. x x x"18

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they
are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic. 19

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR
Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in  Garvida.
The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by
mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.20

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has
acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998:

"x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a 'CERTIFICATION' dated 22 July 1997, certified among
others, that: x x x per records available in his Office, x x x the controverted lot x x x  was not
allocated to any person x x x."21

If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as
reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the
appropriate action, as the latter was under the former's direct control and supervision.

Petitioners' claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as the
pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked
as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. 22 The Certification was not formally offered,
however, because respondents had not been able to file their position paper.

Neither the rules of procedure23 nor jurisprudence24 would sanction the admission of evidence that has
not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary
trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is
held.25

2. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility
refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while
probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. 26 Thus, a
 particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. 27

While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses' respective testimonies, the
failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven.
Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an
affirmative relief.28

G.R. NO. 145006 August 30, 2006

DAVID TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CAROLYN ZARAGOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

David Tan, the accused herein, stands charged with the crime of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (6
counts) in six (6) separate informations which read as follows:

Records show that the accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of Not Guilty, upon being arraigned.
Thereafter, these cases were set for trial on the merits, which cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

Carolyn Zaragoza, of legal age, the private complainant, testified among others that:. The accused was
sent by her lawyer a formal demand through registered mail, for him to pay in cash the aforementioned
bounced/dishonored checks but to no avail.

Despite ample opportunity given to the accused to present its evidence, it still failed to do so; hence, the
court in its Order dated March 18, 1997, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

MTC : Court finds the accused David Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in six (6) counts, and hereby sentences said accused to an imprisonment of six (6)
months for each case, and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P600,000.00
representing the total amount of the subject checks, plus interest thereon in the amount of P50,000.00 and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the MTC wherein he denied receipt of the demand
letter3 dated October 30, 1995 marked as Exhibit "R" and alleged that said evidence was not included in
the formal offer of evidence.

MTC: Said motion for reconsideration was denied. He then appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court
of Parañaque,

RTC: this Court finds the accused David Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in six (6) counts

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision but per Order dated July 5, 1999, the RTC
denied the same.

A Petition for Review was then filed by petitioner with the CA, alleging as follows:
CA:The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision, ruling that petitioner’s guilt had indeed
been proven beyond reasonable doubt since the existence of the element that he had knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time he issued the checks is established by
the demand letter dated October 30, 1995 notifying him of the dishonor of the checks he issued.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration where he argued that no evidentiary weight should be given
to the demand letter dated October 30, 1995 because, although included in the formal offer of evidence
by the prosecution, it was not presented during trial for proper identification, hence, it should not
have been admitted into evidence even if the defense failed to object to the formal offer thereof.
Petitioner insisted that the prosecution did not have proof of notice of dishonor, thus, petitioner’s guilt
had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

CA: The CA denied said motion for reconsideration in its Resolution 8 dated September 4, 2000 holding
that since said issue was never raised before the trial court nor before the RTC, the same can no longer be
considered by the reviewing court.

Issue: WON no evidentiary weight should be given to the demand letter dated October 30, 1995
because, although included in the formal offer of evidence by the prosecution, it was not presented
during trial for proper identification, hence, it should not have been admitted into evidence even if
the defense failed to object to the formal offer thereof.

Held:

No

It is quite true that this Court has ruled that objection to the admissibility of evidence, if not made at the
time such evidence is offered, shall be deemed waived. 10 However, in all cases where said rule had been
applied, the assailed testimonial or object evidence had been duly presented during the course of the
trial.

In the present case, a judicious examination of the entire record shows that, indeed, the demand letter
dated October 30, 1995 was never presented during the course of the trial.

Nowhere in the transcript of stenographic notes[13] for the hearing held on December 17, 1996, did
Zaragosa ever mention the existence of a demand letter dated October 30, 1995. After the direct
testimony of Zaragosa where the exhibits marked were only up to Exhibits "Q" and "Q-1," all the
subsequent hearings did not push through. Zaragosa was never cross-examined. The defense, despite
numerous resetting of hearing dates set for presentation of its evidence, failed to appear during those
hearings, prompting the MTC to deem the case submitted for decision without evidence for the defense.

Since there were no other hearings held, it was impossible for the prosecution to have presented and
marked as exhibit, the demand letter dated October 30, 1995.

The very first time said demand letter was ever mentioned or appeared in the record was in the formal
offer of evidence, supposedly marked as Exhibit "R." How said demand letter came to be marked as
Exhibit "R" and inserted into the record truly mystifies this Court. Such circumstance, to say the least, is
tainted with irregularity because, as previously mentioned, such document was never presented or
identified in any of the hearings. As held in Pigao v. Rabanillo,14 for documentary evidence to be
considered by the court, it must have been presented during trial and formally offered.
Although petitioner admits that they failed to submit any opposition to the formal offer of evidence, he
nevertheless raised the issue of the non-presentation of the demand letter in his motion for
reconsideration filed with the MTC. Evidently, the CA made a mistake in stating that petitioner only
raised for the first time on appeal, the issue on the admission of the demand letter into evidence.

Thus, in view of the foregoing significant circumstances, it would be unreasonable to apply to the present
case the general rule that objection to the admissibility of evidence, if not made at the time such evidence
is offered, shall be deemed waived. As the demand letter was never presented during the course of the
trial, petitioner was never alerted to its possible inclusion in the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence.
Verily, therefore, petitioner’s failure to timely object to this piece of evidence (the demand letter) is
excusable. The prosecution should not benefit from the anomalous inclusion of the demand letter in the
records. Said evidence should be deemed inadmissible and should not have been considered by the
MTC in arriving at its judgment.

G.R. No. L-9181           November 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and
JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN, respondents.

Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with
having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City).

During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its
witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of
a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness,
counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on
such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused
Panganiban.

RTC:The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different
ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan
Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such
conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.

Issue: WON RTC erred in excluding the extrajudicical confession.

Held:

Yes.

Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an
accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.

SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his
guilt as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be
competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy
between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji
was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41;
People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such.

The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule
123, providing that:

The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.

Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this
case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs.
Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).

Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two
accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape
recordings) had not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the
purpose of identifying the confessions), much less formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the
prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban
before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123
also applies to the confessions in question, it was premature for the respondent Court to exclude them
completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.

It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of
the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the
Court issued motu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt
of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead
of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection to the confessions — that it could not be admitted to
prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a
number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that
ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties
may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed
waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marcella vs. Reyes, 12
Phil., 1).

We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial
confessions of two or more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the
identity of the confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not before us and have not
even been formally offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have
allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and
admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into
the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final
determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish the admissible
from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be excluded.

Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co.  vs. Phoenix
Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:

In The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical

objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is
 impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to
know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of
bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept
the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later.
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which the presides, a judge of
first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and
logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously
ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to
correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, — a step which this
Court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first
instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result
in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is
duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the
irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme
Court upon appeal, this Court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct
judgment.

There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility
of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.

Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban
is annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with
law and this opinion. Costs against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban. So ordered.

G.R. No. 204289

FERNANDO MANCOL, JR., Petitioner

vs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

Facts: Respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), scheduled an Invitation to Bid for
Negotiated Sale on October 13, 2004 at the Mezzanine Floor, over a residential lot with a two-storey
building (

In line with this, Fernando Mancol, Jr. (petitioner) executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA)10 appointing his father, Fernando Mancol, Sr. (Mancol, Sr.), to represent and negotiate, on his
behalf, the sale of the subject property. Pursuant to the SPA, Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated Offer to
Purchase11 and Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First Served
Basis.12 DBP then issued an Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 344001813 dated October 13, 2004, in the name of
Fernando R. Mancol, Jr., paid by Fernando M. Mancol, Sr., in the amount of ₱265,200, as initial payment
for the purchase price of the subject property. During the negotiations, DBP officials allegedly agreed,
albeit verbally, to: (1) arrange and effect the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name, including
the payment of capital gains tax (CGT); and (2) to get rid of the occupants of the subject property.14

Petitioner paid the balance in the amount of ₱1,060,800, as evidenced by.

On December 21, 2004, petitioner made a deposit with DBP for the payment of the CGT and documentary
stamp tax (DST) in the amount of ₱99,450. DBP acknowledged the deposit and issued O.R. No. 3440537.17
Sometime in 2006, DBP reneged on its undertaking based on the oral agreement.

petitioner through its counsel demanded from DBP to comply with its verbal undertaking. He returned
the MC and all pertinent documents affecting the sale of the subject property to DBP.

DBP, through its Letter21 dated April 22, 2006, disregarded the subsequent oral agreement and reminded
petitioner that DBP has no obligation to eject the occupants and to cause the transfer of title of the lot in
petitioner's name.

petitioner proposed to DBP that he will facilitate the payment of the CGT and DST but DBP should
shoulder the penalties and surcharges. The proposal, however, was turned down.

On August 24, 2006, petitioner filed a Complaint 26 for damages for breach of contract against DBP before
the RTC of Calbayog City, Branch 31

In its Answer with Counter-Claim,27 DBP alleged that the terms of the

Deed of Absolute Sale stated no condition that DBP will work on the document of transfer and to eject the
occupants thereon.28 Assuming that DBP's officials made such a promise, DBP alleged that the same
would not be possible since the petitioner did not give any money to DBP for other expenses in going to
and from Calbayog City

RTC: issued an Order31 declaring DBP in default by reason of its counsel's failure to appear during the
pre-trial and to file its pre-trial brief.

Trial ensued.

During the trial, Rodel Villanueva testified32 that he was the one commissioned or ordered by a certain
Atty. Mar De Asis (Atty. De Asis) of DBP, to go to BIR-Catbalogan, and to bring the following documents:
a check worth PhP99,450.00, the amount for the CGT, the title, the TD, and the deed of sale. 33

Mancol, Sr. testified34 that he signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase and Negotiated Sale Rules and
Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First Served Basis on behalf of his son, by virtue of the
SPA.35 

R TC Decision:ruled in favor of the petitioner, and ordered DBP to return to petitioner the amount of
₱99,450 deposited to it for payment of the CGT and DST; to pay the surcharges and/or interests on the
CGT and DST as may be determined by the BIR from June 12, 2005 up to the date of payment; and to pay
the petitioner attorney's fees in the amount of ₱l5,000. The RTC likewise dismissed DBP's counterclaim.40

Thereafter, DBP moved for the reconsideration41 of the RTC's Decision. DBP alleged, among others, that
the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. were hearsay because their statements were based on facts
relayed to them by other people and not based on their personal knowledge.

RTC :granted DBP's motion and dismissed petitioner's complaint.

Both petitioner48 and DBP49 appealed the RTC Order dated June 13, 2008 and November 4, 2008,
respectively, with the CA.

CA:the CA in its Decision,50 denied both appeals.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 52 while DBP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,53 seeking the reversal of the CA Decision dated February 22, 2012. Both motions,
however, were denied in the CA Resolution54 dated September 27, 2012.

Issue: whether or not the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, Villanueva and Mancol, Sr., should be
given probative value to establish the alleged contemporaneous verbal agreement in the sale
contract, i.e., that DBP bound itself to arrange and effect the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name;
and, get rid of the occupants of the subject property.

Held:

No.

GR:The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement
by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties,
varying the purport of the written contract."56

Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the exceptions in the second paragraph of Rule
130, Section 957 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add
to the terms of the agreement. "Moreover, as with all possible objections to the admission of evidence, a
party's failure to timely object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may then be entertained. 58

In the case of Maunlad Savings & Loan Assoc., Inc. v. CA,59 the Court held that:

The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably
apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the objectionable question
is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such
answer, otherwise the objection is waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as
competent and complete evidence and all parties are thus amenable to any favorable or unfavorable
effects resulting from the evidence.60 (Citations omitted)

Here, in order to prove the verbal agreement allegedly made by DBP, petitioner invoked the fourth
exception under the parol evidence rule, i.e., the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement, by offering the testimonies of
Villanueva and Mancol, Sr.

The bank, however, failed to make a timely objection against the said testimonies during the trial since
DBP was declared in default. Thus, DBP waived the protection of the parol evidence rule.

This notwithstanding, We stress that the admissibility of the testimonial evidence as an exception to the
parol evidence rule does not necessarily mean that it has weight. Admissibility of evidence should not be
confounded with its probative value.

"The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence
pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade." 61 The admissibility
of a particular item of evidence has to do with whether it meets various tests by which its reliability is
to be determined, so as to be considered with other evidence admitted in the case in arriving at a
decision as to the truth.62 The weight of evidence is not determined mathematically by the numerical
superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact, but depends upon its practical effect in inducing
belief on the part of the judge trying the case. 63 "Admissibility refers to the question of whether
certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of
whether the admitted evidence proves an issue." 64 "Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided
by the rules of evidence."65

It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own personal
knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception. 66 A witness may not testify on what he
merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard. 67 Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of
what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral
testimony or statements but likewise applies to written statements.68

The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that
establishes the truth of a disputed fact. 69 A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact
cannot be called upon for that purpose because his testimony derives its value not from the credit
accorded to him as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the
extrajudicial source of his information.70

Guided by these precepts, Villanueva's testimony falls within the category of hearsay evidence. Contrary
to petitioner's claim, Villanueva had no personal inkling as to the contemporaneous verbal agreement
between petitioner and DBP. In fact, there was no such verbal agreement. As admitted by the petitioner,
the alleged verbal agreement was entered into between DBP and Mancol, Sr., by virtue of the SP A.
Villanueva has no personal knowledge of such fact. His testimony related only to the fact that Atty. De
Asis ordered him to go to BIR-Catbalogan, and bring the following documents: a check worth ₱99,450, the
amount for the CGT, title, TD, and the deed of sale. None of Villanueva's acts would suggest, even
remotely, that he personally knew about the verbal agreement.

Assuming for argument's sake that Mancol, Sr., on behalf of petitioner, entered into a verbal agreement
with DBP, such agreement would remain unenforceable. Despite petitioner's insistence, the act of
entering into a verbal agreement was not stipulated in the SPA. The authority given to Mancol, Sr. was
limited to representing and negotiating, on petitioner's behalf, the invitation to bid on the sale of the
subject lot, which is specifically worded as follows:

G.R. No. 72244 May 8, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE AGRIPA, accused-appellant.

Facts:A grisly sight awaited the authorities who had come to investigate reports of a stabbing in the house
of Jose and Adelfa Agripa at barangay Humapon in Legazpi City. On the floor awash with blood, Jose
was locked in a final embrace with his wife, who was already dead. Adelfa had sustained fifteen wounds
and had expired due to shock and massive hemorrhage. Jose himself had four wounds in his body and
was hardly alive. Because he refused to release his hold on his dead wife, the couple was rolled in a mat
and rushed to the hospital. All this occurred at about one o'clock in the morning of April 30, 1980.

That same morning, Corporal Wilfredo Bermas, a member of the investigating team took down the
exchange between him and Jose, 1 whom he believed to be on the verge of death.

The statement was not signed by Jose. On Bermas's request, it was witnessed by the barangay captain,
Salustiano Botin, who was present during the recorded conversation.

Jose survived to face prosecution for parricide two months later. He was convicted on July 18, 1985. 2
The principal evidence presented against him at the trial was the above-quoted statement, which was
offered as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae. 

In his defense, Jose gave a different version of the killing of his wife (self-defense)

His statements were corroborated by his 18-year old son. Edwin admitted loving his father more than his
mother. He recalled that when he was in Grade I, his mother hanged him by the neck from a coconut tree
with a piece of katsa cloth. 7

The violent nature of Adelfa was affirmed by another witness, Manuel Cardel, who testified that he was
in the store of one Macedonio in the afternoon of April 29, 1980, when he heard Adelfa say she would
stab Jose if he came home without any money.

RTC: trial court correctly rejected the above-quoted interrogation as a dying declaration because it did not
comply with all the requirements of this particular exception to the hearsay rule. The statement does not
show that it was made by the declarant under the consciousness of impending death (although it is true
that Jose was near death at that time). Nevertheless, it was correctly admitted as part of the res gestae,
having been made soon after the startling occurrence of the multiple stabbing of Jose and Adelfa.

But the mere fact that evidence is admissible does not necessarily mean that it is also credible. The
testimony of a competent witness may be admissible if relevant but it is not for this reason alone
believable. According to Rule 128, Sec. 3, "evidence is admissible if it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules." Credibility depends on the evaluation given to the evidence by the
court in accordance with the guidelines provided in Rule 133 of the Rules of Court and the doctrines laid
down by this Court. 9

As the Court sees it, Jose's statement, while admissible as part of the res gestae, is not credible evidence of
his criminal liability. It is quite obvious that he was not in full possession of his faculties when he made
that statement, which, significantly, he did not sign. We note that when the authorities came upon the
wounded couple, Jose refused to let go of his dead wife and was rolled up with her cadaver in a mat to be
brought to the hospital. That was not the conduct of a rational man. Moreover, Jose was himself suffering
from four stab wounds which could have cost him his life had he not been treated immediately. Given the
condition of his mind and body at the time the statement was made, Jose could not be expected to think
clearly and to willingly make the serious and damning confession now imputed to him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.

Facts: Appellant was charged with Rape, in order to have carnal knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D.
UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed weapon stab the
latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on the occasion or by
reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force and violence had
carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s
death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.

On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar
Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They
suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police Officer
Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant
was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him. 12 He
was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not
guilty."

RTC: appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of
1997,

One of the evidences presented was the test showing the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.29

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an
expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. 30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of
examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene
types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken
from the victim’s vaginal canal. 32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and
the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles
could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater
discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of
scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.

Issue: eWON the DNA evidence should be excluded as evidence as it were conducted in violation of his
right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
Constitution.

Held: No

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from
the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded
is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly
taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair
samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial
compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA,
as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the
incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that
there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to
a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.

It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

Bautista vs. Aparece

51 O.G. 805 (1995)
Relevance
FACTS:
As owner of the lot subject of the case, Nicolas Anasco sold the same to Valentin Justiniani. In the
same year, Valentin sold this property to Claudio Justiniani, In October 12, 1935, Claudio Justiniani
executed a public instrument whereby he sold the same property for P100 to Apolonio Aparece in whose
name it was assessed since 1935. While Aparece was in possession, Hermogenes Bautista illegally entered
a part of the land and took possession thereof. Thus, Aparece file a complaint with the guerilla forces
then operating in the province of Bohol. When the case was called for hearing, and after inspection was
made by a guerilla officer, Bautista executed a public instrument wherein he promised to return the land
to Aparece in good will, and recognized Aparece’s lawful ownership over the land. Thus, possession of
the land was restored to Aparece.

However, claiming that the property belongs to him, and alleging that with the aid of armed men
and pretending to be owner, usurped the land, Bautista filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Bohol. The CFI rendered judgment declaring Aparece as owner of the land.
On appeal, Bautista raised as defense the error of the trial court in admitting the public instrument
which he executed as evidence. He argued that the document was executed under duress, violence, and
intimidation, and that the guerilla officer before whom it was executed, had no jurisdiction over the
matter.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence, a public document executed
before an officer who had no jurisdiction over the matter.

RULING:
This argument is beside the point. The test for the admissibility or inadmissibility of a certain
document is whether or not it is relevant, material or competent. The public document is not only
relevant, but is also material and competent to the issue of ownership between the parties litigants.
Relevant evidence is one that has any value in reason as tending to prove any matter probable in ac
action. And evidence is said to be material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by
the rules of substantive law and pleadings, while competent evidence is one that s not excluded by law in
a particular case.

With these criteria in mind, we hold that the mere fact that the public document was executed
before a guerilla officer does not make the same as irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent to the main
issue raised in the pleadings. The public document, considered together with the other evidence,
documentary and oral, satisfies the Court that the portions of land in question really belong to defendant
Aparece.

Lopez vs. Heesen

365 P.2d 448 (1961)
Relevance
FACTS:
Appellee Heesen, an air Force officer, purchased a J.C. Higgins Model 51 30.06 rifle from the store
of appellee Sears. The rifle has a bolt action known as a “Mausser type action” with a “Class 1” safety
mechanism. At the time of the purchase, Heesen was given an instruction pamphlet which he read,
explaining the composition of the rifle and gave operating instructions, including the method to be
pursued to make the gun “safe”.
Immediately after the purchase, Heesen left for a deer hunting trip in an area known as Ute Park.
He placed a live cartridge in the chamber and placed the gun on safety position. He traveled a good deal
during the hours before the shooting and on one of two occasions, he discovered the gun off safety
position. This occurred when he had come down a long hill covered with rocks and boulders. Heesen
wasnot aware that the rifle moved from “safe to fire’ position at least twice before the shooting. Ten
minutes before the accident began, he left the knoll and he was carrying the gun on his shoulder.
He later heard a rustle and saw a deer go between some trees. When he followed the deer, his
left foot went down hard on the ground on one side of a log and his right foot slipped on the grass. This
brought the rifle down and the rifle discharged, the bullet hitting appellant Lopez, who was nearby.
Lopez brought suit against Heesen for allegedly unlawfully assaulting him, thereby inflicting
dangerous and painful wounds. He also included as party-defendant, the designer, manufacturer and
seller of the rifle, Sears, for allegedly negligently designing and manufacturing the rifle bought by
Heesen.
Defendants presented expert testimony on the general reputation of other firearms companies
who use the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51. Lopez objected to this evidence
on the ground that it was wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case. He likewise objected
on the introduction of testimony on the “poundage pressure” required to move the safety levers from
safe to fire position on the ground of irrelevance and immateriality. Lastly, he objected to the introduction
of opinion evidence regarding the design of the safety mechanism, on the ground that it was a subject
which is within the province of the jury to determine.
ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether or not expert testimony on the general reputation of other firearms companies using
the same safety device is material and relevant.
(2) Whether or not testimony on the “poundage pressure” required is relevant and material.
(3) Whether or not the design of the safety mechanism was a proper subject of expert testimony.
RULING:
(1) The expert testimony is admissible. The allegations on the ultimate facts in issue involve whether
the Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous and defective condition due to its negligent
manufacture, in that the safety mechanism moved re4adily from “safe” to “fire” position. This is
an issue, the proper understanding of which, requires knowledge or experience and cannot be
determined independently merely from deductions made and inferences drawn on the basis of
ordinary knowledge. Moreover, the conduct of others is proper evidence for a jury to consider,
in determining whether the tendency of the thing is dangerous, defective, or the reverse.
Considering these principles, the Court held that the testimony as to the reputation of other
firearms companies using the same safety device is material and relevant to the issue of whether
the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
(2) The testimony was introduced under Lopez’s contention that the Higgins model was unsafe and
thus, the issue arose as to the “poundage pressure’ required to move the safety lever from safe
to fire. It was then proper for Sears to show the amount of pressure required to move the safety
lever as this was relevant to the issue posed.
(3) Expert testimony is admissible because the expert testimony was upon the ultimate issue of
whether or not the safety device was dangerous and defective. It was the proper subject of expert
testimony. It does not usurp the functions of the jury as the latter may still reject these opinions.
Said opinion evidence is not binding on the jury.

State vs Ball
339 S.w2d 783 (1960)
Relevance
FACTS:
Ball appeals from an order of the trial court, convicting him of robbery.
At about 2:30 in the afternoon, two colored men, one of them tall and the other short, entered
the Krekeler Jewelry Store. As the taller man looked at jewelry and made his purchase, the shorter man
looked in the cases and moved about in the store. Later in the same day, at around 5:30 p.m., as John
Krekeler was placing the rings and watches in the safe preparing for the closing of the store, the two men
who had been in the store at 2:30, entered the store. They were immediately recognized by Krekeler,
especially the taller man’s narrow-brimmed tall hat, brown jacket, gray short and particularly a scar on
his
face.
The shorter man walked behind the counter and as Krekeler tried to intercept him, the man hit
Krekeler on the face using a 0.38 long barreled pistol. With the gun on his back, the two men directed
Krekeler to go to the watch repair department, then to the restroom, where he was positioned, facing the
wall. Thereafter, he could hear jewelry being dumped in a bag, and the “jingle” of the car register. After
hearing the door slam, Krekeler call the police. He reported that the two men took $4,455.21 worth of
watched and rings, and $140 in cash.
Three weeks later, Ball was arrested by Officers Powell and Ballard while walking in the street.
Ball shoved Officer Powell over and ran down the avenue. The officers ran after him and he was only
pacified when the Officer’s fired a bullet which fell in his back. Ball claims that this evidence of “flight”
was not material or relevant, since it was too remote from the date of the robbery (3 weeks later), to
indicate a consciousness of guilt. Ball likewise objected to the admissibility of the following articles found
in his person during the arrest on grounds of immateriality and irrelevance: a brown felt hat, a brownish
windbreaker type jacket, trousers, gray shirt and shoes, and $258.02 in currency and two pennies.
ISSUES(S)
(1) Whether or not the evidence of flight is inadmissible for reason of remoteness to the time of the
commission of the crime.
(2) Whether or not the articles found in the person of the accused at the time of his arrest are
inadmissible for being irrelevant and immaterial.
RULING:
(1) Unexplained flight and resisting arrest even thirty days after the supposed commission of the
crime is a relevant circumstance. The remoteness of the flight goes to the weight of the evidence
rather than to its admissibility.
(2) In identifying Ball, Krekeler was impressed with and remembered the brown ensemble,
particularly the tall brown hat. These items were of course relevant and admissible in evidence
and there is no objection to them.
However, the money is inadmissible. The proof of the money here was evidently on the theory that Ball
did not have or was not likely to have such a sum of money on his person prior to the commission of the
offense. However, Krekeler was not able to identify the money or any of the items on Ball’s person as
having come from the jewelry store so that in fact, they were not admissible in evidence. There was no
proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash register, it was simply a total of $140. Here,
nineteen days had elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of the
$258.02 and in all these circumstances “the mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no
indication that the possessor was the taker of the money charged as taken, because in general all money
of the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as
the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable.”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, Accused-Appellant.

Reynaldo Belocura y Perez, a police officer charged with illegal possession of 1,789.823 grams
of marijuana in violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, was found guilty of the crime charged on April 22, 2003 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Manila, and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of ₱ 500,000.00.1

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction on January 23, 2006. 2 Hence, this final
appeal for his acquittal.

On March 22, 1999, at 11 o’clock in the morning, Chief Insp. Divina was in his office in the headquarters
of the Western Police District (WPD) on United Nations Avenue in Manila when he received a call from a
male person who refused to identify himself for fear of reprisal. The caller tipped him off about a robbery
to be staged along Lopez Street, Tondo, Manila.

Belocura was seized driving a jeep.

PO2 Santos searched Belocura’s jeep, and recovered a red plastic bag under the driver’s sea t. Chief Insp.
Divina directed PO2 Santos to inspect the contents of the red plastic bag, which turned out to be two
bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper.

Afterwards, the team returned with Belocura to the WPD Headquarters on board the Tamaraw FX. The
team turned over the jeep and the red plastic bag with its contents to the General Assignment Section for
proper disposition.5

Chief Insp. Divina said that the caller did not mention anything about any vehicle; that he and his men
were in civilian clothes at the time; that it was PO2 Santos who recovered the red plastic bag containing
the marijuana bricks; and that SPO1 Rojas examined the contents of the bag in his presence. 6

SPO1 Rojas confirmed his part in the operation. 7 He conceded that he was not present when the red
plastic bag containing the bricks of marijuana was seized, and saw the marijuana bricks for the first time
only at the police station.8

Belocura denied owning or possessing the bricks of marijuana, saying that he saw the bricks
of marijuana for the first time only in court.

RTC: convicted Belocura of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay

CA: affirmed the conviction.15

Issue: WON that the corpus delicti of the crime charged was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: No

In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the
custody of the incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is
offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence. 32 It is not enough that the evidence
offered has probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and
tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it has an
actual connection with the transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is the reason why
authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence are important.33

Yet, no such accounting was made herein, as the following excerpts from the testimony of Chief Insp.
Divina bear out
The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized
by PO2 Santos from Belocura’s jeep following his arrest and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution
later presented as evidence in court. That linkage was not dispensable, because the failure to prove that
the specimens of marijuana submitted to the forensic chemist for examination were the
same marijuana allegedly seized from Belocura irreparably broke the chain of custody that linked the
confiscated marijuana to the marijuana ultimately presented as evidence against Belocura during the trial.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded that unwavering exactitude must be observed in establishing
the corpus delicti – the body of the crime whose core was the confiscated prohibited substances. Thus,
every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established. 37 1âwphi1

The chain-of-custody requirement ensures that all doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.38 The requirement has come to be associated with prosecutions for violations of Republic Act
No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), 39 by reason of Section 2140 of Republic Act No. 9165
expressly regulating the actual custody and disposition of confiscated and surrendered dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors, essential chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia, and laboratory equipment. Section
21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 issued by the Dangerous
Drugs Board pursuant to its mandate under Section 94 of Republic Act No. 9165 reiterates the
requirement, stating:

The chain of custody is essential in establishing the link between the article confiscated from the accused
to the evidence that is ultimately presented to the court for its appreciation. As the Court said in  Mallillin
v. People:43

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in
the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible
to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real
evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or
trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains
in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and
exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering—
without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the
application of the chain of custody rule.44

The first link in the chain of custody started with the seizure from the jeep of Belocura of the red
plastic bag said to contain the marijuana bricks. The first link was immediately missing because the
Prosecution did not present PO2 Santos, the only person with direct knowledge of the seizure and
confiscation of the marijuana bricks. Without his testimony, proof that the marijuana bricks were really
taken from the jeep of Belocura did not exist. The second link was the turnover of the marijuana bricks
by PO2 Santos to another officer back at the WPD Headquarters. As to this, Chief Insp. Divina stated
that he learned following the seizure by PO2 Santos that the marijuana bricks were turned over to the
General Assignment Section for investigation. That was all. On the other hand, SPO1 Rojas’ testimony
contributed nothing to the establishment of the second link because he had immediately left after seizing
the gun from Belocura. As for the subsequent links, the records45 showed that the marijuana bricks were
forwarded to the General Assignment Section on March 22, 1999, but the Prosecution did not prove the
identities of the officer from the General Assignment Section who received the red plastic bag containing
the marijuana bricks, and the officer from whom the receiving officer received the marijuana bricks.
Although Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut prepared the request for laboratory examination of
the marijuana bricks,46 which were thereafter examined by Forensic Chemist Valdez, the records did not
show if Chief Insp. Yabut was the officer who had received the marijuana bricks from the arresting team.
The request for laboratory examination was dated March 23, 1999, or the day following Belocura’s arrest
and the seizure of the marijuana bricks from his jeep; however, the Prosecution did not identify the person
from whom Chief Insp. Yabut had received the marijuana bricks.

Sadly, the Prosecution did not establish the links in the chain of custody. This meant that the corpus
delicti was not credibly proved. This further meant that the seizure and confiscation of
the marijuana bricks might easily be open to doubt and suspicion, and thus the incriminatory evidence
would not stand judicial scrutiny.

LUCIANO TAN, petitioner,
vs.
RODIL ENTERPRISES, respondent.

LUCIANO TAN, Petitioner, v. RODIL ENTERPRISES, Respondent.

Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, through the, entered into a Renewal of a Contract of Lease over the
Ides O Racca Building (Government Owned). A subsequent Supplementary Contract dated 25 May 1992
was similarly entered, thus, extending the lease agreement until 1 September 1997.

Several cases were filed regarding the validity of Rodil’s lease contract.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the preceding cases, in1999, a subsequent Contract of Lease was
drawn between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, the same to be effective retroactively from 1
September 1997 to 21 August 2012. Rodil Enterprises subleased various units, a space thereof was
subleased to herein petitioner, Luciano Tan.

In Rodil Enterprises' Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed against Luciano Tan, the former alleged that
Luciano Tan bound himself to pay under a Contract of Sublease.

In his Answer, Luciano Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the government who owns the Ides O
Racca Building and not of Rodil Enterprises. As such, he has the right to lease the said premises pending
the disposition and sale of the building.

MeTC: recognizing an agreement entered into in open court by Luciano Tan and Rodil Enterprises. MeTC
Ordered Tan to pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September, 1997 up to the present, which is the
outstanding obligation of [Luciano Tan] as of June, 2000, on or before June 30, 2000;

On 14 August 2000, Luciano Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals. He prayed that he
be allowed to deposit the Manager's Check for the amount of P467,500.00, made payable to the City
Treasurer of Manila.
MeTC: denied the Motion on the rationalization that Luciano Tan's prayer to deposit the specified sum
with the City Treasurer of Manila contravenes Section 19,10 Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

MeTC: rendered a Decision in favor of Rodil Enterprises. The court said that Luciano Tan did not contest
the sublease on a monthly basis

According to the MeTC, notwithstanding the evidentiary norm in civil cases that an offer of compromise
is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror, the court cannot
overlook the frank representations by Luciano Tan's counsel of the former's liability in the form of rentals,
coupled with a proposal to liquidate.13 The foregoing gestures, as appreciated by the MeTC, were akin to
an admission of a fact, like the existence of a debt which can serve as proof of the loan, and was thus,
admissible.14 The court pronounced that Luciano Tan had explicitly acknowledged his liability for the
periodic consideration for the use of the subleased property. Estoppel, thus, precludes him from
disavowing the fact of lease implied from the tender of payment for the rentals in arrears.15 The MeTC,
explained further:

Aggrieved thereby, Luciano Tan appealed the Decision to the RTC. Meanwhile, Rodil Enterprises filed a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution,17 which was subsequently denied by the MeTC in the Order18
of 15 December 2000.

RTC: rendered a Decision reversing the judgment appealed from and dismissing the Complaint. It found
that the MeTC erred in holding that the offer to compromise by Luciano Tan's counsel was akin to an
admission of fact, the same being contrary to Section 27,19 Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Subsequently, Rodil Enterprises filed a Petition for Review with the appellate court

CA: set aside the judgment of the RTC and affirmed and reinstated the 6 October 2000 Decision of the
MeTC.

ISSUE: WON Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that there was a judicial admission as to petitioner's
liability under a contract of sublease between him and Rodil Enterprises.

The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability. It is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror.

The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court in Trans-Pacific Industrial
Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,37 to wit:

To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the

case and the intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the
existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the
offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence
of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is
admissible to prove such indebtedness

Similarly, in the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co.39 the Court applied the exception to
the general rule. In Varadero' there was neither an expressed nor implied denial of liability, but during
the course of the abortive negotiations therein, the defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff.
Finding that there was no denial of liability, and considering that the only question discussed was the
amount to be paid, the Court did not apply the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.
In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly appreciated petitioner's admission as an
exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. The MeTC found that petitioner did not contest the
existence of the sublease, and his counsel made frank representations anent the former's liability in the
form of rentals. This expressed admission was coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The Motion to Allow
Defendant to Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as an explicit acknowledgment of petitioner's
liability on the subleased premises. The Court of Appeals agreed with the MeTC. Indeed, the existence of
the Contract of Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not denied by petitioner. The contracts that were
assailed by petitioner are the contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992, the validity of which has been upheld
by this Court in the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 129609 and G.R. No. 135537.

Finally, we find a categorical admission on the part of petitioner, not only as to his liability, but also, as to
the amount of indebtedness in the form of rentals due. The Order of the MeTC dated 27 June 2000 was
clear that the petitioner agreed in open court to pay the amount of P440,000.00, representing petitioner's
unpaid rentals from September 1997 to June 2000; and that petitioner will pay the monthly rentals
computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of each month after 30 June 2000. The petitioner's judicial
admission in open court, as found by the MeTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals finds particular
significance when viewed together with his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, wherein
petitioner stated that the rentals due on the premises in question from September 1997 up to the present
amounted to P467,500.00, as of the date of filing the Motion. Petitioner cannot now be allowed to reject
the same. An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is interposed by a party or not.40 A judicial
admission is an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, for
purposes of the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter disprove.41SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181829               September 1, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SATURNINO VILLANUEVA, Appellant.

On November 6, 2002, three Informations were filed against appellant for the crime of rape.

During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the appellant is the father of "AAA." It was likewise agreed
that "AAA" was below 12 years of age when the rape incidents happened. 8 "AAA’s" birth and medical
certificates were likewise marked as Exhibits "A" and "C," respectively.9

Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly.10

The defense presented appellant as its first witness. In his testimony, appellant admitted that "AAA" is
his daughter.15 He also admitted that on September 27 and 28, 1999 and June 9, 2002, he was living in the
same house as "AAA."16 However, when asked regarding the rape charges filed against him by his
daughter, appellant denied the same.

RTC: The trial court lent credence to the testimony of "AAA." However, it noted that although it was
agreed upon during the pre-trial that "AAA" was a minor below 12 years of age, the fact remains that
"AAA" was 12 years, six months and 19 days when she was ravished by the appellant on June 9, 2002.

Court of Appeals: AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the
penalty of death imposed on appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua for each count of qualified rape,
without eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103, as amended.
The CA also concluded that even without the medical certificate, appellant could still be held liable for
three counts of rape. His conviction could rest exclusively on the credible testimony of "AAA" and the
medical certificate would only be corroborative evidence. 40 Anent the birth certificate, the CA recalled
that during pre-trial, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the appellant had already been
stipulated upon. Hence, the said elements have been sufficiently alleged in the Informations and proven
during trial.

The petitioner elevated the case to SC one of its contention is both the medical certificate and "AAA’s"
birth certificate, although marked as exhibits during the pre-trial, should not have been considered by the
trial court and the CA because they were not formally offered in evidence

Issue: WON both the medical certificate and "AAA’s" birth certificate should not have been considered by
the trial court and the CA because they were not formally offered in evidence.

Yes.

. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides: "The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified."

In this case, we note that after the marking of the exhibits during pre-trial, the prosecution did not
formally offer the said medical certificate or birth certificate in evidence. In fact, the prosecution rested its
case after presenting the testimony of "AAA" without formally offering any documentary exhibit at all.

Our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha45 is instructive, thus:

The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a
considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, as in this case, any
evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.

Note: In view of the foregoing, we find that the prosecution did not present any satisfactory evidence to
prove "AAA’s" minority. "In the prosecution of criminal cases, x x x, nothing but proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must be
established. Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying circumstances must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its
qualified form. As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority
and her relationship to the accused-appellant must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable
doubt."65

In view of the foregoing, we find appellant guilty only of three counts of simple rape 66 the penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua for each count. Accordingly, the awards of civil indemnity must be reduced
to ₱50,000.00 and moral damages to ₱50,000.00. Finally, the award of exemplary damages is proper.
"Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of civil liability if the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Relationship as an alternative circumstance
under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code is considered aggravating in the crime of rape." 67 In this case,
the aggravating circumstance of relationship was duly established. Appellant himself admitted when he
testified in open court that he is "AAA’s" father. However, the award of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages
must be increased to ₱30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.68

G.R. Nos. 157294-95             November 30, 2006

JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 157294-95)

Facts:

In lieu of the Criminal Case “People v. Estrada” for plunder, the Special Prosecution Panel filed before
the Sandiganbayan a request for issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum directing the President of Export
and Industry Bank or his/her authorized representative to produce documents namely, Trust Account
and Savings Account belonging to petitioner and statement of accounts of one named “Jose Velarde” and
to testify thereon during the hearings. Sandiganbayan granted both requests and subpoenas were
accordingly issued. Sandiganbayan also granted and issued subpoenas prayed for by the Prosecution
Panel in another later date. Petitioner now assisted by his counsel filed two separate motions to quash the
two subpoenas issued. Sandiganbayan denied both motions and the consequent motions for
reconsideration of petitioner.

Issues: Whether or not the unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained
therefrom inadmissible in evidence.

Held:

3) NO. Petitioner’s attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails. R.A. 1405, it
bears noting, nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence
obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence. Section 5 of R.A. 1405 only states that “[a]ny violation of
this law will subject the offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a
fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.”

Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule applies in principle to cases involving R.A.
1405, the Court finds no reason to apply the same in this particular case. Clearly, the “fruit of the
poisonous tree” doctrine presupposes a violation of law. If there was no violation of R.A. 1405 in the
instant case, then there would be no “poisonous tree” to begin with, and, thus, no reason to apply the
doctrine.

CONSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSIONARY RULE

POLLO VS. CONSTANTINO-DAVID (2011)

Facts:

Ann anonymous letter-complaint was received by the respondent Civil Service Commission Chairperson
alleging that an officer of the CSC has been lawyering for public officials with pending cases in the CSC.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team with background in information technology and issued a
memorandum directing them “to back up all the files in the computers found in the [CSC-ROIV]
Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”

The team proceeded at once to the office and backed up all files in the hard disk of computers at the
PALD and the Legal Services Division. Within the same day, the investigating team finished the task. It
was found that most of the files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner
were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals.
Chairperson David thus issued a Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or
counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

Petitioner denied that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint. He asserted that he
had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, and that the files in his
computer were his personal files and those of his relatives and associates, and that he is not authorize the
activities as they are in violation of his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-
incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. Also, the files/documents copied from his computer
without his consent are inadmissible as evidence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”

The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged him with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). On 24 July 2007, the CSC issued a
Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of the same merits and meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM
THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties. This Resolution was also brought to the CA by herein
petitioner.

By a Decision dated 11 October 2007, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari after finding
no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. His motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the search conducted and the copying of petitioner’s files without his knowledge
and consent lawful? (WON the evidence obtained can be admitted)

Held:

Yes. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected
by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
“unreasonable” searches and seizures.

Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons for warrantless searches
involving public employees for work related reasons to the case at bar, we now address the following
questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files? (2)
Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair reasonable in its inception and scope?

The petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files for he failed to
prove that he had an actual expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer
which contained his personal files. He did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did
not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors.
He did not use passwords nor adopted any means to prevent access by others of his computer files. The
CSC also implemented a policy which implies on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the
computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.
The search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair was reasonable since it was conducted in connection
with investigation of work-related misconduct. A search by a government employer of an employee’s
office is justified when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the
employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of
the Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for
warrantless searches in the workplace. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its
capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement.
The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee
was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of “lawyering” for parties with pending cases before the
Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering
repercussions. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial
but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or
limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out.

Thus, petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other
argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities.
We likewise find no merit in his contention that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant because the
present case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search
of petitioner’s computer was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored
therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as
government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly
falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.

Cecilia Zulueta vs. CA, and Dr. Alfredo Martin

Doctrine in Nachura: The right to privacy of communication may be invoked against the wife who went
to the clinic of her husband and there took documents consisting of private communications between her
husband and his alleged paramour.

Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. One day, she went to the clinic of her husband,
together with her mom, her driver and Dr. Martin’s secretary and forcibly opened the drawer of her
husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and
his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs
without Dr. Martin’s knowledge and consent. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence
in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had
filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought an action for the recovery of documents and papers, as well as damages against her
wife before the RTC. The RTC ruled in his favor, declaring him to be the exclusive owner of such
documents. The writ of preliminary injunction was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her
attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court. Hence this petition.
Cecilia’s side: She contends that the case of Alfredo Martin vs Alfonso Felix, Jr. (NOTE: the case is
between her husband, Dr. Martin and a lawyer, atty. alfonso) where the court ruled that the documents
and papers were admissible in evidence and that the use of those documents by Atty. Alfonso did not
constitute gross malpractice and gross misconduct.

Issue: WON the documents in question are inadmissible in evidence.

Held: Yes. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes
to the other.

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent.

Facts: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police
Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the
morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to
Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down
the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic)
while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the
place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and
SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that
the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told
the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it;
that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-
like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size one of the content of the said container
is suspected to be shabu.

Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial
ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution.
On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and
extortion.

RTC: convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It found the prosecution evidence
sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid
search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu.

CA: affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

Issue: WON the seized shabu can be used as evidence.

Held: No

there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.15 None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest,
are applicable to this case.

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in
"plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the
evidence was not immediately apparent.16

Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
shown by clear and convincing evidence. 17 It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza,
this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that
petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.18

Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a
police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act
may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons. 20

The foregoing considered; petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the
illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not,
however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless
arrest.22

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening
the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.24
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. 25 The drugs are the very corpus delicti
of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and
calls for the acquittal of the accused. 26

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, Accused-Appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, Accused-Appellant.

Reynaldo Belocura y Perez, a police officer charged with illegal possession of 1,789.823 grams
of marijuana in violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, was found guilty of the crime charged on April 22, 2003 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Manila, and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of ₱ 500,000.00.1

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction on January 23, 2006. 2 Hence, this final
appeal for his acquittal.

On March 22, 1999, at 11 o’clock in the morning, Chief Insp. Divina was in his office in the headquarters
of the Western Police District (WPD) on United Nations Avenue in Manila when he received a call from a
male person who refused to identify himself for fear of reprisal. The caller tipped him off about a robbery
to be staged along Lopez Street, Tondo, Manila.

Belocura was seized driving a jeep.

PO2 Santos searched Belocura’s jeep, and recovered a red plastic bag under the driver’s sea t. Chief Insp.
Divina directed PO2 Santos to inspect the contents of the red plastic bag, which turned out to be two
bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper.

Afterwards, the team returned with Belocura to the WPD Headquarters on board the Tamaraw FX. The
team turned over the jeep and the red plastic bag with its contents to the General Assignment Section for
proper disposition.5

Chief Insp. Divina said that the caller did not mention anything about any vehicle; that he and his men
were in civilian clothes at the time; that it was PO2 Santos who recovered the red plastic bag containing
the marijuana bricks; and that SPO1 Rojas examined the contents of the bag in his presence. 6

SPO1 Rojas confirmed his part in the operation. 7 He conceded that he was not present when the red
plastic bag containing the bricks of marijuana was seized, and saw the marijuana bricks for the first time
only at the police station.8

Belocura denied owning or possessing the bricks of marijuana, saying that he saw the bricks
of marijuana for the first time only in court.

RTC: convicted Belocura of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay

CA: affirmed the conviction.15

Issue: WON that the corpus delicti of the crime charged was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: No

In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the
custody of the incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is
offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence. 32 It is not enough that the evidence
offered has probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and
tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it has an
actual connection with the transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is the reason why
authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence are important.33

Yet, no such accounting was made herein, as the following excerpts from the testimony of Chief Insp.
Divina bear out

The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized
by PO2 Santos from Belocura’s jeep following his arrest and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution
later presented as evidence in court. That linkage was not dispensable, because the failure to prove that
the specimens of marijuana submitted to the forensic chemist for examination were the
same marijuana allegedly seized from Belocura irreparably broke the chain of custody that linked the
confiscated marijuana to the marijuana ultimately presented as evidence against Belocura during the trial.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded that unwavering exactitude must be observed in establishing
the corpus delicti – the body of the crime whose core was the confiscated prohibited substances. Thus,
every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established. 37 1âwphi1

The chain-of-custody requirement ensures that all doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.38 The requirement has come to be associated with prosecutions for violations of Republic Act
No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), 39 by reason of Section 2140 of Republic Act No. 9165
expressly regulating the actual custody and disposition of confiscated and surrendered dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors, essential chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia, and laboratory equipment. Section
21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 issued by the Dangerous
Drugs Board pursuant to its mandate under Section 94 of Republic Act No. 9165 reiterates the
requirement, stating:

The chain of custody is essential in establishing the link between the article confiscated from the accused
to the evidence that is ultimately presented to the court for its appreciation. As the Court said in  Mallillin
v. People:43

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in
the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible
to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real
evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or
trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains
in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and
exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering—
without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the
application of the chain of custody rule.44

The first link in the chain of custody started with the seizure from the jeep of Belocura of the red
plastic bag said to contain the marijuana bricks. The first link was immediately missing because the
Prosecution did not present PO2 Santos, the only person with direct knowledge of the seizure and
confiscation of the marijuana bricks. Without his testimony, proof that the marijuana bricks were really
taken from the jeep of Belocura did not exist. The second link was the turnover of the marijuana bricks
by PO2 Santos to another officer back at the WPD Headquarters. As to this, Chief Insp. Divina stated
that he learned following the seizure by PO2 Santos that the marijuana bricks were turned over to the
General Assignment Section for investigation. That was all. On the other hand, SPO1 Rojas’ testimony
contributed nothing to the establishment of the second link because he had immediately left after seizing
the gun from Belocura. As for the subsequent links, the records45 showed that the marijuana bricks were
forwarded to the General Assignment Section on March 22, 1999, but the Prosecution did not prove the
identities of the officer from the General Assignment Section who received the red plastic bag containing
the marijuana bricks, and the officer from whom the receiving officer received the marijuana bricks.
Although Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut prepared the request for laboratory examination of
the marijuana bricks,46 which were thereafter examined by Forensic Chemist Valdez, the records did not
show if Chief Insp. Yabut was the officer who had received the marijuana bricks from the arresting team.
The request for laboratory examination was dated March 23, 1999, or the day following Belocura’s arrest
and the seizure of the marijuana bricks from his jeep; however, the Prosecution did not identify the person
from whom Chief Insp. Yabut had received the marijuana bricks.

Sadly, the Prosecution did not establish the links in the chain of custody. This meant that the corpus
delicti was not credibly proved. This further meant that the seizure and confiscation of
the marijuana bricks might easily be open to doubt and suspicion, and thus the incriminatory evidence
would not stand judicial scrutiny.

CONG. MANUEL N. MAMBA, M. D. ATTY. FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, JR., HON. GUILLERMO

SUMIGAD, HON. CALIXTO GENOVEZA, HON. MARTIN SORIANO, HON. LOURDES FAUSTO,
HON. LORENZO FERMIN, HON. ADORACION RAQUINIO, HON. LEONIDES FAUSTO, HON.
DIOGENES BALIGOD, HON. LORETO MABBORANG, HON. PETER SY, HON. NICCOLO
MAMBA, LORETO MAMBA, JUAN TAGUBA, DOMINGO CAMARAT, SEVERINO BUCAYU,
CASIANO CHAVENTE, ILLUMINADO BALIGOD, FELICIANO SERRANO, TEOFILO URMA,
REMIGIO DE LA CRUZ, ABELARDO BAUIT, MARIANO MIRANDA, JR., ROMULO SERAFICA,
CARLOS MANANGUIT, ERNESTO FERMIN, ROGELIO FERNANDEZ, ERNESTO CENABRE,
TRINIDAD BALUNSAT, MIGUEL PASON, GIL BALORAN, DOMINGO CALLUENG, BERNARDO
BENITO, JUAN TURINGAN, MARCELINO CORPUZ, IGNACIO PASCUA, JR., LEONIDES
FAUSTO, TEODORICO PASTOR, DOMINADOR CORSINO, GENEROSO AGLAUA, ZACARIAS
MAGGAY, SIMEON BENZON, PATRICIO TAGUIAM, LUCAS TAGUINOD, MA. GLORIA G.
BALIGOD, LAURO N. FAUSTO, EDGAR AGGABAO, RODOLFO CARDENAS, TERESITA
ESPINOSA, PACIFICO C. BINULUAN, ROGELIO SORIANO, ARTURO MAMBA, DR. EXSUPERIO
YUAGA, VIVIAN DE GUZMAN, EX-CONG. FRANCISCO K. MAMBA, CRISTINA MAMBA,
EDWIN LIU, PABLO DANGA, ALICE LOA, VICENTE TOLENTINO, NUMERIANO MACAPULAY,
ROLLY SEDANO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE DOMINADOR L. GARCIA, MTC, TUAO, CAGAYAN, respondent.

Facts: On August 23, 1996, a complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (illegal possession of
firearms) was filed against a certain Renato Bulatao by the Cagayan Provincial Police Command before
the sala of respondent Judge Garcia  
On October 29, 1996, the accused, Renato Bulatao, complained to the NBI that at the scheduled
preliminary investigation on September 4, 1996, P/Sr. Inspector Salvador demanded P30,000.00,
eventually reduced to 6,0000, from him in consideration of the withdrawal of the criminal case against
him. According to Bulatao, the demand was reiterated by Salvador and respondent judge.

Based on Bulatao's report, the NBI set out to entrap Salvador and respondent judge.

Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record his conversation with whoever will receive the money. At 9
a.m., Bulatao went to the Municipal Trial Court and waited for his case to be called. Respondent then
called Bulatao and led him and the two police officers to the office of the MTC court personnel. Inside,
respondent asked Bulatao if he had the money with him. When he answered in the affirmative,
respondent took them to his chambers and left them there as he proceeded to his sala.

After handing the money to the police officers, Bulatao went out of respondent's chambers. Upon his
signal, the NBI operatives waiting outside respondent's court then rushed to the judge's chambers and
arrested the two police officers after recovering 11 pieces of P500.00 marked bills in their possession. 5

After the matter was referred by this Court to Executive Judge Orlando Beltran for investigation, the
latter scheduled several hearings for the reception of evidence for the respondent.. 6

On the basis of these facts, the Investigating Judge made the following recommendation:

"Such acts of the respondent Judge are improper, to say the least. He, therefore, violated the duty
of every Judge to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. (Mortel vs. Leido, Jr. 44 SCAD 567). It cannot be over-
emphasized that a judge's official conduct

Issue: WON Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between Bulatao and the two police
officers is proper.

No.

The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between Bulatao and the two police
officers is erroneous.

The recording of private conversations without the consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of
Rep. Act. No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible
in evidence in any proceeding. 8 The law covers even those recorded by persons privy to the private
communications, as in this case. 9 Thus, the contents of the tape recorder cannot be relied upon to
determine the culpability of respondent judge.

In all other respects, however, the findings of the Investigating Judge are in accordance with the evidence.
We hold, however, that respondent judge is guilty not just of improper conduct but of serious
misconduct. Serious misconduct is such conduct which affects a public officer's performance of his duties
as such officer and not only that which affects his character as a private individual. For serious
misconduct to warrant a dismissal from the service, there must be reliable evidence showing that the
judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law. It must (1) be
serious, important, weighty, momentary, and not trifling; (2) imply wrongful intention and not mere
error of judgment; and (3) have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official
duties. 10