Case: Larranaga v.

CA
Date: October 27, 1997
Ponente: J. Puno

DOCTRINE
“To warrant an order to change the venue of trial on the ground of prejudicial
publicity, there must be actual prejudice, NOT merely a possibility of prejudice.”

FACTS:
Larranaga, a minor, was charged with 2 counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
His case was for preliminary investigation with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu. Due to
the extensive coverage of the proceedings by the Cebu media, he filed for a motion to transfer the
venue of the preliminary investigation to Manila and to replace the authority conducting his
preliminary investigation with the Office of the State Prosecutor alleging that the pervasive
publicity influenced the people’s perception of his character and guilt.

ISSUE:
WON the Supreme Court should grant the motion to transfer the venue of and replace the
authority conducting the preliminary investigation of Larraaga’s case?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court is constrained to dismiss the Larranaga’s motion to change the
venue and the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation for lack of jurisdiction. He should
address his plea to the DOJ which has control and supervision over the conduct of preliminary
investigations. Nonetheless, even if the Court had jurisdiction, motion should still be denied
because it failed to allege and prove that the City Prosecutor has been actually affected. Pervasive
publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial. To warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. There must be actual
prejudice shown from the totality of circumstances. It must be proved that the publicity fatally
infected the fairness and impartiality of the City Prosecutor.