PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (PD NO.

1529)
Malabanan vs. Republic, April 29, 2009
Facts:
In 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Velazco, filed an application for land
registration covering the property in the RTC, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and
adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of
his title. He presented during trial a certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of
DENR.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration: the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed
sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v.
Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as
alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real
owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period
prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in
their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in
possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and
disposable by the State.
RTC: granted application. Mario died during the appeal to CA, and his heirs elevated the CA’s decision SC.
Issue: The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Held: Denied the motions for reconsideration.
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit: Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be
disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles; (a) By judicial legalization; or (b) By administrative legalization
(free patent).
The heirs failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Therefore, the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private
property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run
against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.
I. Classifications of land according to ownership. Immovable property, may be classified as of:
1. Public dominion- (a) intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth
 Patrimonial property of the state- land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of
such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service. Prescription can run against the
State.
2. Private ownership- belongs to a private individual.
Regalian Doctrine- all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not appearing to be clearly under
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public
domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons. (Congress and President can
declare)
II. Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
- 1935 Constitution, lands of the public domain were classified into 3: agricultural, timber and mineral.
- 1987 Constitution adopted the 1935 classification: agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added
national parks. (The last 3 are not susceptible of alienation unless classified as agricultural by the exec. And
are outside the Public Land Act’s coverage)
Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. The
identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of
the Executive.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other
natural resources may not be.
Categories of Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified
as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural.
III. Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
(agricultural lands) can be disposed of: (1) For homestead settlement (2) By sale (3) By lease (4) By confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles (By judicial legalization or By administrative legalization- free patent)
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was
the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. The
character of the property subject of the application as alienable agricultural land of the public domain determines its
eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
To be clear, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the
time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable. Where all
the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous,
exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a
certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.
Republic vs. Remnan Enterprises, February 19, 2014
Facts: In 2001, Remman Enterprises (respondent), filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over
2 lands. In 2001, the RTC issued the Order finding the respondent’s application for registration sufficient in form and
substance and setting it for initial hearing in 2002, which was published in the Official Gazette & People’s Balita, & was
likewise posted in a conspicuous place in the 2 lots & City Hall of Taguig. Only the Laguna Lake Development Authority
appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA.

LLDA: 2 lots are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On the other hand.
Republic: respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
R’s witnesses: OCENP since 1945. They purchased 2 lots from Salvador Mijares in 1989, originally owned and possessed
by Jaime, who planted different crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. The lands are
within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by DENR.
Presented: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale (2) survey plans of the properties; (3) technical descriptions of the subject
properties; (4) Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate; (5) tax declarations; & (6) certifications issued by Calamno, Senior Forest
Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that 2 lots form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.
RTC: granted the respondent’s application for registration of title, & confirming the title of the applicant Remman
Enterprises.
CA: Affired RTC’s decision. R was able to establish that the subject properties are part of the alienable & disposable
lands of the public domain; that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, as claimed by the petitioner.
Issue: whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision, which granted the application for registration filed by the
respondent. YES
Held: That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean that they
already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to
prove, with incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that the elevations of the subject properties are
above the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to Section 41(11)
of R.A. No. 4850, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of
title to the subject properties, citing the Regalian Doctrine.
The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. It refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired
under the Public Land Act: applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: 1 st, that the subject land forms
part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; 2 nd, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The 1st requirement was not satisfied in this case. The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in
support of its application for registration are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by
the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in subsequent cases notwithstanding that the applications
for registration were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.
Anent the 2nd and 3rd requirements, respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The testimony of R’s witnesses are self-serving assertions of the possession and
occupation of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the
incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other
than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other evidence to prove the character of the
possession and occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.
Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual
evidence of possession. Proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of
ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The
possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years."
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent were only for
2002, which respondent failed to explain why. No improvement or plantings were declared or noted in the said tax
declarations. This fact belies the claim that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest, contrary to Cerquena's
testimony, have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the manner required by law.
Republic vs. Joson, March 10, 2014
Facts: This case concerns the discharge of the burden of proof by the applicant in proceedings for the registration of land
under Section 14 (1) and (2) of Property Registration Decree. Republic appeals the adverse decision promulgated
in2004, whereby CA affirmed the judgment rendered in 1981 by the CFI, granting the application of the respondent for
the registration of her title covering a land in Bulacan. Joson filed her application for land registration in the CFI in
Bulacan. In 1977, at the initial hearing of the application, Fiscal Reyes interposed an opposition in behalf of the Director
of Lands & the Bureau of Public Works.
Joson: The land was a riceland originally owned and possessed by Dionisio since 1907. In 1926, Dionisio, by way of a
deed of sale, had sold the land to Jacinto; that upon the death of Jacinto, her sister Maria (mother of the respondent) had
inherited the land; that upon the death of Maria in 1963, the respondent had herself inherited the land, owning and
possessing it openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely against the whole world, and in the concept of owner since then;
that the land had been declared in her name for taxation purposes; and that the taxes due thereon had been paid, as shown
in OR.
Fiscal Reyes, the Director of Lands and the Director of Forest Development: whatever legal and possessory rights the
respondent had acquired by reason of any Spanish government grants had been lost, abandoned for failure to occupy and
possess the land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land applied for,
being actually a portion of the Labangan Channel operated by the Pampanga River Control System, could not be subject
of appropriation or land registration.
OSG:  the land was within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan, as indicated in BF Map; that areas within the
unclassified region were denominated as forest lands and thus fell under the exclusive jurisdiction, control and authority
of the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD); CFI didn’t aquire jurisdiction since the land was beyond the commerce of
man; the payment of taxes vested no title or ownership in the declarant or taxpayer.
RTC: ordered the registration of the land in favor of the respondent on the ground that she had sufficiently established her
OCEN possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. CA: Affirmed
Issues: WON the land subject of application for registration is susceptible of private acquisition; WON RTC and CA erred
in granting the application for registration
Held: Cited Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Property Registration Decree. Section 14(1) deals with possession & occupation
in the concept of an owner while Section 14(2) involves prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership.
In Republic v. Doldol, the Court provided a summary of these amendments: The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No.141
provided for possession & occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No.
1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January
25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession & occupation for 30 years/more is not sufficient. Therefore, since
the effectivity of PD 1073 in 1977, it must now be shown that possession & occupation of the piece of land by the
applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total
conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529. Under Section 14(1), therefore, the respondent had to prove that: (1) the land
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) she, by herself or through her
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945, or earlier. It is the applicant who carries the burden of
proving that the 2 requisites have been met. Failure to do so warrants the dismissal of the application.
The respondent unquestionably complied with the 2 nd requisite. She testified on how the land had been passed on to her
from her predecessors-in-interest; & tendered documentary evidence like: (1) the Deed of Sale evidencing the transfer of
the property from Dionisio to Jacinto in 1926; (2) Tax Declaration showing that she had declared the property for taxation
purposes in 1976; and (3) Official Receipt indicating that she had been paying taxes on the land since 1977. Nonetheless,
what is left wanting is the fact that the respondent did not discharge her burden to prove the classification of the land as
demanded by the 1st requisite. She did not present evidence of the land, albeit public, having been declared alienable and
disposable by the State. Belatedly realizing her failure to prove the alienable and disposable classification of the land, the
petitioner submitted the certification in 2000 issued by the DENR-CENRO, certifying that the land falls within the
Alienable or Disposable Land Project No of Paombong. However, the CA denied her motion to admit the appellee’s brief,
and expunged the appellee’s brief from the records. Even had the respondent’s effort to insert the certification been
successful, the same would nonetheless be ineffectual: a survey conducted by a geodetic engineer that included a
certification on the classification of the land as alienable & disposable was not sufficient to overcome the presumption
that the land still formed part of the inalienable public domain.
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified/alienated to
a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept
of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.
The mere certification issued by the CENRO/PENRO did not suffice to support the application for registration, because
the applicant must also submit a copy of the original classification of the land as alienable and disposable as approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO
Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in
support of its application. Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original registration. Yet, even assuming that the
DENR-CENRO certification alone would have sufficed, the respondent’s application would still be denied considering
that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable came only after the filing of the application in court in 1976.
The certification itself indicated that the land was reclassified as alienable or disposable only on October 15, 1980.
On the other hand, under Section 14(2), ownership of private lands acquired through prescription may be registered in the
owner’s name. The respondent did not acquire the land through prescription even considering that her possession &
occupation of the land by her and her predecessors-in-interest could be traced back to as early as in 1926, and that the
nature of their possession and occupation was that of a bona fide claim of ownership for over 30 years.
Nonetheless, Article 422 and 420 of CC. Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and
reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the
bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine
and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as
such and ought to be used only by the Government. In other words, the period of possession prior to the reclassification of
the land, no matter how long, was irrelevant because prescription did not operate against the State before then.
City Mayor vs. Ebio, June 23, 2010
Facts: Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a land in Parañaque & covered by Tax Declaratios in the
name of respondent Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant &
possessor of the said land was their great grandfather, Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro.
From then on, Pedro continuously & exclusively occupied & possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit
declaring possession & occupancy, Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration over the said property in his name.  Since
then, respondents have been religiously paying real property taxes for the said property. Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent
Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. Upon Pedro’s advice, the couple established their home on the said lot. Ebio
secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the said
compound.  Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Ebio.
Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedro’s name were cancelled & new ones were issued in Ebio’s name.
In 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a Resolution seeking assistance from the City
Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek. The proposed road will run from
Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. When the city
government advised all the affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their opposition
thereto. As a result, the road project was temporarily suspended.
In 2003, officials from the barangay & the city planning office proceeded to cut 8 coconut trees planted on the said lot.
Respondents filed letter-complaints before the Bureau of Lands, DILG and the Office of the Vice Mayor.  In 2005, City
Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area. Threatened of being evicted, respondents
went to the RTC of Parañaque & applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. In the course of the
proceedings, respondents admitted before that they have a pending application for the issuance of a sales patent before the
DENR.
RL 8 is owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by a TCT. It appears to have been donated by the Guaranteed Homes
to the Government of Parañaque in 1966 & which was accepted by the then Mayor BERNABE. There is no evidence
however, when RL 8 has been intended as a road lot. VITALEZ possessed the accreted property since 1930 per his
Affidavit for the purpose of declaring the said property for taxation purposes. The property then became the subject of
Tax Declaration beginning the year 1967 and the real property taxes therefor had been paid for 20 years. In 1987, PEDRO
VITALEZ transferred his rights in the accreted property to MARIO EBIO and his successors-in-interest.
RTC issued an Order denying the petition for lack of merit, & they were not able to prove successfully that they have an
established right to the property since they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title & their application for
sales patent has not yet been granted. They also failed to implead the Republic, which is an indispensable party. CA ruled
in Ebio’s favor.
Issues: 1) whether the State is an indispensable party to respondents’ action for prohibitory injunction; 2) whether the
character of respondents’ possession & occupation of the subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory
injunction. YES
Held: It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along
the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits along the banks of a
creek: Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or
sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands. Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters.
All alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by
law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial
property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. In contrast, properties of public dominion
cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no
prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city/municipality cannot acquire them by
prescription as against the State. Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion,  the land which is
formed by the gradual & imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain
by clear provision of law.
In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of Parañaque from proceeding with its
implementation of the road construction project. The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action
where no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar.
Neither would it be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights infringed.
We also find that the character of possession & ownership by the respondents over the contested land entitles them to the
avails of the action. A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief
must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing.
For more than 30 years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the government of Parañaque in its corporate/private capacity
sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject
property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title
over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the
registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land.
The filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains pending before the DENR, didn’t make them
estopped them from filing an injunction suit. Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either
through judicial proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant case, respondents admitted that they opted to
confirm their title over the property administratively by filing an application for sales patent.
Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corp., February 20, 2012
Facts: The respondent filed with the RTC an application for land registration in Misamis Oriental. The respondent
purchased the portion of the subject property from Francisca pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale in 1990 & the remaining
portion from Rosario, Nemesia & Mariano pursuant to a Deed of Partial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale in 1991. It
was claimed that the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive
possession of the subject property since June 12, 1945. RTC issued a Decision, granting the respondent’s petition for
registration of the land, which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: whether the respondent has proven itself entitled to the benefits of the PLA & P.D. No. 1529 on confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles.
Held: Respondent fell short of proving that it has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property under Section 48 (b)
of the PLA. The respondent can’y register the subject property in its name on the basis of either Section 14 (1) or Section
14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It was not established by the required quantum of evidence that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property for the
prescribed statutory period.
The PLA governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. Under Section 11 thereof, one of the
modes of disposing public lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by "confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles".On the other hand, Section 48 provides the grant to the qualified possessor of an alienable and disposable public
land. Thus: The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to CFI of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the
rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.
P.D. No. 1073, which was issued in, 1977, deleted subsection (a) and amended subsection (b) as follows:
SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended
in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant thru himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
P.D. No. 1529, which was enacted in 1978, codified all the laws relative to the registration of property. Section 14 thereof
partially provides: Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper CFI an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion
under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) are clearly different. Section 14 (1) covers "alienable and disposable land" while Section
14 (2) covers "private property".
In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the
periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically convert said property into private property or release it from
the public domain. There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for public service or
development of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the State, and thus, may not be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public
use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how
public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is
only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law. 15
In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14 (2) and set up acquisitive prescription against the State, it is
primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession
preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the
prescriptive period. To prove that its predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject property on or prior to June
12, 1945 or had completed the prescriptive period of 30 years.
To prove that its predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the subject property, the respondent claimed that
per Francisca Oco’s Tax Declarations, the following improvements were introduced in Area A: nineteen (19) coconut and
ten (10) banana trees in Area A in 1957 and 1963; thirty-three (33) coconut trees in 1969 and 1973; thirty-three (33)
coconut trees, one (1) mango tree and three (3) seguidillas vines in 1974; thirty-three (33) coconut trees in 1980; eighty-
seven (87) coconut trees in 1987; and fifteen (15) coconut trees in 1989. Per Jacinto Tan’s Tax Declarations, there were
fifty-seven (57) coconut trees in Area B in 1973, 1974, 1980, 1989 and 1990. 18
On the premise that the application for registration, which was filed in 1995, is based on Section 14 (2), it was not proven
that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject property in the manner prescribed
by law and for the period necessary before acquisitive prescription may apply.
While the subject land was supposedly declared alienable and disposable in1925 per the 1997 Certification and Report of
the CENRO, DAR converted the same from agricultural to industrial only in 1990.  Also, it was only in 2000 that the
Municipality passed a Zoning Ordinance, including the subject property in the industrial zone.
On the premise that the application of the respondent is predicated on Section 14 (1), the same would likewise not
prosper. As shown by the tax declarations of the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest, the earliest that the respondent can
trace back the possession of its predecessors-in-interest is in 1948. Furthermore, the testimony of the respondent’s lone
witness that the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest were already in possession of the subject property as of June 12,
1945 lacks probative value for being hearsay.It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and occupation required
to acquire an imperfect title over an alienable and disposable public land must be "open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious" in character.
On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required nature of possession and occupation, thus, requiring a
reference to the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118 thereof, possession for
purposes of prescription must be "in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted". In Heirs of Marcelina
Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon,25 this Court expounded on the nature of possession required for purposes of prescription:
It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession
should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent,
visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to
his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or
the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the
essential elements of acquisitive prescription.
This Court is not satisfied with the evidence presented by the respondent to prove compliance with the possession
required either under Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2). The Tax Declarations for a claimed possession of more than 46
years do not qualify as competent evidence of actual possession & occupation. The plants were on the subject property
without any evidence that it was the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest who planted them and that actual
cultivation/harvesting was made does not constitute "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" of actual possession and
occupation. Hence, existence of an unspecified number of coffee plants, sans any evidence as to who planted them, when
they were planted, whether cultivation or harvesting was made or what other acts of occupation & ownership were
undertaken, is not sufficient to demonstrate petitioner’s right to the registration of title in her favor. The respondent’s
application was filed after only 4 years from the time the subject property may be considered patrimonial by reason of the
DAR’s Order shows lack of possession whether for ordinary/extraordinary prescriptive period.
Republic vs. CA and Tancino, October 12, 1984
FACTS:
Tancinco, et al filed an application for the registration of the lots adjacent to their fishpond property bordering the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. RTC granted the application on the finding that the subject lots were accretions to the
fishponds owned by Tancinco, et al. CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Hence, this petition. The Republic submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Art 457, NCC, because what
actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the
Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial. Meanwhile, Tancinco, et
al rely on the testimony of a witness which, they submit, establishes the fact of accretion without intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the lots were subject for registration
RULING: NO.
RATIO:
Art 457, NCC provides - to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters. This requires the concurrence of three requisites - 1) that the deposit
be gradual and imperceptible; 2) that it be made through the effect of the current of the waters; and 3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. In this case, there
is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects of the
current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by
special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the Tancinco, et al transferred their dikes
towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive
force of the waters of the river.
The Court cannot validly order the registration of the lots because they were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river
and are therefore classified as property of the public domain which are not open to registration under the Land
Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the Tancinco, et al is null
and void.
Grande vs. CA, June 30, 1962
On Registration (Property registration decree)
FACTS:
Ignacio Grande, et al are the owners of a lot which they received by inheritance from their predecessors, in whose name
said lot appears registered as show in the OCT. The land was described to have Cagayan River as the northeastern
boundary, as stated in the title.
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of the river, and an alluvial deposit of almost
20,000 sq.m. was added to the registered area. Grande, et al instituted the present action against Calalung to quiet title
over the accretion. They alleged in the complaint that they were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof,
until Calalung entered upon the land under a claim of ownership.
CFI adjudged the ownership of the portion to Grande, et al and ordered Calalung to vacate the premises. It ruled that the
accretion is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property belonging to Grande et al, and could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession by another person.
On appeal, the CA reversed by stating that the accretion to registered land does not ipso jure become entitled to the
protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title as the protection under the Land Registration Act does not extend
beyond the area given and described in the certificate of title. As Calalung had been in possession since 1934, and that
Grande, et al only woke up to their rights 14 years later, prescription had already supervened in favor of Calalung.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a
Torrens title, thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible
2. W/N Calalang has acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription

RULING:
1. NO.
2. YES.
RATIO:
1. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under the Torrens system is another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the CC; while imprescriptibility of registered land
is provided in the registration law. Registration under the LRA and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the
land, but merely confirms and protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by
occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws.
The fact remains, however, that Grande, et al, never sought registration of said accretion up to the time they
instituted the present action in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not
subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system.
Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
2. The CA, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since
1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in
1958. This finding of these facts by the CA is conclusive.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil
Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the SCC were not in force and
before the effectivity of the NCC in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the CA that Calalang acquired the alluvial lot
in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
Intnl. Hardwood vs UP, August 13, 1991
On Registration (Property registration decree)
FACTS:
International Hardwood was granted by the Government a renewal of their exclusive license for a period of 25 years to
cut, collect, and remove timber from a certain portion of timber land. Since 1953, Hardwood has been in peaceful
possession of the timber concession.
During the effectivity of the license agreement, Executive Proclamation 791 was issued, reserving for the University of
the Philippines certain parcels of land for purposes of agricultural research and production. Later on, RA 3990 was
enacted, establishing a central experiment station for UP. On the strength of this, UP demanded that Hardwood pay the
forest charges to the former instead of the BIR and that the sealing of any timber cut by Hardwood within the boundaries
of the experiment station be performed by UP. However, despite repeated demands, Hardwood refused to accede to UP’s
demands.
Hardwood filed a petition, seeking a declaration that UP does not have the right to supervise and regulate the cutting and
removal of timber and other forest products; to scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or collect forest charges from
Hardwood and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its concession covered by the license
agreement.
CFI ruled in favor of Hardwood. In ruling against UP, CFI held that the cession in full ownership of the tract of land
referred to in RA 3990 was expressly made ‘subject to any existing concessions.’ As Hardwood’s concession was existing
and would continue to exist for a few more years, UP will acquire full ownership and exclusive jurisdiction over the
property only after the expiry of the term. CA elevated the case to the SC as the case involves purely legal questions.
ISSUE: W/N UP is entitled to supervise the logging, felling and removal of timber within the area covered by RA 3990
RULING: YES.
RATIO:
RA 3990 provides that the reserved area was ‘ceded and transferred in full ownership to UP subject to any existing
concessions, if any.’ When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic completely removed the area from
the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of Hardwood, removed and
segregated it from a public forest.
That the law intended a transfer of absolute ownership to UP is unequivocally evidence by its use of the word ‘full’ to
describe it. Thus, insofar as the Republic is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the timber license were effectively
assigned, ceded, and conveyed to UP as a consequence of the transfer of full ownership.
In this case, while an exception is made for Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the concession, it has the correlative duty
and obligation to pay the forest charges or royalties to the new owner, UP. The charges should not be paid anymore to the
Republic through BIR because of the very nature of the transfer as said.
Republic Rep. by Mindanao Medical Center vs. CA, September 30, 1976
FACTS:
Eugenio de Jesus applied with the Bureau of Lands for a sales patent covering a 33HA land, then known as Lot 522 of the
Davao Cadastre. Years after, the BoL accepted bids for the purchase of the same land, with Eugenio as the winning
bidder. The Director of Lands issued to him an order of award. The award provided that Eugenio’s application be entered
in the records of BoL, covering the tract awarded therein.
Later, a portion of the land covered by the sales application was needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site
purposes as per Proclamation 85 and was thus excluded. Thereafter, Eugenio was granted a sales patent.
However, Proclamation 85 was revoked and the portion declared open to disposition under the provisions of the Public
Land Act for resettlement of squatters. Later on, the proclamation was again revoked and the same portion was reserved
for medical center site purposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital.
Hence, Mindanao Medical Center (MMC) applied for the Torrens registration of the portion, claiming ‘fee simple’ title to
the land on the strength of the proclamation. Alejandro de Jesus, on behalf of Eugenio, opposed the registration on the
ground that his father had acquired a vested right on the lot by virtue of the order of award issued to him.
CFI ruled in favor of MMC; while the CA affirmed Alejandro’s appeal and decreed the portion in his name. Hence, MMC
elevated the matter to the SC.
ISSUE: W/N MMC has a registrable title over the contested area by virtue of Proclamation 350 reserving the said land for
medical site purposes
RULING: YES.
RATIO:
Proclamation 350 legally effected a land grant to the MMC, et al of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial registration
under the Land Registration Act. It would be absurd to rule that, on the basis of the proclamation, MMC only has
registrable title on the portion occupied by it and not to the full extent of the reservation when the proclamation explicitly
reserved the entire lot to it.
Additionally, the patent and sales order issued in favor of Eugenio only covers 20.64HA, not the entire 33HA as applied
for by him. The phrase 'whole tract' in the sales award cannot be licitly seized upon as basis for the conclusion that the
area awarded to Eugenio was the entire 33HA. Such general description of 'whole tract' cannot prevail over the specific
description delineatint the area in quantity and its boundaries.
Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Govenrment and most strongly agains the grantee. Any
doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant is to be resolved in the Government's favor.
Eugenio's alleged occupation, cultivation, and imporvement of the entire 33HA did not vest in him a right of preference in
the acquisition if land. Such right is subject to the authority of the President to withdraw such lots for sale or public
acquisition or to reserve them for public use.
PUBLIC LAND ACT (CA NO. 141)
Republic vs. Doldol, September 10, 1998
FACTS:
Nicanor Doldol filed an application for saltwork purposes over a certain portion of land he occupied. The Director of
Forestry, however, rejected the same. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution reserving
a lot as a school site, which unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol. Years later, Proclamation 180 reserved
the area for Opol National School.
The School needed the area occupied by Doldol and made several demands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused
to move. In view of such refusal, the School filed a complaint for accion possessoria. The RTC ruled in favor of the
school and consequently ordered Doldol to vacate.
CA reversed by holding that Doldol was entitled to his portion, having possessed the same for 32 years. It grounded its
decision on Sec 48, Public Land act which provides that a citizen of the Philippines may acquire alienable land of the
public domain if he has possessed the same for 30 years. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: W.N Doldol, having occupied the lot for 32 years, acquired the right over the land
RULING: NO
HELD:
The CA has resolved the question as to who between the parties had a better right to possess the lot through an erroneous
application of an outdated version of the PLA. Such has been amended by PD 1073, approved on January 25, 1977 - it
now provides that the bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership must be since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title.
In this case, the evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable, in accordance with the
District Forester’s certification. The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial that Doldol had been occupying the
portion reserved for the school site only since 1959 .
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot since his occupation of the same
started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set by the law, Doldol
cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land in question and cannot assert a right superior to the School, given that a
proclamation reserved the lot for it.
Republic vs. Espinosa, July 18, 2012
FACTS:
Domingo Espinosa filed an application for land registration covering a lot. In support of this, he alleged that a) the
property is alienable and disposable; b) he purchased the property from his mother; and c) he and his predecessors had
been in possession of the property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. He also submitted the blueprint of a
survey plan, tax declarations, and a certification from the City Treasurer.
The Republic opposed Espinoa’s application by claiming that the Public Land Act had not been complied with as
Espinosa’s predecessor possessed the property only after June 12, 1945 and that the tax decs were insufficient proof that
Espinosa and his predecessors possessed the land for the period required by law.
MTC granted Espinoa’s application and ordered the registration and confirmation of his title. It found that Espinosa was
able to prove that the property is alienable and disposable and that he and his possessors were in OCENPO. CA affirmed
by ruling that possession for at least 30 years, despite the fact that it commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert
the property to private.
Hence, this recourse to the SC.
ISSUE: W/N Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is worthy of confirmation and
registration
RULING: NO.
RATIO:
Based on Espinosa’s allegations and his supporting documents, it is patent that his claim of an imperfect title over the
subject property is based on Sec 14 (2) of the PRD in relation to Sec 48 (b) of the PLA. However, the changes in the PLA
must be apprised.
Previously, Sec 48 (b) provided for a 30-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. However, on
January 25, 1977, the requirement was changed to possession and occupation since June 12, 1945.
While it is true that vested rights may be acquired prior to the amendment, there is nothing on record which would show
as of January 25, 1977, Espinosa or his predecessor had already acquired title by means of possession and occupation of
the property for 30 years. On the contrary, the earliest tax dec presented was in 1965, indicating that as of the reckoning
date, only 12 years had lapsed from the time she first came supposedly into possession.
Thus, assuming that the aforementioned provisions should apply in this case, as the lower courts held, it was incumbent
upon Espinosa to prove that his predecessor’s possession dated back at least to June 12, 1945.
Granting Espinosa and his predecessors possessed and occupied the property for an aggregate period of 30 years, this does
not operate to divest the State of its ownership. For prescription to run against the State, there must be proof that there was
an official declaration that the subject property is no longer earmarked for public service or the development of national
wealth. Moreover, such official declaration should have been issued at least 10 or 30 years, as the case may be, prior to
the filing of the application for registration.
To prove that the land was alienable and disposable, Espinosa relies on the blueprint copy of the conversion and
subdivision plan approved by the DENR, which bears the notation of a surveyor geodetic engineer that the land was
‘alienable and disposable.’ This proof, however, is insufficient as what is required by law is incontrovertible evidence.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.
Based on the foregoing, Espinosa cannot avail of the benefits of either Sec 14 (1) or (21) of the PRD in relation to the
PLA.
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT- IPRA (RA NO. 8371)
Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, December 6, 2000
Facts: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground
that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands"
which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP (National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples) and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Respondents Secretary of the DENR and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through
the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part.
Issue: Issue: Whether or not the IPRA law (specifically the aforementioned sections therein) is unconstitutional.
Ruling: NO. After due deliberation on the petition, 7 members of the court voted to dismiss the petition.
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that
grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large
scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands
and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal
grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same. 
Summary of separate opinions of each Justice
Q1: Whether or not Sections 3(a)(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57 and 58 of IPRA unlawfully deprive the state of its ownership of lands
of public domain and violate the regalian doctrine.
Justice Kapunan: NO. Said provisions affirming the IPs’ ownership of their ancestral land by virtue of native title do not
diminish the state’s ownership of lands within public domain because ancestral lands and domains are considered private
land.
Sec. 3(a) does not confer any right of ownership over the natural resources to the ICCs/IPs. Its purpose is merely
definitional. Sec. 57 only grants priority rights to ICCs/IPs in the utilization of natural resources and not absolute
ownership thereof.
Justice Puno: NO. Ancestral lands and domains are not part of public domain. They are private and belong to the
ICCs/IPs. The classification of lands in the public domain under Sec. 3, Art. XII of the
Constitution does not include ancestral lands nor domain.
The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and lands may be acquired in 2 modes: (1) native title or (2) torrens title
under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
Both modes recognize the land as private. However, by including “natural resources”, Sec. 1, Part II, Rule III of
Implementing Rules goes beyond Sec. 7(a) and therefore is unconstitutional.
Justice Panganiban: YES. Sec. 3(a) contravenes Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution. IPRA does not specify the limits to
ancestral lands and domains. It also relinquishes the state power of full control of natural resources in ancestral lands and
domains in favor of ICCs/IPs who may exercise these rights without any time limit.
Justice Vitug: YES. Sec. 7 and 57 go beyond the context of the fundamental law.