IN RE: WILL OF REV. ABADIA, G.R. NO.

L-7188, AUGUST 9, 1954

Facts::
The deceased Father Sancho Abadia executed a holographic will in his own handwriting, numbered and signed by
the testator himself and attested by three (3) witnesses on September 6, 1923. He died on January 14, 1943 in
Cebu. The will was admitted to probate on January 24, 1952. Some of the cousins and nephews, who would inherit
the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.

Issue:
What law should apply as to the validity of the holographic will: the old Civil Code when the will was executed or
the new Civil Code which could have validated the will?

Held:
It should be the old Civil Code. The new Civil Code, which took effect August 30, 1950, provides in Art. 795: “The
validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made.” Here, the
validity of the holographic will is to be judged not by the law enforced at the time when the petition is decided by
the court but at the time the instrument was executed. When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to
observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution, just like in this case, then upon his death he
should be regarded and declared as having died intestate. This is because the general rule is that the Legislature
cannot validate void wills.
FLEUMER V. HIX, 54 PHIL. 610
Facts:
Petitioner theorized that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who
had his residence in that jurisdiction. The will was presented for probate in the Court of First Instance but no
evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the
alleged will was executed. For that reason, the probate was denied.

Issue:
Whether the courts of the Philippine Islands are authorized to take judicial notice of foreign laws insofar as wills
are concerned.

Held:
NO. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. Such laws must be proved as Facts:.
Here, the requirement of law was not met. There was no extract from the law attested by the certificate of the
officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in the Section 301 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on
this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside
without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means.
(Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 633)

ESTATE OF GIBERSON, G.R. NO. L-4113, JUNE 30, 1952

Facts:
Lela G. Dalton presented on February 10, 1949 an application with the Court of First Instance of Cebu for the
probate of the holographic will of William R. Giberson, a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States, dated April
29, 1920 in San Francisco, California. Spring Giberson, legitimate son of William R. Giberson, presented an
opposition alleging that the will is apocrypha (with questionable authenticity), it does not represent the true will of
the late Giberson, and has not been granted according to the law.

Issue:
Whether the wills executed outside the Philippines may be probated without being first probated in the country of
its execution.

Held:
YES. Section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating that “a will made out of the Philippine Islands… may be
proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to
the laws of these Islands” is still in force and has not been abrogated by Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. Here, the will
of William Giberson need not be probated first in the State of Illinois, USA before it may be probated here in the
Philippines. The Court opined that Section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure is substantive in nature and therefore
could not have been repealed by the Rules of Court which are only procedural in nature.
DE LA CERNA V. POTOT, 12 SCRA 576
Facts
1. The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will where they gave two (2) parcels of
land to manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child. When Bernabe died, the said will was
probated in 1939.

2. Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952 but due to the
failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in 1954.

3. The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law. While the Court of
Appeals reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was Issue:d by a court of probate jurisdiction and
conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the will is valid

HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that Once a decree of probate becomes final in accordance
with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata. THe final decree of probate entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu is
conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the
invalidity of joint wills. (There was an error on the court but the decree has now become final.)

The probate court committed an error of law which should have been corrected on appeals but which did not
affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision. A decision which is binding
upon the whole world.

Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and could not include the disposition of the
share of his wife which was still alive then, her properties were still not within the jurisdiction of the court. Hence,
the validity of the will with respect to her, must be on her death, be re-examined and adjudicated de novo -- since
a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.
ESTATE OF RODRIGUEZ, 46 O.G. #2, P. 584

Facts:
Respondents opposed petitioner Araniego’s petition for probate of his deceased wife’s will. Araniego was made a
universal heir by his wife; likewise, he made his wife as his universal heir. Thus, respondents contend that being
reciprocal beneficiaries, Araniego and his wife violated the prohibition on joint wills.

Issue:
WON the wills executed is a joint will under Art. 818

Held:
NO. It is the making of a will in a conjoint manner or in the same document, is that which is prohibited. Here, there
is no joint will to speak of because Araniego and his wife made each other as their universal heir in their respective
wills.
ESTATE OF CHRISTENSEN, 61 O.G. #46, P. 7302
FACTS:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but migrated to California where he resided. Later, the Philippines
became his domicile until the time of his death. In his will, he acknowledged Maria Lucy Christensen as his only
heir but left a legacy of sum of money to Maria Helen Christensen. Helen posits that California law is clear that the
matter is referred back to the law of the domicile and therefore Philippine Law is applicable. Lucy contends that
the national law of the deceased must apply hence Helen is not compulsory heir and so Edward could freely
dispose his property.

ISSUE:
Which is the relevant law insofar as the amount of successional rights of Helen and Lucy are concerned?

HELD:
It is ultimately the Philippine Law. The California law has two rules on the matter. The internal law which should
apply to Californians domiciled in California and the conflicts rule which should apply to Californians domiciled
outside of California. Edward being domiciled outside California (in the Philippines) follows that the law of his
domicile. The validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, Helen, should be
governed by the Philippine law in determining the successional rights of Helen.
ESTATE OF AMOS BELLIS, 20 SCRA 358
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas of the United States. He executed a will in the Philippines,
disposing a part of his estate in favor of his illegitimate children, before he died a resident of San Antonio, Texas,
U.S.A. His will was probated in the CFI of Manila.

ISSUE:
Which law must apply to the dispositions in the will, the Texas Law or Philippine law?

HELD:
It is the Texas Law. Texas Law should govern the execution of the will and the successional rights of the illegitimate
children. As stated in Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, it renders applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard the amount of successional rights, among others.
Here, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no
forced heirs or legitimes. The Doctrine of Renvoi was discussed but not applied in this case. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
CAYETANO V. LEONIDES, 129 SCRA 524
FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez,
and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir is Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication, adjudicating unto himself the entire estate of Adoracion.

Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among others that Adoracion was an
American citizen and that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion died in Manila while temporarily residing in
Malate.

While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix.
Hence, this case.

ISSUE:
● Whether or not the will was valid
● Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings

HELD:
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the Issue:s.

In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the law which governs her
will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the national law of the decedent
must apply.

As to the Issue: of jurisdiction --

The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she had an estate
since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident of Cavite.

Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for
relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA V. RIGOR, 89 SCRA 493
FACTS:
Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, left a will executed and was probated by the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest
relatives, his three sisters. In addition, the will provided that it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to
be given to the nearest male relative who shall take the priesthood.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the bequest in question be declared inoperative.

HELD
In the law of contracts and statutory construction, the primary Issue: is the determination of the testator's
intention which is the law of the case. What is no clear is on how long after the testator's death would it be
determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. The SC held that the said bequest
refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time
thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the
succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code). Inasmuch as the
testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in
question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of
Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
REYES V. CA, S.C, L-5620, JULY 31 1954

FACTS:
Benedicto delos Reyes, during his lifetime, sold some of his properties to the heirs of his executor. The said sale
was challenged by the heirs of the decedent, contending therein that said properties cannot be legally disposed by
the decedent because it forms part of his estate to be inherited by petitioners, the decedent heirs. Both the trial
court upheld the validity of the sale between decedent and the heirs of the executor having said that the sold
properties were sold before the death of the decedent and can no longer be part of the inheritance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled of the property sold by the decedent during his lifetime.

HELD:
It depends. The general rule is that the heirs cannot validly claim ownership over the properties in question if
alienated prior to the decedent’s death. The rights to succession are transmitted at the moment of death of the
decedent (Art. 777 of the Civil Code) Exception is when said alienation is subsequently declared void as when there
is intent to defraud and to deprive the heirs of their legitimes. In such case, said alienation is void. Here, the sale
was declared void for being absolutely simulated and because of intent to defraud heirs of their legitimes. Hence,
said properties still form part of the inheritance of the deceased.
GUINTO V, MEDINA, 50 O.G. #1 P. 199, OCT. 7, 1953

FACTS:

Leon Guinto filed an action for forcible entry against Santiago Medina alleging that he has been in possession of
the said parcel of land since 1934 and that Medina by means of force and intimidation deprived him of his
possession thereof. The trial court ruled in favor of Guinto but it dismissed the prayer for damages. Pending
appeal, Medina died. Medina was substituted by his heirs. The Court awarded the damages appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of Medina are liable for damages, and if in the affirmative to what extent.

HELD:

YES. The action to recover damages survives notwithstanding the death of the adverse party whom damages are
sought to be recovered. In this case, the heirs of Medina are liable to pay the damages as they are merely
substituted in the place of Medina upon his death. However, their liability is only to the extent of the value of the
property, which they might have received from the deceased defendant.
USON V. DEL ROSARIO, 92 PHIL. 530
FACTS
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this
litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. Maria Uson sought to recover lands
held by Maria del Rosario who had four illegitimate children with Nebreda, which the latter contends that her
children are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights, and because
these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illegitimate children may have successional rights under the new Civil Code by way of its
retroactive effect.

HELD:
NO. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation,
but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. The law
commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code).
The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot,
therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
DE BORJA V. DE BORJA, 46 SCRA 577

FACTS:
The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put
an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into. Tasiana assailed the validity of
agreement applying the doctrine in Guevarra v. Guevarra. Jose de Borja pointed out that the Rules of Court allows
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs may enter into compromise agreement to convey their share of the inheritance even
before the probate of the will.

HELD:
YES. The Held: in Guevarra v. Guevara, relied by the appellant, which declared invalid a compromise agreement
which disposes of the estate before probate of the will is not applicable here. Successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777). In this case, the clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the
estate of Francisco de Borja and JosefaTangco. The transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities,
upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same.
BONILLA V. BARCENA, 71 SCRA 491

FACTS:
Fortunata Barcena filed an action to quiet title over parcels of land. Pending the proceeding, she died. The counsel
for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be
allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel’s prayer for lack of merit, and
dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a court action survives, through the heirs, after the death of the plaintiff.

HELD:
YES. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent.” From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute
owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their
rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or
right to the parcels of land in litigation, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon
her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the
case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest
for the deceased plaintiff.
CRUZ V. CRUZ, G.R. NO. 173292, SEPT. 1, 2010

FACTS:
Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the RTC a Complaint against her son, Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for “Annulment of Sale,
Reconveyance and Damages.” After Memoracion finished presenting her evidence in chief, she died. The RTC was
informed, albeit belatedly, of the death of Memoracion, and was supplied with the name and address of her legal
representative, Edgardo Cruz.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages is a purely personal action
which did not survive the death of petitioner.

HELD:
NO. The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage
sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property
and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not
survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.
Here, the petition for annulment of deed of sale involves property and property rights, and hence, survives the
death of petitioner Memoracion.
BOUGH V. MODESTO, JAN. 28, 1954, 94 PHIL.

FACTS:
Bruno Modesto, Bough and Restituto Anapo executed a private document whereby Modesto agreed that he would
share to the latter-parties whatever property that he will receive by inheritance from his wife, who predeceased
him eventually. It was proved in such private document that the properties were to be divided and proportioned.
Bough and Restituto instituted the present action to secure judgment ordering Modesto to divide the properties
left by his wife in the manner and form provided for in such private document.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract which contains object of which is Modesto’s inheritance is valid and binding between
the parties.

HELD:
YES. The contract is valid. It is well settled that rights by inheritance are acquired and transmitted upon the death
of the decedent. With this, it follows that it is perfectly legal for an heir to enter into a contract of the nature of the
document. The contract becomes effective only when Modesto is declared as heir but his right over the
inheritance accrues from the time his wife died.
BORROMEO-HERRERA V. BORROMEO, 152 SCRA 171

FACTS:
Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitime being an illegitimate son of the deceased, by incorporating a Waiver of
Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by the rest of the Borromeo’s. In the waiver, 5 of the 9 heirs relinquished to
Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The petitioners opposed this Waiver for reason that this is without
force and effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid
acceptance of the inheritance from the heirs who intend to transfer the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a Waiver of Hereditary Rights can be executed without a valid acceptance from the heirs in
question.

HELD:
YES. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that “the properties included in an existing
inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
continue the personality of the former. The heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less,
time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the
hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with
article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding
hereditary portion.
SOLIS V. ASCUENTA, 49 PHIL. 333

FACTS:
Maria Solla died leaving a will in accordance with the laws then in force but was not probated. Maria then
instituted grandson Leandro Serrano as universal heir, with the obligation that the latter shall “give or deliver to
the parish priest of this town a sufficient sum of money necessary for a yearly novena” and shall “insist that his
heirs comply with the same”. The Trial Court ruled that the order mentioned by Maria Solla that Leandro shall
“insist that his heirs comply with the same” pertains to both the distribution of the legacies and the pious
bequests.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the phrase “insist that his heirs comply with the same” pertains to both the distribution of the
legacies and the pious bequests.

HELD:
NO. In order to determine the testator’s intention, the court should place itself as near as possible in his position,
and hence, where the language of the will is ambiguous or doubtful, should take into consideration the situation of
the testator and the Facts: and circumstances surrounding him at the time the will executed. In the present case, it
appearing that it was Mari Solla’s intention, in ordering her universal heir Leandro Serrano in her will at the hour of
his death, to insist upon the compliance of her orders by his heirs, that the latter should comply with her pious
orders and that she did not mean her orders concerning her legacies.
BALTAZAR V. LAXA, G.R. NO. 174489, APRIL 11, 2012

FACTS:
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster at the time she executed her will. The same was executed in the house of a
certain retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice, was signed by her, and was attested to by three credible
witness. Petitioner Rosie Mateo, daughter of the first cousin of testatrix, testified that the latter was “magulyan” or
“forgetful” because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later.
ISSUE:
Whether or not forgetfulness is equivalent to being unsound mind, hence lack of testamentary capacity.

HELD:
NO. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Article 799 of the Civil Code provides for
the criteria for soundness of mind. In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s
forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of
unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary.
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed. She
specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death.
SUROZA V. HONRADO, 110 SCRA 388

FACTS:
Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza. Mauro died and
Marcelina became the beneficiary of Mauro’s pension. Years after, Agapito married Nenita. Marcelina executed a
notarial will. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. Marcelina was illiterate. In that will, Marcelina
bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was
stated that English was a language “understood and known” to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was
stated that the will was read to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a will written in another language which is a translation of the language known to the testator is
void.

HELD:
YES. That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and,
therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the
Igorot testator, is void and must be disallowed.
GARCIA V. LACUESTA, 90 PHIL. 489

Facts:
The CA reversed the judgment of CFI by disallowing the will of Antero Mercado and ruled that the attestation
clause failed (1) to certify that the will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the end of the
will by Atty. Florentino Javier at the express request of the testator in the presence of the testator and each and
every one of the witnesses; (2) to certify that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the
former's request, said testator has written a cross at the end of his name and on the left margin of the three pages
of which the will consists and at the end thereof.

Hence, this appeal in which petitioner argues that there is no need for a recital of such express direction because
the cross written by the testator after his name is a sufficient signature and that the cross is as much a signature as
a thumbmark.

Issue:
WON the allegedly written cross by testator Mercado is a signature which sufficiently satisfies the requirement of
‘express direction’ by him to Atty. Javier

Held:
NO. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Mercado caused Atty. Javier to write the
testator's name under his express direction. Pursuant to De Gala v. Gonzales which petitioner relied on, a cross as
an intended signature is a sufficient compliance of the statutory requirement. However, the mere sign of the cross,
without any proof that it is the usual signature of the testator or at least one of the ways by which he signed his
name, cannot be likened as a thumbmark, and therefore, not a sufficient signature. A mere cross cannot and does
not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
BALONAN V. ABELLANA, 109 PHIL 358

FACTS:
The first page of the will is signed by Juan Bello and under his name appears typewritten “Por la testadora Anacleta
Abellana…”, and on the second page appears the signature of three (3) instrumental witnesses Blas Sebastian,
Faustino Macaso and Rafael Ignacio, at the bottom of which appears the signature of T. de los Santos and below
his signature is his official designation as the notary public who notarized the said testament.

ISSUE:
Does the signature of another person above the name of the testator comply with the requirements of law
prescribing the manner in which a will shall be executed?

HELD:
NO. The will must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written by
some other person in his presence and by his express direction (Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure). Here,
the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under the will by said Abellana herself, or by
Dr. Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that the testator
must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence and by his
express direction.
NERA V. RIMANDO, 18 PHIL. 450

FACTS:
A notarial will was executed in a small room. At the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document,
Jaboneta was outside, some eight or ten feet away but was actually and physically present and in such position
with relation to Jaboneta that he could see everything that took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper
direction and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the notarial will is void for the failure of the instrumental witnesses to see each other sign.

HELD:
NO. The phrase “in the presence” required by law simply means that position of the parties with relation to each
other at the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they
choose to do so. The question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the
instrument “in the presence” of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually
cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing
conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper
direction they could have seen each other sign.
TABOADA V. ROSAL, 118 SCRA 195

FACTS:
In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged last will and
testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will consists of two pages. The
first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the
testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which
contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three
(3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is void for failure to state the number of pages used in writing the will.

HELD:
NO. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire
will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses. [T]he first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at
the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is
marked as “Pagina dos” comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself
states that “This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page”.
ECHAVEZ V. DOZEN CONSTRUCTION, G.R. NO. 192916, OCTOBER 11, 2010
FACTS:
Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of the subject lots donated to petitioner Manuel Echavez
(Manuel) through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa, sans attestation clause, acknowledged before a notary public.
Manuel accepted the donation. Vicente sold the same lots in favor of Dozen Construction and Development
Corporation (Dozen Corporation). Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicente’s donation mortis causa in his favor
and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of Dozen Corporation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation mortis causa is valid despite the non-conformity with the formalities of a will.

HELD:
NO. A donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills,
“otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect.” Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have
been applied. Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation
Mortis Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the instrumental witnesses to
the execution of a decedent’s will. Hence, the donation is void, while the sale to Dozen Construction is valid.
✔ 25 IN RE: ENRIQUE LOPEZ; LOPEZ V LOPEZ, G.R. NO. 189984, NOVEMBER 12, 2012

FACTS:
The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with the required statement in the attestation
clause as to the number of pages used upon which the will is written. While the acknowledgment portion stated
that the will consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the
RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not
having been executed and attested in accordance with law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the discrepancy between the number of pages in the attestation clause and the actual number of
pages in the will that would warrant its disallowance.

HELD:
YES. The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil Code provide
that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is
to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or
decrease in the pages. Here, the will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy
cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.
✔ 26 ICASIANO V. ICASIANO, 11 SCRA 422
VILLACORTE. CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-18979, 11 S 422, June 30, 1964
FACTS::
Petitioner Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the alleged will of Josefa
Villacorte, deceased. Petitioner also filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition,
alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that
date, submitting the signed duplicate which he allegedly found only after the filing of the petition. Respondent
then filed her opposition; and she petitioned to have herself appointed as a special administrator. The records
show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of the petition consists of
five pages. While signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting
witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and
supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three of the original, admits that he may have lifted two
pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence.
Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the
duplicate are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and further aver
that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue influence
and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those
who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will.

ISSUE:: Whether or not the absence of one of the instrumental witnessess’ signature on a page of the original copy
of the will is fatal where the duplicate has the complete signatures of the testator and all witnesses on every page.

HELD:: The Court held that the testatrix signed both original and duplicate copies of the will spontaneously, on the
same in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will; and Atty.
Samson, who actually prepared the documents. Moreover, there is no adequate evidence of fraud or undue
influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither.
The failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two
pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of
this page is assured not only by the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but
also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified
by testatrix and all three witnesses.
Furthermore, that the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is
shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures
in every page.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
✔ 27 CRUZ V. VILLASOR, 54 SCRA 31
FACTS::

Agapita Cruz, the surviving spouse of Valente Cruz, the deceased, opposed the allowance of the will alleging that
such will was executed through fraud and undue influence.

She argued that of the three instrumental witnesses was at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will
was supposed to have been acknowledged. Consequently, it resulted to only two witnesses as opposed to what
Article 806 of the New Civil Code provides which talks about three or more credible witnesses.

Notwithstanding petitioner’s objection, the Court allowed the probate of the last will and testament hence this
appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE::

WON the last will and testament of the deceased was executed in accordance with law.

HELD::

No. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself that he has signed the will.

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement. That
function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. He would be
interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involved him and the validity of his own act.

To allow the notary public to act as a third witness or one of the attesting and acknowledging witnesses would
have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions
of Art. 806.

Hence, judgment appealed was reversed.

✔ 28 GABUCAN V. MANTA, 95 SCRA 752

FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Camiguin in its “decision” for the probate of the will of the late Rogaciano Gabucan,
dismissed the proceeding because the requisite documentary stamp was not affixed to the notarial
acknowledgment in the will and, hence, according to respondent Judge, it was not admissible in evidence, citing
section 238 of the Tax Code, now section 250 of the 1977 Tax Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate of a notarial will should be denied on the ground that it does not bear a thirty-centavo
documentary stamp.

HELD:
NO. What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to affix the requisite
thirty-centavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will which is the taxable portion of that
document. That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that the non-admissibility of the
document, which does not bear the requisite documentary stamp, subsists only “until the requisite stamp or
stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled.” Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be
affixed at the time the taxable document is presented in evidence. That the lack of the documentary stamp on a
document does not invalidate such document.
✔ 29 JAVELLANA V. LEDESMA, 97 PHIL 258
Facts::
1. The CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate a will and codicil executed by the deceased Apolinaria Ledesma in July
1953. This testament was deemed executed on May 1950 and May 1952. The contestant was the sister and
nearest surviving relative of the deceased. She appealed from this decision alleging that the will were not
executed in accordance with law.

2. The testament was executed at the house of the testatrix. One the other hand, the codicil was executed after
the enactment of the New Civil Code (NCC), and therefore had to be acknowledged before a notary public. Now,
the contestant, who happens to be one of the instrumental witnesses asserted that after the codicil was signed
and attested at the San Pablo hospital, that Gimotea (the notary) signed and sealed it on the same occasion.
Gimotea, however, said that he did not do so, and that the act of signing and sealing was done afterwards.

2. One of the allegations was that the certificate of acknowledgement to the codicil was signed somewhere else or
in the office of the notary. The ix and the witnesses at the hospital, was signed and sealed by the notary only when
he brought it in his office.

Issue:: Whether or not the signing and sealing of the will or codicil in the absence of the testator and witnesses
affects the validity of the will

HELD:: NO. Unlike in the Old Civil Code of 1899, the NCC does not require that the signing of the testator, the
witnesses and the notary be accomplished in one single act. All that is required is that every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and witnesses. The subsequent signing and sealing is not part
of the acknowledgement itself nor of the testamentary act. Their separate execution out of the presence of the
testator and the witnesses cannot be a violation of the rule that testaments should be completed without
interruption.
✔ 30 GONZALES V. CA, 90 SCRA 183

Facts::
1. Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces of the deceased Isabel
Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in Tagalog
and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two months prior to the death of Isabel. It consisted of 5
pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin
of all the pages.
2. Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the probate.
3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed and attested in accordance
with law on the Issue: of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.

Issue:: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will

HELD:: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the
disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement that they are of good standing or reputation in the
community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is believed and accepted in
court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that evidence be established on record that the
witnesses have good standing in the the community. Competency is distinguished from credibility, the former
being determined by Art. 820 while the latter does not require evidence of such good standing. Credibility depends
on the convincing weight of his testimony in court.
✔ 31 GARCIA V. VASQUEZ, 32 SCRA 489

Facts::
1. Gliceria del Rosario executed 2 wills, one in June 1956, written in Spanish, a language she knew an spoke. The
other will was executed in December 1960 consisting of only one page, and written in Tagalog. The witnesses to
the 1960 will declared that the will was first read 'silently' by the testatrix before signing it. The probate court
admitted the will.

2. The oppositors alleged that the as of December 1960, the eyesight of the deceased was so poor and defective
that she could not have read the provisions contrary to the testimony of the witnesses.

Issue:: Whether or not the will is valid

HELD:: The will is not valid. If the testator is blind, Art. 808 of the New Civil Code (NCC) should apply.If the testator
is blind or incapable of reading, he must be apprised of the contents of the will for him to be able to have the
opportunityto object if the provisions therein are not in accordance with his wishes.

The testimony of her opthalmologist established that notwithstanding an operation to remove her cataract and
being fitted with the lenses, this did not improve her vision. Her vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects
and not for reading. There was no evidence that her vision improved at the time of the execution of the 2nd will.
Hence, she was incapable of reading her own will. The admission of the will to probate is therefor erroneous.
32 ROXAS V. DE JESUS, 134 SCRA 245
FACTS:: Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he found a notebook
belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win addressed
to her children and entirely written and signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found.
The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected although it is not written by a
lawyer.
The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus and Manuel Roxas
de Jesus They further testified that their deceased mother understood English, the language in which the
holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by their
mother.
Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the purported
holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was not executed in accordance with law, (b) it was executed
through force, intimidation and/or under duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged
testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have intended the said Will to be her last Will and
testament at the time of its execution.

Issue:: Whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand
of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not
be witnessed.

HELD:: The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 688 of the Old Civil Code
require the testator to state in his holographic Win the "year, month, and day of its execution," the present Civil
Code omitted the phrase Año mes y dia and simply requires that the holographic Will should be dated. The
petitioners submit that the liberal construction of the holographic Will should prevail.
Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that the purported holographic Will is void for non-compliance
with Article 810 of the New Civil Code in that the date must contain the year, month, and day of its execution. The
respondent contends that Article 810 of the Civil Code was patterned after Section 1277 of the California Code and
Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code whose Supreme Courts had consistently ruled that the required date includes
the year, month, and day, and that if any of these is wanting, the holographic Will is invalid.

We agree with the petitioner.

✔ 33 KALAW V. RELOVA, 132 SCRA 237
Facts::

1. Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of sister Natividad, filed a peition for
probate of the latter's holographic will in 1968. The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's name, designated as the
sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written above it. Such was not initialed, b) Rosa's name was
crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's ma,e was written above it. This alteration was initialed by the testator.

2. Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect so that she would be the sole heir. The lower
court denied the probate due to the unauthenticated alterations and additions.

Issue:: Whether or not the will is valid

HELD:: No, the will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the will which could remain valid as there was
only one disposition in it. Such was altered by the substitution of the original heir with another. To rule that the
first will should be given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of mind. However, this change of mind cannot
be given effect either as she failed to authenticate it in accordance with Art. 814, or by affixing her full signature.
✔ 34 GAGO V. MAMUYAC, 49 PHIL. 902
Facts::
1. Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27,
1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16,
1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the
existence of the second will.

2. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that the second will
presented was merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony
of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified that on December 1920
the original will was actually cancelled by the testator.

3. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.

Issue:: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

HELD:: Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the original will cannot
be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen,
the presumption is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or
destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can
no longer be found after his death.
✔ 35 CASIANO V. CA, 158 SCRA 451

Facts::
Adriana died leaving as heirs herein petitioners and private respondents. Believing that Adriana died intestate, the
heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt’s estate. Later, they executed an
extrajudicial settlement wherein they agreed to divide the estate into equal shares.

Years later, a document purporting to be the will of Adriana was discovered wherein petitioners are given greater
shares than private respondents. Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the
previous intestate proceeding and for the allowance of the will. The trial court denied their motion, thus this
petition for certiorari.

Notably, the CA found that the will had been revoked since the animus revocandi in the destruction of the will has
been sufficiently proven.

Issue:: WON the will was revoked by Adriana

Held::
NO. The requisite of animus revocandi or the intention to revoke alone is not sufficient. Animus revocandi must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of destruction by the testator or by another in the testator’s presence and
under his express direction.

In here, there is scarcity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. First, the documents burned by
Adriana’s maid was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all. Second, the burning was not proven to have
been done under Adriana’s express direction.
36 MOLO V. MOLO, 90 PHIL. 37
FACTS:: Mariano L. Molo died, leaving two (2) wills: one executed on August 17, 1918 and the other executed on
June 20, 1939. Without Mariano leaving any forced heir in either descending or ascending line, his wife, Juana
Juan, filed for probate of the 1939 will. There being no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition
filed by oppositors Luz, Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, the order of the court admitting the will to
probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence,
the court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that
the same was executed in accordance with law.

Because the 1939 will was disallowed, Juana filed for probate of the 1918 will in the same court. The same
oppositors filed an opposition to the probate on the ground that (1) Juana is now estopped from seeking the
probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the manner required by law and (3) that the
will has been subsequently revoked. But before the second petition could be heard, the battle for liberation came
and the records of the case were destroyed. Consequently, a petition for reconstitution was filed, but the same
was found to be impossible because neither petitioner nor oppositors could produce the copies required for its
reconstitution. 

As a result, petitioner filed a new petition on September 14, 1946, similar to the one destroyed, to which
the oppositors filed an opposition based on the same grounds as those contained in their former opposition.Then,
the case was set for trial, and on May 28, 1948, the court Issue:d an order admitting the will to probate already
stated in the early part of this decision. 

ISSUE:: May the 1918 will of the decedent Mariano L. Molo be probated, despite the revocation of the
disallowance of the 1939 will?

HELD: YES.  No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his
knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated
under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a
will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition
as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.
37 AGTARAP V. AGTARAP, G.R. NO. 177099 AND 177192, JUNE 8, 2011
Facts:: 

Decedent Joaquin contracted (2) marriages. First with with Lucia, bearing three children, Jesus+, Milagros+, Jose+
(survived by three children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa) and then lastly when Lucia died, thereafter, with
Caridad, with three children, Eduardo, Sebastian, Mercedes. 

Son Eduardo filed petition for settlement of Joaquin’s intestate estate and the RTC Issue:d resolution appointing
Eduardo as administrator. 

Gloria Agtarap de Santos, one of the children of compulsory heir Jose in the estate of Joaquin, died on May 4,
1995, was later substituted in the proceedings above by her husband Walter de Santos. On September 16, 1995,
Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to intervene, alleging that he is the surviving spouse of the
compulsory heir Mercedes Agtarap and the father of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and in his answer in intervention. 

Sebastian, one of the compulsory heirs, filed a motion to exclude Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos as heirs,
but was denied by lower court. He points out that his motion was denied by the RTC without a hearing. 

Issue:: 

WON Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to participate in the estate in representation of the
Joaquins compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes, respectively.  

Held: 

Yes. Sebastians insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not heirs to the estate of Joaquin cannot
be sustained. 

Indeed, this Court is not a trier of Facts:, and there appears no compelling reason to hold that both courts erred in
Held: that… Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully participated in the estate of Joaquin. It was
incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent evidence to refute his and Eduardos admissions that Joseph and
Teresa were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object to the participation of Walter de
Santos and Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do so. 

Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to participate in the estate in representation of
the Joaquins compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes, respectively.
DE BORJA V. DE BORJA, 46 SCRA 577

FACTS:
The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put
an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into. Tasiana assailed the validity of
agreement applying the doctrine in Guevarra v. Guevarra. Jose de Borja pointed out that the Rules of Court allows
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs may enter into compromise agreement to convey their share of the inheritance even
before the probate of the will.

HELD:
YES. The Held: in Guevarra v. Guevara, relied by the appellant, which declared invalid a compromise agreement
which disposes of the estate before probate of the will is not applicable here. Successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777). In this case, the clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the
estate of Francisco de Borja and JosefaTangco. The transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities,
upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same.
38 GAN V. YAP, 104 PHIL. 509
FACTS::

Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in Manila. Fausto E. Gan, her
nephew, initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly
executed by the deceased. Her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap opposed the petition and asserted that the
deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.

During the probate, the alleged will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents and due
execution by the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan
Jimenez who testified Felicidad’s intention to make a will and allegedly saw it as well. According to the witnesses,
Felicidad did not want her husband to know about it, but she had made known to her other relatives that she
made a will.

After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge,refused to probate the
alleged will on account of the discrepancies arising from the Facts:. For one thing, it is strange that Felicidad made
her will known to so many of her relatives when she wanted to keep it a secret and she would not have carried it in
her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband may have access to it.

In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor’s evidence that Felicidad did not
and could not have executed such holographic will.

ISSUE::

May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare
that it was in the handwriting of the testator?

HELD:

The SC ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the
bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.

The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. “A person may execute a
holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject
to no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.”

Holographic will is a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills. With regard to holographic
wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided
however, that they are “entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself.”

“In the probate of a holographic will” says the New Civil Code, “it shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the absence
of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent’s handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony
may be resorted to.”
The witnesses need not have seen the execution of the holographic will, but they must be familiar with the
decedent’s handwriting. Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of
assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity — the testator’s handwriting
— has disappeared.
39 RODELAS V. ARANZA, 119 SCRA 16

FACTS::

Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the
issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:

1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within
twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;

2.the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was
not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it was merely an  instruction as to
the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by the decedent;

3.the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would
produce no effect because lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence
unlike ordinary wills.

4.the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.

MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.

The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will stating that “in the case of Gam vs.
Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that ‘in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to
suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills.”

And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13,
1976. The lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent and
the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to that the decedent had discarded the alleged
holographic will before his death.

Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al. moved to forward the case to the
SC as it involves a question of law not of fact.

ISSUE::

W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.

HELD:

If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated
because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be
a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.

But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because  comparison can be made by
the probate court with the standard writings of the testator. The probate court would be able to determine the
authenticity of the handwriting of the testator.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that “the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such
will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as
material proof of authenticity.” But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that “Perhaps it may be proved by
a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate
court,”
40 AZAOLA V. SINGSON, 109 PHIL. 102

FACTS::

Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City on September 9, 1957. Petitioner submitted for probate her
holographic will, in which Maria Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew, who is the defendant. Only
one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented to testify on the handwriting of the testatrix. He testified that he
had seen it one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as it was given to him and his wife; and that
it was in the testatrix’s handwriting. He presented the mortgage, the special power of the attorney, and
the general power of attorney, and the deeds of sale including an affidavit to reinforce his statement. Two
residence certificates showing the testatrix’s signature were also exhibited for comparison purposes.

The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend
the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August
1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present three
witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being
contested; and because the lone witness presented “did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written
in the handwriting of the testatrix.”

Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness because the will’s
authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of
three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be
denied by the adverse party.

ISSUE::

W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.

HELD:

Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, petitioner
was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
contested, Article 811 can not be interpreted to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify
the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been
present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes
obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the
proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses
“who know the handwriting and signature of the testator” and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the
law does not so express) “that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator”. There may be no
available witness of the testator’s hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive
opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility.

This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows the court to resort to expert evidence. The law
foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no
competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert
evidence to supply the deficiency.
What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will’s authenticity. Where the
prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine,
it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available,
or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts.
The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the
proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
✔ 41 CODOY V. CALUGAY, 312 SCRA 333

EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners,

vs.

EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.

G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:: Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will
of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the holographic will of the deceased,
who died on January 16, 1990. They claimed that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and
disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and
duress employed in the person of the testator, and will was written voluntarily.

Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for probate, alleging that the
holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an
interested party other than the "true hand" of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will. They
argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If
the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at
the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the
holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.

Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence

ISSUE:: Whether or not the requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three
witnesses explicitly declares that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator is mandatory.

HELD:: In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or
mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least
three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.

The Supreme Court is convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The
word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. It ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when
used in a statute is mandatory.

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to prevent. In the
case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the
possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the
testator.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered remanded to the court of
origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño vda. de Ramonal.
✔ 42 UY KIAO ENG V. NIXON LEE, G.R. NO. 176831, JANUARY 15, 2010
FACTS::
Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein
petitioner, before the RTC to compel her to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings
for the allowance thereof could be instituted, but petitioner refused to do so and denied that she was in custody of
the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts.

ISSUE::
Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

HELD:
No. Without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved herein-the production of the original
holographic will-is in the nature of a public or private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed
of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Let it be noted that the respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks production of the original for
purposes of probate.
43 PALAGANAS V. PALAGANAS, G.R. NO. 169144, JANUARY 26, 2011
Facts::
Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their drinking spree at their house but later decided to
proceed to Tidbits Videoke Bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing. Thereafter, Jaime Palaganas arrived
together with Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista. When Jaime Palaganas was singing, Melton Ferrer sang
with him. Jaime got irritated and insulted. He felt that he was being mocked by Melton that caused him to go to
the latter’s table and uttered statements which began the fight. Ferdinand sought help from Rujjeric Palaganas.
They went to the bar and upon seeing the Ferrers instructed Rujjeric to shoot them. Rujjeric Palaganas shot
Servillano, Melton and Michael with the use of unlicensed firearm. As a result, Melton was killed, Servillano was
fatally wounded and Michael was shot in his right shoulder.

Issue:s:
(1) Whether or not Rujjeric Palaganas was guilty of the crime of homicide and 2 counts of frustrated murder.

(2) Whether or not the use of the unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance which should be
appreciated by the court at the case at bar.

Held:
In the first Issue:, Rujjeric Palaganas is guilty of homicide for the death of Melton Ferrer, frustrated homicide for
fatally wounding Servillano Ferrer and attempted homicide for shooting Michael at his right shoulder.

On the second Issue:, yes, the unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance. An aggravating
circumstance was provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act 8294 which is a
special law that was passed stating that: if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance cannot be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance. Voluntary surrender of the petitioner in this case is merely an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.
44 GALLANOSA V. ARCANGEL, 83 SCRA 676
FACTS::

Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels of and at that time.
He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he bequethed his 1/2 share of the conjugal
estate to his second wife Tecla and if she predecease him (as what occurred), the said share shall be assigned to
the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is Tecla’s son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3 parcels of land
to Adolfo, his protege.

The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs filed an action for the
recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Then, 28 years after
probate, another acton agaisnt Gallanosa for annulment of the will, recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit,
was filed. As a result, the lower court set aide the 1939 decree of probate.

ISSUE::

Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled.

HELD::

No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due execution means that the
testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that he was not acting under duress,
menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed in accordance with the formalities provided by law.

The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only be set aside on the
grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the judgment was obtained by means of
extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4 years from the discovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to
wills and testament.
✔ 45 DELA CERNA V. LEONIDES, 129 SCRA 33

FACTS::

Edward Grimm was an American residing in Manila until his death in 1977. He was survived by his 2nd wife
(Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children from a 1st marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which
ended in divorce. Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, CA in January 1959. One will disposed of his
Philippine estate and the second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were
presented for probate in Utah and admitted the two wills and a codicil for probate in April 1978.

In April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into an agreement
in Utah regarding the estate. Manila Intestate Proceedings: Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the
intestate proceeding in Manila on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate proceedings. However, pursuant to
the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will
found in the record. The estate was partitioned.

In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (which was already probated in Utah) Ethel
filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by respondent Judge for lack of merit

ISSUE::

WON respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss

HELD:

No. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and “no will shall pass either real
or personal property unless it is proved and allowed. The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the
estate of a person who died testate should be settled through an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate
case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.
46 ROBERTS V. LEONIDES, 129 SCRA 33
FACTS::

Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was survived by his second wife (Maxine), their two
children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children by a first marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended by divorce.

Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23, 1959. One will disposed of his Philippine
estate described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside
the Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine on March 1978. Maxine
admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah Court
admitted the two wills and codicil to probate on April 1978 and was Issue:d upon consideration of the stipulation
between the attorneys for Maxine and Ethel. Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate
proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.

As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding was instituted by Ethel. On March 1978, Maxine filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate
proceedings. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm’s will. However, pursuant to the compromise agreement,
Maxine withdrew the opposition and the motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record.The
estate was partitioned.

In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (already probated in Utah), that the
partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be
appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties received by them and return the same to
Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel, that the compromise
agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so partition was contrary
to the decedent’s wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by Judge Leonidas for lack of merit.

ISSUE::
Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying Ethel’s motion
to dismiss.

HELD:
We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and “no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed” (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled
in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and
the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
47 NEPOMUCENO V. CA, 139 SCRA 206
Facts::
1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only
executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.

2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the
will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the
petitioner.

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the
will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the
petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Issue:: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will

Held:
Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may
pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator
and the petitioner.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to
remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court
does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of
adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.
✔ 48 PASCUAL V. DE LA CRUZ, 28 SCRA 421
FACTS::
1. On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died at
the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal.
2. On 14 January 1960, a petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal by Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the decedent.
3. Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity of
the will on the grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied with; that the testatrix was
mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution; that the will was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the
signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud.
ISSUE::
Whether or not under the circumstances, undue and improper pressure and influence as well as fraud are grounds
to disallow a will.

HELD:: No. Petitioner, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was
definitely not a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own son. As a matter of fact it was not only
Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but also her sisters held him with affection so much so
that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her property in her will without any objection
from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.
The basic principles of undue pressure and influence as laid down by the jurisprudence on this Court: that to be
sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of
the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own (Coso v
Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil 596); Icasiano v Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964.
The circumstances marshalled by the contestants certainly fail to establish actual undue influence and improper
pressure exercised on the testatrix by the proponent. Their main reliance is on the assertion of the latter, in the
course of his testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign anything unless I knew it," which does not amount
to proof that she would sign anything that the proponent desired. On the contrary, the evidence of contestants-
appellants, that proponent purchased a building in Manila for the testatrix, placed the title in his name, but caused
the name "Catalina de la Cruz'' to be painted therein in bold letters to mislead the deceased, even if true,
demonstrates that proponent's influence was not such as to overpower and destroy the free will of the testatrix.
Because if the mind of the latter were really subjugated by him to the extent pictured by the contestants, then
proponent had no need to recourse to the deception averred.Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the
testatrix who asked Dr. Sanchez to be one of the instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue influence, for the
reason that the rheumatism of the testatrix made it difficult for her to look for all the witnesses. That He did not
resort to relative or friend is, likewise, explainable: it would have meant the disclosure of the terms of her will to
those interested in her succession but who were not favored by her, thereby exposing her to unpleasant
importunity and recrimination that an aged person would naturally seek to avoid. The natural desire to keep the
making of a will secret can, likewise, account for the failure to probate the testament during herlifetime.Pedro de
la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz Fell Short of establishing actual exercise of
improper pressure or influence. Considering that the testatrix considered proponent as her own son, to the extent
that she expressed no objection to his being made sole heir of her sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own
rights, we find nothing abnormal in her instituting proponent also as her ownbeneficiary.The probate of the will
was allowed
49 ROSALES V. ROSALES, 148 SCRA 69

FACTS::

On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato Rosales and
their two children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her,
leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner.  Magna
Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The trial court ordered
that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio be entitled each to ¼ share in the estate of decedent. Irenea,
on the other hand, insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late
Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.

ISSUE::

 Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.

HELD::

No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups, namely,  those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that
a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The law has already meticulously enumerated
the intestate heirs of a decedent. The Court held that Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 because
the provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It
does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as
regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
✔ 50 ARELLANO V. PASCUAL, G.R. NO. 189796, DECEMBER 15, 2010

Facts::
Angel Pascual died intestate leaving as heirs his siblings, petitioner and respondents. In a settlement proceeding,
respondents alleged that a parcel of land which was donated by the decedent to petitioner may be considered as
petitioner’s advanced legitime.

The probate court held that the donated property is subject to collation pursuant to Article 1061. CA sustained the
same.

Issue:: WON the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation

Held::
NO. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs, if possible, and to determine the
free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when
there are compulsory heirs. If there is none, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.

In here, there is no showing that the decedent left any compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who
are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime. Thus, he was at liberty to donate all his
properties. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger,"
chargeable against the free portion of the estate.

There being no compulsory heir, the donated property is not subject to collation.
51 GREGORIO V. MADARANG, G.R. NO. 185226, FEBRUARY 11, 2010
FACTS:: Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr died intestate leaving real and personal properties. He was survived by his wife
Dolores and their five children, namely Casimiro, Jr., Corazon, Ramiro, and the petitioners Vicente and Jose.
Dolores was appointed as the administratrix and subsequently submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties
of the decedents estate but omitted six lots including Lot 829-B-4-B, the land in question. She omitted the land in
question for the reason that it was donated in favor to Vicente during the lifetime of Casimiro.

ISSUE:: Whether or not the exclusion of the property is proper.

HELD: No, the exclusion is not proper. In cases of collation or advancement  Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly
provides Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir and in the account of partition.  in relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court
provides Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to advancement made, or alleged to have
been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions
and on the heir.

Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have been donated by the decedent and his wife to their son-respondent
Vicente, should not be excluded from the inventory of the properties of the decedent.
52 DIZON-RIVERA V. DIZON, 33 SCRA 554
Facts::

On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by
seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon,... Bernardita Dizon,
Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter
named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir... of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the
said decedent.  Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppo-
sitors-appellants.

The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect.  Named
beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other... legitimate
grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly
Jimenez and Laureano Tiamzon.

Testate proceedings were in due course commenced[2] and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and
testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina

Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate

In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided"... in accordance with her testamentary
disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of
her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren.

Issue:s:

Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable to
the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction

Held::

the Court,... stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute
the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its... execution and fulfillment, must
be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly
appears that his intention was otherwise."... testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of
her estate by will.

This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition.

53 DE ROMA V. CA, 152 SCRA 205
54 LOCSIN V. CA, 206 SCRA 383
55 HEIRS OF POLICRONIO URETA, SR. V. HEIRS OF LIBERATO URETA, G.R. NO.165748 AND 165930,
SEPTEMBER 14, 2011
FACTS::

Alfonso Ureta was financially well-off and owned several properties. He begot fourteen children, including herein
petitioners and Policronio, father of respondents. For taxation purposes, Alfonso sold, without monetary
consideration, several parcels of land to four of his children, including Policronio. Alfonso continued to own,
possess and enjoy the lands and their produce. Upon his death, Liberato acted as the administrator. The Fernandez
Family rented the portion transferred to Policronio. But even after the fact, the tenants never turned over the
produce of the lands to Policronio or any of this heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the administrators of his estate.
When Policronio died, except for a portion of one of the parcels of land, neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took
possession of the subject lands. Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,8 which included all the
lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation
purposes. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
involving Alfonso’s estate when it was published in the July 19, 1995 Issue: of the Aklan Reporter. The Heirs of
Policronio averred that the extra-judicial partition is void because Conrado signed the same without written
authority form his siblings.

ISSUE::

WON Conrado Ureta’s lack of capacity to give his co-heirs’ consent to the Extra-Judicial Partition rendered the
same voidable.

HELD::

No. Article 1390 is not applicable in this case. Article 1390 (1) contemplates the incapacity of a party to give
consent to a contract. What is involved in the case at bench though is not Conrado’s incapacity to give consent to
the contract, but rather his lack of authority to do so. Instead, Articles 1403 (1), 1404, and 1317 of the Civil Code
find application to the circumstances prevailing in this case. The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is not a
voidable or an annullable contract under Article 1390 of the New Civil Code. Article 1390 renders a contract
voidable if one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the contracting party’s consent is
vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain
authority from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his incapacity
to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable
against Conrado’s co-heirs for having been entered into without their authority.
56 AZNAR V. DUNCAN, 17 SCRA 590

FACTS::

Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that Helen Garcia was a natural
child of the deceased. The Court of First Instance equally divided the properties of the estate of Christensen
between Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the
order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was preterited in the will thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was
annulled and the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased died intestate.

ISSUE::

Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or whether the inheritance of Lucy as
instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent
to ¼ of the entire estate.

HELD:

The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia.

Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and limited her share to a legacy of
P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to
the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not
ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.
✔ 57 NUGUID V. NUGUID, 17 SCRA 449

FACTS::

Rosario died single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving were her legitimate parents, Felix
and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. One of the siblings filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario 11
years before her death and prayed that she be admitted to the probate and be appointed administrator. The
parents opposed saying that they are the compulsory heirs of the decedent in the direct ascending line and that
the will should be void on the ground of absolute preterition.

ISSUE::

Is the will void on the ground of preterition?

HELD::

YES. The decedent left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending
line of her parents. And, the will completely omits both of them; thus receiving nothing by the testament,
depriving them of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Note
that A. 854 of the NCC merely nullifies the “institution of heir”. Considering that the will presented solely provides
for the institution of the petitioner as universal heir and nothing more, the result is the same. The will is null and
void.
58 REYES V. BARRETO-DATU, 19 SCRA 85
FACTS::
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast
estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan. When Bibiano died, he
left his share of these properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and
Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa and Felisa and his
nephews and nieces. Usufruct was reserved for his widow. The widow then prepared a project
of partition which she signed in her own behalf, and as guardian of the minor Milagros. This was
approved by CFI Manila. As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her
share and secured the cancellation of the originals and the issuance of new titles in her own
name.
Upon the widow’s death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of
which, she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same
and left all her properties in favor of Milagros alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the
first rejected. Plaintiff then filed an action for the recovery of one-half portion of properties left
for them under Bibiano’s will. This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her
right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all theother properties
willed and delivered to Salud, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the
estate of Bibiano, thereby directly attacking thevalidity, not only of the project of partition, but
of the decision of the court based thereon. The defendant contends that the Project of Partition
from which Saludacquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio. This was based on Article
1081 of the Civil Code of 1889: “A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir,without
being so, has been included, shall be null and void.”

ISSUE::
WON the partition between Salud and Milagros in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of Bibiano is void.

HELD:
NO. The agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but
actually consummated, so much so that the titles inthe name of the deceased were cancelled,
and new certificates Issue:d in favor of theheirs, long before the decree was attacked. The only
instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a
final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to
secure relief isreopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period,
insteadof an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, for another
courtor judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and
reshuffleproperties long ago distributed and disposed of. Art. 1081 has been misapplied. Salud
admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament
together with defendant Milagros; hence,the partition had between them could not be one
such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null
and void under said article.
59 ESCUIN V. ESCUIN, 11 PHIL. 332
Facts::

The decedent designated in his will his father and his wife as his sole heirs. He ignored his recognized natural child.

Issue::

Whether or not the will is valid.

Held:

The will is partly valid. It is valid with respect to the 2/3 of the properties which the testator can freely dispose. The
1/3 should be give to his recognized natural child.

The above-mentioned will neither null, void, nor illegal in so far as the testator leaves two-thirds of his property to
his father and wife; testamentary provisions impairing the legal portion of a general heir shall be reduced in so far
as they are illegal or excessive.

The late testator did not leave a recognized natural child, the appellant minor, and a widow; that the said minor,
Emilio Escuin y Batac, is the general heir of his natural father, the said testator who recognized him while living,
and in the present case is entitled to one-third of his estate, which amount constitutes the legal portion of a
natural child; and for the reason that the minor was ignored by his natural father in his will, the designation of
heirs made therein was, as matter of fact annulled by force of law, in so far as legal portion of the said minor was
thereby impaired. Legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not illegal, for the reason that a
testator can not deprive the heirs of their legal portions, except in the cases expressly indicated by law.
✔ 60 BALANAY V MARTINEZ, 64 SCRA 452

FACTS:: Leodegaria Julian died. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and six legitimate children.
Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mothers notarial will, which was written in English. In that
will, Leodegaria declared that it was her desire her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. She devised and
partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half
share of the conjugal assets. Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will. Thereafter,
Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument waiving and renouncing his right in Leodegarias estate in favor of their 6
children.

ISSUE:: Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before Held: on its
allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

HELD:: The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had
been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
void. But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into
an intestate proceeding. The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not
prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the
death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and
the surviving spouse.
61 SOLANO V. CA, 126 SCRA 122

FACTS::
Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against Melita Solano Meliton died during the pendency of
the petition and his daughter substituted him while asking for the probate of the will of the decedent. RTC
specified the legal Issue:s as 1) the recognition of Garcias, 2) correct status of Zonia, 3) the hereditary share of each
of them in view of the probated will. In deciding, RTC declared Garcias as illegitimate children of late Meliton; the
institution of Sonia as sole heir declared null and void, the 3 children shall share equally the estate CA affirmed.

ISSUE::
Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the institution of sole heir from decedents will.

HELD::
That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Meliton’s will, and as a result, Sonia’s institution as
sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art. 854:

“The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir, but the
devises and legacies shall be valid xxx

The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his property which the testator had the
right to such so that it should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the property that the testator could freely
dispose of Sonia’s share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of the estate and Garcias 1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of
will should not be invalidated all together.
62 ACAIN V. CA, 155 SCRA 100
FACTS::

Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his late Uncle, Nemesio
Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters were
instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson,
a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate
Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongson’s petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition
for probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acain’s motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review
on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE::

Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been preterited.

HELD:

Article 854 of the Civil Code:

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice
to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they
are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from
the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted
daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will and
that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that
they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator
results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other
testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
✔ 63 EDROSO V. SABLAN, 25 PHIL. 295
FACTS:: Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death. In this marriage they had a son named
Pedro and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died unmarried and without Issue:,
and by his decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the
hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership.

Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan—Pedro Sablan and Basilio Sablan—appeared in the case to oppose
the registration claiming that the registration of the parcels of land mu be either denied or if granted, be reserved
in their favor.

ISSUE:: Whether the parcels of land may be registered in the name of the reservista?

HELD:: Yes, MarcelIna is entitled to register in her own name, however, a right should be reserved in favor of the 2
uncles of the deceased. The conclusion is that the reservista has the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover,
for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has,
under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to
alienate, although under a condition. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside
in him while he lives.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved cannot dispose of the
property, first because it is in no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and,
moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of fee simple which they can transmit to another.
64 SEINNES V. ESPARCIA, 1 SCRA 750
FACTS:: 
Lot 3368 originally belong to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children named
Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named
Francisco. Lot 3368 was Issue:d in the name of Francisco. When Francisco died, without any descendant, his
mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument entitled extra-judicial settlement and sale whereby, among
other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00, she sold the property in question to Sienes.
Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the
property in their name executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Esparcia. Andrea Gutang died later with
Cipriana Yaeso (child from the first wife) surviving her.

ISSUE:: Who among the vendees, with regard the two sale transactions, is entitled to the properties?

HELD:: Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve
died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death. The sale made
by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire
ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the
reservable property. Inasmuch as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriano Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes
inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the
reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

It is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaesco in favor of the spouse Esparcia was
subject to a similar resolutory condition.
✔ 65 FLORENTINO V. FLORENTINO, 40 PHIL. 480

Facts::
Severina died leaving by will the subject property to her only daughter and compulsory heir, Mercedes. Severina
inherited the property from her deceased son Apolinio III, who, in turn, inherited it from his deceased father
Apolinio II.

The right of the instituted heir, Mercedes, to the property is now contested by the children and grandchildren of
Apolinio II by a previous marriage on the ground that the property is reservable under Art. 891.

Issue:: WON the property left at the death of Apolonio III was invested with the character of reservable property
when it was received by his mother, Severina

Held::
YES. With full right Severina could have disposed in her will of all her own property in favor of her only living
daughter, Mercedes, as forced heiress. But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable
property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce the rights of the other
reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as
said property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve
and to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino.

Thus, the property inherited by the deceased Severina from her son Apolonio Florentino III is reservable property.
66 PADURA V. BALDOVINO, 104 PHIL. 1065
FACTS::
Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908 leaving a last will and testament wherein he bequeathed his properties
among his children, Manuel (child on his first wife), Candelaria and Fortunato (children on his second wife), and his
surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Fortunate was adjudicated four parcels of land. Fortunato died unmarried without
having executed a will; and not having any Issue:, the said parcels of land were inherited exclusively by her mother.

On August 26, 1934, Candelaria died leaving as her only heirs, her four legitimate children, Cristeta, Melania, Anicia
and Pablo, all surnamed Baldovino. Years later Manuel Padura also died. Surviving him are his legitimate children,
Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Gornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino, all surnamed Padura. Upon the death of Benita
Garing (the reservista), the question on the distribution of the said parcels became a dispute between the nephews
and nieces of Fortunato by half-blood (Paduras) and the nephew and nieces by full-blood (Baldovinos).

ISSUE:: 
How should the four parcels of land be divided among the nephews and nieces of Fortunato?

HELD:: Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is
the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of
half-blood.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property
should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable
rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise.

The reservatarios who are nephews of the whole blood are declared entitled to a share twice as large as that of the
nephews of the half-blood.
67 CHUA V. CFI, 78 SCRA 406

FACTS::

In the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia Militar he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and

Manuel. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de
la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel, one of the children of Jose in his first
marriage, died without leaving any Issue:.

Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate. In the intestate proceeding, Consolacion and Juanito got 1/2 each of
Lot No. 399. Jose’s children in the first marriage got cash.

On February 27, 1952, JuanitoFrias Chua of the second marriage died intestate  without any Issue:. After his death,
his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. Then on March 5, 1966,
Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except
her brother and sisters.

In the “Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre,” the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage
and dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of
the first marriage filed the complaint praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399
which formerly belonged to JuanitoFrias but which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter’s death, be
declaredas a reservable property.

ISSUE::

Whether or not the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399 which originally belonged to
JuanitoFrias Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966, or 14 years after the death of Juanito
(prepositus).

HELD::

NO. The Court held that the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor,
Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the
one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.
68 GONZALES V. CFI, 104 SCRA 161
FACTS::

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by
his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters and three sons.

The real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters,
Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F.
Legarda. Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without Issue:. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena
Races Vda. de Legarda.

Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from
her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded
her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held pro indiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she
inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren
in all).

Mrs. Legarda died and her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will. In the testate proceeding, Beatriz
Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother’s estate
the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are
reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda’s three sisters and three brothers and not by
the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda.

ISSUE::

Whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal.

HELD::

In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a
brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law
from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from
which the said property came.

So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an
ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law
(intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another
ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees
(reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the
first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant. If there are only two transmissions there is no
reserve.

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2)
the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
property came.
Hence, upon the reservista’s death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, “automatically and by
operation of law, the owner of the reservable property.” In the instant case, the properties in question were
indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation
became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the
prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
69 DE PAPA V. CAMACHO, 144 SCRA 281

FACTS::

Appellees and appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a
sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of appellees and great grandfather of defendant. During her lifetime,
Romana gratuitously donated four parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of appellees). When
Toribia died, she was survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children Faustino and
Trinidad (mother of Dalisay). The 4 parcels of land were left as inheritance of Toribia‟s two children in equal pro-
indiviso shares. They too inherited 3 parcels of land which was supposed to be the inheritance of the late
Toribia Tioco from her father Balbino. However, when Faustino died intestate, single and  without Issue:, the ½ pro-
indiviso share in the 7 parcels of land was left to his father Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received
the said property subject to a reserve troncal. Subsequently, Trinidad died intestate and her rights and interests in
the parcels of land were inherited by her only legitimate childe, appellant Dalisay. Eustacio thereafter died
intestated, survived by his only legitimate defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho.

The lower Court declared that the appellees as well as appellant Dalisay were entitled as reservatarios to ½ of the
seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions.

ISSUE::

Whether or not all relatives of the prepositus (Faustino) within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed
without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista.

HELD::

No. Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-
appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the
prepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they
are related to him within the same degree as the latter. As held in the case of Abellana v. Ferraris, under the Article
1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other
collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. Hence, a decedent’s uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and  qualified to
succeed, similar to the case at hand.
70 BANAWA V. MIRANO, 97 SCRA 517
FACTS:
Maria Mirano, niece of Julia Mendoza, was taken in by spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, treated
and reared her up like their own child.  A few years later, the spouses opened up a store from which they derived
considerable income and which enabled them to acquire several parcels of land that were bought in the name of
Maria Mirano. After a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died and left as her only nearest relatives the herein
respondents who are claiming ownership over the lands in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old
Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the construction of Section5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court can be applied to the present case.

HELD
No. Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court specifically provides for the case of a judicially adopted child. It is
not applicable to Mario Mirano, an extrajudicial adoption. It is an elementary rule of construction that when the
language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
✔ 71 TEOTICO V. DEL VAL, 13 SCRA 406
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant ,
VS.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor appellee

G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS:: Maria Mortera died in 1955. She left a will, duly acknowledged before a notary public and witnesses. The
will stated that she freely executed the will with sound mind, good health. Among the many legacies and devisees
made in the will was one P20,000.00 to Rene Teodico, husband of her niece Josefina Mortera. She also instituted
Josefina as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.

Vicente Teodico filed a petition for probate of will before the CFI and a hearing was set.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testator, as well as
an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, deceaseed brother of testator, filed an opposition of the will
alleging that: 1.) said will was not executed as required by law; 2.) testator was physically and mentally incapable
to execute the will at the time of the execution; 3.) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.

Vicente Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to
intervene. The probate court, however, allowed the oppositor to intervene as the adopted child of Francisca. She
amended her opposition, alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene
Teotico because he was the physician who took care of testator during her last illness.
Petitioner Teotico, together with Josefina, filed a motion for reconsideration on the decision on the nullity of the
legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico, while the oppositor filed a motion for reconsideration on the decision decreeing
the probate of the will. Both motions were denied. Both appealed.
ISSUE:: Whether or not the probate court erred passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and
in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr.
Rene Teotico?
HELD::
The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has
been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the following may be cited:
"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in probate
proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law."

The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and
the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; these may be impugned as
being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
✔ 72 AUSTRIA V. REYES, 31 SCRA 754
Facts::
Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, all have been declared
by the former as her legally adopted children. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will.
It was opposed by the petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was
allowed.

In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the nearest kin of
Basilia and that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, hence the
latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not
material to the institution of heirs. It held that the testator was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last
will was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.

Issue:: Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

HELD:: Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution does not affect
the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set aside the institution if
certain factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs will be annulled under Art. 850 the following
requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be stated in the will, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must
appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity.
Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side especially when the will shows a clear intention
on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.
73 VDA. DE KILAYCO V. TENGKO, 207 SCRA 600
Facts::

The testator died without an Issue: leaving her last will and testament to her niece , Eustaquia Lizarez. The will was
probated and the project of partition was granted. The decree of distribution became final. However, there were
errors in the distribution as alleged by Kilayko et al.

Issue:s:

Whether or not the errors in the distribution warrants the reopening of the estate of the testator.

Held:

No, the error will not cause the reopening of the succession.

Where the court has validly Issue:d a decree of distribution and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity
of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.

The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when
he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence.

The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to
litigate the same Issue: more than once.
74 PALACIOS V. RAMIREZ, 111 SCRA 704

FACTS::
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was
admitted to probate in Manila. The administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or
"free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez. Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged
with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the ground that the provisions for fideicommissary
substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first
degree.

ISSUE:: Whether the proposed partition is in accordance with law.

HELD:: NO. It may be useful to recall that Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into
the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted. As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect,
the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the reason that the substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted."

From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the
only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary. There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda
to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee
admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the
properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners.
75 CRISOLOGO V. SINGZON, 49 SCRA 491

Facts::

Donya Leona left a will stating that upon Consolacions Crisologo's death death—whether this happens before or
after that of Donya Leona's death—Consolacion's share shall belong to the brothers of the Donya Leona.

Issue::

Whether or not such substitution is a fideicommissary substitution.

Held:

No, it is not fideicommissary substitution.

A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the substitution of heirs provided for
therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissa kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that
appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked
ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon
appellee's death—whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix—her share shall belong to the
brothers of the testatrix.
76 FERNANDEZ V. DIMAGIBA, 21 SCRA 428

FACTS:
On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the CFI a petition for the probate of the
purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930. The will instituted the petitioner
as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio
Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all
surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds
advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent
and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in
favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by the Supreme Court.
The CFI found that the will genuinely executed but deferred deciding on the Issue: of estoppel and revocation until
such time that the opportunity is presented. Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration,
and/or new trial, insisting that the Issue:s of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved but were denied.
The CA later ruled that the case had become final and executor due to failure to appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1930 will is impliedly revoked.

HELD:
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is
plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the
will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there
is no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the
oppositorsappellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly
evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the
revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute
revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament.

As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the
testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent
alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by
the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court
inReyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration
whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful
whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix 272 merely intended to comply in advance with
what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom. Revocation being an
exception, in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not
apply to the case at bar.
77 BELEN V. BANK OF P.I. L-14474, OCT. 31, 1960
✔ 78 DE LOS SANTOS V. DE LA CRUZ, 37 SCRA 555

FACTS:
The parties admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement, was Pelagia
de la Cruz, who died intestate; that defendant-appellant (De la Cruz)is a nephew of the said decedent; that
plaintiff-appellee (De los Santos) is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a
niece who predeceased said Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was
to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of an extra-judicial partition which included a person who is not an heir of the deceased?
HELD:
The extrajudicial partition agreement is void with respect to plaintiff-appellee.
Article 1105 of the Civil Code provides: “A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir, but who is not,
shall be void only with respect to such person.” Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit
from the deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and
lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and
void. A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms enforced
79 TEOTICO V. DEL VAL
FACTS::

Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a will written in Spanish, affixed
her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Among the legacies made in the
will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of
Maria’s interest in the Calvo Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal
parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition
for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of
Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that
said will was not executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the
will at the time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.

ISSUE:: WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.

HELD:

It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding is that he
must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be affected by either as executor or as a claimant of
the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of
the will, defendant has no right to intervene because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor
or administrator because it did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of
the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the CIVIL
CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased
sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the
legitimate relatives of her natural father and that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as expressly
provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate proceeding.
✔ 80 DIAZ V. IAC, 150 SCRA 645

Facts::
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisa's mother, Juliana, were the only
legitimate children of the spouses Felipe and Petronila; 2) that Juliana married Jardin and out of their union were
born Felisa and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona is the widow of Pascual and the mother of
Pablo; 4) that Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and Simona; 5) that Pascual died in 1970;
Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976; 6) that Pablo, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona and
his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta.

Issue:: Who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her
grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)

Held::
Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the IAC did not commit any error in holding
Felisa to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona.

The term relatives, in accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, should be understood to
have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one
81 DE LOS SANTOS V. FERRARIS-BORROMEO, 14 SCRA 986
FACTS:: After more than ten (10) years since the last time Melodia Ferraris was known to be alive, the lower court
declared her presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among the
heirs. She left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives,
namely:

1) Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, and Anacleto Ferraris;

2) Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the
children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her.
.
These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of
said Melodia Ferraris.

ISSUE::  Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral
relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her?

HELD:  In case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first
cousins, etc.) from the succession; and that the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is
a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. 

Moreover, Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be
understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the
same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of representation. They succeed without distinction of
lines or preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship.

Therefore, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of
the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
82 CORPUZ V. CORPUZ, 85 SCRA 567
83 LEONARDO V. CA, 120 SCRA 890
FACTS::

Petitioner Restituta Leonardo is the only legitimate child of the late Sps. Tomasina Paul and Balbino Leonardo.
Private respondents Teodoro, Victor, Corazon, Piedad, et. al, all surnamed Sebastian, are the illegitimate children
of Tomasina with Jose Sebastian after she separated from Balbino Leonardo. In  1988, private respondent Corazon
Sebastian with her niece and a certain Bitang, came to Restituta’s house to persuade her to sign a deed of
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian. Before signing the document, Restituta
allegedly insisted that they wait for her husband Jose Ramos so he could translate the document which was
written in English. Subsequently, she proceeded to sign the document even without her husband and without
reading the document, on the assurance of private respondent Corazon that she will get her share as a legitimate
daughter. Petitioner then asked private respondent Corazon and her companions to wait for her husband so he
could read the document. When petitioner’s husband arrived, however, private respondent Corazon and her
companions had left without leaving a copy of the document. It was only when petitioner hired a lawyer that they
were able to secure a copy and read the contents thereof.

Petitioner refuted private respondents’ claim that they were the legitimate children and sole heirs of Jose
Sebastian and Tomasina Paul since the latter were never married to each other, thus, the extrajudicial partition
was therefore unlawful and illegal. Petitioner also claimed that her consent was vitiated because she was deceived
into signing the extrajudicial settlement. She further denied having appeared before a Judge of  MTC of
Urbiztondo, Pangasinan to acknowledge the execution of the extrajudicial partition.

 ISSUE::

Whether the consent given by petitioner to the extrajudicial settlement of the estate was given voluntarily.

HELD::

No. Contracts where consent is given by mistake or because of violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud are
voidable. These circumstances are defects of the will, the existence of which impairs the freedom, intelligence,
spontaneity, and voluntariness of the party in giving consent to the agreement. In determining whether consent is
vitiated, Courts are given a wide latitude in weighing the Facts: considering the age, physical infirmity, intelligence,
relationship and the conduct of the parties at the time of making the contract and subsequent thereto, irrespective
of whether the contract is in a public or private writing.

In this case,  private respondents failed to offer any evidence to prove that the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate was explained in a language known to the petitioner, i.e. the Pangasinan dialect. Clearly, petitioner, who
only finished Grade 3, was not in a position to give her free, voluntary and spontaneous consent without having
the document, which was in English, explained to her in the Pangasinan dialect.
84 SANTILLON V. MIRANDAN, 14 SCRA 563
FACTS::

Pedro Santillon died without testament, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda.
Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow
Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds:
(a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda
claimed to be her exclusive properties; and
(b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the
properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario.

Claro filed a motion to declare share of heirs to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their
respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from
the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her
and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled
under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of
Pedro’s inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.

The trial court held that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta
Miranda shall inherit 1/2 share and the remaining 1/2 share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon.

ISSUE::

What provision of the Civil Code must properly apply?

HELD::

Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under
the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to
support his claim to 3/4 of his father’s estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888
thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to
the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount
of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the
pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.

The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of
“Children,” therefore it does not apply when there is only one “child”; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should
be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas in
testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate.

It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular.

So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied): “If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the
surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child.” Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on
the ground that “child” is not included in “children,” the consequences would be tremendous.

Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate succession, where there is only one
child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate, if Art. 996 is
applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower “gets only one- fourth.”
She or he may get one-half — if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to
decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor).
85 BICOMONG V. ALMANZA, 80 SCRA 421

FACTS::

Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas and were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia
Bagsic, and Ignacio Bagsic. Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic
remarried Silvestra Glorioso. Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic and  Maura Bagsic.
Simeon Bagsic and Silvestra Glorioso died. Ignacio Bagsic died leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir.
Igmedia Bagsic also died survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died and was survived by her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad
Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.

Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her.
Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5)
months before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband,
the defendant herein Engracio Manese and her father Geronimo Almanza. The subject matter concerns the one-
half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from
her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso. Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely:
(a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco
Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against
the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the
properties left by Maura Bagsic.

ISSUE::

 WON the nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right.

HELD::

Yes. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New
Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that
Maura Bagsic died intestate without an Issue:, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she
is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10)
children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New
Civil Code. By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own
right.

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on
the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to
whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of
whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their
right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra),
which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of
half blood.
✔ 86 BACAYO V. BORROMEO, 14 SCRA 986
FACTS:: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She
was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the
petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still
unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared
presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.

Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa
Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the
same court.

The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by
collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto
Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who
were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent).
These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said
Melodia Ferraris.

ISSUE:: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral
relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt
concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter?

HELD: We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the
decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by
first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise
right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes)
unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975.

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de
cujusexclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more
clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A.
386).

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab
intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The
present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers
and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
succeed.

The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby affirmed. No costs.
✔ 87 NERI V. HEIRS OF SPOUSES UY, G.R. NO. 194366, OCTOBER 10,2012
FACTS::
During the lifetime of Petitioner’s mother, Anunciacion, she and her 2nd husband, Enrique, acquired several
homestead properties. When Anunciacion died, Enrique in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his
minor children executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale adjudicating among
themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter, sold the properties to the late spouses Uy.
Years later, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of the said sale against spouses Uy, assailing
the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. And, also, for having been executed
without their consent or approval, thus, depriving the latter siblings of their legitime.

ISSUE::
Whether Enrique, as guardian of his children and co-owner (with his children), can sell their co-owned property?

HELD::
No, as to the shares of the minor children because as a natural guardian, he is merely clothed with powers of
administration. With respect to the minor children at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their
natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws
prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to
dispose of their shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
88 ALSUA BETTS V. CA, 92 SCRA 332
FACTS::
After executing a holographic will which was later probated during his lifetime, the deceased executed an-other
will, but this second will he did not submit to the court for probate while still alive. Can the second will be probated
after his death?

Issue::
WON there was error in not affirming the findings of the probate court (Special Proceedings No. 699) that private
respondents, oppositors to the probate of the will, are in estoppel to... question the competence of testator Don
Jesus Alsua.

HELD: Yes, for the fact of non-submission to probate during his lifetime of the second will does not indicate any
defect in the requisite testamentary capacity. Besides, a will is revocable at any time by the testator while still
alive.

The claim of the private respondents that the sales were fictitious and void for being without cause or
consideration is as weak and flimsy as the ground upon which the respondent court upheld said claim on the basis
that there was no need for funds in Don Jesus' old... age aside from the speculation that there was nothing in the
evidence that showed what motivated Don Jesus to change his mind as to favor Francisca and discriminate against
the other children. The two contracts of sale executed by Don Jesus in favor of

Francisca are evidenced by Exhibits "U" and "W", the genuineness of which were not at all assailed at any time
during this long drawn-out litigation of 15 years standing. That the consideration stated in the contracts were paid
is also sufficiently... proved as the receipts thereof by Don Jesus were even signed by one of the private
respondents, Pablo Alsua, as a witness. The latter cannot now deny the payment of the consideration. And even if
he now allege that in fact no... transfer of money was involved, We find his allegation belied by Exhibits "X-3" and
"X-5", which show that the checks of Francisca made payable to Don Jesus were in fact given to Don Jesus as he
endorsed them on the back thereof, and most specifically Exhibit "A" in the... annulment case, which proved that
Don Jesus actually used Exhibit "X-1" to complete payment on the estate and inheritance tax on the estate of his
wife to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Private respondents further insist that the sales were fraudulent because of the inadequacy of the given price.
Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven, which in the case at bar was not, that
there was fraud, mistake or... undue influence. (Article 1355, New Civil Code). We do not find the stipulated price
as so inadequate to shock the court's conscience, considering that the price paid was much higher than the
assessed value of the subject properties and... considering that the sales were effected by a father to her daughter
in which case filial love must be taken into account.
89 DOROMAL V. CA, L-36083, SEPT. 2, 1975
FACTS::
A parcel of land in Iloilo was co-owned by 7 siblings all surnamed Horilleno. 5 of the siblings gave a SPA to
their niece Mary Jimenez, who succeeded her father as a co-owner, for the sale of the land to father and son
Doromal. One of the co-owner, herein petitioner, Filomena Javellana however did not gave her consent to the sale
even though her siblings executed a SPA for her signature. The coowners went on with the sale of 6/7 part of the
land and a new title for the Doromals were Issue:d. Respondent offered to repurchase the land for 30K as stated in
the deed of sale but petitioners declined invoking lapse in time for the right of repurchase. Petitioners also contend
that the 30K price was only placed in the deed of sale to minimize payment of fees and taxes and as such,
respondent should pay the real price paid which was P115, 250.

ISSUE:: Whether or not the period to repurchase of petitioner has already lapsed.

HELD::
Period of repurchase has not yet lapsed because the respondent was not notified of the sale. The 30-day
period for the right of repurchase starts only after actual notice not only of a perfected sale but of actual execution
and delivery of the deed of sale. The letter sent to the respondent by the other co-owners cannot be considered as
actual notice because the letter was only to inform her of the intention to sell the property but not its actual sale.
As such, the 30-day period has not yet commenced and the respondent can still exercise his right to repurchase.
The respondent should also pay only the 30K stipulated in the deed of sale because a redemptioner’s right is to be
subrogated by the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract.
✔ 90 ALONZO V. IAC, 150 SCRA 517

FACTS::

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their
deceased parents. One of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein petitioners by way
of absolute sale. One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same
vendees. The petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot,
representing the portions sold to them. On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to
redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an
American citizen. On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the
same right of redemption claimed by her brother.

ISSUE::

Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.

HELD:

YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.

RATIO:

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And
there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question
and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption.
These are the justifications for this exception.

91 BAUTISTA V. GRINO-AQUINO, 166 SCRA 760

FACTS:
Petitioners instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to declare the deed of extrajudicial partition,
deed of absolute sale, Transfer Certificates Title Nos. 14182, 14186 and 15665 all of Registry of Deeds of Pasay City
and Tax Declaration No. 5147, null and void. The land in question was registered in the name of petitioner Manuel
Bautista under TCT No. 2210, and the latter inherited this land from his father, Mariano Bautista. On Dec. 22, 1966,
a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed. Private respondents were signatories to the deed, and the signature
of petitioner Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that document, although petitioner Manuel Bautista
denied having signed that Extrajudicial Partition. Upon registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, T.C.T. No.
2210 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T.T. 14182 was Issue:d. The private respondents, with the exception of
Manolito Bautista, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito Bautista of that property. Upon
registration of the Deed of Sale, T.C.T. T-14182 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T. No. T-14186 was Issue:d to
Manolito Bautista.
On August 7, 1969, Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the other private respondents and upon
registration of said Deed of Sale, T. C.T. Nos. T-1 5665, T-15666, T-15667, T-15668, T-15669, T- 15670, T-15671,
were Issue:d to private respondents. Petitioner Manuel Bautista married his second wife Emiliana Tamayo. Manuel
Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana Tamayo, had only a child, Evangeline Bautista, born on April 29,1949. the
property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition of property on December 22,1966, among the
heirs of the late Juliana Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista. Manuel Bautista denied participation in the
Extrajudicial Partition of Property. On August 1, 1974, all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned
signature of Manuel Bautista. The NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic.

The trial court dismissed the complaint with costs against plaintiffs. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
WON the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an extrajudicial partition of the estate of the
deceased wife

HELD
NO. Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate applies only to the
estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of
the decedent certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.
As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, is
void ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an extrajudicial partition property which does not pertain to the
estate of the deceased would be to deprive the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process of law.
Only property of the estate of the decedent which is transmitted by succession can be the lawful subject matter of
an extrajudicial partition. In this case, the said partition obviously prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as
exclusive owner of the property.

The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir
of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. It is difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista
would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not
surprising that he denied signing the said document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who
is their half-sister to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence
the said partition must be rescinded.

The Court observes that after the execution of said extrajudicial partition and issuance of the title in their names,
private respondents except Manolito Bautista in turn executed a deed of absolute sale of the property in favor of
the latter in whose name the title was also Issue:d. And yet soon thereafter another deed of sale was executed this
time by Manolito Bautista selling back the same property to private respondents in whose names the respective
titles were thus subsequently Issue:d. This series of transactions between and among private respondents is an
indication of a clever scheme to place the property beyond the reach of those lawfully entitled thereto.
Moreover, such extrajudicial partition cannot constitute a partition of the property during the lifetime of its owner,
Manuel Bautista. Partition of future inheritance is prohibited by law.

As said Extrajudicial Partition dated December 22, 1966, of property belonging exclusively to petitioner Manuel
Bautista, is null and void ab initio it follows that all subsequent transactions involving the same property between
and among the private respondents are also null and void. Prescription cannot be invoked in this case as the
petitioners' right to sue their co-owners for partition of the property is imprescriptible. And even assuming that the
present action may prescribe as ruled by the respondent court, petitioners Emiliana Bautista and Evangeline
Bautista who are not parties to the said instrument asserted that they discovered the same only soon before they
filed the complaint in court. Certainly the action has not prescribed.
92 DE LOS SANTOS V. DE LA CRUZ, 37 SCRA 558
Facts:: The parties admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement, was
Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate; that defendant-appellant (De la Cruz)is a nephew of the said decedent;
that plaintiff-appellee (De los Santos) is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a
niece who predeceased said Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was
to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.

Issue:: What is the effect of an extra-judicial partition which included a person who is not an heir of the deceased?

Held:: The extrajudicial partition agreement is void with respect to plaintiff-appellee.

Article 1105 of the Civil Code provides: “A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir, but who is not,
shall be void only with respect to such person.”  Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit
from the deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and
lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and
void. A  fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms enforced.
✔ 93 GUILAS V. JUDGE, L-026695, 31 JAN. 1972

Facts: : Jacinta Limson de Lopez was married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no children.llOn April
28,1936, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir and executor. On October 26,
1953,herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and now married to Federico Guilas, was declared legally adopted
daughter and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro. After adopting legally herein petitioner Juanita
Lopez,the testatrix Doña Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her
heirs.In an order dated March 5, 1959 in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, the will was admitted to probate and the
surviving husband, Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed executor without bond by the Court of First
Instanceof Pampanga. Nevertheless, both Alejandro and Juanita executed a project partition, approved by the
lower court onApril 23, 1960 and directed that the records of the case be sent to the archives, upon payment of
the estate and inheritance taxesOn April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate ordinary
action to set aside and annul the project of partition, on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and pray
further that Alejandro Lopez be ordered to submit a statement of accounts of all the crops and to deliver
immediately to Juanita the lots allocated toher. Meanwhile, in the Testate Proceedings, Juanita filed a petition
dated July 20, 1964 praying that AlejandroLopez be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of said lots and
its produce.

Alejandro opposed the separate petition alleging the testate proceedings had already been closed and
terminated; and that he ceased as a consequence to be the executor of the estate of the deceased

; and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years
after such closure of the estate. The parties have agreed to suspend action or resolution upon the said petition for
the delivery of shares until; after the civil action aforementioned has been finally settled and decided. TC denied
Juanita's petition on the ground that the parties themselves agreed to suspend resolution of her petition for the
delivery of her shares until after the civil action for annulment of the project of partition has been finally settled
and decided. Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Issue: : WON the project partition approved by the TC “ ordering it closed and terminated” terminated the Probate
proceeding.Held: : No. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only

after
the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The
finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding. As
long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated Siguion Vs. Tecson, ); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and
does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period has not
elapsed. The better practice, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by
another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate court already final
and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. Sec. 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules
of Court of 1964 as, which secures for the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover their respective
shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession", re-states the
doctrines. In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the delivery of her share was filed on July 20, 1964,
which is just more than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition was approve and
within 5 years from April 23, 1960 when the original project of partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim
the two lots allocated to her under the project of partition had not yet expired. The position of Juanita should be
sustained and the writs prayed for granted

92 DE LOS SANTOS V. DE LA CRUZ, 37 SCRA 558

Facts:: The parties admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement, was
Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate; that defendant-appellant (De la Cruz)is a nephew of the said decedent;
that plaintiff-appellee (De los Santos) is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a
niece who predeceased said Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was
to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.

Issue:: What is the effect of an extra-judicial partition which included a person who is not an heir of the deceased?

Held:: The extrajudicial partition agreement is void with respect to plaintiff-appellee.

Article 1105 of the Civil Code provides: “A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir, but who is not,
shall be void only with respect to such person.”  Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit
from the deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and
lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and
void. A  fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms enforced.
94 AUGUSTINES V. CFI, 45 O.G. SUPP. #9, P. 184, APRIL 3, 1948
95 IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY, EMILIO SUNTAY, III V. ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, G.R. NO. 183053, JUNE 16, 2010

Facts::

The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990.  Cristina was survived by her
spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein
respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate... grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico's and
Cristina's only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.

The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the spouses Federico and
Cristina.  Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother
Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation... of Isabel's parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco.  Isabel's parents,
along with her paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed
by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I.  Emilio I was eventually... acquitted.

In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her among others with
infidelity.  The trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco

III had demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a co-
administrator thereof.

Issue:s:

WON Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment
can be appointed as administrator.

Held::

To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the Issue: of who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified
to act as administrator of the decedent's estate.  We did not choose.  Considering merely his demonstrable
interest in the subject estate, we ruled that

Emilio III should likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-administrator.  In
the context of this case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.

The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78
of the Rules of Court. The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a
decedent is the prospective administrator's interest in the estate.

The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical
administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,... improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.[10]  In
all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent's
estate... must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other
candidate.

The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator rooted in his failure to "make
and return x x x a true and complete inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed partial
inventories before the probate court and by his... inaction on two occasions of Federico's exclusion of Cristina's
other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.

As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to faithfully discharge the
duties of settling the decedent's estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do.
96 MANUNGAS V. LORETO, G.R. NO. 193161, AUGUST 22, 2011
FACTS:: Engracia Manungas, as administratrix of the intestate estate of her late husband, Florentino Manungas,
filed a civil case for illegal detainer and damages against spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros
Pacifico. In their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
However, the answer was filed beyond the reglementary period and was not considered by the MTC. Thus, the
MTC Issue:d a summary judgment in favor of Engracia Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and
to restore possession to Engracia Manungas. The MTC judgement was affirmed by both the RTC and CA.

Thereafter, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the Estate of
Engracia Manungas in his favor, alleging that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino , is an heir of Engracia
Manungas. The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was
incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that he was not a Manungas, that he was not
an heir of Engracia Manungas, he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and that he was in fact a
debtor of the estate having been found liable to Engracia Manungas for PhP 177,000 by virtue of a decision Issue:d
in a previous MTC civil case.

ISSUE:: Is Diosdado Manungas entitled to the estate of the late Engracia Manungas?

HELD: NO. The evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so he is not
interested in preserving the latter’s estate. On the other hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of
Engracia when she was still alive and who is also the niece of the latter, is interested in protecting and preserving
the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the
decedent’s estate. Hence, the Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as
special administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court exercised its power in a despotic, arbitrary or
capricious manner, as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law. 

To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. It must be
remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate proceedings that have
long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution.
With the termination of the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir
of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the
Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving its value.
There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.