DALLION V.

CA (February 28, 2009)

VDA. DE JOMOC V. CA (August 02, 1991)

FACTS:
FACTS:
Petitioner Segundo Dalion allegedly sold his property in Southern
Leyte to respondent Ruperto Sabesaje through a private deed of sale. A parcel of land in CDO owned by late Pantaleon Jomoc was
fictitiously sold to third persons in which the last transferee are the
Dalion denies the sale and claims that his signature in the document
spouses Mariano and Maria So. Maria Vda de Jomoc filed suit to
was forged.
recover the property and won.
Dalion and Sabasaje executed a contract of sale of parcel of land in a
While pending appeal, Vda de Jomoc executed executed a Deed of
private document. Dalion challenged the validity of the sale contending
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale of Land with private respondent for
that it was conveyed in a private document but the law requires that it
must be in a public document. P300,000.00. The document was not yet signed by all the parties nor
notarized but in the meantime, Maura So had made partial payments
ISSUE: amounting to P49,000.00.
WON there has been a contract of sale between the parties.
So demanded from the heirs of Jomoc for the execution of final deed of
HELD: conveyance but the latter did no comply. As such, So filed a civil case
The authenticity of the signature of Dallion was proven by the and a notice of lis pendens were placed in the title of the land.
testimony of several witness including the person who made the deed
of sale. Dalion never presented any evidence or witness to prove his On the same date, the heirs of Jomoc executed another extra-judicial
claim of forgery. settlement with absolute sale in favor of intervenors Lim Leong Kang
and Lim Pue claiming that they believe that So already backed-out
Dallion’s claim that the sale is invalid because it was not made in a from the agreement.
public document is of no merit. This argument is misplaced. The
provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for
convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for
the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be ISSUE:
embodied in a public instrument. Sale is perfected upon meeting of the
minds of both parties. WON the sale is enforceable.

YES. The provision of Article 1358 of the Civil Code on the necessity of
a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or HELD:
enforceability. In this case, the contract of sale was embodied in a
Since petitioners admit the existence of the extra-judicial settlement,
private document and it does not affect the validity of the contract.
the court finds that there was meeting of the minds between the parties
Therefore, the contract of sale is valid.
and hence, there is a valid contract that has been partly executed.

The contract of sale of real property even if not complete in form, so

YUVIENCO V. DACUYCUY (May 27, 1981) long as the essential requisites of consent of the contracting parties,
object, and cause of the obligation concur and they were clearly
established to be present, is valid and effective as between the parties.
FACTS:
Public document is only needed to bind third persons.
Petitioners own a property in Tacloban City which they intend to sell for
6.5M. They gave the respondents the right to purchase the property The payment made by So is a clear proof of her intention to acquire the
nut only until July 31, 1978. Respondents replied that they agree to buy
property and the petitioners cannot claim about the respondent backing
the property and they will negotiate for details. Petitioner sent another
telegram informing respondents that their proposal is accepted and a out. The sale to the intervenors Lim cannot be recognized because
contract will be prepared. when they bought the property, there was already a notice of lis
pendens and the sale cannot be said to be in good faith.
Lawyer of defendant, Mr.Gamboa, arrived bringing a contact with an
altered mode of payment which says that the balance payment should
be paid withing 30 days instead of the former 90 days. (Otiginal terms:
2M payment upon execution. 4.5M after 90 days) CUYUGAN VS. SANTOS

ISSUE:
WON there was already a perfected contract of sale between the
parties.
HELD:
There was no perfected contract of sale yet because both parties are
still under negotiation and hence, no meeting of the minds. Mr.Gamboa
even went to the respondents to negotiate for the sale. Even though
there was an agreement on the terms of payment, there was no
absolute acceptance because respondents still insisted on further
details.
FACTS:
A deed of sale was executed as a security for loan that
Guillerma have with Santos. In the deed of sale, Guillerma shall
continue to have possession of the land and pay the loaned amount.
Cuyagan offered to pay the balance of the amount that his mother
owed to Santos but the latter refused. Santos filed an action alleging
that the period of the right to repurchase has expired. Cuyugan
contended that the sale was only a security of the loan or mortgage.

With regard to the alleged violation of terms of payment, there was no

written document to prove that the respondents agreed to pay not in
cash but in installment. In sale of real property, payment of installment
must be in requisite of a note under the statute of frauds.
• The plaintiff is the sole heir of his mother, Guillerma Cuyugan y
Canda, deceased;
• that in the year 1895 she borrowed the sum of P3,500 from the
defendant and executed, at the same time, the document, Exhibit C,
attached to the complaint, which purports on its face to be a deed of
sale of the land described therein, with a reservation in favor of the
vendor of the right to repurchase for the sum of P3,500;
• that although the instrument purports on its face to be a deed of sale,
it was intended by the parties merely to evidence the loan of the
nominal purchase price and to serve as a security for the repayment of
the amount of the loan;
ISSUE:
WON the transaction is a sale or mortgage?
HELD:
MORTGAGE. Under the law, the intention of the parties shall be given
force not the provisions of the instrument on its face. In the case at bar,
what was intended by the parties was for the deed of sale to be a
consideration for a loan or mortgage. Therefore, the transaction was
mortgage.
MORTGAGE CLAIMED TO BE A SALE. — That court has held that:
“To insist on what was really a mortgage, as a sale, is in equity a fraud,
which cannot be successfully practiced, under the shelter of any written
papers, however precise and complete they may appear to be.”
CONTRACT OF LOAN ON SECURITY; LOAN ALLEGED TO BE
PURCHASE MONEY. — Also that: “When it is alleged and proved that
a loan on security was really intended, and the defendant sets up the
loan as a payment of purchase money, and the conveyance as a sale,
both fraud and a vice in the consideration are sufficiently averred to
require a court of equity to hold the transaction to be a mortgage.”
ADDISON V. FELIX (August 03, 1918)
FACTS:
Petitioner Addison sold four parcels of land to Defendant spouses Felix
and Tioco located in Lucena City. Respondents paid 3K for the
purchase price and promised to pay the remaining by installment. The
contract provides that the purchasers may rescind the contract within
one year after the issuance of title on their name.
The petitioner went to Lucena for the survey designaton and delivery of
the land but only 2 parcels were designated and 2/3 of it was in
possession of a Juan Villafuerte.
The other parcels were not surveyed and designated by Addison.
Addison demanded from petitioner the payment of the first installment
but the latter contends that there was no delivery and as such, they are
entitled to get back the 3K purchase price they gave upon the
execution of the contract.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid delivery.
HELD:
The record shows that the plaintiff did not deliver the thing sold. With
respect to two of the parcels of land, he was not even able to show
them to the purchaser; and as regards the other two, more than two-
thirds of their area was in the hostile and adverse possession of a third
person.
It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public
instruments is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object
of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may produce
the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had
such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its
material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer
upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. The
thing sold must be placed in his control. When there is no impediment
whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the
purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the
execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But if there is an
impediment, delivery cannot be deemed effected.
DANGUILAN V. AIC (November 28, 1988)
FACTS:
A residential and farm lot in Cagayan owned by Dominggo Melad were
being claimed by petitioner Felix Danguilan and respondent Apolonia
Melad.
Apolonia contends that she acquired the property when Dominggo
Melad sold it to her when she was just three years old in which her
mother paid the consideration. She contends that she just moved out
of the farm only when in 1946 Felix Danguilan approached her and
asked permission to cultivate the land and to stay therein.
Dangguilan presented for his part 2 documents to prove his claim that
the properties were given to him by Dominggo Melad through an
onerous donation. The onerous part of the donation includes the taking
care of the farm and the arrangement of the burial of Dominggo.
HELD:
The ruling should be in favor of Danguilan. The contention of Apolonia
that the deed of donation is void because it was not made through a
public document is of no merit. The deed was an onerous one and
hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 requiring donations
of real properties to be effected through a public instrument. An
onerous donation is effective and valid if it embraces the conditions
that the law requires. Since it has been proven that Danguilan did the
conditions in the onerous donation particularly the arrangement of
Dominggo’s burial, the deed is deemed valid.
On the other hand, the deed of sale made in favor of Apolonia is
suspicious. One may well wonder why the transfer was not made to the
mother herself, who was after all the one paying for the lands. The
averment was also made that the contract was simulated and prepared
after Domingo Melad's death in 1945.
Even assuming the validity of the deed of sale, the record shows that
the private respondent did not take possession of the disputed
properties and indeed waited until 1962 to file this action for recovery
of the lands from the petitioner. If she did have possession, she
transferred the same to the petitioner in 1946, by her own sworn
admission, and moved out to another lot belonging to her step-brother.
In short, she failed to show that she consummated the contract of sale
by actual delivery of the properties to her and her actual possession
thereof in concept of purchaser-owner. Ownership does not pass by
mere stipulation but only by delivery.
PASAGUI V. VILLABLANCA (November 10, 1975)
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Calixto Pasagui and Fausta Mosar bought a property
in Leyte from Estaquia and Catalina Bocar for P2,800. Before they
could take possession of the property, defendant spouses Ester T.
Villablanca and Zosimo Villablanca took possession of it and harvested
from the coconut plantation thereon. Plaintiffs demanded the return of
the property but the defendants refused.
Plaintiffs filed a case in the CFI but respondents contend that the case
is a forcible entry and as such, CFI has no jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON the case is of forcible entry.
HELD:
In order that an action may be considered as one for forcible entry, it is
not only necessary that the plaintiff should allege his prior physical
possession of the property but also that he was deprived of his
possession by any of the means provided in section 1, Rule 70 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
It is true that the execution of the deed of absolute sale in a public
instrument is equivalent to delivery of the land subject of the sale. This
presumptive delivery only holds true when there is no impediment that
may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the vendor
into those of the vendee. It can be negated by the reality that the
vendees actually failed to obtain material possession of the land
subject of the sale.
DY V. CA (July 08, 1991)
FACTS:
Wilfredo Dy bought a truck and tractor from Libra Finance Corporation.
Both truck and tractor was also mortgage to Libra as security for a loan
and as such, they took possession of it. Brother of Wilfredo, Perfecto
Dy and sister Carol Dy-Seno requested Libra that they be allowed to
buy the property and assume the mortgage debt. Libra agreed to the
request.
Meanwhile, a collection suit was filed against Wilfredo Dy by Gelac
Trading Inc. On the strength of a writ of execution, the sheriff was able
to obtain the tractor on the premises of Libra. It was sold in a public
auction in which Gelac Trading was the lone bidder. Gelac
subsequently sold it to one of their stockholders.
The respondents claim that at the time of the execution of the deed of
sale, no constructive delivery was effected since the consummation of
the sale depended upon the clearance and encashment of the check
which was issued in payment of the subject tractor
ISSUE:
WON the William Dy is still the owner of the tractor when it was
obtained through the writ of execution.
HELD:
The tractor was not anymore in possession of William Dy when it was
obtained by the sheriff because he already sold it to his brother.
William Dy has the right to sell his property even though it was
mortgage because in a mortgage, the mortgagor doesn’t part with the
ownership over the property. He is allowed to sell the property as long
as there is consent from the mortgagee such as in this case. But even
if there is no consent given, the sale would still be valid without
prejudice to the criminal action against the mortgagor.
When William  Dy sold the tractor, he already transferred the
ownership of it because NCC states that the ownership of the thing
sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him
or in any other manner signing an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee. In the instant case, actual
delivery of the subject tractor could not be made but there was
constructive delivery already upon the execution of a public instrument
which in this case is a deed of sale.
The payment of the check was actually intended to extinguish the
mortgage obligation.
POWER COMMERCIAL V. CA (June 20, 1997)
FACTS:
Petitioner asbestos manufacturer Power Commercial and industrial
corporation bought the property of spouses Reynaldo and Angelita
Quiambao located in Makati City.
Since there are lessees occupying the subject land, part of the deed of
sale is a warranty of respondents that will defend its title and peaceful
possession in favor of the petitioners.
The property is mortgage to PNP and as such, petitioners filed a
request to assume responsibility of the mortgage. Because of
petitioners failure to produce the required papers, their petition was
denied.
Petitioners allege that the contract should be rescinded because of
failure of delivery.
ISSUE:
WON the contract is recissible due to breach of contract.
HELD:
There is no breach of contact in this case since there is no provision in
the contract that imposes the obligation to the respondents to eject the
people occupying the property.
There was also a constructive delivery because the deed of sale was
made in a public document. The contention of the petitioners that there
could be no constructive delivery because the respondents is not in
possession of the property is of no merit. What matters in a
constructive delivery is control and not possession. Control was placed
in the hands of the petitioners that is why they were able to file an
ejectment case. Prior physical delivery or possession is not legally
required and the execution of the deed of sale is deemed equivalent to
delivery.
VILLARTA V. CA (May 29, 1987)
FACTS:
Respondent Rosalinda Cruz entrusted to petitioner Victoria Villarta
seven pieces of jewelry on November 1968. On December of the same
year, Villarta exchanges one jewelry to another and issued a post-
dated check in favor of Cruz. Cruz deposited the check but it was
dishonored for lack of funds.
An estafa case was filed against Villarta but she argued that she can
only be civilly liable because even though the check bounced, she only
gave it for a pre-existing obligation. She contends a person cannot be
imprisoned for non-payment of debt.
ISSUE:
WON the transaction is a “sale or return”
HELD:
The transaction is not a sale or return but a sale on approval or sale on
acceptance.
When Cruz gave the jewelry to Villarta on November, the clear
intention is to make the latter choose which item she wanted to buy.
There was no meeting of the minds yet at this point and hence, it
cannot be considered as delivery.
If ownership over the jewelry was not transmitted on that date, then it
could have been transmitted only in December 1968, the date when
the check was issued. In which case, it was a "sale on approval" since
ownership passed to the buyer. Vallarta, only when she signified her
approval or acceptance to the seller, Cruz, and the price was agreed
upon.
It is still criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is
made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-
payment of the debt.
STA.ANA V. HERNANDEZ (January 17, 1966)
FACTS:
Spouses Jose Santa Ana, Jr. and Lourdes Sto. Domingo sold a land in
Bulacan to respondent Rosa Hernandez for P11,000 lump sum. (there
were two other previous sales to different vendees of other portions of
the land)
The boundaries of the land were stated in the deed of sale and its
approximate land area.
PORTIOR JURE). (Spouses made annotation on the title of Genato).
Since Cheng was fully aware, or could have been if he had chosen to
inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose spouses under the Contract to Sell
duly annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, it now
becomes unnecessary to further elaborate in detail the fact that he is
indeed in bad faith in entering into such agreement.

Petitioners-spouses caused the preparation of the subdivision plan but

Hernandez didn’t agree to the partition. As such, petitioners-spouses
filed a case alleging that Hernandez is occupying in excess of 17000
square meter of the land sold. Hernandez claims that the excess area
is part of the land she bought.

ISSUE:
WON the excess area occupied by Hernandez is part of the land sold.

HELD:
The sale involves a definite and identified tract, a corpus certum, that
obligated the vendors to deliver to the buyer all the land within the
boundaries, irrespective of whether its real area should be greater or
smaller than what is recited in the deed.

To hold the buyer to no more than the area recited on the deed, it must
be made clear therein that the sale was made by unit of measure at a
definite price for each unit. The sale in this case only involves the
definite boundaries but only approximate land areas. As such,  Art
1542 concerning the sale for lump sum must be considered.

CHENG V. GENATO (December 29, 1998)

FACTS:
Respondent Genato entered a contract to sell to spouses Da Jose
pertaining to his property in Bulacan. The contract made in public
document states that the spouses shall pay the down payment and 30
days after verifying the authenticity of the documents, they shall pay
the remaining purchase price.

Da Jose spouses was not able to finish verifying the documents and as
such asked for a 30 day extension. Pending the extension and without
notice to the spouses, Genato made a document for the annulment of
the contract.

Petitioner Cheng expressed interest over the property and paid 50K
check with the assurance that the contract between Genato and the
spouses Da Jose will be annulled. Da Jose spouses protested with the
annulment and persuaded Genato to continue the contract. Genato
returned the check to Cheng and hence, this petition.

HELD:
The contract between Genato and spouses Da Jose was a contract to
sell which is subject to a suspensive condition. Thus, there will be no
contract to speak of, if the obligor failed to perform the suspensive
condition which enforces a juridical relation. Obviously, the foregoing
jurisprudence cannot be made to apply to the situation in the instant
case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since
the 30-day extension period has not yet expired.

Even assuming that the spouses defaulted, the contract also cannot be
validly rescinded because no notice was given to them. Thus, Cheng's
contention that the Contract to Sell between Genato and the Da Jose
spouses was rescinded or resolved due to Genato's unilateral
rescission finds no support in this case.

The contract between Genato and Cheng is a contract to sell not a

contract of sale. But But even assuming that it should be treated as a
conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force since
it was subject to a suspensive condition that the earlier contract to sell
between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be cancelled or
rescinded.

Art.1544 should apply because for not only was the contract between
herein respondents first in time; it was also registered long before
petitioner's intrusion as a second buyer (PRIMUS TEMPORE,