Lecture Notes in Criminal Law by Justice Florenz Regalado

Chapter One
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY

Section One. – Treason and espionage

Art. 114. Treason

1. Our treason law incorporated in the Code being of American origin,

the doctrinal interpretations in that jurisdiction has persuasive influence on
our courts (People vs. Adriano, 78 Phil. 566). The rule, therefore, is that
treason can be committed only in wartime. However, the crimes of proposal
or conspiracy to commit treason, as well as misprision of treason, can be
committed in peacetime although they are more often wartime offenses.

2. One of the ways of committing treason is by levying war against

the Philippines, which act is to be understood in the international law sense
as treason is classified in the Code as a crime against the law of nations. It
must, therefore, be complemented with adherence to the enemy, or the
influence or support of a foreign power, just like the second mode of
committing treason.

In levying war, the mere enlistment of men is not sufficient but if

there is an actual assemblage of men for treasonable purposes that would be
sufficient even if no actual clash of arms took place (Ex parte Bollman and
Ex parte Swartout, 1 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. [4 Cranch. 75], p. 571). It will be
noted in this connection that in rebellion, there must be an armed public
uprising. In sedition, a mere public uprising will suffice.

3. The second mode of committing treason requires both adherence to

the enemy and giving aid or comfort to them. “Adherence” to the enemy
means that the accused intellectually and emotionally favors the enemy and
harbors sympathies and convictions disloyal to his country’s policy or
interest; while “giving aid or comfort” means an act which strengthens or
tends to strengthen the enemy, and weakens or tends to weaken the power of
the traitor’s country, in the conduct of the war between them (see Cramer
vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct. 918). The giving of such aid or comfort must be an
intentional overt act, no matter how futile the attempt, as long as it tends to
strengthen the enemy (People vs. Pardales, 101 Phil. 1219 [Unrep.]).

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 4. The restrictive two-witness rule is required to prove each overt act
of treason or of giving aid and comfort to the enemy, although the details of
the testimony on the acts testified to by both witnesses need not be identical
(People vs. Abad, 78 Phil. 766). This two-witness rule is not required (a) to
prove adherence to the enemy (People vs. Alitagtag, 79 Phil. 138; People
vs. Bate, 82 Phil. 716); (b) proposal or conspiracy to commit, or misprision
of, treason; (c) to prove the giving of notice and information by
correspondence with the enemy country and with the intent to aid the latter
(Art. 120 [3]), although this amounts to treason and is punished as such.
5. Treason can be committed outside the Philippines, but in the case of
an alien, to be liable he must be a resident of this country. It is submitted,
however, that if the alien is a co-conspirator he need not be a resident of the
Philippines, otherwise the punitive vinculum that binds conspirators under a
common liability can be easily set at naught by evasively availing of
territorial boundaries.

6. Treason absorbs crimes committed in the furtherance thereof

(People vs. Prieto, 80 Phil. 138 People vs. Villanueva, 104 Phil. 450). It has
also been held that rape, robbery and other forms of cruelty can be
considered as aggravating circumstances equivalent to ignominy and cruelty
in the crime of treason (People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil: 623).

7. The defense of “righteous action,” that is, that the collaborator also
helped save some guerillas from death at the hands of the invader, has been
firmly rejected as illogical and baseless by the Supreme Court (People vs.
Victoria, 78 Phil. 122). Also, the defense of suspended allegiance by reason
of change of sovereignty was declared untenable since there was no change
of sovereignty over the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, but only
a suspension of the rights of sovereignty, and allegiance is never suspended
since a citizen owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his country
(Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil. 856).

Art. 115. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason

1. If the crime of treason was committed as a result of a conspiracy or

proposal therefor, the latter acts are absorbed therein since the accused
becomes thereby a conspirator or principal by inducement whose acts are
integrated into the crime of treason itself.

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 The crimes of proposal or conspiracy to commit treason are separately
punished as such felonies only if the crime of treason does not result
therefrom or is not committed. Misprision of treason, however, can be
committed independently by the accused as, in fact, the act of treason may
be committed by other persons and the accused merely learned of the
conspiracy about the same.

Art. 116. Misprision of treason

1. The offender here is a principal in the crime of misprision of

treason, which is an offense distinct from treason itself. This article
provides that he shall be punished as an accessory to the crime of treason or,
more simply stated, his penalty should be equivalent to or be the same for
such accessory, that is, two degrees lower than that for the principal in
treason. Being a principal, the provisions of Art. 20 do not apply even if the
one guilty of misprision is related to the conspirator.

Furthermore, to be an accessory under Art. 20, the accused must have

in effect concealed the crime or the criminal, and mere silence about the
existence of a crime does not make one an accessory. Art. 116, therefore, is
one of the rare instances where silence is punishable, as mere failure to
report to the authorities concerned, even without an attempt at concealment,
is punishable as a felony by omission.

2. Misprision of treason can be committed in peacetime but cannot be

committed by a foreigner even if he is a resident of the Philippines, as
foreigners are specifically excluded by this article.

3. Misprision refers to the offender’s failure to report to the authorities

the existence of a conspiracy to commit treason. If the accused knew only
that someone was committing overt acts of treason, or had made proposals
to commit treason, but he was not aware of any conspiracy therefor, there is
no misprision as contemplated herein.

Art. 117. Espionage

1. This article should be taken in conjunction with the provisions of

C.A. 616 under which it has virtually been subsumed since said special law

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broadly covers the range of acts of espionage in general. It bears noting also
that citizenship is not an issue in espionage, and the unlawful acts can be
committed whether the country is at war or not.

Section Two. – Provoking war and disloyalty in case of war

Art. 118. Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals

1. This crime can be committed only during peacetime in the country

and the offender commits hostile or unlawful acts which could provoke
hostilities or reprisals from that foreign country subject of his provocations.
The acts of inciting here should not be confused with the acts of inciting to
rebellion or sedition which are committed under different factual settings
and for other objectives, as shall be explained in the articles thereon.

Art. 119. Violation of neutrality

1. What requires notice in this felony is that other countries are at war
in which the Philippines is not involved and, having adopted a policy of
neutrality, it has issued regulations to enforce its neutral position. It is the
violation of such regulations that is punishable here.

Art. 120. Correspondence with hostile country

1. The offenses subject of Pars. 1 and 2 are mala prohibita. The

offender shall be punishable even if his correspondence contained innocent
matters, as long as such correspondence is prohibited by the Government
obviously for security purposes.
2. The acts of the offender in the second sentence of Par. 3 are
evidently acts of treason, as he actually intended to aid the enemy through
such notice and information hence, the penalty is that for treason. As earlier
observed, despite the severity of this offense, the two-witness rule for
conviction is not here required to be complied with as the same applies only
to treason under Art. 114.

Art. 121. Flight to enemy’s country

1. This offense is a malum prohibitum and the purpose or reason of

the offender in fleeing to enemy territory is immaterial. There being a war
in which the Philippines is involved, this crime can be committed by a

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resident alien. Furthermore, the mere attempt to flee consummates this
felony.

Section Three. – Piracy or mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters

Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine
waters
Art. 123. Qualified piracy

1. The concept of piracy originally included as a felony in this Code

was piracy jure gentium, that is, as a crime against the law of nations. It is
robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority,
done animo furandi, in the spirit and intention of universal hostility (U.S. vs.
Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 4 L. Ed. 471), hence pirata est hostis humani generic.
Indeed, there is a distinction between the crime of piracy, as known to the
law of nations, which is justiciable anywhere, and offenses created by
statutes of particular nations, cognizable only before the municipal tribunals
of such nations (Dole vs. Insurance Co., 2 Cliff 394, 418, Fed. Case No. 3,
966).

2. In international law, piracy is generally committed on the “high

seas” which, in the English doctrine, begins 3 miles from the coast, while in
the American view, from the low water mark except in the case of small
harbors inclosed on the fauces terrae (U.S. vs. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 7 L.
Ed. 1071). Nonetheless, a view was also held that such form of piracy can
be committed in territorial waters as long as it commenced from
international waters, or international waters were traversed by the accused to
commit the crime, or were thereafter sought for immunity. In U.S. vs. Lol-
lo, et al. (Phil. 19), the pirates who came from southern Philippines were
held guilty of piracy although the depredations were committed within
territorial waters of Dutch possessions.

3. On Aug. 8, 1974, P.D. 532 was issued, to punish piracy committed

in Philippine waters. R.A. 7659 has now amended Arts. 122 and 123 to put
both forms of piracy, whether punishable under international law or our
municipal law, within the purview of these two articles with increased
penalties by simply adding the phrase “or within Philippine waters.

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 4. Since, however, there is no explanation therein as to what
Philippine waters consist of, reliance will have to be placed for the nonce on
the provisions of P.D. 532, thus: “It shall refer to all bodies of water, such as
but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of
the islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth,
length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by
historic title or legal title, including the territorial sea, the sea-bed, the
insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction.”

5. While, generally, piracy contemplates third persons, it is possible

for crew members, passengers or stowaways to commit piracy if they act in
conspiracy with the pirates; otherwise, their offense will be robbery on the
high seas.

6. Since Art. 123 refers to “crimes” committed under Art. 122, mutiny
can also be qualified. However, since Par. 1 of Art. 123 provides for acts of
boarding or firing upon the vessel and its Par. 2 specifically refers to pirates,
then only Par. 3 thereof, speaking of other crimes committed during the
piracy, should be considered as providing qualifying circumstances for
mutiny. Parenthetically, the crime of mutiny on the high seas as originally
provided in the Code was not referred to or affected by the provisions of
P.D. 532.

7. With regard to similar crimes committed on an aircraft, see R.A.

6235 (An Act Prohibiting Certain Acts Inimical to Civil Aviation).

TITLE TWO
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTALS LAWS OF THE STATE

Chapter One

ARBITRARY DETENTION OR EXPULSION, VIOLATION OF

DWELLING, PROHIBITION, INTERRUPTION, AND DISSOLUTION
OF PEACEFUL MEETINGS AND CRIMES AGAINST RELIGIOS
WORSHIP

Section One. – Arbitrary detention and expulsion

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Art. 124. Arbitrary detention

1. This article provides for the first and more common form of
arbitrary detention, the other two being delay in the delivery of detained
persons (Art. 125) and delaying the release of any prisoner (Art. 126). These
felonies are committed by public officers; if committed by private
individuals, it may be illegal detention in any of its appropriate modes (Arts.
267 and 268) or any other crime.

2. The penalty for arbitrary detention is determined by the duration of

such restraint of liberty. The offense of illegal detention by a private
individual carries much higher penalties. However, it has also been held that
a private individual can be liable and punished for arbitrary detention if he
acted in conspiracy with public officers (People vs. Camerino, CA-G.R. No.
14207-R, Dec. 14, 1956).

3. In passing upon the liability of the public officer for supposedly

detaining another arbitrarily, the juridical existence of a crime committed by
the victim is not essential. What is determinative is the good faith and the
purpose of the public officer under the circumstances of the case as they
appeared to him. Where he acted in good faith and without culpable
negligence, there is no arbitrary detention even if it subsequently turns out
that the person detained was innocent of a crime (People vs. Ancheta, 68
Phil. 415) as, in effect, the accused officer acted under a mistake of fact.

4. If the offense charged was committed by the public officer just to

detain the victim without any legal ground or intent to deliver him to the
judicial authorities, the crime is arbitrary detention (Art. 124). If there is no
legal ground for detaining the victim but the purpose of the public officer
was to turn over the former to the judicial authorities, he could be liable for
unlawful arrest (Art. 269). If there was legal ground and the public officer’s
purpose was to deliver the victim to the judicial authorities but he
unreasonably delays such turnover, he would be punishable for such undue
delay (Art. 125). If the public officer had no intent to detain the victim, but
the latter was unlawfully prevented for an appreciable length of time from
freedom of movement, the crime could be coercion (Art. 286). If the victim

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is a woman and she was detained with lewd designs from the outset, the
felony would be abduction (Art. 342).

5. Arbitrary detention can be, and generally is, committed through

unlawful arrest, or sometimes through imprudence (People vs. Batallones,
23 Phil. 46; People vs. Misa, CA, 36 O.G. 3496), but the offenses thus
committed cannot be complexed. The crime will only be arbitrary detention
as the unlawful arrest becomes the element of lack of lawful ground for such
detention. This is similar to abduction wherein the illegal or arbitrary
detention becomes or is absorbed as the element of unlawful taking of the
victim complementary to the element of lewd designs.

6. Arbitrary detention is committed even if the victim was permitted

to take his meals outside of his place of detention, but he was too terrorized
not to return thereto after eating. Psychological, and not only physical,
restraint is sufficient for the crime of arbitrary detention under these facts
(People vs. Oliva, 95 Phil. 962 [Unrep.]).

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities

1. As a research guide and legal reference, it should be remembered

that this article was amended by P.D. 1404 on June 9, 1978 but that
amendment was never implemented and was eventually repealed by E.O. 59
on Nov. 7, 1986.

Thereafter, the original Art. 125, without the intended amendment of

P.D. 1404, was expressly revived by E.O. 191 on June 10, 1987 and
ultimately amended by E.O. 272 as above indicated. This explains the
seeming conflicting periods mentioned and applied in some cases.

2. The provisions of this article apply only to arrests made without a

warrant because if the arrest was made pursuant to a warrant, the prisoner is
already deemed in the custody of the court and he officer has only to deliver
him without unnecessary delay to the nearest police station or jail (Sec. 3,
Rule 113). Also, it is presupposed herein that the arrest was lawful,
otherwise the provisions on unlawful arrest (Art. 269) may be involved.

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 3. The “delivery” mentioned here means the filing of the complaint or
information, and the “judicial authority” refers to the courts of justice and
not the public prosecutor (Sayo, et al. vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

4. To determine the 12, 18 and 36 hours allowable for crimes

punished by light, correctional, and afflictive or capital penalties, the gauge
is what the crime is as it appears, and not what it turns out to be. The failure
of the authorities to deliver the arrestee within the specified periods does not
render his detention illegal, but the arresting officer will be criminally liable
(Gunabe, et al. vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993; People vs. Mabong,
100 Phil. 1069), while the public prosecutor incurs no liability unless he had
any complicity in the violation (Sayo, et al. vs. Chief of Police, supra). This
article applies to offenses punished in special laws as it refers to the
classification of penalties in the Code “or their equivalent.”

In enforcing the applicable periods, the means of communication, the

hour of arrest and other circumstances such as the time of surrender and the
material possibility of conducting a preliminary investigation should be
considered (People vs. Acosta, CA, 54 O.G. 4739). The hours during which
the courts are closed and “no delivery can be made” are not to be counted
(People vs. Acasio, 60 Phil. 1030; Medina vs. Orozco, Jr., etc., G.R. No. L-
20723, Dec. 22, 1966).

5. The arrested person may be detained beyond the stated periods if he

demands a preliminary investigation and expressly waives in writing the
provisions of Art. 125. In that event, the preliminary investigation must
nonetheless be finished within 15 days (Sec. 7, Rule 112).

6. While Art. 125 refers to public officers as the offenders, the same
was held applicable to private individuals, employed as security guards of a
company, who arrested and delayed the turnover of public officers whom
they held in custody (People vs. Sali, CA, 51 O.G. 5676). The accused were
however absolved of liability, it appearing that they acted in good faith.

7. The right to counsel of detained persons was enforced by R.A. 857

which punished denial of such counsel with arresto mayor. This sanction
was strengthened by E.O. 155 on Mar.30, 1987 by increasing the penalty to
prision correccional. However, R.A. 857, as amended, was repealed by

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R.A. 7438, approved on April 27, 1992, which defines the rights of persons
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation and provides penalties for
violation thereof.

Art. 126. Delaying release

1. The offended parties here may be either convicted or detention

prisoners. The order for their release may have been given verbally (People
vs. Misa, CA, 36 O.G. 3496) and may have been issued by either judicial or
executive officers having the authority to do so.

2. The act of delaying the release of the prisoner without jurisdiction

amounts to arbitrary detention and is punished as such by the application of
the provisions of Art. 124.

Art. 127. Expulsion

1. The crime of expulsion consists of either deporting a person or

compelling him to change his residence without lawful ground. Only the
Chief Executive can order the deportation of a person and, in other
instances, the court enforcing a judgment for ejectment, expropriation, or
destierro in effect compels the defendant to change his residence. It should
be observed that this offense can be committed only by public officers and
not by private individuals, the latter being liable for such other offenses as
may be warranted by their acts.

Section Two. – Violation of domicile

Art. 128. Violation of domicile

1. Violation of domicile is committed by a public officer in three

different ways, as follows:

a. He enters the dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, which
means over the objection of the latter or with his or opposition, express or
implied (People vs. Sane, CA, 40 O.G., Supp. No. 5, p.113);

b. He searches for papers and other effects inside the dwelling without
the previous consent of the owner; or

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 c. He refuses to leave the premises, which he surreptitiously entered,
after being required to depart.

2. In the first mode of commission, lack of consent would not suffice

as the law requires that the offender’s entry must be over the owner’s
objection. In the second mode, mere lack of consent is sufficient. In the
third mode, what is punished is the refusal to leave, the entry having been
made surreptitiously.

a. It is believed, however, that if the surreptitious entry had been made

through an opening not intended for that purpose, the offender would be
liable under the first mode since it is entry over the implied objection of the
inhabitant. Also, although the Code speaks of the owner of the premises, it
would be sufficient if the inhabitant is a lawful occupant using the premises
as his dwelling, although he is not the proprietary owner thereof.

b. The penalty for the offense is prision correccional in its minimum

period. If the crime is committed at night, the penalty is the higher degree of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. This shows that
nighttime is not used as an aggravating circumstance but as a qualifying
element for the graver offense. Accordingly, nocturnity here cannot be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Should the offender have an
ordinary mitigating circumstance in his favor, it can only be used to
determine the proper period of the increased penalty.

3. If the offender is a private individual, the equivalent crime is

trespass to dwelling (Art. 280), but only the first mode of committing the
offense of violation of domicile would be applicable there. If the second or
third modes discussed here (searching without consent or refusal to leave
after clandestine entry) attended the unlawful intrusion by the private
individual, he would not be liable for trespass but coercion (Art. 286) or
unjust vexation (Art. 287). In the case of U.S. vs. Flemister (1 Phil. 354), the
accused who entered the house through an open door, and the refused to
leave upon being discovered by the occupants, was acquitted of trespass.
Had he been a public officer he would have been guilty of violation of
domicile under the third mode of commission.

4. Although it is not specifically mentioned in Art. 128, but on the

same rationalization, it is submitted that the circumstances in the last
paragraph of Art. 280 which absolve a person from liability for trespass to

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dwelling (entering another’s dwelling to prevent some serious harm to
himself or the dwelling’s occupants or a third person or to render some
service to humanity or justice, or entry into taverns, etc. and other open
public houses) should also apply to public officers when charged with
violation of domicile.

Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of
those legally obtained

1. If the search warrant is secured through a false affidavit, the crime

punished by this article cannot be complexed but will be a separate crime
from perjury since the penalty herein provided shall be “in addition to” the
penalty for perjury.

The crimes in this article are committed by public officers. If a

private individual executed the perjured affidavit, he will be separately liable
for perjury. However, it is submitted that if he acted in conspiracy with the
public officers, and applying the doctrine in U.S. vs. Ponte (20 Phil. 375), he
could be further liable together with them under this article.

2. The other felony punished here is abusive service of a search

warrant, such as where the searching officers exceeded their authority by
searching beyond the premises authorized in the warrant or taking articles
not included in the directives therein, unless the mere possession thereof by
the offended party is a crime. Undue severity in the service of the warrant is
also punishable, and if employed by the searching party, resistance by the
persons affected is justified (People vs. Tilos, CA, 36 O.G. 64).

Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses

1. This offense is committed only in a search with a warrant as the

other instances when warrantless search is proper are when it is with the
consent of the owner or is incidental to a lawful arrest, but this article
presupposes that the owner is absent. The former conflict of this provision
and that in the Rules of Court has been resolved by the amendment of Sec.
8, Rule 126 to also require two witnesses for the validity of the search.

2. If the search was made by a public officer without a warrant and in

the absence or without the consent of the offended parties, that would
constitute violation of domicile under the second mode of commission.

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 3. The offense in this article is committed only by public officers. If
committed by a private individual, his liability will be determined by his
intent and the crime could be trespass (Art. 280), discovery of secrets (Art.
290), or malicious mischief (Art. 327).

Section Three. – Prohibition interruption, and dissolution of peaceful

meetings

Art. 131. Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings

1. The offenses are committed by public officers. If the offenders are

private individuals, the crime could be tumultuous disturbance (Art. 153).

2. It has been held that these offenses cannot be committed by a

person who is himself a participant in the meeting (People vs. Calera, et al.,
CA, 45 O.G. 2576). The crime for which he should be liable is unjust
vexation (Art. 287).

3. Par. 3, which punishes a public officer who prevents a person from

filing a petition for redress of grievances, a should be understood to mean
that such a petition was filed or made in peaceful public meeting and it is
submitted that a petition verbally made would suffice to hold the offender
liable.

Section Four. – Crimes against religious worship

Art. 132. Interruption of religious worship

1. Any form of religious worship, ceremony or manifestation is

covered by this article as long as the same is customarily observed by the
traditional or accepted practices of that religion or authorized by its
authorities. Violence or threats committed by the offenders are absorbed in
the offense but the penalty is increased thereby.

2. There must actually be a religious ceremony being conducted on

that occasion, either by itself or in conjunction on that occasion, either by
itself or in conjunction with some other activity of the religious
denomination. If the offense was committed only in a meeting or a rally of a

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sect, it would be punishable under Art. 131 (People vs. Reyes, CA G.R. No.
13633-R, July 27, 1955).

3. This crime is also committed only by public officers. If the

interruption was committed in a tumultuous manner by private individuals,
the offense will be tumultuous disturbance of public order. (Art. 153).

Art. 133. Offending the religious feelings

1. This crime may be committed by either a public officer or a private

individual. The offensive acts must be committed in connection with or
against a religious practice, dogma, or ritual of a religious group. A public
rally by itself, even if conducted by such religious group, or sponsored by
their sect, is not the religious ceremony contemplated here (People vs.
Mandoriao, Jr., CA, 51 O.G. 4619).

2. The acts committed by the offenders must be notoriously offensive

to the feelings and religious sentiments of the faithful, as viewed from the
standpoint of the latter (People vs. Baes, 68 Phil. 203). The criminal acts
may be committed during a religious ceremony, but if the offense is
committed in a place devoted to religious worship, it is necessary that a
religious ceremony is then being conducted or in progress.

TITLE THREE
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

Chapter One

REBELLION, COUP D’ETAT, SEDITION AND DISLOYALTY

Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection – How committed

Art. 134-A. Coup d’etat - How committed

1. Art. 134 expresses the intent or purpose of rebellion and formerly,

Art. 135 contained in more detail the overt acts or means of committing
rebellion (People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515). Art. 135 has been amended
to remove the enumeration of those overt acts but that does not affect the

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accepted concept of rebellion as presented by Art. 134, or the doctrines laid
down under the former legislation. The fact is that rebellion, as a crime
against public order, has always been understood to be a crime of masses
and a vast movement of men seeking to change the established order. This
is sufficiently covered by the provision in Art. 134 that rebellion is
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for
the purpose of removing from, or diminishing the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the levers of power stated therein.

a. Under our Code, rebellion and insurrection are used synonymously

(see Arts. 134, 135, 136, 138 and 146). The distinction between them in the
American jurisdiction, which is based on the magnitude of the resistance
movement, does not apply here. In fact, the word “insurrection” was deleted
from the 1987 Constitution (see Sec. 18, Art. VII).

2. A new felony, coup d’etat, has been introduced into the Code and
defined by Art. 134-A. On textual considerations alone, as there are yet no
local judicial pronouncements, it differs from rebellion since it does not
require an armed public uprising; it relies more on the swiftness and stealth
necessary for seizure of power; and it does not appear to be a movement of a
multitude but of a more compact and select cabal belonging to the military,
police or persons holding public office or employment.

3. On the other hand, the crime of , which started with R.A. 1700 and
underwent a series of amendments and transformations, is no longer in our
statute books. A revised anti-subversion law was much later issued as P.D.
885, then amended by P.D. 1736, and ultimately superseded by P.D. 1875.
On May 5, 1987, all these decrees were repealed by E.O. 167 which
simultaneously revived R.A. 1700. However, on Sept. 22, 1992, R.A. 1700
was expressly repealed by R.A. 7636.

4. It has been a conventional rule that treason can be committed only

in wartime; rebellion, sedition, tumultuous disturbance and, now, coup
d’etat can be committed in wartime or peacetime. The basic distinctions that
may briefly be outlined on these crimes would be the purpose and modes of
commission of each.

a. In treason, the purpose is to deliver the government to an alien

enemy or to overthrow the government under the direction of a foreign

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power (Art. 114). An assemblage for that purpose, even without an armed
public uprising, is sufficient.

b. The purpose of a rebellion is to remove from allegiance to the

Government the territory or any part thereof, naval or other armed forces, or
the powers of the Chief Executive or Legislature, or the establishment of the
rebels own government (Art. 134). An armed public uprising by a
substantial number of rebels is generally required.

c. A coup d’etat has for its objective the seizure or diminution of State
power by a swift attack against the public authorities, military camps or
installations and facilities for the exercise and possession of power. The
crime involves persons belonging to the military or police or holding public
office, with or without civilian support or participation (Art.134-A).

d. Sedition connotes a mass movement or action seeking to prevent or

disrupt governmental functions or to despoil for specific political and/or
social ends a political community or social class (Art. 139). There must be a
public uprising, not necessarily with the use of arms.

e. A tumultuous disturbance is a social or political offense of a

relatively lesser magnitude or number of participants, the purpose being
merely to create public disturbance or commotion, without necessarily
involving an uprising or use of arms (Art. 153).

5. Rebellion cannot be complexed with, but absorbs, acts committed

in the furtherance of the rebellious movement (People vs. Hernandez,
supra). This was reiterated as a doctrinal rule in the much later case of
Ponce Enrile vs. Salazar, etc., et al. (G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990).
Conversely, as an equivalent tenet, offenses which were not committed in
the furtherance of the rebellion, but for personal reasons or other motives,
are to be punished separately even if committed simultaneously with the
rebellious acts (People vs. Geronimo, 90 Phil. 95; People vs. Oliva, et al.,
G.R. No. 106826, Jan. 18, 2001).

6. Where the specific charges of murder in the information stated that

the same were committed in the furtherance of rebellion, the plea of guilty
thereto entered by the accused held him liable only for simple rebellion
(People vs. Nana, et al., 106 Phil. 966). Where the accused was charged
with murder, but he proved that the killing was on orders of a Huk

16
commander in the furtherance of the rebellious movement, he was correctly
acquitted as the proper charge should have been rebellion (People vs.
Aquino, et al., 108 Phil. 814).

7. Mere silence regarding the presence of rebels despite the

knowledge thereof by the accused is not punishable because there is no
crime of misprision of rebellion (U.S. vs. Ravidas, 4Phil. 271).

a. In like manner, mere silence regarding the existence of a conspiracy

to commit rebellion or sedition is not a crime, since misprision applies only
to the offense of treason.

b. However, concealment by the offender of rebellious activities may

make him an accessory under Par. 2 of Art. 19, or under Par. 3 thereof if he
acted with abuse of public functions; but concealment of seditious practices
may hold him liable as a principal in the crime of inciting to sedition (Art.
142, last clause).

Art. 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d’etat

1. As hereinbefore noted, Art. 135 was cited by the Supreme Court as

enunciating the means used in committing rebellion which were then
provided as “engaging in war against the forces of the Government,
destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions
or diverting public funds, etc.” The elimination of this clause by R.A. 6968
has not affected the essence of rebellion or the doctrine in Hernandez as
these acts are deemed subsumed in the provision on rebellion in Art. 134.

2. The further amendments to this article consist in the increase of the

penalties for rebellion, and providing penalties for the crime of coup d’etat.

3. Prior to such amendments introduced by R.A. 6968, E.O. 187 was

issued on June 5, 1987 with this provision: “Articles 135, 136, 137, 138,
140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 177, 178 and 179 of the Revised Penal
Code are hereby restored to full force and effect as they existed before the
said amendatory decrees.”

Art. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’etat, rebellion or

insurrection

17
 1. The major crimes against national security and public order, and
specifically punished as such, are treason (Art. 114), rebellion (Art. 134),
coup d’etat (Art. 134-A) and sedition (Art. 139). Punishable crimes related
to or committed in connection with the foregoing are as follows:

a. Treason: Conspiracy and proposal (Art. 115), misprision of treason

(Art. 116);

b. Rebellion: Conspiracy and proposal (Art. 136), disloyalty of public

officers (Art. 137);

c. Coup d’etat: Conspiracy and proposal (Art. 136); and

d. Sedition: Conspiracy (Art. 141), inciting (Art. 142).

2. The basic rule is that conspiracy, proposal and inciting to commit

any of the aforesaid crimes are punishable only if the latter are not
committed as a consequence; otherwise, the former as preparatory acts are
absorbed thereby and the conspirators, proponents or inciters are liable as
co-conspirators or principals by inducement. Misprision of treason and
disloyalty of public officers, however, are crimes discrete in nature from
treason and rebellion and can be prosecuted independently.

Art. 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees

1. This felony is committed only by public officers who fail to resist

the rebellion, or continue to serve in their office under the rebels or accept an
appointment to an office under them.

2. A private individual cannot commit disloyalty on the occasion of a

rebellion under this article, much less will he be liable for refusal to resist
the rebels. He will, however, be liable for rebellion itself if he joins or
collaborates with the rebels in their cause.

3. There is no crime of disloyalty where the principal crime is treason.

The public officer may be liable for treason or espionage depending on the
acts performed by him in collaboration with the enemy’s objectives.

Art. 138. Inciting to rebellion or insurrection

18
 1. There is no crime of inciting to treason. The offender may be liable
either as a conspirator or as a proponent of treason, or under Secs. 3 or 4 of
the Espionage Act (C.A. 616) for disloyal acts or words in times of peace or
war.

2. There is inciting to sedition (Art. 142) as in rebellion. In either

instance, however, it is essential that:

a. The inciter does not take up arms or participate in the rebellion or

sedition; otherwise he will be liable as a direct participant in those crimes;

b. Rebellion or sedition does not result from such incitement,

otherwise the inciter becomes a principal by inducement with his inciting
being absorbed in the major offense (People vs. Geronimo, supra);

c. Such acts or words of incitement must have been premeditated,

otherwise if they were only spontaneous, the crime will be tumultuous
disturbance, as an outcry tending to incite to rebellion or sedition (Art. 153);
and

d. The assemblage of persons present must not have been called for
the purpose of listening to such incitement, otherwise the crime will be
illegal assembly (Art. 146).

3. Inciting to rebellion or sedition does not necessitate formation of an

organization or the calling of an assembly since it can be carried out merely
through writings, scurrilous libels, and so forth.

Art. 139. Sedition- How committed

Art. 140. Penalty for sedition
Art. 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition
Art. 142. Inciting to sedition

1. Art. 142-A which was added to this Chapter One by P.D. 942 on
June 10, 1976; Art. 142-B which was inserted by P.D. 1834 and amended by
P.D. 1974; and P.D. 1996 were all repealed by E.O. 187 on June 5, 1987.

2. In sedition, arms are not necessary as long as the public uprising is

tumultuous; and the ends of the seditious movement may be social in nature
and purpose, not necessarily political. It will also be recalled that in

19
rebellion, Art. 134 provides that, inter alia, the purpose of the rebels is to
deprive the Chief Executive and the Legislature of their powers and
prerogatives. If such acts are directed against the Judiciary, the crime will
only be sedition even if there is an armed public uprising as called for in
rebellion.

3. What is essential in sedition is the presence of a public uprising. If

there is no such uprising, but violence was used for any of the purposes of
rebellion or sedition, the crime may be direct assault (Art. 148) or any
ordinary crime.

4. As earlier discussed, if sedition results from the incitement, the

inciter is considered a principal by inducement; and if sedition did not take
place, he will be liable only for inciting to sedition. In People vs. Perez (45
Phil. 599), People vs. Evangelista (57 Phil. 354), People vs. Capadocia (57
Phil. 364), People vs. Feleo (51 Phil. 451) and People vs Nabong (57 Phil.
455), the accused were found guilty of sedition although they merely uttered
seditious words which did not produce or result in seditious acts on the part
of their listeners.

The reason for that is because the old law sedition (Act No. 292) did
not contain a distinction between sedition itself and inciting to sedition as in
fact the act of inciting therein was a mode of committing sedition. The
distinction between the two offenses under the present Code was sustained
and explained in Espuelas vs. People (90 Phil. 524). Incidentally, those old
cases were based on the dangerous tendency rule, just like the Espuelas case.

5. Regarding Par. 3, the act of hate or revenge committed upon the

person or property of the public officer must have been motivated only by
the fact that the victim is a public officer, otherwise it would be a case of
malicious mischief or any other ordinary crime.

6. Unlike treason and rebellion, sedition does not absorb murder

committed by reason or in the furtherance of the seditious activites (People
vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64; People vs. Kanlan, G.R. No. L-12686, Oct. 24,
1963).

7. In the crime of inciting to sedition under Art. 142, the person “who
shall knowingly conceal such evil practices” is punished as a principal in

20
that crime, although ordinarily such conduct is considered as the act of an
accessory.

Chapter Two

CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR REPRESENTATION

Section One. – Crimes against legislative bodies and similar bodies

Art. 143. Acts tending to prevent the meeting of the Assembly and similar
bodies
Art. 144. Disturbance of proceedings

1. These provisions are intended to protect the proceedings of

Congress or the constitutional commissions and their subordinate
committees, as well as the local legislative bodies such as the provincial
boards, city or municipal councils, or their present counterparts. The
punishable acts enumerated therein are applicable to any person as, in fact, a
mayor and a chief of police have been convicted thereunder (People vs.
Alipit, et al., 44 Phil. 910).

2. While the purpose of the offender here is similar to one of the

objects of rebellion or sedition, the difference lies in the fact that there is no
public uprising involved in the crimes punished by these articles.

3. Preventing the meetings of these bodies may be through force or

fraud. If the force produces physical injuries, or the fraud involves
falsification produces physical injuries, or the fraud involves falsification,
the said offenses are not absorbed in but will be complexed with the crimes
in these articles as necessary means employed for the commission of the
latter. If the acts are committed against Congress, they are further subject to
its contempt power.

4. Disturbing the proceedings in the office of the public prosecutor,

the Special Prosecutor, or in the courts is specially punished by Sec. 1 (e) of
P.D. 1829, without prejudice to citation for contempt by the latter (Sec.1,
Rule 71, Rules of Court).

Section Two. Violation of parliamentary immunity

21
Art. 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity

1. The first part of this article was declared inoperative to hold

criminally liable an arresting officer for violation of the parliamentary
immunity of two constitutional convention delegates charged with crimes
and whom he arrested. The Supreme Court pointed out that the 1935
Constitution then in force provided only for immunity from civil arrest,
hence the provision of this article granting immunity from criminal
processes was deemed repealed by Sec. 2, Art. XVI of the 1935 Constitution
(Martinez vs. Morfe, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-34022, Mar. 24, 1972, jointly
deciding Bautista vs. Changco, et al., G.R. Nos. L-34046-47).

2. Under the 1987 Constitution, a Senator or Representative shall, in

all offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while Congress is in session (Sec. 11, Art. VI).

Chapter Three

ILLEGAL ASSEMBLES AND ASSOCIATIONS

Art. 146. Illegal assemblies

1. From the phraseology of this article, it would appear that if the

assembly was called for the purpose of committing crimes other than
treason, rebellion, sedition, assault or for propaganda purposes, there must
be armed persons in attendance therein, otherwise the offense will not be
covered by this article but may be public disorder (Art. 154[2]).

2. If a person attends the meeting with an unlicensed firearm, the

presumptions arise that, as to him, the assembly is illegal, and that said
armed person is a leader or organizer thereof.

Art. 147. Illegal associations

22
 1. Illegal assemblies and illegal associations are distinguishable as
follows:

a. Illegal assemblies involve public gatherings, but that is not required

in illegal associations;

b. Illegal assemblies are organized for temporary purposes, while

illegal associations are more or less of some duration and existence;

c. Illegal assemblies are held in connection with or for purposes in

committing felonies under the Code, while illegal associations may include
crimes punishable by special laws;

d. In illegal assemblies, what is punished is the holding of a meeting

and attendance therein, while in illegal associations, the law punishes its
formation and the fact of membership therein; and

e. In illegal assemblies, the persons liable are the organizers and those
attending the meetings, while in illegal associations, those liable are their
officers and members.

2. See also R.A. 8049 on hazing and initiation rites in organizations.

Chapter Four

ASSAULT UPON AND RESISTANCE

AND DISOBEDIENCE TO PERSONS
IN AUTHORITY AND THEIR AGENTS

Art. 148. Direct assaults

Art. 149. Indirect assaults

23
 1. For purposes of this Chapter, a clear distinction should be kept in
mind of the concepts of a public officer, as any person who takes part in the
performance of public functions in government (see Art. 203); a person in
authority, as one who is directly vested with jurisdiction; and an agent of a
person in authority, who is generally one charged with the maintenance of
public order and the protection and security of life and property (see Art.
152). A public officer is not necessarily a person in authority or an agent of
the latter, and such person in authority and/or his agent are not always public
officers.

2. It should also be recalled that any person who attacks or offers

violence to the person of an ambassador or a public minister, in violation of
the law of nations, shall be further punished by fine and imprisonment, in
addition to the penalties that may be imposed therefore under this Code. See
Sec. 6, R.A. 75.

3. Direct assault can be committed against a private individual in these

instances:

a. If he is a person in authority or an agent of a person in

authority, even if he is not a public officer. For example,
teachers and professors are private individuals but they are
persons in authority, and a private individual coming to the aid
of a person in authority is deemed an agent of a person in
authority.

b. If the offender employs violence against any private

individual, even if the latter is not a person in authority or his
agent, as long as the object of the offender is among the
purposes of rebellion or sedition but the attack is not
accompanied by a public uprising. In this mode of committing
direct assault, Art. 148 includes any violence committed to
attain any of the purposes inter alia of sedition and this includes
acts of hate or revenge against any private individual or social
class (Art. 139[4]).

4. It is also essential to determine whether the victim is a person in

authority or only an agent of a person in authority. The reason for this is that
to constitute direct assault against an agent of a person in authority, the

24
violence, intimidation or resistance employed by the offender must be
serious (U.S. vs. Tabiana, at al., 37 Phil. 515); but if the victim is a person
in authority, the degree of force employed against him is immaterial as the
mere laying of hands on him is sufficient (U.S. vs. Gumban, 39 Phil. 76).
However, if the direct assault is committed by intimidation, it must be of a
serious nature, regardless of whether the victim is a person in authority or
his agent.

5. In all forms of assault, resistance or disobedience, it is required that

(a) the accused knew the identity of the victim, and (b) the victim was then
acting in the due and lawful performance of his duties, or the reason for the
attack against him was his performance of such official duties (People vs.
Rellin, 77 Phil. 108).

6. The view has been advanced that where the accused and
complainant are both public officers, the liability of the former must be
subject to this qualification: If the accused was also acting in the
performance of his official duties when the contention with the victim took
place, the attack is not direct assault since that presuppose that the accused
was not discharging his official duties. His offense may be coercion (II
Viada 246) or physical injuries.

7. In direct assault against an agent of a person in authority by

resisting his lawful performance of official duties, the resistance employed
by the offender should be active and serious, equivalent to flouting or
indicative of the intent to defy the law at all hazards (U.S. vs. Tabiana,
supra; People vs. Bustamante, CA, 52 O.G. 287). If the degree of resistance
is slight, it may be simple resistance or disobedience under Art.151.

8. In determining whether the crime is direct assault or some other

offense, the occasion when the attack was made and the reason therefore
have to be ascertained, taking into account these jurisprudential guidelines:

a. If the offense was perpetrated on the occasion of the

performance by the victim of his official duties, the motive of
the accused is immaterial; if not on the occasion of such
performance, the assault must be by reason of the victim having
performed such duties (U.S. vs. Garcia, 20 Phil. 358).

25
 b. If the cause of the direct assault was the past
performance by the victim of his official duties which the
accused resented, the accused is guilty of direct assault even if
he attacked the victim while both were going out to fight (Justo
vs. CA, 99 Phil. 453).

c. Direct assault is committed even if several days had

transpired between the victim’s performance of his official duty
and the assault, as where the judge was attacked by the offender
by reason of a contempt order he issued for the incarnation of
the latter several days before the offense (People vs.
Torrecarion, CA, 52 O.G. 7644).

d. Where, however, the motive of the accused for boxing

the judge could not be established, as the judge was then merely
standing at the railway station and no evidence could shed light
on the accused’s hostile conduct, the crime was only physical
injuries (People vs. Sañiel, 33 Phil. 646).

e. If a school teacher was slapped by the accused not

while she was performing her school functions nor by reason
thereof, but the offense was committed in the presence of her
pupils, the crime was held to be slander by deed (People vs.
Gamo, CA-G.R. No. 5110-R, Oct. 24, 1950). If the teacher was
alone, it would be ill-treatment by deed or maltreatment (Art.
266).
9. If serious or less serious physical injuries were inflicted but the acts
do not constitute assault, the penalty is increased if the victim is a person in
authority (Par. 3, Art. 265). If direct assault was likewise committed
simultaneously, both offenses will constitute a complex crime. If direct
assault was committed with slight physical injuries and the victim is a
person in authority, they will be separate crimes; but if the victim is an agent
of a person in authority, the slight physical injuries will be absorbed in the
direct assault (People vs. Acierto, 57 Phil. 614).

10. If the public officer was acting with abuse of his official functions,
he is deemed to be acting in a private capacity and if he attacked, there
would be no crime of direct assault. Thus, where two councilors fought in

26
the session hall, there could be no direct assault if the cause of the fight was
a private matter (People vs. Yosoya, CA-.R. No. 8522-R, May 26, 1955).

11. For indirect assault in Art. 149, it was formerly required that (a)
direct assault is being committed against a person in authority or an agent of
a person in authority; and (b) a third party comes to the aid of the victim by
virtue of the latter’s order or request (U.S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472).
Otherwise, the crime would only be physical injuries or coercion if the third
person is likewise attacked by the same offender.

However, under the subsequent amendment of Art. 152 by R.A. 1978,

a private individual coming to the aid of a person in authority is himself
deemed an agent of a person in authority, and there is no distinction as to
whether or not he came at the request or order of the person in authority
under attack.

Accordingly, the present rules should be:

a. If the victim is a person in authority who is the subject of a direct

assault, and the third person coming to his aid (who thereby is ipso jure an
agent of a person in authority) is likewise attacked, the crime committed
against that third person will be direct assault, resistance or disobedience
depending on the degree of force or violence used against him by the
offender.

b. If the victim is an agent of a person in authority, it depends: If

direct assault is being committed against the agent, the attack against the
third person will constitute indirect assault; but if only resistance or
disobedience is being committed against the agent, the attack against that
third person will be either physical injuries or coercion depending on the
acts committed.

The contrary views that have been expressed on these situations

unfortunately failed to consider R.A. 1978, amending Art. 152, which inter
alia specified that a third person coming to the aid of a person in authority
(not his agent) is considered, albeit only for that purpose, as an agent of that
person in authority; hence, the offender’s liability for attacking that third
person is determined by that status or capacity of the latter.

27
Art. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the National Assembly, its
committees or subcommittees, by the Constitutional Commissions, its
committees, subcommittees or divisions

1. As distinguished from the coverage of Arts. 143 and 144 which

includes local legislative bodies, this article is limited only to Congress and
the Constitutional Commissions.

2. The liability of the offender for a violation of this article is without

prejudice to the power of contempt of the foregoing deliberative bodies
(Arnault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29).

3. This article also punishes a person who restrains another from

attending as a witness summoned by Congress, or induces the latter to
disobey the stated proceedings therein. If the same acts involve a witness in
criminal proceedings, the offender may be liable under Sec. 1(a) of P.D.
1829.

Art. 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents

of such person

1. The provisions of this article apply where the victim is either a

person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. Resistance and
disobedience are distinguished from each other by the degree of defiance on
the part of the offender.

2. Also, assault is committed while the victim is either in the actual

performance of his official duties or as a consequence of his prior
performance thereof. On the other hand, resistance or disobedience can be
committed only on the occasion of the actual performance of his duties by
the offended party.

3. In order that the accused will be punishable here, the directive

which was disobeyed (a) must be peremptory in nature, as distinguished
from one which is merely declaratory of facts or rights, and (b) was directed
to the accused for compliance or implementation without allowing any
exercise of discretion by him.

4. There is no punishable disobedience where the writ of execution

was addressed to the sheriff who told the accused to deliver the property to

28
the other party. The failure to execute the writ was not ascribable to the
accused since it was not directed to him and the acts required therein were to
be performed by the sheriff, not by the accused. If he had refused to turn
over the property to the sheriff on demand, that would be the time when he
would be liable for disobedience.

Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority – Who

shall be deemed as such

1. This article has integrated the different laws and decrees which had
gradually expanded the scope of who are considered persons in authority and
agents of persons in authority. The last amendment incorporated in the third
paragraph refers to lawyers, who are considered as such but in a limited
capacity.

2. It must further be noted that R.A. 7610, the Local Government

Code of 1991, provides that for purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the
punong Barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the
lupong tagapamayapa in each Barangay shall be deemed person in authority
in their jurisdiction, while other barangay officials and members who may
be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of
public order; protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance
of a balanced and desirable environment, and any Barangay member who
comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons
in authority (Sec. 388).

3. A person in authority is defined as one directly vested with

jurisdiction, meaning that he has the power to govern, execute the laws and
administer justice (People vs. Mendoza, 59 Phil. 163).

4. “Persons in authority” in the first paragraph of this article have a

broader scope and application. Those mentioned in the third paragraph are
of more limited applicability. Teachers, professors and persons charged
with the supervision of schools are persons in authority only for purposes of
Art. 148 (direct assault) and Art. 151 (resistance or disobedience). They are
not considered persons in authority for purposes of Art. 149 (indirect
assault). What this means is that if this class of persons in authority come to
the aid of another person in authority, they will be considered only as private

29
individuals who are accordingly deemed to be merely agents of persons in
authority on that occasion.

With respect to lawyers, they shall be deemed persons in authority

only when they are in the actual performance of their professional duties or
on the occasion of such performance.

Chapter Five

PUBLIC DISORDERS

Art. 153. Tumults and other disturbances of public order – Tumultuous

disturbance or interruption liable to cause disturbance

1. The provision that the disturbance is tumultuous if there are more

than three armed persons is only a presumption juris tantum, hence if the
disturbance is in fact tumultuous it is immaterial that there are no such
armed persons. Conversely, if the gathering is not in fact tumultuous, it does
not matter if there are such armed persons present on that occasion.

2. Par. 4, regarding a person who makes an outcry tending to incite

rebellion or sedition, presupposes that such outcry was spontaneously made,
as distinguished from the real crime of inciting to rebellion (Art. 134) or
sedition (Art. 142) where the offender acted deliberately with the intent or
expectation that the crowd would act affirmatively on such criminal
incitement.

3. There can be separate crimes of physical injuries thru reckless

imprudence and tumultuous disturbance caused by the firing of a
submachine gun, as held in People vs. Bacolod (89 Phi. 621). There, the
accused was charged separately with and pleaded guilty to physical injuries,
and it was held that he could still be charged with tumultuous disturbance.
However, an accused could also be liable for the complex crime of assault
and tumultuous disturbance if the latter offense was committed on the same
occasion and by the same means of attacking some election inspectors
(Villanueva, etc. vs. Ortiz, et al., 108 Phil. 493).

Art. 154. Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances

30
 1. The “publication” or “any other means of publication” may be
verbally made, and not necessarily in writing. Public disorder need not
consequently result therefrom, it being sufficient that such unlawful
publications had the tendency to cause the same, as the Code only requires
“false news which may endanger” public order or damage public interest or
credit.

2. The act of the offender of encouraging disobedience to the law or

the authorities, punishable under Par. 2, should be distinguished from
inciting to sedition as the latter offense further requires that the offender
should at the same time incite the people to rise publicly against the
government (People vs. Arrogante, CA, 38 O.G. 1974).

3. Par. 4 proscribes anonymous publications which do not bear the

real printer’s name or are classified as anonymous. Such omissions make it
difficult to determine the origin of the publications which may be pirated
copies or obscene publications. If the publication is both anonymous and
obscene, the offenses cannot be complexed as they involve different acts
separately punished, that for obscenity being punishable under Art. 201.

Art. 155. Alarms and scandals

1. These offenses must be caused in be caused in public places or

must affect public peace, but the disturbance should only be a minor degree,
or at least not of a tumultuous nature, otherwise it would be punishable
under Art. 153.

2. With respect to Par. 1, the firearm should not be pointed at a person

in his general direction, otherwise it would be the crime of illegal discharge
under Art. 254.

Also, the phrase “calculated to cause alarm or danger” is an erroneous

translation of the Spanish text which says “qeu produzca alarma o peligro,”
hence it is not the intent of the offender but the result of his acts that is
determinative of his liability. The offense may even result in grave scandal
(Art. 200).

31
 3. The disturbance contemplated in Par.4 must likewise be in a public
place but must be not of such a nature as to be tumultuous.

Art. 156. Delivery of prisoners from jail

1. It is not accurate to say that this crime can be committed only by

outsiders. This article refers to “any person” who shall remove from the
penal establishment “any person confined therein.” Under Art. 157, evasion
of service can be committed with the connivance of insiders or other
intimate of the penal institution, and Art. 156 applies to any prisoner,
whether under detention or by final judgment (see People vs. Quitorio, CA-
G.R. No. 5098-R, Jan. 16, 1052).

a. In case of conspiracy, the conspirators are liable under this article,

but the warden or jail custodian of prisoners is liable for infidelity in the
custody of prisoners under Art. 223 (Alberto. etc., et al. vs. De la Cruz, etc.,
et al., G.R. No. L-31839, June 30, 1980).

b. This offense may be committed by violence, intimidation or

bribery. The first two means employed by the accused are absorbed in the
crime in the article but the penalty is increased to prision correccional in its
minimum period. Bribery, however, can neither be absorbed nor complexed
but shall be a separate crime, since the penalty therefore is “in addition to”
those for other offenses (Art. 210).

2. Consequently, if the delivery of the prisoner is committed through

bribery, the parties concerned incur the following liabilities:

a. The briber is liable under this article, plus corruption of a public

officer (Art. 212).

b. The jailer, if a public officer is liable for infidelity in the custody of

prisoners, for conniving with or consenting to evasion (Art. 223), in addition
to his liability for bribery (Art. 210); and if he is a private individual, he is
identically liable but is punished with the next lower degree of the penalty
(Art. 225).

c. The prisoner, if he is a convict by final judgment, is liable for

evasion of service of sentence (Art. 157), but is not liable under this article
since he is the object of the crime; if he is a detention prisoner, he incurs no

32
liability for escaping but in the judgment in the judgment in case, if it be of
conviction, he will not be entitled to an indeterminate sentence (Sec. 2, Act
No. 4103, as amended).

3. If the prisoner is detained for the crime of treason, parricide,

murder or an attempt against the President’s life, it has been suggested that
those who delivered him from jail are accessories to those crimes. As a
point of law, there is some validity in this suggestion, in light of the
provisions of Art. 19(3) on accessories.

4. Where a guard who was off duty out a prisoner from jail for 5
hours, replacing him in his cell with another prisoner, the crime was held to
be delivery of prisoners under this article, and not infidelity in the custody of
prisoners (People vs. Del Barrio, 60 O.G. 3909).

CHAPTER SIX

EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE

Art. 157. Evasion of service of sentence

Art. 158. Evasion of service of sentence on the occasion of disorders,
conflagrations, earthquakes, or other calamities
Art. 159. Other cases of evasion of service of sentence

1. The felony of evasion of service of sentence can be committed only

by prisoners who have been convicted by final judgment, under the
following situations provided by the Code:

(a) Escaping under ordinary circumstances (Art. 157);

(b) Escaping on the occasion of disorder caused by conflagration,
earthquake, explosion or similar catastrophe, or during a mutiny in which he
has not participated (Art. 158); and
(c) Violation of conditional pardon (Art. 159).

2. There is no evasion of service of sentence if the escapee (a) is only

a detention prisoner; (b) is a youthful offender committed to a rehabilitation
center (P.D. 603); or (c) is deportee who violates the deportation order (U.S.
vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil. 867).

33
 3. If a detention prisoner escapes from confinement, he will thereafter
be disqualified from the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act
No. 4103) and shall be given a straight penalty, without any prospect of
parole. If he is a convict and he violates his conditional pardon, he can be
rearrested and proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art.
159.

4. Evasion under ordinary circumstances cannot be committed by

“unlawful entry,” as erroneously translated in Art. 157, but by scaling the
prison wall, or “escalamiento” as stated in the Spanish text.

5. Where penalty being served is destierro, the issue of whether there

can be evasion in the service of such sentence will depend on the type of
evasion concerned.

a. The offense of evasion can be committed if what is involved is

evasion under ordinary circumstances, since Art. 157 refers to any penalty
involving deprivation of liberty, and destierro involves deprivation of liberty
although it is served outside prison walls. While Art. 157 mentions
“imprisonment,” this is an erroneous translation of the Spanish version
which reads “sufriendo privacion de libertad” (People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil.
172).

b. There can no evasion of the sentence of destierro in the case of

evasion during a catastrophe or a mutiny as Art. 158 specifically provides
for the act of the offender in “leaving the penal institution where he shall
have been confined” thus referring to a sentence of imprisonment.

c. There can be evasion of destierro by violating a conditional pardon

(Art. 159), but the penalty shall be prision correccitional in its minimum
period, as the convicted cannot be made to serve the unexpired portion since
destierro even in its full duration does not exceed 6 years.

6. The penalty for evasion during a catastrophe or mutiny (Art. 158) is

lower than that committed under ordinary circumstances in Art. 157. In the
former, a proportional penalty equivalent to 1/5 of the time still to be serve
under the original sentence, but not exceed 6 months, is the imposable

34
penalty; while in Art. 157, a fixed penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, or in its maximum period by certain
circumstance, is imposed.

a. Additionally, if the convict surrenders or returns to his place of

detention within 48 hours from the proclamation that the calamity has
passed away, he is entitled to a reduction of 1/5 of his of his original
sentence (Art.98).

b. In case of a mutiny, if the escapee did not participate therein, he is

covered by under which he may receive the foretasted 1/5 reduction or 1/5
addition in his sentence, depending on whether or not he seasonably gave
himself up to the authorities. If he participated in the mutiny, his case falls
under Art. 157 wherein with the maximum period of prision correccional
and he is not entitled to the 1/5 reduction even if the timely surrenders. On
the other hand, he will liable for offenses which he may have committed
during the mutiny, such as murder, the penalty wherefore shall be in the
maximum period by reason of quasi-recidivism.

c. In People vs. Padilla (CA, 46 O.G. 2151), the accused was forced
by some detainees to leave the jail where he was confined, but he returned
thereafter. It was held that there was no mutiny, hence he was not entitled to
the 1/5 deduction as loyalty allowance. On the other hand, he was not liable
either for evasion as he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear,
thus he was not given any additional penalty.

7. In the matter of violation of conditional pardon, two aspects thereof

have to be discussed or clarified.

a. On the question as to where the violation of a conditional pardon is

a substantive offense, the majority opinion in People vs. Jose (75 Phil. 612)
and reiterated in Alvarez vs. Director of Prisons (80 Phil. 43) held that it is
not a substantive offense since the penalty imposed therefore is only the
recommitment of the convict to serve the portion of the sentence remitted by
the pardon, hence the proceeding are considered as only a continuation of
the original case.

The minority opinion appears more logical and realistic in holding

that it is a substantive offense, hence an entirely separate case, because the
Code imposes a specific penalty of prision correccional in its minimum

35
period if the unreserved portion is 6 years or less. This view was adopted as
the ruling in People vs. Martin (68 Phil. 122 and Sales vs. Director of
Prisons (87 Phil. 492), and reiterated in Culanag vs. Director of Prisons
(G.R. No. L-27206, Aug. 26, 1967).

b. The second query is whether or not the convict who violates his
conditional pardon can always be made to serve the balance of his prison
term.

(1) In all cases where the penalty remitted is more than 6

years of imprisonment, the convict must always serve the
balance.

(2) If the penalty emitted is 6 years or less, the court shall

impose on him the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period, but without prejudice to his recommitment by
the President for the unreserved portion remitted by the pardon
(Sales vs. Director of Prisons, supra).

It is believed that the President’s power to recommit the prisoner

under Sec. 64 (i) of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code is still in force,
not being inconsistent with any provision of E.O. 292.

Chapter Seven

COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERVICE OF

PENALTY IMPOSED FOR ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE

Art.160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for

another previous offense

1. Art. 160 defines and regulates a special aggravating circumstance

known as quasi-recidivism which is applicable to offenders who have been
convicted by final judgment. While the circumstance is generally
appreciated against a convict who commits another crime while actually
serving sentence, it also apply to one who has “been convicted by final
judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence.”
Thus, where the accused who has been convicted by final judgment
commits homicide while being transported to the penitentiary for

36
incarceration, he is already considered a quasi-recidivist for purposes of the
penalty for that homicide

2. The offense committed while the accused is serving sentence must

be a felony not a crime punished by special law and the penalty for that
felony shall be imposed in the maximum period. With regard to the offense
of which the accused was sentenced by final judgment, it does not matter
whether it was also a felony or a crime punished by special law (People vs.
Peralta, G.R. No. L-15059, Oct. 11, 1961; People vs. Alicia, et al., G.R. No.
L-38176, Jan. 12, 1980).

3. While quasi-recidivism is usually identified with the commission

by the offender of another crime while serving sentence in jail, quasi-
recidivism can also be attendant where the crime was committed by him
while he was at large after escaping from the penal institution (People vs.
Basadre, G.R. No. L-36383, April 17, 1984; (People vs. Basadre, G.R. No.
L-37482, July 23, 1984) or while he is in the act of escaping therefrom
(People vs. Tiongson, G.R. No. L-35123-24, July 25, 1984).

4. Quasi-recidivism, being a special aggravating circumstance, cannot

be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances, hence the penalty of death
was imposed for murder despite the plea of guilty of the accused (People vs.
Ama, G.R. No. L-14783, April 29, 1961), or even if there were two
mitigating circumstances of surrender and plea of guilty (People vs. Perete,
G.R. No. L-15515, Apil 29, 1961). This doctrinal rule was consistently
reiterated in a series of cases from People vs. Peralta (G.R. No. L-19069,
Oct. 29, 1968) all the way to People vs. Villanueva, et al., (G.R. No. L-
322774, April 2, 1984). However, if the accused has privileged mitigating
circumstances in his favor, the penalty may be lowered by one, two or more
degrees, but to be imposed in the maximum period.

5. Even if the accused admitted in court that he had previously been

sentenced shot someone, but there was no evidence that he was serving a
final sentence at the time he committed the present charge of murder, quasi-
recidivism cannot be considered against him (People vs. Ochavido, et al.,
G.R. No. 68858, May 30, 1986).

6. An interesting question is whether the accused who was serving

sentence by final judgment is a quasi-recidivist if he commits evasion of
service of sentence by escaping from jail. Art. 160 provides that there is

37
recidivism if another felony is committed by the convict “after having been
convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence or
while serving the same. “Evasion of service of sentence is a felony
governed by Art. 157 and is committed while the accused is serving
sentence.

a. It is submitted that there can be no circumstance of quasi-recidivism

in this situation. The operative circumstance that constitutes quasi-
recidivism here is the fact that the convict was serving his sentence under a
final judgment.

That same circumstances is also an essential element of evasion of

service of sentence. Par. 1 of Art. 62 provides that a circumstance which is
an element of or is included by the law in defining a crime shall not be taken
into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.

b. Further, it may be asked in the same case, quasi-recidivism can be

considered if the accused is not yet serving sentence as that other instance
contemplated in Art. 160. That alternative would actually be begging the
question for then there would be no crime of evasion of service of sentence
(Art. 157), and it would be pointless to consider quasi-recidivism on the
basis of a felony which has not been committed. Of course, if there were
other felonies that the accused actually had committed after final conviction
but before service of sentence, quasi-recidivism can be present as a
circumstance in those other crimes.

7. Where the accused committed theft while sentence for robbery, he

would either be a recidivist o a quasi-recidivist. Considering the manifest
purpose of the Code to impose a higher penalty because of the perversity of
the felon who commits another crime even while he is still serving sentence
for a preceding one, it is submitted that the circumstance to be applied
should be quasi-recidivism which cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance, unlike recidivism which can be cancelled out by such
mitigating circumstance.

8. On the same rationale, there will be quasi-recidivism even if the

felony committed by the convict while serving sentence also makes him a
habitual delinquent. Both circumstances will apply as this article allows
quasi-recidivism to be appreciated “(b)esides the provisions f rule 5 of
article 62.” The quasi-recidivism will consequently be punished for the new

38
offense in the maximum period, with an additional penalty for habitual
delinquency.

9. The quasi-recidivist is also entitled to a pardon upon reaching 70

years, except (a) when he is also a habitual delinquent, or (b) when he shall
not be considered worthy of executive clemency.

TITLE FOUR
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST

Chapter One

FORGERIES

Section One-Forging the seal of the Government of the Philippines

Islands, the signature or stamp of the Chief Executive

Art. 161. Counterfeiting the great seal of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, forging the signature or stamp of the executive
Art.162. Using forged signature or counterfeit seal or stamp
1. In ordinary legal terminology, imitating or simulating another’s
signature is falsification. However, if the subject of such offense is the
President’s signature, these two articles, to set it apart from the rest and
emphasize the gravity of the crime, categorize that felony as forgery of the
President’s signature.

2. These articles presuppose that the signature of the President has

been forged on a document which is supposed to have been signed by him in
his official capacity as the Chief Executive. If the document is one
supposedly signed by him in a private capacity, the crime would be
falsification.

Section Two – Counterfeiting coins

Art. 163. Making and importing and uttering false coins

Art. 164. Mutilation of coins – Importation and utterance of mutilated coins
Art. 165. Selling of false or mutilated coin, without connivance

1. A false or counterfeit coin is any coin which is not authorized by

the Government to be used or circulated as legal tender. Article 163

39
contemplates either Philippine coins which have already been demonetized
or foreign coins.

2. In the case of false coins, what are punished are the acts of making,
importing or uttering the same in connivance with counterfeiters or
importers (Art. 163). If the coins in questions are those of a foreign country,
the acts are also punishable even if such coins are legal tender (“moneda”) of
the foreign country.

3. In the mutilation or importation of coins in connivance with

counterfeiters, or the importation, possession or utterance of mutilated coins
(Art. 164), the coins must be legal tender of the Philippines. This article
consequently refers only to genuine Philippine coins, hence there is no crime
of mutilation of false coins or foreign coins.

4. The counterfeiting and/or introduction into the Philippines of

counterfeit coins or currency notes are punishable under the Code even if
such offenses are committed abroad, as long as the coins, currency notes
(and also obligations or securities) are those of the Philippine Government
(see Pars. 2 and 3, Art. 2).

5. The title or epigraph of Art. 165 is erroneous insofar as it provides

for “selling” of false or mutilated coins. What is actually punished by this
article is the offender’s possession of false or mutilated coins with intent to
utter or actually uttering the same, without the connivance of counterfeiters
or importers thereof.

6. P.D. 247, dated July 18, 1973, punishes any person who shall
willfully deface, mutilate, tear, burn or destroy, in any manner, currency
notes or coins issued by the Central Bank of the Philippines with a fine of
not more than P20,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than 5 years.

Section Three. – Forging treasury or bank notes, obligations and

securities; importing and uttering false or forged notes, obligations and
securities

Art. 166. – Forging treasury or bank notes or other documents payable to

bearer; importing, and uttering such false or forged notes and documents
Art. 167. – Counterfeiting, importing and uttering instruments not payable
to bearer

40
Art. 168. – Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and
other instruments of credit
Art. 169. How forgery is committed

1. Art. 166 contains a comprehensive definition of the obligations and

securities contemplated in these articles. They include not only the official
obligations and securities of the Philippine or foreign governments, but also
those authorized by them which thereby become governmental obligations
or securities. Among these were the backpay acknowledgment certificates
issued under R.A. 304 and R.A. 897 and, at present, the Land Bank bonds
issued in connection with the land reform program as these are certificates of
indebtedness. Also, a Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket has been
declared to be a governmental obligation (People vs. Balmores, 85 Phil.
493).

2. Regarding notes payable to bearer (Art. 166), the forgery thereof of

need not be with the connivance of forgers or importers, but the importation
and uttering must be with such connivance. In notes payable to order (Art.
167), all these three acts must be with their connivance.

3. Printing imitations of U.S. postal money orders were held to be not

punishable where the blanks therein were not filled up, as such forms could
not then be considered as obligations or securities (People vs. Santiago, CA,
48 O.G. 4858). This should be distinguished from the ruling in U.S. vs.
Asensi (34 Phil. 750) where the accused also printed spurious copies of
internal revenue tax forms, but he filled up the blanks and filed them, hence
he was convicted of attempted estafa through falsification of public
documents.

4. The mere possession of counterfeit notes and instruments of credit

(Art. 168) is not punishable. The accused must be aware of the counterfeit
nature thereof and his possession must be with the intent to use the same.
Such intent may be determined from the volume or number of said notes and
the acts of the accused taken in connection therewith. In People vs. Digoro
(G.R. No. L-22032, Mar. 4, 1966), the information filed for this offense was
declared totally defective as it merely alleged that the accused had the
“intent to possess” those notes.

5. In People vs. Casals (CA-G.R. No. 12455-R, May 17, 1955), where
the accused printed on ordinary paper inverted replicas of genuine treasury

41
notes by treating the originals with chemicals, the Court of Appeals
convicted him of the impossible crime of illegal possession of false treasury
notes with the intent to utter. It ratiocinated that the spurious nature of those
replicas was so patent and obvious as to make it inherently impossible to
utter the same.

This was obviously an error since an impossible crime refers to an

offense against persons or property, but the offense subject of this case is a
crime against public interest. Incidentally, this same error was committed in
the obiter dictum in People vs. Quasha (93 Phil. 333).

a. In People vs. Balmoes, supra, where the accused wrote the winning
numbers in ink on his sweepstakes ticket, hence it was patently impossible
for the deceit not to be discovered, the stupidity of that ruse was disregarded
and he was convicted of attempted estafa thru forgery. In People vs. Del
Rosario (CA-G.R. No. L-16806, Dec. 22, 1961), a stringent rule was
adopted and the accused was convicted of illegal possession of forged
treasury notes even if the bills were genuine pesos but one digit of the serial
numbers was altered by him.

6. The general distinctions between simple forgery and falsification

may be drawn from the subject matter and the modes of commission of these
offenses. The objects of forgery are bank notes, obligations and securities,
while those of falsification are the different types of documents in law.
Further, forgery is committed in five ways stated in law, while falsification
is committed in eight ways provided in Art. 171, as hereinafter discussed.

7. Forgery is committed by giving the appearance of authenticity to

bank notes, obligations and securities, or by erasing, substituting,
counterfeiting or altering the figures or words thereon, as specified in this
article.

a. Hence, where the accused encashed a treasury warrant, which is a

governmental obligation, but he did so by posing and signing as the payee
thereof, the crime is falsification under Art. 171(2), and not forgery (People
vs. Samson, CA-G.R. No. L-12011-12-R, Oct. 13, 1955).

b. For the same reason, where the subject matters were U.S. treasury
warrants, but the accused did not alter or counterfeit anything thereon and,
instead, he posed and signed the same as the payee named in the warrants,
the crime was falsification, and not forgery, as he made it appear that the

42
real payee had participated in that act when in fact he had not done so
(People vs. Loteyro, CA, 50 O.G. 632).

Section Four. – Falsification of legislative, public, commercial, and

private documents, and wireless, telegraph, and telephone messages

Art. 170. Falsification of legislative documents

1. Just as Art. 161 presents a special form of forgery regarding the

President’s signature, this article provides a special form of falsification of
documents. It departs from the conventional modes of falsification of
documents since it can be committed only on a genuine legislative document
and only by the alteration thereof. There can be no falsification by
simulation as this offense is committed only on a legislative document
which has already been enacted or is pending approval. If the falsification is
by simulation or other means, it may be covered by Arts. 171 or 172, but not
by this article.

2. The subject matter, as stated in this article, is any bill, resolution or

ordinance originating from either chamber of Congress or the local
legislative bodies. It may include executive orders of the President issued in
lieu of statutes during such periods when the President was vested with
legislative powers, , such as shortly after the country’s liberation in 1945 and
after the dismantling of the martial law regime in 1986. Extant presidential
decrees may be considered within the purview of this article.

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastic

minister

1. The regular subjects of falsification are classified into, official,

commercial and private documents. They have been defined by the
Supreme Court in such cases as U.S. vs. Asensi, supra, U.S vs. Orera (11
Phil. 596), People vs. Lerma (44 Phil. 471) and People vs. Uy (101 Phil.
159). For purposes of the law on falsification ion the Code, they may be
more simply explained as follows:

a. The public document is one authorized by law or regulation or in

which a public officer, a notary public or any person authorized to
administer oaths intervenes for the purpose of authenticating the same and
not as a party thereto.

43
 b. An official document is one in the execution of which public
officers take part virtute officit or any document which has become a part of
the public records.

c. A commercial document is one authorized and regulated by the

commercial laws for use and documentation in trade and commercial
transactions.

d. A private document is one by which a disposition is set forth and

proved, but which does not fall under any of the preceding categories.

2. A petition for habeas corpus in court is a public or official

document, equivalent to “public documents” in the present Sec. 19, Rule
132, and can be the basis of a charge for falsification under Art. 171
(Bermejo vs. Barrios, et al., G.R. No. L-23614, Feb. 27, 1970).

3. Under Art. 171, a public officer or a notary public shall be liable if

they act with abuse of their office. Regarding the ecclesiastic, the act must
affect the civil status of a person. Unless their acts are so qualified in their
nature or effect, their liability shall be that of a private individual.

4. There are eight ways of falsifying any document as a general rule,

although with some differences in the details.

a. Par. 1 covers the act of imitating any handwriting, signature, or

rubric which actually exists, or simulating the same although they do not
exist. In imitating, or counterfeiting as it is also called, there must be some
similarity or resemblance between the original and the counterfeit (U.S. vs.
Lampa, 26 Phil. 189). No such requirement is involve in simulating, or
feigning as the Spanish text calls it, since no such original exists.

b. If the person whose signature is falsified is actually fictitious or he

was not present and did not participate in the transaction, Par. 2 is the mode
of violation applicable. Voting in the place of the registered voter for
instance (People vs. Abubakar, G.R. No. L-24157, Sept. 28, 1979) is an
illustration of this type of falsification, just like the offender posing as the
payee of a negotiable instrument in order to encash the same, as earlier
illustrated.

c. Par. 3 refers to the fallacious attribute in writing of statements

which were never made by the declarant or, in ordinary parlance, the act of

44
twisting the words or putting in the mouth of the victim words which he
never said.

d. Under Par. 4, the offender, makes untruth statements in a narration

of facts in writing, to the prejudice of the victim. The elements of this act of
falsification are that the accused knows that what he imputes is false; the
falsity involves a material fact; there is a legal obligation for him to narrate
the truth; and such untruthful statements are not contained in an affidavit or
a statement required by law to be sworn to. The last element is what
distinguishes this form of falsification from perjury (Art. 183).

(1) Making false statement in an application form for patrolman

examination (Civil Service Form No. 2), under oath as required, constitutes
perjury, not falsification (People vs. Cruz, 108 Phil. 255).

(2) Regarding the legal obligation to state the truth, it was held in
People vs. Quasha, supra, that there was no such legal obligation in the
preparation of the formation papers of a corporation, hence there was no
falsification.

In People vs. Poserio (CA, 53 O.G. 6159), was likewise ruled that
there was no legal obligation to disclose the fact of a previous conviction in
the personal data form submitted by the offender to the police department
since that form was not an official document, hence no falsification was
committed.

However, in People vs. Po Giok To (96 Phil. 913 the decision rule
was that there is a obligation to disclose the truth in entries made in a
residence tax certificate, hence the accused was liable for falsification for
failing to do so.

Also, in People vs. Uy, supra, the holding was that the NBI personal
data sheet is an official document, so the untruth statements made therein
constituted falsification. This is especially true where such personal data
sheet is required by the Civil Service Commission (De Guzman vs. Delos
Santos, A.M. No. 2002-8-SC, Dec. 18, 2002).

e. Regarding intercalation in Par. 6, this can be committed only in a

genuine document. Therefore, if a person in order to commit estafa made an
intercalation in a public document which he thought was genuine but was in
fact fictitious, he is liable only for estafa as there was no falsification.

45
 5. Where force employed to compel another to execute a contract, the
offender is not liable for falsification as such compulsion does make it a
false instrument but only a violable one (U.S. vs. Milla, 4 Phil. 391). The
offender will be liable for execution of deeds by violence under Art. 298.

6. Falsification can be committed by imprudence, either by a private

individual (People vs. Bañas, CA-G.R. No. 11761-R, May 31, 1955;
Recebido vs. People, G.R. No. 1411931, Dec. 4, 2000) or by a public officer
(People vs Castillo, CA-G.R. No. 14352-R, April 28, 1956), although in the
latter case his liability was considered on the level of a private individual as
his acts were not virtute officit. In Samson vs. CA, et al. (103 Phil. 277).
The accused were convicted of estafa thru falsification by negligence.

7. The person in possession of a falsified document is presumed to

have falsified the same, especially so if the had the opportunity and the
motive to do so (People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253; People vs.
Sendaygiego, et al., supra). However, this presumption should be carefully
analyzed or applied, as where it was the duty of the accused to prepare the
documents involved such that, of necessity, those documents would be in his
possession and the falsification may have been committed during gaps of
time in his possession of the same (see Alonzo vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No.
68624, June 30, 1987).

8. The requirement for truth in the facts narrated is not violated if

there is some colorable truth in the statements of the accused (People vs.
Bayot, 10 Phil. 518; People vs. Villena, et al., CA, 51 O.G 5691). Also,
what is required to be true is an assertion of fact by the accused; hence
where the declarant stated in her certificate of candidacy that she was
“eligible” for the public position, an in accuracy therein could not hold her
liable for falsification as she was actually expressing only an opinion
(People vs. Yanza, 107 Phil. 888). This was similar to the case of a claimant
of land who asserted that he was entitled to the ownership thereof, as it was
only his opinion for which he could not be held liable for falsification
(People vs. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604).

9. Making alterations or correction in a document to make it speak the

truth, even if unilaterally done, cannot be falsification as the essence of this

46
offense is to make the document tell a lie (U.S. vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324;
Cabigas vs. People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987).

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents

1. In falsification of a private document, damage or intent to cause

damage is an essential element. Damage to honor is sufficient (People vs.
Marasigan, CA-G.R.No. 6040, Oct. 18, 1940). As hereinbefore noted, there
is no crime of estafa truth falsification of a private document; the crime will
only be falsification of that document.

2. Falsification is not a continuing offense and is consummated when

the document is actually falsified, regardless of whether or not it was there
after put to illegal use (Alfredo, et al. vs. Intia, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-27590,
April 30,1976).

In the introduction of a falsified document under this article, damage

is not required if the same is introduced in a judicial proceeding. Damage is
an element only when the document is introduced in a proceeding or
transaction other than judicial (People vs. Prudente, CA, 58 O.G. No. 29, p.
5122). If it is introduced in a criminal case, it may be covered by Sec. 1 (f),
P.D. 1829.

Art. 173. Falsification of wireless, cable, telegraph and telephone messages,

and use of said falsified messages

Section Five. – Falsification of medical certificates, certificates of

merit or service and like

Art. 174. False medical certificates, false certificates of merit or service,

etc.
Art. 175. Using false certificate

Section Six. – Manufacturing, importing and possession of

instruments or implements intended for the commission of falsification

Art. 176. Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for

falsification

1. Arts. 173, 174, and 175 all punish acts of falsification, and are
subject to the general provisions on that crime, but with specific subjects
punishable thereunder. In view of the transmissions and the certificates

47
which may be the subject of falsification, it must have been the purpose to
specifically and individually deal with them to underscore their importance
and the greater prejudice to the public interest.

2. In crimes involving illegal possession of illicit or prohibited

articles, it is usually sufficient that the accused be in possession of the
contraband, with animus possidendi, in order to be criminally liable. In Art.
176, however, it is required for punishment thereunder that the accused shall
introduce into the country the illegal items intended to be used for
falsification; and that the possessor should have the counterfeiting
instruments with the intention of using them. In other words, mere
possession would not suffice, but must be coupled with the intent to use, or
animus utendi, in order to warrant the punitive sanction in said article. The
offender’s possession of the articles may be actual or constructive.

Chapter two

OTHER FALSITIES

Section One.- Usurpation of authority, rank, title, and improper use

of names, uniforms and insignia

Art. 177. Usurpation of authorized or official functions.

1. The offense penalized here is committed by representing oneself to

be an officer, agent or representative of the Philippine Government or a
foreign country and such representation may be words or acts of the
offender. The other mode is by actually performing an act pertaining to a
person in authority or public officer of their government. Damage is not
required as an element of this offense (U.S. vs. Hernandez, 29 Phil. 109).

2. The offense can be committed by a public officer who unlawfully

assumes a public position without color of law, such as a councilor who
insisted on acting as a municipal mayor despite an official opinion that it
should be the vice-mayor who should take over that officer in the absence of
the mayor (People vs. Hilvano, 99 Phil. 655). This situation is different
from those contemplated in Arts. 239 to 241 which refer to usurpation or

48
interference with the functions of a department of the government by an
official belonging to another department.

3. In People vs. Escorbar (CA-G.R. No. 6725-R, Oct. 31, 1951), it

was held that, pursuant to R.A. 10, usurpation may be committed with or
without pretense of official position. However, it was subsequently clarified
that R.A. 10 was only an emergency measure to cope with abnormal
situations after the last war, and was applicable only to the subversive
activities of illegal organizations. As last amended by R.A. 379, pretense of
official position is required in Art. 177 (People vs. Lidres, 108 Phil. 995).

4. Usurpation of the authority or functions of diplomatic, consular or

other accredited officers of a foreign government is punishable under R.A.
75, in addition to the penalties provided by the Code.

Art. 178. Using fictitious name and concealing true name

1. The illegal use of a fictitious name under this article must be to

either conceal a crime, evade a judgment, cause damage to public interest;
otherwise, if the damge concerns private interest, offense may be punishable
as estafa through the use of a fictitious name (Par. 2 [a], Art. 315).

2. The second paragraph refers to the act of concealing one’s true

name and personal circumstances, which need not necessarily entail or
include the use of a fictitious name. Similar provisions and penalties are
provided in P.D. 1829.

3. Apropos to the felonies punished in this article, which being mala

in se require proof of specific or general criminal intent, a malum
prohibitum similar in nature is punished by C.A. 142, as amended by R.A.
6085, which regulates the use of aliases. Except when used under the
exceptions in Sec. 1 of the law, no person who has been baptized with a
name different form that with which he was registered at birth, or an alien
registered with a different name in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry, or
who has obtained judicial authority to use an alias, shall represent himself in
any public or private transaction or shall sign or execute any public or
private document without affixing his real or original name or authorized
aliases or pseudonyms.

49
 An alias (short for “alias dictus” or “otherwise called”) indicates that
one was called by one was called by one or the other of two names (Antone
vs. State, 49 Ariz. 168, 65 P. 2d; Kennedy vs. People, 39 N.Y. 245). The
pseudonyms contemplated in Sec. 1 of the law include pen names and stage
names. The illegal and punishable use of deceptive names is known in some
jurisdictions as “identity fraud”.

4. A person who takes place of a convict will be liable for delivering a

prisoner from jail (Art. 156) and the use of fictitious names for that purpose
may be absorbed therein. The convict who was replaced will be guilty of
evasion of service of sentence (Art. 157) but not for the use of the fictitious
name as he may not necessarily have used a different name. In both
instances, the use of a fictitious name may be complexed with delivery of
that prisoner as that necessary therefore, or these offenses may be punished
separately depending on the actual facts of the case.

Art. 179. Illegal use of uniform or insignia

1. The insignia, uniform or dress in this article must pertain to or were

adopted and used by a particular office or class of persons which actually
exists. The use thereof by the offender must be “improper,” meaning that it
is a public and malicious use.

2. The offense here includes the unlawful use of the ecclesiastical

habit of a religious order (People vs. Romero, CA, 58 O.G. 4402). The
illegal use of the uniform, regalia or decoration of a foreign state is
punishable under R.A. 75. On the other hand, R.A. 493 prohibits and
penalizes the unauthorized or illegal use of the insignia, badge or emblem or
rank, as well as the medal, patch or identification card of members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Section Two. – False Testimony

Art. 180. False testimony against a defendant
Art. 181. False testimony favorable to the defendant
Art. 182. False testimony in civil cases
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation
Art. 184. Offering false testimony in evidence

50
 1. The Code punishes three forms of false testimony, that is, (a) in
criminal cases either against or favorable to the accused, (b) in civil cases
whether for or against any party, and (c) in other cases.

To update the terms in line with current legal usage, the “defendant”
in the criminal cases mentioned in these articles shall be referred to as the
“accused,” and the party who gave false statements or false testimony is
called the declarant or witness.

2. In false testimony against the accused, (Art. 180), the prosecution

must be for a felony committed by him, not for an offense punished under a
special law which is covered by Art. 183.

a. The conviction or acquittal of the accused herein is a pre-judicial

question since the penalty for the witness who gave such false testimony
depends upon the judgment rendered for or against the accused and the
sentence meted to him.

b. Where the accused was punished with a light penalty other than a
fine, it will not be false testimony in Art. 180, as Par. 4 thereof refers to a
correctional penalty inclusive of arresto mayor, or a fine, or acquittal. It
would not be a case of incriminatory machination (Art. 363) which involves
acts tending to bring about the prosecution of the victim, as by “planting
evidence.” It cannot also be presumed that the matter of a light penalty was
merely overlooked in Par. 4 as this article appears complete in substance.
Accordingly, this situation may have to fall under Art. 183, as false
testimony in other cases.

c. The false testimony against the accused need not be the direct cause
for his conviction as long as the declarant gave that testimony with the intent
to bring about his conviction (People vs. Reyes, CA, 48 O.G. 1837).

3. In false testimony in favor of the accused (Art. 181), it would be

impractical or unrealistic to hold the accused liable therefore if in his own
testimony he merely denied or disputed the allegations against him,
otherwise he would virtually be expected to make no defense but to just
admit the accusation. In U.S. vs. Soliman (36 Phil. 5), it was held that the
accused would be liable under this article if he testifies in his favor by
falsely imputing the crime to another person.

a. For conviction of false testimony under these articles, it was held

that it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove which of the two

51
statements of the declarant is false and to show the falsity of that statement
by evidence other than his contradictory statements (People vs. Arazola, CA,
65 O.G. 10887). In People vs. De Mirado (CA, 40 O.G. 4187), the accused
was acquitted despite his admission that one of the statements he made was
false. See, however, the discussion of the Capistrano case in connection
with Art. 183, infra.

4. Art. 182 applies only to ordinary or special civil actions and

supplementary or ancillary proceedings, special proceedings which are
covered by Art. 183 (People vs. Hernandez, CA, 57 O.G. 8330).

5. Art. 183 governs in false testimony given in cases other than

punished by Arts. 180 to 182, and in prosecutions for perjury.

a. As already noted, perjury committed in prosecutions under special

laws, in special proceedings, or under Art. 180 where the penalty is only
arresto menor, can be proceeded against under this article.

b. False testimony is committed in judicial proceedings and the

statement given by the witness is not required by law, whereas perjury does
not take place in judicial proceedings but the statement given by the
declarant is required by law.

Thus, perjury may be committed in the government prosecutor’s

office (People vs. Bautista, CA, 40 O.G. 2491), or it may be made in an
affidavit or a sworn statement filed with the complaint in the municipal trial
court and later attached to the information (People vs. Cabero, 61 Phil.
121).

6. The current rule is that for perjury to exist, there must be a

deliberate assertion of falsehood; it must be made under oath before a
competent officer; the false declaration is with regard to a material matter;
and the statement is required by law.

a. A material matter, according to the Supreme Court, is the main fact

which is the subject of the inquiry or any circumstance which tends to prove
that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or
strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of inquiry, or which
legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies (U.S. vs. Estraña,
16 Phil. 520). It is, therefore, that part of the statement which not only

52
affects the veracity thereof but also the significance of that statement in
relation to the fact to be proved.

b. Where the adverse claim believed to be invalid is not stated in the

offender’s application for registration of land, it was held that there was no
perjury as there was no proof that he knew that the matter he omitted was a
material matter (see People vs. Ignacio, G.. No. L-18332, April 30, 1963).

7. For purposes of perjury, the weight of authority is that the statement

subject of the inquiry must be required by law or, as worded in Art. 183, “in
cases in which the law so provides.”

a. As early as People vs. Tupasi (CA, 36 O.G. 2086), it was held that
the statement in question must be required by law. However, in People vs.
Angangco (G.R. No. L-47693, Oct. 12, 1943 [Unpub.]), the Supreme Court
held that the statement need not be required but that it was sufficient if it was
authorized by law to be made. Subsequently, in People vs. Quasha, supra, a
prosecution for falsification by making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts which is closely similar to perjury, it was held that the questioned
statement must be one that is required by law. Under a similar factual
setting, this doctrine was reiterated in People vs. Cruz (108 Phil. 255).
Finally, in Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, etc., et al. (G.R. No. L-48088, July 31,
1978), where the defendant was charged with perjury for alleged false
statements contained in the verified answer filed in an ordinary civil action,
the accused was acquitted on the ground that under the circumstances that
pleading was not required by the law or the Rules to be under oath.

8. In U.S. vs. Capistrano (40 Phil. 902), it was held that mere
contradictory statements made by the same declarant was not proof of
perjury (equivalent to false testimony now under the Code), but the
prosecution has to prove which statement is false by presenting evidence
aliunde thereon. This appears to be impressed with logic for, among other
things, the question as to which statement contains a falsity on a material
matter, or which statement should properly be the subject of a perjury charge
or a false testimony indictment, should first be resolved.

9. According to some Spanish commentators, what constitutes the

offense of perjury is the giving of false statements in positive or negative
form (citing DSCS, April 2, 1883), but they failed to resolve the contingency
where the declarant merely refused to answer, hence these solutions are
suggested based on Philippine law:

53
 a. If the refusal was made before a legislative body, he would be liable
for disobedience under Art. 150, plus contempt;

b. If in a judicial body, it would only be direct contempt under Rule

71; and

c. If in other administrative or deliberative bodies, it would also

constitute contempt if that body is vested with contempt powers, otherwise
upon application to the proper court.

10. Perjury is distinguished from incriminating an innocent person in

that perjury consists of the actual imputation of a crime in the prosecution of
the victim, while incriminatory acts in Art. 363 are those which are merely
intended to cause or bring about such prosecution by planting evidence
against the victim (People vs. Rivera, 59 Phil. 236).

Chapter Three

FRAUDS
Section One. - Machination, monopolies and combinations

Art. 185. Machinations in public auctions

Art. 186. Monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade

1. Regarding Art. 185, if the machinations are carried out by threats or

coercion, these acts are generally absorbed; but if bribery is employed, it
will always be prosecuted as a separate crime.

2. Art. 186 is our only anti-trust law, pending approval of legislative

proposals on this matter.

Section Two. – Frauds in commerce and industry

Art. 187. Importation and disposition of falsely marked articles or

merchandise made of gold, silver, or other precious metal o their alloys

54
Arts. 188-189. (Repealed by R.A. 8293, The Inttectual Property Code,
effective Jan. 1 1998)

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CRIMINAL LAW II

January 2007

MIDTERM REVIEWER

 TITLE ONE:

CRIMES AGAINST NATIONALSECURITY AND THE LAW OF

NATIONSCrimes against national security.

1.Treason (114)2.Conspiracy and proposal to committreason

(115)3.Misprision of treason (116)4.Espionage (117)

Crimes against the law of nations.

1.Inciting to war or giving motives forreprisals (118)2.Violation of neutrality

(119)3.Correspondence with hostile country(120)4.Flight to enemy’s

55
country (121)5.Piracy in general and mutiny on thehigh seas or in Philippine
waters (122)

114. TREASON

Elements:1.Offender – Filipino citizen or alienresiding in the Philippines

2.

 There is a war – Philippine is involved(not civil war)3.Offender – (a) levies

war against thegovernment (declare war) or (b)adheres to the enemies giving
themaid or comfort. Treason – breach of allegiance to thegovernment
committed by a person whoowes allegiance to it.Allegiance – the obligation
of fidelity andobedience which the individuals owe to thegovernment under
which they live or to theirsovereign, in return for the protection
theyreceive.** Treason cannot be committed in time of peace – while there
is peace, there are notraitors. Treason is a war crime, it is punishedby the
state as a measure of self-defenseand self-preservation.“Levies war” – actual
assembling of men forthe purpose of executing a treasonabledesign by force.
It is not necessary that therebe a formal declaration of the existence of astate
of war. The war must be directedagainst the government: organized
tooverthrow and destroy the establishedgovernment. Mere public uprising to
inflict anact of hate or revenge upon the persons of public officers does not
constitute treasonbecause it is not directed against thegovernment. The
levying of war must be incollaboration with a FOREIGN COUNTRY.**
Adherence and giving aid or comfort tothe enemy must CONCUR
TOGETHER.** The aid and comfort must be given to theenemy by some
kind of action – it must be adeed or physical activity, not merely amental
operation. It must be to renderassistance to them as enemies and
infurtherance of the enemies’ hostile designs.**Murder and physical injuries
were inherentin the crime of treason characterized by thegiving of aid and
comfort to the enemy. These crimes cannot be complexed withtreason.**
Treason by Filipino citizen can becommitted outside of the Philippines,
buttreason by an alien must be committed IN THE PHILIPPINES.**
Treason is a continuous offense – may becommittees by one single act,
series of acts,several series thereof, and different times.Ways of proving
treason:1.Testimony of two witnesses to thesame overt act,
or2.Confession of the accused in opencourt Two-witness rule: The testimony
of twowitnesses is required to prove the overt actof giving aid or comfort. It
is not necessary toprove adherence. Each of the witnesses musttestify to the

56
whole overt act, or if separable,there must be two witnesses to each
part of the overt act.** The defense of duress, lawful obedience toa

de facto

government is a good defense intreason.

115. CONSPIRACY & PROPOSAL TOCOMMIT TREASON

** Conspiracy to commit treason iscommitted when in time of war, two or

morepersons come to an agreement to levy waragainst the government or to
adhere to theenemies and to give them aid or comfort,and decide to commit
it.** Proposal to commit treason is committedwhen in time of war a person
who hasdecided to levy war against the governmentor to adhere to the
enemies and to givethem aid or comfort, proposes its executionto some other
person or persons.** Reason: in treason, the very existence of the state is
ENDANGERED.

© Hanna Magkasi 2007 page 1

57
 

CRIMINAL LAW II

January 2007

MIDTERM REVIEWER

58
** The two-witness rule does not apply toconspiracy or proposal to commit
treason.

116. MISPRISION OF TREASON (keepingit to himself, silence)

Elements:1.Offender – owing allegiance to thegovernment and NOT a

foreigner2.Offender – has knowledge of anyconspiracy to commit treason
againstthe government3.Offender – conceals or does notdisclose and make
known the same assoon as possible to the (a) governor orfiscal of the
province or (b) to themayor or fiscal of the city WHICH HERESIDES.**
Cannot be committed by a resident alien** Does not apply when treason is
alreadycommitted by someone and the accuseddoes not report its
commission to the properauthority – knowledge of CONSPIRACY** His
penalty is like the penalty for anaccessory, still he is in the state of being
theprincipal.

117. ESPIONAGE (spy)

 Two ways of committing:A. “Entering”Elements:1.Offender – enters a

Warship, Fort,Naval or Military establishment orreservation2.He has no
authority to do so3.Purpose – to obtain Information,Plans, Photographs or
other data of a confidential nature relative to thedefense of the PhilippinesB.
“Disclosing”1.Offender – public officer

2.

He has in his possession the saidarticles, data or information byreason of the

public office he holds3.He discloses their contents to arepresentative of a
foreign nation.

118. INCITING TO WAR OR GIVINGMOTIVES FOR REPRISAL

Elements:1.Offender – performs unlawful orunauthorized

acts2.Such acts provoke or give occasionfor a war involving or liable
toinvolve the Philippines or exposeFilipino citizens to reprisal on
theirpersons or property** The intention of the offender is immaterial– the
law considers the effects produced bythe act of the accused. Such acts
mightdisturb the friendly relation that we havewith a foreign country, and
that arepenalized even if they constitute a mereimprudence.** Committed in
time of peace

119. VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY 

59
Elements:1.There is war in which thePhilippines is NOT
INVOLVED2.There us a regulation issued bycompetent authority for
thepurpose of enforcing neutrality3.Offender – violates such regulation** A
nation or power which takes no part in acontest of arms going on between
others isreferred to as neutral.

120. CORRESPONDENCE WITH HOSTILECOUNTRY 

Elements:In time of war in which the Philippines isinvolved1.Offender –

makes correspondencewith an enemy country or territoryoccupied by
enemy troops2.The correspondence is either –
a.Prohibited by thegovernmentb.Carried on ciphers orconventional signs,
orc.Containing notice orinformation which might beuseful to the
enemyCorrespondence – communication by meansof letters

121. FLIGHT TO ENEMY’S COUNTRY 

Elements:1.There is a war in which thePhilippines is involved2.Offender –

owes allegiance to thePhilippine government3.Offender – attempts to flee or
go toenemy’s country4.Going to the enemy’s country isprohibited by
competent authority(government)** Mere attempt to enemy’s
countryconsummates the crime.

© Hanna Magkasi 2007 page 2

CRIMINAL LAW II

January 2007

60
MIDTERM REVIEWER

** If fleeing or going to an enemy country isnot prohibited by competent

authority, thecrime is not committed.

122. PIRACY IN GENERAL AND MUTINY ON THE HIGHT SEAS

Elements:1.A vessel is on the high seas or inPhilippine waters2.Offenders –

not members of itscomplement or passengers of vessels3.Offenders – (a)
attack or seize thatvessel, or (b) seize the whole orpart of the cargo of said
vessel, itsequipment or personal belongingsof its complement or
passengers.Piracy – robbery or forcible depredation onthe high seas without
lawful authority anddone with intent to steal.Piracy vs. robbery on the high
seas: there isviolence against or intimidation of persons orforce upon things
in taking the property inthe vessel --Robbery – offender is a member of
thecomplement or a passenger of thevessel;Piracy – offender is NOT a
passengeror a member of the complementof the vessel.Mutiny – usually
committed by the othermembers of the complement and may becommitted
by the passengers of the vessel.It is the unlawful resistance to
a superiorofficer or the raising of commotions anddisturbances on board a
ship against theauthority of its commander.

PiracyMutiny

Persons who attacksthe vessel or seize itscargo areSTRANGERS to

saidvessel They are members of the crew orpassengersIntent to steal
isessentialIntent to ignore theship’s officers or theymay be prompted bya
desire to commitplunder

123. QUALIFIED PIRACY 

 There should be piracy or mutiny in the highseas. This will be qualified if

any of thefollowing circumstances is present:1.Whenever the pirates have
seizedthe vessel by boarding or firingupon the same;2.Whenever the pirates
haveabandoned their victims withoutmeans of saving themselves;
or3.Whenever the crime isaccompanied by murder, homicide,physical
injuries, or rape.** This is a special complex crime punishableby reclusion
perpetua regardless of thenumber of victims.** Any person who aids or
protects pirates orabets the commission of piracy shall beconsidered as an
accomplice.  TITLE TWO:

CRIMES AGAINST THEFUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE

61
1.Arbitrary detention (124)2.Delay in the delivery of detainedpersons to the
proper judicialauthorities
(125)3.Delaying release (126)4.Expulsion (127)5.Violation of domicile
(128)6.Search warrants maliciously obtainedand abuse in the service
of thoselegally obtained (129)7.Searching domicile without
witness(130)8.Prohibition, interruption, anddissolution of peaceful meetings
(131)9.Interruption of religious worship (132)10.Offending of religious
feelings (133)

124. ARBITRARY DETENTION

Elements:1.Offender – public officer oremployee2.Offender – detains a

person3.Detention – without legal grounds** Public officers liable – must be
vested withauthority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a
crime; i.e. policemen, judges, mayor.** There is detention when he is placed
in aconfinement or there is a restraint on hisperson – even if hr could move
freely, as longas he could not escape for fear of beingapprehended
again.Legal grounds for the detention of a person:

© Hanna Magkasi 2007 page 3

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