Quality & Quantity (2006) 40:959–981 © Springer 2006

DOI 10.1007/s11135-005-5077-3

A Method for Studying Social Representations

IOANNIS TSOUKALAS
Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden,
E-mail: ioannis@socant.su.se

Abstract. The current article is concerned with the presentation of a novel method for study-
ing social representations. Social representations are a key concept within social science
but, as with many other social phenomena, notoriously difficult to grasp and study in a
systematic way. The survey method presented though a formal one is not dependent on pre-
specified and pre-graded answers as most questionnaires do. Instead it creatively utilizes the
elicitation and elaboration of free associations on a given topic in order to shed light on
the semantic field and cognitive organization of a given social representation. As a neces-
sary complement to such a methodological exposition the article also presents some of the
theoretical background that informs the method as well as the tradition of studying social
representations in general. In the course of the article a research design for the method is
presented accompanied by a complete script of the survey instrument. This is followed by a
discussion of the merits of the method as well as some suggestions of analytical approaches
that can be applied to the results. The article concludes with a short discussion of potential
areas of application beyond the field of social representations.

Key words: analytical suggestions, formal method of study, free associations, innovative
questionnaire, research design, social representations

1. Introduction
The present article is concerned with the issue of how to study social rep-
resentations, a key concern within social psychology and social anthropol-
ogy. In this spirit it hopes to further the methodological options available
to social scientists by proposing a relatively new method for systematically
gathering information on the incidence and character of social represen-
tations within a group or larger population. Since the article is mainly
a methodological exposition the discussion of the theoretical background
and epistemological underpinnings supporting the method will be kept to
a minimum. For those wanting to look deeper into such issues references
to relevant literature will be given.

1.1. the history of social representations in social science

Social representations have a long history within social science. They go at
least as far back as to Emile Durkheim and his theorizing on collective
960 IOANNIS TSOUKALAS

representations and social facts (see Cuff et al., 1992). More recently this
heritage from classical sociology has been taken over and developed by
a group of French social psychologists working under Serge Moscovici
(Jodelet, 1989; Moscovici, 1989). This tradition also has some counter-
parts within social anthropology where the concept of social representa-
tions has figured in one way or other (Holy and Stuchlik, 1983; Sperber,
1984).
Social representations besides being a respectable field of investigation
in themselves also have affinities with other important theoretical tradi-
tions. In European social psychology for example – as developed within the
Social Identification Theory – social representations have a prominent the-
oretical status and are considered to be closely related to issues of social
identity and group stereotypes (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Moscovici, 1989;
Billig, 1995). Finally the theory of social representations also has affini-
ties with studies of native classification systems (Lévi-Strauss, 1966; Bloch,
1990; Eriksen, 1995) and cognitive science (Sperber, 1984; Keesing, 1989;
Bloch, 1990; Karmiloff-Smith, 1994; Strauss and Quinn, 1997).

2. The Theoretical Background

Before showcasing the method a short summary of some of the theory
lying behind it will be presented. Critical readers though should be warned:
this article is not attempting a critical discussion of the body of theory (a
rather coherent and well formed such) dealing with social representations.
Its focus is methodological and will present a method for collecting data
that can be used as analytical input for theories dealing with social repre-
sentations. Those deeming a more critical treatment of the issue necessary
should look for it elsewhere. Still many of the references offered below con-
tain such critical discussions. For a radical critique of the idea of represen-
tation in cognitive science see Varela et al (1991).

2.1. the intellectual produce of groups: social representations

The study of social representations is firmly rooted in a small group par-
adigm (see Hogg and Abrams, 1988).1 Another fundamental influence in
the study of social representations comes from social anthropology and the
study of culture (see Holy and Stuchlik, 1983; Sperber, 1984; Moscovici,
1989). Actually these two historical strands fuse together into a well func-
tioning model. Thus conglomerations of linguistically and functionally
related groups are often called societies and conglomerations of related
societies are often called cultures. A culture in this sense is a distinctive and
more or less integrated pattern of knowledge, belief, and behaviour shared
STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 961

by the different classes of group members and transmitted from generation

to generation by way of social learning and training.2 Humans are actually
specially adapted, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, for group life
and culture (Geertz, 1993a, b; Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al., 1993).
A typical expression of group life is that, through the socially orches-
trated activities of its members, it generates a wide array of social repre-
sentations. The members spontaneously adapt to their social environment
by adopting the ideas and values of their peers. Adaptation and proficiency
in the ideational realm can also be a formal prerequisite for membership
in a group. Social representations are therefore an unmistaken expression
of group membership and can also signal the member’s feelings of belong-
ing and solidarity with their group. Social representations are consensual
understandings that grow out of the fertile “soil” of everyday informal dis-
cussion and communication within groups. Social representations in this
sense provide a framework of interpretation for people’s experiences; they
make the unfamiliar familiar, and thus help satisfy the individuals need
to understand his or her world. As such “they generate working hypoth-
eses on which are based expectations, anticipations, and predictions, and
act as cognitive anchoring points against which events, occurrences, and
experiences are compared” (Hogg and Abrams, 1988: 80).
Since social representations are both an image of a phenomenon and a
creative expression of human subjectivity they exhibit a peculiar dialectical
character: they are neither a simple depiction nor a twisted construction
of their object. Instead they are characterised by a double nature, being
simultaneously both percept and concept. Their formation and dissemina-
tion is consequently always associated with systematic transpositions and
permutations of their content leading, in differing degrees, to distortion,
addition and/or omission (Sperber, 1984; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Jodelet,
1989; Moscovici, 1989). Serge Moscovici defines social representations as3
. . . a set of concepts, statements and explanations originating in daily
life in the course of inter-individua1 communications, . . . the equiv-
alent, in our society, of the myths and belief systems in traditional
societies; they might even be said to be the contemporary version of
commonsense.

(Moscovici, 1981: 181; quoted in Hogg and Abrams, 1988: 79–80)

Although social representations stand in close relationship to other forms

of culturally specific knowledge – like for example science, political ora-
tory or technical jargon – they are generally distinguishable by their
wider distribution in the population and their practical function in every-
day social intercourse. A further difference is that they are, generally
speaking, informative rather than prescriptive. Thus a social representation
962 IOANNIS TSOUKALAS

about “public transportation” encompasses a widely shared and general

impression of the subject matter, as well as some basic communicative skills
and behavioural dispositions useful in social intercourse, while a technical
knowledge of the same subject, for example an engine drivers version,
implies a more parochial and prescriptive set of descriptions and operative
procedures (Sperber, 1984; Jodelet, 1989; Moscovici, 1989).
Social representations arise in a multitude of ways. Some of these ways
are known to us but many are still elusive and hard to grasp. The learning
and training necessary for the acquisition of social representations gener-
ally falls within three categories: learning by association, learning by conse-
quences and learning by modelling (for details see Skinner, 1971; Bourdieu,
1990; Tomassello et al., 1993). This learning can either be implicit or
explicit. Thus a certain part of the social representations circulating in a
population are learned through explicit instruction; these highly valued and
officially sanctioned representations are intentionally ‘implanted’ in group
members through compulsory educational practices (e.g., schooling, pro-
fessional training) or culturally prescribed attendances (e.g., church going,
ritual initiations). Other social representations are acquired more implic-
itly by way of modelling significant others (e.g., parents, peers, teachers,
ritual elders); by imitation and trial-and-error the individual moulds and
calibrates his rudimentary knowledge in accordance with the prevailing
social circumstances. Hogg and Abrams point to the peculiar relationship
that tends to arise between formal and informal understandings, between
common-sense and scientific explanations
The emergence of social representations involves an explicitly social
process in which unfamiliar explanations of familiar phenomena are
rendered familiar by being assimilated (distorted, simplified, etc.)
through the course of everyday communication, and then enter into
commonsense understanding. More precisely, small groups of ‘qualified’
individuals (specifically ‘scientists’ – in the broadest sense of the word)
construct highly formalized, non-obvious, and unfamiliar explanations
of familiar phenomena. Although these explanations can be, and are,
taught through the medium of formal education, their dissemina-
tion is overwhelmingly through informal communication (conversa-
tions among friends in a coffee bar, etc.) This introduces systematic
distortions in harmony with people’s pre-existent commonsense under-
standing or framework of interpretation. Thus a social representation
is formed and the formal scientific theory has entered into common-
sense understanding in a simplified and distorted – one could say vul-
garized and popularized – form.
(Hogg and Abrams, 1988: 80–81)
STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 963

2.2. taxonomy of social representations

The resulting social representations, multifaceted as they are, can be
classified in several ways. One way of classifying them is along the gener-
ality/specificity dimension. Thus, besides the default mode of the represen-
tation, the form of it that is most general and inclusive, there is also the
ideal mode and the operational mode. An ideal representation consists of
ideas about how the world (or a part of it) should ideally be like, irrespec-
tive of whether such a state of affairs is practically attainable or not. An
ideal representation of something is therefore quite different from a possi-
ble outcome or an immanent state of affairs, which people may directly try
to create by individual or collective action. Many ideals are just ideals and
nobody has any substantial interest in realizing their existence; they merely
function as points of reference or comparative baselines in the ongoing dis-
cussion and negotiation of social issues and problems. Operational repre-
sentations on the other hand have a more practically inclined character and
function as behavioural guidelines in specific situations; they offer norms
or rules to be followed (Holy and Stuchlik, 1983). This is how Holy and
Stuchlik describe the difference between the operational and the default
mode of a representation
The norms which form part of the actors’ operational models are
always situation specific in the sense that they are invokable in clearly
defined situations. The actors’ representations, i.e. their notions that
things are what they are, or that a society has a certain form, do
not necessarily have to be situation specific. By referring to the endur-
ing form of society they transcend specific interactional situations and
have their existence above and beyond them. In the way in which they
are formulated, they account for a multiplicity of situations and con-
ceptually subsume them (cf. Schneider, 1976: 202) . . . Empirically it
seems that normative rules remain unquestioned as far as they do not
disturb the actors’ representations, i.e. as long as their enactment does
not contradict the notions of what things and relationships between
things are.
. . . The situation-specific normative rules which form part of the
actors’ operational model (whose other elements are their goals, stra-
tegic plans, recipes, etc.) and the situation-transcendent values and
notions about the form of society can best be viewed as two sets of
notions of varying degrees of generality and specificity which can be
invoked by the actors for differing reasons and which, when invoked,
are brought to bear on different actions. The situation-transcendent
values and other representational notions will typically be invoked by
the actors to legitimize their invocation of particular normative rules
(in a situation where two or more norms are invoked as rules to be
964 IOANNIS TSOUKALAS

followed in action), and their pursuit of particular goals or their fol-

lowing of particular plans or recipes . . . What might, on one hand, be
seen as a deviation from [a group’s] idiom or ideology at the level of
pragmatic rules, or at the level of the operational model, is fully con-
sistent with the same idiom or ideology at the level of the representa-
tional model.

(Holy and Stuchlik, 1983: 104–106)

Another useful distinction between social representations is introduced

by Dan Sperber (1984). He classifies them in terms of the character of
their object and distinguishes between two broad categories of represen-
tations: concrete and abstract representations. The first category entails
representations that can be physically located in time and space. This
category includes mental representations, which are internal to the informa-
tion processing devise, and public representations, which are external to the
device and which it can process as input. A mental representation can be
thought of as a configuration of neural connections and operations in the
brain in response to some external stimuli (I see a cross, close my eyes, and
can still see it in my minds eye; next week I can also see it) whereas a public
representation is a socially constructed and collectively shared standardiza-
tion of a relationship between an external stimulus and a category of objects
(a red cross denotes an international aid organization and connotes caring for
the sick; its connotations can shift in response to the social circumstances).
This classification highlights the fact that there are at least two pro-
cesses affecting the distribution and use of social representations in a pop-
ulation. On the one hand there are intrasubjective processes of thought and
memory and on the other there are intersubjective processes of sharing and
co-construction. The first are purely psychological, they have to do with
information processing by the human brain and are to a large extent locked
into fixed configurations, whereas the second are partly psychological and
partly ecological, they have to do with the interface between the brain and
its environment and the way the representations of one person modify the
physical environment of another and thus affect the input for his informa-
tion processing device (Sperber, 1984).
As for the abstract kind of representations they are mostly formal rep-
resentations used within the theoretical sciences (mainly in philosophy,
linguistics and mathematics) and do not necessarily have any explicit refer-
ence either to their mental form in human brains or their public forms in
perceptible patterns of communication or behaviour. At this abstract level
the study of representations is concerned mainly with formal properties and
formal relationships between arbitrarily defined entities. Of course abstract
objects cannot enter into causal relationships with each other and thus
STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 965

both mental and public representations must be considered as well in order

to make the formal study of social representations relevant for the social
sciences. Generally Sperber stresses the importance of the first category of
representations, the concrete ones, as the most important for social science
(Sperber, 1984).
Sperber’s (1984) interest in public representations is connected to his
ambition of developing an adequate explanation of culture. According to
Sperber culture is a derivative of social representations. To explain cultural
phenomena is therefore equivalent to developing an epidemiology of repre-
sentations. Actually a very practical and concise definition of culture can
be given in terms of social representations.4 Sperber has formulated such a
definition as an integral part of his epidemiological approach to the study
of culture.
Widely distributed, long-lasting representations are what we are pri-
marily referring to when we talk of culture. There exists, however, no
threshold, no boundary with cultural representations on one side, and
individual ones on the other. Representations are more or less widely
and lastingly distributed, and hence more or less cultural. So, to
explain culture is to answer the following question: why are some rep-
resentations more successful in a human population, more contagious,
more ‘catching’ than others? And, in order to answer this question, the
distribution of representations in general has to be considered.
(Sperber, 1984: 74)
Finally social representations can be rooted in different representational
systems. This differentiation has to do with the way representations are
construed neuropsychologically. There are three main sensory modalities
that are drawn upon in the formation of representations: the visual, the
auditory and the kinesthetic. A given representation is thus primarily
rooted in one of these sensory modalities and therefore appear as either an
image, a sound pattern or a feeling. The nature of a representation is deter-
mined by the way it is encoded for use in the processing device and not by
its physical form. Thus an image (e.g. a poster) can be acoustically repre-
sented in the mind, and thus classed as an auditory representation, if the
preceiving subject prefers to “read” it.
In this “standardization” of mental faculties the lesser senses are not
totally filtered out, they are only relegated to a more subordinate and
discrete position. Alternatively one can think of it as one of the repre-
sentational systems being granted privileged access to consciousness. The
incidence and use of these representational systems varies across several
dimensions: from individual to individual, from group to group and from
culture to culture. Though ultimately all of them exist at all times their
966 IOANNIS TSOUKALAS

respective strength in the individual and spread in the population is a com-

plex matter of interdigitating personal idiosyncrasy and cultural preferences
(O’Connor & Seymour, 1993; Karmiloff-Smith, 1994; Damasio, 1999).
This multimodality in our way of representing experience can further
give rise to interesting overlaps, so called synesthesias.5 Synesthesias are an
important, if largely, unconscious part of our mental faculties and many
of them seem to be inborn (e.g., certain colours linked to certain moods).
We consciously experience a synesthesia every time a specific feeling (e.g.,
a taste or smell) elicits a complete visual representation of something. The
association can of course be more or less accurate and more or less rigid,
but it is always there. Most of the time synesthesias are unconscious; an
automatic reaction which we are only dimly and occasionally aware of but
which nevertheless remains operative at an embodied level. Despite this elu-
sive character synesthesias are not totally out of reach for our voluntary
grab; under some circumstances it is possible to control and use them at
will. They are for example known to be common among artistic or sci-
entific prodigies (O’Connor and Seymour, 1993; Damasio, 1999). They are
also suspected of being an important part in many socially orchestrated
phenomena such as rituals and public gatherings.6

2.3. the life cycle of representations: consolidation and inertia

When a representation achieves a level of popularity it tends to undergo
a process of objectification which further consolidates its importance and
facilitates its dissemination. Objectification is the process whereby human
subjectivity is embedded in social products and gradually turned into an
element of the environment. The objectification process usually consists of
three stages. The first stage, called selective construction, consists of a selec-
tive apprehension and construction of the object of a representation in
line with the prevailing social contingencies. The second, calledschematiz-
ing, leads to the incorporation of the representation in an existing con-
ceptual framework, with the resulting network of associations increasing
the heuristic value of the individual representation in intersubjective com-
munication and coordination. The third stage, called naturalization, leads
to the instrumentalization of the representation for practical use in social
intercourse. The representation becomes a tool and is used mindlessly and
habitually in order to understand and influence the world and fellow group
members. In this final stage social representations are turned into “concrete
entities”, social facts not unlike those postulated by Durkheim, directly
readable and usable in social interactions. Of these three stages the last
one is the most difficult to influence while the first two are more suscepti-
ble to intervention and change (Jodelet, 1989; Moscovici, 1989). Hogg and
STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 967

Abrams contrast this comparative inertia to the scientific ideal of “conjec-

ture and refutation”
Social representations have an enormous inertia in so far as experi-
ences and perceptions are distorted to conform to the representation.
If people are indeed naive scientists, it is a science very unlike Popper’s
characterization in terms of ‘conjecture and refutation’ (Popper 1969).
Rather, people try to verify, not refute, their hypotheses and conjec-
tures, and by all accounts are highly successful at this. There is abun-
dant evidence that preconceptions (Moscovici’s ‘social representations’)
distort reality in such a way as to preserve intact the preconception,
and furthermore that they can even create a reality that fits.

(Hogg and Abrams, 1988: 80)

Finally it should be mentioned that social representations are not isolated

phenomena. Generally they stand in a close relationship to many other
social phenomena, such as ideology and discourse. What distinguishes
them epistemologically from these related but more aggregate phenomena,
abstract one could equally well say, is the fact that social representations
are fundamentally rooted in a group context and informed by social psy-
chological and cognitive theory (Sperber, 1984; Jodelet, 1989; Moscovici,
1989). This situation is nicely summarized by Hogg and Abrams
Social representations are internalized or acquired through the pro-
cess of self-categorization associated with common group membership,
or social identity. Contextual factors will determine identity salience
(as discussed earlier) and thus the relevant level of common group
membership which dictates the specific social representation which is
engaged as a working hypothesis or internalized as a new frame of
reference. The underlying dynamic is clearly associated with social
identity.
The concept of social representations subsumes stereotypes and nor-
mative beliefs and thus highlights the latter’s underlying function to
furnish an understanding, explanation, or naive commonsense theory
to account for relevant events, experiences, or features of the environ-
ment. Social representations thus back onto the sociological concept
of ideology (Larrain, 1979) and potentially fall within the purview of
hermeneutics (Bauman, 1978).

(Hogg and Abrams, 1988: 82)

As can be seen from the above presentation social representations are a very
complex phenomenon, formed in the tension field between people’s cogni-
tive abilities and their social interactions, and prone to several interesting
968 IOANNIS TSOUKALAS

Knowledge

science
abstract framework
reified knowledge
construction interpretation

Subject Representation Object

epistemic material
psychological social
collective expression symbolizing human
ideal

Practice

experience
action
embodiment

Figure 1. The complex network of constitutive relations affecting social representa-

tions. Adapted from Jodelet (1989). My own translation.

transformations during their use and dissemination. For a graphic overview

of some of the points discussed above see Figure 1 at the end of the article.

3. The Method
The method of surveying social representations to be presented below is
based on the use of free associations. The fact that it is based on the use of
free associations means that it is less structured and more open-ended than
most traditional survey methods. For example it does not depend on pre-
specified and pre-graded answers as most questionnaires do. At the same
time however it retains many of the advantages of the questionnaire, like
for example its formal character and the ability to gather large amounts of
quantifiable data.
The subjects are asked to produce a number of associations in response
to a given mother-word. These associations are then successively sorted-out,
contextualized and elaborated through the use of several exercises. The
resulting pattern of associations helps elucidate and pin-point the distribu-
tion of a social representations semantic field, its social construction as well
as its basic features and central core. Getting valid knowledge about these
four aspects of a social representation is important in order to be able to
understand its meaning.
The method although a formal one can easily be used in most set-
tings and is sufficiently non-technical in its construction and application
STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 969

to appeal to the qualitative researcher. It can both be administered in real

time and on the spot, to large audiences or small groups, as well as in
more indirect ways, via mail and post facto. Hopefully it can function as a
nice complement to the more traditional qualitative methods of participant
observation and interviews that have previously been used in the study of
social representations.
The method yields a rich material which can be easily documented, for
example by paper and pencil or on a PC, and is suitable for both qual-
itative and quantitative analysis. If coupled with participant observation
and interviews the method can be additionally contextualized and cross-
checked and its data can thus serve as a solid base for drawing infer-
ences and making generalizations. Transcribed interviews can for example
be analyzed by measuring the frequency and value of various component
parts of a social representations semantic field (e.g., words, sentences) and
correlating them to those found in the Representational Survey. Since the
Representational Survey generates explicit and formal data issues of reli-
ability and validity can be checked by standard quantitative techniques (see
Dane, 1990) as well as more hermeneutic evaluations (see Karlsson, 1993).
Further the method can easily be adapted to a before-and-after research
design thus increasing its appeal for longitudinal and/or experimental
studies.
Antecedents to this method are mainly to be found within the psycho-
analytic literature, where the elicitation and analysis of free associations is
a well known technique for investigating unconscious contents. In addition
similar methods for investigating social representations can be found within
the tradition of studying social representations itself. Jean-Claude Abric
(1994) in particular, has done a very good job in bringing together and
summarizing many of the methods that can be used in studying social rep-
resentations; in fact the current method has drawn heavily on his discus-
sion of methodological options. For one specific part of the survey (Part
III, question 2) influences from the phenomenological tradition have also
been used, especially the method of eidetic reduction (see Karlsson, 1993;
Depraz, 1999).
Finally one ought to mention that the method also exhibits some sur-
face similarities to the well-known method of brainstorming. Like there,
the generation of words and sentences is the raw material of the method.
However the similarities to brainstorming are mostly incidental, while the
differences are substantive. For example there is only one part of the Rep-
resentational Survey which is dependent on the spontaneity, abundance and
speed of the produced associations (a prerequisite of good brainstorming)
and that is Part I. All the other parts require quite conscious and sophis-
ticated reasoning.
970 IOANNIS TSOUKALAS

3.1. the method in a nutshell

The goal of the Representational Survey is to produce meaningful associative
chains, able to capture both the semantic content of a social representation,
the organization of its content and its central core. The Representational
Survey is laid out in three parts.
The first part consists of a mapping out of the semantic contents of a
social representation (cf. Abric, 1994). The procedure is simple: A single
word is given and the participants are asked to associate 15 new words
to it. Of these 15 words 3 are selected. From the original word plus the
three new associations three pairs of words are formed and the respondents
are asked to generate new words per pair, a total of nine new associations
(three per pair). From the original pairs and the 3 new words generated for
each of them nine triplets of words are formed and the respondents are
asked to generate 3 new words per triplet, a total of 27 new associations
(3 per triplet). Each person is asked to do this elaboration in private and
document it on paper or on his PC.
The second part of the Representational Survey attempts to investigate
the links between the semantic constituents of a social representation. A
version of the Miller Sorting Technique (see Abric, 1994) is used to try
to get a glimpse of how the respondents assemble the constitutive parts
of the social representation into larger meaningful chunks. This technique
helps uncover the “construction principles” that are inherent in the seman-
tic field of a social representation supposedly conditioned by the groups
social life. It uses the associations produced in the previous stage as an
input. The procedure is simple. First the respondents are asked to assem-
ble related words into “packages”. Then they are asked to explain why they
have grouped the words in this particular way. Finally they are asked to
give a name/heading to every group.
The third part tries to establish the basic features and central core of
the representation.7 A technique to establish rank is Abric’s (1994) Succes-
sive Hierarchical Choices whereby the produced words are divided into two
groups: one for those words that are most characteristic of the social rep-
resentation and one for those that are least characteristic. For the group
consisting of the most characteristic words the procedure is repeated. In the
end you reach the highest ranking word, a keyword around which the rest
of the representational field is structured.
Establishing the central core of the representation is done by a tech-
nique inspired by the phenomenological practice of eidetic reduction. Eide-
tic reduction is a thought experiment, a kind of imaginative variation,
aimed at getting to the core features of a category of objects (see Karlsson,
1993: 45; Depraz, 1999). The previous parts of the Representational Sur-
vey have hopefully highlighted some of the more meaningful chunks that
STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 971

constitute the field of a representation. The elements from these meaning-

ful chunks are selected and presented in a list. The respondents are then
asked to vary the social representation in their mind along the elements of
the list in order to see when and where it changes species. In other words:
What happens if you take away element X? Is the representation still via-
ble? Or does it change species? What happens when you take away element
Y? Is the representation still viable? Or does it change species? This proce-
dure can also be done for pairs of elements.
The aim of the Representational Survey is to get a glimpse of the mean-
ing of a social representation, specify its semantic field and component
parts and reduce eventual ambiguities in its interpretation (ideas in a de-
contextualized state could mean anything).

4. The script
The survey instrument has the following outline (see next page):

4.1. epistemological underpinnings of the survey instrument

These are the main goals for each part of the questionnaire:
1. Part I of the questionnaire tries to capture the distribution of meanings
in the semantic field of the social representation. It also helps to iden-
tify frequent themes (common words) in the semantic field of a social
representation.
2. Part II as a whole is devoted to the social construction of a social rep-
resentations semantic field. It tries to reconstruct the relevant clustering
of meanings inside a social representations semantic field.
3. Question 1 of Part III attempts to reveal the ranking of the component
parts of a social representations semantic field.
4. Question 2 of Part III finally tries to isolate the central core of a
social representations semantic field. The quintessential component(s)
that distinguish it form similar or related representations.
972 IOANNIS TSOUKALAS

Part I
1. Think shortly of what it means to be a social anthropologist. Then write down fifteen (15) words or short
sentences that come to mind with respect to being an anthropologist. It is preferable that you produce words;
use sentences only if you have to. The words could stand for thoughts, feelings, behaviours or anything else.
Formulate yourself in a clear way so that it will be easy for a future reader to understand what you mean
(make it easy to separate positive from negative evaluations, subject from object, present from future tense
etc.). Don’t think about it to much; just write down whatever words pop-up in your head.
2. Look for a moment at the words you have produced in the previous section and try to figure out which
ones best capture the meaning of the mother-word. Which are most representative of the meaning of the
mother-word? Select three such words. Transfer those three words to this page and write them down under
the mother-word.
Social anthropologist
——– —————— ——–
3. Couple each of the above words with their mother-word to create three pairs. Think shortly about the
meaning of these pairs. Then write down three words or short sentences that come to mind in association
with each of the pairs. The words could stand for thoughts, feelings, behaviours or anything else. They
could be new words or the same as before.
Pair one: Pair two: etc . . .
Associated thoughts: Associated thoughts:
4. Couple each of the above words with their mother-pair to create nine triplets. Think shortly about
the meaning of these triplets. Then write down three words or short sentences that come to mind in
association with each of the triplets. The words could stand for thoughts, feelings, behaviours or anything else.
Triplet one: Triplet two: etc . . .
Associated thoughts: Associated thoughts:
Part II
1. Go back to the previous sections and gather all the associations (single words) you have produced under
exercise 2, 3, and 4 and transfer them to this page. Use the copy and paste function of your computer
for convenience. They should amount to a total of 39 words. Select 32 of them by discarding seven words
that you find less important.
Look at the 32 words and think about them for a while. Now try to group them in a way that feels
meaningful for you. Place all the words that you think are related in the same group. You can create as
many or as few groups as you want as long as they are more than one. You don’t have to use all 32
words; leave some words out if you like.
Selected words (32): Group 1: Group 2: etc . . .
2. Now that you have placed the words into different groups describe in a few sentences what considerations
lead you to group them in this particular way. Try to explain in what way the words are related to each
other and to the initial mother-word (“social anthropologist”). You should offer one explanation for every
group you have made. Formulate yourself in a clear way so that it will be easy for a future reader to
understand what you mean.
3. Finally give a suiting name/heading to every group.
Part III
1. Go back to Part II (page x) and transfer the 32 words you selected to this page. Use the copy and
paste function of your computer for convenience. Divide the words into two equal groups (16 words in
each): one for those words that are most characteristic of the mother-word (“social anthropologist”) and
one for those that are least characteristic. Take the group consisting of the most characteristic words and
repeat the procedure. Divide it into two new equal groups (8 words in each): one for those words that are
most characteristic of the mother-word and one for those that are least characteristic. Repeat the procedure
until you just have one word remaining in the “most characteristic group”.
Selected words (32): First round: Second round: etc . . .
Most characteristic words: Most characteristic words:
Least characteristic words: Least characteristic words:
2. Go back to the previous part and gather all the associations you have assembled into groups and transfer
them to this page. Write them down in the form of a list for every group. If you had three groups in the
previous part then you should make three lists of words, if seven groups then seven lists etc. The order of
the words does not matter.
Now think of the mother-word we used in the beginning, the word from which all the above associa-
tions (single words) originate from. Think of the meaning of this word. What does it mean to be a social
anthropologist? Then look at the lists of words which you have produced. These words are all derived from
the mother-word by association. They are part of what it means to be a social anthropologist.
Look at the first word in the list. What happens if you take it away? Is it still possible to be a
social anthropologist without it? Is the idea of an anthropologist viable without it? If it is possible to be
an anthropologist without it put the word in the non-essential category (copy it from the list and paste it
there). If the word is a necessary condition for being an anthropologist put it in the essential category. In
other words you should try to figure out which words are an integral part of being a social anthropologist.
Repeat this procedure with the other words in the list. You should end up with just a few essential words;
the ideal would be to have just one essential word per list. Repeat this procedure for the other lists as well.
List 1: List 2: etc . . . .
Non-essential word(s) of list 1: Non-essential word(s) of list 2:
Essential word(s) of list 1: Essential word(s) of list 2:
STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 973

4.2. a simple research design

The research design presented below uses the Representational Survey in
order to pin-point the selection, proliferation and objectification of the
social representations in a group:
1. A Representational Survey (RS1) is administered early on in a group’s
life cycle. The questionnaire is administered to the whole group or a
relevant sample.8 A pilot study or a literature review conducted prior
to the survey can give an indication as to which themes are important
and worth further exploration. At some later stage a presentation and
discussion of the results can be held with the relevant group in order to
explore group dynamic effects or test issues of validity and reliability.
2. A Representational Survey (RS2) is administered later on in the
group’s life cycle. This is a follow-up on the initial survey and aims at
revealing which themes have been selected and retained from the first,
more explorative, survey. It offers a comparative background.
3. Representational Surveys on other topics may be conducted to explore
the links between the focal subject and other social representations cir-
culating in the group. This further investigation can be undertaken if it
turns out that the group in question entertains other social representa-
tions of importance. In that case the Representational Survey will help
specify and contextualize them.
4. Participant observation can be used to contextualize the social repre-
sentation in its relevant social environment and reveal its objectification
process. It can also serve as an important control of the more decon-
textualized Representational Survey.
5. Interviews can be used to contextualize the social representation in its
relevant personal environment and reveal the potential narrative appro-
priation (objectification?) of the representation by social actors. They
can also serve as an important control of the more decontextualized
Representational Survey.

5. Some Pros and Cons

The method of course has both advantages and disadvantages. Its advantages
become most apparent when it is compared with other standard methods
customarily used in the study of social representations. More specifically
in comparison to participant observation, one of the cardinal methods in
qualitative research, the following advantages become obvious. The Repre-
sentational Survey yields explicit data while participant observation yields
mostly implicit data. In the Representational Survey it is clear what the
units of information are and where they are. In participant observation it is
not always clear what the resultant units of information are and where they
are to be found (are they in the “mystical and private” log notes, in the lit-
974 IOANNIS TSOUKALAS

erary cleansed monograph, in the ethnographer’s body etc). This has to do

with the unfortunate situation that most of the time participant observa-
tion is an under-theorized method, without a clear “syntax and grammar”,
and thus its methodological steps and data output are not properly defined
or specified in advance.
A second difference is that the Representational Survey yields formal
data while participant observation yields mostly informal data. The data
from the Representational Survey are relatively context transcendent and
can be used as input to other kinds of analyses, both qualitative and quan-
titative. They are amenable to several analytical operations, both by the
researcher in charge and other social scientists. The data from participant
observation are generally too closely tied to the anthropologists personal
experience and a given context and consequently to idiosyncratic to be suit-
able as input for any other kind of analysis. They are amenable to only
one kind of analytical operation: the one chosen by the anthropologist in
charge. After that the data are generally useless (as formal data that is; not
necessarily as general information). This is most clearly evidenced by the
fact that there are almost no true meta-analytical studies conducted on the
basis of qualitative research results (an study were results form previous
studies are used as input data in a new analytical framework).
A third difference is that the Representational Survey yields first order data
while participant observation, all the emic romanticism of anthropology not-
withstanding, yields second order data. The data from the Representational
Survey are produced by the informants/subjects themselves while the data pro-
duced by participant observation are primarily produced by the researcher, and
thus most of the time stand for his interpretation of a given situation, inter-
action or utterance. Of course in participant observation there is also often
“hidden interviews”, the informal talk with informants. Those “hidden inter-
views” of course produce first order data, emic accounts, but more often than
not they are just a minor part of the total fieldwork enterprise and thus do not
substantially alter the abovementioned situation. Formal interviews of course,
especially when documented and transcribed, are a different story. They pro-
vide first order data, but then again they are also a different method. Still the
above conclusions also hold true, but to a lesser degree, for a comparison with
the standard qualitative (non-directive) interview. There too the degree of for-
mality, explicitness and directness of the data are generally lower than in the
Representational Survey we have presented.
As for the shortcomings of the Representational Survey most of them are
typical of other more standard questionnaires. The biggest one is of course the
issue of drop-out; many of the people sampled to participate get rather scared
or bored by the work they will have to perform and thus decide to drop out of
the survey. This of course can seriously jeopardize the whole research project
if not properly dealt with. However since this problem as well as several others
STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 975

does not differ substantially from those to be expected when conducting survey
investigations in general they will not be given a special treatment here. The
interested reader could look into a standard methodology textbook for more
information on this issue (see for example Dane, 1990).
More unique problems of the Representational Survey have to do with
its special use of free associations. The data collected through the Repre-
sentational Survey might for example give rise to several semantic ambi-
guities. For one thing the plentitude of synonyms in most languages may
result in respondents denoting (or connoting) the same thing but by differ-
ent lexical means, by generating different words. How could such a situ-
ation be remedied? The easiest solution is to decide on a standardization
of recurring denotations (or connotations) by way of a book of synonyms.
Thus for example the words “brother” and “sister” could be standardized
into the synonym word of “sibling”.
Another semantic difficulty that might occur is the use of sentences
instead of words. The method allows this in order not to interrupt the
spontaneous meaning making of the respondents but of course prefers
words since they are easier to handle analytically. In this case a possible
solution is to nominalize the verbs supporting the meaning of a sentence.
Thus for example the sentence “they cared for the weak” could be nomi-
nalized into “caring” or “protection” depending on what the context (both
of the collected associations and of the respondent’s life situation) suggests.
Of course nouns thus produced can in case of semantic overlap, different
words denoting or connoting the same thing, be standardized by the use of
synonyms as indicated above.
Finally one ought to mention that although care is taken so as to semanti-
cally contextualize the associations produced by the respondents, via a whole
series of successive exercises and elaborations, the output data of the question-
naire are still mostly words and words, even in relatively good company, can be
misleading and ultimately meaningless. Thus additional care must be taken to
contextualize the results of the questionnaire, both for the individual respon-
dent, for example via interviews, and the group he belongs to, via for example
focus groups or participant observation.
Overall the questionnaire gives rise to several interpretative possibilities,
something which is not necessarily a weakness. The possible fuzziness of
some answers can most of the time be remedied thanks to the inbuilt logic
of the questionnaire which allows several ways to trace and even recon-
struct the original meaning of the responses.

6. Analytical Considerations
The Representational Survey can be analyzed in several ways and all its
parts are capable of giving useful information. The words produced from
976 IOANNIS TSOUKALAS

the exercises of Part I and listed in Part II (32 words) provide the most
general and inclusive overview of the semantic field of a social representa-
tion. The information in Part I is thus well suited for getting a broad pic-
ture of the ideational variation exhibited by the whole group.
The words to be found in the “groups” of Part II and the “rankings” of Part
III provide a more personal and exclusive rendition of the key meanings inher-
ent in the semantic field of a social representation. Part II and Part III thus
offer the most condensed and focused information in the survey. These are the
parts where some of the randomness, the unavoidable “noise”, of the responses
is worked through and sorted out, leaving a more systematized and thus more
comprehensible result. The outcome of these parts could be considered as the
conceptual backbone of the respondent’s opinion about a subject, the central
meaning of the social representation in question.
The results from the survey can be analyzed in several ways. The sim-
plest quantitative analysis would be to calculate the average frequency and
rank of the words for the given sample. Frequency and rank can further
be compared to each other in order to ascertain if there is any system-
atic correlation between them and whether that correlation is significant.
The frequency of the words can also be compared to their incidence in any
potential interviews so as to corroborate their importance. The statistical
correlations that can be made between various data of the Representational
Survey are several. To name a few
• frequency in the RS to ranking in the RS
• frequency in the RS to central core in the RS
• frequency in RS1 and RS2 to central core in RS1 and RS2
• frequency in the RS1 to frequency in RS2
• ranking in RS1 to ranking in RS2
• central core in the RS1 to central core in RS2
Commonalities in the frequency, ranking and central core of a social represen-
tation between respondents are indicative of a “stream-lining” (social construc-
tion) due to group processes. For this reason a Representational Survey should
not be conducted early on in the life-cycle of a group. Time should be allowed
to pass in order for the potential social construction to take place.
Also more advanced statistical methods could be used, like for example
cluster analysis, but in that case the researcher must take care in the scaling
and scale transformations of the received data so as not to make unjusti-
fiable operations or invalid inferences. The survey instrument as it is gen-
erates mostly nominal and ordinal data and is therefore not well suited for
advanced statistical processing. Still the yield of data that it gives is suffi-
ciently rich to allow such methods, if they are deemed necessary.
The material generated by the survey can also be analyzed by more
qualitative techniques. One such approach would be to use the various
STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 977

methods developed within the fields of discourse analysis and semiotics.

Another approach readily applicable to the material is to use some of the
methodological devices of the hermeneutical tradition. Several other meth-
ods could be used as well (for ideas and suggestions see Karlsson, 1993;
Kvale, 1996; Bignell, 1997; Depraz, 1999).

7. Suggested Uses
Besides its obvious uses within the established tradition of studying social
representations the Representational Survey presented above can also be
adapted to other purposes and other traditions within the social sciences.
One such obvious candidate is the study of memory. Especially complex
memories that have taken on a “public life” and circulate widely within
a population (e.g., collective traumas) could easily be studied with this
method. The fact that these kinds of memories are moulded through
various social processes makes it very interesting to study their social con-
struction, selection and dissemination performed by a population and its
subgroups. Generally collective memories stand very close to the concept
of a social representation as defined above and should thus not present any
special difficulties for the Representational Survey.
Another candidate for study by the Representational Survey is native
classification systems. The fact that classificatory concepts have clear affin-
ities with social representations (see relevant footnote) makes them amena-
ble to study by this method. In cases where the degree of literacy is low
in the studied population or familiarity with formal assessment techniques
is lacking the Representational Survey could be creatively adapted to suit
the local conditions. It is easy for example to change it from a paper-and-
pencil exercise to a more audiovisual method for gathering information. In
the later case one could use pictures, objects or just oral accounts in order
to get to the semantic network underlying a social representation.
A third candidate that could benefit from using this method is semi-
otics and discourse analysis. The Representational Survey could for exam-
ple be used to conduct media production and audience reception studies in
various communicative sectors (newspapers, literature, TV-programs etc.) as
well as looking into the important question of how these two are related.
In this purpose the Representational Survey could help elucidate both the
coding and the decoding of a message and showcase how the socially con-
structed and contextually specific arrangement of its semiotic components,
its denotations and connotations, are affected by successive disseminations
and filterings, from production to consumption, from arrangement to re-
arrangement and vice versa (on the coding-decoding hypothesis see Hall,
1999). The method could thus add interpretative depth and formal strin-
gency to discourse analysis as it is practised in the social sciences.
978 IOANNIS TSOUKALAS

Finally the Representational Survey could also be used to conduct stud-

ies of public opinion and political propaganda. This is also a field, which
like memory studies, has very close affinities to the field of study from
which the method originated. Public opinion is a kind social representation
and should therefore be within easy reach for the Representational Survey.
As for propaganda it is a bit more removed form the original concept of
a social representation (more formalized, authoritative and parochial) but
still it should not present any particular difficulties for the method. The
Representational Survey is sufficiently flexible to be able to accommodate
variances stumbled upon in the field. In both cases the survey can, via
an appropriate research design, help pin-point the selection, transformation
and reception of various ideas and representations as they spread through
a population. It can also help discover links to other ideas and represen-
tations that are related the focal representation. In that it can potentially
increase our understanding of the social processes affecting political life.
Of course several other fields of study and theoretical traditions within
social science could be thought of as potential beneficiaries of such a
methodological approach.

8. Concluding Comments
The method that has been presented above offers new options to the
researcher interested in the systematic study of social representations. It
can be used separately or in combination with other methods customarily
used in this field and in any case offers several advantages. The first and
most important one becomes obvious when considering the form and func-
tion of more standard questionnaires. Standard questionnaires are usually
dependent on very complicated methodological assumptions, construction
principles and analytical procedures, often perplexingly so, and this creates
an unnecessary distancing from ordinary experience and understanding and
makes their use a cumbersome and parochial business. In contrast the pres-
ent questionnaire is crafted in such a way as to stay close to the intui-
tive and common-sense meaning of a social representation – both when it
comes to its findings and the analytical options they suggest – while simul-
taneously being open to a multitude of more systematic data analysis meth-
ods. This is an unmistaken advantage which makes the questionnaire more
transparent and its use more meaningful, for respondent and researcher
alike.
Another advantage of the method is that the use of free associations instead
of pre-given questions and pre-specified answers offers more freedom and ini-
tiative to the respondents to express their own opinions on the subject matter.
Still the successive exercises performed on their first round of responses offers
the researcher the possibility to get under the surface of their answers thereby
STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 979

getting a thorough picture of their underlying conceptual world. Thus the open
ended character of the questionnaire does not impinge negatively on the need
for a systematic approach and the collection of formal data.
Finally the method offers a high degree of flexibility to the researcher that
chooses to use it. This is also a clear advantage. The various parts of the ques-
tionnaire can for example be used and evaluated both together and separately
depending on what the situation calls for. Further the results of the method can
be subjected to both a qualitative and a quantitative analyses and evaluation,
again depending on what the situation calls for. It is thus up to the particular
researcher to choose what suits his needs or purposes better.
The method presented above has been preliminary tested in a pilot study
with encouraging results. This together with the fact that it has well documented
antecedents in the scientific literature (see Abric, 1994) as well as obvious com-
parative advantages makes it a good candidate for any researcher wanting to
supplement his methodological options. In the near future the method is going
to be tested within a larger interdisciplinary research project and this “larger
run” will hopefully reveal and correct any shortcomings or misfiring hitherto
undetected. In the meantime the method is deemed sufficiently interesting and
safe to be worthy of announcement and a peer review.

Notes
1. This is how Holy and Stuchlik define a group:
‘group’ usually refers to a plurality of individuals bounded by some principle(s) of
recruitment and by a set of membership rights and obligations . . . Everybody fulfill-
ing the recruitment criteria is a member of the group and every group member auto-
matically has the rights and discharges the obligations characterizing membership . . .
Interactions of people are seen, not as those of individuals, but as those of group mem-
bers, i.e. occupants of specific statuses. Only when a particular individual does not fulfil
his membership obligations does his action constitute a problem, a discrepancy to be
explained on contingent grounds.
(Holy and Stuchlik, 1983: 111)
2. A less enumerative and more operational definition of culture is offered by Maurice Bloch.
According to his view culture “can be defined as that which needs to be known in order to
operate reasonably effectively in a specific human environment” (Bloch, 1990: 183).
3. An alternative, more technical, definition of a representation is offered by Dan Sperber
(1984: 76): ‘A representation involves a relationship between three terms: an object is a
representation of something, for some information processing device’. Thus according to
this view a specific digital series of 0 and 1 – corresponding to a sequence of electrical
currents in an integrated circuit – is a representation of a programming operation for
the processing device called a computer. Similarly closing our eyes and imagining a car
– which presumably corresponds to a specific pattern of neuronal activity – produces a
representation of a car outside our head appropriate for the processing device called a
human mind.
4. By the same process a technical definition of a cultural institution can be given in repre-
sentational terms:
980 IOANNIS TSOUKALAS

Some sets of representations include representations of the way in which the set should be
distributed. An institution is the distribution of a set of representations which is governed by
representations belonging to the set itself. This is what makes institutions self-perpetuating.
Hence to study institutions is to study a particular type of distribution of representations.
This study falls squarely within the scope of an epidemiology of representations.
(Sperber, 1984: 87)
5. Here we are not using the term synesthesia in its strictly technical sense, meaning inher-
ently multimodal representations, a rare occurrence even within the field of neurology, but
in a looser sense, meaning conditionally multimodal representations. Synesthesias of the
later case are commonplace and are more akin to a spatiotemporal association of sensory
input through social conditioning, intentional or accidental.
6. As the perceptive reader might have noticed social representations resemble two other
analytical concepts currently used in social science. The first one is that ofschemata or
scripts used in cognitive science. A schema is defined as a “chunked network of loose pro-
cedures and understandings which enable us to deal with standard and recurring situa-
tions, for example ‘getting the breakfast ready’, that are clearly culturally created” (Bloch,
1990: 185). However the two concepts also differ in important respects. Thus schemata
are in general applied on the micro and intermediate level whereas social representations
are generally more relevant to the macro level; schemata are more individual and con-
text specific whereas social representation are by definition widely shared and distributed;
schemata fall back on and are used in connection with issues of learning, memory and
expert systems whereas social representations are more closely affiliated with issues of
power, ideology and discourse; schemata are informed by cognitive theory whereas social
representations by social psychology; schemata are more of a technical term whereas
social representations are more familiar to the general population. For more details see
Anderson (1990), Strauss and Quinn (1997), Jodelet (1989), and Bloch (1990).
The second is that of classificatory concepts used within anthropology and ethnology.
Classification “entails dividing objects, people, animals and other phenomena according
to socially pre-established categories or types” (Eriksen, 1995: 220). Here too there are
differences between the two concepts. Thus classificatory concepts are in general under-
stood as verbal and propositional entities whereas social representations are generally
more visual and imaginary in their character; classificatory concepts are seen as more
inert and sacrosanct whereas social representations are more labile and transmutable;
classificatory concepts are more hierarchically organized whereas social representations
are organized in loose networks. For more details see Lévi-Strauss (1966), Jodelet (1989),
Keesing (1989), and Bloch (1990).
7. The central core can be thought of as the element or combination of elements that is
peculiar to the social representation. In other words the part of a social representations
semantic content that is not shared with other similar representations. The essentialism
implied in the term “central core” is not a literal one but a socially constructed one. So
anti-essentialists, do not panic . . .
8. If random samples cannot be taken the participants in the representational survey should
be matched (in gender, nationality, class etc.) to the total population.

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