Article

The President of India: Indian Journal of Public

Administration
The Constitutional 63(3) 330–351
© 2017 IIPA
SAGE Publications
Head with Discretionary sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0019556117720618
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Ruchi Tyagi1

Abstract
The Constitution of India has vested the President with the role ‘to aid and
advise’ (Article 74) while expecting him/her to use authority and influence
under certain circumstances, yet leaving the actual decision-making with the
Cabinet. The president may be assertive and use his/her discretion under certain
circumstances—in appointment and dismissal of the prime minister, maintaining
relationship between prime minister/president and Council of Ministers,
exercising right to be informed, dissolution of the parliament, use of veto
power, etc. In fact, the equation within the Union Executive depends upon the
factional balance of forces in the ruling party or coalition, the political conditions
of hung parliament, party splits and naked struggle for power along with the
personalities of the principal actors involved. The experiences have showed that
the president’s role was definitely not that of a mere rubber stamp.

Keywords
Constitutional head, independent presidency, discretion, collective responsibility,
coalition, aid and advise, information, prosecution, dissolution, veto, disallowance

Introduction
Vested with the role ‘to aid and advise’ (Article 74), which could lend the presi-
dent as much authority and influence as his/her own personal character, capability
and political situation would warrant and leaving the actual decision-making with
the Cabinet, in fact, is the actual position of the president of India. Article 53
states the powers of the president and these powers have remained unchanged by
the 42nd and 44th Amendments of 1976 and 1978. The Article provides that the

1
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Kalindi College, University of Delhi, Delhi,
India.

Corresponding author:
Ruchi Tyagi, E 7/10A Vasant Vihar, New Delhi 110057, India.
E-mail: ruchityagi@hotmail.com
Tyagi 331

executive power of the union shall be vested in the president and shall be exer-
cised by him/her either directly or through officers subordinate to him/her in
accordance with the Constitution. In Article 74, after the words ‘aid and advise the
President’, the 42nd Amendment inserted the phrase ‘who shall, in exercise of his/
her functions, act in accordance with such advice’. And the 44th Amendment only
gave the president the right to return a proposal to the cabinet for reconsideration
only once and bound him/her to that advice—whether changed or unchanged.
Even so, if a prime minister dies or a government resigns, the president still has
considerable discretion (Verney, 2011).
While there may not be any occasion for the president speaking to the media
or in public against the policies or acts of his/her own ministers, he/she has every
right ‘to be consulted, to encourage, and to warn’ his/her ministers where neces-
sary (Kashyap, 2002).
First Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru explained president’s position in the
Constituent Assembly by saying:

We want to emphasize the ministerial character of the government that power really
resides in the ministry and legislature and not in the President as such. At the same time
we do not want the President to be just a mere a figurehead like the [pre-vth Republic]
French President. We do not want him to have any real power but we have made his
position one of great authority and dignity.

He added, ‘You will notice he is also to be the commander-in-chief of the defence

forces just like the American President is’ (Constituent Assembly Debates, 1989).
The Constituent Assembly never envisaged that the powers and functions vested in
the president would be exercised by him on his own without the advice of the min-
isters. This point was clearly elucidated by several members in the Constituent
Assembly. While introducing the Draft Constitution as settled by the Drafting
Committee, Dr B. R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, made it
clear:

Under the Draft Constitution, the President occupies the same position as the King
under the English Constitution. He is the Head of the State, but not of the Executive. He
represents the Nation, but does not rule the Nation.... The President of the Indian Union
will be generally bound by the advice of his Ministers. He can do nothing contrary to
their advice; nor can he do anything without their advice. (ibid., VII, p. 32)

In his capacity as the president of the Constituent Assembly, Rajendra Prasad also
expressed on the day the Constitution was passed:

Although there are no specific provisions, so far as I know, in the Constitution itself
making it binding on the President to accept the advice of his Ministers, it is hoped
that the convention under which in England the King acts always on the advice of his
Ministers will be established in this country also and, the president, not so much on
account of the written word in the Constitution, but as the result of this very healthy
convention, will become a Constitutional President in all matters. (ibid., XI, p. 988)

Thus for all practical purposes the President is a constitutional head.... The Constitution
lays down specifically either in the matter of performance of a governmental action or
332 Indian Journal of Public Administration 63(3)

appointments to high offices, as to how the President should exercise that function, but
where it is silent or where details are not provided for, that function has to be performed
by the President in accordance with the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers, or
more particularly by the Prime Minister as the spokesman of the Council of Ministers,
In the realm of the executive action of the Government of India ... the President is
merely a figurehead ...’ (Markandan, 1969)

The President of India, thus, is expected to be the constitutional head performing

a nominal or ceremonial role. However, it does not mean that the president did not
have difference of opinion with the prime minister on the policies of the govern-
ment on certain occasions. But such differences did not assume serious propor-
tions culminating in any constitutional crisis. Whenever such differences arose,
they were attempted to be resolved informally or through party functionaries.
The role of prime minister and his ministerial colleagues can be found in the
exchange of notes between Nehru and Patel through Mahatma Gandhi (cited in
Singh & Saxena, 2011, pp. 127–128). Here, Nehru perceived prime minister not
merely as figurehead, but as a person with ‘outstanding role’, ‘who should be
more responsible than anyone else’ with ‘full freedom to act’, whereas Sardar
Patel opined that prime minister was ‘first among equals’ with ‘no overriding
powers over his colleagues’. However, after the assassination of Gandhi, both the
leaders sank their differences and worked jointly. This exchange of notes reflected
the equation within the union executive depends upon the factional balance of
forces in the ruling party or coalition, along with the personalities of the principal
actors involved.
The first president of India, Rajendra Prasad, though a close associate of Nehru,
did not agree with the prime minister on certain issues. After occupying the office
of the president of the republic, on several occasions he attributed to his office
enormously greater powers than those provided by the Constitution. In September
1951, he expressed his desire to act solely in his own judgement, independent of
the council of ministers, when giving his assent to the bills, when sending mes-
sages to Parliament, and when returning a bill to Parliament for reconsideration
(Singh, 2012). However, A. K. Ayyar and Attorney-General M. C. Setalvad opined
against any such development, as it was bound to upset the whole constitutional
structure (Chakrabarty & Pandey, 2008, p. 60). In actual practice, Prasad avoided
any constitutional crisis on certain issues. Prasad was not in full agreement with
the Hindu Code Bill; he complied with the policy of the government. However, as
prime minister distanced himself from Law Minister Ambedkar’s draft, the latter
resigned from the Cabinet.
On 28 November 1960, President Prasad, in his address to the Indian Law
Institute, New Delhi, remarked, ‘there is no provision in the Constitution, which
in so many words lays down that the President shall be bound to act in accordance
with the advice of his Council of Ministers’.1 By way of reply, Prime Minister
Nehru stated in December 1960, at a Press Conference:

The President has always acted as a constitutional Head. We have modeled our
Constitution on the Parliamentary system and not a Presidential system, although have
copied or rather adopted many provisions of the US Constitution, because ours is a
Tyagi 333

federal one. Essentially, our Constitution is based on the UK Parliamentary model. That
is the basic thing. In fact, it is stated that whatever it does not expressly say anything,
we should follow the practice of the House of Commons.2

Contrary to the views of Prasad, Asok Sen, the then law minister, felt that the
debates of Constituent Assembly, the way the president has functioned in practice
in India, the recognised constitutional practices and the various provisions of the
Constitution of India leave no room for doubt, that the president must necessarily
act in accordance with the advice of the council of ministers (Patnaik, 1996, p. 135).
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court interpreted the post of the president
as a constitutional head. In R.C. Cooper vs Government of India (1970 AIR 564),
the Supreme Court said that under the Constitution, the president being the consti-
tutional head, normally acts in all matters including the promulgation of an ordi-
nance on the advice of the council of ministers. Further, in Samsher Singh vs State
of Punjab, the Apex Court stated that president was only a formal head (1974, 2
SCC 831, AIR 1974 SC 2192). The same view had also been held by the Supreme
Court in Ram Jawaya vs State of Punjab. The Court held that our Constitution had
adopted the English system of Parliamentary executive, the president is constitu-
tional head of the executive and the real power lay in the ministers or the Cabinet.
Under Article 53(1), ‘the executive power of the Union is vested in the President,
but under Article 75 there is to be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister
at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions. The
President has, thus, been made a formal or constitutional head of the Executive
and the real executive powers are vested in the Ministers or the Cabinet’ (1955,
2 SCR 225(236), AIR 1955 SC 549) and even after the dissolution of the Lok
Sabha, the council of ministers does not cease to hold office (U.N. Rao vs. Indira
Gandhi 1971 AIR 1002, 1971 SCR 46).
Moreover, there are some cases where the Courts (Supreme Court and High
Courts) themselves have recognised the existence of an autonomous sphere of
presidential action. In Jayantilal Amritlal vs F.N. Rana case (1964, AIR 648, 1964
SCR (5) 294), by making distinction between the executive functions of the union
and that of the president, the Supreme Court recognised an autonomous field of
action for the president. In Rao Birinder Singh vs Union of India case (AIR 1968
Punj 441), the High Court of Punjab and Haryana opined that the power of pro-
claiming president’s rule belonged to the category of the discretionary powers of
the president and that consequently, the ordinance proclaiming president’s rule in
Haryana, did not have to mention the advice of the council of the ministers. In
1971, the Supreme Court in Sardari Lal vs Union of India case observed:

The power to promulgate Ordinances under Article 123; to suspend the provisions of
Articles 268 to 279 during an emergency; to declare failure of the constitutional machin-
ery in states under Article 356; to declare a financial emergency under Article 360; to
make rules regarding the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to
posts and services in connection with the affairs of the Union under Article 309 ... are
not powers of the Union Government; these are powers vested in the President by the
Constitution, and are incapable of being delegated or entrusted to any other body or
authority under Article 258(1).3
334 Indian Journal of Public Administration 63(3)

Thus, from the above discussion it is clear that there is no unanimity regarding the
powers and position of the Indian president among the jurists, legal experts and
academicians.

Independent Presidency
Developing a theory of ‘Independent Presidency’, K. M. Munshi, a prominent
member of the Constituent Assembly in his book The President under the Indian
Constitution has said that the president is not only the biggest dignitary of our
realm, but the embodiment of the unity of our country. The principal role of the
president is to prevent a parliamentary government from becoming a parliamen-
tary anarchy and it is the presidential authority that keeps the country and the
people bound together (Kumar, 2015). The term, ‘if the President is satisfied’
found in Articles 347, 352, 356 and 360 may be interpreted as the discretionary
powers of the president. The satisfaction of the president is purely subjective
in character being based on objective facts. His satisfaction is necessary not only
for the declaration of Emergency, but also for its duration. A plain reading of
Article 343(2) will convince that discretionary powers have been given to the
president without mentioning the same. The president’s discretionary power is
simply not mentioned in Article 74(1) (Patnaik, 1996, p. 125).
The Constitution in many cases spells out the exercise of personal discretion
by the president. The Constitution uses a variety of words in many of the Articles
instead of using the term ‘discretion’. Dr Munshi (1963, p. 45) has referred to a
large number of such Articles. They are, ‘is satisfied’ in Articles 123, 347, 352, 360;
‘is of opinion’ in Article 124(3); ‘consent’ in Article 127; ‘determine’ in Article
128; ‘deem necessary’ in Article 103; ‘pleasure’ in Article 72(2); ‘if it appears’ in
Article 263; ‘previous sanction’ in Articles 304, 349; ‘assent’ in Article 111; ‘it
shall be lawful to hold’ in Article 365; and ‘recognise’ in Article 366(22). Some of
the above Articles of the Constitution necessarily imply the use of personal discre-
tion by the president. The dual role of the president gets creditability because of
ambiguities in certain constitutional provisions. These were summarised by Dr.
Munshi as follows:

• There is no provision in the Constitution of India, which expressly lays

down that the president is bound by the advice of council of ministers.
• The president is elected by the Parliament and the state legislatures. As
such, he is expected to protect the interests of the states. He, therefore, owes
a duty to the states as well as the centre. He has a wider sphere of responsi-
bility than the Cabinet.
• He also takes the oath to defend, protect and preserve the Constitution. In
other words, he safeguards the provisions of the Constitution from violation
and encroachments from any quarter including the government.
• There are certain contingencies, besides the super-ministerial powers of
dismissal of the council of ministers and dissolution of Lok Sabha, wherein
he may act contrary to the advice of the Cabinet.
Tyagi 335

• Under Article 111, the president has the power to either give or withhold his
assent to union legislation nor send it back for reconsideration. There is no
time limit fixed for him in which to do this, this implies sanction for delay-
ing action on a bill indefinitely.

These arguments generated a debate on eve of the Fourth General Election. The
doctrine of Independent Presidency attracted favourable response from opposi-
tion parties in the late sixties. As if to prevent even the idea gaining momentum in
1976, the 42nd Constitution Amendment Act was passed, which stipulated that
the president shall be bound by the advice of the council of ministers. This amend-
ment ended all misgivings about Independent Presidency. The 44th Constitution
Amendment of the Janata government, however, restored the earlier position by
adding that the president can send the advice back for reconsideration once. But if
the council of ministers sends the same advice again to the president, then the
president must accept it.
It is fascinating to know that the discretionary powers of a governor are men-
tioned explicitly in the Constitution, while the same is not mentioned explicitly
for the president—it is only understood from the provisions. However, under
certain circumstances, president may use his discretion implied by the context.

Selection and Dismissal of Prime Minister

In accordance with the conventions of parliamentary system and constitutional
provision for collective responsibility of council of ministers towards Lok Sabha,
president’s powers to appoint and dismiss a prime minister or other ministers are
only a formality. However, when the Lok Sabha election does not produce a con-
clusive result because none of the parties or pre-poll formations secures a clear
majority in the election, then the Constitution of India has empowered the presi-
dent to decide in her or his discretion whom to invite to become the prime minister
and form a government (Subramanian, 2009). As it is, the chosen prime minister
should command majority in Lok Sabha. This commanding of majority can create
delicate situation and calls the president to play an effective and decisive role in
case of

• a Hung Lok Sabha (with no clear majority for a party or coalition) as it arose
in 1989, 1991, 1996,1998 and 1999;
• loss of majority as result of defections from or splits in parties as it hap-
pened in 1979 and
• claims of competing claims of parties for their ability to form governments
as the situation arose in 1979, 1990, 1997 and 1998.

However, in the event of death of prime minister, the president had no prime min-
ister to advise him, so he had to use his discretion to appoint a caretaker prime
minister and decided for prime ministerial succession in different manners.
After the death of Nehru in 1964 and Shastri in 1965, President S. Radhakrishnan
sworn in the senior most Cabinet member Gulzarilal Nanda as the interim prime
336 Indian Journal of Public Administration 63(3)

minister, till the time Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi were elected by the
Congress Parliamentary Party, respectively (Mahurkar, 1996).
The role of President Sanjiva Reddy in 1979 became subject of controversy.
The Janata Party government headed by Morarji Desai resigned as consequent
to the split in the Janata Party. The president, did not, however, let Morarji Desai
explore the chances of forming a new government in his capacity as leader of the
largest single party—a status claimed by him after his resignation as prime minis-
ter in face of a no confidence motion. The president gave the first opportunity to
Y. B. Chavan, the then leader of opposition, belonging to Congress. Since Chavan
expressed inability to form a government, Charan Singh, the leader of a Janata
Party splinter, was invited to form the government and prove his majority within
a period of one month (Mehrotra, 1980, p. 28). Sanjiva Reddy’s decision had
far-reaching implications. First, a person or a party failing to retain the support of
majority in the Lok Sabha, cannot claim the right to form a new government in
his capacity as the head of the single largest party. Second, Jagajivan Ram, though
backed by 200 members in the 538-member Lok Sabha and the leader of the main
faction of the Janata Party was denied the chance to get into the office because all
others favoured a different course. Third, the president could play a decisive role
in times of crisis. It depicted that if a political party cannot get the requisite major-
ity, the burden then falls upon the president to exercise his discretion.
Whereas after Indira Gandhi’s assassination on 31 October 1984, deviating
from the precedence of appointing the Home Minister Pranab Mukherjee, the senior
most in the cabinet, as temporary prime minister till the time party in power for-
mally elects its leader, President Zail Singh immediately appointed Rajiv Gandhi
as prime minister.4 It was only later that Congress Parliamentary Party chose him
as its leader. Thus, by using his powers and patronage, he made it fait accompli
for the Congress Parliamentary Party.5

Changing Role of the President in Selection of Prime

Minister During the Multi-party Coalition Phase
In the 1989 Lok Sabha election, no party secured a majority. The Congress with
194 seats was the single largest party in the House. So President R. Venkataraman
first invited Congress party leader Rajiv Gandhi, who declined to form a govern-
ment. Thereafter, the president invited the leader of the National Front, V. P.
Singh, to form the government. President Venkataraman applied what is called the
‘arithmetic test/objective test’ of summoning the parties in order of their numeri-
cal strength (Subramanian, 2009). When V. P. Singh did not resign after BJP with-
drew support to his National Front government, the president’s task was delicate
and difficult. This was a situation where the president had to use his own judge-
ment. He asked Singh to prove his majority. The government lost the trust vote
decisively on 7 November 1990 and as events unfolded, it was possible to install
an alternative government headed by Chandra Shekhar, the leader of the
Samajwadi Janata Party, with Congress support (Kashyap, 2010). 
In May 1996, President Shankar Dayal Sharma had administered the oath of
office to Atal Bihari Vajpayee, without any letter from supporting parties. No
Tyagi 337

party had received absolute mandate. Unless elections were to be reduced to an

irrelevant farce, the only point to be considered by Sharma was who had the best
mandate. Under Article 75(1), it was ‘the President’s prerogative and responsi-
bility to see which party had the best claim to the mandate of the people and to
invite its leader to become the PM’. When it was found that the council of minis-
ters did not enjoy the confidence of the House, it had to go and it did (Kashyap,
2010). The government fell down within 13 days and president came in for criti-
cism. Thereafter, when H. D. Deve Gowada staked claim to form a government,
the president asked for letters of support and a common minimum programme.
Thereinafter, the president did not oblige the then Congress President Sita Ram
Kesari, when he staked his claim after the fall of the Deve Gowada government
(Noorani, 2009).
In the 2004 general elections, again, no single party obtained a clear mandate.
However, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance emerged as the largest
alliance and Congress as the largest single party. In a significant departure from
tradition, not the leader of the largest alliance, but her nominee, Rajya Sabha
member, Manmohan Singh, was called upon by President Kalam to form the
government (Kashyap, 2010). 

President to Act on the Advice of the

Council of Ministers
Before the 42nd Amendment, Article 74(1) stated that ‘there shall be a Council of
Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the
exercise of his functions’ and under Article 74(2), such advise cannot be ‘inquired
into in any court’. Yet, there was a slight ambiguity whether the advice of the
council of ministers is binding on the president. 42nd Amendment to the Constitution
of India (1976) made it explicit that the president shall ‘act in accordance with such
advice’. The 44th Amendment (1978) added, however, that the president can send
the advice back for reconsideration once. But the president must accept the advice,
if after reconsideration, the council of ministers sends the same advice again to the
president. Singh and Saxena have observed that the president ultimately has to ‘go
by Cabinet advice, subject only to one request for reconsideration’ (Singh and
Saxena, 2011, 125). Nonetheless, the experience of President Narayanan has
reflected some assertion even in ‘one request for reconsideration’.
Under Article 78(c), the president may give his counsel or require the matter
to be reconsidered by the council of ministers as a whole, but once a policy has
been decided by the council of ministers and formally submitted to him, he has
ultimately to abide by it and act accordingly. Interpreting this clause, B.N. Rao
has suggested:

Acting on ministerial advice does not necessarily mean immediate acceptance of the
Ministry’s first thoughts. The President can state all his objections to any proposed
course of action and ask his Ministers in Council, if necessary, to reconsider the matter.
It is only in the last resort that he should accept their final advice. (Rau, 1963, p. 410)
338 Indian Journal of Public Administration 63(3)

President K. R. Narayanan, twice in October 1997 and September 1998, sent back
for reconsideration union Cabinet’s recommendations for imposition of presi-
dent’s rule in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, respectively (Ahmed & Baweja, 1998). In
Uttar Pradesh, Governor Romesh Bhandari had dismissed the BJP government
led by Kalyan Singh and replaced it by an all-defector government led by a
Congressman, Jagdambika Pal. The governor sent a report to the centre recom-
mending dissolution of the Assembly and imposition of president’s rule (Chandra,
Mukherjee, & Mukherjee, 2008, p. 68).
The Janata Dal-led United Front government in New Delhi headed by I.K. Gujral
adopted an ostrich policy and left President Narayanan without any advice in the midst
of repeated representation to the Union government for intervention in the matter.
Narayanan on his own faxed an advice of disapproval—not any specific directive—
to the Governor. (Singh and Saxena, 2011, pp. 133–134)
Finally, the matter reached the Supreme Court which ordered the restoration
of the dismissed government (Rudolph & Rudolph, 2004, also see India Today,
3 November 1997, p. 22). In September 1998, in deference to the president, the
Vajpayee government withdrew its decision to dismiss the Rabri Devi govern-
ment in Bihar (Subrahmaniam, 2005). The union Cabinet’s recommendation was
made hours after the Rabri Devi government had won a confidence vote in the
Bihar Assembly. The president’s decision came after three days of consultation
with political parties and constitutional and legal experts. The president said in
his communication to the union government that ‘application of Article 356 of the
Constitution is not warranted as constitutional machinery in the state [Bihar] has
not broken down’.6
The same procedure was utilised by the President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam,
while returning to the Vajpayee government for the reconsideration of ordinance
seeking to amend the Representation of the People Act in August 2002 annulling
the Election Commission (EC) directive requiring candidates to file an affidavit
along with nomination papers regarding their financial assets, educational quali-
fications and involvement, if any, in criminal activities. The EC directive was in
pursuit of a Supreme Court judgment (Singh & Saxena, 2011, p. 134). Later, when
the Cabinet reiterated its proposal, the president had to grant his assent to the bill
(Venkatesan & Kumar, 2002).
Another controversy followed Governor Buta Singh’s advice to impose presi-
dent’s rule in Bihar after the Assembly election in 2005, on the ground that no
political party was in a position to form government. In another report to the
centre, the governor stated that a ‘particular party (NDA-led coalition govern-
ment under Nitish Kumar) may be close to getting a majority’ alleging horse
trading in legislators. The Congress-led UPA government at the centre headed
by Manmohan Singh sent a proposal to President Kalam endorsing the gover-
nor’s report and faxed it to the president, then in Moscow. Kalam faxed back his
approval. The notification dissolving the Assembly was issued on 23 May 2005.
Later, the Supreme Court held void Bihar Assembly’s dissolution. The presi-
dent had, perhaps, allowed himself in his simplicity to be hurried into signing a
Tyagi 339

blatantly ‘unconstitutional’ notification. He could have taken his own time and
held consultations before deciding. The incident again showed that the president’s
role was definitely not that of a mere rubber stamp (Kashyap, 2010). 
President Pranab Mukherjee took three long days to satisfy himself that
the Modi Cabinet decision recommending imposition of the central rule under
Article 356 of the Constitution in Arunachal Pradesh, a sensitive border state
governed by Congress, was based on legitimate grounds of ‘breakdown of law
and order machinery’ due to the 15 December 2015 political upset which alleg-
edly reduced the ruling Congress to minority.7 Imposition of central rule in
Uttarakhand in March 2016 brought the focus back to the role of President Pranab
Mukherjee, a day before Harish Rawat was to take a trust vote.  While former
Attorney General Soli Sorabjee commented that the president had limited options,
former additional solicitor general Raju Ramachandran opined, ‘[O]ur President
…. should have exercised his discretionary powers.’8

President/Governor Can Seek Information

from PM/CM
Under Article 78, the president enjoys the right to seek information from the PM
regarding the administration of the affairs of the union. Under Article 78(a) of
the Constitution, the prime minister has to communicate to the president all deci-
sions of the council of ministers relating to the administration of the affairs of the
union and proposals for legislation. Article 78(b) casts an obligation on the prime
minister ‘to furnish such information relating to the administration of the affairs
of the Union and proposals for legislation as the President may call for’. Under
clause(c) of Article 78, the president may require that a matter decided upon by
a minister be placed before the council of ministers and it shall be the duty of the
prime minister to do so.
In March 1987, one leading newspaper9 published a letter purported to have
been written by the president to the prime minister. The text of the alleged letter,
which was not authenticated either by the president or by the prime minister, con-
tained, inter alia, the following:

The President-Prime Minister relations in our country are governed by certain well-
established practices and conventions besides express provisions of the Indian
Constitution. I am constrained to say that certain well-established conventions have not
been followed. Before your visit abroad and after your return I have not been briefed...
In fact, I have not been briefed on foreign policy issues relating to such of our imme-
diate neighbours in South Asia with which there are outstanding problems. ..Even on
certain important domestic issues, I have not been kept informed on matters relating to
accords finalised in respect of Assam, Punjab and Mizoram. I was not briefed at any
stage...It is also distressing that constitutional provisions regarding furnishing of infor-
mation to the President have not been consistently followed. I have brought it to your
notice that reports of some of commissions of enquiry had not been sent to me even
long after their receipt by the Government.10
340 Indian Journal of Public Administration 63(3)

President Zail Singh complained of denial of power and opportunities to be

briefed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in person as well as to be provided with
the Thakkar Commission Report on Indira Gandhi’s assassination that he relin-
quished (cited in Singh & Saxena, 2011, p. 126). These issues led to the famous
‘controversial’ correspondence between the president and the prime minister and
steered Zail Singh, who ‘almost decided to ‘dismiss’ Rajiv Gandhi’ (Bhambhri,
2007, p. 123). However, Zail Singh exercised restraint by not initiating any action
against the government. Thus, an imminent constitutional crisis was avoided
(Chawla, 1987b). However, efforts to discuss the said letter in the Parliaments
was denied by the presiding officers in both the Houses and ruled that the
president’s name could not brought in any way on the floor of Houses to influence
the debate.11 It is to be noted that Article 78 of the Constitution may be studied in
context of Article 74 which reflects the prerogative of the union council of minis-
ters to decide what type of information should be provided to the president. No
doubt, the president has a right to be informed and to give advice, but he cannot
make it a practice to take over executive governance (Dhavan & Saxena, 2012).

Concerning Prosecution of the Prime Minister

A new category of powers, which the president may have to act without the advice
of council of ministers, seems to be emerging under special laws such as the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Supreme Court’s rulings in the Karunanidhi
Case (K. Karunanidhi vs Union of India, 1979 AIR 898, 1979 SCR (3) 254) and the
R. S. Naik case (State of Maharashtra vs Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak, 1982 AIR
1249, 1982 SCR (1) 8) suggested that the chief minister might be deemed to be a
public servant and governor (and therefore the president) may decide indepen-
dently of the council of ministers in sanctioning prosecution for such proven
charges of corruption. The issue of dismissal of or allowing prosecution against the
prime minister on corruption charges emerged in the backdrop of Bofors arms deal
scandal involving the Rajiv Gandhi government. Presidents Zail Singh and his suc-
cessor Venkataraman did not take these drastic steps. Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh also faced this problem for his so-called involvement in ‘Coalgate’ scam
(Dr. Subramaniam Swamy vs Dr. Manmohan Singh, 2012 3 SCC 64.). Going by
strictly legal and constitutional norms, Singh and Saxena have opined, ‘the
President should in such cases neither short-circuit judicial procedure nor circum-
vent a parliamentary majority’ (Singh & Saxena, 2011, p. 126).

Right to Warn or Encourage the Council of Ministers

Under the established convention, the president has the right to warn or encourage
the council of ministers in the exercise of his power. President Rajendra Prasad
did not agree with the prime minister on certain issues. Over the Hindu Code Bill,
the first president exchanged letters with the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru, about powers and limitations of the president. As quoted by Prabhu Chawla
(Singh & Saxena, 2011), in September 1951, President Prasad expressed his
Tyagi 341

desire to act solely on his own judgement, independent of the council of ministers,
when giving his assent to the Bills, when sending messages to Parliament, and
when returning bills to Parliament for reconsideration.
In the immediate aftermath of the Chinese attack in 1962, President
Radhakrishnan’s political views were sometimes critical of existent government
(Satchidananda Murty & Vohra, 1990, p. 164). He was also reported to have played
a significant role in securing the resignation of Krishna Menon, the defence minis-
ter, in 1962 (cited in Gehlot, 1973). In 1967 also, in his last Republic Day message,
he openly accused the government for ‘widespread incompetence and gross mis-
management of the country’s resources’ (Government of India, 1969, p. 86).

Case of Lack of Confidence and Dissolution

of Lok Sabha
If the Lok Sabha adopts a motion of no-confidence in the council of ministers or
the prime minister, the president is bound to take due note and dismiss the council
of ministers, if the prime minister does not tender his resignation on the adoption
of the said motion. There is a view, as espoused by legal commentator Rajeev
Dhavan, that the president’s power to dissolve the Lok Sabha is discretionary. It is
generally recognised that the president is not bound by the advice of the council
of ministers to dissolve the Lok Sabha if it is clear that it has lost majority support
in the House. Faced with hung Parliaments, former presidents Neelam Sanjiva
Reddy in 1979, R. Venkataraman in 1991 and K.R. Narayanan in 1998 and 1999
exercised their power under Article 85(2)(b) not solely on the basis of the advice
tendered by the outgoing Cabinet, if there was any (Venkatesan, 2004).
On 20 August 1979, Mr Charan Singh resigned before a vote was taken on
the motion of confidence in the specially convened session of the Lok Sabha and
advised the president to dissolve the Lok Sabha and order a mid-term poll as ‘the
only way out of the present unstable situation’.12 On the advice of Charan Singh,
Sanjiva Reddy dissolved the Lok Sabha and ordered a mid-term poll. At that time,
Jagajivan Ram, the new leader of the Janata Party representing the largest group
in Lok Sabha was not invited to form the government. The president accepted the
advice of Charan Singh, who chose not to face the Lok Sabha and dissolved the Lok
Sabha. On this occasion, thus, the president acted arguably independently, which
went down as a controversial action in the Indian constitutional history.13 His argu-
ment was that his decision was backed by all groups, except the Jagjivan Ram-led
Janata Party. He also thought it inapt to call a person (Morarji Desai) to form a gov-
ernment again, who had just tendered his resignation instead of facing the no-con-
fidence motion in the House. He, in fact, had three options before him. These were
(a) to invite Jagjivan Ram to form a government led by the Janata Party and ask
him to prove his majority in the House, (b) to invite Morarji Desai to do the same,
and (c) to dissolve the Lok Sabha and order fresh elections. This was to be accom-
panied by inducting a new government under a non-controversial leader chosen by
consensus of various parties and acceptable to him and to accept Charan Singh’s
advice to dissolve the Lok Sabha and let it continue as a caretaker government.14
342 Indian Journal of Public Administration 63(3)

The president accepted the recommendation of Charan Singh for the dissolution
of the Lok Sabha, because he himself was satisfied that no other leader could form
the government and the general election was the only alternative (Sanjiva Reddy,
1989, pp. 41–43). The largest single party led by Jagjivan Ram, a Dalit, was not
given an opportunity to form a government.
The president can dissolve Lok Sabha only on the advice of council of
ministers, but the advice is binding only if the government is in a majority.
President Venkataraman was well aware of the fluid constitutional position on
the issue of accepting or not accepting the advice of the defeated Prime Minister
Chandrashekhar. It was felt that the president dissolved the House on the addi-
tional ground that no political party had staked the claim to form the government
(Patnaik, 1996, p. 142). Here, Subhash C. Kashyap has opined that following
the resignation of the Janata Dal(S) government headed by Chandra Shekhar in
March 1991—before it had presented the Budget—we were in the midst of an
unprecedented constitutional crisis. The president had undisputed powers to issue
fiscal ordinances, but there was not a single precedence of the president doing by
an ordinance what Parliament did by passing a vote-on-account and an appropria-
tion Bill. President Venkataraman decided the House could be dissolved only after
passing a vote-on-account (Kashyap, 2010).
A. G. Noorani (2009) has recounted a historic communique issued by the
President K. R. Narayanan on 26 April 1999. After the loss of confidence by the
Vajpayee government in Lok Sabha, the president gave the prime minister his
assessment that the 12th Lok Sabha was not capable of yielding a government
with a reasonable prospect of stability.

The recourse to dissolution on the defeat of a minority coalition government arises

when it appears to the President that a stable government cannot be formed without
a general election. Dissolution is indicated if an alternative government with working
majority which can be expected to carry on for a reasonable period of time is not feasi-
ble. The President informed the Prime Minister that in his perception the dissolution of
the Twelfth Lok Sabha had therefore become necessary.15

A. B. Kohli is also of the view that the president can exercise his discretion in the
matter of dissolution of the Lok Sabha. As he said:

The President has also the discretion regarding the dissolution of the Lok Sabha as he
would not always accept the recommendation of the outgoing Prime Minister who has
lost majority or has been defeated on the floor of the House. He would dissolve the Lok
Sabha only if he is satisfied that no other leader can form and run the government and
finds general election to be the only alternative.... (Kohli, 1988, p. 18)

H. M. Jain has maintained:

The conclusion is that while the Constitution, after the amendments (42nd & 44th),
formally and expressly requires the President to exercise his powers in accordance with
the advice of his Council of Ministers, there is still left with him an area of discretion
in the matter of appointment and dismissal of the Prime Minister, and in a very limited
measure, in the matter of dissolution of the Lok Sabha.... (Jain, 1978)
Tyagi 343

Early Dissolution of Lok Sabha/State Legislatures

by President
Another aspect of presidential discretionary powers is regarding the dissolution of
Lok Sabha, wherein he has to think whether to accept or not the advice of Cabinet
to dissolve the Lok Sabha. The president could also use his discretion at the time
of holding mid-term poll to the Lok Sabha, either with or without the advice of the
prime minister. Invoking Article 85, regarding the summon, prorogation and dis-
solution of each House of Parliament, presidents have dissolved the Lok Sabha
six times: 4th Lok Sabha on 27 December 1970; 6th Lok Sabha on 22 August
1979; 9th Lok Sabha on 13 March 1991; 11th Lok Sabha on 4 December 1997;
12th Lok Sabha on 26 April 1999, and 13th Lok Sabha on February 2004. Then,
there was the special case of ‘early dissolution’ of the 5th Lok Sabha, whose life
was extended during the internal national Emergency for one year, but the then
prime minister Indira Gandhi sought dissolution before the year was over. The
dissolutions in 1979, 1991, 1997 and 1999, became necessary, because the gov-
ernment of the day had lost its majority and no alternative government could be
formed (Khare, 2004). Some experts, like N. A. Palkiwala, are of the view that the
president is not bound to accept the advice of every government to dissolve Lok
Sabha. Justice V. M. Tarkunde suggests that in times of political instability every
government going out of the office is not entitled to demand the dissolution of
Lok Sabha. But M. C. Chagla and Justice H. R. Khanna have opined differently.
They are of the view that the Constitution does not recognise any caretaker or
conditional prime minister. A prime minister is always with all rights conferred on
him by the Constitution and if the president does not accept his advice, he is
bound to enter into a realm of controversy (Panda, 1991).
Dissolution of the fourth Lok Sabha by President V. V. Giri raised various
issues. At first instance, it was asked by the prime minister of a Congress minor-
ity government later backed by the legislative support of CPI and the DMK from
the floor. Sane thought that the president should have explored other avenues of
forming an alternative government before granting the request or alternatively, he
should have dismissed the Cabinet the moment it had become a minority govern-
ment.16 A careful reading of the Order makes it clear that the dissolution was con-
ceded on the advice of the Cabinet and the suggestions of the opposition leaders
and not on the advice of the prime minister alone.17
In 1977, Prime Minister Morarji Desai advised the Acting President B. D. Jatti
to dissolve the nine state assemblies, who pointed out that the move for dissolving
the nine state assemblies simultaneously was unprecedented and unwarranted, and
therefore ‘wanted time to consider the recommendation’ (cited in Gehlot, 1988,
p. 62). Thus, the president departed from the earlier tradition of accepting such
advice unquestioningly as soon as it is received from the Cabinet. Subsequently
the president not only accepted the Cabinet’s contention that the centre was justi-
fied in invoking Article 356 to give the people of those nine states a chance to
elect new governments, but also signed the proclamation to dissolve the legisla-
tive assemblies in the nine northern states.18
A. P. J. Abdul Kalam in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Article
85(2)(b) of the Constitution, accepted the Cabinet recommendation and signed
344 Indian Journal of Public Administration 63(3)

the order dissolving the 13th Lok Sabha, eight months ahead of the expiry of its
term in 2004 (Venkatesan, 2004).

Suspensive Veto
The president exercises this veto when he returns a bill (not money bill) for recon-
sideration of the Parliament. However, if the bill is passed again by the Parliament,
with or without amendments and presented again to the president, it is obligatory
for him to give his assent to the bill. So far as the delaying action on a Bill is con-
cerned, Rajendra Prasad delayed in giving his assent to Bihar Zamindari Abolition
Bill, signalling his reluctance to sign it (Manor, 1994, also see Butler, 1991,
p. 149) and reluctantly acquiesced in the passage of the Hindu Code Bill (Chawla,
1987a).
Later, President Zail Singh maintained silence on Postal Bill, when the Indian
Post Office (Amendment) Bill, 1986, passed by the Houses, was submitted to him
on 19 December 1986 for assent. There was public criticism of its provisions that
permitted an interception of all communications through the mail by the govern-
ment of the day (Nariman, 2010). The president, anticipating public outrage, did
not give his assent. His successor, President Venkataraman, after a lapse of over
3 years, returned the Bill to Prime Minister V. P. Singh. It was tabled in Rajya Sabha
on 7 January 1990 for reconsideration by the Houses. But in the absence of any
such reconsideration by the Houses, bill could not be passed.19
In 1998, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Madan Lal Khurana hinted that presi-
dent was delaying some Bills. He, however, got a public reprimand from President
K. R. Narayanan for making such an allegation (Thakurta & Raghuraman, 2004,
p. 373). There was much controversy over the effort to—retrospectively from
1959—legalise the illegality of MPs including high functionaries holding offices
of profit. The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Bill passed by the two
Houses was returned by the president with a message for reconsideration on
30 May 2006. The President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, however, gave his assent when
the bill was passed again and presented to him (Kashyap, 2010). 

Pocket Veto
In this case, the president neither ratifies nor rejects nor returns a bill, but with-
holds his assent or simply keeps the bill pending for an indefinite period, as the
time limit within which the president has to take the decision with respect to a bill
presented to him for assent has not been mentioned in the constitution. Article 111
says that if the president wants to return the bill, he shall do it ‘as soon as possible’
after the bill is presented to him. The president may, as soon as, possible after the
presentation to him of a bill for assent, return a bill, if it is not a Money Bill, to the
Houses with a message requesting the House to reconsider the bill or any speci-
fied provisions thereof, and, in particular, to consider the desirability
of introducing any such amendments as the president may recommend in his
message.
Tyagi 345

The assent to the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Appropriation Bill,
1954, which was passed by both the Houses of Parliament, was withheld by presi-
dent, as by the time the bill was presented to the president, he had already revoked
the proclamation under which he assumed functions of the Patiala and East Punjab
States Union. The information with regard to the withholding of the assent by the
president was conveyed to the House by the Speaker.20 The Salary, Allowances
and Pension of Members of Parliament (Amendment) Bill, 1991, passed by the
Houses was submitted to the president on 18 March 1991. On 9 March 1992, the
Secretary, Ministry of Law, informed Rajya Sabha that the president, on 6 March
1992, had withheld assent to the above bill.21
The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Amendment Bill, 2006,
passed by both Houses of Parliament in the seventh Session of Fourteenth Lok
Sabha was returned by President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam for reconsideration of the
Houses. In the subsequent Eighth Session, the bill was again passed by both the
Houses without any change. However, a Joint Committee of the Parliament was
constituted to define as to what constitutes an Office of Profit. Thereafter, the
president gave his assent to the bill.22

Disallowance of State Legislation

Besides the power to veto union legislation, the president also has the power
of disallowance or return for reconsideration of a bill of the state legislature,
which may have been reserved for his consideration by the governor of the state
(Article 201). In case, the legislature would reconsider the bill within six months
and if it is passed again, the bill shall be presented to the president again. But it
shall not be obligatory upon the president to give his assent in this case too (Basu,
2015, p. 204). The Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime (GCTOC)
Bill, 2015 was returned by President Pranab Mukherjee while raising several
queries. The bill was first rejected by then President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam in 2004.23

Case of No Sitting of Upper House and Lower House

Article 85 empowers the president to summon each House of Parliament to meet
at such time and place as he thinks fit, but six months shall not intervene between
its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next
session. It means that if the council of ministers does not properly advise the
president in summoning the session of the Parliament in such a way that not more
than six months lapse between two sessions, then the president can summon the
session of the Parliament in his discretion.24

An Assessment
On one hand, because of absence of certain clarifications in the Constitution and,
on the other, because of the nature of multi-party system and decline of values in
346 Indian Journal of Public Administration 63(3)

politics, the role and position of president has become an issue of debate. Legal
experts have remained divided upon his constitutional role and position.
Notwithstanding the 42nd Amendment, there is considerable scope for reasonable
and honest differences of opinion between the president and prime minister.
The first president, Rajendra Prasad, took an active interest in political happen-
ings. His strong views about rights and responsibilities of the office of the president
led to a near crisis. Radhakrishnan, during the tenure of his office, had been excep-
tionally frank in publicly giving expression to his views. However, he preferred that
‘there should never be a vacancy in the office of Prime Minister’ and ‘the president
should never directly execute authority’ (Gopal, 1989, p. 394). Zakir Hussain’s brief
tenure as president was not marked by any conspicuous intrusion into politics.
The threat that would have been posed to Indira Gandhi, had Sanjiva Reddy
become president in 1969, prompts James Manor to comment that the prime min-
ister was ‘actually vulnerable to the President’s power’ (Manor, 1994, p. 115. ).
V. V. Giri’s election to the office of the president, indeed, led to the split of the
Congress. As a president as well, he could never remain apolitical. Despite Indira
Gandhi role in his election, he could not conceal his unhappiness over the han-
dling of the railway strike by the government during his tenure as president (Singh
& Pal, 2012).
Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad quite openly sided with the Congress leadership even
in controversial matters like imposition of internal national emergency in 1975.
N. Sanjiva Reddy was a trusted choice of the Janata Party, but some critics visu-
alise his no-insignificant role in the breakup of the party and in withholding his
invitation to Jagjivan Ram to form the government. Gyani Zail Singh had always
been a political personality that made him the favoured choice of Congress Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi, the patronage which he paid back by appointing Rajiv
Gandhi as the prime minister, after the assassination of Indira Gandhi, ignoring
the precedent set earlier by President Radhakrishnan.
While counting presidential assertiveness before 1989, Manor has referred
to president’s assertion for rights and responsibilities of the office of the presi-
dent and threats of resignation from Prime Minister Nehru to persuade President
Prasad to back down. This firmly established the practice that while presidents
can advise and warn governments and ask them to reconsider intended actions,
they cannot defy the will of a government with a majority in the Lok Sabha.
However, after the death of Nehru, even before the Cabinet decision could be
communicated to President Radhakrishnan, he informed the senior most minister
Nanda to swear him in as prime minister (Manor, 1994, p. 126). Similarly, after
the death of Lal Bahadur Shastri, he had again immediately sworn in Nanda, the
senior most cabinet minister and who ‘then coached her (Indira Gandhi) on how
to manoeuvre’ (Manor, 1994, p. 128). Later, due to certain apprehensions, Indira
Gandhi supported V.V. Giri as the presidential candidate.
Presidential assertiveness after 1989, according to Manor, became more visible
at the advent of hung parliaments that undermined the power of prime ministers
and Cabinets. Dependence on diversity of parties, dubious prospects of being re-
elected, and non-committal role of a plethora of smaller parties have changed the
role and position of the president. The parliamentary elections of 1989, 1991,
Tyagi 347

1996 and 1998 all produced hung Parliaments, as no party got majority in the
Lok Sabha; it thus, provided discretionary opportunities to the presidents at
the time of nomination of prime ministers. Some discretion was evidently used
by the president at the appointments of Charan Singh, Chandra Shekhar, A. B.
Vajpayee (in 1996), H. D. Deve Gowda and Inder Kumar Gujral. Though each one
of them had to prove his majority in Lok Sabha, and failing to do so forced them
to resign subsequently. Referring to the views of Jagjivan Ram, James Manor had
indicated that in the era of hung Parliaments, possibility of impeachment of any
unrestrained president would require two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha, which
is not easily obtainable; hence the president may acquire great leverage over a
government. Yet, Manor feels that even though an era of hung Parliaments creates
greater opportunities and often the necessity for presidents to act assertively; yet,
it also generates reasons for presidents not to do so, because assertiveness tends to
generate suspicions of partisanship even when there is no such intention. On the
one hand, Manor asserts that in such situations, people need to become more tol-
erant of legitimate presidential interventions to enable presidents to foster sustain-
able governments in fragmented parliaments; and on the other, presidents need
to take great care to ensure that their interventions are indeed legitimate (Manor,
2005).
In the background of hung parliaments and coalition politics, James Manor
(2005, p. 106) has stated:

[T]he President has become more important since 1989, because he is the referee in
the game of government formation, and he decides whether to grant a Prime Minister’s
request for dissolution of Parliament. In this era of hung Parliaments, the former task
has become more complex and difficult, and the latter is a potential problem. This
makes it much more likely that the presidency will be engulfed in heated disputes which
may occur even if Presidents seek to avoid controversy.

M. P. Singh and Rekha Saxena (2011, p. 133) have opined that Manor’s apprehen-
sion has not happened to any crisis proportions.
R. Venkataraman, during his presidency, is reported to have suggested for
a ‘National Government’ consisting of all political parties. He is said, though
unconfirmed, to have a desire to head that government himself. S. D. Sharma,
who became president after him, did not remain a silent spectator of the demoli-
tion of Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992, and criticised publicly the laxity on the
part of the government headed by P. V. Narsihma Rao in preventing the mosque’s
destruction (Singh & Pal, 2012).
K. R. Narayanan, though he did not come with a political background, through
his actions had shown his capacity to be conscious of president’s power. His acts
in twice returning union Cabinet decisions (concerning imposition of presidential
rule in Bihar and UP); expressing different point of view than that of govern-
ment on need for constitutional review; refusing to confer the Bharat Ratna on
Vinayak Damodar Savarkar; speaking his mind on the Gujarat pogrom of 2002
while seeking Army intervention to control killings and his reported notes on files
for the appointments of judges or university vice-chancellors raised the issues of
president’s role afresh.25
348 Indian Journal of Public Administration 63(3)

A. P. J. Abdul Kalam was eminently successful in the management of high

technology in defence. He brought a refreshingly new approach to the presidency.
Casting away the ceremonial appearances that kept the public at a distance,
he reached out to diverse groups. His contributions to the public discourse in
such areas as education, scientific research and rural development have been of
great value. In going along with the UPA government’s blatantly partisan act of
dismissal of four governors soon after the 14th general elections in 2004,26 and
dissolving the Bihar Assembly in 2005 that was later held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, no doubt were controversial.27 Later, he returned union Cabinet’s
decision for reconsideration the Ordinance for the amendment of Representation
of People’s Act in August 2002; or when he sent back the Office-of-Profit Bill
passed by a broad consensus, only to be overruled by the Parliament. He also
expressed his hesitation in approving the appointment of two judges and indirectly
confirmed public perception about them being corrupt. In the age of increased
media scrutiny, any refusal from the president can dent the moral legitimacy of a
controversial political decision (Dutt, 2007).
It reflects that in Indian situation possibilities of an active President and con-
flict between the President and the Prime minister exist. Fortunately, up to now
all presidents and prime ministers have managed to avoid precipitating a constitu-
tional crisis. No president, however, has accepted the role of a mere rubber stamp,
excepting Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad l’affaire national emergency in June 1975 evi-
dently. At the same time, there is nothing in the Constitution, except for 42nd and
44th Amendments, that reduces the president to a non-entity. Given the condi-
tions, presidents can take advantage of a political situation of a hung Parliament.
He even can manipulate to break the majority of the party in power. He may use
his discretion for six months to rule with his handmaids. Beyond that he cannot
rule within the framework of the Constitution and without the support of armed
forces. In fact, the role of the president depends on the character of the prime min-
ister, and the president himself, the political conditions of hung Parliament, party
splits and naked struggle for power, where he can be an active and alert source of
action and resistance.
In practice, from Rajendra Prasad, and S. Radhakrishnan of olden days to
R. Venkataraman, K. R. Narayanan, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, and Pranab Mukherjee,
the presidents of India have played great roles in leading the nation and have not
remained mere figureheads, in a country marked by immense diversity of lan-
guages, culture, preferences and leadership. The Indian presidents have served to
remain a strong unifying factor and symbol of the nation’s prestige.

Notes
 1. Speeches by Dr Rajendra Prasad, Publications Division, Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1960–1961, p. 165. Also see Kulshreshtha
(1970).
 2. Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, Government of India, Vol. IV, September 1957–April 1963, pp. 100–101.
Also see Diwan and Diwan (1996, p. 58).
Tyagi 349

  3. 1971 AIR 1547, 1971 SCR (3) 461; see also Krishna Iyer (1988, p. 115).
 4. See http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/pranab-mukherjee-recalls-how-rajiv-gandhi-
became-pm-denies-he-tried-to-clinch-post/story-nLtDpvKNPXir0OUNBCFliN.html
  5. ‘Rajiv Gandhi: Prime Minister of India’, Encyclopedia Britannica.
  6. ‘President Rejects Recommendation’, The Tribune, 26 September 1998.
 7. The Times of India, Delhi, 26 January 2016.
  8. See the article ‘After Congress’ Uttarakhand win, President Pranab Mukherjee’s role ques-
tioned’, reported by A Vaidyanathan, Sunil Prabhu, Edited by Deepshikha Ghosh | 
Updated: May 11, 2016, 23:51 IST. Available at http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/
after-congress-uttarakhand-win-president-pranab-mukherjees-role-questioned-
1405174A Vaidyanathan, Sunil Prabhu, www.NDTV.com: 11 May 2016.
 9. The Indian Express, New Delhi, 13 March 1987.
10. Cited in http://164.100.47.134/intranet/pract&proc/chapter-III.pdf
11. Lok Sabha Debates published by Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 2-3-1987, 9-3-
1987, 13-3-1987, 18-3-1987, 19-3-1987. Also see Rajya Sabha Debates, Rajya Sabha
Secretariat, New Delhi, 20-3-1987, pp. 259–267; 30-4-1987, pp. 211––214.
12. The Indian Express, New Delhi, 21 August 1979.
13. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 22 August 1979.
14. The Indian Express, New Delhi, 22 August 1979.
15. The Hindu, Delhi, 27 April 1999, for the full text.
16. The Indian Express, New Delhi, 26 December 1970.
17. The Indian Express, New Delhi, 28 December 1970.
18. The Hindu (Madras), 1 May 1977.
19. See http://164.100.47.134/intranet/pract&proc/chapter-III.pdf
20. Lok Sabha Debates, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 5 April 1954, c. 4035.
21. See http://164.100.47.134/intranet/pract&proc/chapter-III.pdf
22. See http://164.100.47.134/intranet/pract&proc/chapter-III.pdf
23. See http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report (accessed on 29 January 2016).
24. The same was supported by the Apex Court in Rao v. Indira, AIR 1971 SC 1002, cited
in Bakshi (2002, p. 109).
25 India Today, Delhi, 3 November 1997, p. 22, and ibid., 5 October 1998, pp. 18–23.
26. The Hindu, Delhi, 3 July 2004.
27. The Hindu, Delhi, 24 May 2005 and also see The Indian Express, Delhi, 29 November
2015.

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