1. ORTIGAS & CO. LTD. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ISMAEL G.

MATHAY III
G.R NO. 126102
December 4, 2000

FACTS:

• The petition seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March
25, 1996 (CA-G.R. SP No. 39193), which nullified the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the RTC of Pasig Branch 261, in Civil Case No. 64931
• Petitioner Ortigas and Co. Ltd. sold a parcel of land on August 25, 1976, to
Emilia Hermoso with TCT No. 0737 located at Greenhills Subd. IV San Juan Metro
Manila.
• In the Contract of Sale, Ortigas and Co. Ltd., provided the restrictions that
are valid until December 31, 2025, and this restriction follows as that the
owner shall not make the land available for commercial use, it is for
residential use however, it shall be not more than one single-family
residential building to be constructed.
• In 1982, the Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01
also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region
where the portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of
Greenhills Subdivision was reclassified as a commercial area
• January 18, 1984, Ismael Mathay III (private respondent) leased the lot to
Hermoso and J.P Hermoso Realty Corp., however, the lease contract did not
specify the purpose of the lease, and the private respondent constructed a
commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. He
denied any knowledge of the restrictions on the use of the lot and filed cross-
claim against the Hermoso.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the Court of Appeals properly exercised police power.

RULING:
Yes, the Court of Appeals properly exercised police power. The trial court
observed that the contract of sale was entered into in August 1976 while the zoning
ordinance was enacted only in March 1981. Private respondent also failed to show an
evidence that the ordinance has a retroactive effect.
Is it agreed that laws are to be construed as having only prospective
operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward).
Therefore, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are
applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically
intended to have retroactive effect.
 But the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves
police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern
certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may
reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is
applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence.
2. LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. vs. JAC LINER, INC.
G.R No. 148339
February 23, 2005

FACTS:
• Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses why ply various
routes to and from Lucena City, assailed, via a petition for prohibition and
injunction against the City of Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Lucena before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, City
Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia,
the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of the
property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it
enacted the subject ordinances.

RULING:
The Local Government Unit may be considered as having properly exercised its
police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject
and lawful method.
The ordinances in question have been enacted for the objective that the traffic
in Lucena City was to relieve the traffic and by enacting the ordinances, the first
requisite for the proper exercise of police power is present. However, the
ordinances enacted went beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem. The petitioner wanted that the use of the terminal should be compulsory
and that affects the terminals operated by the operators who are already there
before the ordinance was enacted. The compulsory usage of the terminal will affect
the users as they will be paying for the fees such as rentals and charges of using
the terminal. This deems to be oppressive to the respondents and the appellate
found this as correct.
3. THE CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO AND MANILA TOURIST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127
APRIL 12, 2005

FACTS:
• Private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, and lodging inns. MTDC
built Victoria Court in Malate which is a licensed motel and duly accredited by
the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
• March 1993, the City Council and the City Mayor enacted and approved the
Ordinance, prohibiting the establishment or operation of businesses providing
certain forms of entertainment, amusement, services and facilities (using women
as a tool of entertainment) in the Ermita- Malate area. In case of violation and
conviction, the premises or the establishments will be closed and padlocked
permanently.
• June 28, 1993, MTDC filed a petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining order. Respondent
prayed that the “Ordinance” be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ordinance by the City of Manila is Constitutional.

RULING:

The court DENIED the petition of the City of Manila and AFFIRMED the decision of
the Regional Trial Court that the Ordinance is void.
The Supreme Court noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the Local Government Unit to enact and must be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by the law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements:
a. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
b. Must not be unfair or oppressive;
c. Must not be partial or discriminatory;
d. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
e. Must be general and consistent with public policy; and
f. Must not be unreasonable.
4. CARLOS SUPERDRUG, ET.AL vs. DSWD, ET. AL
G.R NO.: 166494
June 29, 2007

FACTS:
• Petitioners filed for Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
assailing the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No.: 9257 or the “Expanded
Seniors Citizen’s Act of 2003.
• February 26, 2004- R.A. 9257 amended the R.A 7432 and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo and it became effective on march 21, 2004.
Section 4(a) of the Act states:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be
entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all
establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels
and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation
centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral
and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
• Petitioners assails the following grounds that Section 4(a) of R.A. 9257:
1. It infringes Article III, Sec. 9 of the constitution which provides
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation;
2. It violates the equal protection clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) enshrined
in our Constitution which states that "no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied of the equal protection of the laws;" and
3. The 20% discount on medicines violates the constitutional guarantee
in Article XIII, Section 11 that makes "essential goods, health and
other social services available to all people at affordable cost.
4. Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional
because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling
drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will
result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose
a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law
failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly
compensated for the discount.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Section 4(a) of R.A. 9257 is constitutional.

RULING:
Yes, the court find that Section 4(a) of R.A. 9257 is constitutional. R.A.
9257 is a legitimate exercise of the police power. It has been described as “the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
to all the great public needs. It is the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statues, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects if the same.
The court DISMISSED the case at bar for insufficient proof that Section 4(a)
of R.A 9257 would be detrimental to the petitioners.
5. ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK,
INC. vs. DEPARMENT OF ENERGY, ET. AL.
G.R No.: 159796
July 17, 2007

FACTS:
• June 8, 2001, the congress enacted the EPIRA law
• June 26, 2001, EPIRA law took effect.
• Petitioners questioned the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law for being
an undue delegation of the power of taxation. Section 34 provides for
the imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all electricity end users
after a period of (1) one year after the effectively of the EPIRA Law.
The universal charge to be collected would serve as payment for
government debts, missionary electrification, equalization of taxes
and royalties applied to renewable energy and imported energy,
environmental charge and for a charge to account for all forms of
cross subsidies for a period not exceeding three years. The universal
charge shall be collected by the ERC on a monthly basis from all end
users and will then be managed by the PSALM Corp. through the creation
of a special trust fund.

ISSUES:

Whether or not, there is an undue delegation of power to tax on the part of

ERC.

RULING:
• The court finds the instant case DISMISSED for lack of merit.
• No, the Section 4 of the EPIRA law provides that the UNIVERSAL CHARGE refers
to the charge, if any, imposed for the recovery of the stranded cost and the
purposes pursuant to Section 34. The amount collected is not made certain
by the ERC, but by the legislative parameters provided for in the law
(RA 9136) itself, it therefore cannot be understood as a rule solely
coming from the ERC. The ERC in this case is only a specialized
administrative agency which is tasked of executing a subordinate
legislation issued by congress; which before execution must pass both
the completeness test and the sufficiency of standard test.
6. MARINA REYES, ET.AL vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R No.: 147511
January 20, 2003

FACTS:

• Respondent, National Housing Authority (NHA) filed separate complaints

for the expropriation of sugarcane lands owned by the petitioners
which is located in Dasmariñas, Cavite. They stated the purpose of the
complaint is for the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project
for the squatters who will be relocated from Metro Manila. The Trial
Court rendered the decision and ordered NHA to pay petitioners for the
just compensations. The Judgment of the lower court were affirmed also
by the Supreme Court.
• A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the
stated public purpose for the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement
Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area,
as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which
showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied.
Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA
when it entered into a contract for the construction of low-cost housing
units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the
expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has
forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment
and the expropriated properties should now be returned to herein.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of
the failure of the NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose
but for a different purpose.

RULING:

The Supreme Court favored the respondent NHA. Petitioners cannot insist on a
restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending
that the contract for low-cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use.
It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to
traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea that "public use" is strictly
limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been abandoned.