Mar Kwok Daniel

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Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection
2014-03
Why conscription, Singapore? the social and

geostrategic considerations
Kwok, Daniel J.
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/41408
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NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
THESIS
WHY CONSCRIPTION, SINGAPORE?

THE SOCIAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
by
Daniel J. Kwok
March 2014
Thesis Advisor: Michael S. Malley

Second Reader: Carolyn C. Halladay
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

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Master’s Thesis
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WHY CONSCRIPTION, SINGAPORE? THE SOCIAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC
CONSIDERATIONS
6. AUTHOR Daniel J. Kwok
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Monterey, CA 93943–5000
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11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Conscription is a centuries-old manpower procurement policy that continues to be used by many countries today;
however, in the last few decades, the trend is for developed countries to transition toward all-volunteer forces.
Reasons to implement conscription include the presence of a clear military threat and authoritarian intentions, among
others, but many nations have since reduced or abolished conscription as they shift toward stable, democratic late-
modern prosperity. Singapore adopted conscription shortly after gaining independence in 1965, yet amid similar
conditions in the past half-century and facing the same challenges to its model and ideal of conscription, has not made
the transition to an all-volunteer force.
This thesis analyzes the reasons for Singapore’s continued use of conscription in a world where other developed
countries have transitioned toward all-volunteer forces. This insight could provide alternative options for countries
seeking to maintain conscription, as well as reframe the civil-military discourse about conscription. Also, Singapore
stands out as an anomaly in the globally occurring transitions to all-volunteer forces, thus explaining the Singapore
case would further an understanding of why countries end, or retain, conscription.
14. SUBJECT TERMS Singapore, Defense Policy, Conscription, National Service, All Volunteer 15. NUMBER OF
Force, Deterrence, Total Defence, MINDEF, SAF PAGES
103
16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF
CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
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Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU
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WHY CONSCRIPTION, SINGAPORE?

THE SOCIAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
Daniel J. Kwok
Major, Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN)
B.S., National University of Singapore, 2005
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES

(CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS)
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

March 2014
Author: Daniel J. Kwok
Approved by: Michael S. Malley

Thesis Advisor
Carolyn C. Halladay
Second Reader
Mohammed Hafez
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs
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ABSTRACT
Conscription is a centuries-old manpower procurement policy that continues to be used

by many countries today; however, in the last few decades, the trend is for developed
countries to transition toward all-volunteer forces. Reasons to implement conscription
include the presence of a clear military threat and authoritarian intentions, among others,
but many nations have since reduced or abolished conscription as they shift toward
stable, democratic late-modern prosperity. Singapore adopted conscription shortly after
gaining independence in 1965, yet amid similar conditions in the past half-century and
facing the same challenges to its model and ideal of conscription, has not made the
transition to an all-volunteer force.
This thesis analyzes the reasons for Singapore’s continued use of conscription in a
world where other developed countries have transitioned toward all-volunteer forces.
This insight could provide alternative options for countries seeking to maintain
conscription, as well as reframe the civil-military discourse about conscription. Also,
Singapore stands out as an anomaly in the globally occurring transitions to all-volunteer
forces, thus explaining the Singapore case would further an understanding of why
countries end, or retain, conscription.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1
B. IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................2
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES ...............................................................3
D. THE FUTURE OF CONSCRIPTION ...........................................................4
1. Conscription’s Steady Decline ............................................................5
2. Conscription’s Continued Relevance .................................................6
E. METHODS AND SOURCES .........................................................................9
F. THESIS OVERVIEW .....................................................................................9
II. CONSCRIPTION ......................................................................................................11
A. CONSCRIPTION REVIEW .........................................................................11
1. Conscription as a Military Tactic .....................................................11
2. Conscription as a Political Tool ........................................................12
3. The Case against Conscription .........................................................14
B. A DYING CONCEPT ....................................................................................15
1. The United States ...............................................................................15
2. Germany .............................................................................................17
3. Taiwan.................................................................................................19
C. CONTINUING RELEVANCE .....................................................................22
1. Switzerland .........................................................................................23
2. South Korea ........................................................................................25
3. Israel ....................................................................................................27
III. NATIONAL SERVICE FOR SINGAPORE ...........................................................31
A. ORIGINS OF NATIONAL SERVICE ........................................................31
B. MILITARY SELF-SUFFICIENCY .............................................................33
1. A Serious Defender’s Challenge .......................................................33
2. Conscription for National Defense ...................................................34
C. SOCIAL FRAGILITY...................................................................................35
1. Effectiveness of Conscription ............................................................36
2. Conscription for National Integration .............................................37
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL SERVICE ....................................38
IV. RETAINING NATIONAL SERVICE .....................................................................41
A. INCREASING PROSPERITY .....................................................................41
1. A Competent SAF for National Defense ..........................................43
2. “Total Defence” for National Identity..............................................45
B. A MODERNIZING POPULATION ............................................................47
1. Revising Remuneration .....................................................................48
2. Revising the National Service Training System ..............................50
3. Leveraging Technology .....................................................................52
C. A GLOBALIZING WORLD ........................................................................54
1. Establishing Partnerships .................................................................55
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D. NATIONAL SERVICE TODAY ..................................................................58
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................61
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS......................................................................61
1. Comparing Responses to Remuneration .........................................61
2. Comparing Responses to Duration Reduction ................................62
3. Comparing Responses to Leveraging Technology ..........................64
4. Comparing Responses to Establishing Partnerships ......................65
B. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT UNCHANGED .......................................66
C. DOMESTIC SITUATION UNCHANGED .................................................68
1. Engaging the Stakeholders ................................................................69
2. Engaging through Schools.................................................................70
3. Engaging the Masses ..........................................................................71
4. Committee to Strengthen National Service .....................................72
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................73
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................75
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................89
viii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACCORD Advisory Council for Community Relations in Defence

ADMM ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CNB Changi Naval Base
CSNS Committee to Strengthen National Service
DRP Defense Reform Plan
EU European Union
FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangement
HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
IDF Israeli Defense Force
MDES Military Domain Experts Scheme
MID Ministry of Interior and Defence
MINDEF Ministry of Defence
MND Ministry of National Defense
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NS National Service
NSF Full-time National Serviceman
ORNS Operationally Ready National Serviceman
PRC People’s Republic of China
RECORD Recognise the Contribution of Operationally Ready National
Servicemen
RSN Republic of Singapore Navy
SAF Singapore Armed Forces
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SAVER Savings and Employee Retirement Plan
SLOC Sea Lines of Communications
TD Total Defence
UN United Nations
WOSpecs Warrant Officers and Specialists
WTO World Trade Organization
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am greatly indebted to a number of individuals who have supported me through

this invaluable experience and enriching learning journey.
To the Singapore Armed Forces for awarding me the Postgraduate Scholarship,

and my mentors in the Republic of Singapore Navy COL Richard Lim, SLTC Foong Kok
Pun, and LTC Kenny Chen whose belief allowed me the opportunity to undertake this
postgraduate award, without which I would not have had this opportunity. I would like to
express my sincerest gratitude.
To my Thesis Advisor Professor Michael S. Malley, for his constant attention

throughout the thesis process that allowed me the space to explore the topic
independently, yet with refined instruction to steer me on track when I needed guidance.
Thank you for sparing your late evenings and weekends, including when you were on
overseas assignments on the other side of the world, to provide feedback on my multiple
iterations.
To my Second Reader Professor Carolyn C. Halladay, for her meticulous editing

and powerful advice that strengthened the presentation of the thesis, yet with focus that
prevented overwhelming my individual character in this personal experience. Thank you
for your faith in my ability to produce a thesis that you would be proud of, and your
willingness to share your insights every step of the way.
To the professors and staff of the Naval Postgraduate School’s International

Programs Office (IPO) and National Security Affairs (NSA) department whose diligence
in imparting their knowledge, coordinating our schedules, and administering the
technicalities of our student lives have facilitated my progress through this 15-month
program, without which I would be bogged by confusion instead of focusing on learning,
researching, and writing this thesis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Conscription is a centuries-old manpower procurement policy that continues to be

used by many countries today; 1 however, in the last few decades, the trend is for
developed countries to transition towards all-volunteer forces. The connection between
conscription and democracy remains central to the analysis, but the international
landscape today is different from half a century ago, leading developed countries to re-
think their conscription policies. Examples of countries reducing conscription, in terms of
absolute numbers of young people inducted into the armed forces or of the length of
service obligations, include Norway, Denmark, and Austria, while countries that have
abolished conscription entirely include Sweden, Germany, and, most recently, the
Republic of China (Taiwan). Most of these states account for their new conscription
policies by noting the lessening of the kinds of threats that earlier necessitated
conscription; the solidification of their democracies; increased income, better education,
and improved standard of living; and a change in the nature of the relationship between
the state and citizens, with civic duty increasingly defined in terms that exclude armed
service.
Singapore adopted conscription shortly after gaining independence in 1965 and,

amid similar conditions in the past half-century, faces many of the same challenges to its
model and ideal of conscription. Yet Singapore has not made the transition to an all-
volunteer force; instead, it has in recent years increased efforts to strengthen conscription.
Why, then, has Singapore chosen to retain and adapt—indeed, to enhance—the
implementation of conscription rather than abolish it in the same way so many similarly
situated countries have done?
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION
How does Singapore approach the civil-military balance that informs its
conscription policy, and what implications does this view have in the broader, global
1 According to the CIA’s World Factbook, 58 countries adopt universal conscription. The World
Factbook, “Military Service Age and Obligation,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 20 July 2013,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html.
1
question of conscription, citizens at arms, military professionalism, and the rights and
duties, as well as the benefits, of citizenship in the globalized 21st century? This thesis
will attempt to explain Singapore’s continued use of conscription in spite of the global
trend for countries like Singapore to transition towards the use of all-volunteer forces.
Based on Singapore’s considerations and experience, the thesis will provide an
explanation for retaining conscription, and offer alternative ways to maintain the
relevance of conscription in a world where its popularity—but perhaps not its
relevance—continues to decline.
B. IMPORTANCE
Conscription, or “National Service” (NS), 2 is the “cornerstone of Singapore’s

defense” 3 and the Singapore government takes considerable efforts on policies that will
ensure it remains relevant despite changes in the domestic and international
environments. A recent move by the Singapore government in this direction is the
“Strengthen National Service” initiative. Announced in March 2013, a Committee to
Strengthen National Service (CSNS), chaired by the Minister for Defence, 4 will study
and propose “measures to strengthen NS as the critical institution for Singapore’s
continued survival and success.” 5 In light of the global trend toward all-volunteer forces,
a comparative study of similar countries may explain Singapore’s persistence in
retaining—and strengthening—conscription. This insight could provide alternative
options for countries seeking to maintain conscription, as well as reframing the civil-
military discourse about conscription, even in states that have already converted to an all-
volunteer model.
2 The term “National Service” (NS) is used for conscription in Singapore. A person serving
conscription is called a “Full-time National Serviceman” (NSF), and a person on reservist after completing
NS is called an “Operationally Ready National Serviceman” (ORNS or NSman).
3 “National Service,” Strengthen National Service website, Government of Singapore, last updated 30
May 2013, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics.
4 Singapore adopts British spelling; formal Singaporean organizational names will be spelled as they
are used in Singapore, and words in quotations will be spelled as quoted. The rest of this thesis adopts
American spelling.
5 “Strengthen NS,” Singapore Ministry of Defense, last updated 6 February 2014,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/key_topics/strengthen_ns.html.
2
Another importance of this thesis is the investigation of the balance between
advanced technology and the duration of conscript training. The Singapore Armed Forces
(SAF) has, in the last half a century, developed a military capability that surpasses that of
its regional neighbors. Defense spending regularly exceeds its much larger neighbors and
has remained robust even during regional and international economic crises, further
demonstrating its commitment to building and maintaining a capable military. Critics,
however, have argued that conscripts are not suited to operate and maintain the
technologically advanced weaponry, especially those habitually acquired by the SAF. An
investigation into how the SAF has adapted may explain the consistent and high level of
conscription despite the increasing technical requirements required by sophisticated new
weapons systems.
Finally, from an academic perspective, Singapore stands out as an anomaly in the

globally occurring transitions to all-volunteer forces. Explaining the Singapore case
would help refine the understanding of why countries end—or retain—conscription, as
well as further an understanding of how similar Singapore is to the various countries to
which it is commonly compared. This understanding would also provide credence to, for
example, Bacevich’s argument to “revive the concept of a citizen soldier” in the United
States in some form of National Service that would begin to overcome Americans’
antipathy toward the draft and “would have the people once again more closely engaged
in decisions as to where that army goes and what it is sent to do.” 6
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES
In recent decades, many nations have either reduced their reliance on or

completely abolished conscription. 7 The reasons for doing so include a decreasing need
for large standing armed forces as a result of decreased immediate threats since the end of
the Cold War, an unprecedented period of sustained peace, the forging of close military
6 Robin Young, “Here & Now Radio Interview with Andrew Bacevich: A Push to Bridge the Gap
between Soldiers and Citizens,” radio broadcast, Boston’s NPR News Station, 9 September 2013,
http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2013/09/02/bacevich-soldiers-citizens.
7 Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western
Publics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977); James Burk, “The Decline of Mass Armed
Forces and Compulsory Military Service,” Defense Analysis 8, no. 1 (1992): 45–59, doi: 10.1080
/07430179208405523.
3
alliances that spread the requirements of armed defense among the several members,
closer cooperation in international peacekeeping efforts, more advanced weaponry
leading to the desire for quality over quantity, deeper information exchange through the
ubiquity of the Internet and transportation, increasingly pervasive trade and globalization,
and the expectation of advanced societies to resolve conflict through diplomatic and
political, as opposed to military, means. 8 Many of these reasons similarly apply to
Singapore, yet Singapore seems to buck the trend of transitioning to an all-volunteer
force; instead, its government devotes much attention to adapting conscription to
maintain its relevance to the changing domestic and international landscape. The case of
conscription in Singapore, however, may be unique because of several conditions that set
it apart from Taiwan and the European countries that have abandoned conscription. These
include a young and fragile history, its tiny geography, a diverse population, and the
fractious regional situation.
This insight leads to two hypotheses that will be investigated in this thesis. The
first hypothesis is that Singapore faces a more dangerous external environment compared
with other countries that have ended conscription; the second is that Singapore retains
conscription because it faces a bigger challenge to national integration than similarly
situated countries. The choice, therefore, has been for Singapore to continually adapt
conscription to surmount the challenges that it, like other countries, has faced in societal,
political, economic, and military progress.
D. THE FUTURE OF CONSCRIPTION
Since the end of the Cold War, critics of conscription have argued for the
transition to all-volunteer armed forces, citing mainly military, economic, and political
considerations. 9 In line with these recommendations, many countries that had previously
adopted conscription have since reconsidered their manpower policies, including the
8 James J. Sheehan, “The Future of Conscription: Some Comparative Reflections,” Daedalus 140, no.
3 (Summer 2011): 112–121, doi: 10.1162/DAED_a_00102.
9 Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, “Conscription: Economic Costs and Political Allure,” The
Economics of Peace and Security Journal 2, no. 1 (2007): 6–15, http://www.epsjournal.org.uk/abs
/Vol2/No1/eps_v2n1_Poutvaara_Wagener.pdf; David R. Henderson, “The Role of Economists in Ending
the Draft,” Econ Journal Watch 2, no. 2 (August 2005): 362–376, http://econjwatch.org/articles/the-role-of-
economists-in-ending-the-draft; Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, “From Conscription to Volunteer Armies,” The
Adelphi Papers 13, no. 103 (1973): 11–16, doi: 10.1080/05679327308457261.
4
United States in 1973, 10 the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, and the
“overwhelming majority of NATO” members—conscription ended before the turn of the
century; 11 Sweden—conscription abolished in 2010; 12 Germany—conscription
suspended in 2011; 13 Norway and Denmark—conscription intakes significantly
reduced; 14 and Taiwan—the transition to an all-volunteer force is in progress and is to be
completed in 2015. 15
1. Conscription’s Steady Decline
Trapans, Archer and Jҩger, and Petersson, have hypothesized that conscription’s
decline in Western European countries results primarily from the recent absence of a
military threat and the newfound collective security available through the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). 16 Lu contributes to the abolishment discussion with a rare
Asian example, Taiwan, which also happens to be the latest example. Lu explains
Taiwan’s decision to end conscription based on political considerations, in particular a
marked improvement in bilateral relations with the People’s Republic of China. 17 In their
10 United States abolished conscription after the Vietnam War, on the recommendations of the Gates
Commission.
11 Sheehan, “The Future of Conscription: Some Comparative Reflections,” 115
12 Agence France-Presse, “Sweden Ends Compulsory Military Service,” Defense News, 1 July 2010,
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20100701/DEFSECT04/7010303/Sweden-Ends-Compulsory-
Military-Service.
13 Alan Cowell, “The Draft Ends in Germany, but Questions of Identity Endure,” New York Times, 30
June 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/europe/01germany.html.
14 Nina Graeger and Halvard Leira, “Norwegian Strategic Culture After World War II: From a Local
to a Global Perspective,” Cooperation and Conflict 40, no. 1 (2005): 46–66, doi: 10.1177
/0010836705049733; Henning Sorensen, “Conscription in Scandinavia during the Last Quarter Century:
Developments and Arguments,” Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 2 (2000): 313–334, doi:
10.1177/0095327X0002600207.
15 Sarah Mishkin, “Taiwan Prepares for End of Conscription,” The Financial Times, 21 November
2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/489ed4c4-1eaa-11e2-bebc-00144feabdc0.html.
16 Burk, “The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Compulsory Military Service,” quotation in 56;
Magnus Petersson, “Defense Transformation and Legitimacy in Scandinavia After the Cold War:
Theoretical and Practical Implications,” Armed Forces & Society 37, no. 4 (2011): 701–24, doi: 10.1177
/0095327X10382216; Clive Archer and Øyvind Jҩger, The Security Policy Doctrines in the Nordic and
Baltic Countries: Stability and Change (Copenhagen: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1998), 449–63; Jan
Arveds Trapans, “The Baltic States: Defence and Geopolitics,” European Security 7, no. 3 (1998): 92–100,
doi: 10.1080/09662839808407374.
17 Lu Wenhao, “Evolving Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan’s New Military Service System”
(Master’s Thesis, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2009), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA517786.
5
analysis of Western countries, Haltiner and Burk offer further explanation, albeit with
differing perspectives, for the decline in the popularity of conscription.
Haltiner’s analysis of Western European countries concludes that “strategic and

military goal-bound factors . . . seem to be more important,” and identifies three reasons
that facilitate the abolition of conscription: joining a defense alliance, declining
susceptibility to a direct military threat, and participation actively in international
missions.18 Sheehan appears aligned with Haltiner’s argument that the military reason
was the dominant cause of conscription’s decline, including the exceptions described by
Haltiner. 19
Burk, however, finds that “the spheres of citizenship and military organization
overlap,” and political and social factors weigh more heavily than military considerations
on decisions to abolish conscription. In his comparative study of Britain, France, West
Germany, and the United States, Burk finds that the decision to conscript is heavily
affected by threats to national integration and the pressures of domestic elections and
political gains. 20 Vasquez offers an analysis that supports Burk’s argument, concurring
that “political and social factors together worked against not only conscription . . . but
also the possibility of selective service” in Britain. 21
Yet, despite the various explanations that support the decline of conscription,
several countries continue to retain conscription as a fundamental element of national
policy.
2. Conscription’s Continued Relevance
National defense can pose a challenge for countries with small populations due to
a lack of military manpower, especially when faced with larger neighbors endowed with
18 Karl W. Haltiner, “The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe,” Armed Forces &
Society 25, no. 7 (1998): 7–36, quotation in 33, doi: 10.1177/0095327X9802500102.
19 Sheehan, “The Future of Conscription: Some Comparative Reflections,” 112–21.
20 Burk, “The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Compulsory Military Service,” 45–59, quotation in
56.
21 Joseph Paul Vasquez III, “More than Meets the Eye: Domestic Politics and the End of British
Conscription,” Armed Forces & Society 37, no. 4 (2011):636–656, quotation in 651, doi: 10.1177
/0095327X10390460.
6
far greater populations and larger militaries. Singapore is no exception to this constraint
and, additionally, continues to face challenges to national cohesion because of its largely
immigrant population, cultural and racial diversity, and young history. It thus suffices to
hypothesize that this mix of factors forces Singapore to deal with these challenges
differently—it constantly assesses conscription’s effectiveness and regularly tweaks its
implementation to suit the increasingly educated and technologically savvy citizen-
military.
Several studies contribute to the understanding of the SAF and the Singapore
government’s conscription policies, including Lellenberg’s report on the citizen-army
concept in Singapore and other prominent conscription countries in the 1960s; 22 Andrew
Tan, 23 Felix Chang, 24 Tan See Seng and Alvin Chew, 25 Bernard Loo, 26 and Norman
Vasu and Bernard Loo’s insights into the early challenges of Singapore and the SAF’s
development; 27 Tan Tai Yong’s explanation of the “fusion” model civil-military relations
in Singapore; 28 and the most comprehensive assessment of the SAF by Huxley. 29 The
latest initiatives by the Singapore government, in particular the Strengthen National
22 Jon L. Lellenberg, Overview of the Citizen-Army Concept (California: Stanford Research Institute,
1972).
23 Andrew T. Tan, “Singapore’s Defence: Capabilities, Trends, and Implications,” Contemporary
Southeast Asia 21, no. 3 (December 1999): 451–474, http://sg.vlex.com/vid/singapore-defence-capabilities-
implications-52714844.
24 Felix K. Chang, “In Defense of Singapore,” Orbis 47, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 114–23,
http://www.fpri.org/orbis-archive/4701/chang.defensesingapore.pdf.
25 See Seng Tan and Alvin Chew, “Governing Singapore’s Security Sector: Problems, Prospects and
Paradox,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 30, no. 2 (August
2008): 241–263, http://130.102.44.246/journals/contemporary_southeast_asia_a_journal_of_international
_and_strategic_affairs/v030/30.2.tan.pdf.
26 Bernard Fook Weng Loo, “Maturing the Singapore Armed Forces: From Poisonous Shrimp to
Dolphin,” in Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, ed. Bridget Welsh and others
(Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2009), 352–375.
27 Norman Vasu and Bernard Loo, “National Security and Singapore: An Assessment,” in
Management of Success: Singapore Revisited, ed. Terence Chong (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2010), 462–485.
28 Tai Yong Tan, “Singapore: Civil-Military Fusion,” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining
Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2001), 276–293; Tai Yong Tan, “The Armed Forces and Politics in Singapore: The Persistence of
Civil-Military Fusion,” in The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and
Leadership, ed. Marcus Mietzner (New York: Routledge, 2011), 148–166.
29 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (NSW: Allen & Unwin,
2000).
7
Service effort, 30 and recent developments in Singapore society, have not yet been studied
and will be included in this study.
There exist extensive studies of civil-military relations issues, including military

professionalism and civilian control, 31 and democracies and the military, 32 including
analyses of these factors in countries that have abolished conscription. Loo, Cunha, and
Tan Tai Yong, however, have in recent years discussed these in the context of
Singapore; 33 according to Tan Tai Yong, the unique civil-military situation developed by
the founders of Singapore, in what he terms “civil-military fusion,” makes objective
civilian control “inapplicable in the Singapore case.” He explains that “Singapore does
not confront the classic civil-military dilemma” because “the defense of Singapore has
always been the collective responsibility of the entire nation, not just the SAF.” 34
This thesis will thus attempt to examine the SAF’s responses through the years to
explain how the Singapore government has effectively managed the implementation of
conscription. The evolution of the military, therefore, is what keeps conscription alive
and relevant in Singapore.
30 “Strengthen NS.”
31 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New
York, NY: Free Press, 1971); Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security
Environment (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001); Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants:
Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Massachusetts, 2003); Peter D. Feaver and
Erika Seeler, “Before and After Huntington: The Methodological Maturing of Civil-Military Studies,” in
American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era, eds. Suzanne C. Nielsen and
Don M. Snider (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 72–90.
32 Richard H. Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 4 (1977):
141–42, quotation in 141, https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v008/8.4kohn.html; Hans
Born, Marina Caparini and Karl Haltiner, “Models of Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: A Multi-
Country Study Comparing ‘Good Practices’ of Democratic Control,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper Series, no. 47 (2002), http://iskran.ru/cd_data/disk2/rr/011.pdf;
Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, Who Guards the Guardians: Democratic Civil-Military
Relations, eds. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: Texas University Press, 2006); Thomas
C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, eds. Thomas
C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013).
33 Loo, “Maturing the Singapore Armed Forces: From Poisonous Shrimp to Dolphin”; Derek Da
Cunha, “Sociological Aspects of the Singapore Armed Forces,” Armed Forces & Society 25, no. 3 (1999):
459–475, doi: 10.1177/0095327X9902500306; Tan, “The Armed Forces and Politics in Singapore: The
Persistence of Civil-Military Fusion.”
34 Tan, “The Armed Forces and Politics in Singapore: The Persistence of Civil-Military Fusion,” 149.
8
E. METHODS AND SOURCES
The present work comprises a comparative study of countries that have abolished
conscription to identify the reasons why Singapore has maintained conscription while
similarly situated countries have abandoned it. This analysis accounts for differences of
country and population size, ethnic diversity, geostrategic environment, military threat,
and economic prosperity.
Following the comparisons, the thesis investigates the Singapore government’s

evolution of the SAF in dealing with the challenges it faces. Data and information from
Singapore’s Department of Statistics, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, pieced together like a mosaic, demonstrate the development of Singapore’s
current conscription policy. In addition, the research also relates the military manpower
policy changes, in particular those of conscription and the reserve force, to the premise of
social integration and its criticality on national success.
Singapore’s domestic policies, its national events, and the regional security
landscape are also examined in relation to the social cohesion of the population. These
non-military factors support the hypothesis that the constant adaptability of the SAF and
conscription has allowed it to retain the relevance of conscription as both a military
manpower procurement method as well as a nation-building institution.
F. THESIS OVERVIEW
This thesis aims to explain why Singapore is an anomaly in the global trend away
from conscription towards all-volunteer forces.
Chapter II focuses on conscription. It reviews conscription and its popular uses as

a military and political tool of the state, and examines countries that have recently
abolished conscription and those that are retaining conscription, and their respective
reasons for the transition or retention.
Next, Chapter III explains the history of conscription in Singapore to provide a

background understanding of the importance of conscription in Singapore. The early
years of Singapore and the development of its military are presented, beginning with its
fragile independence and a virtually non-existent military at independence in 1965. Here,
9
Singapore’s initial military policies are examined to reveal the rationale behind these
decisions.
Chapter IV further explains the evolution of the military through the years and
other non-military policies that contributed to the retention of conscription in Singapore.
An assessment of the government’s adaptability to changing social conditions and
international pressures provides evidence that Singapore considers conscription a critical
institution and spares no effort to retain it as the bedrock of its survival and success.
Finally, the thesis concludes by comparing Singapore’s responses with countries

that have abolished conscription to show that although Singapore’s situations are
somewhat similar, Singapore’s approach to conscription is different because of its social
and geostrategic uniqueness. The study of the conscription-abolishing countries and the
fervor with which the Singapore government has sought to retain the relevance of
conscription will contribute to the understanding of Singapore’s continued adaptation of
conscription instead of transiting to an all-volunteer force.
10
II. CONSCRIPTION
Conscription has been widely used since the 18th century to fuel the military as
well as for national cohesion, but has been on the decline in recent decades with
examples aplenty since the end of the Cold War. This chapter will outline the reasons for
and against the use of conscription, and focus on the reasons that countries abolish or
retain it.
A. CONSCRIPTION REVIEW
Conscription, and more specifically in this discussion universal military service, is

a centuries-old practice that has been used for two fundamental reasons: supplying
military manpower and nation building. In the traditional military role, nations adopt
conscription to rapidly generate vast numbers of soldiers; this reason, however, has
steadily declined as a purpose of conscription since the end of the Cold War because the
reduction in global hostilities, and the inter-connected and inter-dependence of countries,
has made it virtually impossible for states to engage in war, with modern states requiring
militaries generally for the purpose of defense. The birth of the many Third World states
amid decolonization and nationalist movements at the end of World War II and the Cold
War created a need for a nation-building apparatus. Conscription was thus used with a
political objective of nationalism; an effective way to bond the population towards a
common cause, to counter internal challenges, and to homogenize and coalesce the
population. 35
1. Conscription as a Military Tactic
The first effective use of conscription as a military tactic—not as a means of last

resort, but as a matter of policy—was by Napoleon in France’s levée en masse at the end
of the 18th century. Conscription thus garnered popular adoption after its successful
35 Yael Hadass, “On the Causes of Military Conscription,” Social Science Research Network, Working
Paper Series (June 2004), doi: 10.2139/ssrn.564062; Stephen Pfaffenzeller, “Conscription and Democracy:
The Mythology of Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 36, no. 3 (2010): 481–504, doi:
10.1177/0095327X09351226; Henry Dietz, Jerrold Elkin, and Maurice Roumani, “The Military as a
Vehicle for Social Integration,” in Ethnicity, Integration, and the Military, eds. Henry Dietz, Jerrold Elkin,
and Maurice Roumani (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), 1–26.
11
implementation in the French Revolution. As summarized by Charles Tilly, a military
comprising “a state’s own citizen, commanded by members of its own ruling classes”
were often found to fight “better, more reliably, and more cheaply” when compared with
the earlier employment of mercenaries, which had the potential for “foot-dragging,
rebellion, and even rivalry for political power.” 36
This desire for quick mobilization of soldiers must be tempered with what Peter
D. Feaver terms the “civil-military problematique” requiring a delicate balance between
military power and military subordination to the civilian government. 37 In a democracy,
civilian control must be maintained to prevent this unwanted military usurpation.
According to Richard H. Kohn, civilian control is civilian leadership maintaining
superiority over military influence, “to make security subordinate to the larger purposes
of a nation,” to prevent unwanted military usurpation. 38 To increase civilian control over
the military, Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz offer professionalization of the
military as a way to solve the differences between the military and civilian worlds, yet
both differ on the approach toward professionalization: Huntington proposes to militarize
the military to maintain a distinct gap between the military and civilian worlds, 39 while
Morris Janowitz proposes to civilianize the military to close this civilian-military gap. 40
The theories of professionalism will not be discussed in depth but it is suffice to mention
a state’s military is more than the use of force, but also as a political tool of the state.
2. Conscription as a Political Tool
Although conscription has obvious military benefits and seen successes as a tactic
for mustering patriotic citizens for war, Eliot A. Cohen analyzes conscription as a
primarily political, not military, tool. He analyses comprehensively the relationship
between citizenship and soldiering, citing the use of conscription as a platform for nation
36 Charles Tilly, “How War Made States, and Vice Versa,” in Coercion, Capital, and European
States: AD 990–1992 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 83.
37 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999):
214, http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.211.
38 Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” 141–42, quotation in 141.
39 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 80–97.
40 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 422–35.
12
building with examples from France, Germany, Israel, and the United States.
Acknowledging the effectiveness of military service as “a rite of passage by which one
both learns and earns citizenship,” Cohen describes national service as a program “to
foster national unity by mixing together young men (and in some versions, women) from
all parts of the country.” 41 Additionally, in a country where religion, ethnicity, or
language is not homogenous, conscription ensures that the military is representative of
the population, 42 reinforcing Kohn’s caution that civil society may be threatened if the
proportion of military leaders is skewed towards certain demographic groups. 43
Another political advantage of conscription is the enhancement of civilian control

of the military. Cohen asserts that having the majority of the armed forces consist of
citizen-soldiers, “whose main identity is as citizens and not as soldiers, whose loyalty lies
with home and community,” allows the civilian government firm control over the
military. His warning seeks to prevent the possible misuse of a professional military for
selfish purposes or be manipulated as agents of despots, citing the terrifying examples of
Cromwell and King George III who used “professional soldiers to crush popular
liberties.” 44
Morris Janowitz adds to the military sociology discussion with his finding that
conscription is also used as a tool of the state to assimilate the less educated and lower
classes of society into the productive workforce. Through classes on national history and
loyalty to country, and the training of relevant civilian-applicable skills during the period
of military training, Janowitz opines that the otherwise deadweight segments of the
population would be given a chance to contribute to the state. 45 The military can thus be
a useful apparatus for enhancing the social, political, and economic standard of the state.
41 Eliot A. Cohen, “Military Service and Republican Ideology: Civic Obligations and the Citizen-
Soldier,” in Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service, eds. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985b), 122–28.
42 Ibid., 124; Eliot A. Cohen “Military Service and Republican Ideology: Liberalism and
Egalitarianism,” in Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service, eds. Robert J. Art and Robert
Jervis (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985c), 145–51.
43 Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” 146.
44 Cohen, Military Service and Republican Ideology: Civic Obligations and the Citizen-Soldier, 123–
24.
45 Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1964), 81–82.
13
3. The Case against Conscription
Despite the military and political advantages of conscription, there exist problems
with an entire population of males, or males and females, serving compulsory military
service in the modern era. Besides the obvious logistical complications, the
accompanying budgetary burden, and the argument of freedom curtailment by forcing
mandatory military service, there are technological challenges as well.
According to Tilly, our modern world’s advanced weaponry, including nuclear

technology, has continued the world’s “trend toward more frequent, deadlier wars,” 46
thus the personnel required to defend and fight these advanced wars must possess the
requisite technological know-how and professional expertise to engage in these battles.
The nature of civilian-soldiers—fundamentally civilians before soldiers, and time-limited
in service—makes new technology a burden on a conscript military. Huntington defines
“the modern officer corps a professional body,” 47 thus the military profession must
exhibit the three characteristics of a profession: a sense of corporateness, responsibility,
and expertise. Military professionalism would therefore enable a military to fulfil the
needs of modern warfare with substantial experience in the military trade to build
competence, be able to shoulder the heavy responsibility of destructive warfare, and the
requisite technical expertise to operate the sophisticated weaponry; this burden and heavy
responsibility should not be expected of conscripts who would not have sufficient length
of service to build the competence and acquire the necessary expertise for modern
warfare. 48
The decision to implement military service is indeed a complex challenge for any
democracy. As aptly summarized by Cohen in political science’s most prominent book
on conscription, Citizens and Soldiers, “the free man does not wish to become a soldier;
the democratic man abhors unequal burdens; the military man would like to ignore their
46 Tilly, “How War Made States, and Vice Versa,” 67.

47 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 7.
48 Ibid., 8–18.
14
claims, but cannot. It is the task of the statesman to reconcile the three, and to do so in a
way likely to last.” 49
B. A DYING CONCEPT
The United States, on the recommendation of the so-called Gates Commission of

1970, was among the early adopters of the all-volunteer force, a club that also included
the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Since the end of the Cold War, critics of
conscription have also argued in support of all-volunteer armed forces, with military,
economic, and political considerations oft cited. 50 Not long after in 1996, France, after
having used conscription for more than 200 years, announced the end of French
conscription, marking the beginning of the widespread decline in the popularity of
conscription at the turn of the century. This section will analyze three countries that had
once adopted conscription and their decisions to desist.
1. The United States
Although the founding fathers of the United States considered conscription in

conflict with personal freedoms, various forms of military service have been used over
the last century and a half. Also called the draft, military service was first implemented in
the United States during the American Civil War (1861–1865) out of necessity to supply
the manpower for both sides of the conflict, albeit not in the true sense of conscription;
draftees were allowed to provide a substitute or pay a fee in lieu of service, and less than
3 percent of the fighting force on either side consisted of draftees. After the Civil War,
military service was not used again for the next five decades—until World War I. In
1917, after the declaration of World War I, the Selective Draft Law was passed,
providing the primary source of manpower for the war effort. In 1940 the draft (officially
called the Selective Service System) was again implemented while World War II was still
being fought in Europe. There had initially been opposition to this latest initiative
because the United States was not yet involved in the war, but the attack on Pearl Harbor
49 Eliot A. Cohen, “Conclusion,” in Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service, eds.
Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985a), 188.
50 Poutvaara and Wagener, “Conscription: Economic Costs and Political Allure,” 6–15; Henderson,
“The Role of Economists in Ending the Draft,” 362–76; Harries-Jenkins, “From Conscription to Volunteer
Armies,” 11–16.
15
swung public opinion in support of the draft and resulted in the “first genuinely popular
system of conscription.” 51
Shortly after the World Wars, the draft was again revived in 1948 as a
contingency against Cold War emergencies. More significantly, this iteration of
conscription became the standard military recruitment system for the next two decades,
through the Korean and Vietnam Wars. While the Vietnam War was ongoing in
Southeast Asia in the late 1960s, domestic opposition to the United States’ war
participation was growing and the American public called for a review of the draft.
President Nixon thus ordered the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Force
(known also as the Gates Commission, named after its chairman Thomas S. Gates) to
review the military manpower options. 52
The members of the Gates Commission unanimously recommended in its 1970

report that “the nation’s interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force,
supported by an effective standby draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and
conscripts.” 53 Motivated primarily by domestic pressure against the draft during the
Vietnam War, the decision to abandon the draft in June 1973 was based on
comprehensive considerations of “social and demographic factors, military effectiveness,
economic efficiency, the role of women in the military, the role of and prospects for
reserve forces, and other related concerns.” 54
Transitioning to an all-volunteer force was initially challenging and the United

States almost suffered a manpower crisis in its first years of implementation due to a
combination of a healthy economy and the military’s originally inflexible manpower
policies. Manpower policy tweaks and the allocation of a larger budget to military
salaries eventually stemmed the early problems and resolved the issues of high attrition,
which alleviated the downstream effects of higher recruitment costs and decreased
51 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (London: Collier-
Macmillion, 1970), 162.
52 Ibid., 156–164.
53 Ibid., “Letter of Transmittal by Chairman,” Thomas S. Gates.
54 Cindy Williams, “From Conscripts to Volunteers,” Naval War College Review 58, no. 1 (2005): 36,
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/d2cdcd4c-332e-432e-b6b7-2c6502768910/From-Conscripts-to-
Volunteers--NATO-s-Transitions-.aspx.
16
experience. A plethora of changes answered the teething problems of transition in its
early years, enabling the United States all-volunteer force to mature and, as the world’s
premier armed force today, is a validation of its decision to adopt the all-volunteer force
system. 55
Andrew Bacevich, however, disagrees in his latest book with the all-volunteer
system because the country’s decision-makers now have no disincentives to wage war.
He argues that a gap exists between the military and its citizens, because “as Americans
forfeit personal direct responsibility for contributing to the country’s defense—
abandoning the tradition of the citizen soldier—then the state gains ownership of the
military,” and that the “greatest defect [of an all-volunteer force] is this disengagement of
the people from the military.” 56 Bacevich recalls that the conscription system in World
War II raised a military that mirrored the core democratic values of American society that
resulted in an inclusive decision-making, and emphasizes that the close citizen-military
relationship forged with conscription was lost with the decision to abolish the draft
during the Vietnam War. To close this gap and once again humanize the military’s
involvement in conflict, he recommends the reinstatement of a form of national service—
where citizens contribute a number of years of service to the country—to harmonize
American citizens with their military. 57 Although the United States military has grown
into an undisputed global superpower with its professional and technologically advanced
military, Bacevich’s argument throws light back onto the oft neglected social benefits of
the citizen-soldier concept.
2. Germany
In the most recent example of the abolition of conscription, Germany saw its last
batch of conscripts complete their service on 31 June 2011, a turn of events that might
have startled the officers and policymakers who implemented mandatory military service
55 John T. Warner and Beth J. Asch, “The Record and Prospects of the all-Volunteer Military in the
United States,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, no. 2 (2001): 169–192, http://www.jstor.org/stable
/2696597.
56 Robin Young, “Here & Now Radio Interview with Andrew Bacevich.”
57 Andrew J. Bacevich, Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed their Soldiers and their Country
(New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2013), 17–22, 136–37, and 188–96.
17
as a core aspect of the Bundeswehr when it was founded in 1955. This iteration of
compulsory military service in Germany was a result of its militaristic experiences in and
between the World Wars. It served to integrate the armed forces into civilian society;
universal conscription was used to increase civilian-military interaction and hence
enhance civilian control 58—including such democratic values as respect for human
rights. In 2010, however, Germany’s Ministry of Defense conducted a defense reform
and, in line with the changing times and missions and in a decision that “would have been
unthinkable even 20 years ago,” suspended conscription.
According to Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay, the main reason for this
decision is the realignment of German national interest with its political objectives,
hastened by years of severe defense budgetary limitations. 59 That is, for domestic-
political reasons, as well as practical considerations, Germany’s increased role in
international combat operations—for example in Afghanistan or Libya—had no room for
draftees because conscripts could not be deployed unless they specifically volunteered. 60
The maturing of the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), and the European Union (EU) has afforded Germany considerable safety within
these collective, or at least multilateral, political and security mechanisms. More
specifically, in return for Germany’s active involvement in multinational cooperation and
integration to European and international peace efforts, including participation in UN,
NATO, and EU missions from the early 1990s, Germany is protected under the umbrella
of the UN’s collective security, NATO’s collective defense, and EU’s assurance of
solidarity among its member states.
Abenheim and Halladay find also that although compulsory service has been the
foundation of its military since the 1950s, it has been constantly “unpopular in Germany
as an irrelevant burden on those young people who must serve.” Over the years, the
gradual reduction of conscription commitments, eventually to a final duration of six
58 Pfaffenzeller, “Conscription and Democracy: The Mythology of Civil-Military Relations,” 485–86.

59 Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay, “Stability in Flux: Policy, Strategy, and Institutions in
Germany,” in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, eds. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina
Cristiana Matei (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 304–5, quotation in 305.
60 Ibid., 311.
18
months, meant that draftees rarely learned anything of enduring value in or to the
military, which further diminished conscription in German eyes. 61 Compounding the
unpopularity of conscription, the alternative “civil” service option drew many would-be
conscripts away from military service—while the service requirement continued to apply
only to young men.
Germany decided to suspend conscription to realign with the changing strategic

landscape, in particular the result of the UN, NATO, and EU’s evolution into credible
alliances and institutions for conflict resolution. Despite the reduction in manpower due
to the loss of conscripts, the significantly smaller military continues to allow Germany to
fulfil its contemporary political and strategic objectives while continuing to maintain its
sovereignty through enmeshment in international and regional security institutions.
3. Taiwan
Conscription was implemented in Taiwan after the split from mainland China at
the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. On a small island with a small population,
conscription was “a perfect military service system” for a Taiwan that was faced with “an
overwhelming adversary,” the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which was “always a
threat.” For the leaders of Taiwan, therefore, compulsory military service was a natural
choice to build its military in defense of its mainland foe. 62
A seemingly worrying situation for Taiwan is the PRC military’s clear progress
since the turn of the century, including its substantial investment and rapid deployment of
advanced aircraft technology, power projection naval platforms, and state-of-the-art
weapons capabilities. 63 Taiwan’s defense against the PRC must then surely be considered
an intimidating undertaking, especially in the face of the ever-growing potential for
61 Abenheim and Halladay, “Stability in Flux: Policy, Strategy, and Institutions in Germany,” 305–11,
quotation in 311.
62 Wenhao, “Evolving Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan’s New Military Service System,” 7–8,
quotations on 7.
63 “Chapter Six: Asia,” The Military Balance (2013a): 205–16, doi: 10.1080/04597222.2013.757002.
19
overwhelming force from across the Taiwan Strait. 64 In spite of this evident military
threat, however, Taiwan in 2008 decided to transition to an all-volunteer force after
almost six decades of conscription, with the aim of completing the transition by end-
2014. When considered against the backdrop of the decisions of the United States,
Germany, and other nations that have similarly abolished conscription—where a
reduction or absence of threat triggered their decisions to reduce their military
manpower—Taiwan’s decision bucks the trend and is made in the face of a threat that
continues to grow unabated.
According to Lu Wenhao, three factors weighed heavily on the decision to

abandon conscription: a declining population of youth to supply its conscript military, an
opportunistic window during which cross-strait relations are at its most peaceful, and
political pressures against compulsory military service. The first factor, a declining
population that reduces the number of able soldiers to fill the positions required in a mass
army, is a compelling argument for the military to transition to an all-volunteer force.
Although government policies may eventually inspire population growth, a population
decline would take years, if not decades, to reverse and a military would nonetheless
prudently prepare for the future with the current statistical trend. 65
Second, recent cooling of PRC-Taiwan relations has given Taiwan President Ma

Ying-jeou a window of opportunity to execute the drastic manpower transition. Upon
taking office in 2008, Ma reiterated the PRC-Taiwan “1992 Consensus” to maintain a
“one China, respective interpretations” status quo on both sides of the Taiwan Strait,
presuming peace between the PRC and Taiwan. 66 This mutually beneficial relationship
has produced calm in the cross-strait security landscape and allowed Taiwan’s military to
64 Andrew N. D. Yang, “Taiwan’s Defense Preparation Against the Chinese Military Threat,” in
Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security, eds. Michael D. Swaine, Andrew N. D.
Yang and Evan S. Medeiros (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 265–
284.
65 Wenhao, “Evolving Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan’s New Military Service System,” 5–10.
66 Ma Ying-jeou, “Full Text of President Ma’s Inaugural Address,” The China Post, 21 May 2008,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2008/05/21/157332/p1/Full-text.htm.
20
implement the complex transition to an all-volunteer force, planned to be completed over
five years commencing in 2008 and completed by 1 January 2015. 67
Third, reductions in the length of compulsory military service, from the original
three years to the most recent reduction in 2008 to one year of service, has resulted in
questions over the utility of conscripts with only 12 months of training. Since the
democratization of Taiwan in the 1990s, the decisions to reduce the length of service
were thought to be politically motivated—in large part because parents of conscripts
frowned upon the national obligation that would interrupt their child’s useful economic
contributions—and these successive reductions have ironically raised questions about the
competence of an inadequately-trained mass army against a professional and far larger
adversary. 68 The political inclination, therefore, would be to abolish conscription
altogether and adopt an all-volunteer force to eliminate doubts over competence, as well
as alleviate parents’ worry of an interference to their children’s way of life. To compound
the political pressure on military manpower reforms, the recent death of a conscript in
2013 resulting from illegal and excessive punishment for his minor infringement of rules,
sparked public outrage and cast doubt over the integrity of, and honor in volunteering in,
the Taiwanese military. 69
Using the U.S. military’s transition from the draft to an all-volunteer force as an
example, Stanley A. Horowitz in 2009 outlined the potential challenges in Taiwan’s
demographic environment and proposed ways to manage the demand and supply
challenges—accurate predictions of the present situation that has resulted in the
postponement of full transition. He examined U.S. recruitment experiences in the 1990s
and the mid-2000s, and drew the lesson that despite recruitment being “inherently
cyclical,” careful management of personnel compensation could be used to maintain the
necessary recruitment. He tackled demand issues by recommending the profuse use of
civilian manpower where possible to reduce the demand on uniformed personnel and the
appropriate rewarding and incentivizing of soldiers to increase retention rates. Horowitz
67 Wenhao, “Evolving Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan’s New Military Service System,” 10.
68 Ibid., 8–9.
69 “Taiwan’s Army: Blooded,” The Economist 408, no. 8848 (10 August 2013): 34.
21
also proffered supply side solutions, including an increase in pay for new recruits,
increasing the resources for advertising and recruiting, and maximizing recruitment
during the cyclical economic downturns. 70
In spite of the military’s transition nearing the end of its planned timeline, the
Taiwan military today has not achieved the envisaged level of volunteer recruitment. It
has only achieved 30 percent of its recruitment target at the end of 2013, thus continues
to accept and rely on conscripts to staff its military positions. The poor recruitment has
led the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to extend the transition by two years,
postponing the completion to 2017, with proposals to reconsider recruitment and
manpower policies to further attract volunteers. 71 Although there are many examples of
successful transitions from which to learn from, Taiwan is experiencing early
implementation problems and, similar to the United States experience that took almost a
decade of fine-tuning and understanding of manpower policy dynamics to successfully
transition, could overcome these challenges in time with the right mix of policies. The
wisdom of a transition, however, will only be revealed by historians scribing the history
of Taiwan decades into the future.
C. CONTINUING RELEVANCE
Although many countries have transitioned from conscription to all-volunteer

forces, compulsory military service continues to be an important institution in several
countries in the modern world. A common reason for retaining conscription is a small
country and small population facing a real and imminent threat from neighbors, yet there
are also countries that retain conscription despite not having any lurking danger. This
section will analyze three countries and their reasons for continuing conscription.
70 Stanley A. Horowitz, “Implementing an all-Volunteer Force in Taiwan,” Institute for Defense

Analyses (2009), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509059.
71 Shang-su Wu, “Taiwan’s all-Volunteer Military,” The Diplomat, 25 December 2013,
http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/taiwans-all-volunteer-military.
22
1. Switzerland
George J. Stein notes of Switzerland: “A common and oft repeated observation is

that ‘Switzerland does not have an army, Switzerland is an army.’” 72 This perception was
originally realized because of Switzerland’s geostrategic vulnerability—a small land area,
a small population, and surrounded by larger, powerful, and more populated neighbors,
Switzerland was extremely susceptible to any major European conflict. This small
European country therefore relied on conscription to amass a credible fighting force to
fulfil its goal of “dissuasion,” Switzerland’s version of deterrence as a national security
policy; the idea that any attack would be exceedingly costly and any resulting spoils
would not be worth the aggressive endeavor. One convincing aspect of Swiss dissuasion
is the military’s remarkable ability to mobilize a fighting force of more than half a
million soldiers within 48 hours. This state of readiness is made possible by an initial
short but intensive 17 weeks of individualized military training, followed by up to 45
years in three reservist phases requiring a total of 13 refresher courses. This well-oiled
system of utilizing reserves allows the military to rely on a small regular force for
training and essential daily air operations, yet be able to rely on the quick summoning of
a substantial and formidable deterrence against any would-be aggressor in times of war. 73
Switzerland’s foreign policy, emphasizing neutrality, contributes significantly to

its overall defense strategy. By being an active and useful member of the international
community, Switzerland pitches itself as a neutral and responsible mediator that abides
by international law. Switzerland also participates in international efforts to enhance
Third World progress through funding and development expertise, thereby promoting its
“own national interest by being recognized, in an effective way, as a state whose
neutrality it is in the interests of others to respect.” Notwithstanding the intimidating
headcount of a mobilized Swiss army and its international political measures, Switzerland
also utilizes several domestic policies to enhance deterrence. 74
72 George J. Stein, “Total Defense: A Comparative Overview of the Security Policies of Switzerland
and Austria,” Defense Analysis 6, no. 1 (1990): 17, doi: 10.1080/07430179008405428.
73 Lellenberg, Overview of the Citizen-Army Concept, 15–18; Stein, “Total Defense: A Comparative
Overview of the Security Policies of Switzerland and Austria,” 21.
74 Stein, “Total Defense: A Comparative Overview of the Security Policies of Switzerland and
Austria,” 20–21.
23
Known as comprehensive defense, or General Defense, “the coordination of
political, military, economic and psychological factors to produce an effective
‘deterrent’” 75 includes the maintenance of sufficient bomb shelters for the vast majority
of its population, diversity in imports to prevent the risk of being blockaded or sanctioned
into submission, and the comprehensive education and awareness programs to reduce the
risk of educated citizens being subverted or psychologically attacked. Switzerland’s
domestic measures include heavy investment in reliable civil defense processes and every
effort to be transparent with their policies to offer its citizens a confidence that they are
well protected. This assurance is felt most notably through its public and private bomb
shelters that can accommodate up to 90 percent of the population against nuclear fallout
and blast protection. The protection of its people, key national assets, and a protected
headquarters from which to function during war also prevents possible aggressors from
considering blackmail. 76
The successful implementation of dissuasion together with its well-known policy

of armed neutrality has resulted in a country that has successfully, and remarkably,
avoided conflict since the late 1700s. Switzerland has managed to normalize military
service as part of the Swiss lifestyle and continues to implement it with a “near 100
percent conscription ratio” 77 while continuing to receive overwhelming popular
support. 78 One of few unique examples to use conscription despite there being no
immediate threat, Switzerland’s ability to avoid conflict is testament to its robust defense
policy, including compulsory military service and the use of Total Defense. Although
Switzerland continues to use conscription to back up its dissuasion message, the lack of
aggressors and the benign regional security environment may force it to reconsider
conscription.
75 Lellenberg, Overview of the Citizen-Army Concept, 19.

76 Ibid., 15–20.
77 Haltiner, “The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe,” 17.
78 “Volksinitiative ‘Für Eine Glaubwürdige Sicherheitspolitik Und Eine Schweiz Ohne Armee,”
Government of Switzerland, 2 December 2001, http://www.admin.ch/ch/d//pore/va/20011202/det482.html.
24
2. South Korea
With the annexation by the Japanese in 1910 and sufferance in the Korean War in
1950–1953, South Korea was anxious for military security. Although introduced in the
Military Service Law in 1948, conscription was only fully implemented in 1957 to build
South Korea’s massive military. Under the requirements of South Korean conscription,
all males are required to serve a period of 26 months, followed by eight years of annual
refresher training in the reserves. After two coups and three and a half decades of military
dictatorship, a booming economy, globalization, and the period of relative calm towards
the end of the Cold War led South Koreans to favor “Western rather than Confucian
views of life” that led to South Korea’s democratization. 79
Even though South Korea had built up a significant and credible military, it faced
four challenges to its conscription system as it approached the turn of the century. Firstly,
the growth of the South Korean economy led to a growth in its population, causing an
over population of conscripts. The military implemented a partial conscription system to
deal with this overflow, but this created conscription inequality and resulted in
unhappiness in the population. Second, the end of the Cold War resulted in increased
discussions between South and North Korea, signifying a warming of relations, possible
reconciliation, and a reduced reliance on the military. Third, the shift in U.S. military
posture at the end of the Cold War meant a modification of the U.S.-South Korea security
arrangement and the subsequent reorganizing of the South Korean military to gradually
take greater control, beginning with the returning of peacetime Operational Control of
South Korean forces to South Korea. Finally, the international trend towards a global
peace following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 raises South Korean
expectations of a new security situation that would rely on economic cooperation,
reducing the need for the large military. 80
79 Chae Ha Pak, “ROK Defense Manpower Policy: Problems and Perspectives,” The Korean Journal
of Defense Analysis 5, no. 2 (1993): 52–57, quotation in 56, doi: 10.1080/10163279309464519; Seungsook
Moon, “Trouble with Conscription, Entertaining Soldiers: Popular Culture and the Politics of Militarized
Masculinity in South Korea,” Men and Masculinities 8, no. 64 (2005): 69, doi: 10.1177
/1097184X04268800.
80 Pak, “ROK Defense Manpower Policy: Problems and Perspectives,” 57–59.
25
These four challenges, together with international and domestic developments that
hint at a prolonged global peace, have motivated South Korea’s Ministry of Defense to
submit the draft Defense Reform Basic Law in 2005 that specified a transformation of its
military. This plan, titled Defense Reform Plan (DRP) 2020, aims to enhance the
military’s capabilities and address its manpower issues in consideration of the economic,
social, and political environment of the 21st century, including the reduction in
manpower from 681,000 to 500,000 by 2020. 81
Most significantly for South Korea’s security is its alliance with the United States.
Admittedly, growing tensions have arisen from the United States’ close relationship with
South Korea—including creeping involvement in South Korea’s domestic politics, the
United States’ bilateral inclination in North Korea policy that may conflict with South
Korean interests, crimes committed by U.S. military personnel causing complications in
the alliance, and South Korea’s growing confidence and desire for “greater respect from
Washington”—however, “the trajectory of bilateral ties appears generally promising over
the long-run.” 82 This alliance has reinforced South Korean security for more than half a
century and looks set to continue into at least the near future. In spite of the security
provided by the alliance with the United States, South Korea continues to retain
conscription and does not appear ready to reduce its reliance on conscription before 2020.
In 2007, Jung Woo Yim evaluated the feasibility of transitioning the South
Korean military to an all-volunteer force and concluded that conscription should be
maintained in the near future. His recommendations were based on economic limitations
due to its presently large size, the uncertainty in its geopolitical situation, and the inherent
threat from North Korea. Although he concludes the short to mid-term preservation of
conscription, Yim recommends that South Korea consider a longer-term phased transition
81 Fred L. Huh, Azimuth Check: An Analysis of Military Transformation in the Republic of Korea—Is
it Sufficient? (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army
Command and General Staff College, 2009), 13–14, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection
/p4013coll3/id/2542.
82 Weston S. Konishi and Mark E. Manyin, “South Korea: Its Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
Outlook,” United States Congressional Research Service (30 September 2009), 14–16, quotations in 14 and
16, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=32756.
26
to an all-volunteer force because of growing negative sentiments towards conscription in
a modernizing society and the decreasing birth rate. 83
Fred L. Huh examined the DRP 2020 in 2009 and similarly concluded that
conscription will be retained. His assessment was predominantly based on the
“unpredictable security threat from North Korea,” and the “absolute necessity” to
maintain a large number of personnel for stability operations in a post-North Korea
scenario, a number that would be far larger than economically viable with an all-
volunteer force. 84
3. Israel
Surrounded by significantly larger and traditionally antagonistic enemies, Israel

has been in constant conflict since its creation in 1947. The Israel Defense Force (IDF)
options are limited by its scarce land and small population, which offers no strategic
depth and necessary reaction time for military buildup and prevents the employment of a
sufficiently-sized standing army without suffering from the economic tradeoff. It thus
implements conscription to supply the much-needed manpower for its military because in
its geostrategic environment with an ever-present and deadly danger, “Israel’s hope for
victory in war rests largely in the ability to respond rapidly to threats.” 85
In its geopolitical predicament of constant and imminent threat, the imperative for
military dominance in all state affairs naturally results in Israel becoming a garrison state,
where the state functions primarily for its need for military security. Military policy is of
utmost importance to state survival and affects all walks of life. All males serve three
years of compulsory military service and, because of the acute military manpower
shortage, women are also conscripted—about 50 percent of females are required to serve
two years in all units of the army, and especially noncombat roles. 86
83 Woo Yim Jung, “Feasibility of Implementing an all-Volunteer Force for the ROK Armed Forces”
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/795220353.
84 Huh, Azimuth Check: An Analysis of Military Transformation in the Republic of Korea—Is it
Sufficient?, 61.
85 Lellenberg, Overview of the Citizen-Army Concept, 15–18, and 27.
86 Ibid., 23–29, quotation in 27.
27
In addition to its military function, conscription also plays an equally important
role in Israeli nation-building. Conscription is used “as a mechanism for integrating,
socializing, and melting together the divergent cultural backgrounds of immigrants to
Israel” 87 because a half of the population is comprised of immigrants from over seventy
countries with such diverse fundamental differences in religion, politics, and language.
The IDF also contributes significantly to education and the economy: compulsory service
provides many opportunities to educate new inductees who are new to the Hebrew
language and Jewish culture, the army’s large research and development facilities
encourage the development of state of the art technology that are eventually produced in
the military production lines for both military and civilian use, including a significant
portion of which is exported to foreign markets. 88
With the end of the Cold War, an improving international security environment,
its modernizing domestic situation, and a close security relationship with the United
States, 89 however, Israel has tweaked its military policies to keep up with the times.
According to Stuart A. Cohen, the IDF has reduced the frequency and age limit of its
reserves, relaxed exemption requirements for females, and reorganized its manpower
structure in response to the changing demography, economic progress, technology
advancement, and security relations with its neighbors and allies. He opines that although
domestic and international developments have presented new challenges that have led to
these changes, Israel has decided to adapt instead of abolish conscription because, in its
inherent strategic precariousness, it ultimately requires the numbers to compensate for its
lack of strategic depth. 90
It is clear, therefore, that the function of conscription in Israel is for fundamental

military defense, as well as an “important vehicle for social integration, economic and
87 Ayad Al-Qazzaz, “Army and Society in Israel,” The Pacific Sociological Review 16, no. 2 (1973),
158–62, quotation in 158.
88 Ibid., 158–63.
89 “U.S. Relations with Israel,” Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Government of
the United States (28 November 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3581.htm.
90 Stuart A. Cohen, “The Israel Defense Forces (IDF): From a ‘People’s Army’ to a ‘Professional
Military’ – Causes and Implications,” Armed Forces & Society 21, no. 2 (1995), 237–254.
28
social modernization and, above all, nation-building.” 91 The pervasiveness of the IDF,
which encompasses more than three quarters of the population and is a constant presence
in every household, is fittingly summarized by Al-Qazzaz: “[O]ne can say without too
much exaggeration that the Israeli army is the Israeli society and the Israeli society is the
Israeli army.” 92 The IDF is unequivocally the lifeblood of Israel and, considering the
critically of the military purpose and social effects of conscription, it would be impossible
for Israel to abandon compulsory military service.
91 Al-Qazzaz, “Army and Society in Israel,” 162–63.

92 Ibid., 144.
29
30
III. NATIONAL SERVICE FOR SINGAPORE
Singapore, a small island located at the Southern-most tip of the Malay Peninsula
in Southeast Asia, was once a trading colony and major naval base of the British Empire
for much of the 19th century up to the end of World War II. It had no military of its own,
with security provided for by its British colonial rulers and augmented by Australia,
Malaya, and New Zealand. The 1967 economic collapse, however, forced Britain to
reconsider its widespread deployment of overseas forces—Britain decided to decrease
their military emphasis east of the Suez and withdraw their military forces from Malaysia
and Singapore. 93 Singapore in 1967 had only an army of a few hundred soldiers
consisting of mainly Malaysian citizens, a navy with two hand-me-down boats from
Britain, no air force of its own, and a significant reliance on British bases and workers for
20 percent of GNP—Britain’s decision to withdraw thus necessitated Singapore’s
exigency to fill the impending gap created by the withdrawal of the British military. 94
A. ORIGINS OF NATIONAL SERVICE
A tiny island nation with a majority Chinese population, surrounded by larger and
more populous Malay neighbors, Singapore suffered from a dearth of natural resources
and was in its early years dependent on international trade and heavily reliant on
Malaysia for water. Moreover, Singapore’s relations with Malaysia in the early 1960s
were fraught with Malaysian tempest and animosity because of political differences, and
Singapore felt acutely the lack of a military. On 9 August 1965, the day of separation
from Malaysia—the day of Singapore’s independence—Singapore’s first Prime Minister,
Lee Kuan Yew, believed that Malaysian leaders “thought they [Malaysia] could station
troops in Singapore, squat on us and if necessary close the Causeway and cut off our
water supply.” 95
93 Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968 (London: Oxford University Press,
for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1973), 325.
94 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965–2000 (New York: Harper
Collins Publications, 2000), 60–62 and 69–70; Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 9–12.
95 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Editions,
1998), 648–664, quotation in 663.
31
Singapore’s geostrategic environment and heavy dependence on external trade
also exacerbated its seemingly diminutive position. To Lee, this vulnerability was the
“inescapable, permanent condition of Singapore as an independent republic” and even
when enjoying neighborly relations “at their fraternal best . . . tiny yet tenacious
Singapore was seen as the ‘interloper’ of the region.” 96 The early sense of vulnerability
in the region was not confined to the region, but also Lee’s concern in the international
environment at that time. Acutely cognizant of the international “undisguised open
contempt . . . displayed for governments seen to live in a political day-dream marked by
anti-colonial rhetoric,” Lee and his new government “felt obliged to reach out well
beyond its immediate regional locale in order to demonstrate universal confirmation of its
independent status.” 97
The sense of vulnerability in Singapore was almost identical to Britain at the turn
of the 19th century. In Britain’s historic progress, “the vast rise in her population . . .
together with the industrialization . . . led to an enormous increase in the demand for
foodstuffs and raw materials . . . [with] rising prosperity accelerat[ing] this trend . . . [and
becoming] dependent as no other country was for its prosperity upon the import and
export of commodities [emphasis added].” 98 Lee, who had close ties to Britain, had the
astuteness and foresight to realize Singapore’s inherent vulnerability as an island nation,
analogous with Britain’s rise in the early 1800s, and sought to mitigate this vulnerability
by increasing Singapore’s international stature.
To further Singapore’s diplomatic significance and to weigh in on international

relations, Lee relied primarily on two Realist principles that guided Singapore’s foreign
policy: the first foundational consideration was that “as a small state, Singapore has no
illusions about the state of our region or the world,” which implied that self-sufficiency
was of paramount importance; and the second was for Singapore to “always maintain a
96 Fook Kwang Han et al., ed., Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore:
Straits Times Press, 2011), 17–20 and 26–28, quotations in 17.
97 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London: Routledge, 2000),
62.
98 Paul M. Kennedy, “Chapter 7: Mahan versus Mackinder (1859–97),” in The Rise and Fall of British
Naval Mastery (London: Ashfield Press, 1976), 200.
32
credible and deterrent military defence as the fundamental underpinning for an effective
foreign policy.” 99
When Britain announced in 1967, shortly after Singapore’s independence, that its
forces were to be withdrawn following its drawdown of commitments east of the Suez,
Singapore’s leaders knew that it needed to address two critical issues: rapid buildup of a
military to defend itself from external threats, and national integration for internal
stability.
B. MILITARY SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Although a former stronghold serving Britain’s strategic in the east, Singapore’s

military was not a priority for the British and thus did not equip Singapore with an
indigenous military—Singapore had no military at independence and found itself in
perilous need of a self-sufficient defense. Moreover, the fateful examples of Sri Lanka,
Lebanon, and Kuwait were vivid reminders to the Singaporean leadership of small state
vulnerabilities if national security were not taken seriously and if a nation did not have a
self-sufficient military. 100
1. A Serious Defender’s Challenge
Singapore’s small size, however, presented a serious defender’s challenge. As a

small island lacking in strategic depth, Singapore had no option to surrender territory
with the hope of subsequently recapturing it. The defense of Singapore, therefore,
necessitated an air force that would provide air defense and interdiction beyond the
island’s shores, a formidable task considering the requirement to create an air force from
nothing. Singapore was similarly susceptible to disruption to its maritime environment.
Land scarce and devoid of natural resources, and before the proliferation of affordable air
transport, sea trade was Singapore’s lifeline. Besides, Singapore was in a prime position
to capitalize on sea trade as it was situated at the confluence of shipping traffic from
Europe and the Middle East to the Orient through the Strait of Malacca. Mindful that
99 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, xix.

100 Tan, “The Armed Forces and Politics in Singapore: The Persistence of Civil-Military Fusion,”
151–52; Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, 56–67; Lee, From Third World to First, 26–28.
33
maritime trade denial and a blockade could potentially cripple maritime Singapore, the
navy’s capability was built up to protect Singapore’s maritime environment and ensure
Singapore’s trade routes remain open. 101
Singapore thus created its defense policy based on the tenets of diplomacy and
deterrence. Diplomacy to enable Singapore, in spite of its small size, to seek an equal
footing in the interconnectedness of an interdependent world; nevertheless, should
diplomacy fail, Singapore would possess the capability to defend itself. 102 Lee’s first
order of business was therefore to establish military self-sufficiency to defend its
sovereignty and mitigate its vulnerability. This challenging task of budding Singapore’s
defense was proffered to Lee’s close aide and political partner, the adroit Goh Keng
Swee, as Singapore’s first Minister in charge of the Ministry of Interior and Defence
(MID). 103
2. Conscription for National Defense
The most challenging task for Goh was to conjure the requisite manpower from
this small island nation with a population of only two million to create a credible military
before the exodus of the British—a critical task with a deadline of four years. According
to Lee, it was “important for people in and outside Singapore to know that despite our
small population, we could mobilise a large fighting force at short notice.” 104 At that
time, without yet a stable and growing economy, Lee explained that Singapore could not
afford a big army. 105
101 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 9–16 and 19–22; Lee, From Third World to First, 37–41;
Republic of Singapore Navy, Onwards and Upwards: Celebrating 40 Years of the Navy (Singapore: SNP
International, 2007), 32; Republic of Singapore Navy, “Mission Statement,” Singapore Ministry of
Defence, last updated 10 August 2010, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings
/navy/about_us/crest.html.
102 Defending Singapore in the 21st Century (Singapore: Singapore Ministry of Defence, 2000), 6–13,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/dam/publications/eBooks/More_eBooks/ds21.pdf.
103 Lee, From Third World to First, 22–23.
104 Ibid., 33.
105 “Lee Calls for a Territorial Army of 10,000 in Five Years,”The Straits Times, 1 November 1965,
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19651101-1.2.92.aspx.
34
In 1967 Defence Minister Goh thus proposed adopting the Israeli practice of
conscription that would allow “mobilizing the maximum number possible in the shortest
time possible.” 106 Singapore’s military would comprise a small regular force augmented
by a two-year compulsory military service to train and build up a large population of
reserves over time. After the two years of full-time conscript service, they would flow
into the reserves and undergo a refresher of 40 days annually until 40 years of age, or 50
for officers. According to Goh’s plan, Singapore by 1970 was to “have available on
immediate mobilization 45,000 well trained troops. This is a substantial force by any
standard. It should be adequate to protect Singapore against any foreseeable military
threat.” 107 This arrangement would provide for a military that could be called upon in
wartime to provide a large fighting force without having to spend excessively on
burdensome manpower costs and draining Singapore of its economic workforce. 108
Singapore implemented compulsory military service, or “National Service” (NS), in
1967. 109
C. SOCIAL FRAGILITY
Besides external vulnerabilities, Singapore’s young independence was also

troubled by domestic instability as racial factions frequently incited communal
disturbances, including common occurrences of full-scale racial riots. Its ethnic mix also
stuck out like a sore thumb in its geostrategic environment: It was a small majority-
Chinese migrant country located in close proximity to its significantly larger, more
populated, and Malay-dominated neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia. Haunted by fresh
memories of deadly racial conflict and recent race-inspired disturbances—Indonesia’s
106 Lee, From Third World to First, 33.

107 Speech by Goh Keng Swee at the presentation of the Annual Budget Statement in Parliament on 3
December 1968, in Goh Keng Swee, “Chapter 1: Budget Day Speech,” in Wealth of East Asian Nations:
The Essays and Speeches of Goh Keng Swee, ed. Linda Low (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International,
2013a), 7.
109 The term “National Service” (NS) is used for conscription in Singapore, a person serving
conscription is called a “Full-time National Serviceman” (NSF), and a person on reservist after completing
NS is called an “Operationally Ready National Serviceman” (ORNS, or NSman). Singapore introduced
military service, or NS, with the “National Service (Amendment) Act” on 17 March 1967, two years after
independence.
35
Konfrontasi that ended in 1965, a racial riot between the Chinese and Malays in February
1966 over as slight an issue as misunderstanding of instructions that seemed to
discriminate against Malays in the military, and a deteriorating racial situation in
neighboring Malaysia in November 1967 that had the potential to spill over into
Singapore—Lee was cognizant that Singapore “had to deal with matters of race with the
utmost sensitivity.” 110
Singapore, an entrepôt nation with a largely immigrant population, 111 had just
been relinquished by its British colonial rulers and was experiencing the effects of
divisive colonialism, poverty, and disorder; one way to foster social cohesion was
through conscription. 112 According to Kwok Kian-Woon, it was Goh Keng Swee, one of
Singapore’s premier statesmen and undoubtedly Singapore’s social architect, who “built
up the foundations of the SAF almost from scratch” and purposed the SAF as an
institution for social integration, in addition to defense. 113
1. Effectiveness of Conscription
Several authors have studied the effect of the military for social integration—as a
“school for the nation.” Dietz, Elkin, and Roumani found that social integration through
the military is difficult, 114 and their 1991 finding is supported by Krebs who argues that
the use of the “military as potential nation builder is in large part misguided.” 115 Indeed,
the increasing number of countries abolishing conscription appears to support their
110 Global Security, “Konfrontasi (Confrontation),” GlobalSecurity.org, last updated 7 November

2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/konfrontasi.htm; Lee, From Third World to First,
23, 26–33, and 39–40, quotation in 29.
111 Singapore’s migrant population in the 1960s comprised Chinese (77 percent), who were mainly
traders and coolies; Malays (14.8 percent), who were mainly immigrants from nearby Indonesian islands
and Malaya, Indians (7 percent), who eventually settled after expatriation by British colonial rulers as
workers, soldiers, and convicts; and Eurasians and others (1.2 percent).
112 Lee, From Third World to First; Han et al., Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going.
113 Kian-Woon Kwok, “The Social Architect: Goh Keng Swee,” in Lee’s Lieutenants: Singapore’s
Old Guard, eds. Er Lan Peng and Kevin Tan (NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 45–69, quotation in 58.
114 Dietz, Elkin, and Roumani, “The Military as a Vehicle for Social Integration,” 1–26.
115 Ronald R. Krebs, “A School for the Nation? How Military Service does Not Build Nations, and
how it Might,” International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 120, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals
/international_security/v028/28.4krebs.pdf.
36
argument. Simonsen, however, asserts: “A national army could, if not build a new nation
on its own, then at least influence perceptions of what a nation might constitute.” 116 Nair,
Wilkinson, Cunha, Mutalib, and Walsh support Simonsen’s view, specifically from the
Singaporean context. 117
The reality was that racial divisions and social disunity in Singapore was rife, and
the fragile domestic situation was a growing problem that the government of Singapore
could not afford to let deteriorate. Lee understood the importance of a common identity
and the urgent need to bond the population during Singapore’s early years of
independence—the cultivation of this singular cohesive and distinctive Singaporean
identity was of paramount importance and they chose conscription as the conduit through
which to achieve this effect.
2. Conscription for National Integration
Besides the critical supply of necessary military headcount in this manpower-

scarce country, the government designed NS as a vehicle to fashion an identity unique to
Singapore. At the age of 18, every Singaporean male—regardless of language, race,
religion, or social background—was mandated to eat, live, and train together with his
peers through two years of his life as a National Serviceman. This requirement to live in
proximity with one another resulted in the inevitable understanding and eventual
acceptance of his different, yet identifiably Singaporean, fellow citizen. 118
Among other carefully planned national institutions to integrate the society, the
military was the cornerstone of the Singapore identity. In explaining how Singapore
overcame its vulnerabilities as a small nation, Cabinet Minister George Yeo listed the
116 Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Building ‘National’ Armies—Building Nations? Determinants of

Success for Postintervention Integration Efforts,” Armed Forces & Society 33, no. 4 (July 2007): 586, doi:
10.1177/0095327X06291347.
117 Elizabeth Nair, Conscription and Nation-Building in Singapore: A Psychological Analysis
(Singapore: National University of Singapore, 1994); Barry Wilkinson, “Social Engineering in Singapore,”
Journal of Contemporary Asia 18, no. 2 (1998): 165–88; Cunha, “Sociological Aspects of the Singapore
Armed Forces,” 459–475; Hussin Mutalib, “The Socio-Economic Dimension in Singapore’s Quest for
Security and Stability,” Pacific Affairs 75, no. 1 (2002): 39–56, http://www.pacificaffairs.ubc.ca/files/2011
/07/Volume75.pdf; Sean P. Walsh, “The Roar of the Lion City,” Armed Forces & Society 33, no. 2 (2007):
265–285, doi: 10.1177/0095327X06291854.
37
institution of NS as a “social distillery” that was essential in creating the “Singapore
essence,” and elaborating that “the key, therefore, is not economic growth or military
strength or technology, but our sense of identity as Singaporeans. Whatever may be our
race, language or religion, provided we have deep within us a sense of being
Singaporean, we will survive.” 119
The common experience shared by Singaporean males in their two years of NS

intermingling started to cultivate Singaporeans who were more tolerant of one another
and ultimately led a common Singaporean identity amongst a once diverse and divisive
population. 120 Recalling Singapore’s progress in the past few decades, Lee described NS
as having had a “profound impact on Singapore society” since its inception to the extent
that Singaporeans have viewed it as a “rite of passage” and a “way of life that has helped
to unify our people.” 121
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL SERVICE
At independence, Singapore was an infant state, extremely fragile, and largely

considered “another basket case within the underdeveloped Third World” 122—a small
and weak post-colonial nation; it possessed the requisite internal disunity, was situated in
a relatively rough neighborhood, but blessed yet cursed with a particular geostrategic
importance—fraught with security uncertainty and social fraction.
The absence of any semblance of a military and the prevalence of social unrest in
the turbulent years after independence were critical problems for Singapore’s founding
fathers. Notwithstanding its humble beginnings and the herculean effort required to solve
the significant challenges of external defense and domestic strife, Lee and his team
implemented conscription to stabilize and subsequently grow Singapore into the military
119 George Yeo, “Speech by George Yeo, Minister for Information & the Arts and Minister for
Health, at the Temasek Seminar,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 7 November 1996,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/sp/1996/07nov96_speech2.html.
120 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 251.
122 Ian Patrick Austin, Goh Keng Swee and Southeast Asian Governance (Singapore: Marshall
Cavendish Academic, 2004), 40.
38
and economic success it is today; this “basket case” had developed in less than half a
century from a simple fishing port to a thriving nation with a stature par excellence in
Southeast Asia.
It is therefore not an exaggeration to say that NS was the fundamental element in

the survival and growth of Singapore by fulfilling the two imperatives of this nascent
country: national defense and national cohesion.
Militarily, the SAF is widely respected and equipped with arguably the most
advanced technologies in Southeast Asia. Importantly, the SAF has not faced any new or
imminent traditional military threat in recent decades. 123 Economically, Singapore
experienced unprecedented growth and unsurpassed economic progress; it ranks among
the top economies of the world today. 124 This prosperity has afforded Singapore citizens
an increased standard of living, greater income, and better education—a society that is
not too dissimilar from the European examples.
In other words, Singapore has much in common with the countries that have
abandoned conscription but, unlike those countries, Singapore has maintained
conscription and appears highly unlikely to end conscription in the future. The following
chapter will examine how Singapore has managed the evolution of its military and
retained the relevance of conscription in Singapore.
123 “Chapter Six: Asia,” The Military Balance (2014): 275–76, doi: 10.1080/04597222.2014.871879.
124 The 2013 Index of Economic Freedom ranks Singapore #2 in the Asia Pacific region (behind
Hong Kong) and #1 in Southeast Asia with a GDP per capita of $59,711. “2013 Index of Economic
Freedom,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed 5 August 2013, http://www.heritage.org/index/country
/singapore.
39
40
IV. RETAINING NATIONAL SERVICE
At the onset, the idea of NS was not well received because of the colonial-era
distaste for the military and the social stigma towards soldiering. Culturally, the
predominantly Chinese population was prejudiced against serving in the military because,
as Lee noted, every Chinese parent was familiar with the Chinese proverb: “hao han bu
dang bing, hao tie bu da ding (a good lad does not become a soldier, good steel does not
become nails).” 125 The government consequently endeavored to reduce this apprehension
by incorporating the national cadet corps and national police cadet corps in schools, with
Goh working closely with the Ministry of Education to integrate the uniformed groups as
a major part of the schools’ extra curriculum activities. The aim was to alleviate
trepidation of the uniformed services by infusing the concept of uniformed service in
early education, and by encouraging the honor of servitude ubiquitous throughout
society. 126 This was to be the first of many examples in the history of changes to alleviate
the challenges of conscription in Singapore.
Although there has been a consistent emphasis on the military and a continual
review of government policies since the inception of NS, there were three major
developments in the last half century that provide an insight into the Singapore
government’s penchant for retaining the system of conscription: increasing prosperity, a
modernizing population, and a globalizing world.
A. INCREASING PROSPERITY
In addition to the critical need to initiate the creation of a respectable military,

Singapore’s founding fathers also understood the importance of Singapore’s economic
viability. Lee admitted that this was his “biggest headache,” that “extraordinary efforts”
had to be made to make Singaporeans a “tightly knit, rugged and adaptable people who
could do things better and cheaper than our neighbours, because they wanted to bypass us

126 Ibid., 33–34.
41
and render obsolete our role as the entrepôt and middleman for the trade of the
region.” 127
Lee set out to increase literacy, create jobs, and encourage economic growth by
attracting multinational companies and foreign investment to build Singapore’s economy.
Most importantly in this mix of developments, he decided that Singapore’s success would
be rooted in being a financial center of the region. Singapore created the necessary
supporting apparatuses, including fast and reliable telecommunications and transport
linkages, favorable policies for investment and finance, and a stable and incorrupt
government. The success of these policies led to unrivalled growth and positioned
Singapore as the principal hub in the region between 1968 and 1985. 128 Affirming this
explosion of success and newfound prosperity, Goh remarked in 1984 that “we
[Singaporeans] enjoy full employment, the overseas reserves are abundant, economic
growth has been strong even during the world recession of 1979–82, personal incomes
have been rising, and human skills are improving as we learn new technology.” 129
Singapore’s fresh wealth, however, brought about the jealousy of its neighbors,
which did not develop as rapidly. During the first two decades of independence,
Singapore had especially thorny bilateral relations with Malaysia. As Singapore’s
economic development accelerated, Malaysia sought to impede Singapore’s trade and
economic success. Arising from the anti-Singapore sentiment in Malaysia, “the
Malaysians had formed an ‘S’ committee to coordinate Malaysian policies on problems
with Singapore . . . to choke [Singapore’s] economic growth wherever their economy
gave them leverage over [Singapore’s].” 130 Examples of Malaysia’s anti-Singapore
efforts included the imposition of tariffs on imports through Singapore, accusations of
pollution and flooding in neighboring Johor state caused by Singapore’s developments,

128 Han et al., Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going, 137–43 and 147–60; Lee, From
Third World to First, 89–97.
129 Speech delivered by Goh Keng Swee on 25 September 1984, in Goh Keng Swee, “Chapter 12:
Old Guard, New Guard and Other Establishments,” in Wealth of East Asian Nations: The Essays and
Speeches of Goh Keng Swee, ed. Linda Low (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2013b), 153.
42
defamation against Singaporean leaders, and threats to close the Singapore-Malaysia rail
link in order to route trade through its newly opened Pasir Gudang Port and to shut off
the water supply. 131 This bullying and perennial susceptibility in a volatile environment
necessitated a defense force to deter possible escalated aggression.
1. A Competent SAF for National Defense
Having attained a measure of domestic stability after the end of Konfrontasi and
the successful inception of the MID under Goh’s leadership in the early years of
independence, Singapore split the MID into two entities: the Ministry of Home Affairs
and the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF). The establishment of MINDEF in 1970 allowed
Singapore to focus resources on building the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to defend
against external threats. 132 Lee again entrusted Goh Keng Swee with a heavy
responsibility, this time to lead the newly established MINDEF.
Despite being land scarce and devoid of natural resources, Singapore was well
positioned to capitalize on sea trade at the confluence of shipping traffic from Europe and
the Middle East to the Orient through the Strait of Malacca. At the same time, Goh was
also fully aware that sea trade was critical to Singapore’s economic survival—a strong
navy was thus necessary. Cognizant also of the lack of its strategic depth to defend
against any aggressor, an extended defense capability was to be acquired—an air force
with fighters and air defense would provide this extended ring of protection. Goh thus
started to develop the navy and air force to ensure Singapore’s Sea Lines of
Communications (SLOC) remain open and to protect against external threats. 133 As
Minister for Defence from 1970 to 1979, Goh oversaw the rapid development of the SAF
for basic national security, transforming the SAF into a regional heavyweight built on the
tenets of diplomacy and deterrence. 134

133 Tim Huxley and David Boey, “Singapore’s Army: Boosting Capabilities,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review 8, no. 4 (1996): 174–80, https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType
=News&ItemId=+++1676642&Pubabbrev=JIR; Republic of Singapore Navy, Onwards and Upwards, 32;
Republic of Singapore Navy, “Mission Statement.”
134 Tan, “Singapore’s Defence: Capabilities, Trends, and Implications,” 458.
43
Within a span of two decades, Singapore evolved from a hapless newly
independent island state with an almost negligible military to a nation with a credible
army, navy, and air force. NS was a significant enabler of this effort in the budding years
because the steady supply of conscripts filled out the new positions in the rapidly
growing SAF. The flow of full time conscripts to the reserves further added to the
population of reserves available for mobilization, enhancing the message of deterrence.
The increased security and assurance of peace and stability in turn built foreign investor
confidence, with a growing economy resulting in more funds for the development of the
SAF—an envious, yet worrisome, position in the context of jealous neighbors.
Faced with the lack of strategic depth, Singapore’s reliance on NS provided the
military manpower required for quick mobilization of forces to defend its small territory.
Equally important was the augmentation by conscripts to fulfil the growing personnel
demand for the buildup of a capable navy and air force, which further increased the
SAF’s sphere of protection to minimize Singapore’s strategic vulnerability. Against the
backdrop of a relatively peaceful period during Singapore’s development in the 1970s
and 1980s, Singapore’s decision to continue its military buildup without relent attests to
its unremitting appreciation of its inherent vulnerability in its volatile geostrategic
environment.
Obtaining military manpower and upgrading of military hardware to build

credence for this small military were relatively straightforward and fairly reliable through
conscription and acquisitions funded by a growing economy. Singapore made exceptional
military and economic progress since independence, and by the 1980s “most—
particularly those who have been through the formative experience of NS—[had been]
imbued with at least a modicum of patriotism and would almost certainly be willing to
defend their country and their families against clear external threats.” 135
In spite of its admirable military progress, Singapore similarly understood the

importance of a national approach to defense “premised on the belief that Singapore can
survive a war only if the entire society, and not just the military, is prepared and ready for

44
defense.” 136 Singapore thus solicited another important element--”societal heartware”—
for a more comprehensive security strategy to capitalize on its citizens’ sense of loyalty
to involve the entire population in defense. 137 Not wanting to reinvent the wheel in total
defense, Singapore thus sought a ready-made model to fulfil this whole-of-society
strategy—Switzerland’s remarkably successful system of comprehensive defense.
Adapting from the political, military, economic, and psychological aspects of the Swiss
model, Singapore implemented “Total Defence” (TD) concept in 1984. 138
2. “Total Defence” for National Identity
Comprising five pillars—Military, Civil, Economic, Social, and Psychological—

TD was designed to unite Singapore’s citizens in times of crisis and present a deterrent
larger than its military alone. Because Singapore’s conscription policy had always
allocated conscripts into both the homeland defense and military services, conscription
facilitated the implementation of TD with the permeation of at least one member who
was currently serving, or had previously served, in uniform in all of Singapore society.
This approach increased the deterrence against external threats as well as built resilience
internally to mitigate the effects of asymmetric threats. 139 An example of the
effectiveness of TD was displayed during the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) where “Singaporeans from all sectors of society . . . came together and worked
closely with health authorities to fight the deadly virus. . . . Without the cooperation and
active involvement of every Singaporean, it would probably have taken a longer time to
overcome the SARS epidemic.” 140
In addition to its contribution to deterrence, TD also plays an important social

function. Through encouraging every citizen to contribute to TD, the government fosters
136 Tan, “Singapore: Civil-Military Fusion,” 285.

137 Ron Matthews and Nellie Zhang Yan, “Small Country ‘Total Defence’: A Case Study of
Singapore,” Defence Studies 7, no. 3 (2007): 380–81, doi: 10.1080/14702430701559289.
138 Tan, “Singapore: Civil-Military Fusion,” 155–56.
139 K. U. Menon, “National Resilience: From Bouncing Back to Prevention,” Ethos (January 2005):
14–17.
140 Total Defence website, “What is Total Defence,” Government of Singapore, last updated 23 July
2010, http://www.totaldefence.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/totaldefence/about_td.html.
45
a sense of national belonging and identity as a stakeholder in the success of Singapore.
The objective of TD is to involve
. . . every Singaporean playing a part—the young and the old, men and
women, regardless of race or religion. Every small act counts—whether it
is being vigilant against suspicious activities, being tolerant and respecting
people of different ethnic backgrounds, taking care of our environment,
showing support for our servicemen on duty at home or abroad, or simply
looking out for each other. This is the essence of Total Defence—that
when we each play our part, we help to strengthen the nation as well as
ourselves. 141
TD and NS were thus the quintessence of social integration for Goh who “was
convinced that ‘nothing creates loyalty and national consciousness more thoroughly than
participation in defence . . . [and] nation-building aspects will be more significant if its
participation is spread over all levels of society.’” 142 This significance is evident in TD’s
endurance even after three decades and continues to the relevant in Singapore today, as
will be discussed in a subsequent section.
By the end of his tenure in 1979, Defence Minister Goh had stabilized the
implementation of NS, recruited a healthy stable of career soldiers, and transformed the
SAF from a rudimentary military focused on domestic challenges to one that was able to
punch above its weight. The SAF’s evolution and a national TD framework for whole-of-
society contribution to defense endowed Singapore in the late 1980s with the security of a
“‘poison shrimp,’ which meant simply that while the small country could not resist a
determined invader, the cost of any aggression would be made so high as to be an
effective deterrent.” 143
Within two decades of its implementation and the stabilization of conscription,

the public perception of NS had changed. In 1984, Goh spoke of his confidence in, and
Singaporeans’ acceptance of, the NS system:
141 Total Defence website.

142 Goh Keng Swee, quoted in Tan, “The Armed Forces and Politics in Singapore: The Persistence of
Civil-Military Fusion,” 157.
143 Tan, “Singapore’s Defence: Capabilities, Trends, and Implications,” 457–58.
46
National Service imposes not only a great sacrifice of time and money on
the young men called up. It is also unpleasant as military training in the
combat arms aims to push the soldier to the limits of human endurance.
Yet in every election since National Service was introduced, its abolition
has never been an election issue . . . the average Singapore citizen may not
be a towering intellect versed in the latest doctrine on military deterrence,
but deep in his heart, he knows the dangers that he faces are real and not
hypothetical. A kind of folk wisdom has grown on the need to defend
ourselves. 144
B. A MODERNIZING POPULATION
Singapore’s robust commitment to defense and uninterrupted military investment

has afforded the SAF the most technologically advanced and competent military in the
region going into the 21st century. 145 An example of this resolve was seen in the 1997
Asian Financial Crisis. Despite the crisis taking a heavy economic toll on Southeast Asia,
Singapore remained undeterred in military spending; starkly contrasting with the rest of
the region where military program suspensions or cancellations were widespread.
Singapore’s continued military investment and persistence in the system of NS
maintained the SAF’s ability to harness a large proportion of its population to defend its
turf and, in spite of its significantly smaller size and population, fully mobilize an armed
force that outnumbers other larger countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including those of
Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 146 This strong reputation and competence provided
Singapore a security assurance and a safe investment environment, boosting investor
confidence and maintaining Singapore’s economic growth through the turn of the
century.
The stability and peace enjoyed by Singapore going into the new millennium
contributed to a more educated and modern society; yet this affluence led to new
challenges that affected the system of NS. To identify and tackle these new challenges,
144 Speech delivered by Goh Keng Swee on 25 September 1984, in Goh, Chapter 12: Old Guard,
New Guard and Other Establishments, 152.
145 Chang, “In Defense of Singapore,” 108–9; Tan, “Singapore’s Defence: Capabilities, Trends, and
Implications,” 452; “East Asia and Australasia,” The Military Balance (1999): 171–209, doi: 10.1080
/04597229908460133: 173; Defending Singapore in the 21st Century, 51.
146 “Chapter Ten: Country Comparisons – Force Levels and Economics,” The Military Balance
(2013b): 549–50, doi: 10.1080/04597222.2013.757006.
47
MINDEF convened the Committee to Recognise the Contribution of Operationally Ready
National Servicemen to Total Defence (RECORD) in 1990. The aim of RECORD was to
recommend ways to “recognize the contribution of Singaporeans, especially ORNS, to
Total Defence; and enhance the contribution of ORNS, their families and employers to
Total Defence,” 147 to enable NS to remain relevant. Five iterations of RECORD
(RECORD I-V) convened between 1990 and 2009 produced a plethora of
recommendations, most of which were implemented by MINDEF through the years. 148
Notwithstanding the recommendations by RECORD, MINDEF also conducts its

own regular reviews to adapt to Singapore’s fast-paced society. Most pertinent of the
turn-of-the-century issues was a changing demography, presenting MINDEF with
different manpower and societal pressures that threatened to weaken the NS institution.
These included a tightening labor market, changes in population trends, and the changing
expectations of a modern society.
1. Revising Remuneration
Although not directly affecting conscripts per se, volunteer remuneration has a
significant impact on NS. Besides forming the core of the SAF’s navy and air force,
volunteers are, more importantly and with respect to NS, heavily involved in the training
and management of the large conscript and reservist army; volunteer competence and
morale thus directly affect the conscripts they interact with. MINDEF must therefore
constantly maintain its career competitiveness especially because “Singapore’s usual
economic buoyancy has made recruiting and retaining regulars an uphill struggle.” 149
While Singapore enjoyed economic success in the mid-1990s, before the Asian
Financial Crisis, MINDEF remained focused on maintaining the core of the SAF’s sharp
edge, its personnel. It conducted a wage review in 1996 to remain competitive to attract
and retain the necessary talent. Dr Tony Tan, then Minister for Defence, explained that
147 “RECORD Committee Reports,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, last updated 30 May 2013,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/strengthenNS/resources/record.html.
148 MINDEF highlights RECORD recommendations during the Government of Singapore’s annual
Committee of Supply debates.
149 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 108–18.
48
MINDEF “must continue to invest in our people and build a first-class armed force which
is the bedrock of our economic success.” 150 Working with a management consultant to
develop “The New Partnership,” MINDEF laid out the Savings & Employee Retirement
Plan (SAVER) scheme in 1998 to “encourage officers to serve a full 23-year career in the
SAF and provide financial security to transit into their second careers confidently.” 151
A decade later, in the mid-2000s, a more competitive labor market inspired

MINDEF to conduct another major remuneration review. Taking into consideration “new
market realities,” MINDEF in 2008 “made several refinements to strengthen [the SAF’s]
career proposition.” The changes to attract and retain quality personnel included
“additional mid-term retention bonuses” to encourage officers to remain until the end of
their military careers, adjusted wage structures “to be more responsive to market
conditions,” and opportunities for “part-time degree sponsorships for non-graduate
officers to upgrade themselves” and “degree sponsorships for WOSpecs [Warrant
Officers and Specialists].” 152
A sure sign of the fast-paced changes in contemporary Singapore and, more

importantly, MINDEF’s adaptability was MINDEF’s new employment scheme in 2010,
barely two years after the last revision. The impetus of this change reflected not only the
competitiveness of labor demand in the private sector but also the changing expectations
of Singapore’s modern society—MINDEF was adapting to preserve its “single-most
important resource” so as to “better match the aspirations of people seeking a career
within the SAF.” Called the Military Domain Experts Scheme (MDES), this new service
scheme was intended “to build and retain deep professional expertise in critical military
domain areas such as engineering and intelligence,” which also fulfilled the 3rd
150 Tony Tan, “Speech by Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence,
at the Launch of ‘The New Partnership,’” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 12 January 1998,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/1998/jan/12jan98_nr/12jan98_speech.ht
ml.
151 “Savings and Employee Retirement Plan (SAVER),” Singapore Ministry of Defence, last updated
12 January 1998, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/strengthenNS
/resources/record.html.
152 Eng Hen Ng, “Speech by Dr Ng Eng Hen, 2nd Minister for Defence, at Committee of Supply
Debate 2008,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 29 February 2008, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef
/press_room/official_releases/ps/2012/06mar12_ps/06mar12_ps.html.
49
Generation SAF’s requirement of “deep professional competency in many vocations.” In
tandem with MDES, the existing Warrant Officers and Officers schemes were also
enhanced to maintain employment competitiveness. Additional professional development
opportunities, including collaborations with academic institutions for accreditation
programs, were also introduced to provide more avenues for personal and professional
development. 153
2. Revising the National Service Training System
Members of Parliament occasionally raise concerns on behalf of their constituents

and enquire on the duration of NS during Singapore’s regular Parliamentary sessions,
with their main concern being the opportunity costs on conscripts. In response to these
queries, MINDEF unfailingly reiterates the three fundamental principles of NS that have
remained unchanged since its implementation in 1967: NS must be for the fulfilment of
Singapore’s “critical national need . . . [that is] national security and our survival,” NS
must be universally applied to all eligible Singaporeans without bias or unfairness, and
the treatment of conscripts must be equal “regardless of background or status.”154
MINDEF has remained adamant on the three principles of NS and had not budged on
calls to shorten or reconsider the implementation of NS—until the mid-2000s.
As the SAF force structure expanded in the 1970s and 1980s, MINDEF realized
that there was a steady decline in its NSF intake as a result of population control policies
since the mid-1960s. This presented a critical problem as there was to be insufficient
soldiers to defend Singapore; thus, Singapore in 1987 implemented measures to increase
the birth rate. These policies to encourage reproduction were successful but the results
would only be realized in the mid-2000s when the babies of the late 1980s and early
1990s reached conscription age. 155 Notwithstanding government policies to encourage
153 Eng Hen Ng, “Speech by Minister for Education and Second Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen
at the Committee of Supply Debate 2010,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 2 March 2011,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/ps/2010/05mar10_ps.html.
154 Chee Hean Teo, “Ministerial Statement on National Service Defaulters by Minister for Defence
Teo Chee Hean,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 16 January 2006, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef
/press_room/official_releases/nr/2006/jan/16jan06_nr.html.
50
immigrants to settle in Singapore—in large part for their economic contributions—and
the Enlistment Act requiring second-generation Permanent Residents to serve NS, most
of whom had no qualms about sending their sons to fulfil national service obligations and
were “quite happy to stay here,” 156 the supply of NSFs continued to fall until shortly after
the turn of the century. 157
Meanwhile, in the interim years between the implementation and fruition of

Singapore’s population growth policies, MINDEF managed the shortfall of NSFs by
reducing the demand of NSFs. Measures included outsourcing non-combat support
services, restructuring the army order of battle, and introducing automation and
computers to increase productivity. 158 The population boom after 1987 would eventually
take effect in 2006, allowing MINDEF to amend the NS and reservist lengths of service.
According to Defence Minister Teo, the birthrate spurt in 1988 to 1997 was the “key
enabler” that allowed MINDEF to reduce conscription in 2004 from 36 months to 24
months, while the maturing of the SAF’s 3rd Generation transformation into a more
technologically-effective military was the “key driver” of this reduction. 159 By the same
token, the duration of reservist commitments was similarly rationalized in 2005, reducing
reservist obligations from 13 to 10 years. 160
The see-saw in conscript supply will nevertheless continue because of the delayed
effect of population policies, with the next round of shortages expected in 2016, most
worryingly because of a resident population that has been reproducing below the rate of
156 Han et al., Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going, 283 and 285–86.
157 Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, Population Trends 2013 (Singapore: Government of
Singapore, 2013), 22, http://www.singstat.gov.sg/publications/publications_and_papers/population_and
_population_structure/population2013.pdf.
159 Teo, “Ministerial Statement on National Service Defaulters by Minister for Defence Teo Chee
Hean.”
160 “Enhancing the National Service Training System,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 11 August
2005, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2005/aug/11aug05_nr.html.
51
replacement for the past three decades. 161 MINDEF continues to be conscious of
Singapore’s population trends, remains cautious of the impact of manpower supply on
national defense, and is wary of public pressure to re-think further reductions in NS
duration. With each request for reconsideration, MINDEF’s consistent reply has been the
restatement of the fundamental principles of NS and the explanation that the time
required for training and operational contributions necessitates a service of two years,
which means that any further “reduction will result in a drop in the size of [Singapore’s]
standing force and adversely affect the ability of the SAF to meet operational
requirements.” 162
3. Leveraging Technology
From the get-go, Singapore has dedicated a generous portion of its annual budget
to the SAF. This constant, yet prudent, expenditure—approximately 20 percent of the
government’s budget and 3–5 percent of GDP, with a ceiling of 6 percent, annually—
allowed the young conscript military to leverage on advanced equipment to overcome the
lack of manpower. MINDEF’s principle to substantially and relentlessly invest in the
military contributed to the rapid development of the SAF through the years, resulting in a
substantive arsenal that quickly exceeded those of its potential aggressors. 163
Again, the military transformation into a 3rd Generation SAF was a key driver of
that decision. This transformation was made possible with a healthy defense spending
161 Singapore’s Population White Paper in 2013 reported that Singapore’s Total Fertility Rate was
1.20 in 2011 and has been below the replacement rate of 2.1 for more than three decades. Singapore
National Population and Talent Division, Population White Paper 2013: A Sustainable Population for a
Dynamic Singapore (Singapore: Government of Singapore, 2013), 9, http://www.nptd.gov.sg/content
/NPTD/news/_jcr_content/par_content/download_98/file.res/population-white-paper.pdf.
162 “Factsheet – Frequently Asked Questions on Full-Time National Service Duration,” Singapore
Ministry of Defence, 15 June 2004, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr
/2004/jun/15jun04_nr/15jun04_fs.html.
163 “Tables,” The Military Balance (1987): 221, doi: 10.1080/04597228708459990; “Tables and
Analyses,” The Military Balance (1992): 220, doi: 10.1080/04597229208460047; “Analyses,” The Military
Balance (2000): 299, doi: 10.1080/04597220008460148; “Chapter Six: Asia,” The Military Balance
(2013a): 251, doi: 10.1080/04597222.2013.757002; Chang, “In Defense of Singapore,” 108–9; Tan,
“Singapore’s Defence: Capabilities, Trends, and Implications,” 452; “East Asia and Australasia,” The
Military Balance (1999): 173, doi: 10.1080/04597229908460133; Defending Singapore in the 21st
Century, 51; IHS Global Limited, “Singapore: Defence Budget Overview,” Jane’s Sentinel Security
Assessment - Southeast Asia (19 February 2013), https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages
/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1305137&Pubabbrev=SEA.
52
that is consistently among the highest in Southeast Asia in the past three decades,
permitting MINDEF to continually acquire cutting-edge and specialized hardware.
Examples of such modernization include acquiring the region’s first anti-ship missiles,
executing a far-sighted submarine program, and evaluating, purchasing, then operating
advanced F-16 and F-15 fighter aircraft with the requisite comprehensive logistics and
training support; typifying Singapore’s knack to plan for and operate sophisticated
platforms and capabilities. MINDEF also implemented networked capabilities to
operationalize joint missions and maximize the effectiveness of each service. 164
When faced with the threat of military survivability, above the immediate
requirement of creating a military, Singapore’s founding leaders also had the foresight to
grow Singapore’s defense industry to provide indigenous support for the SAF. Lee and
his team acknowledged that “strong capabilities are at the centre of the SAF’s defence
strategy” and that “the SAF’s future capabilities will depend on its ability to exploit the
technological changes for military advantage,” 165 in addition to contributing significantly
to job-creation and the economy. Singapore’s three key defense-related entities include
manufacturing, production, and industrial support; research and development; and
procurement and management. These three entities support the SAF’s evolution with the
planning, development, and implementation of indigenously designed weapons, ships,
vehicles, and combat systems. Singapore’s plethora of homegrown defense expertise has
also contributed to specialized upgrading programs customized to the SAF’s unique
needs that extend the effectiveness of its major platforms, doubling their original shelf
lives and maximizing defense spending. 166
When asked in Parliament to elaborate on the developments of the 3rd Generation

SAF, Defence Minister Dr Ng Eng Hen reminded Parliament Members that, in spite of
the generous allocation of up to 6 percent of GDP on defense, MINDEF’s spending will
remain prudent. He reiterated MINDEF’s military investment principle; that the “first
164 Eng Hen Ng, “Speech by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen at the Committee of Supply
Debate 2012,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 6 March 2012, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef
/press_room/official_releases/ps/2012/06mar12_ps/06mar12_ps.html.
165 Defending Singapore in the 21st Century, 45.
166 Ibid., 63–71; Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 182–95.
53
instinct is to upgrade existing platforms to extend their lifespan, instead of purchasing
new ones . . . only acquire new platforms when the capabilities they provide are
considered critical . . . [and] when it is more cost-effective to do so, we build our
own.” 167
The SAF’s fondness for advanced weaponry applies similarly to investments in

simulator and trainers. The use of these training technologies saved on time required to
travel to live-firing ranges, reduced wear and tear on actual field equipment and weapons,
and improved operational competence because of the opportunities for additional practice
at reduced costs. Besides the tactical and operational level uses of trainers, war gaming
and battlefield management simulators have also been used by the SAF in strategic-level
exercises to enhance inter-service interoperability without having to spend time in the
field on actual exercises. This leverage on advanced technology has allowed the SAF to
maintain its training and operational effectiveness despite having faced a shortage of
manpower and a reduction in the duration of conscription service. 168
C. A GLOBALIZING WORLD
Even though Singapore was extremely susceptible to external pressures and did
not possess any semblance of a capable military during its independence in 1967, it did
not commit itself to any alliances. Yet Singapore’s founding fathers were cognizant of its
precarious position and established Singapore’s defense policy of deterrence and
diplomacy knowing the importance of international cooperation and understanding:
Singapore’s defence policy is fundamentally based on the twin pillars of

deterrence and diplomacy. The first pillar of deterrence is provided by
developing a strong and capable SAF and a resilient Singapore, through
the institutions of NS and TD, as well as by taking a prudent and stable
approach to defence spending. The second pillar of defence diplomacy is
built by establishing strong and friendly ties, through extensive
167 Ng, “Speech by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen at the Committee of Supply Debate 2012.”
168 Ibid.
54
interactions and cooperation, with defence establishments and armed
forces in the region and around the world [emphasis added]. 169
The end of the Cold War and globalization, however, has created a world where
interconnectivity and cooperation are now commonplace. The maturing of institutions
like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), UN, EU, NATO, and World
Trade Organization (WTO) has resulted in a more cooperative regional and international
environment; yet, in spite of its inherent vulnerability in a volatile region, Singapore
maintains its refrain from alliances.
1. Establishing Partnerships
Notwithstanding the abstinence from alliances, whether deliberate or incidental,

Singapore understood that “apart from an adequate defensive force, its security depends
on an articulate foreign policy and therefore maintains a web of diplomatic links with its
neighbours.” 170 Singapore therefore actively participates in various cooperative
arrangements and international organizations with the purpose of developing
understanding, building confidence, and reducing the risk of misunderstandings. The first
of these arrangements of significance is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of
which Singapore was a founding member. Although ASEAN is not a military
cooperative, it is nonetheless a platform to “accelerate the economic growth, social, and
cultural development in the region” to increase understanding and collaboration, thus
leading to peace and stability. 171
Singapore also fervently establishes and maintains close ties with its partners
through regular exercises and participation in regional and international fora. In this
respect, MINDEF contributes as an active player in maintaining these ties, particularly
through the use of the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN). An example of this
engagement is the use of its sprawling naval base at the eastern corner of Singapore.
169 “Defence Policy and Diplomacy,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, last updated 18 October 2012,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/key_topics/defence_policy.html.
170 Tan, “Singapore: Civil-Military Fusion,” 286.
171 “Overview of ASEAN,”ASEAN Secretariat, accessed 31 January 2014, http://www.asean.org
/asean/about-asean/overview.
55
Designed as one of the largest SAF facilities in Singapore, Changi Naval Base (CNB)
was built for the expanded requirements of a growing RSN and, most notably, “the only
facility in Southeast Asia that can dock a U.S. aircraft carrier.” 172 As acknowledged by
the United States Chargé d’Affaires at the inaugural docking of a USN aircraft carrier in
Singapore in 2001, Singapore “reached out to us [the United States] to ensure that it also
matched U.S. aircraft carrier requirements.” 173 Besides the hospitality towards the United
States, the base “is also open to the navies of other friendly countries . . . [and] facilitates
the RSN’s collaboration with other navies to fight common threats.” Even before its
official opening in 2004, CNB welcomed a plethora of international guests, with “close to
100 ships from 11 navies” in 2003 alone—ships and submarines from “ASEAN countries
like Malaysia and Indonesia . . . UK, Australia and New Zealand . . . France, China,
Japan, and India.” 174
The SAF has, since the turn of the century, developed into a “highly regarded and
potent military force in Southeast Asia” and was subsequently able to relinquish the
fundamentally “defeatist” poisonous shrimp strategy in an updated defense posture. 175
Singapore’s increasingly competent and professional military has led the SAF to extend
her principle of defense diplomacy further afield by participating actively in international
missions. Significant and successful contributions to UN-led peace support operations,
and regional and international Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)
operations have given the SAF a strong reputation and credibility in the international
security arena. A mature defense capability consisting of a well-equipped land force,
missile-armed ships and stealthy submarines, and a potent air force, combined with a
resilient society in the TD concept, has allowed Singapore the confidence to assume a
172 Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Singapore: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research
Service (26 July 2013): 3, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=741587.
173 Herbert W. Shultz, “Address by Herbert W. Shultz, Charge D’Affairs, U.S. Embassy Singapore at
the Ceremony of the First Visit by U.S. Aircraft Carrier, U.S.S. Kitty Hawk to Changi Naval Base,”
Singapore Ministry of Defence, 23 March 2001, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room
/official_releases/sp/2001/23mar01_speech2.html.
174 Chok Tong Goh, “Speech by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the Opening Ceremony of Changi
Naval Base,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 21 May 2004, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room
/official_releases/nr/2004/may/21may04_nr3.html.
175 Loo, “Maturing the Singapore Armed Forces: From Poisonous Shrimp to Dolphin,” 182.
56
new and more diplomatic role akin to that of a “dolphin.” Singapore would now be
“willing to use its wits, its flexibility, and its maneuverability to outwit potential
aggressors, confident that if such non-violent measures failed to dissuade the potential
aggressor, it still possessed sufficient military capability to defend the island.” 176 This
newly-defined defense posture afforded Singapore a wider range of options in
international relations, and was now “regarded as a strong regional security cooperation
advocate.” 177 Singapore was thus able to represent itself “as a useful balancer and
intermediary between major powers in the region,” 178 enhancing its policy of espousing
diplomacy.
Not one to rest on its laurels, and with its newfound “dolphin” role in
international relations, Singapore continues its courtship of maritime powers near and far,
enmeshing them in the regional maritime security network. Two examples are the
welcoming of a Chinese surveillance vessel to CNB in 2011 as “part of an ongoing
exchange on technical cooperation on maritime safety with Beijing,” and the facilitating
of the “U.S. strategy of ‘places-not-bases’ in the region” in 2013 with the hosting of USS
Freedom (LCS 1), the first of four littoral combat ships on a rotational deployment to the
Pacific. The RSN continues to support Singapore’s defense diplomacy by regularly
hosting ships and bilateral, multilateral, and international exercises, conferences, and
exhibitions to deepen defense cooperation. 179 This intense defense interaction is not
limited to the RSN, but is also evident through the efforts of the Singapore Army and
Republic of Singapore Air Force in exercises and training deployments in the United
176 Loo, “Maturing the Singapore Armed Forces: From Poisonous Shrimp to Dolphin,” 179.
177 Collin Koh, “Pan-ASEAN Maritime Security Cooperation: Prospects for Pooling Resources,”
RSIS Commentaries, no. 96 (17 May 2013), http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective
/RSIS0962013.pdf.
178 Chanlett-Avery, Singapore: Background and U.S. Relations, 4.
179 Examples of exercises, conferences, and exhibitions hosted by the RSN at Changi Naval Base
include Ex LION KING (Singapore-India), Ex SINGAROO (Singapore-Australia), Ex CARAT
(Singapore-United States), MALSINDO (Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia), Western Pacific Naval
Symposium (WPNS) and Exercises, Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) Exercises, and
International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference (IMDEX).
57
States, China, France, France, Australia, New Zealand, India, Thailand, Brunei and
Indonesia, among many others. 180
Singapore’s policy of defense diplomacy applies beyond the SAF’s operational

units and into regional and international security fora as well. Examples of these are
regularly highlighted in Parliamentary discussions as a reminder of the versatility of
MINDEF at representing Singapore in all levels of diplomacy. As reported by Defence
Minister Ng in the 2013 Parliamentary Committee of Supply Debate: “MINDEF is
working hard within the platforms . . . the ADMM (ASEAN Defence Ministers’
Meeting), the ADMM-Plus, the Shangri-La Dialogue, the FPDA (Five Power Defence
Arrangements), and other bilateral or multi-lateral platforms, because we want to
improve military-to-military relations to build confidence and reduce the risk of
miscalculation.” 181
Hence, despite Singapore’s aversion to alliances—or the absence of the term

“alliance” in any of its partnerships—Singapore’s defense diplomacy strategy is actively
promoted through these numerous engagements. The cooperation and understanding of
these partners gives the international community, especially Singapore’s ASEAN
partners and the major powers, an increased stake in regional security, with the aim of
promoting stability in the region that will consequently enhance Singapore’s security. 182
D. NATIONAL SERVICE TODAY
Conscription in Singapore’s early years was more than just a manpower

technicality. In addition to personnel procurement for the SAF, NS was intended as a
social institution: to create a unique Singaporean identity in a volatile region in an
unstable and uncertain Cold War era, and to integrate a divided society in a fledgling
180 Eng Hen Ng, “Speech by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen at the Committee of Supply
Debate 2013,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 12 March 2013, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef
/press_room/official_releases/sp/2013/12mar13_speech.html.
181 Ibid.
182 David Capie, “Structures, Shocks and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise of Asia’s Defence
Diplomacy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 35, no. 1 (2013): 1–26, doi: 10.1355/cs35-1a; Ralf Emmers,
“The Five Power Defence Arrangements and Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 8, no.
3 (2012): 271–86, doi: 10.1080/14799855.2012.723921; “Defence Policy and Diplomacy.”
58
nation where racial and social unrest was common. After the initial implementation of NS
and development of the SAF had taken root, and with the society fairly well integrated
through almost two decades of NS, Singapore reinforced its security with the TD concept
in 1984. This whole-of-society defense further enhanced Singapore’s deterrence with the
message that a painful “poison” would befall an aggressor even after, and only if,
Singapore succumbed militarily.
Notwithstanding the largely intangible but effective benefit of TD producing

resilience against internal national issues, Singapore’s latter challenges were solved with
NS satisfying a military, rather than social, need. The social efficacy of TD, however,
cannot be discounted simply because its effects are intangible—akin to an insurance
policy, one would never know the true value of social cohesion and national unity until
an untoward social conflict occurs, by which time a remedy may already be too late.
59
60
V. CONCLUSION
For nearly five decades, NS has remained the bedrock of the SAF. In every aspect
of the SAF—whether in a domestic patrol or an international interaction, a routine
exercise or a spontaneously activated relief mission—it is almost certain that a fair
number of conscripts would be among the uniformed personnel deployed. The ubiquity
of NS in society is indeed a testament to Singapore’s efforts to adapt conscription to
changing domestic and international conditions. Indeed, MINDEF’s responsiveness to the
challenges arising from a modern society and a globalized world is evidence that NS
continues to function as a critical institution in Singapore.
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Since the end of the Cold War, many countries have reduced their reliance on
conscription either because they believe the world has entered a relatively peaceful era
where major wars are a thing of the past or because it no longer suits their increasingly
educated and prosperous societies. By contrast, Singapore continues to maintain its
practice of conscription. Its reasons and experiences—as compared to those of the United
States, Germany, Taiwan, Switzerland, South Korea, and Israel—reflect a lack of change
in the social and geostrategic conditions it faces.
1. Comparing Responses to Remuneration
In tackling the challenge of recruitment and retention, Singapore’s responses were

similar to those of the United States and Taiwan. All three countries heavily depend on
volunteers in their militaries; except Singapore’s review of volunteer remuneration was
not intended to transition to an all-volunteer force, but to reinforce the attractiveness of
volunteers alongside Singapore’s continued reliance on conscripts. Although there are
differences in the use of volunteer soldiers in their militaries, the importance of volunteer
employment was critical to each system’s success and the principles of these
remuneration reviews in all three countries were identical—to attract quality personnel,
retain experienced personnel, and ultimately reduce volunteer turnover. Apart from
Taiwan’s early problems with attracting sufficient volunteers during the initial years of
61
transition, the success of the United States’ eventual transition lends credence to the
responsive remuneration mechanism that is paramount to recruitment and retention of
volunteers for a healthy military.
An example of this constant evolution is the progress of women volunteers in the

SAF. To a 2013 Parliamentary question on the contributions of women volunteers in the
SAF, Defence Minister Ng replied with the following statistics: about 1500 women, or 7
percent of the volunteer population, receive equivalent scholarship opportunities, are
deployed in various combat and non-combat arms of the military, are given equal
prospects for progression based on the principle of meritocracy, and undertake the same
missions and operations together with their male counterparts. 183
Singapore’s reliance on a stable volunteer force to positively influence the

conscripts, whom they are responsible for training and managing, is a critical enabler of
the overall progress of its military. The frequent and substantial iterations in this
responsive remuneration system is not simply MINDEF’s commitment to maintaining a
strong SAF—it is Singapore’s smart adaptation to integrate the experience and talent of
professional soldiers, exclusive to a volunteer force, with the societal benefits of
conscription. Instead of throwing out conscription to conform to a modernizing society
and succumb to the prevailing global trend, Singapore continues to both strengthen the
commitment towards its volunteer force, applying the same workforce approaches as
other countries have adopted, and actively adapt the relevance of all-inclusive
conscription.
2. Comparing Responses to Duration Reduction
As seen in the examination of Germany, Taiwan, Israel, South Korea, and

Switzerland in Chapter II, the issue of conscription length is not unique to Singapore. In
both Germany and Taiwan’s responses to popular pressure, the steady reductions in
service lengths eventually led to a common public perception that conscription had lost
its relevance. Although South Korea has initiated a service reduction of 6 months, the
183 Eng Hen Ng, “Written Reply by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen to Parliamentary Question
on Women in the Singapore Armed Forces,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 21 October 2013,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/ps/2013/21oct13_ps4.html.
62
conscripts will serve a minimum of 18 months, which is deemed sufficient to receive the
necessary training and still remain relevant in the eyes of the population. Israel and
Switzerland, on the other hand, did not significantly reduce their conscription time and,
more importantly, they maintain the comprehensive use of their conscripts during active
and reserve service, continuing the relevance—or perception of relevance—in public
opinion.
Singapore occasionally faces the same domestic pressures and calls to reduce the
length of service but, similar to Israel, Switzerland, and South Korea, maintains a firm
position on a minimum duration of service. This insistence on maintaining the 24-month
minimum—12 months of training followed by 12 months of operational duties—retains
the relevance and contribution of NS to national defense even as Goh Keng Swee’s
reminder in 1984 continues to ring true of Singapore in modern times: that the sacrifice
of two years of a Singaporean life is necessary to maintain the sovereignty of Singapore.
We must never forget that our existence as an independent sovereign state

cannot be made to depend on the sufferance [sic] of others. The most
dependable guarantee of our independence is a strong SAF. A strong SAF,
in turn, depends on the political will to make the effort and pay the
price. 184
Most recent Parliamentary responses by MINDEF—to questions of the impact of

the declining birth rate on the SAF and the feasibility of employing conscripts to
alternative non-military forms of national service—continue to reiterate the fundamental
principle of NS for Singapore. In response to the declining birth rate, Defence Minister
Ng gave assurances of MINDEF’s forward-looking plans, including of the NS population
three decades into the future, and cemented the principal ingredient of a strong SAF: the
NS personnel that constitute the bulk of the military. 185 His response to the second
concern highlighted the necessarily military nature of conscription, with a reminder that
any non-universal contribution to NS “would be unwise and inequitable, as it would
184 Speech delivered by Goh Keng Swee on 25 September 1984, in Goh, Chapter 12: Old Guard,
New Guard and Other Establishments, 152.
185 Eng Hen Ng, “Reply by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen to Parliamentary Question on
Singapore’s Declining Birth Rate and Impact to the Singapore Armed Forces,” Singapore Ministry of
Defence, 12 November 2012, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/ps/2012
/12nov12_ps.html.
63
erode the support for NS, where every enlistee performs his duties, whether it is within
the Singapore Police Force, Singapore Civil Defence Force, or the SAF,” 186 echoing
Eliot Cohen’s warning that the implementation of conscription be egalitarian. 187
The strategic foresight, constant assertion of the principles of NS, and consistence
in MINDEF’s stand on its NS policies through the years is thus a strong indication that
Singapore seeks to retain conscription well into the future.
3. Comparing Responses to Leveraging Technology
Technology is a key component of an armed force and the maximizing of

advanced weapons and training systems would benefit any military, as seen in Taiwan
and Israel, which use technology to reduce their manpower burden. Although Taiwan
benefits from the acquisition of advanced weaponry, technology alone will not resolve
Taiwan’s problems of recruitment and retention. As a result, Taiwan has had to extend
the eventual implementation deadline and implement additional personnel remuneration
measures as it continues in its transition towards an all-volunteer force.
Israel’s example, on the other hand, provides a more cautionary tale on the use of
technology. In spite of its technological superiority resulting from its national research
and development institutions that directly feed its weaponry, Israel has not reduced its
reliance on conscription but instead uses the advanced technology to enhance the IDF’s
potency. Singapore’s attitude can be likened to this approach as explained in the decision
to reduce the duration of NS: advanced technology is the driver of MINDEF’s NS policy
change, while the enabler of change is its personnel. Along the same vein is a caution by
Defence Minister Ng at the 2013 Committee of Supply Debate:
Even if we have the most sophisticated platforms and systems, ultimately

our defences are only as strong as the resolve and the commitment of our
people . . . we ought to be wary of complacency because we have a
technologically advanced SAF. Because the temptation is always that
186 Eng Hen Ng, “Reply by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen to Parliamentary Question on
Deployment of NSFs to Navy Shipboard Vocations,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 12 November 2013,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/ps/2013/12nov13_ps.html.
187 Cohen “Military Service and Republican Ideology: Liberalism and Egalitarianism,” 145–51.
64
because it’s so sophisticated, you don’t need the man in the loop. And that
would be a tragic and costly mistake. 188
Notwithstanding the reminder that its people are the bedrock of the SAF,
MINDEF continues to invest in technology to evolve with the changing threat
environment. Since the turn of the century, the SAF has kept up with the wider range of
threats by using technology “to have better command and control, strike with more
precision, and use more unmanned systems” to counter the non-conventional threats “of
terrorism, piracy, natural disasters, and cyber-threats.” In addition to technology, the SAF
maintains its edge by re-organizing into more focused task forces “to be more responsive
and potent” to these modern threats. 189
4. Comparing Responses to Establishing Partnerships
Countries have placed considerable weight on alliances when deciding whether to

maintain or abolish conscription, as Chapter II made clear. Germany, for example,
transitioned to an all-volunteer force in large part because of its reliance on the UN,
NATO, and EU for collective security, collective defense, and membership solidarity. By
contrast, Switzerland is a rare example of the use of non-alliance to avoid conflict,
relying on its principle of armed neutrality to avoid involvement in any conflict that has
led it to possess the noteworthy record of avoiding conflict since the 1700s. There are
also countries that, despite having alliances and strong security partnerships, maintain a
self-reliant military through conscription; South Korea and Israel fall into this category of
countries that have decided to invest in defense, rather than rely on their allies and
partners, in the face of extreme uncertainty and severe threat.
Singapore has maintained a non-aligned position since its independence, yet

invests in healthy military and diplomatic relations to foster military-to-military
understanding to promote regional peace and stability. Several regional and international
frameworks exist to which Singapore is an active member, including ASEAN, ADMM,
189 Eng Hen Ng, “Written Reply by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen to Parliamentary Question
on Regional Security and Development of the SAF,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 18 February 2014,
www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/ps/2014/18feb14_ps3.html.
65
ADMM-Plus, and FPDA. Although not security or military pacts, these are vital vehicles
to increase dialogue, build trust and confidence, and enhance interoperability with the
goal of closer relationships. Bilateral defense relations—including, notably, with regional
neighbors—and international deployments also play a significant role in building
Singapore’s diplomatic influence. Regular multi-level tri-service interactions with
Malaysia and a plethora of joint exercises with Indonesia, and close ties with the United
States, China, and “with partners such as Brunei, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand,
India, France, and Germany remain strong.” 190 Additionally, the SAF’s continued
contributions to UN-led operations and disaster relief operations both near and far allow
Singapore to weigh in on international issues and be counted as a valuable member of the
international community. 191
As Singapore uses its unique blend of diplomacy in concert with military self-
reliance, enabled through its determination to maintain conscription, its defense
diplomacy policy has enabled the country to stand on its own feet. This independence
gives Singapore the ability to enjoy “the political space and the freedom to act in
[Singapore’s] best interests.” 192
B. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT UNCHANGED
Vulnerabilities from a lack of strategic depth, a heavy reliance on imports, and

close proximity to far larger and more populous neighbors constantly highlight the
country’s status as an inherently enticing target. As if to remind the world of Singapore’s
predicament, Indonesian President B. J. Habibie in 1998 made a snide remark in the
191 Ibid.; “RSAF Helicopters Complete Hurricane Katrina Relief Operations,” Singapore Ministry of
Defence, 10 September 2005, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases
/nr/2005/sep/09sep05_news.html; Republic of Singapore Navy, “About the Navy,” Singapore Ministry of
Defence, last accessed 14 January 2014, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/navy/careers/about_the_navy_overseas
_missions.html.
192 “Defence Policy and Diplomacy.”
66
Asian Wall Street Journal alluding to Singapore’s insignificance as a little “red dot” on a
map. 193
The reality is that Singapore is occasionally threatened and belittled by some of

its neighbors. Various bilateral and regional events in the last two decades continue to
reinforce a conservative yet pragmatic view of security among Singapore’s leaders. On
Singapore’s National Day in 1991, for example, Malaysia and Indonesia conducted their
largest ever bilateral military exercise, involving a paratroop drop in Malaysia’s state of
Johor, which lies just across the border from Singapore. 194 Other incidents include anti-
Chinese trouble in neighboring Indonesia; niggling bilateral issues between Singapore
and Malaysia over immigration land; the banning of sand exports by Malaysia and
Indonesia to Singapore in 1997 and 2007; 195 complaints over Singapore’s alleged
infringement of air space in 1998; 196 and Malaysia’s regular threats to turn off the tap on
Singapore’s supply of freshwater; 197 and a long-standing territorial dispute with Malaysia
over the island of Pedra Branca. 198 Additionally, nationalistic rhetoric in neighboring
countries continues to cause ripples in bilateral relations, especially during election years
in those countries. 199
Besides niggling neighborly differences, regional and international disturbances

also affect this globalized island, including possible spillovers from growing tensions
over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and uncertainty over growing powers
193 In an Asian Wall Street Journal article on 4 August 1998, Indonesian President B. J. Habibie made
a snide remark about the insignificance of Singapore, commenting “It’s O.K. with me, but there are 211
million people [in Indonesia]. All the green [area] is Indonesia. And that red dot is Singapore.”
194 Tim Huxley, “A Strong and Silent Keeper of the Peace,” The Straits Times, 1 July 2008; Huxley
and Boey, “Singapore’s Army: Boosting Capabilities,” 175.
195 Azhar Ghani, “Jakarta Bans Sand Exports, Cutting off Singapore’s Main Supply,” The Straits
Times, 25 January 2007; Han et al., Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going, 26–27.
196 Brendan Pereira, “KL Curbs Airspace Use by RSAF Jets,” The Straits Times, 18 September 1998;
Matthews and Zhang Yan, “Small Country ‘Total Defence,’” 376–395.
197 Zuraidah Ibrahim, “Water Row Not about Money; Issue is Singapore’s Sovereignty and About
Honouring Agreements,” The Straits Times, 26 January 2003; Lee, From Third World to First, 276; Han et
al., Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going, 26–28 and 31.
198 S. Jayakumar and Tommy Koh, Pedra Branca: The Road to the World Court (Singapore: NUS
Press, 2009), 1–19.
67
seeking to assert their authority internationally that may inevitably draw Singapore into
polarizing power struggles. 200 These incidents may seem individually insignificant, but
when viewed together they demonstrate that Singapore continues to face a volatile region
with players of uncertain intentions. In other words, the fundamental challenges that
Singapore faces have not disappeared, even if they have become less serious since
independence in 1965.
It appears likely that Singapore will continue to experience harrying by its

neighbors from time to time and international events will continue to pose challenges to
its globalized economy. These regional and international dynamics have remained
unchanged in the past half a century and will continue their effects on Singapore into the
future, thus warranting Singapore’s continued emphasis on the principle of a self-
sufficient defense. This self-sufficiency will allow Singapore to “chart [its] own course as
an independent sovereign nation, without having to buckle under pressure from larger
states, or to become subservient to their strategic imperatives.” 201
C. DOMESTIC SITUATION UNCHANGED
Equally important are the internal threats to the NS institution because

Singapore’s domestic situation, too, has not changed drastically since its independence.
Although the standard of living has improved significantly in this rapidly growing
economy and globalism has crept into every aspect of the Singaporean way of life, the
population remains a steadily growing mix of ethnicities, religions, and cultures. There
were occasional domestic hiccups in the last two decades—the heightened security
following the 9/11 incident in 2001 and Bali bombings in 2002, the national effort to
contain SARS in 2003, the economic challenges due to the global financial crisis in 2008,
200 Matthews and Zhang Yan, “Small Country ‘Total Defence,’” 377–78; Clive Schofield et al.,
“From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East and
Southeast Asia,” NBR Special Report 30 (2011): 3–8, http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?id=233;
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Chapter 2: Major Trends Shaping the Security Environment,” “Chapter 3: Patterns of
Security Cooperation,” and “Chapter 4: Key Tensions,” in Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security
Cooperation (Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010), 13–40.
201 Chee Hean Teo, “Lunch Talk on ‘Defending Singapore: Strategies for a Small State,’” Singapore
Ministry of Defence, 21 April 2005, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2005/apr
/21apr05_nr2.html.
68
and the regular bouts of haze with poor air quality reaching unprecedented levels in
2012—but Singapore weathered through these incidents relatively unscathed and
emerged stronger, with a resilience that is significantly underwritten by TD. 202
The importance of NS in this TD framework cannot be understated; the

pervasiveness of conscription throughout Singapore society is its core ingredient.
Although mandatory only for males, their inescapable presence permeates the population
through family and work, consequently affecting children and peers alike. Conscription’s
societal influence thus infuses into society as a result of the common 24-month
experience that all males can relate to, and an enforced communal environment that
fosters tolerance for fellow Singaporeans regardless of race, language, or religion. This
common experience and an intimate understanding of his fellow Singaporean citizen are
the foundation on which the pillars of TD—civil, economic, social, psychological, and
military—are built.
As it is of paramount importance to the defense of Singapore, Total Defence Day

is commemorated on 15 February annually. The date marks Singapore’s fall in 1942 and
serves as a reminder “that Singapore is defensible and is worth defending, and we
[Singaporeans] must defend Singapore.” 203 In addition to themed activities held in
schools and TD exhibitions held nationwide on Total Defence Day, MINDEF also
extends the message of TD throughout the year to reinforce the importance of TD. This
message encompasses Singaporeans in all walks of life and remains an integral part of the
TD effort.
1. Engaging the Stakeholders
MINDEF engages these stakeholders through feedback and dialogues to

understand the challenges that may arise with the changing times because it is cognizant
that employers directly affect the functioning of the reservist system. This engagement is
202 Eng Hen Ng, “Speech by Minister for Defence on Total Defence Day at the National Museum of
Singapore,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 15 February 2014, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef
/press_room/official_releases/sp/2014/15feb14_speech.html.
203 “Core Events,” National Education, Singapore Ministry of Education, accessed 15 January 2014,
http://www.ne.edu.sg/core_events.htm.
69
done through the Advisory Council for Community Relations in Defence (ACCORD),
which conducts regular dialogue sessions and visits to military units for grassroots
leaders, employers, and trade union leaders to facilitate a deeper understanding and
importance of the SAF. Incentives and policies are also used to encourage support for the
reservist system by lessening the burden on companies when they have to release their
employees for their annual refresher obligations. Such measures reduce the apprehension
of employing these individuals and at the same time encourage ORNS-friendly behavior
so that ORNS do not feel encumbered to return for their annual refresher stints. 204
Since 2007, MINDEF acknowledged that “women are very much part of our
[Singaporean] NS journey” and endeavored to include the female half of the population
in the feedback loop. In addition to seeking feedback and suggestions from women’s
groups to improve the NS experience and commitment to defense, MINDEF also
produced a 12-part web mini-series called “Basic Military Talk” to share the life of an
NSF with those who do not undergo the two years of service, in particular women. 205
2. Engaging through Schools
Singapore’s compulsory education system facilitates the TD outreach to the

youth. Besides traditional National Education classes that impart national history and
values, and the annual Total Defence Day to remind students of the importance of TD,
various other activities are also implemented to broaden the engagement. In partnership
with the Ministry of Education, MINDEF conducts regular student engagement activities
for students both within their school where members of the SAF hold sharing and
discussion sessions, and outside of school where students get to see and experience SAF
training, similar to the ACCORD visits for stakeholders. More contemporary methods
204 Mohamad Maliki Bin Osman, “Speech by Senior Parliamentary Secretary for Defence and
National Development Dr Mohamad Maliki Bin Osman at the Committee of Supply Debate 2013,”
Singapore Ministry of Defence, 12 March 2013, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/press_room
/official_releases/sp/2013/12mar13_speech3.html.
National Development Dr Mohamad Maliki Bin Osman at the Committee of Supply Debate 2012,”
Singapore Ministry of Defence, 6 March 2012, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room
/official_releases/ps/2012/06mar12_ps.html; “Basic Military Talk,” CyberPioneerTV YouTube page,
accessed 16 January 2014, http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL0DCF11422A4DF300.
70
like media competitions have also been introduced in a nation-wide effort to engage
Singapore’s youth. For example, N.E.mation!, a digital animation competition, was
launched in 2005 to capitalize on more modern forms of engagement targeted at the
media-savvy youth of today. 206
3. Engaging the Masses
The use of new media goes beyond targeted groups but, more importantly, to the
general population of Singapore. Examples of these are ciNE65, a “short film competition
for film enthusiasts to tell their Singapore story . . . to harness the potential of short films
to touch the hearts and minds of Singaporeans”; 207 various reality and documentary-
styled factual entertainment channels that tell the different stories of life in the SAF,
including the two-season, 39-episode Every Singaporean Son, the ten-part The Passage:
A Midshipman’s Journey, and the 12-part I’m a Soldier, Sailor, and Airman; 208 a two-
part full length NS movie Ah Boys to Men in collaboration with local film producer Jack
Neo, 209 and the popular social media platform Facebook. 210 Additionally, videos on key
military exercises and events are also regularly produced by CyberPioneerTV and
uploaded on YouTube to keep the public updated in matters of Singapore’s defense
National Development Dr Mohamad Maliki Bin Osman at the Committee of Supply Debate 2013”;
“N.E.mation!,” accessed 16 January 2014, http://nemation.sg.
207 “ciNE65,” Nexus, last updated 10 February 2014, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef
_websites/topics/nexus/our_microsites/cine65.html.
208 “Every Singaporean Son,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, accessed 16 January 2014,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/everysingaporeanson; “The Passage: A Midshipman’s Journey,” Singapore
Ministry of Defence, last updated 15 March 2012, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary
/videos/docus/mstd.html; “I’m a Soldier, Sailor, Airman,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, last updated 16
August 2011, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/videos/docus/SSA.html.
209 Sherlyn Quek, “Growing Up from ‘Ah Boys’ to Men,” CyberPioneer, 19 July 2012, http://www
.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/news/2012/jul/19jul12_news.html.
210 “CyberPioneer,” Facebook, accessed 16 January 2014, https://www.facebook.com
/cyberpioneer.connect.
71
through easily accessible means, 211 which “help to deepen the public’s understanding of
and support for NS, and enhance their commitment to defence.” 212
Military roadshows and exhibitions were other methods used by MINDEF to

instil confidence and engage Singaporeans. Traditionally held in military camps, the 2012
edition of the Army Open House was brought into the heart of the city where the public
could easily interact with the soldiers and learn about the Army. This non-traditional
method attracted record attendance figures and facilitated the Navy’s exhibition of a
frigate and subsequently an LST at the promenade of a popular waterside shopping
mall. 213
These proactive engagements have brought the military and its soldiers closer to
the non-military segment of Singaporeans. This, in turn, builds a more intimate link
between the military and society to enhance awareness of the need for a resilience that
can only be achieved through the contribution of not just the soldiers in the SAF, but
every member of the community.
4. Committee to Strengthen National Service
Although the domestic mix of multi-cultural, multi-racial, and multi-religious

Singaporeans have remained the same since independence, MINDEF acknowledges that
Singapore’s modernized society has evolved and is different from when NS first started
in 1967. In order to “respond to these changes and ensure that the commitment of a new
generation of NSmen remains strong,” 214 MINDEF thus convened the Committee to
Strengthen National Service (CSNS) in 2013. Chaired by the Minister for Defence, CSNS
will consist of the “Support for NS” and “Recognition and Benefits for National Service”
211 “CyberPioneerTV Channel,” YouTube, accessed 16 January 2014, http://www.youtube.com

/user/cyberpioneertv.
National Development Dr Mohamad Maliki Bin Osman at the Committee of Supply Debate 2012.”
213 “Army Open House 2012,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, accessed 16 January 2014,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/aoh12/index.html; Benita Teo, “RSN Returns to VivoCity,” CyberPioneer, 14
November 2013, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/news
/2013/nov/14nov13_news.html.
72
working groups to “explore how to better allow National Servicemen to maximise their
contributions and abilities to serve NS,” and “explore ways to promote the recognition
and appreciation of National Servicemen’s contributions.” By engaging Singaporeans in
dialogues and focus groups, CSNS is expected to “recommend measures to strengthen
NS as the critical institution for Singapore’s continued survival and success.” 215
MINDEF’s determination to evolve and adapt to the dynamics of contemporary

society is indicative of the essence of NS to the SAF and Singapore. Instead of relenting
to public pressure to reconsider conscription, Singapore remains persistent in preserving
the NS system and endeavors to maintain the relevance of TD for the defense of
Singapore.
D. CONCLUSION
Singapore, like many other small countries, faces a plethora of challenges to its
survival and sovereignty but has thus far succeeded in dealing with these challenges.
Singapore’s responsiveness in revising remuneration, being flexible yet firm on the
duration of NS, developing a technologically superior and capable military, forging
robust military and diplomatic regional and international relationships, and implementing
and maintaining the importance of Total Defense has enabled the country to succeed
beyond the imagination of the naysayers who greeted its independence. Despite recent
global developments, however, Singapore’s fundamental societal make up and
geostrategic environment have remained largely unchanged—it is still a diverse
population of multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-cultural peoples living on a small
island with a small population situated among larger and more populous neighbors in a
volatile Southeast Asian region. The reality, then, is that Singapore must maintain its
ability to stand up against intimidation or it will have to accept being bullied into
submission, and the SAF remains instrumental to the prosperity and sovereignty of
Singapore in the face of such pressures. 216
215 “Committee to Strengthen NS,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, last updated 13 November 2013,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/strengthenNS/about/csns.html.
216 Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, 142–45; Lee, From Third World to First, 257–328; Han et al.,
Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going, 17–20 and 322–23.
73
NS will continue, therefore, to be the cornerstone of the SAF and Singapore: for
the SAF to preserve Singapore’s sovereignty so that Singapore is afforded the political
space to act independently, and as a national unifier to tackle domestic challenges with
resilience to support and fuel the Singapore economy. Even today, Singapore’s founding
father, Lee Kuan Yew, continues to espouse the gravity of the SAF’s contribution to
Singapore’s autonomy and unparalleled success: “From the day we started, I knew that
we needed a strong SAF, and I believe that still remains today. Without a strong SAF,
there is no economic future, there is no security.” 217
217 “Mr Lee Kuan Yew Speaks with SAF Officers and Defence Officials at Dinner Dialogue,”
Singapore Ministry of Defence, 18 May 2012, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room
/official_releases/nr/2012/may/18may12_nr.html.
74
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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection

Why conscription, Singapore? the social and

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WHY CONSCRIPTION, SINGAPORE?

Thesis Advisor: Michael S. Malley

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

WHY CONSCRIPTION, SINGAPORE?

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Author: Daniel J. Kwok

Approved by: Michael S. Malley

Conscription is a centuries-old manpower procurement policy that continues to be used

ACCORD Advisory Council for Community Relations in Defence

I am greatly indebted to a number of individuals who have supported me through

To the Singapore Armed Forces for awarding me the Postgraduate Scholarship,

To my Thesis Advisor Professor Michael S. Malley, for his constant attention

To my Second Reader Professor Carolyn C. Halladay, for her meticulous editing

To the professors and staff of the Naval Postgraduate School’s International

Conscription is a centuries-old manpower procurement policy that continues to be

Singapore adopted conscription shortly after gaining independence in 1965 and,

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Conscription, or “National Service” (NS), 2 is the “cornerstone of Singapore’s

Finally, from an academic perspective, Singapore stands out as an anomaly in the

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

In recent decades, many nations have either reduced their reliance on or

D. THE FUTURE OF CONSCRIPTION

1. Conscription’s Steady Decline

Haltiner’s analysis of Western European countries concludes that “strategic and

2. Conscription’s Continued Relevance

There exist extensive studies of civil-military relations issues, including military

Following the comparisons, the thesis investigates the Singapore government’s

Chapter II focuses on conscription. It reviews conscription and its popular uses as

Next, Chapter III explains the history of conscription in Singapore to provide a

Finally, the thesis concludes by comparing Singapore’s responses with countries

Conscription, and more specifically in this discussion universal military service, is

1. Conscription as a Military Tactic

The first effective use of conscription as a military tactic—not as a means of last

2. Conscription as a Political Tool

Another political advantage of conscription is the enhancement of civilian control

According to Tilly, our modern world’s advanced weaponry, including nuclear

46 Tilly, “How War Made States, and Vice Versa,” 67.

The United States, on the recommendation of the so-called Gates Commission of

1. The United States

Although the founding fathers of the United States considered conscription in

The members of the Gates Commission unanimously recommended in its 1970

Transitioning to an all-volunteer force was initially challenging and the United

58 Pfaffenzeller, “Conscription and Democracy: The Mythology of Civil-Military Relations,” 485–86.

Germany decided to suspend conscription to realign with the changing strategic

According to Lu Wenhao, three factors weighed heavily on the decision to

Second, recent cooling of PRC-Taiwan relations has given Taiwan President Ma

Although many countries have transitioned from conscription to all-volunteer

70 Stanley A. Horowitz, “Implementing an all-Volunteer Force in Taiwan,” Institute for Defense

George J. Stein notes of Switzerland: “A common and oft repeated observation is

Switzerland’s foreign policy, emphasizing neutrality, contributes significantly to

The successful implementation of dissuasion together with its well-known policy

75 Lellenberg, Overview of the Citizen-Army Concept, 19.

Surrounded by significantly larger and traditionally antagonistic enemies, Israel

It is clear, therefore, that the function of conscription in Israel is for fundamental

91 Al-Qazzaz, “Army and Society in Israel,” 162–63.

A. ORIGINS OF NATIONAL SERVICE