1Case digest summary – Maria C. E.

Biggs – March 16, 2021

(1) xx Calalang.

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Facts:

In 1940, the National Traffic Commission recommended that the Director of the Public Works
and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications prohibit animal-drawn vehicles along
Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue for one year. This was done pursuant to Commonwealth Act
No. 548.

Issues:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents unlawfully infer with
legitimate business and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether [those rules and regulations] infringe upon constitutional precepts promoting social
justice and economic security?

Held:

1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting [Act 548], the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by
the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. ... Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental [aim] of the government, the
rights of the individual are subordinated. The paradox [is] that the apparent curtailment of liberty
is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people ... through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium ... [people constitutionally and legally, or through]
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of
salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
paramount objective of the state of promoting health and welfare. This is based on the
fundamental objective of the state of of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
number.”

(2) xx Ericta.

ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioner,

vs.
HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br.
XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C. GALO respondents.
G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970

FACTS:

Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioned the SC to rule
squarely on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law in this proceeding for certiorari and
prohibition against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the
enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition,
filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the validity of such enactment as well as
such administrative order.

Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in
effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: “No motor vehicles of whatever style,
kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such
reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or
luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all
times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night.” 35 Then
came a section on dimensions, placement and color.

The respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether the Reflector Law is unconstitutional.
2.) Whether the same is invalid and contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power.

HELD:
NO. both are valid and constitutional.
It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to
promote public safety. What is delegated is authority which is non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.

1. Police Power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government.
“the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers,” (Justice Holmes) aptly pointed
out “to all the great public needs.”
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where
it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: “Needs that
were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the
nation.

2. Delegation of Legislative Power. It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of

separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other
branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local
affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the
Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute
in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or
not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope
and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a
complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be
done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in
pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be
regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It
is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the
legislative objective is public safety.

(3) xx Rubi.

Case Brief: Rubi et. al. vs. The Provincial Board of Mindoro
January 23, 2018Jeff Rey

G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.

FACTS:

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province
of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the
reservation. It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board
thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial board.

The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and
was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This,
therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to the provincial official and a department head.

HELD:

No.

That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be
zealously protected, the Court agrees.

However, an exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the
central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine
Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the
provincial governor and the provincial board.

Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest
of law and order?” As officials charged with the administration of the province and the
protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the
conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a
backward state?

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

(4) xx Ichong.

ICHONG v HERNANDEZ DIGEST CASE - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

G.R. NO. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LABRADOR, J.

FACTS:

A law, RA No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business" was enacted with an
effect of nationalizing the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are:
(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business
on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural
persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of
juridical persons;
(3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a
provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation
of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to
trade, commerce and industry;
(5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business;
(6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration
with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other
matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal
offices of judicial entities; and
(7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner Inchong, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this
action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary
of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers,
from enforcing its provisions. Inchong attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization
for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of
Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act
was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in
the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject
embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and
the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
ISSUE:

WON RA 1180 is unconstitutional since its exercise violates one’s right to due process and equal
protection as guaranteed by the Constitution

RULING:

NO. The Court finds the enactment of RA 1180 to clearly fall within the scope of police power
of the State. It is clear that the law in question was enacted to remedy a real and actual threat and
danger to the national economy posed by alien dominance and control of retail business and free
citizens and country from the said dominance and control.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just
as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have
transcended human foresight. However, the Constitution has set forth limitations thereof and the
most important of these are: the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

[Conflict] between police power and guarantees of due process and equal protection ... is more
apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees ... coexist. The balancing is the
essence ... the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic
society. There can be no absolute power ... for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be
absolute liberty, for that would mean ... anarchy. [The] State can deprive persons of life, liberty
and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes
and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as
always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. Here that
existed.

The statistics on the retail trade graphically illustrate the alien dominance that concerned the
law's makers. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien
domination and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders, and the
nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), statistics unmistakably pointed to ever-increasing
alien dominance of the retail trade. While there were more Filipino retailers, alien assets and
gross sales averaged between six and seven times those of Filipinos. So the law did not violate
the Constitution's equal protection clause, since sufficient grounds existed for the distinction
between alien and citizen. The same applies to the due process of law clause; the law is
prospective in operation and reasonably protects privileges of aliens already engaged in business.
The wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident
— [both] appropriate [and ] necessary. [But that determination] ... falls within the prerogative of
the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the [courts] may not interfere.

The petition was therefore denied.

(5) xx St. Luke's

St. Luke’s Medical Center Employee’s Foundation v. NLRC

G.R. No. 162053 March 7, 2007

Facts:

Republic Act No. 7431 (the “Radiologic Technology Act of 1992") requires that no person shall
practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines without
having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology.
Petitioner Maribel Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the Radiology department of private
respondent St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC).

Petitioner Maribel S. Santos was advised that only a license could assure her of her continued
employment at the Institute of Radiology. She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, saying her
failure to pass the board licensure exam for X-ray technicians did not constitute just cause for
termination as it violated a right to security of tenure. The appellate court rejected this
contention.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner was legally dismissed pursuant to R.A. 7431?

Held:

Yes, the petitioner's dismissal was valid due to her failure to secure a technician's license.

While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise
may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health,
morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently,
persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical
knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen
careers. The state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements for x-ray technicians and/or
any other professions connected with the health and safety of its citizens. Respondent being
engaged in the hospital and health care business, is a proper subject of the cited law; thus, having
in mind the legal requirements of these laws, the latter cannot close its eyes and complainant
private interest override public interest. The law is clear that the Certificate of Registration
cannot be substituted by any other requirement to allow a person to practice as a Radiologic
Technologist and/or X-ray Technologist.

(6) xx Garin
MMDA V. GARIN (2005)

Facts: Respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, had his driver's license confiscated by MMDA for
parking illegally on Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, in August 1995. He applied for
preliminary injunction, contending that Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA
unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses with no judicial review,
violating due process. Respondent also claimed the provision violated the constitution as an
undue delegation of legislative authority.
The trial court held for respondent, and this appeal followed.

Issue:

1. Whether MMDA, under Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police power.

HELD: Yes. Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well
as municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

The Local Government Code (1991) delegated police power to LGUs. Metropolitan (Metro)
Manila is a body composed of several local government units. Rep. Act No. 7924 declared
Metropolitan Manila a "special development and administrative region" and authorized the
MMDA "development authority" to administer "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region,
coordinating with various national government agencies, non-governmental organizations and
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the metropolitan area.

Rep. Act No. 7924(5)(f) states that MMDA shall "install and administer a single ticketing
system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and
regulations ... and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of ...
traffic laws and regulations ..." and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic
laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards,
or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority,
subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose."

Trial court reversed.