MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION ‘Gedung Perkantoran Bandara Soekarmo-Hatta | Phone: (+62- 21) 2256 6288 | Fax : (+62 -21) 2256 6309 JJ C3, Cengkareng, Tangerang - Indonesia (+82 -21) 2560 8887 SAFETY CIRCULAR Number: SE 12 TAHUN old 1. Title Unreliable Airspeed Indications 2. Applicability All Indonesian operator under OC 91 and AOC 121/135. 3. Background Historical and recent accidents and incidents have highlighted the risk associated with unreliable airspeed (URA) events. These events are normally transient in nature and can cause multiple, seemingly unrelated wamings and failures. The following philosophy and guidelines are provided to assist in reducing the risks associated with URA events. The keys to successfully dealing with a URA event are recognition, procedures, and training. The aircrew’s recognition of and initial reaction to a URA event are critical. Manufacturers should attempt to ensure unreliable airspeed events are clearly identifiable to aircrews. The most important function of the aircrew during an in-flight URA event is to maintain control over the aircraft's flight trajectory and energy situation by selection of attitude and power settings so that the aircrafts flight parameters remain within normal limits. Crews should be aware of the instruments and critical systems that are not affected by a URA event (e.g. Attitude displays, engines). Procedures and training for URA events should include the effect of a URA event on other aircraft systems, and potential alerts/warnings and indication system inaccuracies that could be expected. Crew coordination and communication are important elements in successfully addressing a URA event. URA procedures should provide information on attitude and power settings that enable crews to maintain the aircrafts flight parameters within normal limits during in- flight unreliable airspeed events for all phases of flight. URA procedures should address the availability and use of independent alternate sources of airspeed information (e.9. GPS, inertial, angle of attack, etc.). URA procedures should include memory items for critical immediate action steps. Training programs addressing URA should exist at beginning (ab initio/MPL), initial, and recurrent levels. URA training should include both simulator and academic phases4. Reference Aviation Act No. 1 Year 2009 PM 93 Year 2016 CASR Part 19 “Safety Management System” CASR Part 91 “General Operating and Flight Rules” CASR Part 121 “Certification and Operating Requirements Domestic, Flag and Supplemental Air Carrier’ CASR Part 135 “Certification & Operating Requirement Commuter and Charter” ‘+ Flight Safety Foundation Recommended procedures established by aircraft manufacture in Flight Crew Operating Manual and/or Flight Crew Training Manual 5. Description A failure to promptly recognize and respond to erroneous flight instrument indications can result in loss of control. A simultaneous effect of the primary problem on a Fly- By-Wire aircraft may be the reversion to Flight Control Laws (or Modes) which provide less Flight Envelope Protection than the Normal Law / Mode. The autopilot may also disconnect as a consequence of the fault. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the Air Data systems, Autopilot (AP) and Flight Director (FD) systems and individual AP/FD channels on the specific aircraft type is essential if such a situation is to be managed safely. With knowledge of pitot static systems and an understanding of the types of erroneous indications that can occur, pilots can identify that there is a problem and follow procedures to establish and’ maintain the aircraft in a safe condition by reference to remaining reliable information, in particular by reference to the aircraft attitude in relation to the thrust setting and altitude as verified from at least two similar displays from independent data sources. The Pitot Static System Indicated Airspeed (IAS) is a function of the difference between + The Total Pressure (Pt) measured by a forward facing pitot head or probe and; * The Ambient or Static Pressure (Ps) measured at static plates or ports. Complete or partial blockages of pitot heads and static ports can confuse an unprepared crew and may be caused by In-Flight leing Insects Volcanic Ash Heavy rain Crude Oi! Smoke Failure to remove maintenance seals or protective covers from external vents prior to flight Failure to select pitot static heat on * Damage to the radomelnose cone of an aircraft causing erroneous pitot and ‘static information. 2Effects ‘+ If the pitot probe is blocked but the pitot drain and static ports are free, then in straight and level (cruising) flight the displayed IAS will tend to reduce, eventually indicating zero, ‘+ Ifthe pitot probe and pitot drain are blocked but the static port is free then the IAS will increase during a steady climb and decrease during a steady descent. ‘+ If the pitot probe, pitot drain, and static ports are all blocked then the IAS will remain constant despite changes in actual airspeed. In addition to airspeed indicators, systems which rely on information directly or indirectly (via Air Data Computers) from the pitot-static system are also unreliable if the pitot static system is blocked in some way. © If the static vent only is blocked, then the altimeter will freeze on the altitude that the blockage occurred, the VSI will show zero climb or descent, and the IAS will over-read in the descent or under-read in the climb. Defences ‘+ Inspection of all pitot heads and static ports during the pre-flight aircraft external inspection. «Use of pitot static heat in accordance with the aircraft's fight manual. A comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the Air Data systems, Autopilot (AP) and Flight Director (FD) systems and individual AP/FD channels on your aircraft type. ‘+ Monitoring of primary flight path parameters (pitch attitude, thrust setting and indicated airspeed) during periods of potential icing encounters. ‘+ Awareness of the normal attitudes and power/thrust settings for the various “phases of flight” Recognition of Unreliable Airspeed Indication Abnormally large Mach number or IAS fluctuations, and differences between the indications at each pilot position, or between target and actual speed, may suggest an unreliable airspeed condition. However, all indications may be consistent but equally unreliable if the problem is affecting all pitot-static systems — although it is normal for modem aircraft to be certificated with a standby pitot head of different design to the two main heads. Note also that a difference between target and indicated speed could also be the result of the aircraft being heavier/ighter than planned or as a result of something which is causing unusual drag, such as incorrect configuration for the phase of fight Flight crew awareness of typical speed/pitchithrustfuel flow/climb or descent rate characteristics for the stage of flight is the most effective way of detecting unreliable airspeed indications e.g + airspeed increasing with typical climb pitch attitude and power setting; + airspeed decreasing with typical descent pitch attitude and power setting; Abnormal Auto Thrust or Autopilot behaviour, including disconnection;* Unexpected stall warning (since stall waming is based on angle-of-attack and configuration, it is independent of airspeed indications), an unexpected over ‘speed wamning or simultaneous stall AND over speed warnings; ‘* an unexpected speed/aerodynamic noise relationship. Pilots may only become aware of the problem when the aircraft has adopted an unusual pitch attitude, making the recovery and further control of the situation much more challenging, especially if the aircraft has entered a stall. Recognition of the problem relies on a pilot having a good understanding of the pitch attitudes and Power setting expected for level fight at various speeds/ configurations in normal circumstances. For recognition of a gross error this needn't be much more accurate than, for example; low speed 7deg nose up, medium speed 5 degrees nose up high speed 3 degrees nose up. It is interesting to note that pilots flying highly automated aircraft, who are accustomed to using information such as Flight Path Vector (FPV), are frequently unable to describe these reference figures with any accuracy Autopilot, auto thrust, and flight directors can all contribute to loss of control in the event of unreliable speed. For example, the auto thrust system may erroneously sense an over speed and command a thrust reduction and if the speed is actually much lower, than sensed, a stall could result Response Keep the aircraft away from the low-speed and high-speed ends of the fight envelope. ‘Disconnect the Auto thrust, Autopilot, and Flight Director, + Revert to safe default parameters for pitch attitude and thrust setting; + Every effort should be made to remain in VMC. In the event of unreliable airspeed indications, a crew should fly the approximate pitch and power normally expected at that stage of fight unti itis discovered which (if any) system is indicating correctly or the problem is resolved. Aircraft manufacturers issue appropriate guidance for specific aircraft types including pitch and power settings to fly at different stages of flight if airspeed information is not available. Information in either the Flight Manual or manufacturer's abnormal procedures is comfortingly accurate. With intelligent crew co-operation it is possible to fly surprisingly accurate speeds using the published data. If in doubt, or until more accurate information is available, maintaining a slight nose up attitude and climb power should keep the aircraft safe. Reliable Sources of Information The following information sources, independent of the pitot static systems, can provide reliable information for situational awareness: + 1pm, and fuel flow, for engine thrust indication (not EPR, which may be unreliable); + Pitch and bank display; * FPV (Flight Path Vector) if available and derived from inertial and not barometric sources; Radio height when below 2500ft agi; EGPWS‘© Stick Shaker - may not always be activated but if it is, it is independently reliable; * Navigation systems can provide ground speed and position information (GPS can also provide altitude information); Radio navigation aids and RNAV. ATC, in a radar or ADS-B environment, can provide aircraft ground speed. If TAS can be determined, a rough approximation of IAS at altitude can be calculated by the fomula : IAS=TAS — (FL+2), eg 400TAS FL300 = 250 IAS. Note: Some aircraft systems are configured, as a safety measure, such that stick shakers and pushers will not operate if there is disagreement between systems. Thus, if the aircraft approaches and/or enters a stall, these safety features might not activate. However, if the stick shaker does activate, it should, in the absence of clear contrary indications, be believed Jakarta, QMarch 2018 PSO, M.Sc idya (IVid) 104 199711 1 001