SET # 2

BAR OPERATIONS 2

JOSEPH JOJO D. DAJAY

LLB – 4 PSU – School of Law FOR: DECEMBER 15, 2017

CONTENTS

19. Conchita A. Sonley Vs. Anchor Savings Bank/Equicom Savings Bank

G.R. No. 205623. August 10, 2016

20. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines Vs. Ofelia M. Olivia/Ofelia M. Olivia Vs. National Grid Corporation of th
G.R. No. 213157/G.R. No. 213558. August 10, 2016

21. Hon. Alvin P. Vergara, in his capacity as City Mayor of Cabanatuan City, and Sangguniang Panlungsod Vs. Lourd
G.R. No. 185638. August 10, 2016
22. Sps. Lolita Orencia and Pedro D. Orencia Vs. Felisa Cruz Vda. De Ranin
G.R. No. 190143. August 10, 2016
23. Oscar M. Baysac Vs. Atty. Eloisa M. Aceron-Papa
A.C. No. 10231. August 10, 2016
24. Gloria S. Dy Vs. People of the Philippines, Mandy Commodities Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 189081. August 10, 2016
25. Victoria Echanes Vs. Sps. Patricio Hailar and Adoracion Hailar
G.R. No. 203380. August 10, 2016
26. People of the Philippines Vs. Roman Espia
G.R. No. 213380. August 10, 2016
27. People of the Philippines Vs. Charlie Balisong
G.R. No. 218086. August 10, 2016

28. Bloomberry Resorts and Hotels, Inc. Vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, Henares
G.R. No. 212530. August 10, 2016
29. Soliman Security Services, Inc. and Teresita L. Soliman Vs. Igmedio C. Sarmiento, et al.
G.R. No. 194649. August 10, 2016
30. Republic of the Philippines Vs. Danilo A. Pangasinan
G.R. No. 214077. August 10, 2016
31. People of the Philippines Vs. Manuel Prado y Marasigan
G.R. No. 214450. August 10, 2016
32. Arnold G. Tecson Vs. Atty. Maricel Lilled Asuncion-Roxas
A.M. No. P-16-3515. August 10, 2016
33. Milagros Hernandez Vs. Edwina C. Ocampo, et al.
G.R. No. 181268. August 15, 2016
34. Elizabeth Alburo Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 196289. August 15, 2016
35. People of the Philippines Vs. Rodel Bolo y Maldo
G.R. No. 217024. August 15, 2016
36. IBM Philippines, Inc. Vs. Prime Systems Plus, Inc.
G.R. No. 203192. August 15, 2016
19

G.R. No. 205623

CONCHITA A SONLEY, Petitioner 
vs.
ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK/EQUICOM SAVINGS BANK, Respondent

FACTS:

On January 28, 2005, she agreed to purchase a real property from [Anchor] for the sum of
Php2,200,000.00. The said real property pertained to a parcel of land that had been foreclosed by
[Anchor] with an area of 126.50 square meters located at Fairview, Quezon City. Pursuant to the
said agreement, the parties entered into a Contract to Sell  whereby the petitioner agreed to pay
the amount of Php200,000.00 as down payment with the balance of Php2,000,000.00 payable in
sixty (60) monthly installments amounting to Php47,580.00.

Petitioner, however, defaulted in paying her monthly obligations which prompted [Anchor]
to rescind the contract to sell. In filing the complaint petitioner averred that the rescission of the
contract to sell was null and void because she had already substantially paid her obligation to the
bank.

Anchor denied the allegations that were made by the petitioner in her complaint. On the
contrary, it contended that the post-dated checks which were issued by the petitioner in its favor
covering the monthly installments for the purchase of the subject property were all dishonored by
the drawee bank when they were presented for payment. Thus, [Anchor] averred that petitioner
should not be allowed to benefit from her own fault and prevent [Anchor] from exercising its right
to rescind their contract to sell.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court may issue a writ of execution against the petitioner
despite the fact that the issuance thereof was not specifically provided for in the judgment
which it rendered based on compromise agreement.

HELD:

Considering the aforequoted stipulations in the compromise agreement and the

contract to sell, this Court does not find any merit in the claim of the petitioner that [Anchor]
could not avail of the remedy of rescission in case of default in payment by the petitioner. On
the contrary, the intent of the contracting parties was clearly embodied in the compromise
agreement when the said agreement stated that the petitioner should pay additional charges
should she default in the payment of her obligations x x x. The payment of said additional
amounts, however, shall be without prejudice to [Anchor’s] right to rescind the contract to sell
and consider the payments that were already made by the petitioner as rentals for her use
and occupation of the subject property.

Verily, it is a settled rule that a compromise agreement, once approved by final order of the
court, has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except
for vices of consent or forgery. Hence, a decision on a compromise agreement is final and
executory and it has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties. It transcends its
identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto as it becomes a judgment
that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules of Court. In this regard, Article 2041
of the Civil Code explicitly provides that, if one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the
compromise agreement, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as
rescinded and insist upon his or her original demand.
20

NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

v. OFELIAM. OLIVA, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE CITY TREASURER OF CEBU
CITY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 213157, August 10, 2016

OFELIA M. OLLVA, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE CITY TREASURER OF CEBU

CITY, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 213558

FACTS:

On September 24, 2009, NGCP received from the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City,
three (3) Final Notices of Demand, all dated September 16, 2009, addressed to National Power
Corporation/Transco. It was stated in the Notices of Demand that Transco/NPC was served
Notices of Delinquency for all the above properties in 2008 and that failure to pay the amount
demanded would result in the Public Auction of the properties above-mentioned.

Petitioner NGCP paid the total amount demanded under protest on November 11, 2009 for
P2,792,862.41. The written protest was filed on the same day at the office of, the City Treasurer
of Cebu City albeit that protest-letter is dated October 6, 2009.

The City Treasurer of Cebu did not act on [NGCP's] written protest. Petitioner NGCP sent its
appeal by way of registered mail on March 11, 2010, to the LBAA of Cebu City. petitioner NGCP
received copies of its verified Petition from the Post Office of Diliman, [Quezon City] with notation
"RTS, insufficient address, NGCP filed its Motion to Admit Petition with the LBAA of Cebu City. In
July 2010[,] the LBAA directed the City Treasurer and City Assessor of Cebu City to file their
Comment on [NGCP's] Motion. The City Assessor[,] on his own, did not interpose any objection.
The City Attorney, however, opposed the, same in his Comment/Opposition on [the] ground that
the NGCP's Petition was filed out of time and prayed the Local Board to dismiss the same
accordingly. On October 12, 2010, the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Cebu City issued
the assailed Order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the tax liabilities to the City Government of Cebu.

HELD:

NGCP took control of the subject properties in 2009. Although laws on real property taxes
are prescribed by the Local Government Code, it is imperative to examine the applicable tax
provisions in NGCP's franchise.

Section 939 of RA 9511 provides that NGCP shall pay "a franchise tax equivalent to three
percent (3%) of all gross receipts derived by the Grantee from its operation under this franchise."
This franchise tax is "in lieu of income tax and any and all taxes, duties, fees and charges of
any kind, nature or description levied, established or collected by any authority whatsoever,
local or national, on its franchise, rights, privileges, receipts, revenues and profits, and on
properties used in connection with its franchise, from which taxes, duties and charges, the
Grantee is hereby expressly exempted."

It is very clear that NGCP's payment of franchise tax exempts it from payment of real
property taxes on properties used in connection with its franchise. However, NGCP's tax exempt
status on real property due to the "in lieu of all taxes" clause is qualified: NGCP shall be liable to
pay the same tax as other corporations on real estate, buildings and personal property exclusive
of their franchise. The phrase "exclusive of this franchise" means! that real estate, buildings, and
personal property used in the exercise of the franchise are not subject to the same tax as other
corporations.

21

HONORABLE ALVIN P. VERGARA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF CABANATUAN

CITY AND SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF CABANATUAN CITY, Petitioners 
vs.
LOURDES MELENCIO S GRECIA, REPRESENTED BY RENATO GRECIA, AND SANDRA
MELENCIO IN REPRESENTATION OF MA. PAZ SAGADO VDA. DE MELENCIO, CONCHITA
MELENCIO, CRISTINA MELENCIO AND LEONARDO MELENCIO, Respondents

G.R. No. 185638

FACTS:

That sometime in 1989, the subject land was taken by the Sanggunian for road-right-of-
way and road widening projects. Despite the taking of the subject land and the completion of the
road widening projects, the Sanggunian failed to tender the just compensation to the
respondents. Upon the request of Lourdes, the Sanggunian created an appraisal committee,
composed of City Assessor of Cabanatuan Lorenza L. Esguerra as Chairman, with City Treasurer
Bernardo C. Pineda and City Engineer Mac Arthur C. Yap as members, to determine the proper
amount of just compensation to be paid by the Sanggunian for the subject land. The Appraisal
Committee then issued Resolution No. 20-S-2001 7 recommending the payment of P2,295.00 per
sqm. as just compensation.8

Thereafter, the Sanggunian issued Resolution No. 148-2000  authorizing Mayor Vergara

to negotiate, acquire, purchase and accept properties needed by the Sanggunian for its project.

More than four years had lapsed after the signing of the MOA but no payment was ever
made by the petitioners to the respondents despite the fact that the subject land was already
taken by the petitioners and was being used by the constituents of the City of Cabanatuan.
However, before the records of appeal were submitted to the CA, the respondents filed a Motion
for Partial Execution before the RTC-Branch 86.

ISSUE:

Whether there is propriety in the partial execution of the judgment pending appeal.

HELD:

Undisputedly, in this case, the purpose of the condemnation is public but there was no
payment of just compensation to the respondents. The petitioners should have first instituted
eminent domain proceedings and deposit with the authorized government depositary an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the subject land before it occupied the same. Due to the
petitioners' omission, the respondents were constrained to file inverse condemnation proceedings
to demand the payment of just compensation before the trial court. From 1989 until the present,
the respondents were deprived of just compensation, while the petitioners continuously burdened
their property.
22

SPOUSES LOLITA ORENCIA AND PEDRO D. ORENCIA, Petitioners, v. FELISA CRUZ VDA.

DE RANIN, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MRS. ESTELA C.
TANCHOCO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 190143, August 10, 2016

FACTS:

The records showed that the petitioners had been occupying Door No. 4 of the seven-
door apartment and lot which is registered under the name of the respondent as evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 514491 7 and Tax Declarations (TD) No. TY 004-13393 8 and
No. 00-TY-004-5912.9chanrobleslaw

In her complaint, the respondent alleged that the petitioners stopped and failed to pay
the monthly rental on the subject property starting April 15, 2005. On April 24, 2006, the
respondent, through counsel, sent to the petitioners a formal letter of demand to vacate, 10 which
was received by the petitioners' representative in the subject property on May 2, 2006 as certified
by the Postmaster of the Philippine Postal Corporation of Taytay, Rizal. The respondent also
referred the matter to the barangay for conciliation proceedings. However, despite the demand to
vacate and referral to the barangay, the petitioners continuously refused to vacate the subject
property. Consequently, since no conciliation was agreed upon, a Certification to File
Action11 was issued.12chanroblesla

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent has the right of physical possession of the subject property.

HELD:

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied. "The possession of the defendant in an unlawful detainer
case is originally legal but becomes illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.
When the defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership
shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

Undeniably, it is evident from the records of the case that the petitioners are the
occupants of the subject property which they do not own. The respondent was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that she is the owner and the rightful possessor of the subject
property. The respondent has the right of possession over the subject property being its
registered owner under TCT No. 514491. The TCT of the respondent is, therefore, evidence of
indefeasible title over the subject property and, as its holder, she is entitled to its possession as a
matter of right.

On the other hand, aside from their bare allegation that the respondent is not the owner
of the subject property, the petitioners presented nothing to support their claim. They did not
submit any piece of evidence showing their right to possess the subject property. Thus, their
unsubstantiated arguments are not, by themselves, enough to offset the respondent's right as the
registered owner.
23

OSCAR M. BAYSAC, Complainant, 
v. ATTY. ELOISA M. ACERON-PAPA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10231, August 10, 2016

FACTS:

Complainant Oscar M. Baysac (complainant) owns a property with an area of 322 sq. m. covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-58159 and registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Trece Martires City. The property was mortgaged by complainant to Spouses Emmanuel and
Rizalina Cruz (Spouses Cruz) on December 20, 2000.2 The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage3 was
notarized by Atty. Renelie B. Mayuga-Donato on December 20, 2000.

In February 2003, complainant went to the Registry of Deeds of Trece Martires City to get a
certified true copy of the certificate of title of the property because the property had a prospective
buyer. However, complainant was surprised to find out that TCT No. T-58159 had already been
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-670894 was issued in favor of Spouses Cruz.

After further investigation, complainant found out that the property was transferred in the name of
Spouses Cruz pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale6 which was allegedly executed on January
13, 2003 for the consideration of P100,000.00.7

The Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly signed by complainant, as the owner of the
property, was notarized by respondent on January 13, 2003.  Complainant, however, vehemently
denied having ever signed the Deed of Absolute Sale and having ever appeared before a notary
public on January 13, 2003 to acknowledge the same. He claimed that he was in Tanza, Cavite
that entire day with Ms. Flocerfida A. Angeles (Ms. Angeles) searching for a buyer of the property.
Complainant further stated that the Deed of Absolute Sale showed that what he allegedly
presented to the notary public when he acknowledged having executed the document was his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) issued on May 26, 2000 or three years prior to the execution of
the Deed of Absolute Sale. The same CTC was used for the notarization of the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage on December 20, 2000.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is administratively liable.

HELD:

In this case, however, it would have been physically impossible for complainant to
appear before respondent and sign the Deed of Absolute Sale on January 13, 2003. On that
same day, complainant was with Ms. Angeles in Tanza, Cavite the whole day. Ms. Angeles, in
her affidavit, confirmed this fact. Further, the NBI's findings in its Questioned Documents Report
show that the signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale was not signed by complainant. These
allegations remain un rebutted despite the opportunity given to complainant to do so.

Therefore, the affidavit of Ms. Angeles, and the findings of the NBI prove that
respondent violated the Notarial Law when she notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale without the
personal appearance of complainant. It was respondent's duty as notary public to require the
personal appearance of the person executing the document to enable the former to verify the
genuineness of his signature.34 Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence
of the affiant does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that
the affiants may not be who they purport to be.

By notarizing a spurious document, respondent has made a mockery of the legal

solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment. 41 Respondent's failure to perform her duty as a
notary public resulted not only in the damage to those directly affected by the notarized
document, but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public, and in degrading the function of
notarization.42 Precisely because of respondent's act, complainant was unlawfully deprived of his
property.

24

GLORIA S. DY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANDY COMMODITIES CO.,

INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, WILLIAM MANDY, Respondent.

G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner was the former General Manager of MCCL. In the course of her employment,
petitioner assisted MCCI in its business involving several properties. One such business
pertained to the construction of warehouses over a property (Numancia Property) that MCCI
leased from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Sometime in May 1996, in pursuit of MCCI's
business, petitioner proposed to William Mandy (Mandy), President of MCCI, the purchase of a
property owned by Pantranco. As the transaction involved a large amount of money, Mandy
agreed to obtain a loan from the International China Bank of Commerce (ICBC). Petitioner
represented that she could facilitate the approval of the loan. True enough, ICBC granted a loan
to MCCI in the amount of P20,000,000.00, evidenced by a promissory note. As security, MCCI
also executed a chattel mortgage over the warehouses in the Numancia Property. Mandy
entrusted petitioner with the obligation to manage the payment of the loan.

ISSUE:

The central issue is the propriety of making a finding of civil liability in a criminal case
for estafa when the accused is acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of
the crime charged.

HELD:

The Civil Code states that when an accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for
the same act or omission may be filed. In the latter case, only preponderance of evidence is
required.  This is supported by the Rules of Court which provides that the extinction of the criminal
action does not result in the extinction of the corresponding civil action.  The latter may only be
extinguished when there is a "finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."  Consistent with this, the Rules of
Court requires that in judgments of acquittal the court must state whether "the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist
25

VICTORIA ECHANES VS. SPS. PATRICIO HAILAR AND ADORACION HAILAR

G.R. NO. 203880; AUGUST 10, 2016

FACTS:

The late Eduardo Cuenta was the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 1,447
square meters, As the owner of the said property, he was issued Tax Declaration No. 7622-C.
The heirs of Eduardo Cuenta executed an Extrajudicial Settlement [7] dividing and adjudicating
unto themselves the parcel of land left by Eduardo Cuenta.

A portion of Lot No. 2297 denominated as Lot No. 2297-A comprising 495 square meters was
adjudicated to petitioner who is one of the heirs (granddaughter) of Eduardo Cuenta. Thereafter,
petitioner applied for a free patent over Lot No. 2997-A. Accordingly, an Original Certificate of
Title No. P-43056 was issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur on October 15,
1996.

A portion of Lot No. 2291-A with an area of more or less 80 square meters is currently occupied
by respondents. Since petitioner’s children are in need of the area currently occupied by
respondents, petitioner sent respondents a Notice to Vacate dated March 12,2009. The demand
letter was received by the respondents on March 13, 2009. Despite receipt of said demand letter,
respondents refused to vacate the premises.[10]

ISSUE:

Who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in
dispute?

HELD:

In an action for forcible entry and detainer, if plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in
himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he
cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and
detainer even if he should be the owner of the property.

There is no dispute that the respondents had continuously and openly occupied and possessed,
in the concept of an owner, the subject property from the time they purchased it from Eduardo
Cuenta. They segregated and declared for taxation purposes as early as 1959 the portion of Lot
No. 2297-A consisting of 231 square meters. The property was consistently declared for taxation
purposes until 2007. While tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proofs of
possession, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner based on the
presumption that no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not his
actual or constructive possession. At the very least, they constitute proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property.
26

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. ROMAN ESPIA, Accused-Appellant,
JESSIE MORANA, REX ALFARO, RODRIGO AZUCENA, JR., AND RENANTE
ABISADO, Accused,
G.R. No. 213380, August 10, 2016

FACTS:

On 21 February 1991, at around 7:00 in the evening, appellant, Jessie Morana (Jessie),
Rex Alfaro (Rex), Rodrigo Azucena, Jr. (Rodrigo) and Renante Abisado (Renante) entered the
Ganzon's residence and declared a hold-up after pointing their guns at Mrs. Estela Ganzon (Mrs.
Ganzon) and house helper, Azucena Perez (Azucena). While appellant was standing by the door
as a look out, the hands and feet of Mr. Melberto Ganzon (Mr. Ganzon), Azucena, and another
house helper, Danilo Ballener (Danilo) were being tied by one of the co-accused. Later on, Danilo
saw another co-accused bring Mrs. Ganzon to the bedroom and overheard her say, "Here are the
jewelry and the cash we collected for the day. " The men who entered the house also took the
silverware, chinaware and other valuables of the spouses.
After some time, the men locked Danilo and Azucena inside the bathroom and told them that they
will just borrow the spouses. Thereafter, Danilo and Azucena heard the sound of the spouses'
jeepney speeding away.

When the house helpers were able to free themselves from the ropes, they immediately
reported the incident to Mrs. Ganzon's father. When the latter came, it was learned that
P300,000.00 amount of cash, P1,000,000.00 amount of jewelry, and P210,000.00 amount of
checks were taken. Spouses Ganzon were found dead due to gunshot wounds on their heads in
Gen. Luna, Barotac, Viejo the following morning.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court erred in finding that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt accused-appellant's guilt.

HELD:

In the crime of robbery with homicide, what is essential: is that there is a direct relation or
intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or
subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.  When homicide
is committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in
the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery
with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that
they endeavored to prevent the same.

No doubt exists that all the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar. Appellant's
co-accused admitted the taking of the cash, checks, and pieces of jewelry of Spouses Ganzon. In
fact, some of which were even found in the houses of his co-accused. Furthermore, the
testimonies of the eyewitnesses were strengthened by the admission of Rex and Jessie that they
indeed used firearms in order to ensure the consummation of the robbery. Importantly, the
contemporaneous acts of appellant and his co-accused in entering the Ganzon's residence;
ordering its occupants to drop to the ground; asking where the money and other valuables were
kept; and taking the cash and several personal belongings of the Spouses Ganzon prove that
they were initially motivated by animus lucrandi. The testimony of co-accused Morana regarding
the robbery up to the events leading to the killing of the victims establishes that the crime of
homicide was committed on the occasion or by reason of robbery.
27

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. CHARLIE BALISONG, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 218086, August 10, 2016

FACTS:

In an Information3 dated September 5, 2011, accused-appellant Charlie Balisong was

charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide, committed by wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously having sexual intercourse with AAA, 4 the 62-year-old mother of his common-law
wife, against her will and by means of force and intimidation, and thereafter choking her to death.
The accusatory portion of said Information reads:

That on or about September 3, 2011, in the evening thereof, at Brgy. Poblacion East,
Municipality of Milagros, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, with lewd design and by means of force, and intimidation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with the
herein complainant, AAA, a 62-year old woman, and thereafter choked to death the said victim,
against her will.

BBB testified that in the evening of September 3, 2011, he and his grandmother, AAA, were
sleeping in AAA's house when appellant, his stepfather, suddenly entered the house and
undressed himself and AAA. AAA shouted for help but appellant did not stop and continued to
choke her. When AAA became unconscious, appellant went on top of her and proceeded to rape
her. Thereafter, appellant dragged her lifeless body and threw her into a nearby river. BBB was
unable to shout for help because he was afraid of appellant. The following morning, he reported
the incident to his mother, DDD, and grandfather, EEE, in the presence of appellant, who denied
the same.8 Thereafter, DDD and EEE rushed to the river and found AAA's lifeless body, which
was naked from the waist-up, with her lower garments below her knees. 9 That same day, they
reported the incident to the Milagros Municipal Police Station of Masbate and brought the cadaver
to the Office of the Municipal Health Officer where the autopsy thereon was performed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the Special complex
crime of Rape with homicide

HELD:

In the instant case, the Court concurs with the rulings of both the trial and appellate courts in
categorically finding the presence of the foregoing elements. In proving the guilt of appellant, the
prosecution presented the testimonies of BBB, the 8-year-old stepson of appellant and grandson
of AAA, as well as that of Dr. Calucin, the Municipal Health Officer of Milagros, Masbate who
conducted the post-mortem examination on AAA's body. A plain and simple reading of BBB's
testimony reveals his unquestionable certainty as to the identity of appellant as well as to the
manner by which AAA was raped and killed. From a distance of a mere few feet away, BBB
witnessed, with his own eyes, the event in its entirety from the moment appellant entered the
house and undressed himself and AAA, to the time he choked and placed himself on top of her,
up until the moment when he dragged her lifeless body out of the house to throw her into a
nearby river. In fact, as aptly observed by the trial court, he unmistakably pointed at appellant,
whose familiarity as his stepfather was unassailable.
28

BLOOMBERRY RESORTS AND HOTELS, INC., Petitioner, 

v. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REPRESENTED BY COMMISSIONER KIM S.
JACINTO-HENARES, Respondent
G.R. No. 212530, August 10, 2016

FACTS:

The factual antecedents of the case reveal that, on 8 April 2009, PAGCOR granted to
petitioner a provisional license to establish and operate an integrated resort and casino complex
at the Entertainment City project site of PAGCOR. Petitioner and its parent company, Sureste
Properties, Inc., own and operate Solaire Resort & Casino. Thus, being one of its licensees,
petitioner only pays PAGCOR license fees, in lieu of all taxes, as contained in its provisional
license and consistent with the PAGCOR Charter or Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1869, 3 which
provides the exemption from taxes of persons or entities contracting with PAGCOR in casino
operations.

However, when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9337 took effect, it amended Section 27(C) of the
NIRC of 1997, which excluded PAGCOR from the enumeration of government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs) exempt from paying corporate income tax. The enactment of
the law led to the case of PAGCOR v. The Bureau of Internal Revenue, et al., where PAGCOR
questioned the validity or constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 removing its exemption from paying
corporate income tax, and therefore alleging the same to be void for being repugnant to the equal
protection and the non-impairment clauses embodied in the 1987 Philippine Constitution

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the assailed provision of RMC No. 33-2013 subjecting

the contractees and licensees of PAGCOR to income tax under the NIRC of 1997,
as amended, was issued by respondent CIR with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
2. Whether or not said provision is valid or constitutional considering that Section 13(2)
(b) of PD No. 1869, as amended (PAGCOR Charter), grants tax exemptions to
such contractees and licensees.

HELD:

1. Given that [PAGCOR's] Charter is not deemed repealed or amended by R.A. No.
9337, [PAGCOR's] income derived from gaming operations is subject only to the five
percent (5%) franchise tax, in accordance with P.D. 1869, as amended. With respect to
[PAGCOR's] income from operation of other related services, the same is subject to income tax
only. The five percent (5%) franchise tax finds no application with respect to [PAGCOR's] income
from other related services, in view of the express provision of Section 14(5) of P.D. No. 1869, as
amended.

The Court through Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, categorically followed what was simply provided
under the PAGCOR Charter (PD No. 1869, as amended by RA No. 9487), by proclaiming that
despite amendments to the NIRC of 1997, the said Charter remains in effect. Thus, income
derived by PAGCOR from its gaming operations such as the operation and licensing of gambling
casinos, gaming clubs and other similar recreation or amusement places, gaming pools and
related operations is subject only to 5% franchise tax, in lieu of all other taxes, including corporate
income tax. The Court concluded that the CIR committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued RMC No. 33-2013 subjecting
both income from gaming operations and other related services to corporate income tax
and 5% franchise tax considering that it unduly expands the Court's Decision dated 15
March 2011 without due process, which creates additional burden upon PAGCOR.

2. As the PAGCOR Charter states in unequivocal terms that exemptions granted for
earnings derived from the operations conducted under the franchise specifically from the payment
of any tax, income or otherwise, as well as any form of charges, fees or levies, shall inure to the
benefit of and extend to corporation(s), association(s), agency(ies), or individual(s) with whom
the PAGCOR or operator has any contractual relationship in connection with the operations of the
casino(s) authorized to be conducted under this Franchise, so it must be that all contractees and
licensees of PAGCOR, upon payment of the 5% franchise tax, shall likewise be exempted from
all other taxes, including corporate income tax realized from the operation of casinos.

29

SOLIMAN SECURITY SERVICES, INC. AND TERESITA L. SOLIMAN, Petitioners, 

v. IGMEDIO C. SARMIENTO, JOSE JUN CADA AND ERVIN R. ROBIS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 194649, August 10, 2016

FACTS:

Respondents were hired as security guards by petitioner Soliman Security Services, Inc.
and were assigned to Interphil Laboratories, working seven (7) days a week for twelve (12)
straight hours daily. Respondents alleged that during their employment - from May 1997 until
January 2007 for Robis and from May 2003 until January 2007 for Sarmiento and Cada — they
were paid only P275.00 a day for eight (8) hours of work or P325.00 for twelve (12) hours of work
but were not paid ECOLA, night shift differentials, holiday pay, as well as rest day premiums. For
cash bond and mutual aid contributions, the amounts of P400.00 and P100.00, respectively, were
deducted from their salaries per month. Respondents claimed that they sought a discussion of
the nonpayment of their benefits with petitioner Teresita Soliman but the latter refused to take
heed and told them to tender their resignations instead. According to respondents, on 21 January
2007, they received an order relieving them from their posts and since then, they were not given
any assignments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents were dismissed from their employment as security
guards.

HELD:

Though respondents were not per se dismissed on 20 January 2007 when they were
ordered relieved from their posts, we find that they were constructively dismissed when they were
not given new assignments. As previously mentioned, placing security guards under floating
status or temporary off-detail has been an established industry practice. It must be emphasized,
however, that they cannot be placed under floating status indefinitely; thus, the Court has applied
Article 29221 (formerly Article 286) of the Labor Code by analogy to set the specific period of
temporary off-detail to a maximum of six (6) months. 22 It must also be clarified that such provision
does not entitle agencies to retain security guards on floating status for a period of not more than
six (6) months for whatever reason. Placing employees on floating status requires the dire
exigency of the employer's bona fide suspension of operation. In security services, this happens
when there is a surplus of security guards over available assignments as when the clients that do
not renew their contracts with the security agency are more than those clients that do.
30

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

v. DANILO A. PANGASINAN, Respondent
GR. No. 214077, August 10, 2016

FACTS:

Danilo and Josephine first met at the Philippine Plaza Hotel in Manila where they were both
working sometime in 1981. Following a three-month courtship, Josephine became pregnant. To
erase any notion of impropriety, the couple immediately contracted marriage, first civilly on
December 29, 1981, followed by a church wedding on January 23, 1982. 4 The couple begot three
children—Juan Carlo, Julia Erika, and Josua.

At the outset, life for Danny and Josephine generally ran harmoniously, although marred from
time to time by arguments about money matters. They did not have any major problems, and
even became partners in Danilo's business pursuits. 5 Signs of marital kinks appeared when
Danilo's business began to slow down. This caused the couple to fight incessantly, since Danilo
began to have difficulty supporting Josephine and their children at the same level to which they
were accustomed.6 Allegations of infidelity on the part of Danilo compounded things.nrobleslaw

Sometime in September 2007, Josephine underwent hysterectomy. Four days after bringing
her home from the hospital, Danilo flew to Tacloban for a business trip, which Josephine already
knew of even prior to her operation. As it turned out, Josephine did not want him to leave. Danilo
came home to find an irate Josephine seething at him. Josephine's sudden demand to see his
bank passbook so enraged Danilo that he tossed the passbook in front of her. Josephine, in turn,
became incensed and started to curse and berate him. Out of anger and exasperation, Danilo
grabbed and smashed two glass cups beside him, while Josephine continued on with her tirade
against him. Josephine left the conjugal home the next day, never to resume cohabitation with
Danilo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Josephine's psychological incapacity is a medically rooted psychological

affliction that was incurable and existing at the inception of their marriage.

HELD:

It is true that in petitions for nullification of marriages, it is not necessary that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. If the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.  However, the
totality of evidence must still prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the
alleged psychological incapacity.  In addition to the foregoing, the psychological illness and its
root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage.c

In this case, there is no such reliable and independent evidence establishing Josephine's
psychological condition and its associations in her early life. Aside from what Danilo relayed to Dr.
Dayan, no other evidence supports his claim and Dr. Dayan's finding that the root cause of
Josephine's personality disorder antedated the marriage since Emelie and Jay's testimonies
covered circumstances that transpired after the marriage.
31

G.R. No. 214450, August 10, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL PRADO Y MARASIGAN, Accused-

Appellants.

FACTS:

That on 15 April 1999, SPO1 Saludes and other policemen, including the deceased
Police Officer 1 Weddy Arato (PO1 Arato), received information about an illegal gambling
operation at Ciba-Geigy, Canlubang, Laguna. There were many people at the site when the team
reached the place. As the team was about to ask questions, four (4) men equipped with short and
long fireamis suddenly appeared and fired upon them, instantly killing PO1 Arato and hitting
SPO1 Saludes. SPO1 Saludes identified appellant in open court as one of the four (4) men;
appellant had been outfitted with a short firearm that fateful day.

Appellant interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. He asserted that this is a case of mistaken
identity and that he had been in Leyte in 2008 at the time of his arrest. 7 His sister, Teresa Sartiso,
sought to support appellant's defenses but had no documentary proof therefor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged.

HELD:

Well-settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility
of the witnesses, and has the unique opportunity to observe the witness first hand and note his
demeanor, conduct and attitude under gruelling examination.  Absent any showing that the trial
court's findings of facts were tainted with arbitrariness or that it overlooked or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of significance and value, or its calibration of credibility was flawed, the
appellate court is bound by its assessment.
32

ARNOLD G. TENGSON, Complainant 
vs.
ATTY. MARICEL LILLED ASUNCION-ROXAS, Clerk of Court VI, Branch 23, Regional Trial
Court, Trece Martires City, Cavite, Respondent
A.M. No. P-16-3515
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 15-4401-P)

FACTS:

At the time of the institution of the said criminal case, the complainant, was employed as
a Draftsman in Doha, Qatar under a six-year contract with Qatar Petroleum, effective until
September 3, 2011. Consequently, the Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the RTC of Trece
Martires City issued a Hold-Departure Order against the complainant. The complainant's name
was then included in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and in the Look-Out
List in the Passport Division of , the Department of Foreign Affairs. 

On October 10, 2013, the RTC of Trece Martires City, Branch 23, rendered a Decision in
the criminal case finding the complainant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
A copy of the said decision was received by the complainant on November 4, 2013. On even
date, the complainant filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC of Trece Martires City, Branch 23. 

In a letter dated January 23, 2015, the complainant requested ' the Clerk of Court of the
RTC of Trece Martires City, Branch 23, , herein respondent, to transmit the records of Criminal
Case No. TMCR-038-08 to the CA within five days. However, the respondent still failed to
transmit the records of Criminal Case No. TMCR-038-08 to the CA. The complainant claims that
since he could not file with the CA any motion to lift the Hold-Departure Order issued by the ,
RTC, he could not accept the employment offered to him in Lagos, Nigeria.

On March 18, 2015, the complainant filed an affidavit-complaint with the OCA charging
the respondent with gross neglect of duty. In the , Indorsement  dated March 26, 2015, the OCA
required the respondent to submit a comment within 10 days from notice. On May 18, 2015, the
respondent submitted her comment. 

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent is guilty of gross neglect of duty.

HELD:

It appears that the respondent was only able to transmit the complete records of Criminal
Case No. TMCR-038-08 to the CA on February 23, 2015 - more than a year after the complainant
filed his notice of appeal on November 4, 2013. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the respondent
was indeed remiss in her duty as a clerk of court. The respondent's failure to transmit the records
of Criminal Case No. TMCR-038-08 to the CA for one year and three months is unreasonably
long; it unquestionably amounts to gross neglect of duty considering that the case involves the
right of an accused to appeal his conviction to the CA.

The respondent's excuse of heavy workload deserves scant consideration. The Court notes
that trial courts are indeed heavily laden with workload due to the number of cases filed and
pending before them. It does not, however, serve as a convenient excuse to evade administrative
liability; otherwise, every government employee faced with negligence and dereliction of duty
would resort to that excuse to evade ·punishment, to the detriment of the public service

33

MILAGROS HERNANDEZ, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, FE HERNANDEZ-

ARCEO, Petitioner, 

v. EDWINA C. OCAMPO, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, FELICITAS R. MENDOZA,

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, THE SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BINAN, LAGUNA, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALAMBA CITY,
LAGUNA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 181268, August 15, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner Milagros Hernandez (Hernandez) alleges that sometime in 1985, she bought
from Romeo Uy An (An) two parcels of land, Lot 8 Block 3 (Lot 8) and Lot 6 Block 3 (Lot 6), both
located in Binan, Laguna, as evidenced by a deed of sale.  From 1985, she was in continuous,
open, and adverse possession of these lots. Until now, her daughter, Fe Hernandez-Arceo and
her family occupy them. Hernandez entrusted the registration of the lots in her name to her son-
in-law, Ricardo San Andres. However, he died in 1991 without transferring the titles to
Hernandez's name.  At that time, Hernandez was already residing in the United States  and was
not aware of the non-registration of the lots. Due to old age, she has also not come back to the
Philippines for a long time.

Sometime in 2002, Hernandez and her family were surprised to receive a letter from
one Atty. Agapito Carait, who wrote in behalf of respondent Felicitas R. Mendoza (Mendoza),
demanding that they vacate Lot 8.   Upon investigation, they discovered that the titles to the lots
were registered in the names of Mendoza and respondent Edwina Ocampo (Ocampo) by virtue of
a Deed of Sale dated April 13, 1989 executed by An. Lot 8 was then covered by TCT No. T-
193772 and registered in the name of Mendoza, while Lot 6 was covered by TCT No. T-193 773
and registered in the name of Ocampo.

Hernandez and her family also discovered that the lots were mortgaged. Lot 8 was
mortgaged with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) and Lot 6 was mortgaged
with Philippine Savings Bank(PSB).

ISSUE:

Whether Hernandez is entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

HELD:

Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the
property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding
the property adversely to the judgment obligor.

From the foregoing, upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or
redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the
judgment debtor to the property, and its possession shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner. It is but logical that Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court be applied also to
cases involving extrajudicially foreclosed properties that were bought by a purchaser and later
sold to third-party-purchasers after the lapse of the redemption period.  The possession of the
property, however, will not be given to either the purchaser, redemptioner or third-party-purchaser
when a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor. In which
case, the issuance of the writ of possession ceases to be ex-parte  and non-adversarial.

34

ELIZABETH ALBURO, Petitioner, 
v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 196289, August 15, 2016

FACTS:

yPetitioner and her husband bought a house and lot from petitioner's sister-in-law, Elsa Alburo-
Walter, who is married to James Walter, through Aurelio Tapang in his capacity as attorney-in-
fact of Elsa and James Walter. The subject property is located at Villasol Subdivision, Brgy.
Santol, Angeles City, covered by TCT No. 71458. The agreed consideration is Fifty Thousand
U.S. Dollars ($50,000.00) or its peso equivalent. Petitioner and her husband made a partial
payment of Twenty-One Thousand U.S. Dollars ($21,000.00) and the remaining balance has
been paid through four (4) postdated checks issued by petitioner, now the subjects of this case.
The checks eventually bounced, thus, four (4) separate Informations for violation of B.P. 22 were
filed with the MTCC, Branch 2, Angeles City against petitioner

ISSUE:

Whether the accused shall liable for the crime charged without proof that notice of
dishonor was not duly served.

HELD:

To hold a person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must not only establish that a
check was issued and that the same was subsequently dishonored, it must further be shown that
accused knew at the time of the issuance of the check that he did not have sufficient funds or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment. This
knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit at the time of the issuance of the check is the second
element of the offense. Inasmuch as this element involves a state of mind of the person making,
drawing or issuing the check which is difficult to prove, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a  prima
facie presumption of such knowledge

The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply proof for the second element
arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up, but also affords the offender due
process.29 The law thereby allows the offender to avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of the
check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for the payment in full, of the check by
the drawee within five banking days from receipt of the written' notice that the check had not been
paid.30 Thus, the absence of a notice of dishonor is a deprivation of petitioner's statutory right.
35

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODEL BOLO Y MALDO, Accused-

Appellant

G.R. No. 217024, August 15, 2016

FACTS:

In an Information  dated April 13, 2007, accused-appellant Rodel Bolo y Maldo was
charged with the crime of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, in relation to
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), committed by inserting his finger into the vagina
of his 4-year-old daughter, AAA, against her will and without her consent. That on or about the
9th day of April, 2007, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously insert his finger into the vagina
of AAA, a minor, 4 years of age, his daughter, against her will and without her consent, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

According to AAA, while she was standing by the gate of her maternal aunt's house in the
evening of April 9, 2007, appellant kissed her on the neck and inserted his finger in her vagina.
Consequently, she felt pain and, thereafter, she told the incident to her grandmother, who brought
her to the police station. Two (2) days after, acting on a request from Police Supt. Constante
Agpaoa, Police S/Insp. Dr. Ebdane conducted a genital examination on AAA. In her Initial
Medico-Legal Report, she stated that there was no evidence of injury or laceration on AAA's
hymen. She explained that, generally, an insertion of a finger can cause irritation or redness of a
victim's genetalia. But from the time of the occurrence of the incident up to the genital
examination, however, fourteen (14) hours had already lapsed indicating that any redness or
irritation may have been already cured. She further explained that her finding that "there is no
evident injury at the time of the examination and medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual
abuse," meant that it was still possible for penetration to occur without injury on the hymen
because AAA was only four (4) years old and the hymen of a child was elastic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape as charged.

HELD:

The fact that the Information did not specifically state therein that appellant was being
charged with "rape in violation of Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code" does not
automatically result in the violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. As the CA properly ratiocinated, while the Information failed
to specify the particular provision of law which appellant allegedly violated, the character of the
crime is not determined by the specification of law but by the recital of the ultimate fact and
circumstances of the case. Hence, since the body of the Information clearly alleged that
appellant, through force and intimidation, inserted his finger into AAA's vagina, a minor, thereby
enumerating all the essential elements of the crime, appellant is considered sufficiently apprised
of the charge against him. Similarly, the prosecution's failure to specify the exact time and place
of the commission of the crime does not call for appellant's acquittal for they are not elements of
the crime of rape.

36

IBM PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner 

vs.
PRIME SYSTEMS PLUS, INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 203192

FACTS:

Petitioner entered into an agreement with respondent whereby the former will deliver 45
automated teller machines (ATMs) and several computer hardware to respondent's customers for
the total price of ₱24,743,610.43. On September 9, 2002, petitioner instituted a Complaint for
sum of money, attorney's fees, costs of litigation with application for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment5 against respondent. In the said Complaint, petitioner sought to have
respondent pay the former ₱45,997,266.22 representing respondent's unpaid obligation with 3%
monthly interest.

In its Answer dated June 17, 2003, respondent denied the allegations in the Complaint.
Respondent also alleged that ''[it] (had) fully paid for the fifty six (56) A TMs it purchased from
[petitioner] during the period covering December 1997 to February 1998.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner's imposition of 3% monthly interest constitute a written stipulation under

Article 1956 of the Civil Code?

HELD:

Court finds that the evidence points to respondent's lack of consent to a 3% monthly
interest. Petitioner adamantly claims that respondent's act of requesting for a lower interest rate
shows the latter's agreement to a 3% monthly interest. Such an askewed reasoning escapes us -
especially here where respondent's authorized representative never assented to petitioner's
letter. To accept petitioner's misplaced argument that the parties mutually agreed to a 3%
monthly interest when respondent subsequently ordered ATMs despite receiving petitioner's letter
imposing a 3% monthly interest will render the second condition - that the agreement be reduced
in writing - futile. Although respondent did agree to the imposition of interest per se, the fact that
there was never a clear rate of interest still leaves room to guess as to how much interest
respondent will pay. This is precisely the reason why Article 1956 was included in the Civil Code -
so that both parties clearly agree to and are fully aware of the price to be paid in a contract.