Agenda and Motions

Agenda and Motions for the 75th Annual General Meeting of the Malaysian Bar
Date: 13 March 2021 (Saturday)

Time: 10:00 am
Venue: The AGM will be held online and conducted virtually from the Bar
Council Board Room, Level 4, Wisma Badan Peguam Malaysia,
2 Leboh Pasar Besar, 50050 Kuala Lumpur
The agenda for the 75th Annual General Meeting of the Malaysian Bar is as follows:
(1) To consider and, if approved, to adopt the minutes of the 74th AGM held on 14 March
2020;
(2) To discuss matters arising from the minutes of the 74th AGM held on 14 March 2020;
(3) To consider the President’s Report, Chief Executive Officer’s Report, Advocates and
Solicitors Disciplinary Board’s Report, committees’ reports, and any other reports re
activities of the Malaysian Bar for the year 2020/21;
(4) To consider and, if approved, to adopt the Audited Accounts of the Malaysian Bar for
the year ended 31 December 2020;
(5) To consider the following motions proposed in accordance with section 64(6) of the
Legal Profession Act 1976:
(5.1) “Motion Regarding the Continuing Professional Development Scheme”,

proposed by Salim Bashir (Chairman, Bar Council), on behalf of the Bar
Council, dated 4 March 2021 (pages 3 to 7);
(5.2) “Motion Regarding the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance 2021”,

proposed by Salim Bashir (Chairman, Bar Council), on behalf of the Bar
Council, dated 4 March 2021 (pages 8 to 15);
(5.3) “Motion on Minimum Remuneration for Pupils and Improving the Quality of
Pupils”, proposed by Sarah Yong Li Hsien, dated 5 March 2021 (pages 16 to
20);
(5.4) “Motion to Clarify on the Policy to Implement Minimum Remuneration for

Pupils in Chambers”, proposed by Goh Cia Yee, dated 5 March 2021 (pages
21 to 26);
1
(5.5) “Motion to disclose the LexisNexis Subscription Agreement dated 20 February
2019 and establish an independent internal inquiry into the finding of facts and
circumstances of its signing and termination”, proposed by New Sin Yew and
Surendra Ananth, dated 5 March 2021 (pages 27 to 30);
(5.6) Motion entitled “The Malaysian Bar to support the call to abolish the practice
of Child Marriages in Malaysia”, proposed by Srividhya Ganapathy and Ajeet
Kaur, dated 5 March 2021 (pages 31 to 36);
(5.7) “Motion to Clarify the Validity of the Bar Council’s Sexual Harassment
Mechanism Adopted Pursuant to the Bar Council Circular No. 54/2007 dated
2 March 2007 titled ‘Code of Practice on the Prevention and Eradication of
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace’”, proposed by Nathalie Annette Kee
Xuan Li, dated 5 March 2021 (pages 37 to 42);
(5.8) “Motion Condemning Repatriation in Violation of Court Order, and Enactment

of Refugee/Asylum Seeker Law”, proposed by Charles Hector Fernandez,
dated 5 March 2021 (pages 43 to 46); and
(5.9) “Motion for the Abolition of Scandalizing the Judiciary as Form of Contempt
of Court, Repeal of Section 114A Evidence Act, and an Enactment of a
Contempt of Court Act”, proposed by Charles Hector Fernandez, dated 5
March 2021 (pages 47 to 61); and
(6) General.
A G KALIDAS
Secretary
Malaysian Bar
10 March 2021
2
Item 5.1
3
“Motion Regarding the Continuing Professional Development Scheme”, proposed by
Salim Bashir (Chairman, Bar Council), on behalf of the Bar Council, dated 4 March
2021
WHEREAS:
(1) The object and powers of the Bar in section 42(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1976
stipulate that the purpose of the Malaysian Bar shall be, inter alia: “. . . (b) to
maintain and improve the standards of conduct and learning of the legal profession
in Malaysia; (c) to facilitate the acquisition of legal knowledge by members of the
legal profession and others; . . . (e) to represent, protect and assist members of the
legal profession in Malaysia and to promote in any proper manner the interests of
the legal profession in Malaysia; . . .”; and
(2) This motion is pursuant to these objects and powers, and the need for exemplary
standards of professional practice, etiquette and conduct to be achieved by Members
of the Malaysian Bar (“Members”), and to inculcate a culture of continuing
professional development in Members.
(3) At the 70th Annual General Meeting (“AGM”) of the Malaysian Bar held on 19
March 2016, it was resolved that the mandatory Continuing Professional
Development (“CPD”) Scheme would be implemented on a staggered basis, with
effect from 1 July 2016, for Members and pupils in chambers.
(4) The mandatory CPD Scheme came into effect on 1 July 2016 for Members admitted
as advocates and solicitors of the High Court of Malaya on or after 1 July 2011
(“Group One Members”), who are required to obtain a total of 16 CPD points in
each 24-month CPD cycle.
(5) At the 72nd AGM of the Malaysian Bar held on 17 March 2018, it was further
resolved that the mandatory CPD Scheme would continue to be implemented to
Members admitted as advocates and solicitors of the High Court of Malaya between
1 July 2006 and 30 June 2011 (inclusive) (“Group Two Members”), with effect from
1 July 2018. Group Two Members are also required to obtain a total of 16 CPD
points in each 24-month cycle.
(6) The current 24-month CPD cycle is from 1 July 2020 until 30 June 2022 (inclusive).
(7) Where Group One Members and Group Two Members are admitted as advocates
and solicitors of the High Court of Malaya after the commencement of any CPD
cycle, the CPD points to be obtained during that cycle are prorated based on the table
below:
No Duration Prorated CPD Points

(a) 12 to 24 months until the end of the current CPD cycle 16
(b) More than or equal to 6 months, but less than 12 months, 8
until the end of the current CPD cycle
(c) More than or equal to 2 months, but less than 6 months, 4
until the end of the current CPD cycle
(d) Less than 2 months until the end of the current CPD cycle Nil
4
(8) The mandatory CPD Scheme came into effect for pupils in chambers who
commenced their pupillage on or after 1 July 2016, who are required to obtain a total
of 8 CPD points in the course of their pupillage.
(9) A motion to extend the application of the staggered mandatory CPD Scheme to
Members admitted as advocates and solicitors of the High Court of Malaya between
1 July 2001 and 30 June 2006 (inclusive) (“Group Three Members”), with effect
from 1 July 2020, was to have been tabled at the 74th AGM of the Malaysian Bar
held on 14 March 2020. However, in light of the health concerns arising from the
growing COVID-19 pandemic, the motion was withdrawn in order to expedite the
conduct of the AGM, with the intention that an appropriately amended motion be
tabled for a subsequent general meeting of the Malaysian Bar.
(10) This motion seeks to extend the application of the staggered mandatory CPD
Scheme to Group Three Members with effect from 1 July 2021.
(11) Thereafter, the proposed implementation of the mandatory CPD Scheme shall,
subject to the decision of Members at the AGM of the Malaysian Bar in 2022, be as
follows:
No CPD becomes Applicable to Members who

mandatory from commenced legal practice on or after
(a) 1 July 2022 1 July 1996 to 30 June 2001 (inclusive)
(b) 1 July 2024 1 July 1991 to 30 June 1996 (inclusive)
THEREFORE, it is hereby resolved that the CPD Scheme shall apply to:
(A) Members Admitted as Advocates and Solicitors of the High Court of Malaya
between 1 July 2001 and 30 June 2006 (Inclusive) (“Group Three Members”)
(1) The CPD Scheme shall take effect from 1 July 2021 until 30 June 2022
(inclusive) for a 12-month cycle (“applicable CPD cycle”);
(2) The CPD Scheme shall apply to Group Three Members, who shall be
required to obtain a minimum of eight CPD points during the applicable CPD
cycle;
(3) Thereafter, from 1 July 2022, Group Three Members shall be required to
obtain a minimum of 16 CPD points during each subsequent 24-month CPD
cycle; and
5
(4) If, as at 30 June 2021, any Group Three Member has obtained CPD points
from the period of 1 July 2020 until 30 June 2021 (inclusive) (“eligible CPD
points”) exceeding eight points, the Member can carry forward the excess
eligible CPD points into the applicable CPD cycle, as illustrated below:
(a) Member X has obtained two CPD points as at 30 June 2021: This
Member cannot carry forward any points into the applicable CPD
cycle, and shall therefore be required to obtain a minimum of eight
CPD points during the applicable CPD cycle;
(b) Member Y has obtained 12 eligible CPD points as at 30 June 2021:

Four eligible CPD points will be carried forward into the applicable
CPD cycle; and
(c) Member Z has obtained 20 eligible CPD points as at 30 June 2021: 12

CPD points will be carried forward into the applicable CPD cycle.
This Member is therefore deemed to have complied with the
requirement of obtaining a minimum of eight CPD points during the
applicable CPD cycle.
(B) Other Members: Members Admitted as Advocates and Solicitors of the High
Court of Malaya Before 1 July 2001
(1) The CPD Scheme shall take effect on other Members (either in totality or for
a selected group), subject to the decision of Members at the AGM of the
Malaysian Bar in 2022.
(C) Compliance with the CPD Requirements
(1) Compliance by Group Three Members with the requisite CPD points within
any CPD cycle shall result in Group Three Members receiving one event
voucher for selected Bar Council and/or State Bar Committee professional
development events, which will be valid for one year from the date of issue.
(D) Non-Compliance with the CPD Requirements
(1) Non-attainment of the required CPD Points in any CPD cycle shall result in:
(a) an automatic six-month extension to obtain the required CPD points

for that cycle; and
(b) a further extension not exceeding three months may be granted by the
Bar Council Professional Standards and Development Committee
and/or the Bar Council, if the required CPD points are not obtained
within the six-month extension period.
The granting of an extension will not affect the number of CPD points that
Group Three Members will be required to obtain in any subsequent cycle.
6
(2) In the event of non-compliance upon the expiry of the extension(s) granted
under D(1) above, the following penalties will be applicable:
No Status of CPD point(s) at the end of Amount of fine

the extension period(s)
(a) Between 9 to 15 CPD points RM100
(inclusive)
(b) Between 1 to 8 CPD points RM200
(inclusive)
(c) No CPD points RM500
In this regard, the Bar Council shall be authorised to do all acts as it may
consider to be necessary or appropriate to implement D(2) above, including
through the making of Rules or Rulings, or through amendments to the Legal
Profession Act 1976.
(E) Ancillary Matters
(1) The Bar Council shall be authorised to take all necessary steps towards the
implementation and enforcement of the CPD Scheme, including, if
considered necessary:
(a) adopting the CPD Guidelines, as shall be updated from time to time;
(b) accrediting courses, seminars, workshops, conferences and other
appropriate events for the CPD Scheme;
(c) organising courses, seminars, workshops, conferences and other
appropriate events for the CPD Scheme;
(d) putting in place measures to ensure participation in the CPD Scheme
and to inculcate a culture of continuing professional development
amongst Members and pupils; and
(e) doing all such other things that are incidental or conducive to the
successful achievement or betterment of the CPD Scheme.
(2) The Professional Standards and Development Committee will report on the
progress of the CPD Scheme at each subsequent AGM.
7
Item 5.2
8
“Motion Regarding the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance 2021”, proposed by
Salim Bashir (Chairman, Bar Council), on behalf of the Bar Council, dated 4 March 2021
Whereas:
(1) In December 2019, cases of “viral pneumonia” were identified in Wuhan, People’s
Republic of China (“China”), and subsequently reported to the World Health
Organization (“WHO”).1 Shortly after, it was identified as a new type of coronavirus
(novel coronavirus, nCoV) and later termed by WHO as “COVID-19”.
(2) On 13 January 2020, the first case of COVID-19 in Thailand was reported.2 By 27
January 2020, 11 countries (excluding China) reported laboratory confirmed COVID-
19 cases, including Malaysia.3 WHO declared the COVID-19 outbreak as a “Public
Health Emergency of International Concern” on 30 January 2020.4
(3) In Malaysia, a Movement Control Order (“MCO”) was implemented on 18 March 2020
to 31 March 20205 following a steep rise in the number of cases. The order would be
extended over the course of 2020 and 2021, to date, as follows:
MCO:
(a) 1 April 2020 to 14 April 2020;6
(b) 15 April 2020 to 28 April 2020;7
(c) 29 April 2020 to 12 May 2020;8
Conditional MCO: On 1 May 2020, the Prime Minister, YAB Tan Sri Muhyiddin
Yassin (“Prime Minister”) announced the implementation of a Conditional MCO,
beginning 4 May 2020. The daily number of COVID-19 positive cases on 1 May 2020
1
Rolling updates on coronavirus disease (COVID-19) (31 July 2020), updated 31 July 2020. World Health
Organization. Retrieved from: who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen.
2
Ibid.
3
Epidemiological Update Novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) (27 January 2020). Pan American Health
Organization. Retrieved from: tinyurl.com/3c6se282.
4
Rolling updates on coronavirus disease (COVID-19) (31 July 2020), updated 31 July 2020. World Health
Organization. Retrieved from: who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen.
5
Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Declaration of Infected Local Areas) Order 2020 [P.U.(A)
87/2020], and Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures within the Infected Local Areas)
Regulations 2020 [P.U.(A) 91/2020].
6
Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Declaration of Infected Local Areas) (Extension of Operation)
Order 2020 [P.U. (A) 98/2020].
7
(No. 2) Order 2020 [P.U.(A) 116/2020].
8
(No. 3) Order 2020 [P.U.(A) 132/2020].
9
stood at 69 (compared to 117 on 18 March 2020)9, whilst total positive cases numbered
at 6,071.10
(d) 13 May 2020 to 9 June 2020;11
Recovery MCO: On 7 June 2020, the Prime Minister announced that the Conditional
MCO would end on 9 June 2020, and the Recovery MCO would be implemented,
beginning 10 June 2020. The daily number of COVID-19 positive cases on 9 June 2020
stood at 7, whilst total cases numbered at 8,336.12
(e) 10 June 2020 to 31 August 2020, and subsequent extensions.13
(4) In addition, localised places would be put under Enhanced MCO as the need arose.
(5) In September 2020, Malaysia witnessed a surge in the number of COVID-19 positive
cases. This has been attributed to the snap Sabah state elections which took place on
26 September 2020.14 On 3 October 2020, the daily number of positive cases stood at
31715 — the highest single-day report of confirmed cases, at that time, since the start of
the outbreak16. This figure would continue to climb in the ensuing weeks.
(6) On 23 October 2020, the Prime Minister sought an audience with His Majesty the Yang
di-Pertuan Agong on the declaration of a state of emergency under Article 150(1) of
the Federal Constitution by reason of the COVID-19 pandemic. On 25 October 2020,
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, in a statement released by the Istana Negara in the national
9
Situasi Terkini 18 Mac 2020 (18 March 2020). Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia. Retrieved from:
covid-19.moh.gov.my/terkini/032020/situasi-terkini-18-mac-2020.
10
Situasi Terkini 1 Mei 2020 (1 Mei 2020). Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia. Retrieved from: covid-
19.moh.gov.my/terkini/052020/situasi-terkini-01-mei-2020.
11
(No. 4) Order 2020 [P.U.(A) 146/2020].
12
Situasi Terkini 9 Jun 2020 (9 June 2020). Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia. Retrieved from:
covid-19.moh.gov.my/terkini/062020/situasi-terkini-09-jun-2020.
13
(No. 5) Order 2020 [P.U.(A) 180/2020]. The order would be further extended to 31 March 2021, via the
(No. 6) Order 2020 [P.U.(A) 253/2020] and Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Declaration of Infected
Local Areas) (Extension of Operation) (No. 7) Order 2020 [P.U.(A) 399/2020].
14
“PM admits Sabah election among causes of spike in COVID-19 cases”, Bernama, 6 October 2020. Retrieved
from: https://www.astroawani.com/berita-malaysia/pm-admits-sabah-election-among-causes-of-spike-in-
covid19-cases-262477.
15
Situasi Terkini 3 Oktober 2020 (3 October 2020). Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia. Retrieved from:
covid-19.moh.gov.my/terkini/102020/situasi-terkini-03-oktober-2020.
16
“Malaysia: Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report. Weekly report for the week ending 4
October 2020”, 6 October 2020. World Health Organization: Representative Office for Malaysia, Brunei
Darussalam, and Singapore. Retrieved from: who.int/malaysia/internal-publications-detail/covid-19-in-malaysia-
situation-report-20.
10
language, expressed that “tiada keperluan buat masa ini untuk … mengisytiharkan
darurat di negara ini atau mana-mana bahagian negara Malaysia.”.17
(7) The Malaysian Bar, on 23 October 2020, released a statement stating that a declaration
of Emergency is unwarranted, as there are existing laws and mechanisms in place to
manage the COVID-19 pandemic, such as the Prevention and Control of Infectious
Diseases Act 1988 (Act 342) (“PCIDA”), which provides the Government with wide-
ranging powers.
(8) During the months of October to December 2020, Sabah, Selangor and the Federal
Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya, were placed under Conditional MCO again
due to the rise in daily reported COVID-19 positive cases. The daily number of positive
cases on 31 December 2020 stood at 2,525, whilst total cases numbered 113,010.18
(9) By the end of January 2021, the MCO was reintroduced to all states except Sarawak.
(10) On 11 January 2021, following an audience granted to the Prime Minister19 and upon
the Prime Minister’s advice, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong issued a Proclamation of
Emergency pursuant to Article 150(1) of the Federal Constitution to declare a state of
Emergency for the whole Federation effective from 11 January 2021 to 1 August 2021
(“Proclamation of Emergency”).20 The Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance 2021
(“Emergency Ordinance”)21 was also promulgated, coming into operation on 11
January 2021.
(11) The Malaysian Bar, on 13 January 2021, released a statement maintaining its view that
the PCIDA and other pieces of legislation were sufficient for the Government to
manage the COVID-19 pandemic, and that its request for an Emergency Declaration
appeared to be overblown. In a subsequent statement on 15 January 2021, we then
highlighted our concerns arising out of the Emergency Ordinance, which afforded
wide-ranging powers to the Executive branch.
(12) Provisions of the Emergency Ordinance that are particularly concerning are:
(a) Suspension of Federal and State legislative proceedings (sections 14 and 15);
(b) Suspension of Federal and State elections (sections 12 and 13);
17
Kenyataan Media, 25 Oktober 2020. Dato’ Indera Ahmad Fadil Shamsuddin, Datuk Pengelola Bijaya Diraja,
Istana Negara. Retrieved from: https://tinyurl.com/csk3vm2m.
18
Situasi Terkini 31 Disember 2020 (31 December 2020). Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia. Retrieved from:
covid-19.moh.gov.my/terkini/122020/situasi-terkini-covid-19-di-malaysia-31122020.
19
Speech text of the Special Announcement of Emergency: YAB Tan Sri Dato’ Haji Muhyiddin b Haji Mohd
Yassin, Prime Minister of Malaysia, 12 January 2021. Retrieved from: pmo.gov.my/2021/01/teks-ucapan-
pengumuman-khas-darurat/.
20
Proclamation of Emergency [P.U.(A) 7/2021].
21
Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance 2021 [P.U.(A) 12/2021].
11
(c) Entrenchment of the position of the current Executive at Federal and State levels
(section 11);
(d) Vast powers afforded to the armed forces (section 7);
(e) Vast powers to temporarily take possession of any land, building or movable
property (section 3) and to demand for the use of resources for any purpose
(section 4). The assessment of compensation in these circumstances cannot be
challenged by the Courts — an “ouster clause” (section 5); and
(f) An “immunity provision” (section 10) which seeks to shield the Government
from any acts taken in carrying out the provisions of the Emergency Ordinance.
The qualification that such acts must be done in “good faith” does not provide
sufficient redress, as it still affords the Government with immunity in situations
of negligence.
(13) The Malaysian Bar is holding a watching brief in five suits which have since been filed
in relation to the Proclamation of Emergency and the Emergency Ordinance. These
suits were commenced by the following parties:
(a) Non-governmental organisations (“NGOs”) and human rights groups, namely

BERSIH 2.0, Suara Rakyat Malaysia (“SUARAM”), Centre for Independent
Journalism (“CIJ”), ALIRAN, Kuala Lumpur and Selangor Chinese Assembly
Hall (“KLSCAH”), Pergerakan Tenaga Akademik Malaysia (“GERAK”) and
SAVE Rivers;
(b) Hassan b Abdul Karim;
(c) Datuk Seri Salahuddin b Ayub, Dato’ Johari b Abdul, and Abdul Aziz b Bari
(commonly referred to as the “Pakatan lawmakers suit”);
(d) Dato’ Seri Anwar b Ibrahim; and
(e) Khairuddin b Abu Hassan.
(14) Article 150(1) of the Federal Constitution provides for a Proclamation of Emergency
only where a grave emergency exists, that is, where the security, economic life or public
order of the Federation is threatened.
(15) It should not be sought or invoked lightly as it effectively results in vast powers being
placed at the hands and control of the Executive. The provisions of the Emergency
Ordinance are drafted in a broad manner, and therefore present the potential and risk of
abuse.
(16) While it is recognised that during a health crisis, the normal functioning of society
cannot be maintained, and that as a result of health measures taken, some rights and
freedoms which ordinarily form an integral and necessary part of a democratic society
will inevitably be encroached upon (such as in relation to movement), it remains vital
that the fundamental values of democracy, rule of law and human rights standards are
to be maintained, and any derogations thereto are necessary and proportional.
12
(17) The Government has, since the beginning of the outbreak, effectively utilised its powers
under PCIDA to manage the COVID-19 pandemic. Powers under PCIDA include:
(a) declaring an area as an infected local area (section 11);

(b) prescribing measures to be taken to control or prevent the spread of the disease
within or from an infected local area (subsection 11(2)) — such as restrictions
in movement as imposed by the MCO;
(c) directing any person or class or category of persons living in an infected local
area to subject themselves to isolation, observation or surveillance, and any
other measures considered necessary to control the disease (subsection 11(3));
(d) temporary requisitioning of premises (section 26);
(e) mobilising the police, customs and immigration officers, and officers from other
government departments and agencies, to assist for the purposes of exercising
any powers and/or regulations made, under PCIDA (section 5); and
(f) penalties and fines.
(18) The MCO, Enhanced MCO, Conditional MCO and Recovery MCO contain sufficient
enforcement and adequate measures to manage the spread of COVID-19 in the infected
local areas.
(19) It is incumbent on the Government to satisfactorily justify its decision for implementing
a state of Emergency, and for resorting to suspending Parliament.
(20) In particular, section 14 of the Emergency Ordinance is unprecedented in the history of

Malaysia. This is the sole occasion22 where Parliament has been expressly suspended
by reason of an emergency.
(21) Such derogation from the rule of law is neither necessary nor proportional. Emergency
powers should not result in a carte blanche of the Legislature’s powers being exercised
by the Executive, particularly where the circumstances do not call for such extreme
measures.
(22) Adequate health and safety measures can be taken to ensure that sittings of Parliament
carry on in a manner that is compliant with the recommended standard operating
procedures (“SOPs”), as opposed to a blanket and total suspension for so long as the
Emergency is in force (unless otherwise summoned by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong).
22
Whilst Parliament did not sit for a period of two years (1969 to 1971) as a result of the 13 May 1969 racial riots,
this was due to the interruptions (caused by the riots) to the General Election which took place at that time.
Parliament was dissolved on 20 March 1969, General Election was held on 10 May 1969, the riots ensued on 13
May 1969, and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong proclaimed a state of Emergency under Article 150 of the Federal
Constitution (P.U. (A) 145/1969) on 15 May 1969. Pursuant to section 7 of the Emergency (Essential Powers)
Ordinance 1969 (P.U.(A) 146/1959), elections to the Dewan [Rakyat] and the Legislative Assembly of any State
which had not been completed, would be suspended until such date as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong might
determine. Parliament resumed on 20 February 1971 (The Straits Times, 20 February 1971, page 14 from National
Library Board, Singapore).
13
(23) The earlier localised proclamations of Emergency and ordinances promulgated in Batu
Sapi23 and Bugaya24 in Sabah, and in Grik, Perak25 in 2020, were made without a need
to suspend the respective State Legislative Assemblies.
(24) It is recognised that the Legislature fulfils core functions of representation, law-making
and oversight. Legislative oversight, in particular, seeks to ensure that the Executive
remains responsive and accountable for its actions — a check and balance.
(25) The Legislature also provides the necessary counterbalance to the Executive’s powers
during an emergency and functions to verify whether such emergency powers are still
justified throughout the relevant period. Thus, Article 150(3) of the Federal
Constitution stipulates that the Proclamation of Emergency and any ordinance
promulgated shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament.
(26) Furthermore, as held by the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh,26 even while a
Proclamation of Emergency is in force, where any further laws are required by reason
of the Emergency, Parliament may, pursuant to its legislative authority under Article
44 and by reason of Articles 150(5) and (6) of the Federal Constitution, promulgate
ordinances having the force of law.
(27) Thus, the doctrine of separation of powers, which forms the basic structure of our
Federal Constitution (as recognised by the Judiciary in Semenyih Jaya27, Indira
Gandhi28, and Alma Nudo Atenza29) is upheld even during an Emergency. Article 150
of the Federal Constitution envisages a functional Parliament, playing a critical role
during the administration, and oversight of, an Emergency — such as guaranteeing
transparent debate, ensuring accountability of the Government, and scrutinising the
passing of laws, during a pandemic.
(28) As expressed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 30 at an audience granted to the Yang di-
Pertua (Speaker) of the Dewan Negara, YB Senator Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Utama Dr. Rais
Yatim, and the Yang di-Pertua (Speaker) of the Dewan Rakyat, YB Datuk Azhar
Azizan Harun on 24 February 2021, the Emergency Ordinance allows Parliament to
convene during the Emergency on a date as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong thinks
23
Proclamation of Emergency (P.U (A) 329/2020) and Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance 2020 (P.U. (A)
330/2020).
24
Proclamation of Emergency (No. 3) (P.U (A) 329/2020) and Emergency (Essential Powers) (No. 2) Ordinance
2020 (P.U. (A) 330/2020).
25
Proclamation of Emergency (No. 2) (P.U (A) 358/2020) and Emergency (Essential Powers) (No. 2) Ordinance
2020 (P.U. (A) 359/2020).
26
Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor [1979] 1 MLJ 50, Privy Council.
27
Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat [2017] 4 MLRA 554, Federal Court.
28
Indira Gandhi Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak [2018] 2 MLRA 1, Federal Court.
29
Alma Nudo Atenza v PP & Another Appeal [2019] 5 CLJ 780, Federal Court.
30
Kenyataan Media (24 Februari 2021). Dato’ Indera Ahmad Fadil Shamsuddin, Datuk Pengelola Bijaya Diraja,
Istana Negara. Retrieved from: tinyurl.com/573vr8zd.
14
appropriate upon the Prime Minister’s advice. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong also
emphasised that Malaysia practices a system of democracy that is based on the principle
of supremacy of the Constitution. As such, each branch of the administration — the
Executive, Judiciary, and Parliament — must abide by that principle.
(29) The incapacitation of Parliament is therefore unnecessary, irrational, unreasonable

and/or disproportionate for the purposes of combating the COVID-19 outbreak. It is
repugnant to the Federal Constitution, rendering it impossible to give effect to the intent
and spirit of Articles 150(3) and 150(5).
(30) The Executive should not usurp the legislative powers that rightfully vests in
Parliament, nor should it be shielded from the necessary scrutiny it would normally be
subjected to before Parliament. It is during times of crisis that public confidence in the
legitimacy of the administration and its decisions must be assured and protected,
warranting a higher threshold of accountability through, for example, legislative
oversight.
THEREFORE, the Malaysian Bar hereby resolves that:
(A) The Emergency Ordinance, including sections 14 and 15, is invalid and
unconstitutional, and therefore null and void;
(B) The Malaysian Bar call upon the Government to take the immediate necessary and/or
appropriate steps to advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to summon a meeting of the
Parliament, and for the Proclamation of Emergency and the Emergency Ordinance to
be laid before Parliament in accordance with Article 150(3) of the Federal Constitution;
and
(C) The Malaysian Bar mandate the Bar Council to take any and all steps that it deems
necessary and/or appropriate regarding the aforesaid Proclamation of Emergency and
the Emergency Ordinance, including instituting legal proceedings, for and on behalf of
the Malaysian Bar, to challenge the validity of the Emergency Ordinance; to seek
interim and/or permanent reliefs, as may be deemed necessary; and to give effect to the
resolutions above.
15
Item 5.3
5 March 2021
Sarah Yong Li Hsien

C/O Messrs Lo Chambers
13A-6, Menara 1 Mont Kiara
No. 1,JalanKiara
Mont Kiara
50480 Kuala Lumpur
A G Kalidas By Email
Secretary of the Malaysian Bar jsecretarymalaysianbar.org.my;
Bar Council motionsmalaysianbar.org.myj
Wisma Badan Peguam Malaysia
2 Leboh Pasar Besar
50050 Kuala Lumpur
Dear Sir,
Motion on Minimum Remuneration for Pupils and Improving the Quality of Pupils
75111
I refer to the Notice of the Annual General Meeting of the Malaysian Bar (13 March
2021) via Malaysian Bar Circular No. 077/2021 dated 25 February 2021.
I propose to move the enclosed motion at the Annual General Meeting.
Kindly acknowledge receipt.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
J2
Sarah Yong Li Hsien
(BC/Y/807)
sarah.yong@lochambers.com
16
Motion on Minimum Remuneration for Pupils and Improving the Quality of Pupils
Whereas:
1. Article 23(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) expressly

provides that “everyone who works has the right to just and favourable
remuneration…”.
2. The Malaysian Bar has on numerous occasions advocated support for the UDHR. The
Malaysian Bar has consistently celebrated Human Rights Day on the 10th of December
to commemorate the adoption of the UDHR.
3. At present, pupils-in-chambers (“pupils”) are not subject to any minimum

remuneration.
4. In line with the stand on UDHR, it is now imperative the Malaysian Bar adopts a
position to have in place minimum remuneration for pupils.
5. Pupillage is not an employment under the law as it is governed by the Legal Profession
Act 1976 and is exempted from the Employment Act 1955 and the Industrial Relations
Act 1967.
6. Pupillage is seen as an extension of the educational process for pupils. However, legal
firms taking in pupils do obtain economic benefit from pupils in the course of pupillage.
Education is incidental and comes along with the job. Quoting Lord Bingham in
Edmonds v Lawson [2000] QB 501:
“On balance we take the view that pupils such as the claimant provide consideration
for the offer made by chambers such as the defendants' by agreeing to enter into the
close, important and potentially very productive relationship which pupillage
involves.”
17
7. In the same vein, pupils should be expected to exercise the skills required of a
competent pupil and not expect to be treated as students.
8. In this regard, there is a great need to revamp legal education and introduce a common
bar course that would equip prospective entrants with the basic skills required by the
industry.
9. Acknowledging that the issue is nuanced and requires a holistic approach towards the
pupillage process itself and the entry into that process, but also acknowledging that a
minimum remuneration can prevent any potential or real exploitation and uphold basic
human rights.
It is hereby resolved that:
1. The Malaysian Bar accepts in principle that pupils ought to be protected with minimum
remuneration.
2. The Malaysian Bar Council shall immediately take all necessary steps to:
2.1. Examine the survey conducted by the National Young Lawyers and Pupils
Committee (“NYLPC”) during its 2020/2021 term and any report compiled by
NYLPC on minimum remuneration;
2.2. This examination shall include the issues of whether the quantum should differ
by the geographical location of the pupil and whether such quantum should be
reviewed periodically;
2.3. If there are any relevant issues not covered in the survey, a further survey and/or
report shall be conducted; and
18
2.4. Implement the enforcement of a minimum remuneration by appropriate means
including but not limited to issuing rulings or advocating for legislative
amendments.
3. The Malaysian Bar Council shall immediately look into revamping the pupillage
system including the entry level and for that purpose, consider the following:
3.1. Re-establishing the Common Bar Course Committee with a view to push for the
introduction of a Common Bar Course for all law graduates; and
3.2. Regulating the master-pupil relationship including stipulating the basic

requirements on the training and mentorship required during that period.
Dated this 5th day of March 2021
Proposed by Sarah Yong Li Hsien (BC/Y/807)
Seconded by:
1. New Sin Yew (BC/N/2169)

2. Surendra Ananth (BC/S/2982)
3. Rajsurian Pillai a/l Chellappa Pillai (BC/R/1148)
4. Vivian Kuan Hui Xian (BC/V/298)
5. Lim Wei Jiet (BC/L/2466)
6. Farhan Haziq (BC/F/664)
7. Weera Premananda (BC/W/970)
8. Goh Chee Sun (BC/G/517)
9. Kuhan Manokaran (BC/K/1515)
10. Mary Ann (BC/M/3057)
11. Guan Hui Wan (BC/W/902)
12. Shugan Raman (BC/S/3126)
13. Stephenie Yuan Huey Theng (BC/S/3275)
19
14. Purshotaman Puvanendran (BC/P/595)
15. Sukhvinder Singh Sidhu (BC/S/3309)
16. Ooi Jia Liang (BC/O/485)
17. Kee Hui Yee (BC/K/1470)
18. Tishondra Puspanathan (BC/T/1842)
20
Item 5.4
21
Motion to Clarify On The Policy to Implement Minimum Remuneration for Pupils In
Chambers
Whereas:
1. Several other jurisdictions, including England & Wales, Hong Kong and Australia,
have implemented some form of either mandatory or recommended minimum pay for
persons undergoing pupillage or equivalent.1 In this regard:
a. The mandatory minimum for pupils in England & Wales, fixed by the Bar
Standards Board (the regulatory entity for barristers in England & Wales), is
GBP18,960 per annum for pupillages in London and GBP16,601 per annum for
pupillages outside London.
b. The recommended minimum for trainee solicitors in England & Wales, proposed
by the Law Society (the representative body for solicitors in England & Wales),
is GBP22,541 in London and GBP19,992 outside of London.
c. The mandatory minimum in Hong Kong is HKD6,000 per month, pursuant to

paragraph 11.9A of the Code of Conduct of the Hong Kong Bar Association.
d. The mandatory minimum for law graduates undergoing training within law firms
is AUD1,012.90 per week or AUD26.66 per hour, pursuant to the Legal Services
Award 2020.
2. On 7th January 2020, the Malaysian Bar issued a circular (No. 004/2020) (“Circular”)
announcing the launch of a national survey on Minimum Salary of Young Lawyers,
the objective of which was to “gain a better understanding of the perspectives of, and
financial challenges faced by, young lawyers, in order to ascertain whether a
minimum wage system should be developed for the legal profession”.2 The results of
this survey has yet to be officially released with reference to its results only available
via a Press Comment that was released by the Chairperson of the National Young
Lawyers and Pupils Committee, Mr Yusfarizal bin Yussoff on 14.1.2021 (addressed
further below)3.
3. On 16th December 2020, a group of young lawyers (The Young Lawyers Movement)
submitted a Change.org petition called “Implement minimum pay for pupils in
Malaysia” with a total of over 4200 supporters to Mr Yusfarizal bin Yussoff, the
Chairperson of the National Young Lawyers and Pupils Committee, who accepted
the petition on behalf of the Bar Council.
1
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/faq-minimum-remuneration-pupils-jason-yong-kok-yew/
https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/topics/hr-and-people-management/recommended-minimum-salary-for-trainee-
solicitors
2
https://www.malaysianbar.org.my/cms/upload_files/document/CircularNo004-2020.pdf
3
https://www.malaysianbar.org.my/article/news/press-statements/press-statements/press-comment-proposal-for-
implementation-of-minimum-remuneration-or-pupils-in-chambers-and-young-lawyers
22
4. Subsequent to this, the President of the Malaysian Bar. Mr Salim Bashir in an
interview with the Malaysian Insight published on 27.12.20204 stated that the
Malaysian Bar is working on making the necessary changes to allow pupils to be paid
reasonably during their pupillage period. He reportedly stated the following:-
”It is not a straight jacket formula and the idea of minimum allowance needs to
take into account various factors, including business financial impacts and
sustainability of most law firms due to the pandemic.
“We need to err on the side of caution and refrain from making popular
decisions.”
5. The Young Lawyers Movement then served several copies of the said petition to the
following State Bar Committees: The Perak State Bar Committee on 29.12.2020, The
Penang State Bar Committee on 30.12.2020, The Kedah Bar State Committee on
31.12.2020 and The Perlis Bar State Bar Committee on 31.12.2020.
6. The Chairperson of the National Young Lawyers and Pupils Committee, Mr

Yusfarizal bin Yussoff subsequently released a Press Comment on 14.1.2021,
stating amongst others the following:-
e. In September 2019, the Bar Council conducted a survey among members of the
Malaysian Bar to collect data on the remuneration of pupils.
f. Between January and February 2020, the National Young Lawyers and Pupils
Committee conducted a separate online national survey, which resulted in
95.35% of the 2,600 respondents agreeing that the Bar Council should
implement a minimum remuneration for pupils. 61% of the respondents agreed
that the rate should vary according to the state in which they were practising in.
g. The Bar Council then directed the National Young Lawyers and Pupils
Committee to conduct another series of surveys at the State Level by the
respective State Bar Committees throughout Peninsular Malaysia. According to
Mr Yusfarizal bin Yussoff, the National Young Lawyers and Pupils Committee is
expected to be able to produce a final report by 2021.
7. We note that there have been several issues regarding the implementation of a
minimum remuneration for pupils in chambers that were raised in the Press Release,
namely the following:-
a. “Section 12(3) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (“LPA”) stipulates that the
remuneration to pupils is only optional, and a structured training programme
must be devised by the pupil-master once he/she decided to take a pupil under
his/her tutelage”;
4
https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/291919
23
b. “Other legal impediments, such as the sanctity of contract between the pupil and
the pupil-master based on consensus ad idem”;
c. “Whether the fixing of a minimum remuneration to pupils would affect the ability
of pupil-masters to take pupils, as the option would be open for firm-owners to
instead take paralegals or legal associates with better experience”;
d. “The movement and concentration of pupils from one place to another that
provides better remuneration”; and
e. “The current economic situation that affects legal firms in terms of financial
capability and employability.”
8. We believe the issues above can be resolved through sufficient data and discussion
as to, inter alia, the mechanism by which such a minimum wage may be
implemented, the method by which the minimum wage level is set, and the needs of
different states to set minimums at different levels. As such, we seek clarification on
the position of the Malaysian Bar on these several issues and its ongoing efforts to
implement a policy on minimum remuneration.
9. There are various benefits to the implementation of a minimum wage, whether

mandatory or recommended, within the legal profession, namely the following:-
a. Underpaid pupillages disproportionately favour pupillage candidates who are

fortunate enough to be able to live on even an underfunded pupil’s allowance for
at least nine months, owing to their socioeconomic privilege.
b. Underpaid pupillages disincentivise the recruitment of many otherwise well-

qualified, competent pupils who would be a valuable addition to the profession,
merely on the basis that their personal circumstances (social, economic or
otherwise) do not allow them to live on an underfunded pupil’s allowance for a
period of at least nine months.
c. The reputation of the Malaysian Bar as an open, accessible, noble and diverse
profession would be compromised if such inequity were allowed to persist within
the profession.
d. Underpaid pupillages may affect a pupil’s learning because of their inability to

sustain their cost of living.
e. The Bar Standards Board in England & Wales remarked, in a 2010 report on
pupillages:5
“The reasons why (the minimum wage) was introduced are obvious and, in
our view, still relevant. The financial stresses on candidates for the Bar are
5
https://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/regulation/pdf/Annex_B_Pupillage_REPORT.pdf
24
considerable. The prospect of receiving no payment during pupillage would,
we have no doubt, act as a further deterrent to recruitment, which would be
additional to the inherent cost of the BVC/BPTC (compulsory qualifying
exams for admission), and the uncertainty of getting any pupillage at all.
Pupillage would be restricted to individuals whose personal circumstances

permitted them to work for at least six months, if not twelve, without payment.
The reputation of the Bar as an open, accessible profession would be
severely damaged.”
f. The Bar Standards Board in that same report noted that having adequately paid
pupillages also had the effect of improving the quality of pupillages by
incentivising firms, pupil masters and pupils to treat pupillages as an investment
in the pupils and in the growth of their practices.
g. All of the above applies similarly to the recruitment and retention of already-
qualified advocates and solicitors.
The Malaysian Bar shall immediately and without further delay take all necessary steps to:
A. clarify the progress and status of the various state-level surveys conducted by their
respective State Bar Committees;
B. release a report or reports of the results of the state-level surveys immediately if

completed, and in any case prior to September 2021;
C. clarify the Malaysian Bar’s position on whether the minimum remuneration should be
mandatory in nature;
D. clarify the Malaysian Bar’s position on whether amendments to the Legal Profession
Act 1976 are necessary for the implementation of a minimum remuneration (whether
mandatory or otherwise) for pupils and/or advocates and solicitors and the grounds
for that position;
E. if amendments to the Legal Profession Act 1976 are required, clarify what steps the
Malaysian Bar has taken or intends to take towards proposing and procuring such
amendments to the Legal Profession Act 1976.
25
F. clarify any and all other steps the Malaysian Bar has taken or intends to take towards
the implementation of a minimum remuneration (whether mandatory or otherwise) for
pupils and/or advocates and solicitors, including but not limited to issuing Bar Council
Rules and Rulings.
Dated this 5th day of March 2021.
Proposed by
Goh Cia Yee (BC/G/661)
Seconded by:
1. Cassandra Chung Li Hooi (BC/C/2043)

2. Chew Ying (BC/C/2122)
3. Daniel Mizan Qayyum bin Mahhiszan (BC/D/517)
4. Eric Toh (Toh Kah Yung) (BC/T/1964)
5. Jeffrey Ooi Ping Hong (BC/J/721)
6. Joshua a/l Moghana Sundaram (BC/J/854)
7. Muhammad Firdaus bin Abdul Khalik (BC/M/3220)
8. Nathalie Annette Kee Xuan Li (BC/N/4221)
9. Nicholas Wong Kwang Tee (BC/N/3939)
10. Tan Hoo Seh (Vince Tan) (BC/T/1856)
26
Item 5.5
27
28
29
30
Item 5.6
31
The Malaysian Bar to support the call to abolish the practice of
Child Marriages in Malaysia
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whereas
1. It is recognised that Malaysia being a signatory to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, has a critical obligation and duty to ensure the development and
protection of all children in Malaysia.
2. Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child inter alia states that:
“Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is
necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties
of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally
responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate
legislative and administrative measures.
3. The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) defines ‘child marriage’ as any
marriage where either one (or both) partners are below 18 years of age. The CRC
urges countries to set the minimum age for marriage for men and women (with
or without parental consent) at 18 years. The United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) define child marriage
as “a formal marriage or informal union before age 18”.
4. The Center for Reproductive Rights’ Briefing Paper on Child Marriage in South
East Asia – International and Constitutional Legal Standards and Jurisprudence
for Promoting Accountability and Change, states:
The Malaysian Bar to support the call to abolish the practice of Child Marriages in Malaysia
32
“Child marriage does not constitute a single rights violation;
rather, every instance of child marriage triggers a continuum
of violations that continues throughout a girl’s life. Child
marriage endangers the survival and well-being of women and
girls by exposing them to forced initiation into sex and ongoing
sexual violence, as well as to early, unplanned, and frequent
pregnancies. Further, women and girls married as children are
often denied educational opportunities, are isolated from
society, and face a lifetime of economic dependence. Together,
child marriage and early pregnancy trap generations of women
in cycles of poverty. These harms result in significant violations
of girls’ rights, including their reproductive rights and their
right to freedom from gender-based violence. Ensuring
accountability for child marriage entails both holding
responsible those officials who have failed to implement laws
and policies against the practice, and addressing legal and
social barriers that prevent married girls seeking to leave such
marriages from being able to do so. It also requires the
introduction of specific legal measures and remedies to address
the particular needs of married girls.”
5. Malaysia has committed to eliminate child marriage by 2030 in line with target
5.3 of the Sustainable Development Goals (“the SDGs”). The government did not
provide an update on progress towards this target during its Voluntary National
Review at the 2017 High Level Political Forum.
6. Malaysia acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1995, which sets
a minimum age of marriage of 18, and acceded to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) in 1995,
which obligates states to ensure free and full consent to marriage.
7. Malaysia has committed to the ASEAN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence

against Women and Violence against Children (2013), which acknowledges the
importance of strengthening ASEAN efforts to protect children from all forms of
violence, including early marriage.
8. In 2018 the CEDAW Committee recommended that Malaysia raise the minimum
age of marriage to 18 for women and men for both civil and Muslim marriages,
and require the full consent of women for any marriage.
33
9. During its 2013 Universal Periodic Review, Malaysia agreed to examine
recommendations to take steps to address trends in child marriage and adopt
proper measures to discourage the practice.
10. It is recognised that child marriages are medically, socially and economically
harmful to children of either gender and society with countries around the
world, including Turkey and Indonesia legislating on measures to abolish child
marriages. Child marriage has lasting consequences on girls that last well
beyond adolescence, including:
(i) Women married in their teens or earlier struggle with the health effects of
getting pregnant at a young age and often with little spacing between
children. Early marriages followed by teen pregnancy also significantly
increase birth complications and social isolation. The inability to interact
with peers and the limitation of socialization outside the family disturbs
the normal identity development in the child;
(ii) In Malaysia, marriage or pregnancy can limit or eliminate a woman's

education options, affecting her economic independence. The current
position is that married or pregnant children are not allowed to attend
government schools. Without education, girls and adult women have
fewer opportunities to earn an income and financially provide for
themselves and their children. This makes girls more vulnerable to
persistent poverty if their spouses die, abandon, or divorce them;
(iii) Girls in child marriages are more likely to suffer from domestic violence,
child sexual abuse, and marital rape. This trauma may lead to the
development of depression which subsequently increase the risk towards
suicide or self harm in the adolescent mothers. Maternal depression will
also affect the children as the toxic stress responses can have damaging
effects on their learning, behavior, and health later in life;
(iv) Given that girls in child marriages are often significantly younger than
their husbands, they become widowed earlier in life and may face
associated economic and social challenges for a greater portion of their
life than women who marry later. While there isn’t much research on the
effects of child marriage on boys, it is clear that it forces boys out of
34
education and into the workforce at an earlier age, thus limiting their
educational, economic and social status;
(v) High rates of child marriage negatively impact countries' economic

development because of early marriages' impact on girls' education and
labour market participation. Some researchers and activists note that
high rates of child marriage prevent significant progress toward each of
the eight Millennium Development Goals and global efforts to reduce
poverty due to its effects on educational attainment, economic and
political participation, and health.
11. Child marriages continue to be practiced in Malaysia. Statistics show that child
marriage in Malaysia is not just a problem in Muslim communities, but one
encountered in every community in Malaysia, including those of the Orang Asal.
12. It is recognised that the triggers leading to child marriages in Malaysia include
poverty, pre-marital sex, teenage pregnancies, a lack of access to education, ,
gender norms, traditional values, violence against girls, a lack of adequate quality
age appropriate reproductive health and sexuality education for children and a
lack of access to contraception and reproductive healthcare. It is further
recognised that the problem of child marriages cannot be addressed unless and
until these trigger factors are addressed.
13. The Government in attempting to find solutions to the problem of child

marriages in Malaysia unveiled on 16th January 2020 a 5-year National Strategy
Plan in Handling the Causes of Child Marriage, which the Malaysian Bar
recognises as a step in the right direction.
14. The Malaysian Bar notes that the preamble to the Child Act 2001 recognised that:
“…a child is not only a crucial component of such a society but also the key to its
survival, development and prosperity”.
15. The Malaysian Bar however recognises that despite all of the above, there is no
Act of Parliament protecting children from child marriages or providing
solutions and protection to victims of child marriages or any children born out of
such marriages.
35
Therefore, the Malaysian Bar hereby resolves
(A) That the Malaysian Bar calls upon the Government to enact an Act of Parliament:
(a) abolishing the practise of child marriages;
(b) raising the legal age of marriage to 18 years of age for all children in
Malaysia;
(c) providing protection to children against child marriages; and
(d) providing solutions and protection to victims of child marriages or any
children born out of such marriages;
(B) That the Malaysian Bar calls upon the Government to take immediate proactive
steps and measures to advocate and ensure that the public is educated and
advised that child marriages are medically, socially and economically harmful to
children and society; and
(C) That the Malaysian Bar calls upon the Government to adopt a multi stakeholder
approach and take immediate measures to address the trigger factors leading to
child marriages in Malaysia which include poverty, pre-marital sex, teenage
pregnancies, a lack of access to education, gender norms, traditional values,
violence against girls, a lack of adequate quality age appropriate reproductive
health and sexuality education to children and a lack of access to contraception
and reproductive healthcare.
Dated 5th March 2021
Proposers:
Srividhya Ganapathy (BC/S/857)
Ajeet Kaur (BC/A/663)
Seconders:
1. Karen Cheah Yee Lynn (BC/C/646)
2. Siti Hajar Bt. Ahmad (BC/S/515)
3. Tengku Hezrul Anuar bin Tengku Abdul Samad (BC/T/977)
4. Lee Teong Hooi (BC/L/1601)
5. Desmond Ho Chee Cheong
6. Nur Iman Bin Nur Azmi (BC/N/4129)
7. Zuwita Kamaruzzaman (BC/Z/127)
8. Mah Looi Yin (BC/M/162)
36
Item 5.7
37
Motion to Clarify the Validity of the Bar Council’s Sexual Harassment Mechanism
Adopted Pursuant to the Bar Council Circular No. 54/2007 dated 2 March 2007 titled
‘Code of Practice on the Prevention and Eradication of Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace’
Whereas:
1. On 2 March 2007, the Bar Council issued Circular No. 54/2007 (“Circular”)1
announcing that it had adopted a mechanism for the resolution of sexual harassment
complaints for members of the Bar and pupils within the legal profession and in dealings
with the judiciary and the courts (“Complaints Mechanism”).
2. The Complaints Mechanism was taken pursuant to the adoption of the Code of Practice
on the Prevention and Eradication of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (“Code”) at
the 59th Annual General Meeting of the Malaysian Bar, which was held on 22 October
2005.
3. According to a Malaysiakini press article published on 30 November 2020 (“Press

Article”)2:
3.1 it was reported that a complainant who had attempted to bring a complaint
under the Complaints Mechanism was told that the Complaints Mechanism is
faulty due to a legal impediment. The said complainant was advised to lodge
a separate complaint with the Advocates and Solicitors Disciplinary Board;
3.2 upon being contacted by Malaysiakini, the outgoing Malaysian Bar President
Mr. Salim Bashir reportedly confirmed that the Bar’s internal mechanism to
deal with sexual misconduct is facing a legal hurdle, stating:
“However, due to legal impediments, we are not able to proceed further

in conducting any inquiry on the subject matter”.
3.3 he stated that the Malaysian Bar is unable to hold sexual harassment inquiries
under the Complaints Mechanism on the basis that only the Advocates and
1
https://klbar.org.my/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/BC54_2007.pdf.
2
https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/553097.
38
Solicitors Disciplinary Board is empowered under the Legal Profession Act
1976 to carry out inquiries against members of the Bar; and
3.4 to date, on record there has only been one complaint brought under the
Complaints Mechanism since 2007.
4. However, despite Mr. Salim Bashir reportedly confirming that the Complaints
Mechanism is invalid:
4.1 the Bar Council has not to date issued any official statement or circular to
Members on the matter stated in paragraphs 3.2 & 3.3 above;
4.2 to-date, the Bar Council has not clarified or elaborated on the purported legal
impediment of the Complaints Mechanism;
4.3 to-date, the Bar Council has not clarified how it intends to address the
purported legal impediment of the Complaints Mechanism, or whether it
intends to address it at all; and
4.4 to-date, the Malaysian Bar has not clarified the validity of the Complaints
Mechanism - whether it is still valid, and members of the Bar may still bring
complaints under the Complaints Mechanism or otherwise.
5. Members of the Bar have a right and are fully entitled to know of the matters set out in
paragraph 4.1 to 4.4 above. In this regard:
5.1 there is a need for members of the Bar to be informed of the current position
of the Complaints Mechanism, in particular, whether it is invalid or otherwise.
In the absence of such, the Complaints Mechanism which is now 14 years old
is still deemed valid as an available recourse to members of the Bar when this
is reportedly no longer the case; and
5.2 the lack of announcement / clarification by the Bar Council on the Complaints
Mechanism and its purported legal impediment does not reflect the Malaysian
Bar’s commitment to fully adopt and implement the Code. This is wholly
39
inconsistent with the Bar’s reiteration of its commitment to “pursue the
facilitation of a safe and heathy environment that is free from unwanted
harassment and intimidation of a sexual nature”.3
The Bar Council shall immediately and without further delay take all necessary steps to:-
A. clarify the purported legal impediment of the Complaints Mechanism;
B. if indeed there is a legal impediment of the Complaints Mechanism, clarify how the
Bar Council intends to address the legal impediment;
C. clarify the validity of the Complaints Mechanism in addressing the sole reported
sexual harassment complaint and its present status;
D. clarify the validity of the Complaints Mechanism in addressing future sexual

harassment complaints by pupils and Members of the Bar;
E. clarify whether the Complaints Mechanism has been subjected to a periodic 5-year
review;
F. issue an official statement addressing A-E above; and
G. to further consider the inherent issues with the Complaints Mechanism evidenced by
the lack of reporting and utilisation of the Complaints Mechanism after 14 years.
Dated this 5th day of March 2021.
Proposed by: Nathalie Annette Kee Xuan Li (BC/N/4221)
Seconded by:
1. Ambiga Sreenevasan (BC/A/084)
3
https://www.malaysianbar.org.my/article/about-us/president-s-corner/pressstatements/press-release-high-time-
for-legal-and-social-reform-and-the-enactment-of-sexual-harassment-legislation.
40
2. Ahmad Iyas Abidin Bin Ahmad Husni (BC/A/2917)
3. Aqila Zulaiqha binti Zulkifli (BC/A/2768)
4. Avinash Kamalanathan (BC/A/2793)
5. Cassandra Chung Li Hooi (BC/C/2043)
6. Chew Ying (BC/C/2122)
7. Daniel Mizan Qayyum bin Mahhiszan (BC/D/517)
8. Denise Lim Hsui Yen (BC/D/454)
9. Eric Toh (Toh Kah Yung) (BC/T/1964)
10. Goh Cia Yee (BC/G/661)
11. Harvinder Singh a/l Kulwant Singh (BC/H/1131)
12. Ilyssa Jace Chakrabarty (BC/I/423)
13. Ivan Aaron Francis (BC/I/424)
14. Jagshey Pipariya (BC/J/756)
15. Jason Cheong Kah Lok (BC/J/813)
16. Jeffrey Ooi Ping Hong (BC/J/721)
17. Joshua a/l Moghana Sundaram (BC/J/854)
18. Koh Tsi Jing (BC/K/1575)
19. Lee Yoke Shan (BC/L/2799)
20. Loi Yean Wei (BC/L/2961)
21. Low Henn Xhen (BC/L/3050)
22. Mak Yik Mun (BC/M/3179)
23. Michael Cheah Ern Tien (BC/M/2933)
24. Michelle Chew Ai Phin (BC/M/3299)
25. Muhammad Firdaus bin Abdul Khalik (BC/M/3220)
26. Navaron Anak Chula (BC/N/3609)
27. Naveen Sri Kantha (BC/N/3743)
28. Ng Shawn (BC/N/4492)
29. Nicholas Wong Kwang Tee (BC/N/3939)
30. Pang Huey Lynn (BC/P/724)
31. Phoon Wai Weng (BC/P/678)
32. Preveena Ravindra Kumar (BC/P/728)
33. Rachel Chong Jia Wei (BC/R/1331)
34. Rachel Ng Li Hui (BC/R/1295)
35. Sean Tan Yang Wei (BC/S/3389)
36. Sheryn Yong Shi Yee (BC/S/3587)
41
37. Vince Tan (Tan Hoo Seh) (BC/T/1856)
38. Weera Premananda (BC/W/970)
39. Yap Sher Min (BC/Y/877)
40. Jason Yong (Yong Kok Yew) (BC/Y/855)
42
Item 5.8
43
MOTION CONDEMNING REPATRIATION IN VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER, AND ENACTMENT OF
REFUGEE/ASYLUM SEEKER LAW
Whereas:-
1. When Malaysia on 23/2/2021, reportedly repatriated 1,086 Myanmar citizens whom it described
as “illegal immigrants” to Myanmar despite an existing court order preventing the sending back
of 1,200, it raised several issues including the obligation of State and government departments to
respect and obey court orders. The order was issued in a case was filed, amongst others, to ensure
that all the said 1,200 persons are duly vetted and determined to be not refugees and/or asylum
seekers, whereby a repatriation of any such persons would be a violation of the universally
recognized principle of non-refoulement that guarantees that no one should be re-turned to a
country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
and other irreparable harm.
2. Refugees are people who have fled war, violence, conflict or persecution and have crossed an
international border to find safety in another country....The 1951 Refugee Convention is a key
legal document and defines a refugee as: “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their
country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.
3. It is totally unacceptable and unjust for Malaysia to return back to countries from where refugees
and/or asylum seekers have fled from, simply because these persons were simply considered
‘illegal’(or undocumented), for not entering Malaysia with the proper documentation, or simply
because their passport( work permit, passes..) had expired making their remaining in Malaysia
‘illegal’.
4. Malaysia to date still do not have a Refugee and Asylum Seeker law, which defines ‘refugee’ and
‘asylum seeker’, set out rights and obligation of those seeking refuge or asylum, the procedures
of determination whether said person is a refugee or asylum seeker, and the manner in which
they will be dealt with after they have been determined to be a refugee/asylum seeker or not.
5. Many countries that have specific laws, or have included in other laws like immigration laws, on
how to deals with refugees/asylum seekers. The United States, for example, have the Refugee Act
of 1980.
5. In Australia, the Migration Act 1958 has section 1A(2) which gives effect to Australia’s obligation
of non-refoulement—not to return a person in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where the person’s life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.[3] Section 36(2)
provides for the grant of a protection visa to a ‘non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is
satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the
Refugees Protocol’.
6. Besides the UN Conventions, Article 12 of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 1990
also states ‘Every man shall have the right, within the framework of the Shari'ah, to free
movement and to select his place of residence whether within or outside his country and if
persecuted, is entitled to seek asylum in another country. The country of refuge shall be obliged
44
to provide protection to the asylum-seeker until his safety has been attained, unless asylum is
motivated by committing an act regarded by the Shari'ah as a crime.
7. Malaysia, to date, has not signed and/or ratified the UN Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees 1951, and the 1967 Protocol. That is not a major problem if Malaysia has its very own
law to deal with refugees and asylum seekers.
8. In other countries like in India, who has not ratified/signed the said UN Convention or have their
own domestic laws on refugees and/or asylum seekers, the Courts have created law on the
dealing of refugees/asylum seekers. Like India, Malaysia too acknowledged in our Federal
Constitution the equality of persons (not just citizens), and all persons are accorded rights in many
different laws of the land.
9. In the past, even though refugees/asylum seekers are not recognized in Malaysian law, Malaysia
has provided refuge to refugees/asylum seekers, and have respected the principle of non-
refoulement in most cases. Malaysia recognized and treated differently, persons vetted and
decided to be persons likely to be refugees/asylum seekers as determined by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
10. After the recent repatriation despite a clear court order, there is a need for the commencement
of contempt proceedings, to enable also the alleged person/s or entities who ignored a court
order a right to be heard and for the court to thereafter make a clear decision, which would
determine whether that act amounts to a contempt of court or not. This would be most beneficial
for the people of the land too.
11. In the past, the Malaysian government, vide the Immigration authorities, in several instances have
simply caused the repatriation or even failed to stop ‘forced’ sending back of migrants by
employers, by taking the simplistic position that those that are ‘illegal’ or those without proper
documentation to remain in Malaysia shall be repatriated. This practice have impeded
significantly the rights of many send away from Malaysia, and also the administration of justice.
12. Those with complaints and legitimate claims against employers and/or others simply cannot
access avenues or complete their quest for justice until the end. Absence of claimants/complaints
often result in the end of proceedings at the relevant departments like Labour Department,
tribunals and courts. The fact that victims of crimes and relevant witnesses in Malaysia, and
Malaysia’s lack of resources/capacity to bring them back for trial, results in alleged criminals
getting off scot free – hence an impact to the criminal justice system. In some jurisdictions, such
victims, especially workers having outstanding claims against employers, are allowed to stay until
the complaint/claim is speedily disposed of. Allowing perpetrators of crime to escape justice must
end, and the State must ensure justice – not facilitate the escape of violators or rights and/or law.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED:-
A. That the Malaysian Bar condemns the actions of the Malaysian government, including the
Immigration Department, for acting in violation of a court order when they repatriated 1,086 back
to Myanmar;
45
B. That the Malaysian Bar calls for contempt proceedings to be commenced against the Malaysian
Government, including the Immigration Department, for the violation of an explicit court order,
which will also accord the alleged contemnor/s the right to be heard and a fair trial, and for the
court to pronounce a clear judgment;
C. That the Malaysian Bar calls for Malaysia to monitor and ensure the safety of the 1,086
repatriated to Myanmar despite a court order, and provide a report to Parliament and Malaysians
soon as to whether those repatriated are safe;
D. That the Malaysian Bar calls for the enactment of a Refugee and Asylum Seeker Act or laws that
will recognize refugees and asylum seekers, and determine their rights and stipulate proper just
procedures;
E. The Malaysian Bar calls for a review of Immigration laws, to ensure that victims of injustices
and/or crimes, and possibly relevant witnesses, are not send out the jurisdiction of Malaysia,
hence defeating one’s right to justice; and
F. That the Bar Council do all things necessary to give effect to the above Resolutions;
Motion proposed by
Charles Hector Fernandez

(BC/C/712)
46
Item 5.9
47
MOTION FOR THE ABOLITION OF SCANDALIZING THE JUDICIARY AS FORM OF CONTEMPT OF
COURT, REPEAL OF SECTION 114A EVIDENCE ACT, AND AN ENACTMENT OF A CONTEMPT OF
COURT ACT
Whereas
1. The Federal Court, in its 4-1 Judgment dated 19/2/2021, found Malaysiakini guilty of contempt,
whereby this was the contempt of scandalizing the court/judiciary, for which Malaysiakini
was fined RM500,000. This was in relation to 5 comments posted by this online media
under a news report, where the 5 commenters were not cited for contempt. A perusal of
the judgment sees that the Court failed to do an independent comprehensive evaluations
of the said 5 comments to determine whether there were in fact contemptuous or not.
Just because the alleged contemnor/s admitted, this should not have stopped the court
from making a thorough analysis and determination of whether it was in fact
contemptuous or not.
2. In this case, the draconian section 114A of the Evidence Act was used.
114A Presumption of fact in publication
(1) A person whose name, photograph or pseudonym appears on any publication
depicting himself as the owner, host, administrator, editor or sub-editor, or who
in any manner facilitates to publish or re-publish the publication is presumed to
have published or re-published the contents of the publication unless the contrary
is proved.
(2) A person who is registered with a network service provider as a subscriber of a
network service on which any publication originates from is presumed to be the
person who published or re-published the publication unless the contrary is
proved.
(3) Any person who has in his custody or control any computer on which any
publication originates from is presumed to have published or re-published the
content of the publication unless the contrary is proved.
(4) For the…
3. It must be pointed out, that after this new section 114A was inserted vide amendment
that came into force on 31/7/2012, there was many calls for its repeal.
4. This section also shifts the burden of proof to the alleged contemnor, when rightly the
burden of proof should remain on those who allege, more so when it concerns
posts/statements made by third parties. This burden should be not limited to the fact of
the making of statements, but also the intention (mens rea)
48
5. Vide a media statement dated 13/8/2012, entitled ‘Repeal section 114A of the Evidence
Act 1950’ the Malaysian Bar called for its repeal. SUHAKAM took a similar position, as
reported on 25/8/2020 in the Sinar Harian.
6. Malaysian Bar also participated in the STOP 114A public campaign. The Bar took part in
the Internet Blackout Day on 14 Aug 2012 (Tuesday), in support of the initiative by the
Centre for Independent Journalism to create awareness about the negative impact of
the recently–introduced section 114A of the Evidence Act 1950. As such, the Malaysian
Bar website was not operational on 14/8/2020.
7. The fact that the Federal Court heard the matter in the first instance, the right to the 2
appeals was denied. The right to appeal is fundamental to the administration of justice,
enabling the ability to higher courts to review and correct mistakes of lower court. The
absence of the right of appeal could be argued to be a denial of the basic right to a fair
trial.
8. This, not being a direct disobedience of an explicit Federal Court order, provides no
justification as to why the Federal Court should be the court of first instance. It could
have, and/or should have been heard by the High Court, and this would have preserved
the rights to appeal. A Contempt of Court Act is needed.
9. The other concern is the very high fine of RM500,000 being imposed in small
independent alternative media site, which will also impact negatively on our Freedom of
Expression, Opinion and also Media Freedom.
10. A Contempt of Court Act is needed that will indicate clearly what is contempt, and what
will be the penalties to be imposed to the different kinds of penalties. Since 1999, the
Malaysian Bar has been calling for the enactment of a Contempt of Court Act. The Bar
has also submitted a Draft Bill.
11 With this Federal Court decision, once again the archaic contempt of scandalizing the
judiciary/courts have been revived, and the best was for the abolition of this contempt
is by the passing of a law by Parliament.
12. A similar motion was tabled in 2020, which by reason of the Covid-19 pandemic, had to
be withdrawn to keep our then AGM short. Herein below, contents similar to the 2020
Motion is included, with some amendments.
13. In 2019, Attorney General Tommy Thomas initiated 2 different contempt proceedings,
being the contempt of scandalizing the judiciary (also referred to sometimes as
scandalizing the court or scandalizing judges) against 2 lawyers. One lawyer was
subsequently found guilty and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, and a fine of
RM40,000 in default 30 days jail.
49
14. The re-emergence of this contempt of scandalizing the judiciary again in Malaysia,
forces us in Malaysia to consider again this contempt and determine whether it should
be abolished or retained. In UK, this type of contempt was abolished in 2012.
15. This contempt, is akin to similar provisions found in the Sedition Act that seems not so
much interested in the truth or investigating allegations, but rather simply whether
these statements and/or expression may have a negative impact on public perception of
the judiciary or judges. Truth may not even be a Defence. Mens Rea is also irrelevant.
16. In these times, where we place great importance of freedom of speech, opinion and
expression. Note that even the United Nations, and most member states have
recognized the Human Right Defender and his/her duty includes to highlight alleged
wrongdoings makes this continued existence of the contempt of scandalizing the
judiciary, which may have the undesirable effect of deterring the highlighting of possible
wrongdoings, including corruption, of judges or within the judiciary.
17. We are at an age that we ought to welcome the highlighting of wrongs amongst judges
and judiciary, which would then allow for us to weed out the ‘bad apples’ or put in place
mechanisms to overcome the problems where the end result will be a clean and
independent Judiciary and a system of administration of justice, where we can all be
proud of.
18. It must be pointed out that the Malaysian Bar and its lawyers have historically said and
did things, that reasonably may also be considered to be a contempt of scandalizing of
the judiciary, which thankfully many a past Attorney Generals and/or others did not
elect to initiate contempt proceedings.
19. We recall the statements and actions about judges and/or the judiciary following the
1988 Judicial Crisis, later the issue of a Chief Judge holidaying with a lawyer, then the
issue about a former Chief Justice immediately after retirement joining a law firm and
many others that have been raised by the Bar and/or its lawyers, and even others.
20. Most of these have resulted NOT in the commencement of contempt proceedings but
discussions for reform, formation of a Royal Commission of Inquiry and other positive
changes.
21. However, we also recall the case of Manjeet Singh Dhillon, the then Secretary of the
Malaysian Bar, who was found guilty of the contempt of ‘scandalizing the judiciary’, and
the sentence imposed was a fine of RM5,000 in default 3 months imprisonment. This
was in relation what was stated in an Affidavit that was in the case the Malaysian Bar
had commenced against Tun Dato' Abdul Hamid(the then Chief Justice).
22. We also recall the case of Murray Hiebert, a journalist of the Far Eastern Economic
Review, who was found guilty of contempt of court, amongst others, the contempt of
50
scandalizing the judiciary. He authored an article entitled "See You In Court" published
in FEER in the edition of 23 January 1997. The article was about the wife of a prominent
judge who sued the Kuala Lumpur International School when her 17-year-old son was
dropped from the debating team. The article allegedly suggested the case moved
through the legal system unusually quickly because the boy's father was a judge. This
Canadian was found guilty and sentenced to 6 weeks in prison.
23. We recall also the call by some quarters for contempt proceedings against a sitting
Attorney General. In response to the Court of Appeal decision, “The department's stand
is that rape cases require deterrent sentencing to reflect the abhorrence and revulsion
of the public towards such crimes. “This aberration of justice for those who most need
the protection of law must be rectified,” said the statement signed by the then Attorney
General, Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail.(Star, 5/9/2012). The question raised the was,
amongst others, whether the phrase ‘aberration of justice’ amounted to contempt, i.e
the contempt of scandalizing the judiciary.
24. The above AG’s statement was in response to public uproar after former national youth
squad bowler Noor Afizal Azizan and electrician Chuah Guan Jiu were bound over for
five years and three years respectively on a RM25,000 good behaviour bond after being
found guilty of statutory rape.
25. Queries have also been made in the public arena as to whether statements in a speech
made by immediate past Attorney General, Tommy Thomas, during the opening of the
Legal Year 2019 could also be a contempt of scandalizing the judiciary. He said, amongst
others, that “The administration of justice has not been immune from the cancer of
corruption which spread in the conditions created by the former government…“The
scandals that involved judges, lawyers, prosecutors and litigants for at least three
decades since the Judicial Crisis of 1988 are too well known, and no reminders are
required for this morning’s audience.”
26. These statements or expressions, which clearly lead to contempt of court proceedings,
the contempt of scandalizing the judiciary, being initiated, have in most cases resulted in
reforms and improvements in the Judiciary. The Judicial Appointments Commission
today is one such reform.
27. Freedom of expression and opinion is a human right that ought to respected and protected,
even if sometimes it may later be found that it was based on wrong or false facts.
2019 Contempt of Scandalising the Judiciary cases
28. In 2019, Attorney General Tommy Thomas in itiated 2 contempt proceedings, being the
contempt of scandalising the judiciary (also referred to sometimes as scandalising the court or
scandalising judges) against 2 lawyers.
51
a) Arunachalam Kasi - The Federal Court on Tuesday (April 23) sentenced lawyer Arunachalam
Kasi, better known as Arun Kasi, to 30 days' jail and also a fine of RM40,000 in default 30
days' jail after finding him guilty of contempt of court over his two statements criticizing the
proceedings and decision of a court case.(Star, 23/4/2019). The Federal Court had earlier
granted an ex-parte application for leave by Attorney-General Tommy Thomas to initiate
contempt proceedings against a lawyer who had allegedly criticised the proceedings and
decision of a court case.(NST, 27/2/2019).
b) This was in connection to 2 articles he had written entitled ‘How a dissenting judgement
sparked a major judicial crisis’ and ‘Tommy Thomas must look into arbitration centre that
sparked judicial crisis.’
c) Muhammad Shafee Abdullah - The High Court, on 1/3/2019, allowed AG Tommy Thomas to
start contempt proceedings, after the court was satisfied there was a prima facie case.
Shafee had allegedly said, amongst others, that victory for Najib was possible “if the judge is
straight, if witnesses are not coached, and if evidence is not fabricated”.
d) On 31/7/2019, High Court allowed lawyer Muhammad Shafee Abdullah’s bid to set aside an
order for contempt proceedings obtained by Attorney-General (AG) Tommy Thomas against
him for allegedly undermining the administration of justice. Judge Mohd Firuz Jaffril ruled
that the application filed by the AG was lacking in particulars on the contempt charges. Firuz
added the alleged contempt complaint against Shafee about “scandalising the court” was
nowhere to be found in the AG’s application.(FMT, 31/7/2019)
UK abolished scandalising the judiciary as form of contempt of court in 2012

29. In the UK, when the Attorney General of Northern Ireland commence this similar ‘archaic’
contempt proceedings, it resulted in finally the abolition of Abolition of scandalising the
judiciary as form of contempt of court.
30. Extracts from the House of Lords Hansard states this – ‘The law of scandalising the judiciary
could have been left in the moribund state in which it has rested for many years. However, the
Attorney-General for Northern Ireland unwisely chose earlier this year to seek to breathe life
into it by bringing a prosecution, later dropped, against Peter Hain MP for some critical
comments he had made in his autobiography concerning a Northern Ireland judge. That
prosecution had two main consequences. First, it substantially increased the sales of Mr Hain’s
book and, secondly, it led to this amendment.’
31. 0n 10/12/20112, the House of Lords UK Parliament vide Amendment 113A, abolished the
contempt of scandalizing. The new section entitled ‘Abolition of scandalising the judiciary as
form of contempt of court’ Section (1) states, ‘(1) Scandalising the judiciary (also referred to as
scandalising the court or scandalising judges) is abolished as a form of contempt of court
under the common law of England and Wales.’ This is now law.
32. Some of the relevant comments, as extracted from the Hansard of the House of Lords(which is
attached) are as follows:-
52
- It is no longer necessary to maintain as part of our law of contempt of court a criminal
offence of insulting judges by statements or publications out of court. The judiciary has no
need for such protection’(Lord Pannick)
- ‘….the wise judge—and he, if I may say so, was a very wise judge—normally ignores insults
out of court. ’(Lord Pannick)
- Judges, of course, are as entitled as anyone else to bring proceedings for libel, and some
have done so.’(Lord Pannick)
- ‘…that the amendment is not designed to encourage criticism of the judiciary. Much of the
criticism to which judges are subjected is ill informed and unsubstantiated. However, even
where criticism is unjustified, it should not be a criminal offence. (Lord Pannick)
- “It may be necessary to clarify that the abolition of this offence does not affect liability for
behaviour in court or conduct that may prejudice or impede particular proceedings”(Lord
Lester)
- ...He will remember that the other antique and archaic speech crimes of sedition, seditious
libel, defamatory libel, obscene libel and blasphemous libel were all abolished by the
previous Government and Parliament for similar reasons connected with free speech. (Lord
Lester)
- Although abolishing this crime in this country will make very little difference because the
law is entirely obsolete, it will make a difference in the rest of the common law world.(Lord
Lester)
- …The special sanction for judges remains unnecessary. My reasons remain the same. Judges
have to be hardy enough to shrug off criticism, even if it is intemperate or abusive, which
has happened; even if it is unfair and ill-informed, which has certainly happened; and even if
it is downright deliberately misleading, the same applies…I speak from some knowledge. I
have been scandalised on several occasions in the course of criminal trials at which I was the
presiding judge without a jury. It was intemperate, certainly ill-informed and extremely
offensive. I was deeply offended and hurt, but I certainly did not consider attempting to ask
anyone to invoke the special procedure of scandalising the court. If anyone had suggested it,
I would have firmly discouraged him at that time, which is a good many years ago now.
(Lord Carswell)
- …that it is better not to introduce any such offence into the law but simply to leave it at
abolishing the offence of scandalising…My reasons are three. First, special protection of
judges immediately invites criticism from those who are all too ready to give vent to it.
Secondly, if a judge had to give evidence in such proceedings, it would create a further and
better opportunity for intrusive cross-examination and create a field day for publicity for
critics of the judiciary. Thirdly, as I have said before, judges have to put up with these
things; they have to be robust, firm and, on occasions, hard-skinned enough.(Lord
Carswell)
53
33. Interestingly, the 26th Sultan Azlan Shah Law Lecture was delivered by the same Lord David
Pannick, QC entitled “Scandalising the judiciary: criticism of judges and the law of contempt” on
5 September 2012 at the Mandarin Oriental Hotel.
34. Our Malaysian judges are wise and strong, and they too like the judges of UK, should no
longer fear criticisms of themselves or their decisions by anyone.
35. The argument that we are a young democracy, after 60 plus years, should not be used as a
reason not to abolish the scandalizing the judiciary contempt. This lame excuse has been used
in the past to keep bad laws and also not having democratic election to choose our community
leaders, members of the local government (Local Council) and/or Senators.
36. After all, we are already acknowledged that young people of 18 years and above are mature
enough to vote. The Bar, and the government too, has now acknowledged that a young lawyer
is ‘mature enough’ to stand for Bar Council Elections, and even to be appointed President of the
Malaysian Bar. So too, are Malaysians now mature enough to exercise their democratic rights at
all levels of government, and certainly we are ‘mature’ enough to see the death of the
SCANDALIZING THE JUDICIARY AS FORM OF CONTEMPT in Malaysia.
37. It must be remembered that Malaysian judges, if needed can always commence personal
defamation suits against anyone, if they choose to do so. Hence there is no longer the need to
maintain the contempt of scandalizing the judiciary in Malaysia.
38. It is sad that we have not heard anything about the allegation or suspicion of corrupt practices
allegedly raised by Arunachalam Kasi in his article, where he also lodged a report to the
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission(MACC). After all, former AG, also acknowledged
Contempt of Court Act
39. In the absence of and/or delay in enacting a Malaysia Contempt of Court Act, there arises
uncertainty.
40. The need for a Contempt of Court Act emerged in 1999 in the public sphere, and it is also a
matter that lawyers and the Malaysian Bar have talked about.
41. Parliament to date has not imposed any restriction by law relating to contempt of court under
Article 10(2) of the Constitution. As such the common law provision under s. 3 of the Civil Law
Act 1956 is preserved.
Section 3(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 reads:
Save so far as other provision has been made or may hereafter be made by any written
law in force in Malaysia, the court shall:
(a) in West Malaysia or any part thereof, apply the common law of England and the rules
of equity as administered in England on the 7th day of April 1956;
54
(b) in Sabah, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity, together with
statutes of general application, as administered or in force in England on the 1st day of
December 1951;
(c) in Sarawak, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity, together with
statutes of general application, as administered or in force in England on the 12th day of
December 1949, subject however to subsection 3(ii):
Provided always that the said common law, rules of equity and statutes of general
application shall be applied so far only as the circumstances of the States of Malaysia
and their respective inhabitants permit and subject to such qualifications as local
circumstances render necessary.
42. Parliament has the power to enact a clear law relating to Contempt of Court in Malaysia, and it
is time to do so now.
THEREFORE, it is hereby resolved that:

A. That scandalizing the judiciary as form of contempt of court be abolished in Malaysia, and
B. That the Malaysian Bar call on the Malaysian government to enact a Contempt of Court Act;
C. That the Bar Council do the needful to help draft and ensure that a just Contempt of Court Act
is enacted soonest;
D. That the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar do the needful to ensure that our fundamental
freedom of expression, freedom opinion and press freedom is always respected and
protected, including the right of everyone, as Human Rights Defenders to freely highlight
alleged or suspected wrongdoings, rights violations and/or injustices without retaliation by
the government and/or other alleged perpetrators.
E. That the Malaysian Bar reiterates its call for the REPEAL of Section 114A Evidence Act 1950;
F. That the Malaysian Bar calls for the RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL, which includes also the right to 2
Appeals be protected;
G. That the Bar Council do the needful to give effect to this Resolution, even if it means launching
needed campaigns and exercising our right of peaceful assembly for, amongst others, the
repeal of section 114A and abolition of ‘scandalizing of judiciary/courts’ contempt
Proposed by
Charles Hector (BC/C/712)
Dated 5/3/2021
55
ADDENDUM
Extract from the Hansard of the House of Lords when it decided to abolish scandalising of the
Judiciary as a form of contempt of Court
(https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/121210-0001.htm#1212107000682
10 Dec 2012 : Column 851
House of Lords
Monday, 10 December 2012.
2.30 pm…
Amendment 113A
Moved by Lord Pannick
113A: After Clause 23, insert the following new Clause—
“Abolition of scandalising the judiciary as form of contempt of court
(1) Scandalising the judiciary (also referred to as scandalising the court or scandalising judges) is
abolished as a form of contempt of court under the common law of England and Wales.
(2) That abolition does not prevent proceedings for contempt of court being brought against a person
for conduct that immediately before that abolition would have constituted both scandalising the
judiciary and some other form of contempt of court.”
Lord Pannick: My Lords, this amendment seeks to abolish the crime of scandalising the judiciary in
England and Wales. I am delighted that the Minister has added his name to this amendment.
The amendment is also signed by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who has played a
leading role in arguing for reform of this area of the law. The amendment is also in the names of
the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell—a former Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland—
and the noble Lord, Lord Bew.
I can explain the reasons for this amendment very briefly. It is no longer necessary to maintain as part
of our law of contempt of court a criminal offence of insulting judges by statements or
publications out of court. The judiciary has no need for such protection. As the noble and
learned Lord, Lord Carswell, explained in Committee, the wise judge—and he, if I may say so,
was a very wise judge—normally ignores insults out of court. The noble and learned Lord, Lord
Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, made a similar point in a case he decided, as he may recollect.
Judges, of course, are as entitled as anyone else to bring proceedings for libel, and some have
done so.
56
The law of scandalising the judiciary could have been left in the moribund state in which it has rested
for many years. However, the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland unwisely chose earlier this
year to seek to breathe life into it by bringing a prosecution, later dropped, against Peter Hain
MP for some critical comments he had made in his autobiography concerning a Northern Ireland
judge. That prosecution had two main consequences. First, it substantially increased the sales of
Mr Hain’s book and, secondly, it led to this amendment.
When we debated this subject in Committee on 2 July, the Minister gave a cautious welcome to the
amendment but said, very properly, that the Government wished to consult on the matter. As a
result of the debate in this House, the Law Commission expedited the publication of a
consultation paper on 10 August in which it proposed that the offence of scandalising the
judiciary should indeed be abolished.
I emphasise that the amendment will not affect other aspects of the law of contempt of court and in
particular the powers of the judge to deal with any disruptions during court proceedings. I also
emphasise that the amendment is not designed to encourage criticism of the judiciary. Much of
the criticism to
10 Dec 2012 : Column 872
which judges are subjected is ill informed and unsubstantiated. However, even where criticism is
unjustified, it should not be a criminal offence.
The amendment will not affect the law in Northern Ireland or Scotland, in the latter of which the
offence is known as “murmuring judges”. I understand that in Northern Ireland more
consultation is required. It is ironic that the impetus for this amendment came from the Peter
Hain case in Northern Ireland, and now the anachronistic law that led to that case is to be
abolished in England and Wales but not in Northern Ireland. I hope that the Minister can give us
an indication of when consultations with Northern Ireland will be completed and a decision
reached.
Meanwhile, I am delighted by the historic decision which I hope that this House will take tonight to
approve an amendment abolishing the offence of scandalising the judiciary in England and
Wales. As Justice Albie Sachs said on this subject in a judgment in the Constitutional Court of
South Africa in 2001, respect for the courts will be all the stronger,
“to the degree that it is earned, rather than to the extent that it is commanded”.
I beg to move.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill: My Lords—
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally): My Lords, I wonder if my noble friend will give
way. I want to intervene now because what I am going to say will help the shape of the debate. I
realise that my noble friend and a number of noble and learned Lords may wish to contribute. I
in no way want to cut short or pre-empt that debate, but I hope that my comments will
establish the context for them to comment on what the Government intend to do.
57
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, told us, we considered a similar amendment to this in Committee in
July. I said that the Government were sympathetic to the concerns raised about the offence of
scandalising the judiciary but we wished to consider the issue further and to consult others. In
particular, before moving to reform or abolish this offence, we wished to consider whether such
a step could result in a gap in the law or have an unwanted side-effect.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, told us, in this we had the benefit of the work of the Law Commission,
which was and is currently reviewing the law on contempt of court. As the noble Lord said, it
kindly brought forward the element of its review considering scandalising the court and
published a paper for public consultation in August. The commission considered three options in
its consultation paper—to retain, abolish or replace the offence—and it has concluded that the
offence should be abolished without replacement. Its analysis was in-depth, examining the
human rights aspects and considering the arguments for and against the various options.
The consultation closed in October, and the commission published a summary of responses last month
and a summary of its conclusions yesterday. I was pleased to see that several noble Lords
responded with their views, and that members of the judiciary and other legal professions were
also well represented. Of 46 responses, some from organisations, 32 were in
10 Dec 2012 : Column 873
favour of abolition. The remainder expressed a variety of views, most favouring a replacement offence,
but I note that only two favoured retaining the offence in England and Wales, at least for now.
We have also noted other views, such as those expressed by noble Lords in Committee, and have
concluded that it is right that this offence should be abolished. We therefore support the
amendment. However, we also noted the Law Commission’s observation in its paper that:
“It may be necessary to clarify that the abolition of this offence does not affect liability for behaviour in
court or conduct that may prejudice or impede particular proceedings”.
We support that view that abuse of a judge in the face of the court, or behaviour that otherwise
interferes with particular proceedings, should remain a contempt. The new clause includes a
provision that will ensure such behaviour will remain subject to proceedings for contempt of
court.
In contrast to the amendment we debated in Committee, which extended to Northern Ireland, this
amendment applies to England and Wales only, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained. In
July, I said that we would be consulting the devolved Administrations; noble Lords must
remember the criminal law is a devolved matter in both Northern Ireland and Scotland.
Scandalising the judiciary is also a common law offence in Northern Ireland. As I have said, we
consulted with the Minister of Justice, David Ford, who has confirmed that he does not wish the
Westminster Parliament to legislate on behalf of the Northern Ireland Assembly on this offence.
Similarly, the Scottish Government have also confirmed that they do not wish us to legislate on
their similar common law offence of murmuring judges. Given that this is a devolved matter in
both jurisdictions and under the terms of the Sewel Convention, we wish to respect the wishes
of the Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Assembly in this matter.
58
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lester and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for bringing this matter
before the House. The Government are happy to support this amendment, and through it the
abolition in England and Wales of the offence of scandalising the judiciary. I hope that my
intervention at the start of the debate does not prevent other noble Lords and noble and
learned Lords from making observations on where we are and where we are going.
4 pm
Lord Lester of Herne Hill: My Lords, I declare a former professional interest in that I acted for the
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission in the aborted contempt proceedings in relation to
Peter Hain and his publisher. I am extremely grateful to the Attorney General for Northern
Ireland for his entirely misguided decision to move for committal because, but for that, I would
not be standing here in support of the amendment. We owe everything to the Attorney General
because it was that which caused me to contact the Law Commission and the Government, and
to discuss the matter with my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in the first place.
10 Dec 2012 : Column 874
It is important that the Government have decided to do what we have just heard from the Minister,
and that is most welcome. However, I pay tribute to the previous Government, and I see the
noble Lord, Lord Bach, in his place when I say this. He will remember that the other antique and
archaic speech crimes of sedition, seditious libel, defamatory libel, obscene libel and
blasphemous libel were all abolished by the previous Government and Parliament for similar
reasons connected with free speech.
So far as blasphemy was concerned, for the reasons given by the Minister, it was decided that,
although we could abolish that offence in Britain, we could not do so in Northern Ireland. We
left it to Northern Ireland to do so itself, and we thought that it would be easy to do there
because Northern Ireland already had a law on incitement to religious hatred that was rather
stricter than what we have in this part of the kingdom. However, nothing has happened on that
issue in Northern Ireland because there is institutional paralysis about doing anything of the
kind. I know that this matter has concerned the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission,
and exactly the same problem arises now. Even though the amendment springs from a problem
that arose in Northern Ireland, I am doubtful as to whether the Northern Ireland Government
will agree to bring their common law into line with what we are doing in England and Wales.
However, given that two other supporters of the amendment know far more about Northern
Ireland than I would ever know, I shall not say more about that matter.
I should like to make one other point. Although abolishing this crime in this country will make very little
difference because the law is entirely obsolete, it will make a difference in the rest of the
common law world. All the textbooks, including that of the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, say the same
thing, which is that, although this is an outmoded and archaic offence, there remain many parts
of the common law world where it is enforced. The most notorious example occurred in
Singapore last year, where Mr Alan Shadrake, who wrote a book criticising the Singapore
judiciary’s attitude towards the death penalty, was committed for contempt, sentenced to
prison, fined and told to pay legal costs. This gentleman, who is about my age and a
59
distinguished senior writer, was condemned in that way, with the Singapore Court of Appeal
applying its view on our case law and this offence. By abolishing the offence today we do not
really change much in this part of the world because, apart from what happened in Northern
Ireland, it is simply never invoked anymore. However, it will send an important message across
the common law world. That is another reason why I am so delighted that the Government have
decided to take this course.
Lord Carswell: My Lords, I support this amendment. I spoke briefly in Committee and I intend to be
brief again today, particularly in view of the way in which the House has so far received the
amendment and what the Minister has said.
Since that debate in Committee, the Law Commission has published this admirable consultation paper,
which contains a full and helpful discussion of the issues, the principles and the possible
solutions. My view, which
10 Dec 2012 : Column 875
was very direct and brief in Committee, remains unchanged. The special sanction for judges remains
unnecessary. My reasons remain the same. Judges have to be hardy enough to shrug off
criticism, even if it is intemperate or abusive, which has happened; even if it is unfair and ill-
informed, which has certainly happened; and even if it is downright deliberately misleading, the
same applies.
I speak from some knowledge. I have been scandalised on several occasions in the course of criminal
trials at which I was the presiding judge without a jury. It was intemperate, certainly ill-informed
and extremely offensive. I was deeply offended and hurt, but I certainly did not consider
attempting to ask anyone to invoke the special procedure of scandalising the court. If anyone
had suggested it, I would have firmly discouraged him at that time, which is a good many years
ago now.
After I read the Law Commission consultation paper, I considered quite seriously whether there was
room for the possibility of a new and more specific offence, penalising possibly deliberate and
malicious targeting of a judge by making untrue and scandalous allegations into something of a
campaign. I am persuaded, however, that it is better not to introduce any such offence into the
law but simply to leave it at abolishing the offence of scandalising.
My reasons are three. First, special protection of judges immediately invites criticism from those who
are all too ready to give vent to it. Secondly, if a judge had to give evidence in such proceedings,
it would create a further and better opportunity for intrusive cross-examination and create a
field day for publicity for critics of the judiciary. Thirdly, as I have said before, judges have to put
up with these things; they have to be robust, firm and, on occasions, hard-skinned enough.
The Law Commission, in my view, was right in its provisional conclusions and I hope that when the
report has been considered, the responses will confirm that. I would certainly support the
amendment that the offence should simply be abolished.
Finally, as noble Lords have said, this of course does not apply in Northern Ireland. The authorities
there will form their own view and take their own course. I cannot and do not in any way speak
60
for them, nor have they consulted me about such provisions. I have to say, and I hope that they
will take this into account, that I cannot see any reason why judges in Northern Ireland should
have any different protection from judges in England and Wales against scandalising. I think the
same considerations apply, and having been a judge there for 20 years, I would certainly not
wish to see any differentiation.
Lord Beecham: My Lords, I echo the remarks made by the Minister and by other noble Lords. We are
entirely supportive of the amendment, and glad that the Government have agreed to take
matters forward in the way that the noble Lord indicated.
Lord McNally: My Lords, I will clarify a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The Justice
Committee in Northern Ireland recently agreed to proceed with an amendment to its Criminal
Justice Bill that would see this offence repealed. I am sure that
10 Dec 2012 : Column 876
the words uttered by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell, about his own experience will carry
great weight. However, this is a devolved matter for Northern Ireland.
Lord Pannick: I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke.
Amendment 113A agreed.
61

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Agenda and Motions for the 75th Annual General Meeting of the Malaysian Bar

Date: 13 March 2021 (Saturday)

(5.1) “Motion Regarding the Continuing Professional Development Scheme”,

(5.2) “Motion Regarding the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance 2021”,

(5.4) “Motion to Clarify on the Policy to Implement Minimum Remuneration for

(5.8) “Motion Condemning Repatriation in Violation of Court Order, and Enactment

No Duration Prorated CPD Points

No CPD becomes Applicable to Members who

(b) Member Y has obtained 12 eligible CPD points as at 30 June 2021:

(c) Member Z has obtained 20 eligible CPD points as at 30 June 2021: 12

(C) Compliance with the CPD Requirements

(D) Non-Compliance with the CPD Requirements

(a) an automatic six-month extension to obtain the required CPD points

No Status of CPD point(s) at the end of Amount of fine

(E) Ancillary Matters

(d) 13 May 2020 to 9 June 2020;11

(e) 10 June 2020 to 31 August 2020, and subsequent extensions.13

(a) Non-governmental organisations (“NGOs”) and human rights groups, namely

(a) declaring an area as an infected local area (section 11);

(20) In particular, section 14 of the Emergency Ordinance is unprecedented in the history of

(29) The incapacitation of Parliament is therefore unnecessary, irrational, unreasonable

THEREFORE, the Malaysian Bar hereby resolves that:

Sarah Yong Li Hsien

I propose to move the enclosed motion at the Annual General Meeting.

Kindly acknowledge receipt.

1. Article 23(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) expressly

3. At present, pupils-in-chambers (“pupils”) are not subject to any minimum

It is hereby resolved that:

3.2. Regulating the master-pupil relationship including stipulating the basic

Dated this 5th day of March 2021

Proposed by Sarah Yong Li Hsien (BC/Y/807)

1. New Sin Yew (BC/N/2169)

c. The mandatory minimum in Hong Kong is HKD6,000 per month, pursuant to

6. The Chairperson of the National Young Lawyers and Pupils Committee, Mr

9. There are various benefits to the implementation of a minimum wage, whether

a. Underpaid pupillages disproportionately favour pupillage candidates who are

b. Underpaid pupillages disincentivise the recruitment of many otherwise well-

d. Underpaid pupillages may affect a pupil’s learning because of their inability to

Pupillage would be restricted to individuals whose personal circumstances

It is hereby resolved that:

B. release a report or reports of the results of the state-level surveys immediately if

Dated this 5th day of March 2021.

1. Cassandra Chung Li Hooi (BC/C/2043)

7. Malaysia has committed to the ASEAN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence

(ii) In Malaysia, marriage or pregnancy can limit or eliminate a woman's

(v) High rates of child marriage negatively impact countries' economic

13. The Government in attempting to find solutions to the problem of child

Dated 5th March 2021

3. According to a Malaysiakini press article published on 30 November 2020 (“Press

“However, due to legal impediments, we are not able to proceed further

It is hereby resolved that:

A. clarify the purported legal impediment of the Complaints Mechanism;

D. clarify the validity of the Complaints Mechanism in addressing future sexual

F. issue an official statement addressing A-E above; and

Dated this 5th day of March 2021.

Proposed by: Nathalie Annette Kee Xuan Li (BC/N/4221)

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED:-

Charles Hector Fernandez

2019 Contempt of Scandalising the Judiciary cases

UK abolished scandalising the judiciary as form of contempt of court in 2012

Contempt of Court Act

Section 3(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 reads:

THEREFORE, it is hereby resolved that: