Xiaoyuan Liu - China and The Issue of Postwar Indochina in The Second World War

China and the Issue of Postwar Indochina in the Second World War Xiaoyuan Liu Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2 (May, 1999), 445-482. Stable URL: ftp flinksjstor.org sci sici=0026-749X% 28 19990542033%3 A2%3CA45%IACA TIOPWIELO.CO%SBL-U Madern Asian Studies is currently published by Cambridge University Press. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhupvful-jstor-orp/abouv'terms.himal. ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have ‘obtained prior permission, vou may not download an entire issue of a joumal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial us. Please contact the publisher cegarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at bbupsfukjstor-orp/journals/cup btm. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transtnission. ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding ISTOR, please contact support @jstor.org- hupsfuk.jstororg/ Sat Mar 19 13:31:53 2005Moder Asian Studies 38,2 (1999), PO 445-482. © 1999 Cambridge University Press Printed in the United Kingdom China and the Issue of Postwar Indochina in the Second World War XIAOYUAN LIU Potsdam Gollege of SUNY Ghina’s foreign relations during the Second World War underwent a radical metamorphosis. The Chinese government under Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) earned new international respect by mounting a tenacious resistance against the Japanese enemy. By allying itself with powerful countries in the West for the first time in modern history, China emerged from its involuntary diplomatic isolation. The new Grand Alliance facilitated China’s diplomatic initiatives seeking to eradicate the legal stigma of its semi-colonial status through the abrogation of the unequal treaties. In the process China also leaped to the rank of the ‘Big Four’. Ata time when the Western colonialism was receding, the Japanese Empire was collapsing and national independence movements were on the rise in many Asian countries, China seemed positioned to achieve a new prominent leadership role in Asian and world affairs, When the war ended, China emerged transformed into a different country in its international status but not in the way intended by China's leaders. Although throughout the war years other Allied governments generally acknowledged the dawning of a new China, not many shared President Franklin D. Roosevelt's view that China should be treated as a great power. China’s membership in the vic~ torious Grand Alliance of the United Nations did not guarantee a full recovery of its ‘lost territories’. Although the Cairo Conference of 1943 promised the return of Taiwan and Manchuria to China after the war, the wartime political alignment resulted in certain grey areas for Chinese diplomacy, such as Hong Kong, Tibet, and Mon- golia. Moreover, when the Chinese government sought to formulate a postwar strategy for renovating China’s relations with other countries in the Asian-Pacific region, its concerns about China’s security, economic well-being and national prestige often encountered little ‘That is, if China's depressing association with the Western Allies in the First World War is not counted 0026-749X/ag/47.50#80.10 445448 XIAOYUAN LIth enthusiasm from its allies. Even more problematic, during the war the Kuomintang (KMT) government could claim national leadership within China but only in a most superficial sense, A latent danger of renewed civil strife was always present. No less threatening to the. KMT's power was a mismanaged government finance amidst a war- torn economy. When the war ended, all these conditions would have helped reduce che Allied triumph over Japan to a ‘bitter victory’ for China? For a moment China seemed stunned at the threshold separating past from future. ‘This essay examines the case of the Ghinese government's Indo- china policy during the Second World War in order to show how the KMT's leadership strove to redefine China's international status and in particular its role in Asian affairs. Contrary t0 a conventional view that in the war years the Chinese government had no Indochina policy, the wartime Chinese diplomacy actively searched a role for China to play in postwar Indochina.* To Chongqing, the importance of an Indochina policy transcended any ordinary bilateral relationship with its southern neighbour. First, unlike Korea whose postwar settlement would be an act of demolishing the Japanese Empire, 2 This the tite of calection of essays etd by James C. Hsiung and Steven 1 Lanne, Olina Biter Vin Tie War with Japon, 1997-1945 (Atmanke ME Sharpe, ge) Tn China's wartime foreign policy planing, ters ike ndochina’, Vietnam’, and ‘Anna’ were ned interchangeably. What Chinese oficial sealy meapt was ‘Victmam, one of the thee Indachnese counties. This patie wl be followed ia this esa. * Stared by King ©. Chen, Vaan and Ching, 1958-1954 (Princeton: Princeton University res, 1969), 07-8 prevailing notnn found nthe historiography hole that during the Seeond World War, the Chinese government did not develop any specific policy for Vietnain, The most recent exampe af recing Chen's conlasion tt Stein Tenneson, The Picnamau Reston of sogs Rn Ho Chi Mek and Gain e rtd ot War (London: Sage, 1991). Chen bases his conclasion onthe tesisony of Xing Senahon am agent of Jun Tog (he Mary Bareat of Invest Seon aed Sat the Chee ace pie) n charge the bres wrk mong the Vietnamese partisans, In fate 144 it 2 ceport to his superior, Xin tlced objections to an attempt bythe Chinese tiitarynathonty in Gang ta une Vietmamene expatriate in China for antcBrench purgeues, One a his pnts was that "Chonggng tthe Ute didnot have aay established poly for Vietnam and therefore the Chinese sovetnment should not forsake opportunities of working with the French in expect to Indochina, tn this writers epiton, ing emark i valid only with regard to Chongaings relationship with the Viemamese partisan. Tn the war yeets the Kuomintang government aint decide on conapting with the Vietnamese to Tauneh 2 nationalist revolution In Indochina, Otherwise, KAT leaders looked on iplomacy within the United Nations colton, principally a paceahip wth the Unita Stats, a the md for aching Ch ejectsCHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 447 Indochina belonged to the Western imperial system in Asia. The Ghinese government's Vietnam policy therefore could not be separated from its general attitude toward Western colonialisin. Second, the pre-colonial relationship between China and Vietnam had been conducted within the traditional framework of the Confucian Empite, Thus any attempt by the Chinese government to challenge the French colonial rule in Indochina would also pose a challenge to itself in finding a new basis on which China would develop its postwar relations with most of its Asian neighbors. Third, because President Roosevelt displayed a personal interest in the future of the French colony, KMT leaders had ¢o contemplate the matter in connection with their American alliance. In coping with these issues, Chinese leaders had three options. ‘They could follow American leadership and settle with the role of a junior partner to Washington's Asian policy; they could accept restoration of the prewar status quo in Southeast Asia and continue to be a weak country encircled by Western empires; or they could start assuming great-power responsibilities while taking the initiative in mustering international support for China’s leading role in reorgan- izing the Rast Asian international order. Although China's nationalist leadership always coveted the third position, the country’s wartime weakness tended to restrain its leaders’ ambitions. The resultant plot of Chinese diplomacy on Indochina thus had a grandi- ose beginning but a gloomy conclusion. As in Chongqing’s other wartime undertakings, the American alliance proved an ever-present factor in Chinese foreign policy making in respect to Indochina. Seek a ‘Big-Brother’ Role By 1941, China had already fought Japan arduously for four lonely years. Therefore Japan’s attack of Pearl Hasbor on 7 December and the resultant American entry into the Second World War were wel- coming developments to Chongqing. Chinese diplomacy was invigor- ated under the new circumstances. Soon, the Western Allies got the first glimpse of a renovated Chinese foreign policy. In early 1942, ‘when talking to an American officer in Chongqing, Wang Chonghui, secretary-general of the Chinese Supreme Council of National Defense, identified Chinese nationals in Indochina, Burma, Thai- land, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines as the most important concern for China's Southeast Asian policy. According to448 XIAOYUAN LIU Wang, three alternate solutions were then under consideration by the Chinese government: (1) China’s direct control of these areas; (2) plebiscites in these territories to decide whether they would remain under their prewar colonial authorities or under some new political authority; and, (3), these arcas to be put under the supervision of an international organization. Wang identified the first wo as Chongqing’s preferred solutions.> Chinese nationals in Southeast Asia was an old concern of Chinese forcign policy, but Chongqing’s projection of the three solutions unveiled a new and bold intention ¢o alter the prewar status quo of the region. Apparently the sting in these ptopositions was directed more toward Western colonial powers than toward Japan, The ori- gins of Chongqing’s anticolonialism and claim for Chinese patronage over Southeast Asian countries can be traced back to Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Kuomintang. In his doctrine of Chinese nationalism, Sun not only advocated the emancipation of China from foreign imperialism but also embraced an ill-defined wangdao (kingly way) tradition of China, or imperial China’s alleged benevolent over- lordship over its lesser neighbors.’ But not until now, when Japan’s action of war in the Pacific shattered Western empires and also drove China and Western powers into alliance, did the KMT leadership see an opportunity Co assert China's leading role in Southeast Asian affairs. Especially, America’s recent alliance with China tended to embolden officials in Chongqing. Intending to place China under America’s aegis, President Roosevelt pledged to help the Chinese. government redefine China’s ‘national standing’. From the spring of 1942, he began to promote an idea among the Allied governments, that after the war China should act as one of the ‘four policemen’ of the world So far as Asia’s colonial problems were concerned, Roose velt seemed to believe that he could easily enlist Chiang Kai-shek’s support to his solutions. In February, through T.V. Soong, Roosevelt invited Chiang to join with him in a partnership for rearranging Southeast Asian territories after the war. He told T.V. Soong: ® Subcommittee to Investigate the Adeinistation ofthe Enteral Security Ace and Other internal Security La ofthe Committe an the aditary, United States Senate, Morgrth Dian (Chine) QWashington, DiG> nat Sesion of the Sth Cone gress, 1965), 1: 887, Sun tose, San Mfin Gh The Pee Price ofthe Pape (Chonghing: Minis ‘eyo Information ofthe Republic of China, 1948), 7. 94-9" "Robert F. Sherwood, Rese and Hiplins” An Frtmate Hiery (New York Harper, 1948). 572-3CHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 449 For a time period after the war, countries like Vietnam, Thailznd, and Burma might have difficulties {in achieving] complete self-government. Per- haps China and the United States should both serve as trustees for these countries until they achieve the ability of self-government. This matter ‘ought to be discussed with Generalissimo Chiang wich a long-term view.* ‘This was Roosevelt's earliest disclosure to a foreign government of his trusteeship formula for Indochina. Three months later, however, when repeating the trusteeship idea to the visiting Soviet foreign minister V.M. Molotov, the president attributed the original authorship of the idea to Chiang Kai-shek.? TT.V. Soong was enthused bath by Roosevelt's attention to China and his decolonization program for Indochina. In May, while attending a Pacific War Council meeting, Soong teamed up with Roosevelt in chastising French colonialism." But Chiang Kai-shek ‘was oblivious of his own ‘contribution’ to Roosevelt's trusteeship formula for Indochina. In August, after learning more about the formula from Lauchlin Currie, Roasevelt's personal envoy, Chiang was troubled by the connotations surrounding the proposed solution. Currie brought up the trusteeship formula at a conversation with Chiang on 3 August. After indicating President Roosevelt's disap- proval of France’s return to Indochina after the war, Currie described for Chiang the advantages of «rusteeship: ‘The fact that two or three countries are involved {in trusteeship] will insure that none of them will treat it [the trust territory] as a colony. This matter should be of particular interest to China for the reason that she may be fone of the three nations for the administration of an international trusteeship over her neighboring countries after the war." Chiang, however, did not reciprocate Currie’s enthusiasm and maintained a polite silence. A more sensitive observer would have detected Chiang’s serious reservations on the spot. To begin with, ® Zhang Faochen to Ni Guanghua, 4 Jan. 1944, T.V. Soong papers, box 4, This telegram cites the contents of two despatches that Soong sent to Chiang on his conversations with President Raoseveit in 1942. "US. Departient of State, Forage Pelatios of the Unltd State toga Washington, D.C: G.P.Oy 1960), 4: 578-81 (hereafter cited as FR with year oF subsitle). We. Roger Louis, Inpensne At Bay: The Unite States and the Damtonirtion of the British Bepir, 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 155~ 1, rightfully questions Roosevelt's assertion about Chiang’s authorship af the trust- ceship idea, calling the president's act “embellishment”. "Memorandum by Joha L. McCjea on the 8th meeting of the Pacific War Coun- «il, 23 May 1942, Franidin.D. Roosevelt papers, Map Roum File (SIRF), box 168, sont Memorandum on Chiang-Carrie comesition, Aug, 1942 Currie papers x450 XIAOYUAN LIU. the trusteeship policy reflected American leaders’ paternalism toward Asian peoples, about which Chiang eventually broke his silence when he heard Currie describing the relations between China and the Western powers as ones ‘between an adolescent child and its parents’, Chiang responded to his condescending guest by saying that the United States ‘often shows a “superior complex” overween- ing toward everybody else’? Then, in a more practical sense, Chiang ‘was apprehensive of the trusteeship formula’s ominous implications for China’s own borderlands, such as Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet. Currie seemed unaware of the connection here. When talking with Chiang about trusteeship in Indochina, Currie imprudently broached the thought that after the war Manchuria could be made a buffer zone to separate China, Russia, and Japan. Not surprisingly, Chiang fiercely resented this proposition.”? Furthermore, the trusteeship solution as described by Currie would not confer on China a leading role in postwar settlement in Vietnam or other colonies in Southeast Asia. In 1942, still intoxicated by China’s new alliance with the United States and hoping to gain valuable returns from the relationship, KMT leaders could not be satisfied with China’s role as merely one of several trustees, especially when the formula itself represented a Western initiative. Curtie’s visit did bring about one change to Chongging’s policy. That is, overt displays of KMT leaders’ ambitions to reclaim China’s leadership in Asian affairs would be replaced by a more subtle approach. Soon after his meetings with Currie, Chiang Kai-shek himself formulated an official rhetoric on the matter, which dis- claimed China's ‘right’ to lead Asia but reaffirmed its ‘responsibility’ for assisting underprivileged Asian nations.'* Before the year ended, the U.S. government further learned about the meaning of China’s ‘responsibility’. In December, 1942, Chiang asked Owen Lattimore, "2 Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiywanhui Dangshi Weivuanhui, Zhonghua Minguo Zinayoo Shiiae Chubien Ds Bt Kengchon Shigi (Preliminary compilation of important historical documents of the Republic of China: The period of the war of resistance against Japan), 7 vols (Taipek: Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Wety- anhui Dangshi Weiyuankut, 1981), val. 3, book pp. 700, 703, 715 (hereafter cited s.hilae, volume (book): pages); menioranduua, Excerpt from ritites on my confer ence with Chiang Kai-shek on August 6, 1942, Currie papers, box 4 Memorandum on Chiang-Curcie conversation, § Aug. 1943, Currie papers, box 4, Tid Kuomintang Dangshi Weivuanhui, Xion Zongung Jiang Gong Sisiane Yanlun Zongit(Cornplete works of the late Presdont Chiang [Kal-ehek}) (Taipei Zhongguo ‘Gcomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Weljuanhui, 1984). 19: 347, 38! 02-5; FR: China, 1942, 174CHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 451 his American adviser, to convey an informal message to President Roosevelt, in which he disclosed his vision of 2 new international order in postwar Asia. Aside from reiterating China’s demands for recovering Taiwan and Manchuria from Japan, Chiang proposed that after the war Korea be detached from Japan and achieve a semi- independent status under an ‘American and Chinese tutelage’. Chiang was unequivocal about his intention to use the American— Ghinese device to keep Sovict influence out of the Korean Peninsula. As for Tndechina, although supportive of Roosevelt’s stand against postwar restoration of French colonial rule, Chiang sidestepped the president's proposal for an international trusteeship. Instead, he offered that China ‘act as big brother’ for Indochina before it would be able to gain complete independence. ‘That would work out all right, Chiang reasoned, ‘because Indochina was far distant from Russia’ and China had some ‘old ties’ with the people there.!® Noteworthy in the message is an important distinction between Korea and Indochina. During the war, Chongqing sponsored a ‘Korean Provisional Government’ and hoped to transplant its client back to Korea after the war. By 1942 the KMT regime itself was still squatting in the southwestern corner of China, unable to foresee when and whether its military influence would ever be able to reach Korea. Therefore, in his message Chiang endeavored to encourage the United States to play an active role in postwar Korea in order to hold the nearby Soviet power at bay." Indochina was a different geopolitical case, It was beyond the reach of the USSR but close to the KMT bases in southwestern China. From a geostrategic point of view, Chiang obviously believed that his government was positioned to assume control in Indochina at a certain point in the course of the war."” China’s right to exercise such authority had been granted by an inter-Allied understanding reached at the end of 1941, which created a ‘China theatre of the United Nations’ under Chiang Kai-shek’s command to include China, Thailand, and Indochina.'* In his message to Roosevelt, Chiang actually asked the president’s agreement ta expand his wartime military authority over Indochina © Memorandum, ‘Re: Chinese postwar ama’, 4 Dec. 1942, Currie papers, box ° For the lave of Korea ee this writer's Sino American Diplomacy over Koved during World War IC, The Jounal of Amaren-Bast Asien Reatins 1 Summer 1090). 204-44 a ‘Shitian, 3 (2): 773-8; FR, 1942 China, 749-52, 754-5, 9805 FR, 1943 Chine, 52-5, Shilian, 3 (8) 97452 XIAOYUAN LIV into a postwar political responsibility that would allow China to supervise the tetritory unilaterally Although Chiang’s message was by no means clear about the concrete attributes of the ‘tutelage’ for Korea and the ‘big brother’ for Indochina, the former’s explicit anti-Sovietism and the latter's impli- cit anti-Western tendency were enough to alarm US. policymakers, Tt was hard for them not to notice that Chiang’s need for the presence of American influence in postwar Asia was proportional to the proximity of Soviet Russia and his fear of Soviet power. In Indochina, where Soviet influctice seemed unlikely to reach, Chiang preferred a thorough de-Westernization of the local affairs, even if this would mean his rejection of a partnership with President Roosevelt. By observing the disagreements between his own and Chiang’s positions on postwar Asia, Roosevelt cautiously avoided further direct ‘contradiction with Chiang. What he did was to offer a soft rebuttal to ‘Chiang’s proposals regarding Korea and Indochina in other people’s name. During the last few days of 1942, a letter was sent to Chiang bearing Lattirsore’s signature, The letter made it clear that Chiang’s proposal for excluding the Russians from Korean affairs would be harmfal to postwar stability in Northeast Asia. As for Chiang’s claim for China’s ‘big-brother’ role in Indochina, Lattimore’s letter contained only a vague comment to the effect that in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, Roosevelt would be willing to consider a single- nation (rusteeship in certain areas but multinational supervision in others." ‘The American president’s resort to ambiguity did not deter Chongqing. For, in genetal, Roosevelt's China policy in 1943 would retain the theme of ‘making China a great power’. In the middle of the year, Roosevelt announced to 'T.V. Soong: ‘I want to put China in the sun even before she has the economic power’ The problem was that Chiang Kai-shek wanted to sunbathe wearing his own garb and marking out his own beach. In the spring of 1943, Chiang Kai- shek published his notorious book, China’s Destiny, in which he made a sweeping claim to China’s ‘original territories’. Chiang listed the Ryukyu Islands, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Pescadores, Vietnam, and Burma as the first group of territories that China had Jost to foreign powers. Although Chiang did not mean that China should necessarily 12 Shiliae, (1): 748-8; FR China, 1092, 185-7 ® Record of Conversation with the President and Mr. Hopkins, 16 July 1943, Soong papers, box 32.CHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 453 retake all these areas, he did want to see China again exercising tremendous sway over them. As he told Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun), Chinese ambassador to London, ‘it was not necessary to say that China had no particular view’ on territories in Southeast Asia. Soon the Waijiaobu began to contemplate measures for implementing China’s foreign policy objectives as outlined in Chiang’s book." In public, KMT officials propagated the so-called ‘ties of blood? between the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples, alluding to China’s special position in Vietnam. After Chongqing broke diplomatic relationship with the French Vichy regime in August, for the first time during the war the KMT’s official organ, Zhongyang Ribao (Central daily), editorialized China’s interests in Vietnam as a matter solely between China and the Vietnamese people. The French factor was eradicated.”® Yet a truism about China's wartime diplomacy is that given Chongqing’s reliance on U.S. support, its thrust for an independent foreign policy could not go far. Chiang Kai-shek and his associates were painfully aware of this fact. China’s “big brother” position in Indochina would not take shape if Chongqing could not overcome French and British opposition diplomatically and sustain an occupation operation in the territory materially. On both counts, Wash- ingcon's support was essential. Having failed to win President Roose- velt’s sympathy through Lattimore’s communication, in 1943 Chiang Kai-shek tried once again at his summit meeting with Roosevelt at Cairo. Symbolically, the Cairo Conference marked an important success of Chongging’s wartitne diplomacy for enhancing China's international status. In practice, Chiang Kai-shek’s debut in the stage of ‘world politics was at best a bitter-sweet experience. So far as Indo- china was concerned, Chiang gained nothing but misgivings. First, he became involved in a quarrel with the British about inter-Allied tnilitary authority over Indochina and Thailand. The British endeavored to persuade Chiang to turn over his commanding authority aver % Chiang Kai-shek, Chine Destiny (New York: Rey Publishers, 1947), 58% ‘Reminiscences of Wellingcon Koo’, (Chinese Oral History Project of the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, New York) 5 (2): 470 (hereafter cited as RWK); Waijiacbu memorandum, “Zhuxi duiya waijiao fangesian ahi 2hishi', (The president’ (Chiang’e] instructions on diplomatic problems), ned. (1943), and Waljiaobu ‘memarandum, ‘Benbu zunzhao shexi zhishi banli gingxing’, (The status af this rain- istry’ work for implementing the president's instructions), nd. (1943), Vietor Hoa (ilu Shize) papers, box 3, * "Zhongsang Riso, 7 AUg. 1945,454 XIAOYUAN LIU these areas to the newly-created Southeast Asian Command under Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. Failing to do so, the British saw in Chiang an irrational and face-loving oriental.” This opinion was perfunctory, for Chiang’s stubbornness, as shown in his ensuing political meeting with Roosevelt, was derived neither from military rationale nor from an obsession with ‘face’. The real reason was Chi- ‘ang’s political agenda for Indochina. AGhinese ‘summary record? of the Roosevelt-Chiang political dia- logue at Cairo, which took place on 23 November, indicates that the two only reached a vague understanding about their governments? cooperation in helping Indochina achieve independence after the war. Nothing is mentioned in the record about cither Roosevelt's trusteeship formula or Chiang’s ‘big-brother’ proposition.* The final document of the conference, the Cairo Communiqué, contained an ambiguous promise for Korea to gain independence ‘in due course’; Vietnam was not even mentioned. After the summit, Chiang told his associates that at Cairo he had invited Roosevelt to join him in making declaration ta support independence for Vietnam. But the president, according to Chiang, cavalierly dismissed the idea with a Taugh2* The American side kept no mimutes of the discussion. After the conference, President Roosevelt claimed that Chiang ‘whole- heartedly supported’ his Indochina policy.2* He would repeat the same story many times. Roosevelt’s most vivid description of his discussion with Chiang was given to a group of reporters aboard the USS. Quincy, on 23 February 1945, when he was on his way back to the United States from the Yalta Conference. But when Roosevelt supposedly recited verbatim Chiang’s reproach of French colonial- istu, he was in reality repeating word for word his awn speech delivered at a Pacific War Council meeting that took place a few months before the Cairo Conference.” % Louis, 278; FR, Canfrences at Caine and Tehersa, 887-8; John J. Sbrega, Anglo- Anarican Relations and Colarialism in Eait Asia, 1942-1945 (New York: Garland, sa83), 115-57. ER, Confoencr at Coteo and Teberen, 1943, 335- ® Jiang Yongjing, Hu Zhiming Zat Zhongpua’ Vige Vuenan Mincuchiyi Weighuangche (Ho Chi Minh in China: a feigned Viernamese nationalist) (Taipei: Zhuanji Wensue Chubanshe, 1972), 188, 205, n. 22 % Cordell Hull, The Monotee of Corel Hull (New York: Macmillan Company, 1948), 2: 1507; Roosevelt to Hull, 24 January 1944, Rootevelt papers, President’ Secretary File (PSF), box 74 2” Samuel I. Roseman (comp.), The Public Papers end Addie of Franklin D. Roate- sll; 1944-45 Volune Victory and the Threrhld of Peace (New York: Random Hause,CHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 455 ‘The fact remains that at Cairo, neither Roosevelt nor Chiang had the other's ‘whole hearted’ support. What available evidence does reveal is that the two leaders’ accord concerning Indochina was lim- ited to two matters. The first was their opposition (o the restoration of French sover¢ignty in Indochina. The second was that the people in the area would not be able to gain independence without tangible assistance from the outside. But Roosevelt and Chiang had never before disagreed on such fundamentals. Meanwhile, the Cairo Con- ference did not help bridge the disagreement between the two with regard to the form and extent of outside assistance in postwar Indo- china. By the time of the Cairo Conference, neither Roosevelt nor Chiang had substantiated their Indochina solutions with concrete policy measures. Their disagreement between ‘international (rusteeship’ and ‘Chinese big brother’ therefore did not go beyond a concep- tual polemic. The disagreement was nevertheless profound. Both leaders anticipated the end of the colonial system in Asia after the war, In its place Roosevelt wanted to install an enlightened Western, governance of Asia peoples, or an internationalized Philippine system. The system would theoretically be able to placate Asian nationalism and to keep former Asian colonies integrated with the West. Chiang’s program was not intended to isolate the oriental ‘world again from the West, but after the Western powers’ uninvited domination of Asian affairs was broken by Japan, Asia’s reorganiza- tion and reconstruction must. assume Asian characteristics. In the Chinese leader's mind, this naturally meant restoration of China's centrality in Asian affairs. At Cairo, so far as Indochina was concerned, Roosevelt and Chiang were both successful in conducting negative diplomacy. Neither allowed himself to be manocuvred by the other side into assuming a follower's position. This meant that both failed to advance their tespective policy objectives regarding Vietnam. The mate between the Chinese and the American governments would eventually prove unfortunate to the Indachinese countries and bene- ficial to France. Suffice it to say, relative to inter-Allied politi Cairo Conference may have been the sole opportunity for the Allied governments to articulate a decolonization principle regarding the French colony. But the chance was missed. 1950), 562-3; memorandums by Chester Hammond on the ggrd mesting of the Page War Council, 21 July 1949, Roosevelt papers, MRF. bor 168, % There is, of course, the British policy at Caira to consider. Important studies ‘of the American-British diplomacy over Indochina inclucte Walter La Feber, “Roo velt, Churchill, and Indochina, 1942-1945", The American Hinricel Review, 80456 XIAOVUAN Lit Redefine China’s Role ‘The Roosevelt-Chiang failure at Cairo with regard to Indochina should also be understood in the context of their governments’ foreign policy planning. Especially, a success of President Roosevelt’s Indochina diplomacy at Cairo would have helped him institutionalize his policy in the U.S. government. The U.S. State Department had always been aware of the president's opinion on Indochina. When Roosevelt discussed the issue with British foreign minister Anthony Eden in March 145, Secretary of State Cordell Hull was in attend- ance, Also, at least on one occasion President Roosevelt directly told the State Departinent’s planning staff that in his opinion France should not return to Indochina after the war. Yet the policy planning staff in the State Department consistently maintained that the U.S. government had a ‘categorical commitment’ to releasing the French Empire, including Indochina, from the Axis' yoke. The Caio Cone ference had no effect whatsoever to change this view. According to 2 post-Cairo planning document of the State Department, dated 1 March 1944, ‘this Government is pledged to the restoration of the French Empire’, but ‘the President has suggested placing Indochina under an international trustecship [emphasis added]. Such behaviour certainly exceeded offering advice to the Chief Executive and was little short of insubordination. The policy favored by the planning staff of the State Department called for ‘restoration of Indochina to France subject to some meas- (0975): 1277-95, Christopher Thorne, ‘Indochina and Anglo-American Relation, 4g4a-tgqs), Pace Micrial Resin, 45 (197): 73-96, and Donald C. Watt, Br tain, America and Indo-China, 1g42=1g4a' in his Suczeding Joke Bult Americ in Briains Place, 1900-1075 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 194 219. These studies agree that hefore and after the Cairo Conference, the Beith entsstently opposed President Roosevelt's anteFrench policy in Indochina. They alo agree that by the cme ofthe Cairo Conference the president was operating at high geat in promoting the rusteship solution for Indachina, What these scholars ddo-not agree is whether or not, when sliding t0 4 junior parcnce's position im its telationship with the United States, the British government would Rave tsked 4 Break with Washington over Indochina [eis not totally nteasonable to speculate that at Cairo had Romsevelt and Chiang conducted their policies eifferenty, Indo chinese independence migh atleast have gained recognition in a farm cose ta the “in due course’ formula for Karea, " Sadieation of Contact with the President on Postwar Matters’ n.d, Records of Harley A. Notter (Postwar Planning) (RG 59), box 54 {hereafter cited as Notter records); P214a, $o Sept. 1943, Note records, box By T=598, 2 Now. 1943, Notter records, box 6; 404, 9 Nov 43, shit; CAC-5b, 5 Feb. sgq4, Noter records, box ‘og ST minutes 23, fly 1943, Noter records, box 79, Parga, 1 March 14g, Noteer records, box 58,CHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOGHINA 457 ure of international accountability’, which was also Secretary Hull's own preference.” State Department officials agreed with Roosevelt that the French colonial record in Indochina was poor. But they did not believe that America’s own record in the Philippines was good enough to allow the U.S. government to hold a moral edge over other colonial powers. Nor did they share the president's view that after the war France should relinquish its great power status. On the contrary, in the postwar years U.S. foreign policy would need a strong, independent, and friendly France as a ‘bulwark against the spread of anti-democratic movements’ in Europe." America’s postwar interests in Southeast Asia also mattered, In the State Department's view, the strategic importance of the region to USS. security had been accentuated by the war in the Pacific. Economically, America would continue to need raw materials from the area and, more importantly, would need to enlarge its trade and investments in countries there. Politically, in addition to its lingering obligations in the Philippines, the United States would not be able to evade a responsibility for preserving stability and promoting progress throughout Southeast Asia. While forecasting an overextension of America’s commitments in ‘an area where, except for the Philippines, it has been relatively litile concerned in the past’, the planning staff of the State Depart- ment did not believe that the United States would be able to pull the things off in Southeast Asia without other Western powers’ regaining their influence there.”® As summarized by the Depart- ment’s Security Technical Committee, U.S. foreign policy in postwar Far East would have to begin either with a ‘blank sheet’ or with a ‘restored status quo ante’, The ‘blank sheet? approach, which projected a Southeast Asia minus European colonial empires, was not the State Department's choice. ‘Viewing European colonial powers as America’s potential allies in postwar Southeast Asia, the State Department regarded the Chinese government as posing an unnecessary hindrance. During 1943, when. President Roosevelt was still actively soliciting Chongqing’s partnership in his Indochina enterprise, some planning officers in the State Department already considered China as a postwar nuisance. At & CAG 66:, 5 Feb, 1944, Notter records, box 10g; Hull, 2: 1598-3, 8 PWC-176, go May 1944, Stanley K. Hornbeck papers, box 124; CAC-2gg preliminary, 1 July 1944, Noteet record, 112 & CDs-i47, 17 April 1944, Notter records, box 123. % GDA-147, U7 April 1g44. Notter records, box 123; ST minutes 16, 7 May 1945, Notter records, box 79-458 XIAOYUAN L1G Security Technical Committee meetings, it was suggested that ‘the containment of China’ be envisaged for a ‘fear of Chinese domination’ existed among Asian nations.° On the eve of the Cairo Confer- ence, members of the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems reached a consensus that ‘in Southeast Asia the expansionist designs of China were feared as much as were those of the European powers’. In 1944, the same committee conceded that the Chinese government had to date made no territorial claims in Southeast Asia. But, still concluded that the seven-and-a-half million Chinese nationals ing in the region constituted a convenient instrument for China to pursue a disguised colonial policy. Largely the State Department based its estimation of Chongqing’s foreign policy intentions on public. statements made by Chinese offi- ials. As indicated earlier, during the first two years of the Pacific war Chinese officials, including Chiang Kai-shek himself, made statements that could be construed by other governments as evidence of Chongqing’s expansionist designs. Yet during the Second World War a difficult question for foreign observers of China was how to interpret the policy statements emanating from Chongqing. Should they be treated as evidence of a great power’s definite policy intentions? Or should they be discounted as noises made by a volatile nationalist regime that was uncertain about its international status? John Carter Vincent was representative among the State Depart- ment’s ‘China hands’ who wanted to base a judgement of Chinese foreign policy on China's political and economic. realities without overlooking those significant historical changes in Chinese foreign affairs. Though not always approving Roosevelt’s approach to ‘making China a great power’, Vincent nevertheless believed that “China's new-found position in the Far East’ deserved ‘a sympathetic understanding’, While the French expressed an assertion that ‘pour PAnnamite, les Chinois ... représentent I'ennemi héreditaire’, Vin- cent refuted it as a misleading propaganda. Vincent was willing to believe that the Vietnamese people harbored no hostile feelings against China and that Chongging maintained a generally cautious and correct attitude toward Indochina. His recommendation to the State Department was that ‘the Chinese Government should be consulted and its views given full consideration in regard to plans for % ST minutes 18 7 May 1943, Note reeds, bok 79; ST minutes 2 Fly 1945, PY minutes 56, 11 New. 1943, Records of the Undersecretary af State (Dean Acheson} (RG 49), box 9; T-504 preliinaty, 3 July 1944, Noter records, box 67.GHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 459 the future of Indochina’ Yet, despite Vincent's rising status as 2 China expert in the State Department during the war, these views hardly found their way into the department's policy planning ‘operation. There is no evidence that the Chinese government was aware of the State Department-White House divergence over Indochina, In any event, it would be difficult for Chiang and his aides to imagine that President Roosevelt might have less control over the Stare Department than Chiang had over the Waijiaobu. To Chinese offt- cials, the président wes the U.S. government, Therefore, they took the Chiang-Roosevelt impasse over Indochina at Cairo seriously. A pre-Cairo consensus among KMT officials was that the Chinese government should take advantage of its diplomatic status enhanced by the war to resuscitate China’s leadership in Asian affairs. In 1944 this was replaced by three recognizable trends of thought among KMT policymakers. One called for continuation of the pre-Cairo policy aimed at achieving Chongqing's maximal objectives in Indo- china, with or without Washington’s endorsement, At the other end of the spectrum was a recommendation that China temporarily shelve its decolonization objective regarding Indochina and switch to 2 policy of improving Chinese interests in the area through negotiations with the French Empire. At the middle was a position to modify Chongqing’s own ambitions about Vietnam in order to achieve an accommodation of Chinese interests in President Roose- vele’s trusteeship formula. Supporters of the first option were officials involved in foreign policy planning operations in the Waijiaobu and the Supreme Coun- cil of National Defense. They were responsible for translating the ideas of Chiang’s Cihina’s Destiny into policy measures, rarely concerning themselves with the daily realities of Chongging’s wartime diplomacy. In 1944 the KMT government's participation in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. provided an occasion for these policy planners to engage in flamboyant memorandum writing. Mistaking » Memo by Vincent, Background and Brief Notes on Relations between China and the United States’, md, (Nov. 1944), Records of the Division of China Aflies, box 1; Vincent to Berle, 2 Nov. 1943, Hornbeck papers, box 173 4% For instance, as evidenced in CAC-664, 5 Beb. 1944, Netter recards, box 10g, although conceding that China might need t be consulted in respect to milicary ‘administrations in certain Uberated Asian territories, including: Indochina, the department's Incer-Divisional Committee on the Rat East believed that the US. government should probably join with Britain and France in their oppasition against Chinese designs in Indochina460 XIAOYUAN LIU the forthcoming inter-Allied meeting for a preliminary peace conference, Chongqing’s foreign policy strategists devoted much of their energy to the question as to what kind of international management ‘of postwar Asian affairs would serve China best.* They strongly fav- cored a regional body for Bast Asia. Without such an organization, a Waijiaobu memorandum asserted, ‘various problems relating to peace in the Far East wauld likely be overlooked by the powers, and China would be hurt mast’, These officials regarded America’s Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere as an ideal model for China, Corresponding to America’s leading position in a pan ‘American system, ‘in the fature, China's importance and leadership in a Far Eastern regional organization should also be understood and recognized by other countries! According to KMT planners’ opinion, the China-centered regional body should be entrusted with ant enormous decision-making authority over states and areas in East Asia. It should have the auchority to decide long-term policies of the United Nations toward Japan, Korea and Siam. It should assume responsibilities for helping South- east Asian colonies achieve independence. It should also be put in charge of all ‘mandated islands’ in the Pacific. In these operations, “China’s special relations’ with ‘Annam, Burma, Malaya, and Dutch Indies... should be respected by other governments’. These officials id not define the ‘special relations’ merely in cultural terms. For instance, in the case of the Dutch Indies, a long-term scheme for Chinese control was contemplated. It was proposed that the Chinese government foster the existing Chinese communities in the Dutch colony into ‘embryonic states of Chinese nationals’, and then ‘grant ‘open support to these at a proper time in order to use them as China's periphery and buffer zone’ ® Waijiaobu program for Dumbarton Oaks, 7 June 1944, Hoa papers, boy 33 Waijiaobu memorandum, “Zhanhou guoji heping jigou yi gita youguan went’ (Postwar international peace arganization and other related issues), n.d. (494), Hoo papers, bos 7; memorandum by the Supreme Council of National Defense ‘Riben wutiaojian touriang shi suo ying jieshoU zunban zhi tiaokuan eao'an’ (Draft prograts on conditions for Japan to accept when it surrenders unconditionally), n.d {1g 44), Too papers, box 6 ‘Waijiaobu memorandum on the Dumbatton Oaks Conference, 7 June Hoo papers, box 3; Waijiaobu memorandum, ‘Zhanhaw guoji heping igo ji qi youguan wens? nd. (1944), Hoo papers, bor 7. - ‘Waijiaobu memorandurr, Zhankow guoli heping jigou ji qita youguan went nnd. (1944), Hoo papers, box 7; Waijiaobu memorandum, “(Ding) Taipingyang shang 2himindi wentt yu yiban anquan wenti: woguo dui Heyin ying cai fangrhew {((D) The Colonial problems in the Pacific and gencral security problems: policiesCHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 461 ‘The policy design for Vietnam was similarly ambitious. A position paper produced by the Waijiaobu is worth a complete translation here: ‘Policy Measures regarding Vietnam’ (1) Use armed forces to control Beigi (Chinese term for the Tonkin area of Vietnam] and che Laos, which will not only consolidate [Chinas] national defense in the southwest, but will also enable [China] co whip om [gdce] Vietnam, and thus to dominate Zhongnan Bondao [Mid-South Peninsula, oF the Indochinese Peninsula) and keep Siam and Burma under surveillance (2) Apply diplomatic stratagem to consolidate the position of Chinese nationals [in Vietnam]: (a) strive for a most-favored nation status in order to lay the basis for [China's] counterweighing the French with economic strength; (b) negotiate with the French-Iadochina regime for releasing Chinese nationals from various tyrannical laws and regulations; (c) promote ‘education among Chinese nationals and enhance cheir level of literacys and (4) open new consulates in Shunfiua (Chinese name for Thanh Hoa] and ‘Cambodia to extend protection for Chinese nationals and to facilitate trade. (3) Employ political means to induce the Vietnamese nationality to lean inward [wixiang]: (a) support Vietnamese youth and strengthen their national confidence; (b) link up the Chinese and the Vietnamese cultures and restore the traditional spirit of mutual assistance and mutual trust between China and Vietaam:; (c) try to sit Vietnamese representatives in the postwar international peace conference and to eliminate the French suzerainty in Vietnam; (4) increase the number of permanent diplomatic envoys in Vietnam so’ as to enhance Chinese—Vietnamese relations and Vietnam’s international status; and (e) propagate widely the spirit of the Atlantic Charter on national self-determination and Presidenc Roosevelt's statement to the Pacific War Council that ‘after the war Vietnam should not be returned to France but be assisted by the Allies to achieve self- government ability, and that 2 so-called trusteeship should be applied there {o help the Vietnamese people gain independence’, so as to instigate the ‘Vietnamese people to achieve national self-determination.* ‘The document listed the military, diplomatic, and political means for achieving Chongqing's policy objectives as if they were mutually supplementary. Yet it can be easily recognized that these were designed for different contingencies. Option one, based on military prowess, was aimed at resuscitating Chiva’s ancient controlling position vimdvis Vietnam and the rest of the continental Southeast toward che Dutch Indies that aught to be adopted by our government), 7 Jane 1944, loo papers, box 3 Waijiaobu memorandum, (Ding) Taipingyang shang zhitindi wenti yO yiban anquan wenti: (A) dui Annan zhi zhengee'((D) The colonial problems in the Pacific and general security problems: (a) policy measures regarding Vietnam), 7 June 1044, Hoo papers, box 3462 XIAOYUAN LIU Asia. In 1944, however, the problem for such a policy was that, crippled militarily by its war with Japan, Chongqing was in no posi tion to project its postwar military posture and strength in any realistic manner, The second, diplomatic orientation anticipated France's return to Indochina after the war. By that time, KMT planners expected, France would have been badly weakened by the war and thus would be inno position to resist China's diplomatic offensive. The Chinese governinent, buttressed either by its military strength in South China or by international support, would be able to extract signific~ ant concessions from the French through negotiations. In contrast to option one that relied on hard, or military, force, the diplomatic approach. sought to strengthen China’s ‘soft’ presence in Vietnam consisting of cultural, economic, and ethnic elements. The objective of China’s coercive diplomacy with France was to displace the rem- nant of French influence in Indochina gradually. As a matter of fact, wartime conditions had already proven favorable to China’s coercive approach to deal with the French. ‘The third, political option was the closest to Chiaug’s big-brother stratagem, It was derived from an assumption that at the war's end 4 strong Vietnamese nationalist movement would emerge on which Chongqing could capitalize. Yet, at the time, the strongest Vietna- mese nationalist movement, Viet Minh, was based in its own home- land and was beyond Chongqing’s manipulation. Meanwhile some other Vietnamese groups seeking refuge in China during the war were ineffective and often preoccupied with quarrels among themselves.*5 Therefore, although KMT planners could stretch their ima- ginations to anticipate that the Vietnamese on the ‘periphery’ would Took upon Ghina as the ‘center’ to rally, in the war years the Chinese 1 The latest Chinese occupation of the Tonkin avea had taken place between 1420 and 14a, when the Ming emperor of China tried abortively co deny Vietnam independence. the best study ofthe traditional Vietnamese-Chinese relationship is Reith W. Taylor, The Birth of Vituam (Betkeley: University of Calif 08g). DGE. Hal's classic, A History of Southeast Ata (New York: St. Mas 1988), chapter 9 salto use “For instance, in late suminer 1945, after breaking diplomatic celations with the Vichy government, the Chinese authorities took unilateral action to asic control of the Chinese section of the Indochina. Yunnan railway, which France had ‘owned according to ils treaties with China. The French Comittee of National Liberation under Charles de Gaulle asked the US, goternient Tor help but ith no resule See FR, zo43 Chins, ABG-91- See King ©. Chem, 35-09 for an original discussion of Chongaing’s wartime telations with Vietnamese partisansCHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 463 government did not possess 2 suitable instrument for inducing such result. Also interesting about the political strategy is how it moulded President Roosevelt's trusteeship formula to suit Chinese. purpose The formula was largely viewed as a useful piece of propaganda for inciting pro-Chinese Feelings among the Vietnamese. Except for the idea about an East Asian regional organization, the, schemes above were of course part of Chongqing’s hidden agenda not intended for inter-Allied diplomacy. The Waijiaobu actually recommended to Chiang Kai-shek that unless the colonial question of Asia was frst brought up by the other governments at the Dum- barton Oaks Gonference, the Chinese delegation should avoid dis- cussing it. Chiang concurred but went even further. He instructed the Chinese delegation not to ‘insist on anything’. Chongqing’s self-restraint spared its delegation embarrassment at Dumbarton Oaks, During the conference, which convened between 21 August and 7 October 1944, the other governments there were interested mainly in setting general rules for a world peace organization but not in any particular regional issue. The Chinese delegation was certainly not in a position to change the conference agenda decided by the Big Three. Chongqing had other reasons to conduct a low-profile diplomacy. During the year, under Japan's Ichigo (Operation No. 1) offensive, Chongqing's military position went from bad to worse and its military reputation among the Allies declined to the lowest. Under such circumstances, any attempt by the Chinese delegation at Dumbarton Oaks to broach Chongqing’s assertive foreign policy would have been a laughing stock among the other Allies. Furthermore, in the summer and fall of 1944. the relationship between Roosevelt and Chiang deteriorated radically because of the so-called Stilwell affair. Chiang and his American chief of staff, Gen- eral Joseph Stilwell, had always despised cach other. Amidst Chongqing’s military disaster caused by Japan's offensive, the ill will between the two escalated and was then overtaken by a larger dispute over the command of Chinese troops that also involved Preside ent Roosevelt himself. Between July and October, hoping to salvage the China theatre from a total collapse, the president tried to induce Chiang to place all Chinese forces under Stilwell’s command. Chiang resisted the pressure fiercely. Aside from his resentment against for- “TY, Soong to Wei Daoming, 2g July 1944. Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun) papers, box 70; Chiang Kai-shek to Kong Xiangxi, 19 Aue. 1944. sbuls T.V. Soong 0 Wei Daoming, 13 Sept. 1944, bid; Koo to Chiang Kai-shek, nd. (1944), Koo papers, box 68,464 XIAO YUAN LIU eigners' interference in the KMT political-military establishment, Chiang feared that Stilwell’s command might result in American aid to the Chinese Communists. Although President Roosevent finally gave up the idea and also decided to recall Stilwell, the affair inflicted some irreparable damage to the relationship between Chongqing and Washington.” ‘At Dumbarton Oaks, consequently, the Chinese delegation made no more than a ceremonial contribution to the Allied discussions regarding the organization of a United Nations. At the conference, the predicament of Chongqing’s search for a new role in international affaits was captured in. a Chinese diplomat’s observation: We stand in the position of a great power but entertain the anxiety of a small state’? To some in the KMT government, such a predicament in China’s international situation was exactly the reason that Chongqing must pledge allegiance with the United States, As a matter of fact, after the Cairo Conference exposed the divergence between Chongqing’s and Washington’s thinking about postwar Asia, some senior officials in Chongqing began to worry about the future of the Chinese-Amer- ican alliance. In theit opinion, more important than Chongqing’s particular stand on certain postwar issues in Asia, such as Korea and Vietnam, was the general understanding reached by the Chinese and American governments at Cairo about their cooperation during and after the war. These officials therefore called for modification of Chongqing’s own original foreign policy objectives in order to remove sone causes for mutual misgivings in the Chinese-American partnership. ‘TV. Soong was the most prominent proponent of this orientation, once telling American officials that he endeavoured consistently to keep other KMT leaders’ ‘hands off Indochina’.® In late 1943 and early 1944, Charles de Gaulle’s ‘Pree France’ and the French colonial authorities in Indochina made separate statements that prom- “ Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1045 (Now York Cotumnbia University Press. 1979) 147-75; “ Minues of the meeting of the Chinese delegation, 9 Sept. 1944. Kao papers, box 75, Zhongyang, Yenjiusuan Jindaishi Yenjiusuo, Gusmia Zheng Yu Hanguo Dl Yundong Shion (Historical materials on the nationalist government and Korea inde~ fendence movement) Tape: Zhongyang Yenjuyuan findash: Yeast, 1988), 19-22. ® ‘Note on conversation with Cordelt Hull and with Stanley Hornbeck on Sep- tember 22, 1943', Soong papers, bax go.CHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 465 ised new rights to the peoples of Indochina after the war. These instantly caused interest. in Chongqing. At the beginning of 1944, acting upon Chiang Kai-shek’s directives on studying the French statements, Soong, on behalf of the Waijiaobu, made a strong argu: ‘ment against what he saw as a cryptic French scheme. According to Soong, President Roasevelt’s trusteeship solution for Indochina had caused ‘deep apprehension’ among the French. To pre-empt the Roosevelt policy, the French now would want to try a stratagem of “taking away the firewood from under the cauldron [fe di chow xin}, that is, to negotiate with China before the Allied victory’. Soong believed that Chongqing must not fall into such a trap but should seek a thorough solution of the Indochina problem in complete cooperation with Rooscvelt’s policy. He proposed that the Chinese government take steps to reach agreements with Western Allied governments on implementing trusteeship in Indochina.”" Still fresh from his frustrating experience with the Americans at Cairo, Chiang protracted a decision for six months. Not until July was Soong authorized to approached U.S. Ambassador Clarence ‘Gauss with a proposition that a new American-British-Chinese conference be held in Washington to determine these governments? responsibilities for administering ‘liberated areas’ in Asia after the war. Promising China's complete cooperation with President Roose- velt’s leadership, Soong especially requested Washington to offer ‘some exposition’ of its policies toward Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, and Thailand, He made it clear that although the Chinese government was willing ¢o discuss with the Netherlands government the future of the Dutch East Indies, it did not want to include the French in any discussions regarding Indochina.’® ‘Surprisingly, T-V. Soong, conversant as he was with the secret of using the back door of Roosevelt's White House, did not make an attempt to bring his case directly to the president. His overture through the normal channels foundered. In consulting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department was opposed to the conference proposal on the ground that such a meeting could compromise the secrecy of Allied military strategies and also hold undesirable implications for general peace settlements. The State Department 5 Soong to Chiang, 4 Jan. 1944, Soong papers, box 4. For backgrounds of the French statements in question, see Evelyn Colbert, Southead Aris in Intemational Polites, 1945-1956 (uhaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 98-9, and Tennesson, FR, rag China,466 XTAOYUAN LIU was only willing to answer Soong’s request for a policy ‘exposition’ by informally outlining U.S. policies toward ‘liberated areas’ in Asia, includimg Indochina. The JGS agreed to secand such an approach, provided that the State Department's communication with Chong- qing divulge no specifics.* When Soong finally got a response from the State Department in mid-September, he was told that so far as Indochina was concerned, the American government had not yet made a decision. He was especially disappointed by the State-JCS rejection of the conference proposal. By this time, Chiang, not optim- istic about the initiative in the first place, had decided to cut himself loose from Song's abortive diplomacy. He simply told Gauss that he had never authorized Soong to seek another conference with American and British leaders. ‘The impasse hetween Chongqing and Washington afforded opportunities for the French. By the summer of 1944, Chongqing had already broken its relationship with the Vichy regime and had switched to de Gaulle’s Provisional Government of the French Republic. Zinovi Pechkoff, de Gaulle’s representative in Chongqing, tended to view Chongqing’s general attitude toward France as a mere refiection of Washington’s policy. But his superiors seemed more interested in working directly with the Chinese. At the time, an on-going talk between the Chinese and the Dutch governments on Chinese interests in the Dutch Indies established a precedent of Ghongqing’s bilateral approach to settle similar concerns im other Southeast Asian areas.” The French were anxious (o show Chong- ing that compared with the Dutch they were far more enlightened on colonial issues and more sensitive to Cbinese concerns. In late August, the French let the Chinese Embassy in London know de Gaulle’s desire to conclude an agreement with China on Indochina. Ambassador Koo received the French overture favorably. On 24 State Department memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Aug 19445 Records of the Office of Chinese Affaes (RG p),box 11: FR, 1944 China, 1187-9. BFR, 1944 China, 1166, 1169, % Jin Wensi, Watjizo Gongcw Be Heist (Reminiscences on diplomatic missions} Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1968), 93; Zhonghua Minguo Waijaoba, Zrongquo Zhumat Ge Dai Gong Shiguan Liven Gienshang Xianning Nianbian (A chart of tiles for the heads of China's missions ¢o foreign countries) (Taipei: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1969) 73; Teunesson, 55, % fin Wensi, 136-46; Jin Wensi to Waijiaobu, ‘Chuli Heyin wenti baogaot (Report, on the settlement of the Duteh Indies problems}, 30 March 1944, and “Zrong He xinyue tanpan jingguo baogao’, (Report on the negotiations for & new Chinese-Dutch treaty} 22 fume 1945, Wuns? King (fin Wensi} papers, box 1CHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA — 467 ‘August, one day before Paris was liberated, Koo sent a report to Chiang. Aside from noting the marked difference between French and Dutch attitudes, Koo pointed out that after the war France ‘would again become a potent force in international affairs. There- fore, the ambassador recommended, the Chinese government should, seize the opportunity and ‘actively foster contacts’ with de Gaulle's government.” ‘The timing of Koo’s recommendation was good. The aforemen- tioned Soong’s initiative with the State Department hit a stone wall; and the tug of war between Chiang and Roosevelt over the Stilwell affair was conducted by the two sides with quasi-uitimatums. On 10 October 1944, in a. message to Roosevelt, Chiang rejected a compromise offered by the president some time earlier.®® On the same day, Chiang talked to Pechkoff with extraordinary cordiality. In the conversation, Chiang went out of his way ¢o please his guest, saying that the Chinese always felt closer to the French than to the Anglo- Saxon and desired to have France’s assistance in China’s national development. Renouncing any Chinese designs on Indochina, Chiang asked Pechkoff to convey to General de Gaulle that ‘we are very willing to help your government to re-establish a French administration in that colony’. With some foresight, Chiang promised that French colonial troops in Indochina would receive ‘brotherly treat- ment’ in China should they be forced out by the Japanese. Two weeks later, Chongging formally recognized de Gaulle’s Provisional Government. The rapport between Chongqing and de Gaulle continued to gain momentum in 1945. In January, a Sino-French Com- mittee of Scientific Cooperation was established in Chongqing, and cultural-exchange activities followed. In March, the two governments conducted communications governing future negotiations for the settlement of pending questions between China and France. During the remainder of the war, however, the affable atmosphere between the Chinese and the French was never substantiated by a diplomatic breakthrough, Although Chiang’s conversation with Pech- of Japanese surrender in Hanci) (Beijing: She Zhishi Chabanshe, 1984). 92, The Ghiang-Pecthoif meeting is also discussed in Lin Bua, Chiang Kai-rhe, De Gaulle conte lo Ct Mink: Vounam, 1945-2946 (Pati: VHarmaiten, 19o4), pp. 610 Tam fractal tothe MAS's anonymous cater for Bringing the wark ta my actencion © Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handi, 193-1948 (New York: The Macmillan Companys 4047) 74-5468 XIAOYUAN LIU koff had much to do with the deteriorating relationship hetween Chongqing and Washington at the time, the timing for a serious \o-French negotiation over Indochina was a different matter. In Chongqing there were indeed supporters of Ambassador Koo's posi- tive approach toward France, but there were also those who cautioned Chiang about the timing for holding talks with the French. Before the Chiang-Pechkoff conversation took place, a memorandum from the Supreme Council of National Defense advised Chiang that the timing for launching negotiations with the French should hinge upon the likelihood of Chongqing’s military entry inte Indochina. If the government had a definite plan and the ability for carrying through a military occupation in Indochina, then talks with France should be delayed to such a time as the Chinese occupation forces were in readiness. But, if conditions should presage the impracticability of such an operation, Chongqing ought to initiate negotiations with the French before the latter could ascertain China’s military intentions toward Indochina.‘ The trouble for Chiang was that throughout the war he was unable to decide a military strategy about Indochina one way or the other. General Zhang Fakui, commander of the Fourth War Zone of China, and his staff actively engaged in making plans for an offensive strategy against Japanese forces in northern Vietnam, believing it part of their tasks. From time to time, the thought of an invasion also surfaced in Chongqing’s military agenda. Vet, along the Chinese— Indochinese border, a convenient defensive posture seemed always preferable to a risky offensive operation. Especially in the fall and winter of 1944, a Chinese offensive was out of the question. At the time Japan's determined drive in Guangxi to make a passageway into northern Vietnam even deprived the Chinese forces of the con- venience of a defense. By November, Zhang Fakui’s units had been thrown into disarray and, according to Zhang’s report t© Chiang, Shad lost their will to fight In the spring of 1945, when the Chinese governtnent at last began to consider a counter-offensive strategy, two plans coded as ‘Ice Man’ and ‘White Tower’ were drafted, These plans provided that the Chinese Army should not Wu Nanru to the Supreme Council of National Defense, Wogu dui Fash Yuenan 2h tichang’, (Our goverament’s stand on the French Indochina) n.d, (between May and Auguat 1944), fle 287, Quanzong Hao (general archival number) 43 Supreme Council af National Defense Files), Zhongguo Di Er Lishi Danglangian (The Second Historical Archives of China), Naniing Shia, 2(3): 609,CHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA — 469 attack Japanese troops in Indochina unless the latter attempted to move northward to block KMT troops’ main thrust toward China’s eastern coast. More than anybody else, Chiang knew that before the war's end, he would lack a military leverage in Indochina to force a better deal with the French. Thus, after a serious flirtation with the French, Chiang stopped short of launching his government into a formal negotiation with the French over Indochina. Entering 1945, Cihiang’s commanding authority over the China theater still included Indachina, but its hollowness could no longer be concealed. The British and the French operated in the arca dis regarding Chiang’s authority. Chiang even began to lose American support in the matter. In July, unknown to Chiang, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Stilwell’s successor in China, made a comment to George Marshall that it would be ‘militarily sound’ to integrate Thai- land and Indochina into the British Southeast Asian Command because Chiang’s China Command ‘has no plans for either" Chiang nevertheless wanted to keep his commanding authority intact for postwar purpose. But, mainly because of the American-British-Soviet diplomacy at Yalta in February 1945, the KMT government’s Indochina policy would again swing back to the mode of seeking cooperation with the United States. Only this time the quest was characterized by a tremendous degree of urgency bordering desperation; and also gone was any trace of Chongqing’s ‘big brother’ ambition. Drift with Events In the wake of the military and diplomatic erises of 1944, KMT. leaders became incteasingly conscious that the stock of ‘great power © BR, 1942 Chine, 749-605 FR, 1945: Ghz, 882-8; Siloe, 2 (5): 201-6, 243; ibid. 9 ()= 74, 585-6, 606; ibid., 2 (6): aren ‘Chang Fa-k'uei (Zhang Fakui) Diaries, enery on 24 Sept 1943, and entry on 4 June 1948, Ghang F3-kuel (Zhang Fakai papers, rel 3, lash no 3, part a; Zhang Fakui, ‘Rang fh ZRanaheng Hua Geminiscences of the wat of fesistance agsinst Japan), Webi Zillaa Nuoyi 1 Guly 1986): 174,176, 205; Tat Qh a al. (ed), Vaontene Yin Mio Kangchon (The truside in India and Burma to rest Japan) (Beijing: Zhonggua Wenshi Chubanshe, 1990), 1-2, 58-4, 107-10, 154-69; Liang Jingtong, Shdloe! Shijian (The Sevell tain) Beijing, Shangou Vinhuguan, 1979), 91-5: © Grace B. Hayes, The Hitay of the fait Ohh of Stain World War Ik The Wer Agsinat Japan (Annapolis: Naval inaitate Press, 1982), 627; Wedemeyer to Mar. shall, 10 July 194g, Wedemeyer papers, box 1539.470 XIAOYUAN LIU China’ was in rapid decline so far as U.S, foreign policy was concerned, But, not until the Yalta Conference did they realize how far President Roosevelt would go in reversing his original Asian policy based on ‘great powet China’. At first they were dismayed by the Chinese government's exclusion from the Yalta Conference; then they were shocked after learning in a piecemeal manner the content of a secret accord on the Far East reached by the conferees." Always suspicious of Soviet ambitions in Manchuria and fearful of Western allies? compliance with such ambitions, Chongqing had made a series of efforts in 1944 to preclude a West-Soviet collusion. The Yalta Conference proved that all these efforts had been made in vain. It reminded KMT leaders that the international status af their government might not be stronger than that of the Peking Government during the Paris Peace Conference of 1gig. Yalta made a bitter reality erystal clear (o Chongqing: China's nominal ranking as one of the Big Four had neither ended its diplomatic isolation nor enabled it to avoid vietimization by big power politics. As a result of Yalta, KMT leaders were horrified by the prospect that they would soon have to face an intruding Soviet Red Army in Manchuria,” Still hoping to avert such a nightmare, Chiang and his senior advisors now wanted first to reach a thorough understanding with the United States. Then, talks with Moscow would also be necessary for containing the Soviet military expansion in northeastern China, ‘These considerations totally changed the position of Indochina in ‘Chongqing’s forcign policy. Now, according to KMT officials’ understanding of President Roosevelt’s Indochina policy, any attempt by Chongqing to assert its predominant position in postwar Indochina would not only be futile but would also hinder the urgent task of improving relations with Washington. Besides, Chongging’s assertive Indochina policy might even be construed by Moscow as a precedent Co justify the latter’s own ambitions in Manchuria.” Therefore, in * Chongaing fist got a hint abou the Soviee demands a Yalta from its embassy Jn Moscow, nd then, in mid-March, President Roosevelt hicself informally leaked the content af the secret accord during a canversarion with Wei Daomning, Chinese ambassador to the United States, Fr more details, ace Xiaoyuan Lin, Petaehip Jr Disrer: China, the Uniled Stats, and Thats Pas for the Postwar Dilpriton of the Tapancee Empirn, 0422945 (Carnblge. Carsbradge University Pees, 1996), 242 7 & RWK, 5 (Bi): Ban, 864-6, 869-79; Shilian, 4 (a): 542-3. For a detailed diseus- sion of the Manchuria question in the Chinese-American diplomacy in 1944, see ‘Li, A Parenarihp fr Dizrder, 931-42. © This latter point was not missed by the US. State Department's planning staff In a planning document, CAC-8éa, § Feb. 1944, Notter records, box 109, theCHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 471 April, when the KMT government sent its delegation to the United Nations conference in San Francisco, Chiang Kai-shek was prepared to accept any American program concerning Indochina. He authorized TV. Soong, head of the Chinese delegation to San Francisco, to support any of the following solutions likely ¢o be favored by the U.S. government: (1) Indochina’s return to France, (2) Indochina under a French trusteeship, and (3) Indochina under a multinational trusteeship. Indochina’s independence was conspicuously absent in Chi- ang’s list. The Waijiaobu justified this opportunistic policy by arguing that the most urgent issue for Chongqing was to gain Washington's sympathy through its own cooperative gestures, and that Chinese interests in Indochina could be enhanced under any of the above conditions as long as the Chinese and the American governments were on the same side.® Thus, President Roosevelt's earlier assertion that he had Chiang’s ‘whole-hearted? support to his Indochina policy could at last be substantiated by Chongqing’s readiness to accept Washington’s Indochina policy unconditionally. Yet, ironically, Chongging’s reorientation came too late either to serve Roosevelt's trusteeship formula for Indochina or to save the Chongqing-Wash- ington partnership. During the better part of the war, Chongqing’s opportunistic Indo- china policy was well matched in Washington by the infighting between President Roosevelt and the State Department over an Indochina policy. Meanwhile, both governments lacked a realistic and sophisticated understanding of the other side's policy-making process. For instance, in mid-1944 the Office of European Affairs, a stronghold in the State Department against Roosevelt's Indochina trusteeship, speculated that the president's anti-French policy would not be supported by other great powers ‘except possibly China’ ‘This judgement was not informed by the Roosevelt-Chiang disagreement at Cairo, and it also failed to inform about the oscillation of Chongqing’s Indochina policy at the time. KMT leaders tended to identify President Roosevelt's stated intentions with official U.S. policies. But in early 1948 they were no longer certain about what French fear of Chongaing’s designs in Tonkin and the Chinese fear of Moscow's designs in Manchuria were both discussed Chiang to Soong, 3 April 1945, Koo papers, bx 81; Waijiaobu Co Chiang Kai sheky ‘Ni jd Jujinshan htyi huiwai ying yO Mei, Ving, Su shangtan zhi gexiang, fang'an qingshi you’, (Report for approval with regard to the programs that are intended for discussion with the American, British, and Soviet governments outside the San Francisco Conference), 25 March’ 1945, id. “® Memo by the Office of European Affairs, ‘American Policy with regara to Indo~ china’, go June 1944, Acheson records, box 9,472 XIAOYUAN LIU. Washington's Indochina policy was. That was why the Chinese delegation to San Francisco had to carry a list of possibilities. Yet, in 1945 such misunderstandings about each other's Indochina policy ‘were not the main reasons for the futility of Chongqing's new Indo- china initiative. The initiative failed because it was not really about Indochina. It was about the larger Sino-American strategie relationship involving also the Soviet Union Ry the time when Chongqing decided to clase ranks with Wash. ington with regard to Indochina, even President Roosevelt had lost interest in China’s cooperation. Ever since the Cairo Conference, any meaningfill communication about Asia's postwar issues between Chongqing and Washington stopped. During the rest of the war, believing that at Cairo he ‘never could break through to’ ‘this fellow Chiang’, Roosevelt ceased searching for a personal working relationship with the Chinese leader with regard to postwar Asia.” Chongqing’s military setbacks and the Stilwell controversy in 1944 were additional aggravating factors. Amidst the Stilwell controversy, Roosevelt told Wellington Kao, who was heading the Chinese delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, that the United States could not eare less about Indochina and that it was free for China to take. At the time Koo did not know how to construe the president's “generosity” On Roosevelt’s part, the statement might just be a subtle way to vent his frustration about working with Chiang. As shown in later events, the real direction of Roasevelt’s thought was to write China off as an important partner in war and peace. In mid-March 1945, just. a few weeks before his death, Roosevelt discussed Indochina with his trusted adviser Charles Taussig, In the conversation, the president kept the trusteeship idea intact. But he also made a concession that would allow France to serve as the sole trustee for Indochina ‘with the proviso that independence was the ultimate goal’.”? Scholarly interpretations vary greatly of this seem- ingly about-face in Roosevelt’s attitude toward France.” The State Department's stand and the mounting pressure from the British might be accountable for the change. In early 1945, the matter was ® Bagar Snow, Random Nos op Red Chine, 1936-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- seesity Press, 1974), 127 * Gu Weijun (Wellington Keo), Gu Wain Huiyly (Memoirs of Gu Weijun) (Gejing, Zkonghua Shoje, 1987), 5° 577-8. PRR, 1945, 1 144 Sec, for satancey Lous, Inprialom at Bay, 28, Watt, Sacding Jon Bull, 216, 1a Feber, Roosevele, Churchill, and Indochina} 1295, and Kimball, ageer, 153CHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 473 further complicated by the prospect of French resistance groups” participation in the Allied military effort in the territory.”* Yer, because President Roosevelt's last discourse on Indochina consisted of a concession (French retura to Indochina) and a condition (Indochina’s ultimate independence), histary as it has happened cannot reveal how, had Roosevelt lived longer, the U.S.French relationship over Indochina would have evolved. Roosevelt, however, did not bequeath a similar historical enigma about the U.S—Chinese relationship regarding Indochina. The conspicuous omission af China in Roose~ velt’s terminal discussion of Indochina had only one policy implica- tion: after significantly devaluating Chongqing in his northeastern Asian strategy through the Yalta diplomacy, Roosevelt also removed the China factor from America’s postwar policy in Southeast Asia Between April and June, when visiting in the United States, Soong was greeted by the new president, Harry S, Truman. Their three meetings during these months did not help improve Chongqing’s precarious diplomatic position wrought by the Yalta Conference.”* Shortly after Soong’s arrival in Washington, American Ambassador Patrick Hurley cautioned Chiang that President Roosevelt's Indo- china policy might be changed by the new president, and that the subject should not be brought up in Washington at this moment lest it cause unnecessary misunderstanding. Consequently, during these meetings, Chongqing’s intended initiative about Indochina was simply put off.” In view of all the military and diplomatic developments to the point, it is highly unlikely that had Soong met with Roosevelt, not ‘Truman, the Sino-American alliance would have been revitalized and a Chongqing-Washington partnership in Indochina resuscitated The Truman presidency only explicated the impossible. While not conversant with Roasevelt’s foreign policy programs, Truman certainly did not share Roosevelt’s personal interests in Indochina. The presidency’s sudden descent upon ‘Truman was overwhelming enough, but he had to be further surprised by (wo well-kept secrets in the government, the development of atornic bombs coded as the Manhattan project and the Yalta accord on the Far East, both crucial to the defeat of Japan. So far as the wartime Sino-American relationship was concerned, a few days before his first meeting with Soong 2 FR, 1944 3: 769-84: La Feber, ‘Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina’, 1290—1 7% RWK, 5(E): 846; Harry Truman, Memois by Harry S. Truman: Year of Decisions igw York: Doubleday, 1955), 1:8, Go-1, 296-8; Shia, 9 (2) 548-0 ‘Shiliae, 3 (1): 200-07,474 XIAOYUAN LIU on 1g April, Truman had only an one-and-a-half hour discussion with Harry Hopkins over lunch (o learn about the ‘whole history’, including the Yalta diplomacy.” With all these matters of enormous mag- nitude in Truman's mind, plus his most serious concerns about Mos- cow's intentions in Europe, it is not a surprise that President Truman only had a marginal interest i Southeast Asian affairs.” After all, designated as a British military zone, that region was marginal (0 US. war and peace efforts in the Pacific. Therefore, what happened to U.S. Indochina policy in the post- Roosevelt era was the ascent of the State Department's view. In his second week in the White House, Truman read and concurred with a State Department memorandum saying that ‘as a further basis for peace and stability, we favor the establishment by China of close and friendly relations with Korea, Burma, Thailand, Indochina and other neighboring arcas, without Chinese domination over such atcas’, ‘The State Department meant a French Indochina.” While it took some time for this development to be known in Chongqing, events in Indochina quickened. In March, Japanese troops in Indochina launched a coup to establish Japan's direct control of the area. The five-year collaboration between Japan and the French colonial authorities was thus terminated. As a result, more than five thousand French colonial troops fled across the Chinese horder. In May, General Gabriel Sabattier, commander of the French troops in China, came to Chongging to discuss with Chiang Kai-shek how the ‘New France’ could cooperate with China militarily.” Still no result from TV. Soong’s mission in the United States, Chiang solicited advice from General Wedemeyer and Ambassador Hurley. Wedemeyer advised Chiang not to support the French unless it became absolutely certain that they would use Chinese assistance purely for anti-Japanese operations and that they would operate under Chiang’s command. Hurley concurred with Wedemeyer. In addition, he urged Chiang to wait for a clarification of U.S. Indochina ® Robert H, Fertll (ed), Of the Reco The Private Papers of Hor S. Trman (New York: W.W. Norton, 1980), 18-19 7H Melvyn P. Lefer, Pipondaranee of Poser National Sac the Tramen Adrini- ‘ration, ad te Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 93; George C. Hering, “The Traman Administration and the Reateraton of French Sovereignty inpdechina Dipmat Hy, Spring 1977) 97-117 Jiang Vongiing, 210-12; Archimedes ILA. Pati, Why Vit Nam? Pride to Amer= ‘cay Albatros Berkeley: University of California Pres, 1980), 88, 94-5CHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 475 Pe , referring to a recent request he despatched to Washington. In early June, a message from the State Department to Hurley resolved the puzzlement in Chongqing about Washington’s current policy on Indochina. While denying any basic change in policy, the State Department made it clear that the US. government would uphold a voluntary principle, as established by the Yalta Conference, in the matter of trusteeship for dependent areas. Since a French consent on trusteeship in Indochina “seems unlikely”, the message continued, President Truman intended to ask the French government (o promise an enlargement of the Indochinese peoples’ liber- ties and self-government, Hurley was also instructed that the French offers of assistance in the war against Japan be considered ‘on their military merits’ Now that Washington's attitude was clarified, the KMT government began to readjust its own policy accordingly. The first’ public sign of Chongqing’s new policy appeared in an editorial of the Zhong- yang Ribao in late July. While reiterating Chongqing’s intention to ‘liberate [jieftng]’ all Japan's insular possessions in the central and northern Pacific, the editorial articulated a new attitude that all territories in Southeast Asia and the southern Pacific should ‘be restored to their original status [fuifi yuanz-huang]. By supporting the restoration of the pre-war status quo in Southeast Asia, the KMT leadership relegated its wartime anti-colonialism to the death bed. Unable to consult Washington directly over Indochina, Chongqing pledged its allegiance to America’s leadership in such 2 low-key manner, The gesture was a far cry from Chongging’s originally intended policy initiative, and it was totally irrelevant to the concurrent, new tound of inter-Allied diplomacy, including the Sino-Soviet negotiations in Moscow and the Potsdam Conference among the Big ‘Three. In the last phase of the Pacific war, the world’s attention focused on events in Northeast Asia; and when the end suddenly occurred, it % ‘Minutes of Meeting No. 58 with the Generalssieno (Chiang Kai-shek), 28 May 4g4s', Wedemeyer papers box 150; Patt, 108. Grew’'to Hurley, 7 June 1945, Top Secret General Records of Chungking Embassy, China, 1945, box 1 Phangan ibaa, 24 July 194s. % For two different wews of the Sino Sovier negotiations in Moscow between $0 June and ng August, 1945, sce Jolin W. Garver, Ohinie~Soout Relation, 1937-1945 “he Diplomesy af Chine Nationals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 214 50, and Ode Arne Westad, Culd War and Reclution: Soiet-American Rioaly and the Grigins ofthe Chinese ieil Wer, ro4q-1046 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 30-56.476 XIAOYUAN LIU ‘was ushered by the roar of the two atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the rush of the Soviet Red Army into Manchuria, When victory came, KMT leaders could not help but feel anxious about its timing and the manner in which the war ended for China. According to a Sino-Soviet agreement concluded in Moscow just after ‘Japan's surrender, the Soviet Red Army would turn over Manchuria only to the KMT government after all military activities there ceased.” Facing the challenge posed by the Chinese Communists, Chiang Kai-shek believed all along that the KMT government’s authority in northern China had to be restored with military force. Yet the KMT regime’s wartime safe haven in the southwestern corner of China now became such a remote and inconvenient base for the KMT to compete with the CCP in the north. After waiting, patiently in the war for Japan’s defeat, Chiang Kai-shek now suddenly ran out of time. With General Wedemeyer’s help, Chiang began to consider a plan for reoccupying China (Chiang preferred to name it the ‘plan for the joint American-Chinese acceptance of the capitulation of Japan’) just one week prior to Japan’s surrender. No wonder, in his ‘victory broadcast’ on 15 August, Chiang exhorted his audience that ‘the problems of peace that descend upon us are more trying even than those we met during the war’ * When a new round of struggle for Manchuria began in the immediate postwar months, no one seemed to remember that the Pacific war had started partially because of Japan's occupation of Indochina, or to foresee that Indochina would become the battle field of the longest postwar war in Asia. At war's end, the inter-Allied handling of the Indochina question was an anticlimax to Roosevelt's high profile public diplomacy. According to an Anglo-American agreement at the Potsdam Conference, the territory was quietly divided into two zones along the 26th parallel; and British and Chinese troops would separately receive the Japanese surrender in the south and the north. The State Department assured the French government that such arrangement was ‘purely an expedient operational matter based on available forces, entirely free from political implications’. ‘Chongqing was informed accordingly and was also advised by the * Shitian, 3(2): 666-7. ‘Minutes of Combined Staff Meeting, Number 197, 13 August 1945', Wed meyer papers, box 1552: Chinese Ministry of Information, The Coleciad Wartime Messen: ef Geteralisina Chiang Kaisha (New York: Jal Day, 1946). 861-2.CHINA AND THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 477 State Department to invite French representatives to be present at the Japanese surrender in Indochina."” With the Potsdam decision made, Washington saw no major Amer- ican responsibilities in postwar Indochina other than a small military mission for assisting the repatriation of recovered Allied prisoners and observing the Chinese operation of disarming the Japanese. Politically, the U.S. government tried to sit on the fence between Asian nationalism and European colonialism. As defined by a State Department memorandum, the problem for the U.S. government Bast Asia was ‘to harmonize ... its policies in regard to the two objectives: increased political freedom for the peoples of the Far East and the maintenance of the unity of the leading United Nations’®* Yet, the US. government’s practical Indochina policy around the war’s end focused only on the latter objective. To American policymakers, the division of Indochina at Potsdam was a compromise to solve the British-Chinese dispute over the commanding authority. To Chiang Kai-shek, who was not consulted about the matter before or during the Potsdam Conference, the decision was another slap in the face. Yet Chiang did not have many reasons (0 complain. Having not sent a single soldier to fight the Japanese in Indochina during the war, now the KMT government could legitimately despatch troops into the territory as liberators More important, due to its proximity to Chiang Kai-shek’s wartime bases, northern Vietnam would prove the only place where the KMT government was able to discharge its international obligation as a ‘great power’. Ironically, poor as its performance had been in the ‘war against Japan, at war's end Chongqing had the strongest ‘available forces’ among the Allies in respect to continental Southeast Asia.® The problem was whether or not Chiang would use these forces to honor Washington’s intention for big-power unity. ° ‘Minutes of Meeting Number 7g with Generalissimo, August t5, 1945", Wede- meyer papers, box 1553, Ronald HL. Spector, Advice and Supports Phe Early Vaeef the U.S. Army in Vietaam, 1941-1960 (New York: Free Press, 1985), 59-41 PRS Preliminary-a, 91 Aug 1945, Notter records, box 119, "According to Chongqing’ and Washington's wartime planning, Korea and Japan were two other cegions where China should share che allied oceupation responsibilities. Buc the KMT government was unable to patticipate in either See Liu, A Pavturship for Disorder, 228-9, 290-1 "When the British occupation in South Vietnam began in mid-Septermber, Gen ‘eral Douglas D. Gracy had under his command only one battalion af his 20th Indian Division plus a reconstituted French company. Unprepared for the difficult task,478 XIAOYUAN LIU, As before, Chiang continued his double dealing. In late August 1945, the Chinese occupation commenced under a fourteen-point program prepared jointly by Chinese military staff and Wedemeyer’s American staff officers. Adhering to Washington's current Indochina policy, the plan provided that the Chinese military authorities in ‘Vietnam consult only with their French counterparts with regard to ‘occupation operations. General Lu Han, commander of the Chinese ‘occupation forces, was at first troubled by the obvious contradiction between this policy of collaboration with the French and Chongqing’s anti-colonial stand at the time of the Cairo Conference. Chiang had personally to make Lu Han au courant about the goverament’s new orientation." This ‘correct’ policy, however, was only expediential. With northern Vietnam coming under China’s military control, the most desirable scenario envisaged by KMT strategists in 1944 seemed to materialize. Yet Chiang knew perfectly that in Indochina he did not have the same prerogative as Stalin did in Manchuria. He nevertheless hoped that Chinese occupation would now be able to sway the US. government (0 take a stronger position in Indochina to counter-balance the British-French team. Chiang’s wife, Song Meiling, whose publicist’s clout with the Americans had been reputed worth ten divisions in wartime Chongqing, again acted as Chiang’s mouthpiece in Washington. On 2g August, the same day when Ho Chi Minh declared the establishment of a provisional government for independent Vietnam, Song Meiling talked with Presid- ent'Truman and queried him about Indochina. Truman responded by expressing his satisfaction with France’s willingness to work toward Indochina independence. Song Meiling then reminded Truman that President Roosevelt had advocated trusteeship for the territory. To this Truman answered blintly that ‘as far as he was concerned’, the American government had never discussed trusteeship for Indochina. ‘Thus, while the KMT government could hardly contain Soviet power in Manchuria and was challenged by the CCP in northera later Gracy had co rely on che surrendered Japanese troops co maintain order under the 16th parallel, See, Patti, 298, 907, 562 notes 4 and g; Ellen J. Hammer, The ‘Stuggle for Indechina, 1940-1955 Vice Nam and the French Esperance (Stanford: Stan ford University Press, 1966), 11, inutes of Conobined Staft Meeting Number 214, 26 August 2945', Wede- meyer papers, box 1550; ‘Minutes of Combined Staft Meeting, Number 145, 27 ‘August 1945) bid; Ling Qthan, 5-7, 19-155 190-2 PR, 1045, 7: 540-8.GHINA AND THE ISSUE QF POSTWAR INDOCHINA 479 China, China’s newly-achieved eminence in Indochina was unable to enhance its diplomacy with Washington. In September, however, Chiang felt compelled to make a last effort to enlist American support in Indochina, this time purely ont of a sense of weakness. In mid-September, Chiang received a report from Qian Tai, Chinese ambassador to France, that the French government was planning to despatch 40,000 troops to Vietnam within two months. At the time the Chinese government already installed in North Vietnam a for- midable force, but among these only 38,000 troops were intended for occupation purpose. The rest were destined for transportation to northern China, where a civil strife between the KMT regime and the Chinese Communists just began to unfold. Fearing that China's military superiority in Indochina would soon be lost, on 1g Sep- tember Chiang instructed Wang Shijie, who was at the time Chinese forcign minister attending a five-power-conference in London, to revive the trusteeship idea with the Americans and the Russians. Subsequently in a conversation with Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Wang suggested that either Indochina be put under an international trusteeship or France pledge publicly to grant the territory independence within ten years. Byrnes would abet neither. Wang was not surprised, Later he told Ambassador Koo that he had made the proposals to Byrnes just for ‘testing him out’. Wang's recommendation to Chiang was that negotiations with the French should proceed promptly.” KMT troops’ occupation of northern Indochina in the immediate Postwar months was the last shadow cast by the wartime ‘great power China’, and the shadow faded away quickly. When Chiang was charging Wang Shijie to make the last-ditch effort to pursue the ghost of a Chinese-American partnership in Indochina, T.V. Soong vouched to Charles de Gaulle in Paris that the Chinese government would welcome France as its Asian neighbour again and would not in any manner hinder France's tights in indo china.™ Willingly or not, the KMT government had no choice but ® Chiang co Wang Shijie, 1g Sept, 1945, Koo papers, box 57; Wang co Chiang, 22 Sept. 1945, shié; RWK, 5(E): 887. Qian Tal's report eventually proved false. ‘Until the end of the Chinese dceupation, the military balance af power in Indochina retained favorable to China. In Match 1946, when the Chinese and French gavern- ‘ments signed agreements to settle the Indochina question and other bilateral issues, there were about 185,000 Chinese troops in northern Vietnam, The French troops in the south enly numbered 15,000. See Spector, 52, and Hammer, 132. Ling Qian, 5480 XIAOYUAN LI to accept the restoration of the prewar status quo along its south- er borders. On the other hand, KM troops’ brief sojourn in northern Vietnam did serve some practical purposes. In March 3945, after a few months of hard bargaining, a scries of agreements on Vietnam were concluded between the Chinese and French governments as part of a general readjustment of theic bilateral relationship. Chinese troops in Vietnam proved a useful leverage for winning some concessions from the French. In addition, between September 1945 and April 1946, the port of Hai- Phong became one of the most important embarking points for the KMT forces’ moving to northern China to fight the CCP. As of 1 April, the US. Navy helped transport a total of 218,741 KMT troops from southern China to northern China. 53,399 (or 24.4%) of these, including the KMT’s Northeastern Garrison Headquarters for Manchuria, went through Haiphong. In the month of April, another 38,000 troops would be shipped out of Haiphong. Thus, in mid-March, when the U.S. government endorsed the Chinese~French agreement on the replacement of the Chinese units in northern Indochina with French troops, its objective, the ‘unity of the leading United Nations’ in the postwar period, seemed to emerge from these governments’ diplomatic and military coordination in fighting a new enemy, the Communists, in Bast Asia®® By the end of the Pacific war, it hecame clear that the wartime Amer- ican-Chinese diplomacy for recasting Southeast Asia's international order had been a futile exercise. The two governments’ efforts to forge a partnership for decolonizing Indochina failed not because their policies lacked new visions or their alliance had no tangible strength to prevent the return of the French colonial rule. In view of the postwar Indochina wars, either Roosevelt's trusteeship formula or Chiang’s ‘big-brother’ device would have been a better alternative than the restoration of French cotonialism. Both leaders understood that the Chinese government, with Washingtan’s diplomatic endorsement and financiat support, would have to provide the * ‘Movements of Chinese Armies by US, Resources’, Black Book, Volume 7, Book 9: 15", Wedemeyer papers, box 85; ‘Responsibility for French Indo-China’, ‘Black Book, Volume 7, Book 1: 4', id. For the relationship between the KMT government's Indochina policy end the Chinese Civil War of 1945-1949, se Ling Qian, Zee Henat Jieshou Riben Teusieng Naima, and King C. Che, Vistnam ond China, 1938-19534, ch. 3 and 4CHINA AND THE (SSUE OF FOSTWAR INDOCHINA — 481 bulk of the occupation forces in postwar Indachina, At war's end, Chinese troops were indeed available for any possible American Chinese scheme in Indochina. (Other reasons for the failure have to be considered. Washington’s and Chongqing’s most urgent concerns about their countries’ postwar security had certain effects. President Roosevelt failed to bring the State Department around with respect to Indochina partially because he himself did not totally disagree with the department's argument about America's foreign policy needs in postwar Europe. When Truman took over, the contest with the Soviets in Europe further became a fixation in US. foreign policy. Washington’s Europe-first orientation thus resulted in its correlative deference to European allies’ intentions more than to Asian peoples’ interests even in Asia. This definitely posed as an obstacle to American— Chinese cooperation in decolonizing Southeast Asia, As for Chiang Kai-shek, his obsession was with the Chinese Communists’ challenge from North China compounded by Soviet power in Northeast Asia. Yet, although Chongqing's anti-Soviet foreign policy in the north ‘eventually prompted its compromise with the French in the south, the policy itself was not necessarily a snag to a US.-Ghinese partnership in Indochina. The most interesting phenomenon in the American-Chinese diplomacy over Indochina, though, is that their partnership was wrecked by a fundamental disagreement even at times when American and Chinese leaders were not much distracted by other poticy considera- ions, As this study has shown, from the very beginning Roosevelt's and Chiang’s Indochina policies stood far apart. In the final analysis, their disagreement was not so much about Indochina’s status as about China’s new interational role, President Roosevelt's pre= Cairo invitation to Chiang for a joint American-Chinese enterprise in Indochina was part and parcel of his paternalistic approach of “making China a great power’. His trusteeship formula was intended not only to keep indochina within the Western orbit but also to retain China as an American client, KMT leaders, some of them vehemently nationalistic, regarded the Pacific war and the ens American support to China as favorable conditions for redressing the wrongs that foreign imperialism had inflicted on China during the past century. They wanted to reestablish Chinese influence in countries like Korea and Vietnam as but the first step to restore China’s centrality in Asian affairs. To these leaders, therefore, the Rooseveltian trusteeship became a refined Western device to limit482 XIAOYUAN LI China’s potential. The distance between President Roosevelt’s fancy about a super client in China and Chinese leaders’ dream of a glori- cous, self-conductive Chinese state, a question about what kind of power modern China should become, separated the two governments across the Pacific. The question would remain a theme in Chinese— Western relationship in the years to come.

Xiaoyuan Liu - China and The Issue of Postwar Indochina in The Second World War

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Xiaoyuan Liu - China and The Issue of Postwar Indochina in The Second World War

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