Professional Documents
Culture Documents
IN MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVE
Neoliberalism in Multi-Disciplinary Perspective
Adrian Scribano
Freddy Timmermann Lopez
Maximiliano E. Korstanje
Editors
Neoliberalism in
Multi-Disciplinary
Perspective
Editors
Adrian Scribano Freddy Timmermann Lopez
Centre for Sociological Research and Catholic University Silva Henriquez
Studies (CIES) Santiago de Chile, Chile
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Maximiliano E. Korstanje
University of Palermo
Buenos Aires, Argentina
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface
v
Acknowledgment
This book is fully dedicated to our families, daughters, sons, wives, friends,
and colleagues who distressingly devoted considerable of their time while
we concentrated efforts in organizing the chapters. The authors who pas-
sionately contributed to this project, as well as Palgrave Macmillan staff,
above all Katelyn Zingg for her generous support. By this way, we do
thank the labor and time of reviewers who substantially made a real con-
tribution to their observations. Majid Yar struggled, taking pains to edit
this manuscript for gaining readability. This was a great effort for three
non-English native speakers to adapt the different chapters to a polished
English. However, we feel—after hard work—our efforts have been
worthwhile and we are very happy with the outcome. Neoliberalism is a
key factor of capitalism, which deserved our attention. We proposed here
a critical perspective formed by the voices of scholars coming from the
four corners of the world. Lastly, this book would have never seen the
light of publication without the author’s commitment.
vii
Contents
ix
x Contents
Index 229
CHAPTER 3
Horacio Machado Aráoz and Pedro Lisdero
Introduction
As we attempt to delve into neoliberalism, an issue intensively covered by
social sciences and current political debates, it seems appropriate to start
out from a key thoughtful reflection from our perspective. As a matter of
fact, we cannot refrain from warning—and to take as a starting point—that
we are speaking from a region which is not only troubled by said phenom-
enon, but also decisively relevant for its further arrangement as such.
Despite its being an undoubtedly global phenomenon, any analytical
attempt to comprehend it could not—or should not, actually—be sepa-
rated from the particularly verified events within this region. Latin America,
H. Machado Aráoz (*)
CITCA-CONICET—Universidad Nacional de Catamarca, CIES,
San Fernando del Valle de Catamarca, Argentina
e-mail: machadoaterreno@arnet.com.ar
P. Lisdero
CIECS—CONICET y Universidad Nacional de Córdoba—, UNVM,
CIES, Córdoba, Argentina
e-mail: pedrolisdero@gmail.com
1
Actually, although Von Hayek’s ideas had more impact on the theoretical-political field,
Milton Friedman’s courses taught at the University of Chicago achieved greater direct influ-
ence on the economic policies, administrators, and decision-makers. Connections of the
Chicago School with Chilean students date back to mid-50s through the formalization of an
agreement between the University of Chicago with the University of Chile and the Pontifical
Catholic University of Chile. As a result of this agreement, teachers such as Theodore Shultz,
Arnold Harberger, Earl Hamilton, and Simon Rottenberg, among other members of the
Friedman group, developed a course of studies at the Center for Economic Research specifi-
cally created to that end. Then, Chilean students who attended that Center were given
scholarships to continue with their Master’s and PhD studies at the University of Chicago.
Afterward, many of them held key positions within Pinochet’s regime, such as the following:
Sergio de Castro (Minister of Economy, 1975–76; Minister of Finance, 1976–82), Pablo
Baraona (President of the Central Bank, 1975–76; Minister of Economy, 1976–78), Álvaro
Bardón (President of the Central Bank, 1977–81; Under Secretary of Economy, 1982–83),
Sergio de la Cuadra (President of the Central Bank, 1981–82; Minister of Finance, 1982),
Jorge Cauas (Minister of Finance, 1974–77), Hernán Büchi (Minister of Economy, 1979–80;
National Planning Office [ODEPLAN], 1983–84; Minister of Finance, 1985–89), Miguel
Kast (ODEPLAN 1978–1980; Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, 1981–82; President of
the Central Bank, 1982), Rolf Lüders (Minister of Economy, 1982; Minister of Finance,
1978–79), among others (Delano and Traslaviña 1989).
NEOLIBERALIZATION AND NEW COMMODIFICATION FRONTIERS… 47
Some years later, the imaginary expansion and neoliberal policies had a
second and significant experimentation cycle in 1985 in Bolivia, where
under Jeffrey Sachs’ guidance, a monetary shock program—initially pre-
pared for the dictator Hugo Banzer, but later executed by the administra-
tion of Víctor Paz Estenssoro, the leader of the revolutionary party of
1952—was applied for the management of hyperinflation, and which,
some years later, would be replicated in Poland and Russia after the fall of
the Berlin Wall. Also during the 1980s—severely affected by the outbreak
of the Latin American debt crisis—international financial entities, such as
the International Monetary Fund at the forefront, would try out in the
region their “fiscal adjustment programs,” systematic monitoring of pub-
lic accounts, and they would set explicit goals for economic policies ulti-
mately contingent upon ensuring debt repayment.
Subsequently, during the early 1990s, under certain emblematic presi-
dencies, such as those of Salinas de Gortari (Mexico, 1988), Menem
(Argentina, 1989), Carlos Andrés Pérez (Venezuela, 1989), and Fujimori
(Peru, 1990), we entered into a third cycle focused on the implementation
of the “Washington Consensus” principles, with the expansion and con-
solidation of programs on privatization, liberalization, and opening of
strategic sectors,2 which would also be “exported” to European countries
of the former Soviet Bloc.
2
Structural reforms occurring in the region from the mid-80s until the end of the century
were characterized by the following:
• Trade and foreign exchange openness: regarding trade regimes liberalization, a 15%
reduction on average rate of duty was implemented. As a result, duties went from aver-
age levels of 48.9% during the pre-reform years up to 10.7% in 1999, and dispersion
was remarkably reduced.
• Financial transformations: reduction of reserve requirements, removal of interest rates
control, and dismantling of compulsory investments mechanisms and directed
credits.
• Taxation: foreign trade taxes went from representing 18% of fiscal revenues of the
countries in 1980 to 13.7% in the mid-1990s—for greater domestic collection.
• Privatizations: 396 sales and transfers to the private sector were carried out between
1986 and 1999, which represent over half of the privatizations operations value in
developing countries. The main sectors that experienced these transformations were
infrastructure (57%) and banking—and similar—institutions (11%). Apart from the
peculiarities of the privatization makeup by sectors/countries, it may also be pointed
out that other affected sectors were electricity—mainly in the Dominican Republic,
Colombia, El Salvador, Argentina, and Bolivia—and telecommunications—mainly in
Guatemala, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela—, among others.
48 H. MACHADO ARÁOZ AND P. LISDERO
One of the major effects of privatizations was the increase in foreign investment in Latin
America after clearing the obstructions—mainly to strategic sectors. Thus, foreign invest-
ment targeted to privatizations accounted for 36% of the direct foreign investment in the
90s, which had a total amount far higher than that recorded during the previous decade—of
0.3% of the GDP in 1989 to 6.9% in 1999 (Lora 2001).
3
The collapse of the neoliberal governance, pre-announced with the Caracazo (February–
March, 1989) and which covertly unfolds through a growing social conflict throughout 90s,
becomes clearly visible with the prolonged Ecuadorian political crisis marked by the promi-
nence of the rebellion of the indigenous movement brought together in the National
Confederation of Ecuadorian Indigenous Nationalities (CONAIE) and the following failed
presidencies of Abdalá Bucaram (1996–1997), Jamil Mahuad (1998–2000), Gustavo Noboa
(2000–2003), and Lucio Gutiérrez (2003–2005), the meltdown of the Argentinean institu-
tional system, in December 2001—anticipated withdrawal of the government from the
Alliance, the “sovereign” default declaration, and subsequent interrupted presidencies until
Néstor Kirchner took office in 2003—, and, decisively, with the events that framed the so-
called Water Wars (2000) and Gas Wars (2003) in Bolivia.
4
From different perspectives, the metamorphosis or mutation idea has been referenced as
a change process, where structures that give meaning to—and define—the social system are
kept (Castels 1996); or as the inherent variability of the social accumulation regime defined
as matrix of changing configuration (Collado 2005; Nun 2003).
NEOLIBERALIZATION AND NEW COMMODIFICATION FRONTIERS… 49
American streets and plazas burst into an unexpected fresh wind that not
only contradicted the Pensée unique order, but also seemed to fiercely rein-
state a revolutionary political language that had been deemed outdated for
a long time.
After emblematic historical events such as the assumption of power of
president Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (February 1999), Lula in Brazil
(2003), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006), and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay
(2008), the discourse of the first years of Kirchnerist policies in Argentina,
the triumph of Frente Amplio in Uruguay (2004), the constitutional pro-
cesses opened in Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2009), and Bolivia (2009),
among other events, the most ambitious political prospects for once-
inconceivable radical transformations were efficiently enabled. Back then,
terms such as “turning left,” neoliberalism, neoliberalism’s “failure,”
“end,” and “overcoming” started being used. They talked about post-
neoliberal governments and the “post-neoliberal era.”
It goes without saying that “progressive governments’” policies trig-
gered mutations regarding the neoliberal boom during the 1990s.
“Progressive” governments marked a stark contrast against the ideological
discourse of preceding decades. However, the sense, course, and political
balance of the “progressive” wave has been, and currently is, the subject
matter of heated debates. When they were in full swing, but, even more,
when some signs of exhaustion and crisis were starting to be foreseen,
these governments created a strong atmosphere of polarization as regards
neoliberalism binarism versus “the only alternative” in the face of the
threat of the “neoliberal right wing.”
In these times, the fact that we are facing a new turning point of the
political processes is indisputable. The advent of new governments has
prompted intensification of debates on neoliberalism, framed within dis-
putes regarding “failures” or “defeats” of the “progressive projects.”
Ultimately, this brief résumé allows us to determine to what extent the
events that took place in Latin American territories and affected its popu-
lation during the last 50 years have become decisive for the future of struc-
tural transformation processes—of neoliberalization—of the global
political system. It also allows us to size up to what extent Latin American
societies have been—and continue to be—beleaguered by neoliberalism.
We are trying to approach the phenomenon within and from societies that
have been drastically affected by it, societies that have been pioneers in
experimenting with neoliberal policies, and which, additionally, have gen-
erated the toughest popular rebellions against neoliberalism. These are
50 H. MACHADO ARÁOZ AND P. LISDERO
5
Among them, Anderson (1999), Harvey (2007), Plehwe et al. (2006), Puello Socarrás
(2015).
6
https://www.montpelerin.org/statement-of-aims/
52 H. MACHADO ARÁOZ AND P. LISDERO
triangle, from state to the market (Therborn 1999: 31). Although the
importance of the ideological dimension in the arrangement of neoliberal-
ism is not less important, and we should not overlook the complex opera-
tions involved in the battle of ideas,7 it seems evident that it cannot be
reduced to them. There is at least a 30-year gap that needs to be explained
between the moment of the inception of neoliberal ideology and the
moment of its massive entrenchment and dissemination—and over signifi-
cant political agents and actors.
Other literature is focused on the large changes verified in central capital-
ism—particularly the crisis of the post-war American hegemony and its
rebuilding attempts—as triggers of the neoliberal era. On one hand,
Literature such as those coming from Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2004),
Aijaz Ahmad (2004), and Gregory Albo (2004), among others, suggest con-
ceiving neoliberalism as a newly restructured form of imperialism on the basis
of great financial and foreign exchange reforms, unilaterally imposed by
United States in the 1970s. Ultimately, they refer to a new globalization and
financialization of capital that, through different mechanisms, managed to
create new and sophisticated mechanisms for a global tax levy.
On the other hand, David Harvey, in one of the most disseminated
interpretations, analyzes neoliberalism as a—new—cycle of accumulation
by dispossession (Harvey 2004). He upholds that cyclical overaccumula-
tion crises tend to be overcome through space-time adjustments, that is,
physical or institutional technologies that increase the geographic scale of
investments, reduce spatial dimensions of valuation processes, and raise
the amount and intensity of commercial and financial transactions. The
final effect of the recomposition of the profit rate is carried out through a
higher step on abstract valuation, namely, the increase of financial income
7
After their first meeting, the Mont Pelerin Society has held 40 general assemblies, 33
regional meetings, and 12 special meetings. It currently has “500 members in 40 countries,
including senior government officials, Nobel Laureates in Economics, ‘businessmen’, jour-
nalists and academics” (Mato 2007: 27). Around it, an extensive and powerful transnational
network of Think Tanks—constituted by over 200 foundations, institutes, “study” centers,
among others, around the world—has been built from which a true crusade against “statism”
has been launched, with a sustained strategy coming into play in the shaping of public opin-
ion through prominent businessmen, political officers, university professors, economists,
journalists, and social and religious leaders aiming at setting up a hegemonic common sense
around the full de-legitimization of the State, the assimilation of the public and state sector
as intrinsically corrupt, inefficient, and authoritative, contrary to absolute markets as the only
social arrangement compatible with full individuals freedom and fair mechanism to allocate
resources.
NEOLIBERALIZATION AND NEW COMMODIFICATION FRONTIERS… 53
8
By case, the income difference between 20% of the world population who lives in the
wealthiest countries and 20% of the poorest countries went from 30 to 1 in 1960 to 74 to
1 in 1997. (Duménil and Lévy 2004, pp. 41–63).
9
These analyses on managerialism can be elaborated on and articulated with Boltansky and
Chiapello (2002) studies regarding the new spirit of capitalism, where, among other things,
the extraordinary increase of inequalities does not affect, nor does it undermine the “legiti-
macy” of the capital, but, on the contrary, streamlines generalization and deepening of the
capitalist ethos beyond the owning classes and the affluent sectors of the working class.
Likewise, the grounds of this analysis also underlie Foucauldian propositions that emphasize
neoliberalism as a new governmentality that is not exerted on conducts, but that nests in the
production mechanisms of those conducts; a generalized rationale-normativity where com-
petition, efficiency and usefulness are undertaken as the “personal” self-accomplishment,
making businessmen from their own individuals (Foucault 2004; Dardot and Laval 2007).
54 H. MACHADO ARÁOZ AND P. LISDERO
under its sphere of influence. The neoliberal phase’s specifics are related to
the leap of scale in the extension and intensity that financialization has
reached in the contemporary world economy; a leap that has only been
possible through the formation of a new power conglomerate, of a power
structured around a complex institutional network that articulates the
core of the great finances and which is made up of the large financial insti-
tutions to their full extent.
Another complimentary type of literature on neoliberalism, which
places emphasis on the great transformations of the global political econ-
omy, is that provided by the Regulation School (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz
1986; Boyer 1986). Such literature proposes thinking about neoliberalism
as the result of the crisis arising from the Fordist accumulation regime or
from organizational capitalism, and the restructuring of capital under a
new post-organizational or flexible accumulation regime. In fact, flexibility
can be understood as a euphemism to allude to the dramatic increase in
power and in the ability to manage capital in different areas: the work-
force, the production processes, the dynamics of technological innovation
and the informational, merchandise and material flows, and energy inputs.
Broadly speaking, big companies gain a greater capacity to stipulate over
social life arrangements based on the restructuring of labor markets and
on the control over consumption patterns. The acceleration in the pace of
technological innovation, the shrinking of the life cycle of products, the
hyper-transportable characteristic of production factors, diversification,
globalization, and ultra-segmentation of consumption patterns come out
as another side of the discarding rate of the workforce and the increases in
the demands for the “retraining” of the workforce, the substantially grow-
ing precarity of working conditions, and the fragmentation of salary scales
and work status. This occurs in a wider context of drastic increase in social
inequalities and the reconstitution of global rates of surplus value which it
entails. Many strands roughly outline the new social, cultural, and political
landscape of flexible accumulation: the degradation or the loss of social
welfare mechanisms, the uncertainty of life caused by the arresting of pro-
fessional development, the widespread growth of consumption as a social
prescriptive and regulating phenomenon, and the transformation of a pat-
tern of accumulation which is more focused on rent extraction than on
profit making. In this way, the relationship between macroeconomics,
society, and culture, Bauman’s analyses of the liquid aspect of modernity
(1999, 2005, 2006, 2007) lead to a precise grasp and a synthetic under-
standing of the zeitgeist of the neoliberal era.
NEOLIBERALIZATION AND NEW COMMODIFICATION FRONTIERS… 55
In the whole conception of history up to the present this real basis of history
has either been totally neglected (…). History must, therefore, always be
written according to an extraneous standard; the real production of life
seems to be primeval history, while the truly historical appears to be sepa-
rated from ordinary life, something extra-superterrestrial. With this the rela-
tion of man to nature is excluded from history and hence the antithesis of
nature and history is created. The exponents of this conception of history
have consequently only been able to see in history the political actions of
princes and States, religious and all sorts of theoretical struggles, and in
particular in each historical epoch have had to share the illusion of that
epoch. (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 1846)
10
We refer to the core of the argument—both for its main leaders and main figures, and
for the organic intelligentsia they have displayed—that has been formulated around the expe-
riences of progressive governments in Latin America, their policies and discourses, mainly the
ones in which they present themselves as “the” alternative to neoliberalism.
In this case too, it should be noted that these experiences and processes created impacts
that cross the boundaries of territory, dogging a large part of political and intellectual forces
from other latitudes into giving in and identifying themselves with this stance. For instance,
the Argentine experience was echoed in Podemos, in Spain, Siryza, Greece; Jean-Luc
Mélenchon and the Left Front had echoed in France, among others.
11
We say “interregnum” because, although the ruling Left pictured itself ushering in a
post-neoliberal era, as we know, that did not last long. Even so, for such sectors, the recent
changes in several governments in the area conceived as a “return to the 1990s”—some
emblematic examples include Temer in Brazil, Macri in Argentina, Kuczynski in Peru, Piñera
in Chile, and even Moreno in Ecuador—would reinforce the view that the progressive gov-
ernments truly meant a “way out” and/or the “overcoming” of neoliberalism. Nowadays,
they place their hopes in Maduro’s “resilient” government, Evo Morales’ re-election and the
return of the ousted leaders in Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador.
NEOLIBERALIZATION AND NEW COMMODIFICATION FRONTIERS… 57
to the “Beijing Consensus,” which took place in the first decade of the
new millennium, enabled a growing cycle in the economy based mainly on
the chronic and fluctuating export of raw materials. This change restored
the illusions around a nostalgic return to the world of Keynesian econom-
ics and the Welfare State.
In fact, it can be foreseen how, in this way and for the sake of the
“struggle against neoliberalism”, the naturalization of capitalism is estab-
lished in a scenario where the political struggle is constrained by the phan-
tasmagorical entanglements of capital: to the progressive reasoning, the
greatest libertarian and emancipatory ambitions are defined in terms of a
horizon of “growth through social inclusion” integrating the expansion of
consumption with the “extension of rights.” In such a context, the fantasy
of state-centered developmentalism functions as a dialectical pair of “neo-
liberalism” as a phantom, its cyclical reverse side of adjustment and repres-
sion policies (sensu Scribano).12
From our understanding, the underlying problem of such positions
stems from an oversimplified conception of reality in a plain version of
ontology which ends up conceptualizing neoliberalism merely at a level of
the great structures and political processes. Such type of ontology ulti-
mately defines what is political and the political aspects of social life from
a strictly state-centered and anthropocentric perspective. To a large part of
the Left and critical thinking, even some supposedly Marxist literature,
neoliberalism implies a structural change in capitalism. However, this
“structural” change is basically understood at the following levels: at the
level of major political, economic, and ideological actors; at the level of the
state apparatus, its institutional, legal-ideological, and social-normative or
repressive framework; at the level of the global market and the dynamics
12
Here we take Scribano’s contributions (2004) into account to think of a series of pro-
cesses that have their epicenter in the body, and particularly, in a series of affectivities partially
structured as the embodiment of the social aspect. On the basis of these processes, social
actors seek to maintain their world of life without problematizing them, because that is how
they obtain certainty, foresight, and an unquestioned set of practices. Here is where the
notions of phantoms and social fantasies are inscribed as a specific chapter of these practices
whose objectives bare a relationship to conflict avoidance. Fantasies prevent conflict-related
situations in a journey in which perceptions and sensations take something particular as uni-
versal. To this effect, the fantasy has a hint of hope or illusion which is contrasted with the
phantom, since they are built from the perceptions that they bring forward the failures,
frustrations, and defeats, thus disabling the capacity for action of the subject. After practice,
the phantom becomes a perception associated with a feeling of threat and of social fear that
later redefines the new practices.
58 H. MACHADO ARÁOZ AND P. LISDERO
that same government (...). What is most serious, however, does not reside
in that, but in that such artists and intellectuals are the major producers of
ideological surplus value for the system. We complete our theory, then, by
adding a fundamental and necessary corollary: ideological surplus value is
produced proportionally to the revolutionary potential of those who pro-
duce it. (Ludovico Silva [1970] 2017: 224)
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