iii

The Battle
for Central Europe
The Siege of Szigetvár and the Death of
Süleyman the Magnificent and Nicholas Zrínyi (1566)

Edited by

Pál Fodor

budapest

LEIDEN | BOSTON

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 Contents
Contents v

Contents

Preface ix
Pál Fodor

Introduction 1
Pál Fodor

part 1
The Empire of Süleyman the Magnificent

 ttoman Politics in the Reign of Sultan Süleyman: Government,

O
Internal Politics and Imperial Expansion 7
Feridun M. Emecen

 ransformation of the Ottoman Empire into a Military-Fiscal State:

T
Reconsidering the Financing of War from a Global Perspective 21
Erol Özvar

S tate and Religion, “Sunnitization” and “Confessionalism” in Süleyman’s

Time 65
Tijana Krstić

Law and Legislation under Süleyman I 93

Colin Imber

 he Aesthetics of Empire: Arts, Politics and Commerce in the Construction of

T
Sultan Süleyman’s Magnificence 115
Gülru Neci̇poğlu

part 2
The Empires of Charles V and Ferdinand I of Habsburg

 absburg Dynastic Politics and Empire Building during Charles V’s

H
Reign 161
Z
 oltán Korpás

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vi Contents

 he Central European Habsburg Monarchy in the Middle of the Sixteenth

T
Century – Elements of Cohesion and Division 179
István Fazekas

 amerale, Contributionale, Creditors and Crisis: The Finances of the

C
Habsburg Empire from the Battle of Mohács to the Thirty Year’s War 193
Peter Rauscher

“ Clash” or “Go-between”? Habsburg–Ottoman Relations in the Age of

Süleyman (1520–1566) 213
Arno Strohmeyer

I ntangible Cultural Exchanges: Christendom’s Eastern Frontier as Seen by

Philip II’s Ambassador Chantonnay (1566) 241
Alfredo Alvar Ezquerra

part 3
The Hungarian Theatre of War in the Age of
Süleyman the Magnificent

 he Ottoman Conquest in Hungary: Decisive Events (Belgrade 1521, Mohács

T
1526, Vienna 1529, Buda 1541) and Results 261
János B. Szabó

The Ottoman Conquest and Establishment in Croatia and Slavonia 277

Nenad Moačanin

 ttoman and Habsburg Military Affairs in the Age of Süleyman the

O
Magnificent 287
Gábor Ágoston

Ottoman Defence System in Hungary 309

Klára Hegyi

 ungary, Vienna and the Defence System against the Ottomans in the Age of
H
Süleyman 321
Géza Pálffy

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Contents vii

part 4
The Siege of Szigetvár – the Death of Süleyman and Zrínyi

 he Hungarian Frontier and Süleyman’s Way to Szigetvár according to

T
Ottoman Sources 339
Claudia Römer and Nicolas Vatin

Tokaj, 1565: A Habsburg Prize of War, and an Ottoman Casus Belli 359

James D. Tracy

 iklós Zrínyi, Captain-General of Szigetvár (1561–1566) – His Organisational

M
Activity and Death 377
Szabolcs Varga

The Sieges of Szigetvár and Gyula, 1566 397

József Kelenik

Sigetvarname: A Visual Source of Sultan Süleyman’s Last Campaign 411

Zeynep Tarım

On Süleyman the Magnificent’s Death and Burials 427

Nicolas Vatin

part 5
Remembering the Battle for Szigetvár, Süleyman and Zrínyi
and the Search for the Lost Türbe of the Sultan

 he Memory of the 1566 Siege of Sziget and of Miklós Zrínyi in Hungarian

T
Literary Tradition 445
Gábor Tüskés

 he Entangled Memory of the Battle of Sziget (1566) in Early Modern

T
Europe 479
Zsuzsa Barbarics-Hermanik

 he Memory of Nicholas IV of Zrin and the Battle of Szigetvár in Croatia and

T
the Balkans 509
Damir Karbić

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viii Contents

 he Memory of Szigetvár and Sultan Süleyman in Ottoman/Turkish

T
Culture 523
Günhan Börekçi

The Pilgrimage Town (Türbe Kasabası) of Sultan Süleyman at Szigetvár  539

Norbert Pap

Index of Personal Names 553

Index of Geographical Names 561

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Miklós Zrínyi,
Captain-General of Szigetvár (1561–1566)
– His Organisational Activity and Death
Szabolcs Varga*
Institute of History, Research Centre for the Humanities,
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest
szavarga@gmail.com

Miklós Zrínyi and Süleyman’s names have become closely intertwined as the
memory of the 1566 siege has deeply infiltrated into Hungarian and Croatian
national identity.1 Thus, in Hungary, the significance of the siege overreaches the
framework of history writing and both Zrínyi and Szigetvár have extra meanings.
This brings about a delicate situation. While the international specialist
literature approaches the events of Ottoman Hungary from the point of view of
Süleyman and the Ottoman Empire and regards this area as a theatre of war of
the Ottoman–Habsburg rivalry, Hungarian and Croatian historiographies
investigate the 1566 campaign from the aspect of Zrínyi and the Hungarian–
Croatian border defence system. Of course, the significance of Zrínyi and that of
Süleyman are not to be mentioned in the same breath, but the Hungarian
aristocrat’s activities and all his life make us better understand the nature of
Ottoman Hungary and the causes of the 1566 campaign.
First, I will shortly introduce the region where Zrínyi Miklós, the captain-
general of Szigetvár worked. In international historical scholarship, the area of
Ottoman Hungary has generally been portrayed as an integral whole where the
major campaigns shifted the borders, but the inner lands remained the same
during the 150 years of conquest.2 This impression was strengthened by maps
that marked the whole of the Ottoman Hungary with the same colour.
Fortunately, the schematic picture has become more sophisticated in the past
few decades. Ferenc Szakály pointed out that the Hungarian authorities

* The study was supported by OTKA PD 109863.

1 István Fazekas, ʻSzigetvár emlékezete a XVI. századbanʼ, in Múlt-kor történelmi magazin
melléklete. Budapest, 2016, 18–22; Dénes Sokcsevits, ‘A Zrínyiek újkori kultusza a horvátok-
nálʼ, in Múlt-kor, 62–66.
2 Sadık Müfit Bilge, Osmanlı’nın Macaristanı. İstanbul, 2010.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi 10.1163/9789004396234_020

For use by the Author only | © 2019 Koninklijke Brill NV

378 szabolcs varga

collected taxes throughout the area of Ottoman Hungary3 and Klára Hegyi’s
research demonstrated that sipahis serving in Ottoman Hungary were granted
prebends well beyond the Hungarian border fortresses.4 Due to these results,
the area of Ottoman Hungary has become striped on the maps.5 However, this
still conceals the shifts of the border and the rapid changes in the status of
certain territories. Since the borders between the two world powers were in
constant flux in the Carpathian Basin, it is almost impossible to show longer
phases.
In 1556, a Viennese report commented on the number of fortresses captured
by the Turks after 1526. Published by Géza Pálffy, this valuable source mentions
two hundred and sixty-two fortresses, as the enquired aristocrats, among them
Miklós Zrínyi/Nikola Zrinski, were able to recall so many by heart. Hundred
and thirty-six of them lay south of the Drava and forty-four stood in South
Transdanubia. Since out of these hundred and eighty fortresses only eight were
south of the Sava, one can establish that hundred and seventy-two castles fell
on a two hundred and fifty kilometre long strip of the border in thirty years.6
(Maps 1, 2) The opposing forces were engaged in fierce struggles to possess
these forts and the Ottoman military command had to fight for each meter in
Slavonia and South Transdanubia. Such a large-scale struggle took place only
once in a while in the first two-thirds of the 16th century – for instance, in the
area bordered by the rivers Danube, Tisza and Maros (Mureş) in 1551 and 1552
– and thus the Ottoman conquest did not bring about a dramatic change in the
beginning. However, the people in Slavonia and South Transdanubia suffered
badly and sometimes whole counties lost their populations.7 Mainly Orthodox
Serbians and Vlachs settled in the empty areas.

3 Ferenc Szakály, Magyar adóztatás a török hódoltságban. Budapest, 1981.

4 Klára Hegyi, ‘“Aranyásó szpáhik” a királyi Magyarországon’, in Ferenc Glatz (ed.), A tudomány
szolgálatában. Emlékkönyv Benda Kálmán 80. születésnapjára. Budapest, 1993, 103–111.
5 Ferenc Glatz (ed.), Virágkor és pusztulás. A kezdetektől 1606-ig. (História Könyvtár. Atlaszok
Magyarország történetéhez) Budapest, 1995, 52–56.
6 Géza Pálffy, ʻEgy rendkívüli forrás a magyar politikai elit 16. századi földrajzi ismereteiről.
Az 1526 és 1556 között török kézbe került magyarországi városok, várak és kastélyok össze-
írása a Német-római Birodalom rendjei számáraʼ, in György Terei et al. (eds.), Várak
nyomában. Tanulmányok a 60 éves Feld István tiszteletére. Budapest, 2011, 177–194.
7 Ive Mažuran, ʻTurska osvajanja u Slavoniji (1526–1552)ʼ, Osječki Zbornik 6 (1958) 93–135;
Nenad Moačanin, ‘Migrationen in Slawonien und Syrmien im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert’, in
Internationales Kulturhistorisches Symposion Mogersdorf 1997. Zagreb, 2000, 68–75; Nenad
Moačanin, Slavonia i Srijem u razdoblju osmanske vladavine. (Bibliotheca Croatica: Slavonica,
Sirmiensia et Baranyensia; Studije, Knj. 3.) Slavonski Brod, 2001.

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miklós zrínyi as captain-general of szigetvár 379

map 1 Advance of the Ottomans in the Southern Transdanubian region until 1566

Slavonia and South Transdanubia, both of which had been conquered,

formed the western base of Ottoman Hungary, and the security of this section
of the border was, therefore, of strategic importance for the Ottoman military
command. The fate of Buda and Ottoman Hungary depended on the logistic
line along the Danube, and Christian troops could threaten the reserves sent to
Buda only from this direction. This fact is essential to an understanding of the
importance of Sziget(vár), the strongest Hungarian border fortress of the
region. Szigetvár impeded the Ottoman advance in South Transdanubia,
successfully controlling transportation on the Drava and posing a constant
threat to the Ottoman border castles in Slavonia, mainly Virovitiça (Virovitica/
Verőce) and Pojega (Požega/Pozsega). Samuel Budina rightly titled his work
(1568) “The History of Szigetvár, the Strongest Bastion of the Whole Slavonia”,
which “is fortified artificially and naturally, and lies in a place surrounded and
almost flooded by marshes on the border of Slavonia”.8 It is not by chance that
the castle of Szigetvár was a constant target of Ottoman attacks and its captains

8 Imre Molnár (ed. and transl.), Budina Sámuel históriája magyarul és latinul Szigetvár 1566. évi
ostromáról. (Szigetvári Várbaráti Kör kiadványai, 6.) Translation checked by Mária Berényi­né
Révész. Szigetvár, 1978, 5–7.

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380 szabolcs varga

map 2 Advance of the Ottomans in Slavonia until 1565

frequently mentioned this topic in their correspondence. Ottoman troops

besieged the increasingly fortified stronghold both in 1555 and 1556; however,
at that time their attempts remained unsuccessful.9 The mere existence of
Szigetvár was an enormous challenge to the Ottoman military command
because the fortress might have strengthened to an extent that its soldiers
could have seized the initiative in the field and could have seriously endangered
South Transdanubia and the consolidation of Ottoman Hungary.10
As Géza Pálffy’s research has shown, the Habsburg border defence system
was extremely complex.11 In Slavonia, it was controlled by the Croatian–
Slavonian ban, while in South Transdanubia, that is in the territory between

9 Péter Kasza (compil. and annot.), Remembering a Forgotten Siege: Szigetvár, 1556 / Egy
elfeledett ostrom emlékezete. Szigetvár, 1556. Ed. by Pál Fodor. Budapest, 2016.
10 Szabolcs Varga, ʻA vár és mezőváros története 1526–1566ʼ, in Sándor Bősze, László Ravaz-
di and László Szita (eds.), Szigetvár története. Tanulmányok a város múltjából. Szigetvár,
2006, 45–88.
11 Géza Pálffy, ʻThe Habsburg Defense System in Hungary Against the Ottomans in the Six-
teenth Century: A Catalyst of Military Development in Central Europeʼ, in Brian J. Davies
(ed.), Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1500–1800. (History of Warfare, 72.) Leiden, Boston,
2012, 35–61.

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miklós zrínyi as captain-general of szigetvár 381

the Drava and Lake Balaton, it was managed by the captain-general of Szigetvár
and that of Transdanubia. Of the Hungarian aristocrats, only Miklós Zrínyi
held all these three posts.
The Croatian count and Hungarian aristocrat was Croatian–Slavonian ban
from 1542 to 1556.12 Following the 1552 campaign, he consolidated the defence
of Slavonia and soon launched a counter-attack. This post brought the best out
of Zrínyi in the next fifteen years. As the fourth most important dignity of the
country, not only the Viennese court but also the Austrian territories became
aware of his name and respect his military prowess. The Croatian–Slavonian
ban literally fought his way up to the highest political circles by his sword, but
for the sake of an even more successful career, he had to accept some new
tasks.
Zrínyi wanted to get into the highest echelon of society and thus he needed
to be close to the imperial city. To this end, he left both his native region of Una
and his chosen homeland of Slavonia and set up a new home in Transdanubia.
In 1546, he acquired Muraköz (Međimurje) in Zala County, and Csáktornya
(Čakovec) became the new residence of the family. Although Zrínyi had earlier
possessed small estates north of the river Drava, it was at this time that he
became a prominent member of the Hungarian aristocracy. As a result of the
marriage contract signed with Péter Erdődy in 1556, Zrínyi got hold of the
estates of Monyorókerék (Eberau), Vörösvár (Rotenturm) and Vép, all of which
lay in a region safe from Ottoman attacks. This agreement rocketed him to the
circle of the richest landowners, and his new residence in Monyorókerék was
only at arm’s length from the royal court.13 (Map 3)
The ruler appointed Zrínyi as royal treasurer in 1557 and from that time on
he often visited Pozsony (Pressburg/Bratislava) and Vienna, the two capitals of
the Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy. However, the post of
the captain-general of Szigetvár became vacant in 1561 and Zrínyi returned to
the battlefield.14

12 Géza Pálffy, ʻA szigetvári Zrínyi Miklós a Magyar Királyság és a Habsburg Monarchia arisz-
tokráciájábanʼ, in Zoltán Varga (ed.), Zrínyi Miklós élete és öröksége. A 2008. november 7–8-án
Zrínyi Miklós születésének 500. évfordulója alkalmából Szigetváron rendezett konferencia
előadásainak szerkesztett szövege. Szigetvár, 2010, 28–48; Sándor Bene, Zoran Ladić and
Gábor Hausner (eds.), Susreti dviju kultura. Obitelj Zrinski u hrvatskoj i mađarskoj povijesti.
Zagreb, 2012.
13 Szabolcs Varga, ‘„Az Zrinyi Ház, soha az Erdeödy házhoz ighaz nem volt.” Fejezetek a
Zrínyi­ek és Erdődyek kora újkori kapcsolatából’, in Sándor Bene, Pál Fodor, Gábor Hausner
and József Padányi (eds.), Határok fölött. Tanulmányok a költő, katona, államférfi Zrínyi
Miklósról. Budapest, 2017, 187–207.
14 Szabolcs Varga, Europe’s Leonidas: Miklós Zrínyi, Defender of Szigetvár (1508–1566).
Budapest, 2016, 188–212.

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382 szabolcs varga

map 3
Zrínyi estates in the
16th century

He knew the fortress at Sziget well. At the time he was ban, he himself must
have galloped over here a number of times, delivering supplies, soldiers and
weapons to the fortress that was now in the king’s hands. He knew very well
that Sziget was of key importance for the defence of South Transdanubia and
Slavonia, so he did everything in his power to assist the castle hiding in the
swamps of the Almás brook. He was there under Babócsa in 1556 to stop the
fortress from falling to the enemy, and he also took part in the reconstruction
of the damaged fortifications. His new lands in Transdanubia only made him
all the more fond of the fortress at Szigetvár, as he knew very well that it was
this fortification which protected the population of Csáktornya, the whole of
Muraköz, and even the more distant Monyorókerék. So he was in no doubt that
after the death of Márk Horváth, the captain of Sziget, in 1561, he would take
his place. As early as on 22 August 1561, only a few days after his predecessor’s
death, he applied to Archduke Maximilian of Habsburg, requesting that he put
in a good word for him with his father regarding the position. Hardly a month

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miklós zrínyi as captain-general of szigetvár 383

later, Ferdinand informed the Hungarian Chamber that he had come to an

agreement with Zrínyi on the conditions for accepting the post of captain, and
on 3 October he appointed Zrínyi castellan of the fortress of Sziget and senechal
– or, to use the contemporary term, provisor – of the castle domain.15
Zrínyi had taken on one of the most dangerous posts in the Hungarian
defence system. In the weeks after the appointment, the captain was already in
the fortress starting his service. At that time, he did not know that he would
have only five years commanding the fortress. Yet even this short space of time
was enough for the names of Sziget and Zrínyi to be linked irrevocably and for
the name “Miklós Zrínyi of Szigetvár” to enter the history books for good.
Unlike commanders of smaller castles, Zrínyi was not just the captain of a
fortress; as a baron enjoying the greatest honours from the king and belonging
to the highest circles of the elite he would not have been satisfied with such a
“minor” position. The Hungarian system of border defences was often divided
up into larger main fortresses and smaller fortifications which belonged to
them; this was no different in the case of Szigetvár. The captain of the fortress
would also be responsible for the defence of South Transdanubia; for this to be
successful, he had to cooperate with the palatine, the ban and the captain-
general of Transdanubia.16 His jurisdiction extended to the town and to the
civilian population of the castle domain, and, with the collection of taxes, his
tasks were not only military, but also economic.17
In reality, the Szigetvár posting was a promotion for Zrínyi. If we look at the
certificate dated 3 October 1561, we see that, aside from its prestige, this post
was similar to the office of ban he had previously held. He could retain the
position of royal treasurer, too, so he could now boast of two prestigious posts.

15 István Kenyeres, XVI. századi uradalmi utasítások. Utasítások a kamarai uradalmak prefek­
tusai, udvarbírái és ellenőrei részére. Vol. 2. (Fons könyvek, 2.) Budapest, 2002, 655–663.
16 Géza Pálffy, ʻThe Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against the
Ottoman Empire in Hungary (Up to the Early Eighteenth Century)ʼ, in Géza Dávid and Pál
Fodor (eds.), Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Con-
fines in the Era of the Ottoman Conquest. (The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage. Politics,
Society and Economy, 20.) Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2000, 3–69.
17 Kenyeres, XVI. századi, 661: Postquam etiam sibi demandata est proventuum arcis admi­
nsitratio, ideo cunctos redditus, tam ordinarios, quam extraordinarios, scilicet frugum,
bladorum vinorum, nonarum, decimarum numerum et aliarum rerum similium in bonis,
tam ad arcem spectantibus, quam occupaticiis fideliter colligere. Censum item ordinarium et
subsidia quotiens communi consensu statuum et ordinum regni Maiestati Caesareae of-
feruntur de comitatu Baranÿa et partibus illis adjacentibus, diligenter exigere ac de universis
et singulis praeceptis bonam et justam rationem medio rationistae seu viceprovisoris sui te-
nere et postulante Sua Majestate eam etiam reddere debebit.

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384 szabolcs varga

Under his command was the army, funded by Styrian pay, of the nearby
Babócsa, Berzence, Barcs, Vízvár and Csurgó on condition that they were
obedient to the Slavonian captain-general as well. In addition, a further
hundred soldiers on Styrian pay were stationed at Sziget, a clear sign of the
interdependence of the areas to the south and to the north of the Drava.
The death of Palatine Tamás Nádasdy in 1562 had an effect on Zrínyi’s role at
Szigetvár. At the time the Habsburg court considered it preferable for the
position of palatine to remain vacant, and so Zrínyi – although he gave serious
thought to the idea – had no real chance of taking up the office left available by
his friend. The captaincy-general of Transdanubia could not remain vacant,
however, so in 1563 Zrínyi was appointed to this office.18 With this, the leadership
of the area stretching from Lake Balaton to the river Drava was finally united in
the hands of one man, and in this region the captain-general of Transdanubia
had almost the same rights as the palatine in his capacity as the captain-
general of the Kingdom of Hungary.
Zrínyi began work with enormous zeal. Immediately after his appointment
as captain he started to make it clear to everyone who was in control of the
area now. In spring 1562 he personally led his soldiers across the Drava, where
they crushed the troops of Arslan, sancakbeyi of Pojega, bringing the castle of
Monoszló (Moslavina) to the ground, to prevent the Ottomans from fortifying
it. Under Zrínyi’s leadership, the Christian military command went on the
attack, keeping the enemy guard stations on both sides of the Drava in constant
dread. On hearing about the Hungarian attacks, many of the Ottoman
governors near the border started fortifying their castles, as happened in Peçuy
(Pécs), Valpova (Valpovo/Valpó) and D’urd’evaç (Ðurđevac/Szentgyörgy).19
Zrínyi came to the same conclusion the Hungarian elite had reached a
generation earlier; namely that the country was unable to withstand the
“wartime years of peace”, and only with an active border defence could it stand
a chance against the Ottomans’ superior numbers.20

18 Wien, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Hun-
garica AA Fasc. 86. Konv. A. fol. 68–71; Géza Pálffy, A császárváros védelmében. A győri
főkapitányság története 1526–1598. (A győri főkapitányság története a 16–17. században,
1.) Győr, 1999, 90–91.
19 Samu Barabás (ed.), Codex epistolaris et diplomaticus Comitis Nicolai de Zrinio / Zrínyi
Miklós a szigetvári hős életére vonatkozó levelek és okiratok. Vol. I. Budapest, 1898, No.
CCCXCIV.
20 Géza Pálffy, ʻElképzelések a török hódoltság elpusztításáról (16–17. század). A Habsburg
Birodalom magyarországi hadszínterének néhány főbb sajátosságárólʼ, in Gyöngyi Kovács
and Miklós Szabó (ed.), „Quasi liber et pictura.” Tanulmányok Kubinyi András hetvenedik
születésnapjára. Budapest, 2004, 387–403.

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miklós zrínyi as captain-general of szigetvár 385

Zrínyi knew very well that effective defence required a huge amount of
money on his part, money the central government was not able to generate. So
he tried to acquire as much of an income locally as he could. An opportunity
for this was offered by the reorganization of the domain around Szigetvár. It
was his predecessor, Márk Horváth, who had already started this work. He had
extended the jurisdiction of the castle from 1558 onwards, and thus South
Transdanubia was no longer a safe area for the Ottoman conquerors.21 Mehmed
Bey, the district governor of Peçuy, complained to the Porte in autumn 1559
that Márk Horváth, captain of Sziget, had captured many Muslim travellers
and sipahis, and was hiding them in his fortress.22 In the spring of 1560, hajdús
from Szigetvár, Babócsa and Csurgó drove dozens of Ottoman soldiers into the
church in Mohács and set the building on fire. The attackers were supported by
Hungarian peasants.23 Due to the Hungarian attacks, the Porte ordered the
building of a new fortress in Mohács on the bank of the Danube and the
establishment of an independent kapudanlık in order to secure the waterways.
The new stronghold was to station the garrisons of the destroyed palisades.24
The soldiers of Szigetvár imposed a constant threat in the conquered areas of
Baranya and Tolna Counties – a fact that considerably modifies the schematic
representation of the maps mentioned at the beginning of this study. For in the
1560s, the conquerors had to build fortresses in places well beyond the
borderline, which they had occupied without a single shot twenty years earlier.
Zrínyi continued the work started by Márk Horváth, and by 1566 almost the
entirety of South Transdanubia paid taxes to him. He introduced many
innovations which led to a drastic increase in tax burdens. He again demanded
unpaid work in kind, the so-called robot: The peasants would have to appear in
the castle at an appointed time, with their tools and carts, and carry out
whatever the captain’s orders were. Not even the villages of far-flung Tolna
County were exempted from this; anyone trying to escape this duty could
expect to be severely punished.25
The castle domain of Szigetvár would, by the 1560s, be operating as a state
within a state, and Zrínyi governed the province with which he had been

21 Ferenc Szakály, ‘Egy végvári kapitány hétköznapjai (Horváth Márk szigeti kapitány leve-
lezése Nádasdy Tamás nádorral és szervitoraival, 1556–1561)’, in Somogy Megye Múlt-
jából 18 (1987) 45–126.
22 Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, „Ez az ügy fölöttébb fontos” A szultáni tanács Magyarországra
vonatkozó rendeletei (1559–1560, 1564–1565). (História Könyvtár. Okmánytárak, 6.) Bu-
dapest, 2009, 53.
23 Ibid., 86–87.
24 Ibid., 106–107.
25 Szakály, Magyar adóztatás, 72–96.

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386 szabolcs varga

map 4
The taxation district
of Szigetvár, 1565

entrusted with almost total power. In addition to the rents due to the lord of
the land, he also collected state taxes, and far more efficiently than the central
institutions had done previously. This did not meet with the approval of the
Hungarian Chamber, however, and a fierce conflict erupted between the
captain-general and the central administrators regarding the villages which
had formerly belonged to the castles of Siklós and Valpó.26 (Map 4)
The real reason for the conflict was that Zrínyi thought as a soldier. He knew
what resources were needed for defence, but this led to the depletion and
impoverishment of the region. The Hungarian Chamber’s interests, on the
other hand, lay in seeing as great an income as possible coming into the central

26 Kenyeres, XVI. századi, 664–674; Sándor Takáts, ʻVizsgálat Zrínyi Miklós ellenʼ, Századok
39 (1905) 889–901.

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miklós zrínyi as captain-general of szigetvár 387

budget thanks to efficient financial management.27 A fiscal approach would

produce serious problems even then.
As a result of Zrínyi’s efforts, Szigetvár became an enormous fortress, sur­
rounded by tax-paying villages, smaller fortresses protecting the main
thoroughfares, and, most tightly around it, an almost impenetrable swamp.
The effectively inscrutable system of walls and fortresses must surely have
presented visitors with an imposing spectacle.28 Posterity is tempted to scoff at
the quality of 16th-century Hungarian castle architecture, but contemporaries
were well aware that Sziget was an up-to-date fortification; some of the
architectural elements employed in it can also be seen at Castel Nuovo in
Naples, and at the castles of Bergamo and La Valetta.
It was thanks to this unapproachable fortress that the Ottoman admin­
istration did not succeed in pacifying occupied Transdanubia;29 in fact, by
overseeing the shipping route along the Danube and the Drava, the soldiers of
Szigetvár posed a constant threat to the guard positions in Northern
Transdanubia, too. It came in very handy for Zrínyi that the Ottomans wanted
to abolish the sancak of Sekçöy (Szekcső) at that time. According to reports,
this step “led to chaos in the area, the villains of Szigetvár can attack both by
land and the Danube. There is an awful muddle, it is impossible to reach
Mohaç. Peçuy and Seksar (Szekszárd) are far from each other and they cannot
put down the riots around Mohaç and Baranavar (Baranyavár)”.30 Due to the
disorder, the Ottomans gave up their plans regarding the mentioned sancak at
the beginning of 1565 but the uncertainty could come to an end only slowly.31
The situation worsened because of the conflict between the sancakbeyi of
Peçuy and the sipahis who refused to obey to their commander.32 As a result of
the abuses relating to tax collection, the Christian inhabitants of the villages
became more and more hostile and they filed their complaints directly with
the Porte.33 The ravage and plundering of the garrisons of the newly built

27 István Kenyeres, ʻA végvárak uradalmainak igazgatása és gazdálkodása a 16. századbanʼ,

Századok 135:6 (2001) 1349–1412; Géza Pálffy, ʻDer Preis für die Verteidigung der
Habsburgermonarchie: Die Kosten der Türkenabwehr in der zweiten Hälfte des 16.
Jahrhundertsʼ, in Friedrich Edelmayer, Maximilian Lanzinner and Peter Rauscher (eds.),
Finanzen und Herrschaft: Materielle Grundlagen fürstlicher Politik in den habsburgischen
Ländern und im Heiligen Römischen Reich im 16. Jahrhundert. (Veröffentlichungen des
Insti­tuts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 38.) München, Wien, 2003, 20‒44.
28 Varga, ‘A vár és mezőváros’, 80–82.
29 Dávid and Fodor, „Ez az ügy fölöttébb fontos”, 160–161.
30 Ibid., 174.
31 Ibid., 201.
32 Ibid., 164–165, 167.
33 Ibid., 168.

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388 szabolcs varga

fortresses along the Drava, Monoszló and Berzőce (Brezovica) also added to
the difficulty because eighty-one villages of the districts (nahiye) of Şelen
(Sellye) and Göröşgal (Görösgal) protested against them unanimously.34 The
Porte wanted to solve the problem by ordering Hamza, the sancakbeyi of
Mohaç, to prevent the garrisons of the mentioned castles from crossing the
river and pillaging the territory of Baranya.35 These cases deserve attention
because all these villages had been under Ottoman jurisdiction from 1543 and
their fate sheds light on the chaotic state of affairs of the Ottoman public
administration.
In 1565, Zrínyi took the strategic initiative and started a counter-attack in
South Transdanubia. It was the worst possible moment for the Ottoman
military command, as John Sigismund’s power turned out to be insecure in
Transylvania and the Habsburg army was stationed near Tokaj and Szatmár
(Satu Mare). To repel the attack, the sancakbeyis of Niğbolu (Nikopol) and
Hersek (Herzegovina) were summoned to Transylvania,36 and the troops of the
sub-provinces of Pojega, Kilis (Klis) and Bosna were ordered to support Hamza
Bey of Mohaç in a relieving campaign in South Transdanubia.37 However, it had
become increasingly clear that local forces could not solve the problem. Thus,
the entourage of Sultan Süleyman determined in autumn 1565 to take Gyula
and Szigetvár in order to stabilize their control in Hungary.38
The detailed description of the 1566 campaign and the siege of Szigetvár lies
outside the scope of the study. As is well known, several ideas have been put
forward about Süleyman’s aims and the plans of the Habsburg military
command. Without going into details, I would like to draw attention to some
important but unnoticed developments – the more so because these are
closely related to the siege of Szigetvár and the heroic death of Miklós Zrínyi.
The last campaign of the sultan does not fit into the series of former attacks
because in the 1550s the Ottoman–Habsburg rivalry grew more refined than it
had been in the previous decades. Charles V of Habsburg had died, and
Ferdinand and Süleyman had become old. Only the local Ottoman forces were
engaged in various attacks in the Hungarian theatre of war after 1552. The local
population suffered badly and several castles were taken at that time, but the
first phase of the conquest had ended. In 1562 the two rulers signed a peace
treaty for eight years and there were no signs that the sultan wished to launch
a further campaign. Indeed, a legitimate hope was that the ageing ruler would

34 Ibid., 171.
35 Ibid., 173.
36 Ibid., 308.
37 Ibid., 306.
38 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Karton 21. Konv. 1. 1566. Jan.–März. fols. 13–15.

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miklós zrínyi as captain-general of szigetvár 389

never again attack the Kingdom of Hungary. However, a conflict that broke out
between the Habsburgs and John Sigismund dashed such hopes.39
In the mid-16th century, the most important political issue in the courts of
Vienna, Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia) and Kraków was Transylvania, as the Habsburg
court and members of the Hungarian political elite that were loyal to the
Habsburgs never abandoned their desire to gain Szapolyai’s legacy.40 However,
the sultan adamantly refused to consent to this, and so Transylvania became the
focus of clashes between the two empires in the Carpathian Basin.41
Queen Isabella strengthened her position in Transylvania in 1556, and her
son, John Sigismund, also started his reign with a firm hand in 1559. During
these years only Gyula remained in Habsburg hands in the neighbouring area,
but it did not pose much danger at that time. However, the state of affairs
changed drastically in 1562. In that year Melchior (Menyhért) Balassa, who had
formerly supported John Sigismund, went over to Ferdinand’s side, whereby
the huge Balassa estates lying around Szatmár were also lost for Transylvania.
The riot of the Szeklers added to the difficulties, and John Sigismund was
forced to seek Ottoman help.42 The war dragged on until 1565 when the captain-
general, Lazarus von Schwendi, arrived and the Habsburg army launched an
offensive. Habsburg forces then occupied Szatmár, Nagybánya (Baia Mare) and
the castle of Tokaj, and the defeats shook John Sigismund’s position.43 Being
aware of these events, Sultan Süleyman decided to start a campaign in the
Hungarian theatre of war the next year. Therefore, after 1551, Transylvanian
affairs led once again to a new war. The main reason for the 1566 campaign was
the restoration of the original status quo.
It is important to stress the Transylvanian events because even at the time
most people were unaware of the reasons for the campaign. Many ideas were
put forth relating to its causes. Some Ottoman chroniclers maintained that the
reason for launching the campaign had been Szigetvár, while others thought
that the soldiers of Eger had made the sultan angry. Again, some other people
suggested that the sultan had Vienna in his sights. According to Ferenc Forgách,

39 Pál Fodor, The Unbearable Weight of Empire: The Ottomans in Central Europe – A Failed
Attempt at Universal Monarchy (1390–1566). Budapest, 20162, 129–131.
40 Teréz Oborni, ʻDie Pläne des Wiener Hofes zur Rückeroberung Siebenbürgens 1557–1563ʼ,
in Martina Fuchs, Teréz Oborni and Gábor Ujváry (eds.), Kaiser Ferdinand I. Ein mit-
teleuropäischer Herrscher. (Geschichte in der Epoche Karls V., 5.) Münster, 2005, 277–297.
41 Dávid and Fodor, „Ez az ügy fölöttébb fontos”, 178–325, passim.
42 Teréz Oborni, ʻKettős függésben. Erdély államisága a 16. század közepénʼ, Korunk 17:7
(2007) 33–40.
43 Géza Pálffy, ʻVédelmi övezetek a Tiszától keletre a 16. századbanʼ, in István Lengvári (ed.),
In memoriam Barta Gábor. Tanulmányok Barta Gábor emlékére. Pécs, 1996, 209–228. See
also the study by James D. Tracy in this volume.

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390 szabolcs varga

the bishop of Várad (Oradea), “[the sultan] started this last and large-scale
campaign with such a huge army and with the aim of not leaving Gyula, the
only significant castle held by the enemy, behind his back and capturing it, he
would unite his forces, and breaking through the only gate of Hungary, he
would march toward Austria”.44
The reports of the Habsburg envoys written from Constantinople prove that
the Ottoman military command, when planning the campaign, was intent on
maintaining the vassal status of Transylvania and protecting Ottoman Hungary.
During this phase the sultan’s state of health represented the biggest
uncertainty, as the people in his circle could not decide whether he would be
able to set out for Hungary. However, the targets of the attack were decided
upon in the autumn of 1565.45
Maximilian of Habsburg’s envoy at the Porte, Albert de Wyss (Wijs), reported
the following on 1 January 1566. The Transylvanian envoy had been sent home
two weeks before with the message that John Sigismund should prepare for a
campaign in early spring. De Wyss also mentioned that the sultan would hold
a muster at the spring equinox in Edirne, and then he would fast and set out for
the Kingdom of Hungary. The letter also revealed that Süleyman would travel
only as far as Sofia or Belgrade and that he would not take part in military
operations in Hungary. A part of the army would march to Buda under the
leadership of Prince Selim and ravage the area; another part would capture the
castles of Gyula and Eger, while the third one would attack Szigetvár. De Wyss
felt that the political climate was very hostile toward them and that the sultan’s
war against Maximilian was a certainty.46
According to the next envoy report, “there is a constant preparation for war
whose target will be, on the one hand, Gyula and Eger, and on the other, Sziget”.
Sokollu Mehmed Pasha boasted that these castles almost fell into their hands.
However, some anxious high-ranking officials had the idea that it was all the
intrigue of the grand vizier. They suspected that Mehmed was ignoring the

44 Ferenc Forgách, Emlékirat Magyarország állapotáról Ferdinánd, János, Miksa királysága és

II. János erdélyi fejedelemsége alatt. Selected and edited with a foreword by Péter Kulcsár,
translated by István Borzsák. Budapest, 1977, 846.
45 Tayyib Gökbilgin, ʻNagy Szolimán 1566. évi Szigetvár elleni hadjáratának előzményei’, in
Lajos Rúzsás (ed.), Szigetvári Emlékkönyv Szigetvár 1566. évi ostromának 400. évforduló-
jára. Budapest, 1966, 53–61.
46 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Karton 21. Konv. 1. 1566. Jan.–März. fols. 13–15. +18. I owe grati-
tude to László Glück and István Fazekas, who provided me with the transcriptions of
these documents. They are collecting and processing them as part of a project entitled
“The Political, Military and Religious Role of Szigetvár and Turbék in the Rivalry of the
Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, and the Turkish Regime in Hungary – Facts and Memo-
ry” directed by Pál Fodor and Norbert Pap.

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miklós zrínyi as captain-general of szigetvár 391

sultan’s state of health and wanted to seize the opportunity to precipitate

Süleyman’s death. According to these officials, Mehmed Pasha’s aim was to
arrange for his son-in-law, Selim, to be the sultan, whom he could then
influence.47
Envoy De Wyss reported on 9 February that Selim would march toward
Sziget with the troops of the beylerbeyis of the eastern part of the empire, while
the sultan, together with the central and European troops, would attack
Komárom and Győr. A vizier would then besiege Gyula and Eger with the
auxiliary troops of the vassals.48
Despite the contradictory reports, Zrínyi was sure that one of the targets of
the campaign would be Szigetvár. We have to stress this point as the Viennese
court was unable to form an idea from the conflicting reports about the plans
of the Ottoman military command. Maximilian and his entourage expected
the sultan to besiege Vienna, and they planned all their steps accordingly. From
the outset, therefore, their focus was the region near Vienna, and they did not
have any plans to hinder the siege of Szigetvár or that of Gyula, which lay even
further away. The Porte also played a significant role in the situation, as it
steadily misinformed the Habsburg envoys, thereby successfully deceiving the
Habsburg military command. Therefore, Szigetvár and Gyula were left to their
own devices and had no chance of being relieved. Nevertheless, the defenders
of the former were not aware of this fact. Zrínyi shut himself up behind the
castle walls, secure in the belief that the Habsburg troops would send help, as
they had done in 1556 with the successful lifting of the blockade around Sziget.
On 29 April 1566, Süleyman set off on his thirteenth military campaign; so
began the sultan’s last enterprise. An army of almost thirty thousand led by
Pertev Pasha surrounded Gyula on 2 July, while the sultan himself arrived
under Szigetvár on 9 August, although his troops had encircled the fortress and
the town by 5 August. There were constant battles under the walls, for the
defenders would continuously be breaking out and disturbing the attackers as
they prepared for their siege. According to some sources, the sultan’s tent was
first pitched on the banks of the lake under the castle, but as Zrínyi’s cannons
could reach this far, it was speedily transferred to Semlék hill, lying northeast
of Sziget. This would be Süleyman’s last earthly residence. (Map 5)

47 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Karton 21. Konv. 1. 1566. Jan.–März. fols. 62–64.
48 ÖStA HHStA Türkei I. Karton 21. Konv. 1. 1566. Jan.–März. fol. 68.

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392 szabolcs varga

map 5 Military campaigns in 1566

Zrínyi had been aware of the impending attack for months and did
everything in his power to reinforce the fortress. He summarized his experiences
in a lengthy memorandum.49 His opinion was that with six thousand men he
would be capable of repelling the Ottoman manoeuvres, and he rightly
recognized the role of the town in defending the fortress. He knew that as long
as they were able to defend the town, the Turks could not make a direct attack
on the fortress. Although previously he had threatened to resign his post a
number of times,50 he now announced that he would see the defence of the
fortress as his responsibility even if he did not happen to be its commander.
His sense was that the fate of his country and of his family really did rest on
this siege.
On 1 August around 2,300 Hungarian, Croatian and German soldiers and
two thousand civilians gathered on the market of the inner castle where – if
the chronicler Nicolaus Istvánffy is to be believed – Zrínyi gave a speech and
then had them all swear to resist until death. Giving weight to his words was a
scaffold, which had been used that day to make an example of a soldier for

49 Barabás (ed.), Codex epistolaris, Vol. II. Budapest, 1899, Part I, Letters, No. IV.
50 Forgách, Emlékirat, 832.

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miklós zrínyi as captain-general of szigetvár 393

insubordination.51 Zrínyi did not ask for mercy for anyone – and neither did he
give it.
Although we do not have space to discuss the siege in detail,52 we might
draw some conclusions about Zrínyi’s leadership skills from the events. Zrínyi
certainly kept firm control until the last day of the siege, and it was mainly his
persistence that made his soldiers endure to the end. The Ottoman army of
50,000 men was more than twenty times the size of the defending force, and a
year before, in 1565, more than 9,000 Christian soldiers had put up a fight in
Malta against an Ottoman force smaller than that. A comparison to the siege of
Malta vividly demonstrates the size and significance of the 1566 siege of Sziget.
Zrínyi’s main experience was in fighting open battles and organising
campaigns, but he also had the skills to defend a castle. He involved his captains
in strategic planning; they had already served here during the 1556 siege. They
persuaded him to defend the old and new towns lying south of the fortress
because these tactics had ended in success ten years before. Further, at the
request of veteran commanders, Zrínyi gave permission for two hundred of his
cavalrymen to break out and attempt to prevent the swamp being drained.
Despite the casualties, this effort was unsuccessful and further reduced the
defenders’ chances. Zrínyi was well aware of this fact but, in the first two weeks
of the siege, his underlings forced their own agendas on a number of occasions,
making the work of defence harder.53
Following the loss of the towns and the death of his influential captains,
Zrínyi organized the defence on his own. He was the one who repulsed attacks
against the fortress while his soldiers inflicted great casualties on the enemy.
This happened, for instance, on 29 August when the Ottomans wanted to break
down resistance in a single decisive assault. By sunset, 4,000 Ottoman corpses
lay under the walls. The sultan trusted his traditional lucky day in vain, as fate
had something else in store for him.54
The following days passed in relative calm, with the rainy weather giving the
defenders a moment’s breathing space. The besiegers were decimated by
dysentery; perhaps this is when the sultan himself became infected. The

51 Istvánffy Miklós magyarok dolgairól írt históriája Tállyai Pál XVII. századi fordításában. Vol.
II. Ed. by Péter Benits. Budapest, 2003, 412–414.
52 On this, see József Kelenik’s study in this volume.
53 Lajos Négyesi, ‘Gondolatok szigetvári Zrínyi Miklós várkapitányi tevékenységéről’,
Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 122 (2009) 486–505.
54 Lajos Rúzsás, ‘The Siege of Szigetvár of 1566: Its Significance in Hungarian Social Deve­
lopment’, in János M. Bak and Béla K. Király (eds.), From Hunyadi to Rákóczi: War and So-
ciety in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary. (War and Society in Eastern Europe, 3.)
Brooklyn, NY,1982, 251–259.

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394 szabolcs varga

defenders sent one letter after another to Maximilian of Habsburg, asking for
assistance and then waiting impatiently for relief troops to arrive from the
north. Their hopes were in vain, however: The imperial army did not so much
as budge from the vicinity of Győr. It is not easy to give a simple answer to the
question of why Maximilian’s army did not save Szigetvár.55 What is certain is
that the king’s possible hostility to Zrínyi did not play a role; he was thirsty for
military triumphs himself, and he would shed a genuine tear on hearing of
Zrínyi’s death. Yet an enormous burden of responsibility was borne by the
imperial military command for failing to uncover anything in advance of the
objectives of the sultan’s campaign. It is telling that even in September they
were still expecting the sultan to spend the winter in Buda; it was only on 29
October that Maximilian learned of Süleyman’s death.
In the last days of his life the sultan would brilliantly employ the tactic of
deception one last time. Until the very last minute, Maximilian was genuinely
under the impression that the real target of the campaign was Vienna; it was to
this that he tailored his own movements, and it was on the basis of this that he
deliberated everything.56 Had he been sure that the sultan’s plan was always
just the capture of Szigetvár, then perhaps he could have removed the burden
on the defenders with a diversionary military operation. The news of the
sultan’s death would also have altered the strategic plans, but Sokollu Mehmed
Pasha was very clever in keeping it quiet. While it is true that the imperial
commanders were very stubborn in sticking to their original plans, let us not
forget that only in the previous year, during the siege of Malta, the Habsburg
military command dithered for three whole months before sending a rescue
expedition! Perhaps a few weeks later they would have attempted some
diversionary tactic, but in the case of Szigetvár there was not enough time to
wait for this – and this would seal the fate of its defenders.57
On 7 September, half a day after the sultan’s death, Zrínyi broke out of the
castle, at the head of his remaining soldiers, into certain destruction. In recent
decades the view has been aired that the fortress of Szigetvár fell because of
Zrínyi’s mistakes. This has by now been satisfactorily contradicted.58 One thing
is certain, however. At the end, Zrínyi had two choices: to surrender, or to die.
He chose the latter. His last act was further evidence of his unbroken sense of
duty, which cannot be doubted. He shut himself in the castle when he was not

55 On the events of 1566, see Eduard Wertheimer, ‘Zur Geschichte des Türkenkrieges Maxi-
milians II. 1565–1566’, Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte 53 (1875) 43–103.
56 Georg Wagner, ‘Maximilian II, der Wiener Hof und die Belagerung von Sziget’, in Rúzsás
(ed.), Szigetvári Emlékkönyv, 237–269.
57 Szabolcs Varga, ‘A körülmények csapdájában. Szigetvár elestének okai’, in Múlt-kor, 26.
58 Négyesi, ‘Gondolatok’, 498–500.

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miklós zrínyi as captain-general of szigetvár 395

obliged to, and, as a baron, an esteemed member of the imperial aristocracy, he

chose a hero’s death. Even the historian and politician Ferenc Forgách, who so
detested him, paid him a tribute, saying that with his glorious death Zrínyi had
washed the vices of his life off himself.59 His heroism also evoked the enemy’s
admiration. Two months after these events, Sokollu Mustafa Pasha of Buda
wrote of Zrínyi to Maximilian that “I still regret his death, and I can prove this,
because his head is not on a pale; I sent it up to have it cleaned; I also had his
body buried, as it would have been a shame to have the body of such a brave
gentleman eaten by the birds”.60 The cut-off head really was washed in vinegar
and sent to the camp in Győr. From here it was taken by his son-in-law Boldizsár
Batthyány, leading his warriors, to Muraköz, in order that it be laid to final rest
in the family monastery in Szentilona (Šenkovec) near Csáktornya, alongside
his first wife.
The defenders of Sziget sold their lives dearly. The Ottoman army lost almost
20,000 men under its walls. For comparison, in the previous year, some 30,000
Ottoman soldiers, sailors and pirates had been lost in the bay of Malta, while
7,000 of the 9,000 strong defence force had died in the four-month siege.
Under the Hungarian fortress, 20,000 besiegers died over a month, while the
number of defenders was only four tenths of the number of Christians
defending the Mediterranean island. This was the price to pay for the
liquidation of an important border fortress and castle area which for more
than twenty years had obstructed Süleyman from truly owning that which he
had occupied. Sziget fulfilled its historical calling, preserving in the most
difficult decades the Hungarian presence in Ottoman Hungary, all the while
remaining a thorn in the side of the empire. Although the fortress fell in 1566,
a mere few years later and a few kilometres to the west, the next layer of the
Hungarian border defence system would already be standing behind it, rising
up above the conquerors as an obstacle that could be passed and yet still not
beaten. Thanks to the defenders of Szigetvár, the Kingdom of Hungary
continued to get stuck in the jaws of the Ottoman Empire.

59 Forgách, Emlékirat, 860.

60 Barabás (ed.), Codex epistolaris, II. Part I, Letters, No. LXX.

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