AMERICAN JOURNAL

OF ANCIENT HISTORY
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ANCIENT HISTORY

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 THE ROMAN EMPIRE
DURING
T H E S E V E R A N D Y N A S T Y:
C A S E S T U D I E S I N H I S T O RY,
A RT, A R C H I T E C T U R E , E C O N O M Y
A N D L I T E R AT U R E

Edited by Eric C. De Sena

(American Research Center in Sofia
and John Cabot University, Rome)

This volume is dedicated to the tens of millions of brave people

in North Africa and the Near East
(the homelands of Septimius Severus and Julia Domna)
who in 2011 and 2012 have risked and, even, lost their lives
in order to improve the conditions
of their countries and to achieve the unalienable rights of life,
liberty, justice and the pursuit of happiness.
Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA
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Copyright © 2013 by Gorgias Press LLC

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9
ISBN 978-1-59333-838-1 ISSN 0362-8914

Printed in the United States of America

 TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S

Εditor’s Νote ................................................................................... ix

Ιntroduction ..................................................................................... xi

SEVERAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE ...................................1

The Parthian Campaigns of Septimius Severus: Causes, and Roles in

Dynastic Legitimation ...............................................................3
Mark K. Gradoni
“Unitas ex Africa: Was Tertullian the Origo
of Imperial Unification?” ........................................................25
E.T. Walters

URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS
DURING THE SEVERAN PERIOD......................................67

La Gallia Mosellana nell’età dei Severi:

il caso del Vicus di Bliesbruck ................................................69
Jean-Paul Petit
Sara Santoro
Water Works and Monuments in Gaul in the Severan Age:
Some Considerations...............................................................95
Alice Dazzi
More Water for Rome: Nothing New in the Eternal City?
Water-Related Monuments as Part
of the Severan Building Program ..........................................117
Jens Koehler
A Note on the Architectural Decoration
of the Severan Period in Pamphylia and Cilicia ....................151
Müjde Türkmen-Peker

v
vi THE ROMAN EMPIRE DURING THE SEVERAN DYNASTY

L’Attività edilizia a destinazione pubblica fra i Severi

e i Soldatenkaiser: continuità e trasformazioni .....................173
Simone Rambaldi
Il tempio di Serapide sul Quirinale:
note di archeologia e topografia tra Antichità e Medioevo. ..207
Ottavio Bucarelli
Alcune osservazioni sulla Sicilia durante il periodo dei Severi ....227
Giancarlo Germanà
Vestigia architettoniche del periodo di Settimio Severo
in Tunisia ..............................................................................255
Paola Puppo

ASPECTS OF SOCIETY AND ECONOMY

DURING THE SEVERAN PERIOD....................................285

The Origo of the Thracian Praetorians in the Time of Severans ...287

Ivo Topalilov
Un riempimento fognario di età Severiana dalle cosiddette
“Terme di Elagabalo” a Roma ..............................................301
Edoardo Radaelli
La ceramica ad ingobbiatura nera di Treviri –
una merce costosa in Pannonia durante l’epoca Severiana ...341
Eszter Harsányi
Baetican Oil and Septimius Severus .............................................361
Lúcia Afonso
Economic Growth in the Early and Middle Imperial Periods,
Pre-200 AD: an Economic Approach
from a Peripheral Hispanic Province, Lusitania ...................377
José Carlos Quaresma
Economy and Trade of Sicily During Severan Period:
Highlights Between Archaeology and History......................415
Daniele Malfitana – Carmela Franco – Annarita Di Mauro
Thematic Maps By G. Fragalà
 TABLE OF CONTENTS vii

SEVERAN ART AND IDEOLOGY ............................................463

Between Tradition and Innovation –

the Visual Representation of Severan Emperors ...................465
Florian Leitmeir
Ideological Messages and Local Preferences:
the Imagery of the Severan Arch at Lepcis Magna ...............493
Stephan Faust
Elagabalo invictus sacerdos: l’imperatore fanciullo
e la centralizzazione del sacro attraverso
lo specchio delle monete .......................................................515
Andrea Gariboldi
The Arch of Septimius Severus in the Roman Forum:
a Re-Consideration................................................................541
Maria Lloyd
 T H E PA RT H I A N C A M PA I G N S O F
SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS: CAUSES,
AND ROLES IN DYNASTIC LEGIT-
I M AT I O N

Mark K. Gradoni
(Hood College)

“The Parthians alone of mankind have sustained against the Roman

People the role of enemy in a fashion never to be despised, as is suffi-
ciently shewn (sic.), not only by the disaster to Crassus, and the
shameful flight of Antoninus, but by the slaughter of a general with
his army, under the leadership even of Trajan, the stoutest of emper-
ors, and by the retreat, by no means unharassed or without loss, of that
emperor as he retired to celebrate his triumph.”

—M. Cornelius Fronto, Principia Historiae1

When Septimius Severus was acclaimed emperor by the troops of the

Danube legions in 193 CE, he could not have anticipated that his actions
would embroil him in a series of eastern campaigns that would eventually
draw the Roman Empire into a conflict with Parthia, Rome’s enduring
enemy. The purpose and necessity of the Parthian campaigns of Severus

1
Fronto. Correspondence. VII. From the preamble to the fragmentary history
of Lucius Verus’ Parthian War.

3
4 THE ROMAN EMPIRE DURING THE SEVERAN DYNASTY

remains a point of contention among scholars. While some have argued

that there was no reason to renew hostilities with the Parthian state (Isaac
1998, 22–23,31; Keall 1975, 620), others have declared that the impo-
tence of the declining kingdom made a tempting target for the Roman
army (Sheldon 2010, 162). The purpose of this paper is to examine the
Parthian campaigns of Septimius Severus, their context, and how these
campaigns were later appropriated in imperial propaganda. I will argue
that, rather than representing Roman aggression, Severus’s Parthian cam-
paigns were responses to legitimate threats, or perceived as legitimate
threats, to Roman possessions and interests in the Near East. I will also
argue that the Parthian campaigns served a variety of purposes in the le-
gitimization of the reign of Septimius Severus; specifically, the cam-
paigns themselves provided an opportunity to create a sense of loyalty of
the eastern troops, who had recently fought under the aegis of Pescennius
Niger, to Severus; additionally, the invasion of Roman territory by Volo-
gases V, while Severus was in Europe confronting Albinus, necessitated
the appropriate military response, which manifested in the invasion of
Parthian Mesopotamia, and allowed Severus to match the accomplish-
ments of Verus and Trajan.

PARTHIA AND THE NEAR EAST IN 194 CE

The Parthian monarchy in 194 CE was not the same aggressive, expan-
sionist state that had usurped dominion of the Near East from the succes-
sors of Seleukos. By the early-second century, Parthia may have suffered
the loss of its northeastern vassal states, Hyrcania and Bactria. Both king-
doms sent embassies to the Romans during the reign of Hadrian,2 general-
ly interpreted as indicative of their independence. Also by this time the
Parthian monarchy was confronted with the rise of the kingdom of Kush
on its eastern frontier. Oriental sources mention a war between the Parthi-
ans and the expanding Kushan state during the early second century CE
(Colledge 1967, 167). When compounded with the effects of Trajan’s
wars in 114–117 CE, the prestige of the monarchy was diminished in the
view of the client kings that controlled the kingdoms and satrapies of the
Parthians’ empire (fig. 1).

2
Debevoise 1968, 241, 245. Here citing the biography of Hadrian in the SHA.
 PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF THE SEVERAN EMPERORS 5

However, as with the Roman Empire, the strength of the Parthian

monarchy was entirely dependent on the strength of the individual king.
In the person of Vologases IV, ruling from 148–192 CE, the Parthians
had a monarch powerful enough to command the respect of the vassal
rulers and the Parthian nobility. Vologases IV’s attitude differed from
that of most Parthian monarchs of the previous two centuries in one key
respect: Vologases IV pursued a pugnacious policy towards Rome. At the
ascension of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, Vologases initiated a
conflict by invading Armenia (Dio Epitome LXXI.2.i), a client kingdom,
claimed by both Rome and Parthia, with a long history as a source of con-
flict between the two powers. This incursion began the series of events
that brought Lucius Verus and the Roman legions to the east. In the first
of a series of campaigns, Armenia was retaken and a pro-Roman king
placed on its throne (Dio Epitome LXXI.3.i). The legions, under the
command of Avidius Cassius, took Dura-Europos on the Euphrates and
marched southward along the course of the river towards Seleucia-on-the-
Tigris (fig. 2) (Dio Epitome LXXI.2.iii–3.1). After peacefully occupying
the city, an undetermined incident led the Roman troops to sack the city
(Debevoise 1968, 251), before spreading the carnage to the eastern bank
and the royal capital of Ctesiphon.
The damage that resulted from the campaigns of Lucius Verus and
Avidius Cassius is largely speculative. However, if the conquest of Se-
leucia-on-the-Tigris and Ctesiphon resembled the earlier storming of cit-
ies by Roman troops in terms of severity, then we may hypothesize that
damage to the cities and their populations was extensive.3 The loss of life
and the destruction of agricultural and commercial areas in southern
Mesopotamia must have had a sizeable impact on the economy of the
Parthian state. Seleucia-on-the-Tigris was a massive monument to Hel-
lenistic city building, and was almost certainly the most populous city
under Parthian hegemony. Compounding the issues inherent with a Ro-
man invasion, the population of the Parthian state suffered the effects of
an outbreak of an epidemic originating in the Kushan territories to the
east (CHI III.1, 93), a disease remembered in Roman history as the Anto-
nine plague. Again, the carnage left in the wake of this disease amongst
the Parthian kingdom is speculative. Even if we accept Roman reports of

3
See Dio’s account of the Severan sack of Ctesiphon: LXXVI.9.iv
6 THE ROMAN EMPIRE DURING THE SEVERAN DYNASTY

a loss of perhaps a quarter of the urban population in some areas with a

reasonable degree of scrutiny, we may envision a Parthian state facing a
collapse of agricultural production and the death of a significant percent-
age of its population. The devastation of agricultural lands, the loss a sig-
nificant percentage of the tax base in southern Mesopotamia, and the loss
of military age population and the disruption of commerce would have
cost most Parthian monarchs their throne; but Vologases reigned until
192 CE, retaining control over the vassal kingdoms and the nobility, a
testament to his powerful personality and competence as a ruler. Volo-
gases IV’s successor, Vologases V, inherited a shaken kingdom; a king-
dom that would soon become embroiled in a Roman civil war.
Severus was drawn to the eastern provinces of the empire by the civil
war against Pescennius Niger, the governor of Syria who, along with Se-
verus on the Danube, and Clodius Albinus in Britain, was acclaimed em-
peror in the wake of the assassination of Pertinax. Niger had received the
congratulations of Vologases and several of the rulers of the vassal king-
doms along the Euphrates frontier, accompanied by offers of military
support, should a conflict with other imperial claimants ensue. Initially,
the governor politely declined these offers, but Severus’s mobilization of
the Danube legions forced Niger to reconsider (Herodian III.1.ii). Herodi-
an informs us that Vologases promised he would summon troops from the
satraps for a campaign, though it seems certain that his initial offer of
military aid was an attempt to ingratiate himself with a new Roman mon-
arch rather than a willingness to support Niger in the face of opposition.
Several client kings, those of Adiabene, Osrhoene and Hatra, contrarily
did offer their support and Barsemius of Hatra committed a body of arch-
ers to the Syrian governor’s cause (Herodian III.1.iii).
Severus’s forces engaged Niger’s troops at Cyzicus, proceeded to be-
siege to Byzantium, crossed the Hellespont (Dio Epitome LXXV.6.iv;
Herodian III.2.i–ii; SHA Severus IX.1). A second battle was fought at
Nicomedia (Herodian III.2.ix), and the ensuing Severan victory forced
Niger’s forces to withdraw back to the passes of the Taurus range and the
river Issus (Dio Epitome LXXV.7.i–ii; Herodian III.4.i–ii). In early au-
tumn of 194 CE, the two armies faced each other. Dio and Herodian de-
scribe a battle that hinged on a sudden act of divine intervention, a rain
miracle constituted by the genesis of a sudden storm that blew rain and
dust into the eyes of Niger’s frontlines (Dio Epitome LXXV.7. vi; Hero-
dian III.3.vii). At this time, Valerius Valerianus, Severus’ magister equi-
tem, allegedly uncertain of whether to defect to Niger’s side, saw the lines
 PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF THE SEVERAN EMPERORS 7

falter and succeeded in flanking Niger’s force4 and turning the battle into
a disorderly route. Niger attempted to flee to the Parthian court, but was
overtaken and executed (Dio Epitome LXXV. 8.iii; Herodian III.4.vi).

SEVERUS IN THE EAST: THE FIRST PARTHIAN CAMPAIGN

In Mesopotamia, the forces of the vassal states of Adiabene, Osrhoene

and Hatra turned against their former allies, massacring Roman garrisons
and ultimately besieging Nisibis (Dio Epitome LXXV.1.ii). Representa-
tives of the Mesopotamian states informed Severus that they were attack-
ing soldiers loyal to Niger on his behalf (Dio Epitome LXXV.1.ii–iii).
However, much of this pretense was revealed by their refusal to return
cities taken in their revolt against Niger and the demand that all Roman
garrisons be removed from Mesopotamia (Dio Epitome LXXV. 1.iii).
A more likely scenario, probably suspected by Severus, was the desire to
reclaim territories lost thirty years earlier during the last period of Roman
military activity in the area. Adiabene, for instance, had particularly fo-
cused on the re-conquest of Nisibis, a city that the Parthian king had once
awarded to the king of Adiabene for his loyal service (Neusner 1964, 60;
Millar 1993, 493). The refusal to return Roman territory necessitated the
declaration of war,5 and Severus embarked upon a punitive campaign to
chastise the rebellious Mesopotamians (fig. 3).
The campaign in Mesopotamia fulfilled a variety of functions. In the
Roman imperial psychology a punitive campaign was the only plausible
response to a rebellion of subject peoples; perhaps more significantly, the

4
Spiedel (1985, 321–322) regards this flanking maneuver correctly as the de-
termining factor in the battle. Dio’s account of the rain miracle akin to that de-
picted on the column of Marcus Aurelius at Rome is likely one of many attempts
by Severus and Dio to stress the association of the new dynast with the Antonine
dynasty and period of the “Five Good Emperors.”
5
Isaac remarks that “it is to be noted that all available sources deny that there
was any practical need for Severus’ Persian campaign” (Issac 1998, 22–23).
Whether Isaac is referring to the campaign against the Mesopotamian vassals or
the Parthian campaign proper is uncertain, but if Isaac judges to rebellion of sub-
ject peoples or the invasion of an external power as insufficient cause for a mili-
tary campaign then he seems to misunderstand the nature of Roman military his-
tory during the empire entirely.
8 THE ROMAN EMPIRE DURING THE SEVERAN DYNASTY

prospect of campaign allowed Severus to solicit the loyalty of the eastern

legions and auxiliaries that had supported Niger. In the view of Severus
and his allied commanders a sense of uncertainty regarding the loyalty of
the ten legions stationed in the eastern half to the empire must have per-
vaded discussions about how to proceed in the settlement of the east after
Niger’s defeat. Rankov postulates that “Severus had to safeguard his po-
sition and confirm the loyalty of the eastern armies,” and that next logical
step “was to lead an imperial campaign of conquest across the Euphrates
where, it was claimed, the local kingdoms had supported Niger” (Rankov
1996, 169). A campaign allowed for the emperor to forge a symbolic
connection with the soldiers through shared duress and success (Rankov
1996, 171). While it seems unlikely, as Rankov implies, that there was
any need to fabricate a cassus belli,6 Severus was fortunate that such a
ready opportunity for such a campaign presented itself. While any direct
contest with Parthia, no matter the context, was an uncertain matter, a
campaign against the small western vassal states offered a degree of al-
most certain success given the advantages of the Roman force in terms of
man power and organization.
In the choice of campaigns to establish the loyalty of a formerly rebel-
lious provincial army to a new commander the prospect of certain success
was vital. “From a political point of view, such a campaign would have to
end with an imperial triumph and a solid achievement plain for all to see,

6
The passage to which Rankov is referring, also cited by Millar and Isaac, is
Herodian III.4.v: “As soon as Severus had settled the East to his satisfaction and
advantage, he proposed to go straight on to attack the king of Hatra and invade
Parthia, since he alleged that both were guilty of alliance with Niger” (My em-
phasis). However, Herodian confuses the chronology of the eastern campaigns,
condensing the events into a single campaign originally targeted solely at Parthia;
this confusion may explain his skepticism for the legitimacy of the invasion of
Parthia. Further contributing the confusing nature of Herodian’s account is his
later remark that “using the friendship that Barsemius, king of Hatra, had shown
for Niger as an excuse, [Severus] made an expedition to the East” (III.8.i–ii).
Also of interest is the generally disreputable account of the SHA that “it was
commonly rumoured, to be sure, that in planning a war on the Parthians, Sep-
timius Severus was influenced rather by a desire for glory than by any real neces-
sity (Severus XV.1). This seems nothing more than a reconstitution or corruption
of the epitome of Dio’s conclusion to book LXXV.
 PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF THE SEVERAN EMPERORS 9

such as the acquisition of new territory” (Rankov 1996, 171). A failure in

such a campaign would undermine any confidence of the soldiers and
commanders in the military ability of their new emperor and, as became
apparent throughout the third century, seriously imperil the life of the
embattled emperor. Indeed, from the reign of Severus until the fifth cen-
tury emperors were “virtually obliged to meet the troops and take person-
al charge of campaigns; [the emperor’s] capacity to rule was dangerously
associated with his military ability” (Campbell 1984, 413). While Severus
could not have foreseen the consequences of any potential precedents
established by his invasion of Mesopotamia, the emperor must have un-
derstood the importance of a successful campaign for the stability of the
empire and his own prospects.
Severus’ campaign to restore the stability of Roman possessions in
Mesopotamia began in the spring of 195 CE. The immediate objectives
were to reestablish Roman control of cities taken by the Mesopotamians
and to ravage the lands of vassals who had lent aid to Niger and then ex-
ploited the former’s timely reversal of fortune to find excuse to attack the
troops and lands of the empire. Abgarus IX of Edessa, ruler of Osrhoene,
surrendered upon the advance of the legions, offering his sons as hostag-
es; he took the name Severus, and contributed a force of archers to Seve-
rus’ expeditionary force (Herodian III.9.ii). Severus proceeded to Nisibis,
breaking the siege and establishing the city as his base for subsequent
operations in the region (Dio Epitome LXXV.2.iii). The army was divid-
ed into three columns; these undertook the reduction of Mesopotamia
before crossing the Tigris and capturing Adiabene with its capital at Ar-
bela.7
The rebellion of Clodius Albinus in 196 CE required that Severus and
a significant detachment of the legions return to the Europe to extinguish
the possibility of any further, significant civil strife. The actions of Albi-
nus cannot have surprised Severus since his coins had begun to identify
his son, now named Marcus Antoninus, in one of several attempts to
forge a convincing connection to the Antonine dynasty, as his Caesar,

7
It seems likely that it was at this time that the pro-Roman monarch Narses
was placed on the thrown of Adiabene, and that knowledge of the location of the
Parthian royal tombs at Arbela, a fact significant in Caracalla’s later Parthian
campaign, passed into Roman knowledge.
10 THE ROMAN EMPIRE DURING THE SEVERAN DYNASTY

depriving Albinus of any semblance of authority in the Severan govern-

ment of the empire (Birley 1988, 117).

VOLOGASES’S EXPEDITION,
AND SEVERUS’S SECOND PARTHIAN CAMPAIGN

Vologases V imitated the example of his royal predecessor by seizing the

opportunity to exploit a potential moment of domestic strife by mobiliz-
ing the Parthian army and invading Roman Mesopotamia. The extent of
Vologases’ counter-operations is unclear; the SHA states that Vologases’
crossed the Euphrates into Syria, while Herodian discusses the Parthian
re-conquest of Armenia. Adiabene was certainly retaken, and its mon-
arch, the pro-Roman Narses, drowned in the Greater Zab (Debevoise
1968, 259). Nisibis was besieged and was in serious danger of falling to
the Parthians, saved only by the heroics of the Roman commander, Lae-
tus (Dio Epitome LXXVI.9.i–ii).
Goldsworthy has dismissed the effectiveness of the Parthian army cit-
ing a misunderstanding of the tactics and significance of the Parthian vic-
tory over Crassus in 53 BCE (Goldsworthy 1996, 67). While the defeat at
Carrhae and its consequences are frequently exaggerated in severity and
significance, the martial abilities of a Parthian force under the command
of a competent military leader cannot be dismissed. Similarly, the as-
sumption that the Parthian Empire of the late second century was a de-
crepit and impotent shadow of its former self is not entirely true. The suc-
cess of the Parthian army in 196 CE is indicative of a military potency
that a particularly powerful Parthian monarch could wield. While Roman
invasions of Parthian territory fared better in the second century than they
had previously, this success is reflective of an alteration of Roman strate-
gy rather than the sudden collapse of Parthian military ability. The cam-
paigns of Trajan, Avidius Cassius, and later Severus, utilized a route that
took the legions along the course of the Euphrates, avoiding the open
country of central Mesopotamia that favored the Parthian cavalry. By
following the Euphrates to the densely populated territory of southern
Mesopotamia, the Romans were able to engage in the method of urban
siege warfare in which they excelled. This strategy negated the strength
of the Parthian army: the specialized cavalry core of horse archers and
heavily-armored cataphracts. In an urban setting, the confined spaces fa-
vored the Roman infantry, and the legions always enjoyed an advantage
over a dismounted cavalry force or a hastily assembled militia of irregular
 PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF THE SEVERAN EMPERORS 11

troops. This is not to minimize the importance of the adaptations of the

Roman legions and auxilia to wage war in the theater of the Near East
more effectively; certainly, the adoption of auxiliary units from eastern
peoples, such as horse archers and armored cavalry, were invaluable to
the success and evolution of the Roman army. However, it is an overreac-
tion to dismiss the abilities of the Parthian army simply because Roman
strategy evolved to negate the strengths of the Parthians while exploiting
their weaknesses. Such a development is the successful application of
military science, rather than an indictment of the abilities of a foe.
When it seemed that the Parthian monarchy had struck a decisive
blow that would force the Roman forces back to the western bank of the
Euphrates, the rebellion of vassal kings of Persis and Media necessitated
the abandonment of significant operations in Mesopotamia. Vologases
mustered troops from his remaining vassals and confronted the rebels in
Khorasan (Debevoise 1968, 258). Vologases’ forces were initially sur-
rounded and forced to flee before regaining their composure and turning
upon the disorderly pursuit of their opponents. Vologases, returning to-
ward Mesopotamia encountered a second rebel force, which was defeated
only after two days of hard fighting. The exact chronology of this rebel-
lion and subsequent campaign is unclear, and completely absent from
Roman sources. However, it is reasonable to conclude that by the time the
threat of rebellion was removed, Severus had returned to Syria and was
prepared to embark upon an expedition much greater in scope than the
punitive campaign against the Mesopotamian vassal states.
In 197 CE Severus began his planned invasion of the Parthian empire
with the rapid subjugation of Armenia. While the Armenian king, an Ar-
sacid prince also named Vologases, had neither offered Niger aid, nor
participated in the revolt of the Osrhoeni, Adiabeni and Hatrenes, Arme-
nia constituted a power allied to Parthia, through which any counter at-
tack against Syria and Asia Minor could pass. The Armenian Vologases
sued for peace, and Armenia was removed as a factor from the military
equation. While military control of Armenia was important, and the Ro-
mans seem to have attached undue significance to the importance of that
kingdom, Severus may have had ulterior motives for subjugating Arme-
nia first. Trajan had initiated his Parthian campaign with the conquest of
Armenia, and if Severus was trying to associate himself with that emper-
12 THE ROMAN EMPIRE DURING THE SEVERAN DYNASTY

or, whose great-great grandson he claimed to be (Birley 1988, 117), it is

sensible that Severus would seek to mimic the progressions of Trajan’s
famous war.8
With Armenia securely within the sphere of Roman control, Severus
advanced again to the relief of Nisibis. The Parthian forces maintaining
the siege, likely a minimal force sufficient only for executing the siege,
fled before the Roman emperor (Dio Epitome LXXVI.9.iii). Severus
again divided his forces into three parts; Severus lead the main force
along the Euphrates to attack the dual metropolis of Seleucia-on-the-
Tigris and Ctesiphon, while the second force would again ravage eastern
Mesopotamia, with the third re-crossing the Tigris into Adiabene. Baby-
lon and Seleucia-on-the-Tigris were taken without resistance (Dio Epito-
me LXXVI.9.iii–iv), and Severus reached the walls of Ctesiphon by late
198 CE. Ancient sources9 remark that the sudden appearance of the Ro-
man army outside his capital surprised Vologases; additionally, modern
commentators have citied this episode, and the subsequent failure to en-
gage the Roman army, as indicative of the lack of competence on the part
of the Parthian monarch (Rawlinson 1903, 345; Sheldon 2010, 170). Yet,
again because we do not know the chronology of the revolt of the Per-
sians and Medes, it is possible that Vologases had only recently returned
to Ctesiphon. The rapid advance of Severus and the other Roman generals

8
Edwell notes that “in the centuries that followed [Trajan’s Parthian war],
numerous Roman invasions of the Parthian/Persian empires followed the same
routes and were often undertaken in conscious emulation of Trajan” (2008, 22).
Bivar concurs, describing the route of Trajan followed by Severus as “the now
traditional march down the Euphrates to Seleucia and Babylon” (CHI III.1 94).
9
Herodian III.9.ix. It is important to note that Herodian’s confused chronolo-
gy places the attack on Ctesiphon after the failed siege of Hatra (Herodian con-
denses both sieges into a single event). Herodian states that the Roman army
sought to retreat via the Tigris, but were so unfamiliar with that river that their
boats were washed downstream to the Parthian capital, at which point Severus
fortuitously decided to attack the city. Further indications of Herodian’s general
unreliability for this episode include his assertion that Vologases had little con-
cern for Severus’ attack on Hatra (III.9.ix) and his identification of the Parthian
monarch as Artabanus (III.9.x) At this time Artabanus (V), a son of the reigning
Vologases V, had likely not yet even been granted the position of vassal king of
Media, let alone a share in the absolute rule of the Parthian state.
 PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF THE SEVERAN EMPERORS 13

against a number of small Parthian detachments may have compromised

any chain of military intelligence and tactical communication available to
Vologases. In such a scenario, the appearance of a Roman army on the
western bank of the Tigris may have constituted a legitimate, and sober-
ing, surprise to the Parthian king.
Vologases next move reflected his panic: he elected to meet the Ro-
man army in the field before the walls of Ctesiphon. Engaging the legions
in confined space was never a tactically sound idea, and the Parthian
forces were, unsurprisingly, defeated and driven back. The city was in-
vested with siege works and the walls were soon breached (Dio Epitome
LXXVI.9.iv). Vologases, in a scene commemorated on the Severan tri-
umphal arch in the Roman forum, escaped the city with a few retainers as
his capital fell (Dio Epitome LXXVI.9.iv). Ctesiphon was sacked, the
male population exterminated, and ancient sources attest to the 100,000
persons being sold into slavery. On the centenary of Trajan’s accession to
the throne, a date of significance that surely figured into the speed with
which the city was taken, Severus accepted the title of Parthicus Maximus
(Sheldon 2010, 169), again emulating Trajan and the Antonines.
The timing of Severus’ acceptance of the title of Parthicus Maximus, a
title representing in many ways the apex of Roman military ability, and
closely associated with the “Five Good Emperors,” was certainly inten-
tional. While it is implausible, and entirely contrary to the historical con-
text, to assert that Severus undertook the Parthian campaign solely to le-
gitimate his rule, Severus must have viewed the events in the east, partic-
ularly Vologases counter-offensive, as a perfect opportunity to associate
himself with the military achievements of Trajan and Lucius Verus (and
therefore Marcus Aurelius, his “father” by previous claim, and by means
of fraternal association with Commodus) (Birley 1988, 117–18). With
these successes equaled, Severus logically turned his attentions north-
ward, along the Tigris, to the fortress city of Hatra. Trajan had besieged
the city but failed to take it after his own conquest of the Parthian capital.
Therefore, if Severus could conquer Hatra, thereby succeeding where
even Trajan had fallen short, he could surpass the achievement of the Op-
timus Princeps.
14 THE ROMAN EMPIRE DURING THE SEVERAN DYNASTY

THE SIEGES OF HATRA:

STRATEGIC, AND IDEOLOGICAL, SHORTCOMINGS

Strategically, Hatra represented the last obstacle to the creation of a line

of fortified cities that would bisect Roman-held Mesopotamia. Rome al-
ready controlled Dura Europos on the Euphrates, Nisibis on the Mygdo-
nius, and Singara near the Tigris; Hatra would complete the chain and
allow a line of communication from the Euphrates to the Tigris, as well
as providing the Romans with a base tantalizingly close to the Parthian
capital.
The first attempt to take Hatra was not remarkably different from the
failed attempt of Trajan. The assembled military engines of the legions
were destroyed by Hatrene archers and the Romans failed to make pro-
gress (Dio Epitome LXXVI.10.i). This lack of success led to tension
among the soldiers and the officer corps. Two officers were executed
(Dio Epitome LXXVI.10.ii) and the siege engines were repaired, but nei-
ther seems to have remedied the low ebb in the army’s morale: by early
spring of 198 CE Severus and the legions retired to Nisibis.
A second siege was initiated in early 199 CE. The Roman forces were
provisioned for a much longer action, and Dio informs us that special
siege engines were designed and built by a fellow Bithynian, Priscus,
specifically for the conquest of Hatra (Dio Epitome LXXVI.11.i–ii).
However, the Hatrenes also seem to have made significant preparations,
and once more the assaults of the Roman army broke upon the walls of
the fortress-city. The Hatrene cavalry was deployed to great effect, setting
fire to the Roman siege engines and harassing foraging parties (Dio Epit-
ome LXXVI.11.ii). The defenders upon the walls used naphtha, a burn-
ing, bituminous tar, to cause disorder among the Roman besiegers. The
Hatrenes invested further misery and torment upon the Roman troops by
hurling jars filled with stinging insects down upon them (Herodian
III.9.v).
The Romans, at length, were successful in breaching the walls. Rather
than pressing into the breach, Severus ordered the troops to withdrawal,
hoping an act of benevolence might encourage the defenders to capitulate
(Dio Epitome LXXVI.12.i–ii). The Hatrenes had no intention of peaceful-
ly surrendering and rebuilt the section of destroyed wall during the night
(Dio Epitome. LXXVI.12.iii). When a frustrated Severus ordered a re-
newed assault, the European troops mutinied, refusing to advance (Dio
Epitome LXXVI.12.iii). Their Syrian counterparts fared poorly, and were
 PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF THE SEVERAN EMPERORS 15

driven back with heavy losses. Again, military executions were used to
restore order: this time Laetus, the hero of Nisibis, was deprived of his
life (Dio Epitome LXXVI.10.iii). At the end of only twenty days the Ro-
mans withdrew to Nisibis for the final time (Dio Epitome LXXVI.13.i).
The failure to take Hatra on two occasions certainly strained the army
and may have cost Severus and his commanders a significant amount of
the good will they had engendered among the eastern legions. It is im-
portant to note that, despite their heavy losses, the Syrian troops did not
join in the mutiny of European soldiery. If nothing else, this seems
demonstrative of the loyalty of the eastern forces to the emperor. Though
the Parthian campaign of Severus ended with a setback, rather than a tri-
umphal conquest of a prize that had eluded even Trajan, we need not
view them as a failure.

CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARSHIP
ON SEVERUS’S PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS

In the composition of this paper, two sources, dealing with the Roman
aspect of Severus’s Parthian campaigns, were particularly significant. The
first, Isaac’s Limits of Empire, represents one of the most significant
pieces of scholarship on the Roman army in the eastern provinces, and a
theoretical construction of Rome’s relationship with Parthia, and later
Sasanid Persia, gaining credence among scholars. The second work,
Sheldon’s Rome’s Wars in Parthia, represents the most recent monograph
exploring the military aspects of the relationship between Rome and Par-
thia.
Since the publication of Isaac’s extensive work on the role of the Ro-
man army in the Near East, his theory of systematic, necessary Roman
aggression in the region has become quite popular among historians of
the eastern half of the Roman Empire. The crux of Isaac’s argument that
the campaigns of Septimius Severus in the east were unnecessary derives,
particularly, from as single passage in Cassius Dio (Dio Epitome
LXXV.3,i–iii).10 This quote is often taken out of context, in that the quote

10
“[Severus] used to declare that he had added a vast territory to the empire
and had made it a bulwark of Syria. On the contrary, it is shown by the facts
themselves that this conquest has been a source of constant wars and great ex-
16 THE ROMAN EMPIRE DURING THE SEVERAN DYNASTY

itself is the effect of hindsight, written in the late 210s CE (Millar 1964,
119; Millar 1993, 124). Similarly, it is impossible to pass over Isaac’s
assertion that neither Severus, nor Dio, claimed the Parthian campaigns as
a war of defense (Isaac 1990, 26), without returning to Dio’s declaration
that the refusal of the Mesopotamians to return Roman possessions was
the cause of the first campaign (Dio Epitome LXXV.1. ii–iii). Additional-
ly, Isaac’s preference for the accounts of Herodian and the SHA is trou-
bling, especially as Shayegan has demonstrated the superior accuracy of
Dio’s account of Severus’s wars in Parthia (Shayegan 2011, 30–38). I
believe that I have successfully demonstrated that Roman expansionism
was not responsible from either of the Parthian campaigns; rather, the
classical sources bear out that the campaigns were responses to military
activities by the Parthian state and peoples within its sphere of influence.
Sheldon’s work is particularly notable for its conclusion that, by the
conclusion of the Antonine campaigns in the east, Parthia had “lost any
ability to be an aggressive power” (Sheldon 2010, 162.) In order to take
advantage of internal dissension in the Roman Empire, Sheldon argues
that Vologases used client states in Mesopotamia to take advantage of the
situation (Sheldon 164, 2010).11 As with Debevoise, Sheldon characteriz-
es the eastern campaigns of Septimius Severus as a personal and political
failure. Debevoise concludes that “the Parthian campaign of Severus can
scarcely have given satisfaction from either the political or the personal
point of view” (Debevoise 1968, 262); Sheldon echoed this sentiment,
declaring that “this Parthian campaign cannot be considered a success for
the Romans from a military or political point of view, and not even a per-
sonal triumph for Severus” (Sheldon 2009, 171). Both authors, it seems,

pense to us. For it yields very little and uses up vast sums; and now that we have
reached out to peoples who are neighbours of the Medes and Parthians rather
than of ourselves, we are always, one might say, fighting the battles of those peo-
ples” (Loeb translation). Kennedy (1996, 73), and Millar (1993, 510) also present
further argues that contradict the arguments Isaac derives from this passage.
11
“Using the Hatrians (sic.) as proxies merely gave [Vologases] plausible de-
niability if the struggle did not turn out the way he expected.” While such an in-
terpretation fits in well with our modern concept of the manipulation of satellite
states, shaped by the Cold War, it cannot be proved from the extant evidence.
 PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF THE SEVERAN EMPERORS 17

are mistaken in their understanding of Severus’s goals and intentions.12

As demonstrated above, the conquest of Parthia, the destruction of its
monarchy, and incorporation of its territory into the Roman Empire, was
not the goal of Severus. Rather, Severus seems to have held more feasible
designs.
Parthia occupied a unique position in Roman imperial psyche. The
Roman sources conceive Parthia as a rival to Rome, but the place of Par-
thia in the Roman conscious is less certain. Sheldon believes that Roman
literature portrayed Parthia as an equal and rival power (Sheldon 2009,
218), and Isaac references Mommsen’s conclusion that “the coexistence
of two equal major powers was incompatible with the Roman character”
(Isaac 1998, 28). But is it possible to simplify the cause of the conflict
between Rome and Parthia to something such as “a continuous struggle
for control of the left bank of the Euphrates?” (Isaac 1998, 28). Such an
assertion is neither accurate nor satisfying.
The encounter at Carrhae had a profound effect upon the Roman in-
terpretation of the threat constituted by the Parthians. Such an effect has
precedent in Roman history: the successes of Hannibal in the Second Pu-
nic war led Cato the elder to offer the opinion that Carthage must be de-
stroyed throughout the entirety of his political career. Similarly, the de-
feats suffered during the invasions of the Cimbri and Teutones in the last
decade of the second century BCE engendered a lasting concern for the
protection of the Roman state from the Germanic peoples on its northern
frontiers, a concern intensified after the loss of the three legions at
Kalkriese. In such a manner the destruction of Crassus’s force at Carrhae,
the proceeding Parthian incursions into Syria and Asia Minor, and the
unsuccessful campaign by Anthony, engendered a similar fear. Although,
in the eyes of modern commentators, history has proven that fear irration-
al, the Romans lacked the benefit of viewing the entire history of Roma-
no-Parthian relations through the lens of the modern historian. Isaac
acknowledges that the popular memory of Parthian incursions into Ro-

12
Birley (1988, 129–130), it seems, is mistaken as well in his assertion that
“dissension in the Parthian empire gave an ideal opportunity to neutralise (sic.)
Rome’s major enemy in the east once and for all.” There is no evidence to sus-
pect that Severus’s second campaign (or first) was conceived of as an opportunity
to destroy the Parthian state.
18 THE ROMAN EMPIRE DURING THE SEVERAN DYNASTY

man territory “may well have had a long-term effect on Roman attitudes
towards Parthia” (Isaac 1998, 31). But the termination of Parthia as a ri-
val does not appear as an option that warranted significant Roman con-
sideration.
The destruction of the Parthian state was not a viable strategy for Ro-
man dominance in the East. The Romans may not have known Parthia’s
exact size,13 but even so none of the invasions in the second century CE
were designed for the destruction of the Parthian Empire.14 Such an un-
dertaking was immense in scope and associated in history and mythology
only with the person of Alexander. While Millar is quick to note that “the
image of Alexander was not an unreal or insignificant element in Roman
thinking about military glory in the East” (Millar 1993, 112), few emper-
ors, other than Caracalla,15 could seriously have considered an attempt to
emulate the Macedonian hero. Ultimately, it seems unlikely that the Ro-
mans conceived of any permanent eastward expansion beyond the eastern
bank of the Tigris.16

13
See Millar, 1982, 15–20, specifically 18–19. Millar discusses the lack of
military maps, accounts, and other data in the Roman world which prevented the
development of a reliable, specific understanding of the geography, and spatial
relationships, of areas outside of the Empire, or immediate border regions.
14
Birley believes that “dissension in the Parthian empire gave an ideal oppor-
tunity to neutralize Rome’s major enemy in the east once and for all” (1988, 129–
130). However, if we accept Dio’s conclusion for the rapid evacuation of Ctesi-
phon following the city’s fall, namely a lack of adequate provisions and intelli-
gence, we must also accept that Severus had not made plans for anything beyond
a similar campaign to that mounted by Trajan and Verus.
15
Caracalla’s Alexandrian pretensions are known to us only from generally
hostile sources.
16
With regards to Severus’ campaign, Dio’s anecdote (LXXVI.9.iv–v) about
the lack of preparation for a significant occupation of Ctesiphon is enlightening.
If Severus was unable to remain at Ctesiphon “owing partly to a lack of acquaint-
ance with the country and partly a dearth of provisions,” then assumptions about
Roman geographical knowledge of Mesopotamia eastward into the Zagros range
must be abandoned. This particular passage in Dio is the most damning refutation
of Wheeler’s assertion (1993, 237) that the charge of geographic ignorance of the
Near East lacks credibility. At present, there is no extant evidence that the Ro-
mans employed older maps of the Near East to the planning and execution of
their military campaigns.
 PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF THE SEVERAN EMPERORS 19

EPILOGUE: THE EFFECT OF SEVERUS’S CAMPAIGNS

ON THE FALL OF THE ARSACIDS

Given the present state of our evidence for the final decades of Arsacid
rule,17 it is impossible to fully understand the significance of the two
eastern campaigns of Septimius Severus regarding the collapse of the
Parthian state. While further blows to Arsacid prestige certainly caused
the rebellion during the reign of Vologases V, the discontent of the vassal
kings, particularly those Persis, had much more diverse origins. For the
Persian house of Sasan and their subjects, the disdain for Arsacid rule had
cultural and religious underpinnings. The effect of the widespread discon-
tent with the nature of Parthian hegemony, as exemplified by the defec-
tions and rebellions of subject peoples, hamstrung the repeatedly during
the final century of the Arsacid dynasty acerbating a problem that lay at
the core of Parthia’s confederated, “feudal” structure. The Parthian kings
no longer possessed the resources to execute the administration of the
empire, spawning a cycle of inevitable and intensifying weakness in the
years after Severus’ campaigns. Although Vologases V and his son Arta-
banus V were able to win victories over Roman armies, their political
positions were no longer secure enough to follow up military gains and
translate them into any lasting political stability.

REFERENCES

Birely A. R., Septimius Severus: The African Emperor (1988).

Bivar A.D.H., “The Political History of Iran under the Arsacids”, in
E. Yarshater (ed.), The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 3, Pt. 1 The
Seleucid, Parthian and Sassanian Periods (1983), 21–99.
Campbell J.B., The Emperor and the Roman Army: 31 BC–AD235
(1984).
Colledge M.A.R., The Parthians (1967).
Debevoise N.C., A Political History of Parthia (1968).

17
Widengren’s chapter in Cambridge History of Iran on the sources of Par-
thian, and Sassanian, history remains the most thorough, and useful, survey of the
extant ancient sources.
20 THE ROMAN EMPIRE DURING THE SEVERAN DYNASTY

Edwell P. M., Between Rome and Persia: The middle Euphrates, Meso-
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History of Iran. Vol. 3. Pt.1 The Seleucid, Parthian and Sassanian Pe-
riods (1983), 481–504.
Isaac B., The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East (1990).
Isaac B., The Near East Under Roman Rule: Selected Papers (1998).
Keal E.J., Parthian Nippur and Vologases’ Southern Strategy: A Hypo-
thesis, JAOS 95.4 (1975), 620–632.
Kennedy D.L., “Parthia and Rome: Eastern Perspectives”, in D. Kennedy
(ed.), The Roman Army in the East, JRA Suppl. 18 (1986), 68–90.
Millar F., A Study of Cassius Dio (1964).
Millar F., Emperors, Frontiers and Foreign Relations, 31 B.C. to A.D.
378, Britannia 13 (1983), 1–23.
Millar F., The Roman Near East: 31BC–AD337 (1993).
Neusner J., The Conversion of Adiabene to Judaism: A New Perspective,
JBL 83.1 (1964), 60–66.
Rankov B., “A ‘Secret of Empire’ (imperii arcanum): an unacknowledged
factor in Roman imperial expansion”, in W.S. Hanson (ed.), The Army
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Scotland, JRA Suppl. 74 (2009), 163–172.
Rawlinson G., Parthia (1903).
Shayegan M.R., Arsacids and Sasanians: Political Ideology in Post-
Hellenistic and Late Antique Persia (2011).
Sheldon R.M., Rome’s Wars in Parthia: Blood in the Sand (2010).
Speidel M.P., Valerius Valerianus in Charge of Septimius Severus’ Mes-
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 PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF THE SEVERAN EMPERORS 21

FIGURES

Figure 1. Extent of Parthian Empire in 44 BCE and 138 CE.18

18
Adapted from Farrokh 2004, 155.
22 THE ROMAN EMPIRE DURING THE SEVERAN DYNASTY

Figure 2. Urban centers of the Parthian Empire.19

19
Adapted from CHI, 25
 PARTHIAN CAMPAIGNS OF THE SEVERAN EMPERORS 23

Figure 3. The Fertile Crescent.20

20
Adapted from Kennedy 1996, 71.