Power and Interdependence Second Edition Robert O. Keohane Harvard University Joseph S. Nye Harvatd University HarperCollinsPublishersCGECESESCHOGSEEHDESEHEECEEOEE Contents PART I Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 UNDERSTANDING INTERDEPENDENCE, Interdepondence in World Politics 3 ‘The New Whetorle of interdependence 6 Interdependence asa lytic Concept Power and Interdependence 11 tational Reglne Change 19 and Complex Interdependence 23 sracterstcs of Complex Interdepenslonce 24 Multiple channels. Absence of hierarchy among, Issues. Minor role of military force. ‘The Political Processes of Complex Interdependence 29 Linkage strategies. Agenda setting. Transnational and transgovernmental relations, Role of {ternational organtantions. nal Regime Change 38, tation 38 sonomte Process Explant 30h Leon cero | Overall Power Structure Explanation 42 Chapter 6 The Polities of Rule-Making in Oceans Eroding hegemony. Limitations of an overall and Money 129 structure explanation Beonomic Processes and Regime Change 129 Issue Structure 49 Overall Structure and Regime Ch 132 Limitations of structural explanations rasan ofthe oceans regi. Laternationl An tnterationsl Organization Model 54 monetary regimes. Combining Explanations 58 lose Structure and Regine Change 137 Tntomational monotary lsue area. Oceans polities. PART I REGIME CHANGE IN OCEANS AND MONEY ernational Organization and Regime Change 140 ‘Oceans polites. The International monetary area Chapter ‘The Politics of Oceans and Money: y Historical Overview 63 153 ‘The International Monetary Issuo Aron 05 \ Conclusion 158 ‘The Intornationa gokl standard before 1914. International monotary regis, 1920-76, PART IIL REGIMES AND TWO BILATERAL / “The Ooeans Issue Area 80 RELATIONSHIPS i ing the nse area. The classical ree sas | “ regime. Regime periods, 1920-75. The changing Chapter 7 United States Relations with Aw, agenda of oceans polities Canada and Australia 105 \ Covelasion 98 “Chapter 5 Complex Interdependence in Ocenns and Money 89 » . ‘The Conaitions of Complex Interdepes Issues and Outcomes: ited States 178 1d Outcomes: ited States 108 fl * Role of force, Absonce of hierarchy among issucs. ‘Muliple channcls of contact. Money, wens, and | complex interdependence, | ‘The Political Process in Money and Oceans 112 Coals of actors. Instruments of state policy. ‘Agenda formation. Linkage of isues. Roles of Snternational organizations, raving the Polities of Agenda Formation 198 Accounting for Dilferences in Outcomes 202 Conclusion 120 Regine Change: Alternative Explanations 200 (SC OG ECECECEOCEOSEHOEHCEEEEECEOESECCESSeecescou: @Gee PART iV THE UNITED STATES AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE Chapter 8 Coping with Interdependence 221 Explinatoty Models and Conditions ‘of Werld Politics 292 Power in Coniplex Interdepend 2H ‘Trevids Toward Complex Interdependence 226 Leadérship in Complix tnterdejiilence 229 ‘Multiple Leadership ahd Policy Coordination 232, Building the Legitimacy of International | Regimes 234 Intertational and Domestic Organtzation 230 Conclusion — 242 PART V SECOND THOUGHTS ON THEORY - AND POLICY as 1, Princlpal Thenies of Poivr ad Inlerdependence 145 2, ‘the Research Program of Poiver and Interdependence: A Crtque 251 Inietdependence and bargelning. Complex Anterdependence, International regime change. 3. Limitailane of Structural Theory: Syetamnte Peliteal Processes 260 4. Petceptions and Learning 264 Conclusion 267 ‘Twi Cheers for Multilateralism — 208 ‘The Need for Regimes 270 Notes Index cewrents | le Uneealiste Visions 273 Do not ty to recapture the past. Ask whether ‘world really needs It. Buld on shared interest Use regimes to insure against catastrophe. The ‘host onforcement Is slf-onforeement. Lavk for the right moment, Use regimes to focus U.S. a on the future, Heglme Main eo 870 United Nations peacekeeping. International debt. xchange rates 307 srmorase =For our parents, with gratitude, Aone Preface to First Edition \] Center for International Affairs, Harvard University ‘Aastudents in tho late 19505 and carly 1960s, wo wore taught look at interna . onal polities through “realist” glasses, which emphasized the ever-present Possibility of war among sovereign states. As our earlier work indicates, we ‘s00n became unoasy about this one-sided view of realty, particularly about its {inadequate analysis of economie intogeation and of the roles played by Formal i brary of Congo Catling Fubetion Dat + Koshane Rater 0, but Owen, 04 etme ormalintornatfonal institutions. Our collaboration began in 1068 when, Z4 +, {torgrandiaterdepens Reber 0. Kecane, Joan Hye. 13 new members of the board of editors of International Organization, we (i tad slecided to edit a special issue of that journal to citcize traditional views of Ince graphs references andes world politics te the relevance of international organization to demons 2 tntertiona eco relates ‘roadly conceived.* We decided! to write the present hook, after Transnational Relations and World Politics was published in the summer of 1971, for two main reasons CGESECOECHESECEKOCECCESEEEEGES: eS ow Although in that volume we had poisted aut signifeant probleme with eases s Caprh © 180 Rote Recher. Nye theory, articlly in the area of iteration! poet economy, weld not vhaehoty trepedestnay omer sy provided an alternative theory. We sll needed to ft transnational relains 6 age em otek ey a Inaluerameveafwotdaitatis aetna cata & Sik ding tn he oes task we had gun. From a poly standpoint, we thoght tat signean me 8 neal pga ina reve. provements Amerson poley on isues valiagtemetiaet eet aa ‘nteiational organizations wero illelyunles the premises of policy wore changed, We believed that many ofthe fallires of American foreign policy in 50780 1K ‘Printed the Usted Sats f America "ImterationalOrensation 25, 0.9 (Sumer 191); lar pblshed a Tronwatona elton ‘ond Wold Flic (Cais, Mase: Hara Volver Pres 1972) G&EEOSESE 8 SSHSSBSEGE Sece Vi OG 6SGCCOCE ® i See WL | merace 10 ria eoenon those creas had their roots tn the limitations of reals assumptions. For both analytical sd polley reasons, therofore, wo sought to write a book that would put into a broader eaitot tho classo realist ahalyis that Llans Morgenthau’ folie Anions Nats, among other wars, had Beate othe carrot senor, ‘Our iitlytcil and poley concerns help io czplaln the ortentaion of ths 3k ley eoncern had to do with Anorlean foreign policy, but the books fous is completly diferent from thal of mast books nnd eticles on this subject, Becauze we are concerned with th p cae teon the changing tiatute of the international system and how to _understanlt. Only Inthe last chapter do we draw lessons for foreign policy. ‘Our two country-oriented ease studies, however, are focused on the United States. Yet throughout the book, our emphasis is on theory. The eases were selected fr thelr potential signlficance for theory as much as for thel intrinsic policy importance. Since the Unite States isthe matt important actor inthe systt, oir focis 6m Aimerian actions ean be justified on theoreti! as wel policy grounds. in addition, each of out major cars Is examined over at lens fifty-year porlod to help us understand underlying forecs of stability and change, Our method isnot simply hstoeal: ro havo nnalyzod th eases ao tording toa theoretical and éompatative scheme that we claborat in chaple 1-8. This approach bears some resemblance to what our teacher Stanley Hoff jan called “historical sociology” over x decedo ago® We ry to quantify what ‘we can, but we srest theory over method and understanding the premises of //Aooiey over charting a detailed course of action, In this book we try la tiidetstand world polities by developing ex lanations at thodawel ft onal system, Ths doesnot mean tht wo regard the omestis pots af fortgn policy as unimportant, Quite th contary. Forlgn Bolicy and domestle policy, as we repeatedly emphasize, are becoming incroas- Sete cdientangle. Nevertheless, the complex relations between for- pu and domestic policy make It essential to know how much one ean explain ‘onthe basis of information about the internation ‘we tr} to discover what cannot be explained on the basis of international fae- tors, as well as what can be so explained. Thus, although comparative forciga + Some or ought on this bk av speredin cer at bth have been mgt are In fom dnt toy sow tegen rot th ‘clase, fr hae we noe prin fom ho Uy of Wc re oa ‘rom the following articles: C. Fred Bergson, R. Keohane, and J. Nye, “Intemational Eooposias ‘odletrao ut A Fever ter An ntorationOretatin5n {cr ioroy Kohan god). Ny, Tin Cpe at Cede nen Tstrapendene" Ital Orentaton 2, (sn 14) Ny “Pate ular and rte Conf hn Empl hh Iteration! Qrtatn 38 (hatune ie. Ste Hota Cotenporey heya! eat Enloond Ci: Prenecl h race ro Hse somo | i pully Is not tho subject of this book, we hope that students of comparative Fort poe wil tour anys ustul—i only asa staring pola fore slop to cxpainpltors of mation aclion Wotlo mt ela hat our explains of change and stably a world pl ct Ia eu be devel for tls purpose, oven a he We hava wt, for oxampl, included Mera formulation Many Murase adopt what wo eal a ororll structure approach alsough te retin, thy nest wes theory af tho foreign poly proers, Soe Marist, howover, fc on dro latins emongeaplatathexe form lations, ulnational corporations are mportant ia thee ow ight ex pole actors Yo asae as wo could dotermine, there nota generally accepted ard lary arclated Marit theory of neretional eine change We tea thor smpathete enough with the Mars perspective, nor lenrned enough in its sublets, to develop Macs model four own Its tobe hoped that Maras wil dvi el otro reine change o compete ih or crmplament our own, Friends have fon asked us how we hve managed io collaborates ten: sively over such slang period of time. Tho short answers by arallowing our pre hilo wo toro pu cach ole’ chapters Although callaborstion Inve secusona ruta, it produces the been Inllecual pees ot rapid response and exploration of dons By and lege, we have enjoyed the proces. Tho theorelel chapters have gone throug so many das hat Ws Viral inposst to Mety the sures of patel Idee. Keohane took Prtnary export or the ea studes on money and Ausales Nye or oxcans and Gana, fv hore, howover, then dviton labor doe not sceurately reflect the eaality of our contributions to the Beal version, ‘Our transcontienta eollabortion would not have been pose without {ho support of Ford Foundation grant, In adliln, over the ast lve years, func help was provided to Nyeby the Rockefeller Foundation and to Kee Ine bythe Univenty Consort for Word Order Stadies, the Johnson “Tissot certainly aplosomuch of he Heratar on “inertial depen” which focuses fltns hte dovelpot al derdeveped conte (bl wills by no menat cclasvely Marsa curser Apart me cloereny Morten a see Marat pal of vow canbe founda Staphontymer, “The oration ef Crp inal of onomie ver (Maeh 197) and Ert Manel, Europe, meron Conte: of peri (Nev Yrk: Moh Rav Pres, 170), epecaly capers I-, epea Hyer, “The Bll Coroortin the Law af Uneven Development." aga Bhagwat ed Enemies, ‘World Order from th 170s othe 190s New York: Tho Free Preis, 172), pp. 11910, Joban Calton,“ Sretral Theory of imperial" Jounal of Pe ‘Oa Sunt, “Trarmattonal Captakn and Natloel Datei ‘nd Ecole tae (Univers of West inden) 2, (Mace auf et al, "A Preity Tet ofthe Theay af Dependeny.” Compra 1955)pal ME Lara 0 rere Foundation, and the Stanford University Cntor fr Hescarch in International Studie, Nye ts also grateful to Carleton Univerlly tn Otawn and to the Royal Instituteof International Afatrsin London and ssf. Weare both grateful the Harvard Center for International Ate and Bowle end Raymond Vernon relss and enrminiily supportive c 1 ut wlise help ts hard to imagine this ook. Its ls hard to 1 book without the comments we received from so many critics und friends (the | two eategories are not mitualy exclisvol). We particularly wish to thank | Grahans Allison, Jonathan Aronson, Robert Art, Francs Bator, Dan Cadel, Stephen Cohen, Jorge Domingue, Linda Cul, Da Robert Gilpin, Crauford Goodwin, Emst Haas, Noger Uanwen, Jlf Tart, Barbara Haskell, Fred Msc, Staley iain, Cavan Hoge, An Ulli i Ray Hopkins, Peer Jacobmohn,obor Jervis Jol Q. Johnson, Ptor Katz i stein, James Keeley, Janct Kelly, Peter Keni, Nance! Keohane, Chalor Kindieberger, Stephen Krasier, James Kurth, David Lat, Peter Larye, f Charles Lipson, Peyton Lyon, lachal McCulloch, Michacl Mandell Ea ward Miles, Theodore Mora, Jo Odell, Van Door Ooms, Rob Patong, 1 Wynne Plumptre, Richard Roterance, Jolin Rogie, Hubert Rusa, Philippe \ ‘Schmitter, Ian Smart, Louis Sohn, Susan Strange, Harrison Wagner, and Dan S N Yergin. Ava Feiner, Robert Pastor, Debra Miller, Alison Young, Kenneth Oye, ‘ad Constance Sth greatly helped our research on Ihe ens stu, Nun tus offal ofthe American, Ausiralian, and Canadian yovernmont gave Preface to Second Edition tional relations sulfer from being too clase to the events Uhoy discuss. When we wrote Power and Interdependence in tho mid-1070e, /’ generously oftheir timo in intorviows. Emily Uallin supervised the reproduce tion and transmission of innumerable drafts atthe Stanford end ofthis trans- continental relationship. Beverly Davenport, Amy Caziu, and Amy Contrada ably managed the typing ofthe manuscript and administrative chores at Har= yard. The contributions of Nannerl Keohane and Molly Nye would require nother book, not a mere preface, to recount. ‘Noauthor isan island. We gladly tll our bel of thanks clramatie changes wore taking place in world polities. By the beginning of the dlocade the Vietnam War Ind become highly unpopular fa the United States, tnd detente seemed to have reduced the importance ofthe U.S.-Soviet nuclear ‘competition, At the same tine, nternatfonal trade was growing more rapidly ‘than world product; transnational corporations were playing dramatic politica! rues: and from 1971 on the international monetary system was in flux. Mean while, the relative economic predominance ofthe United States was dec a the European and Japanese economies grew at more rapid rates. President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger spoke of the development of a five- power world, and futurologists such as Herman Kabn predicted the imminent Artival of a multipolar international system. On top of this cane the oll ests uF 1979, in which some very weak states cetrcted enormous resources from the strong. Hans Morgenthau weote of * what he called an unprecedented divorce between military and economic power based on-the control of raw materials The vulnerability of Western societies ata poriod of high commodity prices encouraged many less developed countries to belive that a greater transformation of power had gocurred than "Men Ka sb rae tgs,Thigs to Com (New Yorks Mecilan, 172) "Ain. Mergent, “The Rew Diplansey a Movement” Encounter (At 4) 58 GEGCUESGESRUSCCEECKEECEECESCHEESEECECEEEESR: rt Reser Nie ot SeGUSECSEECCEOEESCEHECEEEEECEHOHEECOECEEE! ‘was actually the ease. Many theorists rflocted on these concorns, A represent ative view among the modernist writers of the 1970s wast ‘The forces now ascendant appear to be dominant structure of evaporation subnational groups, and transatlonal speeal Interests ad eoonsaten would all ba or the support and loyalty of invita, and eots wkd havo ta bo ronlved lyon tho basis of ud hoe bargain in shifting conten of poor rlanh Jn. toward x global sooty without tlyarchy tn which natlon-natos, By the lle 1870s the mood began to change, bothin the United States and in the Unltd Nations. The United States Government ceive more concerned aout Soviet policy, and less sensitive to tho polis and complaints of gow trnments of less developed countries. The experience ofthe Carter administra tin lastrates this pint. While campaigning n 190, Jimmy Carter promised toreduce the defense budget, but by 1080 he was closer to Ronald Reagan's postion than fo his own provious view. Rongan's elction accontuated these trends, Amerlean polley focused on East-West confrontation and scaled down North-South isses and the oloof multilateral institutions. The defense budget Incconsed In eal terms for ive straight yoars, an tho United States vas more willing to use miltary Fore (albot against extremely woak sates suchas Gre- nada and Libya). Arms control was downgetded and the modernization of nuclear forces was intended to restore an “edge” for ndtoalwtlty of rile / ‘ary fore. This shifting agenda was accompanied by a resurgence of realist i analysis, for history seamed to have vindicated the relist model Just as some analysts inthe 1970 overstated the ubsolecenco of tl slit, the decline of force, and the irelevance of security concerns, others In the early 1980s unduly neglected the role of transnational actors and economic (interdependence. Contrary to the tone of much plitel thetorle and some ‘politica analysts, however, the 1950s did nat representa return totho world of the 1850s, justas the decline of American power was exaggerated in the 1970s, so Was the restoration of American power exiggerated in tho 1980s, Looking carefully at miltay and economie indies of power resources, one notes that there was far more change in psychology and mood than in true indicators of power retources. The dfusion of power continued as messured by shares in ‘world trade or world product. Econonte inter depeaulence a rncusured by ‘alnerabilty to supply shocks eased In a period af slack commodity mark (but t could change ifmarkotstghton again and growth of aconone ransace {ions continues). Senaitvty to exchange-rate fluctuations remained high, The costs ofthe great powers” use of fore remand higher than inthe 1950s Moreover, despite rhetoric, the relations between the superpowers Ud not show a return tothe Cold War period. Not only were alinces looser, but * Saya Brom na Forcet n Word Flues (Wainglon Howington, 1972 p 168 rsrace 10 stcono ramon | Xf Uransuetions were highor and the relations between the superpowers rellectod ‘fair dexree of learning in the nuclear area. In our view, therefore, the analy- sisthat we put forward in Power and Interdependence has not been rendered {rrelevant by events. The real questions are not about obsolescence, but about analyte engency. {Ina one, the 1970sand 1960s were merely thelatest instance ofa recurring dialectic hetweon the two main strands In what has been called the “classical tradition” of international-relations theory. Realism has been the dominant strand. The second strand isthe “Uberal” of “Grotlan tradition,” which tends to stress the impact of domestle and international soclety, interdependence, and international institutions. In thelr simplest forms, iberal theories have bbeon easily discredited, Tho proposition that gains from commercial transac. {Hons would overcome the problems inhorent inthe security dilemma and make ‘war too expensive was belied in 1914. Hopes that a system of international law and organization could provide collective securty to replace the need for self- help inherent in the security dilemma were disappointed by 1939. Nonethe- less, the sharp opposition between realist and iberal theories is overstated. fact, tho two approaches can be complementary. Sophisticated versions of lib- ral thoory address the way interactions among states and the development of {International norms ean lnteract with the domestic polities of the states In an international system to transform how those states define thelr interest, ‘Transnational as well as Interstate Interactions and norms lend to new defi. tions of interests as well as new coalition possibilities for different interests within stats, Power and Interdependence sought to explain the patterns of change th 6 observed during the early to mid-I070s by intograltig specs of the realst nd liberal dios, Thus our core argument in Chaplet I that asymmetial intelepenens ean-bo a source of power, links the liberal sess on Le terdepondence with the reall fosis on power Yet we noted Inns Pofoce to the frst edition, we were taught as studenis to fee the world through “real- {st glasses, and our book reflected our strugyle to see a more complex vision ‘Thus, realism bore the brunt of our evtigue, and our quarrels with aspects of liberalism were subdued. As a result of our rhetorical barbs at realism, our ‘approach is sometimes labeled simply ae "Uhers.” Yet thi characterization of Power and Interdependence is highly misleading, since we stressed the impor- |uneo of governments’ wiclding’of power in pursuit of their conceptions of self-interest, and we declared in Chapter | that “military power dominctes “esp Nye Js “Nelo Leng ‘ation (Semone 1987) 4 J. Mast, The DildingDictlne: Hegemony and Deer neratonel Theory (Beso ‘los & Uni, IME). [US.SoveScurty Regine; Irnatlnal Organ amon é stanoacsS e , 6 @ @ 2, @, sip]! L merce 6 won oman ‘economie power in the sonse that economic means alone are likely to be inof- ostive against the serious use of military force” (p. 16). ‘We have quite a bit to say, after more than a decade, both about how com 1 rmehtators construed or misconstrued aur work, and about our own shifts in perspective, We tould have changed the teat of our book, but this would not | hive enabled isto respond to our critics, and it would have concealed our own famiendments, shifts in point of viow, and sccond thoughts. We could have ‘writen long Prefaco—indeed, we drafted one—but our astute editor potnted jut that this would encumber the reader unaequatoted with our book with ‘beforehe o she hid read the orginal text In this edition we have therefore lft the original textat twas wetton asd havonldod only a brit nw Preface, We have, however, added an Afterword, which provides n fllor Alston of how we soe our work, as contrastod with the perspective of formers! i In Chapter 8 of Power and Interdependence we drew some implications Irom our aialyals-for poli. in our view, many of our judgiients remain ~valldforttnice, we argued that redicing the United States” vulnerability {external shook could be pat of a strategy of policy coordinationand interna tonal leadership. Bulldingan Ainerioan oll tockple std tang the loadin th {nkersiational Energy Agehey havo adeed beed the two key components of th ‘uboodsful international energy policy which has helped to transform interna- liolal bniergy polities since the 1970s. Furtherniore, they have beck, as we stigjested, compleinentary, rather than alternative, policies. We also argued Y// for effective sternatonsl pole coordination on cell esuos—as lovers of wild lands wo coal not gnoro this dimension of global plies 1at cooperation on stich issues would be difficult. In general, we called for \ intertiatlorial sttveillance and collective leadership” (p. 232), which we still \liove tobe eric if urgent world problems are tobe addrevsed \\ These preseritions, however valid, were inosty quite general. In 1965 we sight t mako te spect recominendatons, sing ot only the analyst of Poibet dnd Interdependence but also that of subsequicht work on international regithes. The article that we produced, “Two Cheots for Mul ralism,” is. feprinted from Foreign Policy at the end of this volume, following the In the clove yout since we completed Power and Interdependence, our professional paths have diverged end then converged again, Robert 0. Keo- hhane his concentrated on interpreting patterns of international cooperation and discord it light of sdcial science theory; Joseph S. Nye has served in gov- ‘erittuent and published works on nuclear deterrence, ethics and international * Mostf th Aherwordsppsced atu arti ented “Pouce od Interdependence Revd,” (published ln ateratonel Orgel 2 4 (Aut 1): 725-58, SER relations, and U.S-Soviet relations. Since 1985 we have been colleagues at arvard University, xiving us the opportunity to discuss analyieal and policy Issues intensively again, both in seminars and in personal conversations. We hhave gained enormously from our intellectual companionship and deeply salis- fying personal friendship, which now extend over twenty years. If our readers also benefit, we will be doubly pleased. g f B 5B & eUnderstanding Interdependence e < a FIPXAISSIDIODOPDDD HSOPDIAPODIH VIS HN V9 IOP DIBDBSSSSEOCGECOSEOECEESGCEECHEHETEEEEOCOES: “| INTERDEPENDENCE IN S| WORLD POLITICS Qa i a , Wo live tn aw om of interdependence, This vague phisse expresses a poorly understood but widespread feoling that the vety nature of world ie | ae even more deliente and deceptive than in previous ages”? Henry f Kissinger, though deeply roted in the cltical tradition, has satd that | powers, the security of nations — no longer defines our perils or our postt- I ‘he word a bose nerd nemo, comet, inhoman epitatonse* Hw profound ete changs? A modem sell see lecomnonin ions and ft tela exeting “global village” and elo ht bor soning social and cco Hxatinon ar creating 8 "world. wthut Borde® To grater a loser extent munboro scolar tee ou ea at on in which th total tte, which as been damant tn wor pl | ts for the four cones sie feuds nes ended, bel eclipsed by ontritral actos sich a tional coporetos, arsietonl satl i Toovements and ntersatonal ogenaitins Stato about tog ae an soonmfe it? Traditional cll dese asertions wnfounded“glbalonoy.% They pot tho eontinty in wold poles, MilinyInterdependtes hae alongsant @@ eee Cee’ ee L6G OG 660 GOSSSSSCECOE EE 2S, Mould be Ertless, Hather, our task Is to provide a 4 | mrennerennencr mi Wonta rouiTics existed, and military power is still snportant in york putes — witness nuclear deterrence; the Vietnam, Middle East, nnd Inein-Pakistan war fand Soviet fafldence in Enster Europe or Ameriain influence ty tho Caitbbean, Moreover, as the Soviot Union has shown, athortaran stator tan, lo considerable extont, contol talocormunieations sind oct tran stctiois that they consider disruptive, Even pont aud weak exntes have tere alent walt enti wl the rome iationdism casts doubt of the proposition that the natlonstate Is fad away. ‘Neither the modernists hot the traditionalists have sin adequate frano- sWatk for understanding the poites.of global liteidopendonco® Modernists polit eotrectly to the fiidémantal changes vow Unk place, but they ‘fish aadume Without sullcent analysis that advanoos in technology sd jal nd economic transactions will lead to a new world in tnd thei control of force, wll no longer be important. Tra dito fadept al showing Baws in tho modernist vision by polating ‘aut how lity Interdependence continues, bist find It very dieu ae Carty To Intrpiot today's hulidimensional sconce, vost, and ees Joglal tntetdependence ‘Bui isk in this book snot to argue ether the modérnist or traditional position. Beestise our ern is marked by both eomtinity and chinge, cnn of tiling ad “both postions by developing a coherent theorett bending the A cal imeork for the politcal analysis of Interdapendcice, We shal develop several aferest but polentlly complemedtary models, ot intel \. Tectual tools, foF grasping the Fealty of interdepondenco In contemporary |, wen pol, guy portant, we sal atonpt to expla the con \\Hons under which each model will be most likely to produce accurate Eres and satisfactory explahatios. Contemporary world polities is ‘seamless web; itis tapestry of divetse relationships. In such a Hd, one mode cannot expla al stato. The secret of understand ile ti Knowing which approach or combination of approaches to use tn analyzing a situation. There will vever be a substitute for careful anntysis of aotial situations. ‘Yet theory Is inescapable; all empirical or practical analysts rests on it Pragmatic policymakers might think that they need pay no more heed te theoretical dltputes over the natize of world politics then they pay to medieval scholastic disputes over how many angels cai dance on the head of d pin, Academie pens, however, eave inarks inthe minds of statesmen ‘eith profound reeuts for policy. Not only are “pisetieal men who be theintlves to be quite exempt from ny intelectual tflionces” icon ‘of conceptions created by “some academic seribbler of but increasingly the sribblers have been playing 4 direct INTERDEPENDENCE 18 WontD rousTiee | 5 vole tn forming foreign paliy.? appropiate images and fconeived fee a Py Reet ee | Ula eto pete atone ml etalon, rystomatlopresestaton and ayinbalin, San toe tt iy evn er flloyakey th selves, to disentangle reality from shetorte. Traditionally, classical theorles. Of word pols have potaye «Pletal "iat of wee In meh aoe Fnchavior was dombinted by the constant danger of mlitary-conflet, Dur- ing {ha Cold te ‘spectlty ‘the’ firit"decade after World War I, this conception, labled “pole realism” by Ts proponents, been ede, ‘coptd hy stunt nd prctiiones of Internation relatos nr Bae tn the Unite State rng th 1000, mary athrwie heen strane who necepted realist approaches were slow to perceive the development Of new iss tht did center on militay-secuity concen * Th ee Sonim igen he ie 1s 18 wo ely ad to een inore toralite expectations, Yet to exchange It for ay eal siople view ~ fo ota, that may fore isabelle and mond tree ondetehesige won conta neo eqaly grav, xg eet, What are the major features of world politics when interdependence, petlnlarly econonettgdependenco, iextonsive?® This eve of the {so major ution ender Inti book, In Chapter we eeose ae aveton In gover arms in Chaper 8 and pt of Caer 7 we vst gate It fartr tn four cue sts, and Chapter 8 examines th implies tions for Ameream foreign pole. To ly" the groundwerk for thes tugs, nthe rt ofthis chapter we dof nat we mean by ited pendence diferontte its war type ad relate them to the concept of power, which remains fundamental tothe analysis of world polities, acy enmots ropa . ons, Wo afer to tse giving sangeet VOPR TEE The second major questinn ofthis boo ky How and why do nterseel regimes chnnge? Chupter 3 develop a sto explanation forte develo ‘nen of interantional regime, and thelr eventual decline In Chapter 8 we spy thes explanations oles of oceans and money and in Caper 7 we tse them to widertan! some fentues of Caneian-Amesien aa {AtstetateAmericn lationship, * tn Te TrouledPartuerhi (New Yok: MeCerwl for the Cou alain, 19) yA ger nme aon shelf te cot at gh cso es were egy Solan t a serene 99 RC ASOT YATES PPE EEO PSSA NEZz aN GEGESCEEOHOCEERGECEEECCEECE G66 GEE CCE 5 6 | werendernsmeior mv wont rons ily am analytical emoopt. It Is also rhetorical dovies employed by publletsts and stat the states, eager to increase the number of people marching heneath is banner, ‘vague words with broad appos! are useful. For the analyst, such vaguenoss is the path to « swamp of confusion. Before we can construct usable ‘opts, uth less inerease nr derstanding of futerdependenes and regime change, we must cleat a way throug the thetorienl jungle, Our task isto ‘analyze the polities of interdependence, wot to eclebrate i. But interdependence is not s ‘THE NEW RHETORIC OF INTERDEPENDENCE Dring tho Cold War, “national socuity” was 1 slogan Amerienn political Teadets used to genorate ipport for hele polices. The rhetoric of mational sccurty jstlod strategies designed, at considerable cost to bolster the economic, miltary, and politcal stmcture of the “free world” Te also pro- Sided a rationale for International cooperation ane support for the United Nations, as well ax justification for alliances, foreign a, and extensive niltery tnvolvemen National geanty became the favorite symbol of the Internationals whe Favors nctepal Aiea inolvoncnt iv word alae. Th key Tareign poiey coordinating unit in tho White Howse was named Uhe Na~ tional Security Councl, ‘The Truman administration used the alleged Soviet threat to American secusity to push the loan to Britnin and thos tie Marshall Plan thiough Congress. ‘The Kennedy administration em ployed the security nrgument to promote the 1062 Trade Expansion Act Presidents invoked national security to eontsol certain sectoral economic Interests in Congress, particularly those favoring protectionist trade poll \ se Congressnon wn potted adverse ernie flan ht dis or inoreased taxes wore assed — and it turn explained to constituents — That the “national security interest” requived their sacrifice. At the sume timo, special interests Frequently manipulated the symbols of national Socurty for thair own porporer inthe even of petolenn impor quotas, promoted particularly by domestic oil producers anid their political alles. 1© National security symbolism was largely a product of tho Cold War and the severe threat Amerins then felt. Its persuasiveness was increased by realist analysts, which insisted that national sceurity is the primary na- tonal goal and that in international politic security threats are permanent. National security symbolis, and the realist mode of analysis that sup- ported it, not only epitomized a certain way of rencting to events, but Felped to codify a perspective in which some changes, pasticutrly those toward radical regimes in Third World countries, seemed inka! to na- ‘TW4 new auerone oF werenoxrenoENcr | 7 tonal security, while fundameutal changes in the economte relations nang advanced hued counter seemed esgunt ‘As the Gold War sens of sect threat slackered, farign economic pti and domes atbutlnal conf need ‘The Intellectual ambiguity of “national security” beeame more pronounced varied sid aften ontrndictry forme of volvement tok shelter undar a single she tore wnt I hs imagory ofa word balance of power amen fee nije centr (the United State, the Soviet Union, Chine, Europe, Japan President Nixon tried unsuccessfully to extend traditional realist concepts to apply to the ecanomfeebulonge poed by Amerea's postwar all, as wells the polite and mlitary ation ofthe Soviet Union and Chine, ‘As the deserptive ecuricy ofa vow of national seert dominated. by anlitry concerts dscined, 0 did the term's symbolic power. This decting relate not only the Ines smbiglty ofthe concep, but alo Arner can tention othe Vietnam inbroglia tothe les host elton with Russia ai Chia sunsmed wp bythe word detent, and tothe mine of iy thet by Belen Non nthe Wet ale hn to shar tts position as the prime symbel in the introns tescon wth erdopendonas ue ESL ‘olla! loaders often use interdependence thetori to portray dane a a fact to which policy (and rat goign) Tat alan rar Ua Sa saalod aed see jay Rslf.‘They uvuslly argue that conflets of laterest are Tediced by” dopenvdnco, and that cooperation alone holds the answer to world problems. t “Wo are all engaged fn « common enterprise. No nation or group of rations ean gun By pothing beyond th nis thet sustain world convo ‘ovth, No ome benefits ron basing progress on teste of sbength>™ There ‘words clearly Delong tom statesman dntending to lint demencs from the ‘Third Work an iflvnce public attitudes at home, rater thant saan contemporary wality, Poe tho who wish the United. States to Teta ‘world leadephip, st6Repéindonce has become part of the new metre to be used against both econe nationalism at home and accertive chal Jenges abroad Although the connotations of interdependence rhetoric may sem quite ifeent from those of national security symbian each hoe ten be sed olive Ane preset ders in Yet Interdependence rhetoric and national security symbolism eocxst only ners ns extreme formulation, the former sigests tat conte tare poss, herons the later argues that theyre, main, fundamental, and potentially violent, ‘The com “Know ‘what analytical models to apply to woild polit (as we noted earlicr) is18 | werenberenoeNex m wont roLenien ah between two dimensions, snstlty and ounerbilty, Sonat Seid depron of tesponlveness Wit foley teanowbik how qu “Eechangs noe eur bng en chang nso, an how ost tre the Sony elas? Its metsured not merely by the volume of Hows cro border but alo by the esl effects af changer in rantactons on the sodetles or governments. Sensitivity interdependence is erented by Intofaclong witha & femowork of polices. Seni nsuines Unt dhe -ffamoworkFenain tnchngod. ‘Tho Tet that a set of polices renalox constant may rofect th diet in formulating wow polices within = Sort tne, of tmay relec:a commltment toa eatatn pattem of Jmestlo tdi we path "an example of sonivty dependence Js the way the United States, Japan tnd Wester Europe were afeced by insesed ol prices i 07h and egain in 1973-74 and 1075, In the absence of new policies, which ‘ould take many years or decedes to implement, the sensitivity off teonamies wes function ofthe greater cuts of foreign ll and the pro- parton of petroleum they imported. The United States was lest seatve Tn Japan t petroleum pri ies, bxeansn smaller proportion of Ie patoloam requrements wes nccouted for by npr, bit a pid pees Irons end long lines at gwolne stations showed, the United Stats wwe ndeed weave to the cso change, Avator expla of renlty Interdependence ts provided bythe international monetary station prot to August 15,1071 Given the contrast ey eee hy th Fes ofthe Tnteratlonal Monetary Fund (ME, Krvopean governments were Semltve to changes In Amati money poly, ad th United Stats tres senave to European delsone whether or ot to dena the com Yerson of dallas into gol. Sesltvty Ieterdapendence ean be, socal or pola ay well as cc: \\ nomie* For example, there are soclal “contagion effects," such as the “vl ut rapid spread ofthe fad of “stenking” from Amerie to Karo- pean soclty in 1974, or, more siglicant, the way In which the develop. iment of radical student movements during the Tate 1860s was reinforced by knowledge of each other's activities. The rapid growth of transnational communications hae enhanced such sensiivly, "Television, by vividly senting starvation in South sla to Europeans and Americans about dow to thts ony, alot cra to increas attention to and feoncem about the ise in European and American societies. Sensitivity to such an tse may be reflected in demonstrations or other political * sioce we re eletng tothe renatty of eznnomies end plies to one another, not rowan ano nevenperennne | 19 sti, oven I wei taken to alleviat te dates (ond no canon sensitivity thereby results), othe areas (ond ig te wd intrdpedees, bows, ter ty to sey abscues some of the most Important volta espects of mutal dere donc. We must lo consider what the station Would be tthe eee, ‘ould be changed. 1 more altermtlves were valle, ory liferent plies were possibly what would be the ing to the outta chnge? In pttloun for instance, whet itr is nat only The proportion af one needs that Imperted, Eo te alternatives to Imported energy and the cots of purnuing thor alters Lves. Two ents, each importing 25 percent of tel petreloons nec sony seem equally sensitive to price rises; but Hf one cou sift to domes Me sores at moderate cont, andthe ater had no such alternative the tocond state woul be more eulnerble than the fest, The rane dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and col of the alternatives that various actors fage, lor the Bretton Woods mouetary regime during the late 1960s, both the United States mid Great Beta were senive te dectlns by foreign speculators oF conta bunks to shit noes out of dallas or steling spectively. But the United States was ley vulnerable than Ivete beens ita the option (which it oxresed in August 1971) of changing the es of tho systetn a whit tconldered tolerable cost. The undedivg cane tien of the Uaited State reduced its vlveabiliy, and threions sede Issey sve ote. Interns of the east of dependence, seaslvlty seas aiiy to costly effets Impose from outside blore polls are-alieted to try Uo Shane the situation. Vulnerability ean be defined as an actor’ Mability to su Imposed. by-extrnal events even lle pales lave bech stated, Sines i aly dh cage poles oth eet eset cater ng nt mmrent over ime., illustrate this distinction graphically by Imagining three countries faved soc with a exteral event thet impos oss on them — for example, the situation that oil-consuming eauitres face when pre Aucers raise prices. s , Figure 1.1 indicates the sensitivity of the three countries to costs im- posed by such an ontside chinge. Initally, country A has somewhat higher sensitivity to the change than B and much higher sensitivity than s a e 5 G. Over tine, fathermare, Cs sent falls ven’ ith i Smelt pce visor testo ed by soni oat re, iyals even wthout any poy == ‘fin buds on, bat dif from, Unt of Blchard Cooper, The Eeonomicr of changes. Ths change might be eased by price rises in county C, which £ aradally rece oll eonsunpton, and therefore reduce imports The total i Interdependence (New Yorks McGraw l, 1068), (6 SECTS CCEHOEECEECEESTLECEGESEECEEEOEE'1d | inrenoerznmewce i wontn roars FIGURE 1.1, Sensitivity of three Costs impoted by outside ation GURU 1.2. Vulnerability of tree nites (assume policies unchanged) _countiit (ase poly changed) = g 1 5 q & a iil 8 toto baa tine tine sensitivity of each country over the tine covered by the graph is kepre~ tented by the area winder its respective line. to saan ual ramp, tie tonpt mow cof tie ne Th extent ofthe est ae the pala i country such as Jap dowments and is esunng that each country tres SEE a i nd to rouee he cts Imposed by ove Sa ee eth tompt might hove deading 1 iat nf developing. expensive literal ining or. developing. ox teal 1 would be the measire of vuicinblity. The vulnerability of ce hatte ised prot by Unt cote’ pystsl em tually inescapable, without drastic cos. For other ‘countries, such as the United States, physical vulnerability is not so great, But sotpoltcal constants on poly eange my For ists, American elforts t formulate new vulnerability is amu Beginning of the second time period a 8 cra ssi A poley change atthe oh Ame poriod allow that ove, hy the tind ‘period, to reduce costs imposed by external change almost to the vanishing point. Country A's dimi Shed vulnerability would reflect an effective foley to Doe acy or potently sls i ptrloum, For Fistanco, t might possess new sources of energy that eoul by the government. B and changing plley, thus rema ‘be developed are lest able to alter their situations by ing vulnerable to ests Imposed by outside ‘events. Amon ater thingy, the eats af the situation : lly sgl ee i ceo, he ‘be reduced by an appropriate diacount rate, at Tater polts would, of cours have to owen an nerenperesoence | 15 ‘The semsitivity dependence of the three counteles atthe time of the frst ‘external event fe efore, the same a thele vulnerability dependenie & at that time. Measures of the immediato elfects of changes will not pre- b cisely indiente long-term sensitivities (note that C's renstivity declines £ ‘ttl verte), ut thoy ar ily tobe sten in mes | Sor lngtrm valerie, which wil depend on pole! wi gore { erumoutal ‘biity, nd resource capabilites, In our example, although | Suny nds hn cont is mache ae, L ‘Value e perteatry important for understanding th al E {ur of inerdependence rslaton Tau soso estes Se wc” aro “the dainrs of the els prtbwe Clause! or canst the ruler ‘th gama" uloeratity ts leat) moe relevant hanson Tog example in anaizng the oles of raw mater such a the supposed tcansforntion of power afer 1073. All to ften high percentage of impo ne he inet of vu Emory suggest that sett ma Aotsmining ener how seta Delgo this cm tec, what emt. Tho fet thatthe Used States Imports prcntnatey BS Faant of hs bono spply door not inte meresy, wiry to actors by nt exporter ntl we know whit I would cei de tell x ney) to btn satan iy apple osoioplteal as well x poltcn economic tle igs. The valraility of suites otrannatonal rain! movers ‘nth lato 1960 depended on ter sbltes to adjet natal pesto deal ‘ith the change an rade the cots of dvaption. Wihes Swat crtied.Ameroan ply in Vietnam, Hs valnortiy Wo. pestle Amerienn sapesion of cits contacts would ave depended bn Hoss icould adjust pole tothe new station, Could exchange profess el tourist bo atraced from elsewhere? Lotus lank gain atthe elects on the United Stats of famine in South Asa. The vdversblty of an Amertan administration to domestic [rote over te lek of 2 fod id pliey would depend onthe eae th thi 1 could nde poy or latency. shying mone gelato Indi) without incaing other high pte or coon cnt, ow does this diingioa help uy understand the relatonthip between interdependence and power? Clay it indicates at sensi nl. dence wl be kes impor valerabiity interdependence in “vig fortes san I ow soe os ee ERs pole. eer domes or nteratinally, the sensiity orl tb rt ge rs aa sider tad In wprcltral produ between the United Stats and the Soviet Union from 1972 to 19, Intl, the Amerian ccnony we20 | weesnonnenpees We wont rousrien ‘weak, specific international regines often five important effects on fater= Aopondent relationships that involve x fow emutries, oF Involve many countries on a specifi Issue, Since World War I, for instance, specific ots of rules and procedures have been developed to guide states and transnational actors in a wido varity of areas, including ald to lest do veloped countries, environmental protection, faheries conservation, inter- national Food polley, international wieteorologieal ewordination,futerational monetary policy, regulation of yulthwational corporations, international shipping policy, international telecommunications poliey, ard. interna- tional trade." In some eases these regimes have heen formal and eom- prehensivg; in others Informal and partial. Thee effectiveness has varied From issue-area to issue-nrea and from thie to time. On a amore selective oF regional level, specific groupe of countelos such as those in the Euro- pean Community or the Organtzation for Eeonomle Cooperation and Development (OECD) have developed regimes that alfect several aspects of their countries’ relationships with each other International regimes may be incorporoted into futerstate cece or treaties, as were the Intemational monetary seragements developed a Bretton Woods in 1044, or they may evolve from proposed formal aa ments that were never implomentod, as was the General Agreement 0 ‘Tariffs end Trede (CATT), which derived from the International Trade Ongantenton proposed after World War Il Or they nuty bo merely fn ple, as in the postwar Candan-Anverien relationship. They vary wot only in thelr extensivencts but in the degreo of adherence they recaive from major actors, Whon there are no agreed norms and procedures or when the exceptions to the rules aro more Important than the insanes of adherence, there is « nourime situation.” ‘To understand the international rogimes tha nileet patterns of interde- penance OME TRU TOR ell in Chapter 3, at structure and proces {in Fnternationalsystoms, as well as at how they alfoct each other, structure ofa system sefrs tothe distsliition of capabilities among. sin lag-units In futernationel politcal xystons the swest inportant waits sales, and apabiiiel have hoon rode as tele power ing elton of ealeygriring the distribution uf mmbor and importance of sesoutees. power in intestate systems according to the major actors (for instance, as unipola, bipolar, multipolar, and dispersed) just as economists deseribo the structire of market systems as mimpalise tic, duopolistic, ollgopolistc, and competitive? Structure is therefore Wo are concomed a this hick with the grea aston of alone to spect bate norms ofthe ropinor ve examine, Hynes ea ase eager tn toms of the dogres and type of pin! Intonation nin the stats her to thom. ee S Nye Pence in Parts (Boston Ll, Benvm 1571), Chapter 2, for assim of ‘measurement of the Integrative and Intttona dines of rene isos fn proces, whe refers to allctive or bang. be iio within postr stator Tae Ue mal’ ee ye a tn proces Tee! uly a interest a how the yes ply Us hans tiny have oon dealt A the scr level thy are trsted i howe thee che need the ge seated intranets ats beta tur of anorthite een hat takes place within se The structure ofthe system (he disrbution of [per euirers ang tts) profane the nature of he og {the more oes toon se offroad infra er, Fles, nd Peace digs elrant tothe syton), ‘The regime, In tafe tl soe extent governs the ult arginine anak that secur tin the yt “ey 7 Changes bn intrsationaselnes are very important tn teratons trad, for expt, nn rational regime inl, wonder de prtces tis id down bythe General Arce Tn inde (GATT) jn 147 Frans then decades the GATT aang Hae eatitted reaivey effective tration regi. it she, hist Arend, partiiy sine the st United Nos Cosferenee Trade rd Develop! 104, a on ey he pty sucess ents Of let eve ets to change ths reime. Move bs, yt titty the cnn af ese dneloped coats Tor Nes Te tinal Bomomnie Ones inwaved stages ver what itera es shld govern te i sow materi od matress wll att foreign ivestent nthe tw fe power strue-, eas that we will investigate fv Past T= ao ‘oceans — some regime changes have been rapid and dramatic: wh others have feo ada, Dramatic changes took place ia internat nwmetary policy tn 1914 (suspension of the gold standard); 1991 (abun- lonment of the gold-exchinge standard; 104 (agreement on the “Bretton Wools System”): ad J97T (abandonment of the convertibility of do lars into god) Hs governing the nore sho it ul uses of the world's occas changed im icant tumning points fn 1045 andl after 1907, ‘Yet wo have no theary inthe fle of international relations Het adequate explains such changes. Judoed, mast of our theories da wot foens this question at all In Chapter 3, we shall look closely at the problem of explaining the change or persistence in the patterns af norms, rules, and proceddres tat seven ilendepondene in vais tees There we wil ly. ot foe models, or intellectual cmstructs, designed to explain regime change, and cxamine their strengths ane weaknesses, The models rest_on dillerent assumptions about the haste conditions of world. polities, Since word polities varies, over time nnd fon place to place, there iso reason to22 | snreapernnneaer i wont routes botiove that single st of conditions will always and everywhere apply, oor that any one model is likely to bo universally applicable Thus, before ‘cxzmining tho explanatory models, wo shall establish tho eondltions under ‘which they can be expected to apply. As we iulieate tn the next chapter In periods of rapid clvange such as the current one, assumptions about the conditions of world polities exw differ matically REALISM AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE Chapter 2 One's assumptions about world polities profoundly affect what one sces and how one enstructs theories to explain events, We believe that the sssmmptions of political realists, whose theories donninated the postwar Period, are often an tnndeysate basis for analyzing the polities of inter dence, ‘The be seen af an extrome sot of conditions or ideal type, One could also ima: ‘gino vory different cnelitions. tn this chapter, we shall construct another ideal type, the apposite of realism, We call it complex interdepentence ‘Mee erasing the diferenece tween eal comple ie pendence, we shill argue that complex interdependence sometimes comes closor to tality than does wealism, When It does, teadiional explanations of cling in international rogines become questionable and the search for new explanatory models becomes more urgent. or politent roulists, international politics, ike all othes puis stniggle for power but, unlike domestic poll «-sriggle"duiated by joxganized violence, In the words of the most inflental postwar textbook, “AIL history shows that nations active in international polities ate contin ‘ously preparing for, actively involved in, of recovering from ong Violence in the form of wan”! Three assumptions are integral to the realist vision, First, states as coherent ants are the dominant actors in ‘world polities. This is a double assumption: states are predominant, and Uhoy net as eoherent unis. Sceond, realists assume that force is x usable and effective instrument of poliey, Other instruments may also. be em21 | weausie ano enatonax mevimmrsanene ployed, but using oF threatening foree is the aust effective means of ‘wielding power. Thied, partly because of their secon assumption, realists assume a hierarchy of issues in world polities, headed by questions of nilitary socurity: the “high politics” of military security dominates the “low polities” of seowomnic sd seta affatr. These realist assumptions define nw leat typeof world polities, They. allow us to laagine « world in whiels poltcs & evntinnully eharnetertzed by netive oF potential conflict among states, with the ase of force possible at any Ume, Each state attempts to defend its territory and Buterete froin teal or perceived threats. Political Integration among states Is sight aud Tasts only as Tong as Ht serves the sutfonal Interests of the most powerful states, Transnational actors alther do not exist or are pollealy wulmpor. tant, Only the adept exereise of force or the threat of foree permits states to survive, and only while statesmen suceecd iy adjusting thelr hnterests, as in a well-funetioning halanee of power, i the system stable Each of the realist assumptions eam he challenged. If we challenge th all simultancously, we eam imagine a world iw states participate dircetly in world polities, in whic issues dlogp not exist, aid fn which force is ai ineloet policy. Under these conditions — whieh we call the el plex Interdependence ono would expect world polities to he very differ! ent than under roalist condition We will explore these dilferencos in the next section of this chapter We do not argue, however, that complex huterdependonce faithfully re Meets world polities reality, Quite the contrary: hoth it and tho realist ‘portrait are ideal types, Most sitvntions will fll somewhere between these two extremes. Sometimes, realist assumptions will be accurate, or largely seca; but frequently complex Inerdopenlece wll provide 9 beier portrayal of reality. Before one decides what explanatory model to apply to. situation or problem, ono will need to derstand the degree to which realist or complex interdependence assumptions correspond to the situa- tion, ‘THE CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE Complex interdependdonce has three main chraeteristies: 1. Multiple channels connect societies, including: informal thes hetweet governmental elites as well as formal foreign ofice arrangement; informal ties among nongovernmental elites (Face-to-face and through telecom ‘munieations); and transnational organizations (su 2 corporis, se des Be smmrize as interstate, ts sa tna instr rane the Isms hy est Tromgovemmental apes hen toe the reas asin Mat ato ac coherently eile fn naples when esl heaton th ste ae the ey. 2h nga of inlrtte rltnshpr const of mips tat ae mot arranged tn cleo onsant hve HG ubnene of terry ann. ies wens, nmin other hing tat alta socat hci catenins the ngenday Many uot arse om wh ttl ho eosidere conte pes and the dition between dome tea foc is fee These tse econ several sven depatnents (tos foes), ela soe icv dete poly cot on tse baer volver sgcnt coats Dillevent fetes verte diferent colton, bt lin gover tents anaes thes dole diferent degrees of ole. utes does not stop tte water dg 3, Miltary force ese ws by governments toward etbr ge wii the region, or the ft when empl intrdapnce ps “alk I amy, hee, ptt these goverment late ith government nts tat rin, ore thes cst fre elt ttn, kv revi greene one svn meres all yet the sume be ey hast te thal a ty eats th 2 ales Fo the former rato this conto open nterdependene won Ire met; for the hitter, it would wat. " ™ val theres of fnte tallonal polities fof these three ass ily or explicitly dey $ ons ati Moxtore emped also to deny the relevance of ills ised on the complex ntrdependence ideal type. We believe, hnwover, that cur tyes eon Uns ato fit well aprexinated on sone global sues ef canoe and cetlogial interdependence sd tat they cme dose to chance the coir relationship hetween sone comin, One of our purposes hee to prove that etenton. fn slscat chapters We sal ecu cove plex interdepandenee tn ages policy and monetary ply and the catonships of the United States to Canada and Austral In this ape, Fuowever, we sal ey teat yu to take thee eres of adn assumption seriou. ‘Multiple Channels A visit to any major airport is « dramatic way to confrn the existence of multiple channels of contict among advaveed industrial counties; there26 | meatine ano contrnx nerenw {sa voluminous literature to prove it? Bureaucrats from different eoun- trios deal directly with one another at meetings and on the telephone as well as in writing, Similaely, nongovernmental elites frequently get to gether in the normal course of business, in organizations such as the Te lateral Commission, and in conferences sponsored by private foundath In addition, multinational inns and banks alfoct both domestic and Interstate relations. The limits on private fis, or the closeness of ts ho towoon government and business, vary emsideesbly from one aveiety to another; but the participation of large ann! dynamfe organizations, wot controlled entirely by governments, has become normal part of foreign as well as domestic relations. “Thoso actors are Important not only Wocasise of thelr activities fy pue- suit of their own interests, but aleo because they aet as trnsin making government policies {n various countries more sent nother. As the seope of governments’ domeste netivities has broadened, an as corporations, banks, and (o a lessor extent) trade wins have ymade Aecsions that transcend national hnindaries, the domestic policies of dilferont countries i ‘more and more. ‘Transnational comnnutntentio polites touch more domestic economle activity than in the past, busing the lines between domestio‘and foreign policy nnd increasing the number of fesves relevant to foreign polfey. Parallel developments. tn issues of envtvom mental regulation and control over technology reinforce this trend Absence of Hierarchy among Issues Foreign alfairs agendas — that is, sets of issues relevant to foreign policy with which govermsments ara concemed —have heenne larger andl sore diverse. No longer can all issues be subordinated to military security. As Scoretary of State Kissinger doserihod the situation in 1975 progress fn dealing with the traditional agenda is no Tomger enough. A sew and edented kind of fave has emerged, The problem of enorgy, resource, sent, population, the ses of space and the sea ue tne wt epson of military security, fdcology ancl terctoria sivalry whieh ave traditenally ‘made up the diplomatic agenda,” Kissinger’s list, which could be expanded, illustrates how governments policies, even those previously considered merely domestic, impinge on fone another. The extensive consultative arrangements developed by the OECD, as well as the GATT, IMF, and the European Community. tnd cate how characteristic the overlap of domestic and foreign poliey is ng developed pluralist countries. The organization within nine major ALAR O SB A = 3 dopa ‘of the United States government (Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Health, Hdueation andl Welfare, Interior, Justice, Labor, Stat, rind Treasury) and many other ageneles rellets their extens tional commitments. The multiple, overlapping issues that result make nightmare of governmental organization’ ‘When there are anultiple issues on the agenda, many of which threaten the intorests of domestic groups but do not clearly threaten the nation as whole, the problems of forimulating a eohorent and consatent foreign policy inereuse. hv 1975 energy was a foreign poliey problem, but speclic remedios, such as n tax on gasoline and automobiles, involved domestic logislation oppose! by auto workers and companies alike, As one com inentator observed, “wetually every lime Congress has act w national policy Uat changed the way people live . .. the action eaine after a consensus Ina developed, bit hy bit, over the years that a problem existed and that there was one best way to solve it?" Opportunities for delay, for rpecinl protection, for inconsistency and incoherence abound when Internationa polities requiees aliguing the domestic policies of pluralist democratic ‘onto. jor Role of Mi tary Force Political selentists have traditionally eaplasized the role of nullity force Iw ternational polities. As we saw in the frst chapter, force dominates other means uf power: if there are no constraints on ones choice of in struments (« hypothotial situation that has ly been approximated in the lwo world wars), the state with superior military force will provail. If the sceunity dileinna for all sinter wore extremely acute, military force, sup. ported by economic and other resources, would clesefy be the dominant siuree of power, Survival is the primary goal of all states, aud in the ‘worst situations, force ts ulinmately necessary to guneantes survival. military foreo‘s always a central component of national power. ‘Yet particularly among industelalized, pluralist counties, the perceived inargin of safely Ins widened: fears of attack fn general have declined, sun! fous of ntGicks by one mother are virally nonexistent, Franco fine abandoned the fous azinuts (defense in all ditvetious) strategy that Pres dont de Gaulle advocated (it was not taken enthely seriously even at the Lime). Canada’s last war plans for fighting the United States were aban. dloned half « century no, Britain and Gerinany no longer feel threatened clationships of matual influence exist between these countees, bat in most of them force is irelovant or unimportant as nto policy. Moreover, force is often wot an appropriate way of achieving other goals (such as cermomic and ecological welfare) that are becoming more Usta ue Brestle2 | mxauame ann conten uerennerrnnnin important, Te 16 not impasible tw fungine duwsatie once oF revo onary change in whieh the ze of threat of military Torco over am eco nomic issue oF among advanced industrial eonutries night hocomne plausibte ‘Thon realist assumptions would again he a reliable guide to events But In most situations, the effets of military fores are both eostly and ine certain Even whon the direct uso romp of connties, however, military power enn still he use pute. Each superpower continues to use the threat of foree to deter attacks by other superpowers om itself or its allies; its deterronce ability hs serves a indie, protec: tive role, which i ean wse in bargaluing on other sues with its allies, This bargaining too! is partiutaely important forthe United States, whose allies are concerned about potential Sovict threats aid which has fowor other ‘means of influonee over its allies thaw does th Soviet Union over ite Eastern European partners. The United States Is, accordingly, taken advantage of the Europea (particularly the Germans) dose for tts protection and linked the issue of troop levels ju Fsrope to trade and ‘monetary negotiation qh te firstnnder elfoc of deterrent Force is essentially negative—to deny effective offensive power tn superpower opponent a state enn sito that force pontvely —to yun politcal Influence ‘Thus, even for countries whose relations approximate en pendence, twos (I) deste soa snd politcal charige-eoald cause foxce. again. to,hecoine at fmportank direct instrument ‘of jolicy; and (2) even when elites interests axe eamplemontary, mca Ley tha Hes altar Fores fo protect another may have sigaifennt polti plex intorde ‘or telations among Thied World eountties, a wall ag in East-West rolations, force is often important, Military. power helps the Soviet Union to dominate Eastern Huroje seanonically as well as politically. The threat of open or envert Americun military oo has helped to limit revolutionary changes in the Caribbean, especially In Guatemala in 1954 and fy the Dominican Republic in 1965, State Kissinger, iu January 1975, issued a veiled warning to (de Orguntzation Af Fetrolewi’ Exporting Canutries (OP United States might uso force against them “whore there is some netval strangulation ofthe industvalized work." * Even in these rather conflictual stations, Ihnwever, the reemurse to force seems less likely now than at mast tines during the eentury before 1945. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons naskes any attack against nuclear power dangerous, Nuclear weapons re mostly used as a del rent. Threats of gainst winch weaker counties way ac ceasionally be effin wre Tikely to solidly "HME POLITICA eHOCRSEES OF CONFER twTERDREENDENEE | 20 relations between one's adver fore to contrat socially aah United States Failure fn Vietn es. "The limited usetulness of conventional ized populations has heen shown by the mas well as by the rmpid decline of cole Dalisn in Afviea. Furtherwore, employing force on one isue against an Independent state vith which one has @ warety of relationships i Iikly {o rupture mutually profitable relations on other issues. In other words, {tease of Fore oft Tas costly foes on nonsecurty goals, And Bally, in Wester democracies, popu positon to prolonged military cons is very high * eis clear that these constraints bear fon the sane «x lly varus counts, or esi fern stations Nes of ner sion It dante ota fa eas eating oe sist tte ofr athotartan regional powers tha for the Gee Sy Ewope, or Jap ven suthorartan cout may be elves ees force oobi cone objectives when such tae enh be, ate snd tpt other reitoship Dath the ilety af een mest tnliized populations with foe hoops andthe ehenpg weet, Uf sweponty ny ally eae the bly of ee onsite pr he tao ae towal orea “he fet tht the nnging roe of fore has sven elles dogs pot imo seine le tpt, bt I doe nake ate ee eke ‘This camplesty ke compound by diforsees he eet es mn a esr erat a sin, iy Bo thinks nau stone, ele ene ee valuable eneept for analyzing the pallet proces: Uti thet sce her or of feds oa some Fpl tught ot gle he, tome the nee tet of force eld ee de aga eal seine wool ten ne loan 101s thos inpvtatt dstrmin the apply of essa or of compl itrdepontonc tech stanton Witt the dec Tatler analyse Il tte emia. Out pumps ene sermtive (othe reat serpin of wold poles tees Aitertted apo at digestions Sod a ‘or pes not ft smn alam observer do) to ape one arcs lation wit ter counties, oF hot effective ‘THE POLULICAL PROCESSES OF COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE. ‘The thee main chivaeteristies of complex fnterdependence give rise to Alistinetive politic processes, which traishite power resources into power0 | nxatins an contrHaK IFRAME 4s control of outcomes. AS we argued earlier, something fs usually Tost or addled in the translation, Unider conditions of compler tuterlepentonce tho translation will be dilferont than wider realist exnditons, and out predictions about outcomes wil need to he adjust! econ In the realist world, military security will be the dominant goat of states I wl even affect issues that sre vot diectly tnvolved with military Power o eral defense, Nonny pws wil wt uly ba ordinated to military ones; they will he Mudd for ther politic military Inplcatlons Balance of pryients sues, for istance, wil bo covstred at least as much in the light of their implications for_world power gene cally as for thelr purely financial ramifications. MeGeorge Bundy en formed to realist expectations when he argued in 1904 that dovaluation of the dollar should bbe seriously considered if necessary to Right the war in Vietnam? ‘To some extent, so did former Treaniny Secrotary Hemy wwler when he contended in 1971 that the United States neoded « trade surplus of $4 billion to $8 billion tn order to Tend in Western defense. Jn. world of complex Interdependence, however, ano expects so%0 coficils, particulaly at lowor love the saricy of state goals The purse. Jn. the abs rach of Hse, joa swil vary by issuo, and may not he cisely relate. Buch fnrexneraey will i oacerns, and although several agencies may eae eon hint affect thor al, thy will id that consistent pate iMfcult to maintain. Moreover, tewsnational actors Will rode diféent goals Into various groups of fc. Linkage Steategies Gonls wil therefore vary by issue area smnder complex huterdependenco, bat so will the distribution of power and the typical polital processes, Traditional analysis focuses on the international system, atl leads us to antiipate similar political processes ow a variety of iste. Miliarly and economically strong states will dominate a variety uf organizations and a variety of issues, by linking their own poliies on some issuct to other stator’ polio on other iron. By wing tee overlt dominance to prevail] on their weak issues, the strongest states will ve traditional mod ensure a congruence between the overall stictire uf military and eco nomic power and the pattorn of onteames on any ome sue area, ‘world polities ean be treated asa soniless web. lependenee, such congruence i los likely to occur lued, militarily stiowg states will Bnd i mo foul Tues helr"dverall dominance to conteol outcomes on lssues which they ai@-Weak. And sines the distabution of power tesoueos in trade, shipping, or ol, for example, may he quite dilferen, pattoms of ‘outcomes and distinctive politieal processes are Tikely to vasy feom one sot of isons to anther, I fore wore raxily applicable, nd itary eaity weve te highest forcigu poliey youl, these variations fn the lise structures of power would nal matter very mich. ‘The Tinkages dra from them to wiltary issues would ensure conastent dominance by the overall strongest states. Hut when military Coree fs largely immobilized srvng states wll fad that linkage is Tess effective, They nny still attempt sul Tins, bt fv the tof a hierarely of issues, thelr success ll he problematic. Dominant states may try to secure much the same result by using overall econamic power to alleet results on other issues. If only economic objec lives are at stake, they may suceveds money, alter all is fungible. Bue ccomomie objectives have politieal implications, and economic linkage by tho stiong is limited by domestie, transnational, ail transgovernmsgital Actors who resist having their interests traded if-Fiteriore, the inter: hational welors may Ie diferent on diferent ites, and the fnternatinal izations in which negotiations take place are often quite separate. it is difficult, for example, to Imagine a militarily or comoeall g sla Hinking eoncersions on monetary palley to teeiprucil eonee sions in oceans policy, On the other lund, poor weak slates ate not Simi. {arly inibited froin linking related (snes, pasty because their domestic interests re fess complex. Linkage of snelited issues Is often a means of structing emerssions of side payments from rich and powerlul sates And slike powerful states whose fustrimcut for linkage’ (nilitary Cores) {s often ton costly to we, the linknge instrument used by poor, weak states ~ tslernational ganization ~ available ard inexpensive. hs asthe utility of foree declines, and as Fsses Heese wore esl i Importance, the distibitiin of ower within eich iss will beeome more Important. F Tnkages econ less effective” oi the whol politi bargaining vill verona by se tea. The diferentintion among iste nreas in conplex interdependence nati. ave will mens that Tnkages anon isies will become, more proble tend red ex.tham reinforce intemational, bicrarchy:. Linkage srategtes, and defense against them, will pose eritieal strategic ehoiees for slates, Should issues he considered separately or as « package? If linkages fare fo be duawn, whi tases shi he fnked, and on which of the linked issues should concessions be made? How far exw one push a linkage before it heeones counterproductive? For instance, should ene seek forest agreements or informal, but Tess politely sensitive, wnderstanlings? ‘Th fret that workd polities wider complex interdependence is nat «sean | ‘web leads us to expect that cffrts to stitch seas together advantageously as flee Uae strategies, wll very ft, derive the shape af | the fae,299 | MRALIOM ANH) COMPLAK WrrKAORENMENE ‘The negligible role of foree leads us to expect states to rely more on other instruments in order to wield power, For the reasons we have al ready diseussed, less slates will ty to use asymmetrical Fates onree of powe al transnational IL ongautations D ie terdlepwraener inte ‘wells ts olfects om citizens’ welfare, slthangh welfare Tent thele attempts to maxima power, Mast cconaaie anil ceslygieat interdependence involves the possibility of julat gus, oF joint loses, Mutual awareness of potential galas and lasses nd the deur of worsen cach actors position throwgh overly rigaraus slegules aver the istthie tow of the gains ean Tint te use of wsynaetrcal Interdependence, dope also.try.. fv tat Agenda Setting ‘Qu second_asumption of comples interdependence, the lack of clear. leraehy among multiple Fes, lends vs Uv expect thatthe polites of goa HoweMLN snd etl will hecome wore tpontant. Tradifoal Analyses lead staan to facts ov polllerniltary tesuoe and to pay Ai, he broader poll OF agenda formation, Statamen a i wil ho ty ais the Ila of power, nt or antepated, and by porcsived thrats to the sour uf tater Other when they seen to alle soctity sd genes wil be tflucneed strongly by naltary power. Tn tote tse tnsirations of tho overall Ilan of power. Yet, today, some ronnlitry face see ciaphastil fn fotestate role tions at ono timo, whorear others of secmingly eal Importance are ne- glected or quietly handled at tocwea! level International monetary Politics, problems of commedlity torms of trae, oil. fond, and- malting onal corporations have all heen important dri the Test decade: hut not all have been high on inteatte agendis theo ht peed ‘Traditional analysts of Hnterational politics haw pai ttle attention to agenda formation: to how issies come to recive sustained attention by high offal, Tho traditional orientation toward military and security aifais implis that the ervatat probloms of forex poliey aro imposed on states by the actions or threats af other states. These are high polities as opposed to the low pales of ecole aa, Ye, athe complexity of actors and isuos in world polities increases, the utility of Fores declines and the line between domestic poliey aud foreign policy hecomes blurted a the conditions of complex interdependonee nee more closely approx: ‘mated, the polities of agends formation becomes more subtle snd difler cntiated, Under complex interdependence we cr expedt the agenda to be affegted by. Hheinteratonal tnd domestic peobles ereated by economic We rOLANICAL wnocessES OF coMrLEX MerENDEFENDKNGE | Auth wa Invesing ssty atedependnce. thao dest i. thet ate, Dicnteted deste gmp al poltcza tee wa Force mois ts ance coder deste ont the iterate gona SH nth dst of poster tears thin sts of tes wl alas allot nena. Dati ely 197 the nceased power of sik yrode ing goveraments aver the titnatona conportons and the somes ovis dramatically awed the policy agenda, Moreover, ages fo te rn of sues ny cage asst linkages from ole prope in which jer resmrs ae changin Tor examples te broad Agee of Nonhsint trate faves lang aftr the OPEC pre es wel the wi eng of 107-74, Rew I expen among sates do ot change, ea ay I alfetd hy shit ts the Importance of auntie stor: Th pully sumonidng sltvationl conportins tn the ely 1070s, cpl with thelr rapid grove over the pt twenty yes pe the regulation of suc corporations higher en both the United Nets agen and natal aon “Potton = ity the toprol the yg Ca an issue that tend sues, by Tk iis besoining Inelfective ‘or is nol serving import inereasing_ polit outed grooms pe rt hase also ai froin ci, Domesite gps iy become upset enough to fae a darmant sue of to ester with Inet baraing a high level in 107 the Aree secretary of stats wet Hage fs Sov Arnerian tale pct with progress tent as upset the nace of nwt America gr orn toh Congest oink a eae age Inet wl Soviet poles aw pet ‘The technical chatter nd tional seth in which ies ave esd wll strongly let polation patton tn the, United Stes, congressional tin ment of pleat Generally, expt rata cen ogunzations ad tan snetal metworks of bares to stk to aid piteatin, Bem ey Isr ch tk ks) amet barverates nl Tend to ese poltevaton (ptteerlymgrssonal stnton) agit th srt ie eenpettns AL ene tonal Tove we expt sates and try to “ahs or sa stg to et iss rs in tration ongatins that wll nt ze ther advantage by eng or nar the agen 1 and Teansgovernmental Relations nl fins_of complex interdepon ‘oniet among societies, further burs the distinc ult nines of ton between domesticwl polls, The avaitaitty of prtners ty pit oo tions snot necessarily Hite by national nares ns tit sis assumes. The nearer a situation is to complex moro we expect the outcomes of transational relations, Multinatio igaifewnt both ay independent actors and as instr al hy owernmnents The attitudes and poly stale of clomestic grap ane Mikey te affected by communications, organized or wot, Detweon therm and thelr counterparts abrord, “Tinustha.xistevce. of multiple chauncls of contact leads us to expect Tsnits,heyondLshose socially found in aloniestie polities, nw the ability of statesmen (0 caleulie-the snanipulition of interdependence or fallow 1 consistont strategy of linkage. Statesmen must consider «liferental as well ts aggregate effects of interdependence strategies and their likely impli cations for poitictation and agenda control. Transactions among societies = ceomomic and socal trasvetions move than security ones —aflect romps diferent. Opportunities anal costs from tncxeased transnational tes ay be reatet for cata groupe for stan, Arserian workers In the textile oF shoo industries ~ than for others, Som organizations oF groups may futeract diveely with actos in other societies ar with other govern ments to increase their benefits from « network of intestetion, Some actors may therefore be less vulnerable as well as hss sensitive to changes ole where in the network than are others, and this will affect patterns of politialaetio ‘Th multiple channels of contact fowl in complex tnterdependenee are not limited to nongovernmental actors. Contiets between governmental Daraucraciet charged with similar tasks may not ony alter thelr perspec tives but lend to transgovernmental coalitions ow particular policy ques tions. To improve their chances of success, goverment agencies attempt to bring actors from other governments into their own decision-making, processor ar alles. Agenetes of powerful state such as the United States have wed such coalitions to ponotrate wesker governments in such op tuies as Turkey and Chile. They have also heen used to help agencies of ‘other governments penetiate the Uniti States Inweueasey "Ax. we shall see in Chapter 7, transgovornmental polities frequently ehuracterires Canadian-American relations often tothe advantage of Canadian interests. ‘Tho existence of tausgovernmental poliey netwoaks leads to a diferent \lerpretation of one ofthe standard propositions about interuitonal poi- aly ntordependence, the (Ges =U states act in their ow Tnlereik. Under complex interdopen “Wenes, WE conventional wisdom’ begs two portant questions: which sel aid WHTTLAATGLES?-A government ageney may pinste its own inte ests under the guise of the national interest; aul reenerent fnterations ‘can change oficial perceptions oftheir interests, As a enreful study of the relies of United St ate has doen, cnentatng ent tm resins of erin nee for deo fends as ay ie bw onto roses a meats the Ingots ent Into i dy sg preteen “he any of tena Tatsest rae eos probes forte wp alters of act: ea ct cl es ly nee atonal ones att alg tough fog ees cent ent bones roc. Ehs tears a sat wi be ted whe ding wt forlgn gone ee ete “pnt wi ee tan Ite Say when neg wi ow to he alfacty eve sh falcon ti, Hee tlt nich ne Prince) wl be ter ee mange ee ‘pds th grt tra st a ne a ss cto pelt a diferot nwo pol, et ‘of Mans J. Morgenthau havo portrayed «wosld sich sites, acting Tn selina stage fok rnc sere Scwity iss ae doninnt, war Uates tn sucha wel, oe ay sce a iteration hats wl hve amir ae ted y tho re engrace af ch intrest open et tlewiy peripheral tn werd pen, But tra word of muple fossa perfectly liked, in which edalitons are Tome {governmentally, the potential role of fniernational fnstitutovs "i pallical ~ Frrgaiing is grat incre Th paneer tay lp et tial aged and acts stats Fr oto fonnation las eee for pla intves a age hy en tte ‘Governmonts st nay themselves fo eope with th fay of bus vss goad by inert trgantatons By deg the ‘ea deiding eich iss ext be: rnp tet oxo nay Help to determine yovermmental pie ma the nate Ito Acpurtnenta coves andthe argent within peers ‘he 1972 Stoel Eine Coneren strength pons exvizonmentalageaios in varios governments ‘the 174. Weel. Fed Ganferens oss the atenton a npn pat of the United Stes ggvernment om preset flood shortages, The Septet 10% Uae Batons spt extn proposals Torn New Inbetnal Exo40 | execamune nerramrunens snam 12000 snifes away i the sine as that of telephoning someone mach loser, Supertanters ane eter watt shaping, telly, ve Seduced the easts of ranspoting gona. Aud the sae ev, “rumen ave een dan i aypeenent,emsltatons aad nts toe with rapidly expanding testo “Tit promis fan cemvinie process ibid change and nerste in renannieflerepeadence il tn Inertial gles tte ‘he wil He hades Caps es Taceased stun of transteions new Fors ge sation repetentd, for tistanee, by transnational eorpoatons Hstalised Tatlin, rte, nl pred ll he three ith ile ve ov collage. “The socond premise f that gov unde of ve change ats le highly expose to lontats alt demands fort rs soar ug, Nati sere ekfare wil cavaily be the dart pula on ann sxng Ione sina pode wD acral ttn Tho. ie eee a sel hat te pest ggregate ene be pre ae tematlonal taovaments of cpa ons, sod bv son tes ‘Wier ol alee peverninens no incenes to ally oy sect Fer atectt sadist tetore thelr fetes, Coveronents will ee ton of gals at copa abst the Tos of eres entailed In rsh econmne ineependence (vray a ser erat), but they wil overall find that who ther are Tames pulltleat demands for rear ene were, the welfare costs sr atccupdig Internal eanorate eatin, o flowing them to econ Ghaot are grater than the autonomy bevafis, Nelveanty, they ail fami ceondle Interdependence to gros, snd c¥en more rly Per ineosably, they wil be deve into conperting tn the emnstruction of ov fnterntnal segs by evening negetel ple responses, Ts Pains change wl ea prot of grade nap to new wanes ed ee Toane of eanantionl seman ntvty. Caveat vl resist tho Tetpecion to drupe oe break regimes, becuse of he hig cost to eco nomic growth, Fe raf wn ooonomte pracst wel un shuld thovefore expect intesatonal seine tobe undornned fon te Uo ine coon InN technologie changes but thoy wilt disintegrate entirely, atleast ae oe Long hey wl ely be reconstace to dp to cnn a tecnologia condtions- “This sep econ proces model os wt errespond ext the iow of any sophisticated theorist, altho it seems to exert a powerful Jniluence on the views of many people. Prujeetions that in the yenr 2000 a handful of multinational corporations will control mast of world producy tion, and wield greater power than governments, oF assertions that al, eet st Tre fing As pent Biss a ing development intentional integration inevit ng tneaepes art of the pea wf iortanee of technological change i ex the ast eontary. ° “ ply on tertnlotea snl eemnonite treks, Quite evidently, government ily saris econ eliency to see, mt a pales dete Hustle, this aiple eamoraegrt it ine th iyo vig see st to anther and thus doesnot confront the inevitable polite! questions shat jst bn ples, ceed, power Ine Ice te hy oe peti to hve to mit to cage Tn pgp ical cue the views of gover net aot their distribution largely ets "he abi ig adjontnent i ete | ote of lange he prt ples wll mn apidly sing eamonte interepend cate fear aud ingeeuity ang ality porting. Tabor nis and comme lors nay fe that expat dein to shit. production abvond er trends towant reer imports could enise severe wnemploynent md social disess, Inistter threaten by imports press Tor governmental pret. hs, otetonfon nay ate nemo tedepedence hea rote extensive Pytctiontsn has awaye heen With tse But ns the technology of eoninunkten and largoseale corporte organization he rd the stn tr htc ts, nny dese ep fave tured \o veruen to estublish political buffers, Even ‘when a ccnutyy {swt threatened hy Inerssedvolnerablty, the ses of itt gn consid io mie pte that ret strat The eonllts generated hy increased fterdependence ave contributed te ontrveny ver Inertial reine, whieh een emp quite sid cul, Yaa snp nun grt appro 3 vy let fire patti vara its major explanatory variable fs a Jongterm sen orig ag eg ot of tn ty Cpe ar easing auch wetivity, ad Teaing and maintained at some thes whereas ater tne, no regime eam be snccesflly iti? Ignite nth ere allt expat, ove would expect Haterstiona eennonite interdependent successively to ‘ulgrow” reglae constraints, and new regimes, better adapted to the new situation of faterdependene, icky to replace them, Inereasel tek tivity would Krad to now fses snd problems ut pretense ‘orlentation woud lel potieyinakers to new regime solutions. * Yet such an explanation obviously abstracts fron interests, which way Aeveloped Voliical entity, hwever, often diverges fram expectations bused sine i42 | exetainine nvreavationas wHeann cane Alvenge sharply from group to poup, sel Wo sector, oe cant to eo trys Talioessemes tat intermntionalpaiten-nitary pole deisons aco $Sparate fom esonomte ones I 15, tana desos crtated a two-tack or wtitrack rin fn which enone nd seeuty ines were kept fairly separate fn day-tory pete procenes They fvere usually Inked only iernchically hy dnt politi, Ug a Peale to conn scr gone ns of Ui cen, Sr potent cofies withthe goats of swale yoga. Yet Os separa tin and depaieintion of econone esc ea Ue nos in weld pel ies, Indeed, it may well hava licen an anomaly, dependent on postwar bate o alliance leodership, ing cca United States coonomie and military dnoinanes Dectuse the extent of intedepondence nl ls ellets depen to m ent siderable_exten evel political decisions nd agroeents, ted tional approncios to iferationel poles, which havo eoveentated these highlxal decisions andthe overall prover stnetve, should cov \ tribute to an adequate explanation. XPLANATION OVERALL POWER STRUCTUN) Broding Hegemony ‘There nothing new about estan hinds of interdependence sng lato, ‘Aibena and Speta wore interdepeent in itary security a the ie of ‘Thucyuds. The United States and the Svket Unio have been sey Interdepondone throughout the pst perio Nit oly ate te two eo trl tena to ehmgyes tn each hers security pls, ut thy ate tho vaeble ee thers ety dunn Peay te high XC nterdependengs hn oe Isue aren itary early — coupled il “Snatual antagonigne Taisen at the heat of tlitinal analyse of work lites: Under such cfreumstances security fsues take procedonce over Brea and power (with Its supporting exo: ome bas) coves War the est impertane Sd dranatcsees of arathral hange One on vm, for fstance tl tears the marks ofthe outcome af World War TL in the tational view, powerful tales make the rvs As Thucydides put “the stone do whet they ean andthe weak slferwint Uy must.”* In bilatrat rletions, the taitonalistsexpedt thatthe stronger of two \Yy si terete ee Yr System, the strucle (Oat the detribtion of power among the states ns the ature ot rene And thet in portant power resources are military. ve Appeal of the talifonal approach base on the overall power fovenaus, rowru staverune sxrtawarion | 43 structure fies in its simplicity and parsimonious prediction. Judgments of relative power seen easy to anake on the basis of military strength and it 's possible to calculate a rational course of action in any given situation ‘Wo assne that satesien think and seth terms of intrest defied as power, aud tho ovidevee of history bears that assumption out, That assumption ‘allows 1st retrce sind aeipate, as Beer, the steps a statesman —past, present, ot future as token or wil tke on the poliieal seane. We look over his shoulder ‘when he writes his dispatches; we Ustt fn his conversation with other state. ‘men; we read id antitpats his very thoughts? I Hs more extrome fo s, this realist approach deprecates Alomestie polities by smygesting that the national interes : Inte tn tens wf power, relative to other state, I not, the result will bo catastrophic, There litle margin for cholc. If dome Politics Soterferes with diponney, disster wil follow. Less drastic Positions of the traditional view allow for the effet of domestic politics, but the prncipa foes of the theory ~ ad the segment of tt thet provices, ity oxplantony power — conters on competition among states. I is compe tion among autononons ators that provides the ble diving fore of ‘world polities ‘The traditional viow does wot have a thoroughly articulated and aggeed- ca thay of gin cing glans ate pve ard ert structure defled tn terms of power eipabiltiey =daes, however, pro: Wide th as for developing wha theron el pees Te yarn is provided hy the nsertion that ss the power of states changes (that fs, as the structie changes), the rules that comprise Internaonal regimes will change accordingly. ‘This dynamic is at the heart of ou ‘model of sgn change based on the overall power structure This overall stwctore approach docs not dilferentintesiguiicantly among issue areas in world politics. On the contrary, it predietsn strong tevileey toward congrucnee of outcomes atnong issue area, Since poses like money, is considered fungiblo, power resources will be shied. by major stats to secure equal marginal returns inal areas, When outeomes on one issue aren are markedly diferent from those on others. we show expect shifts to make outcomes in the deviant area more consistent with of military and economic power. It follows from this , tht after 1073 the incongruity between. power i petroloun politics andl power generally in world polities was a Sounee of instability. Te war to be expected that the United States and other Ind traized counties would attempt to rece the incongruity in thelr favor by muta aid, encouragement of now souress of supply, and even by Lieats of military force. Nor was it suprising that olLenporting states, ed in the Orguniation of Petvleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),44 | exrtatwine erent vould yt resale the eon i he avr yes thee eng through arms purchases, alianecs with ater ‘hi World eountis for & scree ro rh nth ome tnd unbluus lapse drop tos esse of th ve power dsprtes, nwover, tata then woul ive he OPEC ates red eee eee ee “in apesuln’ about which sie wl rv may ov may wt Be ‘confirmed, bat the realist insight fs important: ne should ‘examine closely Stony in which he dssbuton of power ieee news ven. Tensions develop at these. points of Incongul ye pe seals ak leet dain Wher dines the pve rete fone fue aren wll spread tothe syst asa whole or be messed. ea sen! eae vee fe gal wows sceulng na tool power ttre cn be ated ln hangs aera eee he tug wae hes: the tn pole tay pc hd afetentac eg, Tie ol crea aly poe sh ach tls to ogenany wil leateeip, Econ Rive tegosd that ine ecosomlereyines toque Tedethipthat ngs to fore sor tern gong in oor to pe The rene and fat tn ator & mnt Het to pve svc leadership ren sce ef atmo consume ofthe lngternbenels pede iy the regina "el wld int uh enon gine woul best lyn hogemontl syste tht, whoa stte power ct pn i oe eng nr ato Siting todo mln aalon to em ianing rg ck Tate an abvogi eating proven the adptono ls Ot op fs othe dontant role tn enstieting now rls 8 eg Ironia sytem, threor, the preponderant tte as ot postive wd negative power. Tra rest world, such a condition wld imply military prponerac, bat not cerry freuent use of itary Ce. the netenth on tay, Haan ccesonly cod ts preponderant nal owe to fre roo tnd a Sot Arr a to poet fed of Ti fom he Groahinent of couse sates, fut gory such aout were wes: tary A hogenontl power can cane the roles ator tan adapt oles tthe ales, Brnine poston dla ed of the seas, for etample ad not deter her foo ire neta Shipping wen she was at war. But during penetine, the Dish gover: nett ld in role malotenmce by sorpeluay enforcing foe sem rues taint Its ove domes Itrest, wich atepled tet broader ‘Sasa edo, "Whet the hegemonial power does not sco one lhe sats, ut ly w pro "The Vax Brita that ah leader have been rt its fet pion, ler states nay bone as wel vc fen datas Charen King hes Interatonal econ apne ion ntl thant stem tyne hen soca wth eater opty. the wactacth saree race ‘rent of Gre Dae ed the baa for 8 ay ee Nos entered pal ath wt enty on Lone rea War I theo the 1960, the ean prepondrance at the Used Sinks ena tonamge onety rebates eee nt cons toh th Ht Weds system. Dy eta ee ae in mare deta ater, the appy Inert snc apis the interwar pore ered when the United Ses war Ceeiey ‘ere semen hoo oso egemonialyowers dh mat, terefre ayy explo secondary power emo, During the heyday of the seng anda take rn auton in France evan Hn and te Une Stats ene 50 pero to400 perc ft tha ain Athol ta ed States dominated the monn syste of th posta pated: Beto Jag rr nave py tat a, ven sacs eek en Hoenn Davi Cain nett“ ns dle eeu hae dalla stom wa caning cca toe meee Why thew da legonnsh stent and Uh corerponding econ nes calla? War or maj sist the oval aes of pce thanleenss Bit these sytem ny aso be andere Te ae very eanmomie prnvsus ny ern hosp, the hana Hexen, se eset ty which hye sara ne tag se As thr vente rer nce, Sess) ee change ther pions. Nr lngr de thy hase heer sa dpetence whieh, nner one propeous, adveaely tees es ‘ed pt stats, Ar autonomy and sats Cocos poste, thee wales te taken rie ene eee a Fre oats” At Tos for son Toners a sa France the MB a LN pomp nwo agers Ths the mlvasting na leven pes oe hegemomey iste Ino ert psa seen sata ve Maly tocge ff Btw ae th poles ofthe heen state Anatase + proliferation of al te ply meres wl sam nk ey lige batting to ay. sentra gn to werd arse eat Teaerhi, Fhe, is leadrship wl ew ad es apps to ea econ and pai obetve 4 ater sates baa mae ee ‘The renewal emp of these sears yovernets ae a tutonony ad futher cpanel ea conmotton Unt i nd st prmaee Wee conse nes el such asWolved. More stais for secondary sins ma far the deta power ness In weaker rave” aohomony blag aononant done pte psitivetlleyce af easton lade "Thus the systemnteoenaton nara to een power — which iets tenets wh tote sen gee alge By move natty perspective at hoa a sn, ed y, fonneriy reeled ttle remeron te Arn hf of ney, kon When power socms{o enstre tnt risk ero misal,tls rgiont en Hes litle weights but when crmeksapponr in the hegewnlal eon Proce cous wht floney foray prose When this point iz rexehed on both skles, the hegenonte exgulbetum hhas been broken and a spiral of action snd countersetion may sot in. Ag She.nsten changes ammimpions, dong: ‘on one skle widerations of risk aversion rater independence on the other couse polis with or lest aystomfe implications. ‘The wncertainty thus rete way ba diel to slop eye of disintegration eam readily set a pnp ts pnt of cca proces ered {ng overall hegemony has a certain appeal By adding a fow assumptions itprovids an explvation Dawes the ower pwer arte tt te counts for changes iu econo eogims despite the absence. of major war ‘or major shifts ty the balance of power. Applying tit nade to the post- svar period, one tn aque that ines replies that socompanied the “Imperial Republic” or the “Aneviann Knit” aro coe Taping duc to the “doclne of American poswes.” Limitations of an Overall Structure Explanation avafully defined, the concept of hegemony’ al analysis of its exasion Sp coon pocans cep expla eine ene Bt ths overall structurg explanation fs more ambiguous than i Gest mppoars, wed en Jead to facile descriptions of change, We mast spocity what resouress are considered ellective in establishing hegemonic power, and to what range ‘of phenomena iis monn to apply” The simplest and mos parsonnins version of the eroding he tiass would be that international ceonanie reyines diver “ieoraltary patterns of capability: high polities de ‘Chiviges in imervational een ae explained by st rilitay power. This simple version explains the brad features of the postwar éeonomnie order, particularly its basi divisions. Although Soviet or Chinese purchases and sales ean affect world markets, these planned economies are seperate enough that itis more aveurate to think of tines Alistinct cooionsie systems, corresponding tothe three majar (hut wns) Somes of pales pers " Yer the mst parsimonions explanation Ineaks dovwn when one moves from explaining overall stricture to explaining change, The United Stater Position fw the world exunonsy, aval Hts dnninanes tn polieymaking, both ‘within the iudustitize areas sud with the Third World, have clearly de. clined siven 1944 or 1950. Yet dining this posiod the United States as re wines, wily, the most paver state fn te word and fe may loud over its mar coonomie partners (Japan, Canada, and Europe) hee been stendily maintained if not increased. ‘Tihs, although the distibutlon of alltary power alee the interne onal economic order, by ise it provides only'a small part of the expla tion, Three other major factors must be added. fox au-adequate overall srueture expliiation, thus reducing, its simplicity but increasing its it with the fietz of postwar change i international economic regimes: (I) shonges in perceptions of the threat of mnlitary aggression (2) changes in the relative econ strength of the United States and its trading and in ‘estmontpastners; and (3) changes tn hierarchical” patteyns. involving Eiitope nd the Thied Wonk Gncorn about w communist military deat helped stholeto Amerioans to make shortun econonnte nerifces (What is 0 exercise leadership) to ovelop snd proserve the IMborad postwar economic regimes. that ‘com tnthuted to European and Sapanese reeovery. Many of the major advancos {in Sntersational economie relations eame dining the long period of maxi ruin Cold War tension between 1047 (the Trumaen Doctine) and 1969 (tho Test Ban Treaty), Iv these years, the Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (BND), Genoral Agreement on Tails and Trade (GATD, sod Orgnnization {or Economie Cooperation and Development (BCD) began fo function; eureney convertibility was achieved and nor tevffeuts implemented; and the Common Market was established, United States secaity leadership was prized by its allies, and the Amer can peteeption of high threat from the Soviet Union encouraged United States policymakers to grant variows economic concessions to the Euro: ppoons and the Japanese, The sharp redietions in perceived thyeats recent youre have certainly helped to reduce the United States ability subtly to translate its miltwy leadership of the alliance into economic leadership without resorting to overt and highly resented linkages. Ameri an allies beeaie less willing to acta junior partners once they pereeived the externa threat ns diminished, At the same time, American vlingness to accept economic discrimination or unfavorable exchange rates way also declining, Those changes f» perceptions were reinforced by ineteases in Buropean