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The rout this week was the result of two years of political
misjudgment. The referendum of 2016 was won by just 52% to
48%. Yet rather than consult the defeated side, Mrs May pursued
a hardline Brexit, hurriedly drawn up with a handful of advisers
and calibrated to please her Conservative Party. After she lost her
majority in 2017 the need to build a consensus became clearer
still, but she doubled down. Even after Parliament established its
right to vote on the final deal, she didnʼt budge, instead trying
(and failing) to frustrate Parliamentʼs vote by running down the
clock. The doggedness that has won her many admirers now
looks like pig-headedness. The prime ministerʼs promise after this
weekʼs crushing defeat to work with opposition MPs comes two
years too late.
But the crisis is not just about poor leadership. Brexit has exposed
two deeper problems. One concerns the difficulties that will face
any country that tries to “take back control”, as the Leave
campaign put it, in a globalised, interconnected world. If you take
back the right to set your own rules and standards, it will by
definition become harder to do business with countries that use
different ones. If you want to trade, you will probably end up
following the rules of a more powerful partner—which for Britain
means the EU or America—only without a say in setting them.
Brexit thus amounts to taking back control in a literal sense, but
losing control in a meaningful one. Leavers are right that the EU is
an increasingly unappealing place, with its Italian populists,
French gilets jaunes, stuttering German economy (see article)
and doddery, claret-swilling uber-bureaucrats in Brussels. But
they could not be more wrong in their judgment that the EUʼs
ominous direction of travel makes it wise for Britain to abandon its
seat there.
The prime minister has piled moral pressure on MPs to back the
deal anyway, arguing that even if they donʼt much like it, it is what
their constituents voted for. It is not so simple. Mrs Mayʼs deal is
not as bad as some of her critics make out, but it is far from what
was promised in 2016. Ejection from the single market, the
decline of industries ranging from finance to carmaking, the
destabilisation of Northern Ireland and an exit bill of some $50bn:
none of this was advertised in the campaign. Voters may be
entirely happy with this outcome (opinion polls suggest
otherwise). But there is nothing to say that the vote to leave must
entail support for Mrs Mayʼs particular version of leaving. That is
why all sides can claim to represent the “real” will of the people.
For MPs to back a deal that they judge harmful out of respect for
an earlier referendum which issued a vague instruction would be
neither representative democracy nor direct democracy—it would
be one doing a bad impression of the other.
The first step to getting out of this mess is to stop the clock.
Because Mrs Mayʼs deal is dead and a new one cannot be
arranged in the ten remaining weeks, the priority should be to
avoid falling out on March 29th with no deal, which would be bad
for all of Europe and potentially disastrous for Britain. If Mrs May
will not ask for an extension, Parliament should vote to give itself
the power to do so. This desperate measure would up-end a long
convention in which government business takes precedence over
backbenchersʼ. But if the prime minister stays on the road to no
deal, MPs have a duty to seize the wheel.