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Speech Act Theory and Teaching Speaking: Maryann Christison
Speech Act Theory and Teaching Speaking: Maryann Christison
Teaching
Speaking
MARYANN CHRISTISON
Framing the Issue
Until fairly recently, theories of second language (L2) learning followed models
developed in linguistic theory. These models have been characterized as a process
of complexifying the syntactic system. Speech act theory is a departure from this
paradigm because its focus is on defining L2 proficiency with reference to overall
communicative competence, rather than simply linguistic competence (Hymes,
1972). To understand speech act theory we must look beyond linguistic compe-
tence to consider what sentences actually do and how speakers use sentence pat-
terns in communication and interaction to convey meaning.
A speech act in linguistic terms refers to an utterance that has a performative
function (Austin, 1962), such as congratulating, greeting, inviting, ordering, or
warning. When we perform speech acts, we ordinarily communicate with others,
so understanding speech acts and how we use them is important for English lan-
guage teachers, especially those who embrace communicative language teaching
(CLT)—an approach to language teaching that emphasizes the need to create
opportunities for spoken interaction and meaningful communication in language
learning classrooms.
The term speech act originated with Austin (1962) and was further refined by
Searle (1975) and Searle and Vandervecken (1985). These early researchers helped
us understand that not all speech acts are the same but can be conceptualized into
three main categories: (1) locutionary, (2) illocutionary, and (3) perlocutionary
speech acts. A locutionary speech act is the surface or actual meaning of an utterance,
and the meaning corresponds to the syntactic (the surface structure) and semantic
(propositional) aspects of a meaningful utterance. An illocutionary speech act is the
intended meaning of an utterance as a socially valid verbal action. A perlocutionary
speech act is focused on the actual effect of the speech act, such as the actions one
might take if one is convinced, inspired, or persuaded.
The difference between a locutionary speech act and an illocutionary speech act
can be captured in the following two sentences: Can you drive a car? Can you pass the
salt? The two sentences have the same surface structure syntactically, but the
speech acts represented in the two sentences are quite different. The first sentence
represents a locutionary speech act because the surface meaning of the utterance is
a query about ability, and the intended semantic meaning is the same; conse-
quently, the expected response is to answer “yes” or “no” relative to ability. The
second sentence represents an illocutionary speech act because the intended mean-
ing is not a query about ability but is rather a request. The expected response is for
the interlocutor (i.e., the person to whom the speech act is directed) to pass the salt,
not to answer “yes” or “no.” Speech acts are driven by the contexts in which they
are to be used, and changing the context can change the meaning of an utterance.
Being able to understand a speech act relative to its illocutionary force (i.e., its
intended meaning) and respond appropriately are important skills for English
learners to develop if they are to be successful communicators. In addition, it is
important for teachers to develop skills related to understanding speech acts and
being sensitive to the fact that some common and frequent speech acts can be
problematic for English learners, and learners can benefit from instruction regard-
ing speech acts.
Making the Case
While it is accepted that speech acts fall into three categories, the way in which the
speech acts are used in context is more complicated than it appears at first glance.
For example, I could say to you, “Don’t turn on the lights.” The speech act can be
locutionary with a literal surface meaning of a negative command, telling you not
to do something. However, let’s say that I had experienced electrical difficulties
with the lights in my office earlier and that the faulty wiring gave me a small
electrical shock when I touched the light switch. The electrician said that I should
keep the lights off until he notified me that the problem had been corrected; conse-
quently, when I say, “Don’t turn on the lights” to the student who enters the office
behind me and reaches for the light switch to be helpful, the speech act “Don’t turn
on the lights” is also an illocutionary act, giving my student a warning not to
turn on the lights. If my student heeds my warning, and I persuade her not to turn
on the lights, I have thereby created a perlocutionary act. These situations illus-
trate that speech acts are complex and contextually bound and that it is possible
for one utterance to be used in different ways.
For English learners, illocutionary speech acts can be difficult to understand,
especially for English learners with lower-level proficiency or for learners who
may have had little experience with English outside of a language classroom.
To help English learners work with illocutionary speech acts, teachers need a
system for presenting speech acts and helping students understand their prag-
matic uses. We turn to Searle (1975) and his seminal work on classifying illocu-
tionary speech acts for this guidance. There are five categories for illocutionary
speech acts: (1) representatives, (2) directives, (3) commissives, (4) expressives,
and (5) declarations.
Representative speech acts focus on asserting, claiming, and reporting. The pur-
pose of a representative speech act is to get others to commit to the truth of an
expressed proposition, for example, reciting a set of principles or rules or repeat-
ing doctrine. “One test of a representative speech act is whether it can be charac-
terized as true or false” (Schmidt & Richards, 1980, p. 132). Directive speech acts
focus on getting the hearer to take action, such as getting someone to respond to
a request or take advice. Commissive speech acts ask the hearer to commit to some-
thing. These acts include both extracting promises from speakers and using
threats for failure to take action or commit to taking action. The fourth type of
illocutionary speech act is the expressive speech act. The main purpose of expres-
sive speech acts is to signal a speaker’s attitude or emotions, such as offering
congratulations or making excuses. The last type of speech act is a declarative
speech act. Declarative speech acts are used to bring about changes in the world.
They are speech acts that change reality with the proposition of the declaration,
such as hiring or firing someone, participating in personal rituals, such as mar-
riage or baptism, or the use of speech acts in legal rituals, such as pronouncing
someone innocent or guilty.
Searle (1975) also introduced the notion of indirect speech acts, which are
really indirect illocutionary speech acts. For example, let’s say that I want to
invite you to have lunch with me, so I say, “Would you like to have lunch?” You
might answer by saying, “I’m sorry; I have to study.” In this case, you would be
declining the invitation with an indirect speech act. It is indirect because the
meaning of I have to study does not literally convey any sort of acceptance or
rejection, nor is it a direct answer to a yes/no question. In many contexts, indi-
rect speech acts are the most common way of conveying rejections. Indirect
speech acts are often adopted by a group of individuals as a specific stylistic
device for signaling the message of rejection. Even though indirect speech acts
are quite common, they present enormous challenges for English learners. In the
exchange above, the expectation is that I have to study will be interpreted as a
rejection of the invitation. As a result, one would not expect a response such as,
“I have to study too.” The ability to understand and interpret indirect speech
acts is difficult for English learners because understandings of indirect speech
develop as a result of one’s experiences and interactions with specific groups of
speakers.
While very useful in categorizing and understanding illocutionary speech acts
in isolation, the different types of illocutionary speech acts do not tell us much
about how speech acts are actually used and understood. In other words, what
tools does the listener use to assign illocutionary value to a speech act? When we
perform illocutionary acts we engage in rule-governed behavior. Grice (1975)
offers a set of four general principles or maxims that guide interlocutors in identi-
fying presuppositions, thereby enabling participants in a speech event to assign
illocutionary value. The four principles or maxims that govern speech-act use
among interlocutors in conversations are known collectively as the cooperative
principle because they describe how individuals cooperate and interact with one
another:
1. Maxim of quantity. A speech act should be as informative as is required but
no more.
2. Maxim of quality. A speech act should be one that is true, does not give false
information, and is supported by evidence.
3. Maxim of relation. A speech act should be relevant.
4. Maxim of manner. A speech act should be perspicuous, brief, and orderly.
Although we may not be able to cite these principles, we certainly know when
they are violated in our communications with others. When someone talks too
much or gives too much information in response to a simple question, the
maxim of quantity and/or the maxim of manner may be violated. When
someone provides you with information you know to be incorrect, the man-
ner of quality is violated. Without cooperative principles for governing
human interactions, communication would be far more difficult and often
counterproductive.
It is important to note, however, that Grice found it most interesting to study
communication when the principles were violated, especially when they were vio-
lated in purposeful ways, as in the following example. Let us suppose that Speakers
A and B are talking about Speaker C, who is a mutual friend. A asks B how C is
getting along in his job as a chef in the new French restaurant, and Speaker B
replies, “Oh, pretty well, there’s only been one customer admitted to the hospital
for food poisoning.” Speaker B has violated the maxim of relation by offering what
seems to be irrelevant information. There are two obvious reasons for this viola-
tion. By offering irrelevant information, Speaker B is either communicating humor
or trying to communicate to Speaker A that in his opinion C is a terrible chef. If A
follows this logic, then B has successfully communicated a humorous exchange or
his opinion about C’s skills as a chef.
Most of us have experienced communication when interlocutors violated the
principles but seemed unaware of the violations. These non-purposeful violations
occur very often with the maxims of quantity and quality. For example, suppose
Speakers A, B, and C are talking and sharing information equitably on a specific
topic. Speaker D joins the group and proceeds to talk almost continuously with-
out input from others (a violation of the maxim of quantity). In addition, the infor-
mation on which Speaker D reports is known to be incorrect by the other three
speakers (a violation of the maxim of quality). As soon as Speakers A, B, and C can
find ways to disengage from the conversation and leave the group they will do so.
Pedagogical Implications
Working with speech acts and the principles that govern them in a classroom
context can be both promising and challenging for English language teachers. On
the one hand, the universal aspect of speech acts means that at some level all
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Suggested Readings
Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
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