Admin Digests (I. Law On Public Officers - Basic Concepts and Principles)

A.
Nature and Characteristics of Public Office
Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 116418 [March 7, 1985]

Prepared By: Karl
Relevant Provisions / Concepts / Doctrines
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall have the following offices:
xxx
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and assistance in the formulation and
evaluation of personnel systems and standards relative to performance appraisal, merit promotion and employee
incentive benefits and awards.
xxx
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies, standards, rules and regulations for the
effective conduct of inspection and audit of personnel and personnel management programs and the exercise of
delegated authority; provide technical and advisory services to Civil Service Regional Offices and government
agencies in the implementation of their personnel programs and evaluation systems.
xxx
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in the development and
implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations governing corporate officials and employees in the
areas of recruitment, examination, placement, career development, merit and awards systems, position
classification and compensation, performance appraisal, employee welfare and benefits, discipline and other
aspects of personnel management on the basis of comparable industry practices.
Sec. 17 Organizational Structure — Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least
one (1) Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary to carry out their respective functions. As
an independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as the need
arises.
Sec. 26. Personnel Actions —

xxx
(7) Reassignment. An employee may be re-assigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency ;
Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank status and salary ." (Emphasis supplied)
FACTS
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Inspection and Audit (OPIA) while
petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations (OPR) both at the Central Office
of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City. The respondent is Chairman Sto. Tomas and Commissioner
Ramon Ereneta Jr., both of the Civil Service Commission
Respondents issued Resolution No. 94-3710 which rearranged the offices within the CSC. It specifically merged the
Office of Career Systems and Standards (OCCS), The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit (OPIA), and The
Office of Personnel Relations (OPR) into one single office, the Research and Development Office (RDO).
Petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order against the implementation of the said
resolution since their offices were affected by the same.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
Petitioners were arguing that, pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC had no legal authority to issue
Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent that it merged OCSS, OPIA, and the OPR to form RDO. They further contend
that the Administrative Code allows the CSC to reorganize its offices but not to the extent of abolishing an office
expressly provided by Sections 16. Petitioners argue that the resolution effected the “abolition” of public offices,
something which may be done only by the same legislative authority which had created those public offices in the
first place in referencing Sec. 17. (see relevant laws)
Petitioners also argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 violated their constitutional right to security of tenure.
ISSUE
(1) Whether the CSC has legal authority to reorganize its offices to the extent
of merging the OCSS, OPIA and the OPR, to form the RDO. (YES)
(2) Whether the Resolution constituted to an abolition of public offices (NO)
(3) Whether the resolution violates the constitutional right to security of tenure of public officers. (NO)
RULING
(1) THE CSC HAS LEGAL AUTHORITY TO REORGANIZE ITS OFFICES UNDER SEC. 17
First and foremost, the re-assignments of the petitioners were not founded on baseless grounds. The commission
was moved by legitimate considerations of administrative efficiency and convenience in promulgating and
implementing its resolution. It is clear that the changes introduced by such resolution (re-naming existing offices,
re-arrangement of the groupings of Divisions and Sections composing particular offices; re-allocation of existing
functions) are precisely the kind of internal changes which are referred to in Sec. 17.
The Administrative Code expressly gives the power to affect changes in the organization under Sec. 17, “As an
independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as the need
arises.”
(2) THE RESOLUTION DID NOT EFFECT “ABOLITION” OF PUBLIC OFFICES
The term “public office” is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by
law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that
individual for the benefit of the public.
The SC considers that Resolutions 94-3710 did not abolish any public office as that term is used in the law of public
officers. None of the “changes in organization” carried with it or necessarily involved the “termination of the
relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and employees”.
The Administrative Code did not mean to “freeze” and cast in concrete the offices under the CSC. On the
contrary, the legislative expressly authorized the CSC to carry out “changes in the organization as the need
arises” pursuant to Sec. 17.
(3) THE RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE WAS NOT VIOLATED
The appointments to the staff of the CSC are not appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments
to particular positions or ranks. In the present case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV,
without specification of any particular office or station.
Sec. 26 (7) of the Administrative Code, recognizes reassignment as a management prerogative vested in the CSC.
It follows that the reassignment of petitioners had been effected with express statutory authority and did not
constitute removals without lawful cause.
(meaning their positions were not prejudiced since the CSC through its resolution merely transferred them to
another branch)
De la Victoria v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 95275-76 [ July 23, 1991]
Prepared By: Trixie Arre
Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs
FACTS
On February 1988, election for the mayorship in Albuera, Leyte was conducted and the following candidates
received the following votes:
1. Genoveva Mesina: 5,103 votes
2. Sixto De la Victoria (petitioner): 5,093 votes
3. Loly Fian: 982 votes
With this, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Mesina as the duly elected municipal mayor of Albuera,
Leyte. Elected and proclaimed Vice Mayor was her running-mate, Aquilino Cantiga, Jr. After some time, De la
Victoria filed the following cases:
1. 2 proclamation cases in the COMELEC
2. Election protest Ex Abundante Cautela against Mesina in the RTC
On July 22, 1989, Mesina died and was substituted as protestee by her Vice-Mayor, Aquilino Cantiga, Jr., who
assumed the mayorship by operation of law. Neither Mesina's heirs (respondents), nor her counsel informed the
trial court about her death.
In 1990, De la Victoria then withdrew the 2 proclamation cases in the COMELEC and waived his claim for damages
and costs against Mesina in the RTC. Also, in the RTC, the now incumbent Mayor Cantiga filed a verified Petition to
Intervene. The counsel for Mesina also submitted a Motion for Substitution of the deceased Mesina by her heirs.
De la Victoria opposed the motion for substitution on the ground that the heirs of Mesina are not the "real party in
interest" and that since he (De la Victoria) had waived his claim for damages against the deceased, her heirs have
no more right to intervene in the case or have been "erased from the picture altogether"
The trial court ruled that De la Victoria's waiver of his claim for damages against Mesina rendered the Motion for
Substitution without basis in law, or moot and academic. From here, the trial court declared De La Victoria as the
newly elected mayor.
Because of this, the heirs of Mesina appealed to the COMELEC by a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction (first petition to the COMELEC) to restrain the trial court from rendering a decision in Election
Protest No. B-44 or conducting further proceedings therein. They also filed a Notice of Appeal to the trial court but
this was denied. It held that the intervenor, Vice-Mayor Cantiga, who succeeded the deceased protestee by
operation of law, not the "heirs" of the deceased, is the "real party in interest" in the continuation of the election
protest after the demise of the Mesina. Moreover, upon the waiver by De la Victoria of his claim for damages
against Mesina, the latter's heirs had no more legal interest to defend in her behalf.
On the first COMELEC petition, the COMELEC denied the heirs' application for a temporary restraining order
(TRO), but set the case for hearing before the COMELEC En Banc for "preliminary determination of the sufficiency
of the allegations in the main issue raised by said respondents-heirs."
Afterwhich, the heirs filed in the COMELEC another petition for certiorari and mandamus (second petition to the
COMELEC, praying that the execution of the decision of the trial court in Election Protest be stopped. Here, the
COMELEC set aside the rulings of the trial court (the denial of the motion for substitution and denial on notice of
appeal). It declared the writ of execution null and void and ordered the elevation to it of the records of the case
pursuant to Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (on appeal from election protest decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction).
Because of this, De la Victoria submits to the Supreme Court this petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order.
ISSUE
Can the heirs of the deceased protestee in an election protest be considered as real party-in-interest,
allowing them to appeal the decision in the election protest, even if the vice-mayor has been allowed to
intervene and the protestant had waived his claim for damages and costs in the proceedings (NO)
RULING
The heirs cannot be a real-party-in-interest.
The late Genoveva Mesina's claim to the contested office was not in any sense a transmissible right that devolved
upon her surviving spouse and her children after her death. "Public office is personal to the incumbent and is
not a property which passes to his heirs."
Private respondents' (the children) only interest in the outcome of the case is limited to no more than their
interest in defending her against the protestant's claim for damages and costs (which the protestant, herein
petitioner, has already waived). They may no longer prosecute her own counter-claim for damages against the
protestant for that was extinguished when death terminated her right to occupy the contested office of mayor of
Albuera, Leyte.
In the case of Vda. de Mesa vs. Mencias, we ruled:

"The same cannot, however, be said of the protestee's widow or of the local Liberal Party chapter of Muntinlupa.
The protestee's claim to the contested office is not in any sense a right transmitted to his widow or
heirs. Said widow's remaining interest in the outcome of the case is limited to no more than the possible
award of costs against the deceased protestee. Besides not being such an interest as would justify her
substitution for her deceased husband as an indispensable legal representative, the right to such an award
if eventually made has already been waived by protestant Argana. This effectively withdraws the widow
from the picture altogether.
Cantiga, as succeeding officer to the contested office, is the proper real-party-in-interest.
Vice Mayor Aquilino Cantiga's accession, by operation of law, to the position of Municipal Mayor upon the death of
Mesina on July 22, 1989, automatically made him the real party-in-interest in the election contest for his right
to hold the office of municipal mayor is in jeopardy of being lost should De la Victoria win his protest. Thus
did this Court hold in Lomugdang vs. Javier: cdphil
"The vice-mayor elect has the status of a real party-in-interest in the continuation of the proceedings and is
entitled to intervene therein. For if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice mayor succeeds
to the office of mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume the post."
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R.
Nos. 206844-45 [July 23, 2013]
Prepared By:
Section 7 of Rule 4 E.M. No. 12-040, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366:
SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees.—Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among nominees of
winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed.
Prospectivity of Laws; Article 4 of the Civil Code states that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided.
FACTS
The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-list organization, the Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS). One group is headed by the organization’s
incumbent HOR representative Reo. Arquiza (Arquiza group) and the other, the organization’s third nominee,
Francisco Datol (Datol group).
SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the organization failed to get the required
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast. In accordance with the procedure set forth in the decision of the course in
the case of BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the partylist system, SENIOR CITIZENS was
allocated one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organization’s first nominee, served as a member of the
House of Representatives. Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010
Election.
The nominees of the SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled IRREVOCABLE COVENANT, which
contains the list of their candidates and terms on sharing of their powers. It is broke down in the following manner:
If only one (1) seat is won If two (2) seats are won If there (3) seats are won
No. 1 nominee = 2 years No. 1 nominee= 3 years No. 1 Nominee = 3 years

No. 2 nominee = 1 year No. 2 nominee= 1 1/2 years No. 2 Nominee = 2 years
No. 3 nominee= 1 1/2 years No. 3 nominee= 2 years
No.4 nominee = 1 year
No.5 Nominee = 1 year
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked 2nd among all the party-list candidates
and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep.
Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David Kho (Rep. Kho).
The COMELEC en Banc issued a resolution that the list submitted to them is deemed to be permanent as the law
deprives the party the right to change their nominees. Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-list
were true, the list and order of nominees of the Senior Citizens party-list remains the same in so far as the
COMELEC and the law are concerned as it does not fall under one of the three grounds mentioned in law for the
changing of nominees. And that the resignation of Kho, pursuant to the party nominees term-sharing agreement,
cannot be recognized and be given effect so as to create a vacancy in the list and change the order of the
nominees.
ISSUE
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Omnibus Resolution, disqualifying and cancelling the registration
and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation of the prohibition
against term-sharing
RULING
Yes, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Datol group’s argument
Datol argues that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing was provided for under Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated only on February 21, 2012. Hence, the resolution should not be made
to apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect.
When the term-sharing agreement was executed in 2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any
law or resolution.
Furthermore, they point out that the mere execution of the Irrevocable Covenant between the nominees of SENIOR
CITIZENS for the 2010 elections should not have been a ground for the cancellation of the organization’s
registration and accreditation because the nominees never actually implemented the agreement.
The Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no term-sharing actually transpired between the nominees of SENIOR
CITIZENS. It explained that whatever prior arrangements were made by the nominees on the term-sharing
agreement, the same did not materialize given that the resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved by the Board of
Trustees and the members of SENIOR CITIZENS.
Ruling of Supreme Court
COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that it shall have retroactive effect. Nonetheless, the Court cannot
subscribe to the argument of the Arquiza Group that SENIOR CITIZENS already earned a vested right to its
registration as a party-list organization.
The Arquiza Group cannot object to the retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 on the
ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS’ vested right. Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution
No. 9366 expressly provided for its retroactive application, the Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed
erred in cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS.
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among
the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group even
during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza
Group manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement.
Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to
recognize the term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared
that no vacancy was created despite the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no
indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in
implementing, the term-sharing agreement.
Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the
agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a
member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC
En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on this point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that
SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En
Banc.
Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted
from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to speak
of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation
have no legal leg to stand on.
In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack of a legal ground to disqualify the SENIOR
CITIZENS spell out a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the COMELEC EN BANC. The Court struck down the assailed Omnibus Resolution it issued against the party list.
Notes: It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate
prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication
because the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested. This is
based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward).
B. The Civil Service
1. Scope of the Civil Service
Torres v. de Leon, G.R. No. 119440 [January 18, 2016]

Prepared By: Patricia Nicole San Jose
FACTS
When petitioner Mary Lou Torres (Torres) was the Chapter Administrator of the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC), General Santos City Chapter, the PNRC Internal Auditing Office conducted an audit of the funds and
accounts of the PNRC. Based on the audit report submitted to respondent Corazon De Leon (De Leon), petitioner
Torres incurred a "technical shortage" in the amount of P4,306,574.23.
Thus, De Leon formally charged Torres with Grave Misconduct for violating PNRC Financial Policies on
Oversubscription, Remittances and Disbursement of Funds. After the completion of the investigation of the case
against Torres, respondent De Leon issued a Memorandum imposing upon Torres the penalties of one month
suspension effective July 1 to 31, 2007 and transfer to the National Headquarters effective August 1, 2007.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Thereafter, Torres filed a Notice of Appeal addressed to the Board of Governors of the PNRC through De Leon and
furnished a copy thereof to the CSC. However, De Leon denied petitioner's appeal. The CSC promulgated a
Resolution dismissing petitioner's appeal and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from service.
Torres filed a motion for reconsideration with the CSC, but the same was denied. This prompted Torres to file a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals denied the said petition, and it likewise
denied Torres’ motion for reconsideration.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
Torres claimed that the Supreme Court has decided that PNRC is not a government-owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC), thus, the CSC has no jurisdiction or authority to review the appeal that she herself filed. Torres
insists that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the decision of De Leon.
She further argues that the PNRC did not give due course to her notice of appeal since De Leon’s counsel
erroneously addressed and filed her notice of appeal to the office of respondent PNRC through the office of De
Leon instead of filing it directly with the CSC, and De Leon denied due course to the notice of appeal, thus,
according to Torres, there was no more appeal to speak of.
Torres also claims that she voluntarily served the sentence of one month suspension and transfer of assignment
before her counsel erroneously filed the notice of appeal, hence, when the notice of appeal was filed, the decision
of De Leon was already final.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction to review the appeal of Torres. [YES]
2. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission lost its appellate jurisdiction when Torres voluntarily served
her sentence. [NO]
3. Whether or not the Notice of Appeal and the Appeal Memorandum were filed with the PNRC and not with
the CSC. [NO]
RULING
1. YES. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
As ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Liban, et al. v. Gordon, the PNRC, although not a GOCC, is sui
generis in character, thus, requiring this Court to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case
basis.
National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the
humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief and health and social programmes. The
PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither "be
classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality" as well as its independence,
nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an
auxiliary of the State. Thus, the sui generis status of the PNRC is sufficiently established.
Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary
thereof, respondent (in Liban v. Gordon) was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently
while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a "private corporation"
within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code.
Thus, the sui generis character of PNRC requires the Court to approach controversies involving the PNRC
on a case- to-case basis.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that the CSC has jurisdiction over the PNRC
because the issue at hand is the enforcement of labor laws and penal statutes, thus, in this particular matter,
the PNRC can be treated as a GOCC, and as such, it is within the ambit of Rule I, Section 1 of the Implementing
Rules of Republic Act 6713.
Thus, having jurisdiction over the PNRC, the CSC had authority to modify the penalty and order the
dismissal of Torres from the service. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, as well as decisions of this Court,
the CSC has appellate jurisdiction on administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty
of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary. The Court of
Appeals, therefore, did not err when it agreed with the CSC that the latter had appellate jurisdiction.
The CSC is fully aware that under the Civil Service Law and rules and jurisprudence, it has appellate jurisdiction
only on administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty
days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary.
In the case at bar, the period of Torres’ suspension is from July 1-31, 2007. This period unmistakably indicates that
Torres was actually imposed the penalty of thirty-one days and not merely thirty days or one month. Torres
submits that the actual duration of her suspension was only thirty days.
However, this submission is flawed considering that she was imposed the penalty of one month suspension
effective July 1-31, 2007 or for a period of thirty-one days. Even granting that Torres was imposed the penalty of
suspension for thirty days only, it should be noted that she was also imposed another penalty of "Transfer to
the NHQ effective August 01, 2007." Hence, the CSC would still have appellate jurisdiction.
2. NO. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION STILL HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE EVEN IF
TORRES VOLUNTARILY SERVED HER SENTENCE.
Neither can it be considered that the CSC had lost its appellate jurisdiction because, as claimed by Torres,
she voluntarily served the sentence of one month suspension and transfer of assignment before her counsel filed
the notice of appeal, hence, the decision of the PNRC was already final even before a notice of appeal was filed
with the CSC. The CA was correct in finding that Torres’ appeal was properly and timely made with the CSC under
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS).
A decision becomes final even before the lapse of the fifteen-day period to appeal when the defendant voluntarily
submits to the execution of the sentence. In the present case, it cannot be said that she voluntarily served her
penalty in view of the fact that she appealed therefrom. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been
under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal, in the event he wins the appeal.
3. NO. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL AND THE APPEAL MEMORANDUM WERE FILED WITH THE CSC.
Torres’ claim that the Notice of Appeal and the Appeal Memorandum were filed with the PNRC and not with the
CSC deserves scant consideration.
An examination of the Notice of Appeal shows that the same was addressed to the PNRC and copy furnished the
CSC. On the other hand, an examination of the Appeal Memorandum shows that the same was addressed to the
CSC and copies thereof were sent to both the PNRC and the CSC.
It is thus clear that a copy of the Notice of Appeal was furnished by the CSC and the Appeal Memorandum
was filed with it. While the rules required that the notice of appeal including the appeal memorandum shall be filed
with the CSC, it is undeniable that furnishing a copy of the Notice of Appeal with the CSC and filing with it the
Appeal Memorandum substantially complied with the rule. The important thing is that the Appeal Memorandum
was clearly addressed to the CSC.
Republic of the Philippines v. City of Paranaque, G.R. No. 191109 [July 18, 2012]
Prepared By: Maria Angela Melchor Torres (this case was a bit long so please bear with me :( )
Recit Ready
The PRA (Philippine Reclamation Authority)e is a government corporation created with the purpose of providing a
coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands with the object of maximizing their utilization and
hastening their development consistent with public interest. PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore
and offshore areas of Manila Bay, including those located in Parañaque City, and was issued the OCTs and TCTs
registered under the name of PRA.
However, the treasurer of Paranaque City now claims that the reclaimed lands are not subject to tax exemption,
claiming that PRA is a GOCC and that those lands are not public domain, hence they are subject to taxation by the
local government.
The first issue here is whether or not the PRA is a GOCC and is thus liable to pay real property tax on the
subject reclaimed lands. The SC ruled in the negative, saying that PRA is not a GOCC as it does not meet the
requirement of passing the test of economic viability as required by the Constitution, and that it is only a
government instrumentality.
The second issue here is whether or not the reclaimed lands are part of the public domain, hence exempt
from real property tax. The SC held that they are public domain, exempt from real property tax, and that the local
government of Paranaque cannot tax the PRA because it is a national government instrumentality, and the
LGUs do not have the power to tax national government instrumentalities or agencies. When local governments
invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local
governments.
Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a GOCC as follows:
Sec. 2 (13):
Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case
of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.
Sec. 2 (10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines a government
"instrumentality" as follows:
Sec. 2 (10): Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
Article XII, Sec. 16, Consti:

The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in
the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
TEST OF ECONOMIC VIABILITY:

The GOCC must show capacity to function efficiently in business and that they should not go into activities
which the private sector can do better. Moreover, economic viability is more than financial viability but also
includes capability to make profit and generate benefits not quantifiable in financial terms, all while serving
a public good.
FACTS
PD 1084: Created the PEA (Now the PRA in this case)
EO 525: PEA was designated as the agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing and coordinating all
reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government.
EO 380: Transformed PEA into PRA (Philippine Reclamation Authority), which shall perform all the powers and
functions of the PEA relating to reclamation activities.
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government corporation created by virtue of PD 1084 (Creating the Public
Estates Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes) with the
purpose of providing a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands, and the administration and
operation of lands belonging to, managed and/or operated by, the government with the object of maximizing their
utilization and hastening their development consistent with public interest.
By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay,
including those located in Parañaque City, and was issued the OCTs and TCTs registered under the name of
PRA.
However, the Paranaque City Treasurer, Carabeo, issued Warrants of Levy on PRA’s reclaimed properties (Central
Business Park and Barangay San Dionisio) l ocated in Parañaque City based on the assessment for delinquent real
property taxes for tax years 2001-2002. Essentially, Paranaque was taxing the PRA for the reclaimed
properties which are government-owned, claiming that it is within the power of the local government to tax
that land.
Subsequently, PRA filed a TRO against Carabeo before the RTC to stop the levying of the reclaimed lands, but the
RTC denied their petition. Despite PRA sending a letter to Carabeo requesting Carabeo not to proceed with the
sale of the reclaimed lands, Carabeo replied stating that the public auction could not be deferred because the RTC
had already denied PRA’s TRO application.
Since both parties could not reach a compromise, PRA filed a Motion which sought to declare as null and void the
assessment for real property taxes, the levy based on the said assessment, the public auction sale conducted, and
the Certificates of Sale issued pursuant to the auction sale on the grounds that the reclaimed lands were
government-owned lands and thus exempt from taxation from the local government.
The RTC denied their Motion, reasoning that the PRA was a GOCC under Sec. 3 of PD 1084. Being a GOCC, they
are not exempt from local taxation as this exemption was withdrawn by the Local Government Code (LGC) which
was the prevailing law in 2001 and 2002 with respect to real property taxation. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
1. W / N the PRA is a GOCC and is thus liable to pay real property tax on the subject reclaimed lands (NO)
2. W / N the reclaimed lands are part of the public domain, hence exempt from real property tax (YES)
RULING
1. NO, the PRA is not a GOCC and is not liable to pay real property tax on the subject reclaimed lands. The
PRA is merely a government instrumentality.
GOCC GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY
Refers to any agency: Refers to any agency o

f the National Government:
- Organized as a stock or non-stock corporation - Not integrated within the department
framework
- Vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature - Vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law
- Owned by the Government directly or through
its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where - Endowed with some if not all corporate powers
applicable as in the case of stock corporations,
to the extent of at least fifty-one percent of its - Administering special funds
capital stock
- Enjoying operational autonomy, usually
- Must be for the common good and meet the through a charter
test of economic viability
- Does not need to meet the test of economic
viability
*See above for the provisions from the admin code defining these two
It is clear that a GOCC must be "organized as a stock or non-stock corporation" while an instrumentality is
vested by law with corporate powers. Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally
autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although not integrated
with the department framework.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not necessarily
become a corporation. U nless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate
powers.
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become stock or
non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is deemed a GOCC.
Examples: Mactan International Airport Authority, the Philippine Ports Authority, UP, BSP.
All these government instrumentalities exercise corporate powers but they are not organized as stock or
non-stock corporations as required by Sec. 2 (13) of the Admin Code. These government instrumentalities are
sometimes called government corporate entities. However, they’re not GOCCs in the strict sense.
STOCK CORPORATION NON-STOCK CORPORATION
One whose capital stock is divided into One where no part of its income is distributable as dividends
shares and authorized to distribute to the to its members, trustees or officers
holders of such shares dividends
Non-stock corporations are organized for charitable, religious,
educational, professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal,
literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar purposes,
like trade, industry, agriculture and like chambers
Two requisites must concur before one As for non-stock corporations:

may be classified as a stock corporation: 1. They must have members
1. That it has capital stock divided into 2. Must not distribute any part of their income to said
shares members
2. That it is authorized to distribute
dividends and allotments of surplus
and profits to its stockholders.
If only one requisite is present, it cannot be

properly classified as a stock corporation.
*Defined under Sec. 3 of the Corporation Code
PRA is not a GOCC because it is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation. It cannot be considered as a
stock corporation because although it has a capital stock divided into no par value shares as provided in PD 1084,
it is not authorized to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to stockholders. There is no
provision whatsoever in P.D. No. 1084 or in any of the subsequent executive issuances pertaining to PRA that
authorizes PRA to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to its stockholders.
PRA cannot be considered a non-stock corporation either because it does not have members. A non-stock
corporation must have members, and it was not organized for any of the purposes mentioned; it was created only
to manage all government reclamation projects.
Further, another reason why the PRA cannot be classified as a GOCC is Art. XII, Sec. 16 of the Consti (see above).
Sec. 16 authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special charters on two conditions:
1. The GOCC must be established for the common good; and
2. The GOCC must meet the test of economic viability
PRA may have passed the first condition of common good but failed the second one: economic viability. The
purpose behind the creation of PRA was not for economic or commercial activities. Neither was it created to
compete in the market place considering that there were no other competing reclamation companies being
operated by the private sector. All it was made for is land reclamation.
Sec. 2 and 4 of PD 1084 specify that the PRA was created for the purposes of reclaiming land, developing the
reclaimed land, and to provide for services for the efficient, economical, and beneficial utilization of the reclaimed
land with the goal of maximizing their utilization and hastening their development consistent with the public
interest.
For further proof that PRA is not a GOCC, it does not meet the test of viability. Congress has no power to
create GOCCs with special charters unless they are made to comply with the two conditions of common
good and economic viability.
The test of economic viability applies only to GOCCs that perform economic or commercial activities and need
to compete in the marketplace. Being essentially economic vehicles of the State for the common good (meaning
for economic development purposes) these GOCCs with special charters are usually organized as stock
corporations just like ordinary private corporations.
In contrast, government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and performing governmental or
public functions need not meet the test of economic viability. These instrumentalities perform essential public
services for the common good, services that every modern State must provide its citizens. These instrumentalities
need not be economically viable since the government may even subsidize their entire operations.
The intent of the Constitution is to prevent the creation of GOCCs that cannot survive on their own in the
market place and thus merely drain the public coffers. The reason for this concern is that when the
government creates a corporation, there is a sense in which this corporation becomes exempt from the test
of economic performance.
If a government corporation loses, then it makes its claim upon the taxpayers' money through new equity infusions
from the government and what is always invoked is the common good, but this just empties the state funds in trying
to keep these GOCCs afloat; this is lost money in the billions that could be spent for more pressing issues. Thus,
the framers of the Constitution inserted the requisite of economic viability to become a restraint on future
enthusiasts for state capitalism to excuse themselves from the responsibility of meeting the market test so
that they become viable.
The test of economic viability does not apply to government entities vested with corporate powers and
performing essential public services because the State is obligated to render essential public services
regardless of the economic viability of providing such service. The non-economic viability of rendering such
essential public service does not excuse the State from withholding such essential services from the public.
Thus, PRA is not a GOCC as defined by the Admin Code or the Constitution. PRA was not organized either as a
stock or a non-stock corporation, neither was it created by Congress to operate commercially and compete in the
private market. Instead, PRA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing
an essential public service pursuant to Sec. 2 (10) of the Admin Code. Being an incorporated government
instrumentality, it is exempt from payment of real property tax.
2. YES, the reclaimed lands are public domain and are EXEMPT from real property tax.
o valid or legal basis in taxing the reclaimed lands managed by PRA. Secs. 234 (a) and
Paranaque City has n
133 (o) of the LGC exempts PRA from paying realty taxes and protects it from the taxing powers of local
government units.
Sec. 234 provides that real property owned by the government is exempt from real property tax unless the
beneficial use thereof has been granted to a taxable person; while Sec. 133 prohibits local governments from
imposing taxes on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities.
Further, the Admin Code allows real property owned by the State to be titled in the name of agencies or
instrumentalities of the national government. Such real properties remain owned by the State and continue to be
exempt from real estate tax. Hence, just because the reclaimed lands were titled under the name of PRA, it
does not mean that they can no longer be exempt from tax.
Sec. 133 recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, which
historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. While the Consti now includes taxation as
one of the powers of local governments, local governments may only exercise such power subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide.
When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power is
construed strictly against local governments. The rules are:
1. Tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax
- Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is resolved against taxation
- This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national
government instrumentalities
2. Tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the exemption
- However, when Congress grants an exemption to a national government instrumentality from local
taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national government
instrumentality
The reason for the rule does not apply in the case of exemptions running to the benefit of the government
itself or its agencies. In such cases, the practical effect of an exemption is merely to reduce the amount of
money that has to be handled by the government in the course of its operations. For these reasons,
provisions granting exemptions to government agencies may be construed liberally, in favor of non tax-liability of
such agencies.
There is no point in national and local governments taxing each other because it’s just like the government is
taxing itself again and creates an even more convoluted process of tax payments. There is also no reason for
local governments to tax national government instrumentalities for rendering essential public services to inhabitants
of local governments.
The only exception is when the legislature clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the
delivery of essential public services for sound and compelling policy considerations. There must be express
language in the law empowering local governments to tax national government instrumentalities. Any doubt
whether such power exists is resolved against local governments.
PRA is right in claiming that the reclaimed lands are still part of the public domain, owned by the State and,
therefore, exempt from payment of real estate taxes. As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the
government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain.
The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PRA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it
disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain.
Further, PRA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as well as "any and
all kinds of lands."
The Court also mentioned Sec. 14, Chap. 4 Title I, Book III of the Admin Code which provides that the President
shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for specific public purposes, any of the lands of the
public domain.
Reclaimed lands such as the subject lands in issue are reserved lands for public use. They are properties
of public dominion. The ownership of such lands remains with the State unless they are withdrawn by law
or presidential proclamation from public use.
LRTA v. Pili, G.R. No 202047 [June 8, 2016]
Prepared By: JANE BYUTIFUL
Topic under: Scope of the Civil Service Commission
Article 10-B, Section 2(1) 1987 Constitution:

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
NOTE: Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as "the situation between the labor and the management of the
company where there is failure in the collective bargaining negotiations resulting in a stalemate"
FACTS
LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Executive Order (EO) No. 603 for the
"construction, operation, maintenance, and/or lease of light rail transit systems in the Philippines." It entered into a
ten-year operations and management agreement (Agreement) with Meralco Transit Organization, Inc. (MTOI) from
8 June 1984 to 8 June 1994.
MTOI, a corporation organized under the Corporation Code, hired its own employees and thereafter entered into
collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the unions of its employees. However, the Commission on Audit
declared the Agreement between LRTA and MTOI void.
LRTA then purchased all the shares of stock of MTOI and renamed the same to Metro Transit Organization, Inc.
(Metro) and declared it as a wholly-owned subsidiary. The Agreement between LRTA and Metro expired on 8 June
1994, and was thereafter extended on a month-to-month basis.
In July 2000, the union of rank-and-file employees of Metro staged a strike over a bargaining deadlock which
resulted in the paralysis in the operation of Metro. LRTA did not anymore renew the Agreement and Metro ceased
its operations.
Respondents were employees of Metro who have been terminated upon the expiration of the Agreement. While the
rest of the respondents filed cases involving purely monetary claims in the form of separation pays, balances of
separation pays, and other unpaid claims, respondent Noel B. Pili (Pili), in addition to his monetary claims,
alleged that he was illegally dismissed (The rest of the employees only filed for monetary claims. While Pili
also filed for illegal dismissal).
PILI’S CONTENTION:
On 29 May 2003, he received the amount of P63,117.65 as financial assistance for which he was compelled to
execute a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. Based on the foregoing, Pili argues that his dismissal was illegal and
violative of his security of tenure. He alleges that the mere fact of the expiration of the Agreement was not sufficient
to justify his dismissal. He also claims that the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim he executed does not bar him from
demanding the benefits to which he is legally entitled to or from contesting the legality of his dismissal.
THE REST OF THE RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

- They assert that under Article 4.05 of the Agreement, LRTA contractually bound itself to shoulder and provide all
"Operating Expenses" (including all salaries, wages, and fringe benefits) of Metro.
- The further allege that LRTA sanctioned and approved all the CBAs Metro entered with its employees; that LRTA
and Metro jointly declared the continued implementation of the Agreement, and there would be no interruption in the
employment of the employees of the former MTOI.
Board of Directors of LRTA issued Resolution No. 00-44 where LRTA officially assumed the obligation to ensure
that the Metro, Inc. Employees Retirement Fund is updated and that it fully covers all retirement benefits payable to
the employees of Metro. Based on the foregoing, the respondents — except Pili — argue that the LRTA is liable for
their monetary claims.
LRTA argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction over it as it is a GOCC and that only CSC can take cognizance of the
matter. It also maintains that it has a separate legal personality from Metro, so there can be no illegal dismissal and
no basis for monetary claims of the employees of Metro.
RULING OF LABOR ARBITER:

The Labor Arbiter found that Pili was illegally dismissed and that LRTA was solidarily liable with Metro for the
monetary claims. (Unpaid wages/salaries, unpaid 13th month and earned leave benefits, unpaid hazard pays, rice
subsidies amounts, etc.)
RULING OF NLRC:
NLRC found that there was no illegal dismissal as Pili’s dismissal was valid on account of the termination of the
Agreement between Metro and LRTA.
RULING OF THE CA:

CA ruled that Pili was illegally dismissed as the expiration of the Agreement between LRTA and Metro was not a
valid ground to terminate Pili’s employment.
“Article 283 allows an employer to terminate the services of his employees in case of closure of business as
a result of grave financial losses. But the employer must comply with the clearance or report required under
the Labor Code and its implementing rules before the employment of the employees.
Nevertheless, employers who contemplate terminating the services of their workers cannot be so arbitrary
and ruthless as to find flimsy excuses for their decisions.”
ISSUE
Do the LA and NLRC have jurisdiction over the case of LRTA?
In this particular case, even when LRTA is a GOCC, which should be under CSC, the Court ruled
YES because it bound itself to certain obligations (monetary claims).
But with regard to illegal dismissal, NO.
RULING
Medyo weird yung explanation, but please bear with me!
JURISDICTION OF NLRC OVER LRTA - MONETARY CLAIMS:

The general rule is that there is error with the NLRC taking cognizance of the cases against Metro and LRTA
as far as the monetary claims are concerned. This is despite the fact that LRTA is a GOCC with an original
charter.
BUT!! The NLRC acquired jurisdiction over LRTA not because of the employer-employee relationship of the
respondents and LRTA (because there is none) but rather because LRTA expressly assumed the monetary
obligations of Metro to its employees.
In the Agreement, LRTA was obligated to reimburse Metro for the latter's Operating Expenses which
included the salaries, wages and fringe benefits of certain employees of Metro. Moreover, the Board of
Directors of LRTA issued Resolution No. 00-44 where again, LRTA assumed the monetary obligations of Metro
more particularly to update the Metro, Inc. Employees Retirement Fund and to ensure that it fully covers all the
retirement benefits payable to the employees of Metro.
It is clear from the foregoing, and it is also not denied by LRTA, that it has assumed the monetary obligations of
Metro to its employees. As such, the NLRC may exercise jurisdiction over LRTA on the issue of the monetary
obligations.
To repeat, NLRC can exercise jurisdiction over LRTA not because of the existence of any employer-
employee relationship between LRTA and the respondents, but rather because LRTA clearly assumed
voluntarily the monetary obligations of Metro to its employees. We therefore find no error on the part of NLRC
when it exercised jurisdiction over LRTA which solidarily obligated itself to pay the monetary obligations of Metro.
JURISDICTION OF THE NLRC OVER LRTA - ILLEGAL DISMISSAL:

However, as far as the claim of illegal dismissal is concerned, we find that NLRC cannot exercise jurisdiction
over LRTA. The NLRC and Labor Arbiter erred when it took cognizance of such matter.
Pili cannot claim to be employed by LRTA merely on the bare allegation that the corporate veil must be pierced
based on LRTA's ownership of the shares of stock of Metro. This Court has already rejected such proposition —
there is no sufficient evidence to support the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and LRTA,
even after it purchased all the shares of stock of Metro, maintained and continued to have its separate juridical
personality
Worse, if LRTA was his true employer, as he claims, it is CSC which would have jurisdiction to hear his
complaint against LRTA. LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation — any allegation of
illegal dismissal against it by its employees should have been brought to the CSC. However, the fact remains
that Pili was an employee of Metro alone — the Labor Arbiter and NLRC could not have acquired jurisdiction over
LRTA insofar as the illegal dismissal complaint is concerned.
STARE DECISIS DECISIONS THAT WERE FOLLOWED BY THE COURTS:

- Hugo v. LRTA:
→ The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC do not have jurisdiction over LRTA . Petitioners themselves admitted in their
complaint that LRTA " is a government agency organized and existing pursuant to an original charter (Executive
Order No. 603)" and that they are employees of METRO.
- LRTA v. Mendoza
→ LRTA is liable for the monetary claims of the employees of Metro. The respondents in the said case were
employees of Metro who, similar to the respondents in this case, have been separated due to the expiration of the
Agreement between LRTA and Metro.
→ First: LRTA obligated itself to fund METRO's retirement fund to answer for the retirement or
severance/resignation of METRO employees as part of METRO's operating expenses.
→ Second: Even on the assumption that the LRTA did not obligate itself to fully cover the separation benefits of the
respondents and others similarly situated, it still cannot avoid liability for the respondents' claim. It is solidarily liable
as an indirect employer under the law for the respondents' separation pay.
Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 111091 [August 21, 1995]
Prepared By: Shandrei Guevarra
Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.
Some technical terms found in the facts:

1. Deductive: Charged to the contractor by deducting from the contract price
2. Additive: Charged to the owner
3. Punch list: List of defective or correctible works to be done by the contractor
Characters in this case:

1. Claro Preclaro: Petitioner
2. Jaime Sta. Maria Construction Company: Contractor for the building
3. Alexander Resoso: Company engineer of Jaime Sta. Maria Construction Company
4. Jaime Sta. Maria, Sr.: Owner of Jaime Sta. Maria Construction Company
FACTS
BACKGROUND
Engr. Claro Preclaro (Preclaro) is the Project Manager of the Chemical Mineral Division of the Industrial
Technology Development Institute (ITDI). The ITDI is a component of the Industrial Development Institute, which is
an agency of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).
Preclaro was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. In the information filed against him, it was alleged that:
The Jaime Sta. Maria Construction Company undertook the construction of a government building in Bicutan,
Taguig. The building was jointly funded by the Philippines and Japanese governments. While the construction has
not yet been finally completed, Preclaro directly requested and demanded P200,000.00 for himself. He claimed this
as part of an expected profit of P460,000.00, in connection with the construction of the building. Preclaro
intervened under the law in his capacity as Project Manager of the said construction.
During arraignment, Preclaro pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Sandiganbayan found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
ACTUAL FACTS (This is the story na talaga)
The Chemical Mineral Division of the ITDI employed Preclaro under a written contract of services as Project
Manager, in order to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD (JICA) Building at the DOST Compound in
Bicutan, Taguig.
The contract was in effect from October 1, 1989 up to the end of the construction period, unless sooner terminated.
Preclaro was to be paid a monthly salary drawn from funds financed by foreign-assisted projects and government
funds released by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
DOST then contracted the services of the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction Company with Engr. Alexander Resoso
(Resoso) as the company’s project engineer.
Resoso was then in the process of evaluating a Change Order for some electricals in the building construction,
when Preclaro approached him at the project site. Preclaro said that expenses in the Change Order will be
deductive (meaning, charged to the contractor by deducting from the contract price), instead of additive (meaning,
charged to the owner).
Preclaro intimated that he can forget about the deductive, provided that he gets P200,000.00 from the
contractor’s profit, which he roughly estimated to be around P460,000.00.
Resoso conveyed this proposal to Jaime Sta. Maria, Sr. (Sta. Maria), the owner of Sta. Maria Construction
Company. Sta. Maria then asked for two more days as there were financial constraints. Preclaro was okay with this,
saying that they were not in a hurry. Preclaro was then asked to bring along the result of the punch list (meaning,
the list of defective or correctible works to be done by the contractor).
Thereafter, Sta. Maria and Resoso proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to report the incident.
The NBI suggested an entrapment plan. The next day, Sta. Maria and Resoso delivered P500,000.00 to the NBI.
The money was dusted with fluorescent powder and placed inside an attache case.
Resoso, Sta. Maria and NBI men then proceeded at the Wendy’s Restaurant, corner E. Delos Santos Avenue and
Camias Street. This is the place where Resoso is supposed to give the money to Preclaro, as per Preclaro’s choice.
Preclaro arrived. After a short conversation, Preclaro received the two envelopes of money with his right hand
and placed them under his left armpit. At that point, he was accosted by the NBI men.
Preclaro was then brought to the NBI for examination. His right hand was tested positive of fluorescent powder.
However, the same fluorescent powder was not detected in his shirt and pants.
PRECLARO’S CONTENTIONS
Preclaro asserts that he is not a public officer, as defined by the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He claims
that he was neither elected nor appointed to a public office. Rather, he is merely a private individual hired by the
ITDI on contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified period. This is evidenced by the contract
of services he entered into with the ITDI.
Furthermore, he alleged that he was not issued any appointment paper separate from the contract of services. He
was not required to use the bundy clock to record his hours of work, and he also did not take an oath of office.
Moreover, his intervention was not required by law, but in the performance of a contract of services entered into
by him as a private individual contractor he could not be prosecuted under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
ISSUE
W/N Preclaro is a public officer as defined by the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and thus, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case
RULING
YES, PRECLARO IS A PUBLIC OFFICER.
Preclaro misconstrues the definition of “public officer” in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It provides that
“public officer” includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether
in the classified, unclassified or exemption service, receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government. The word “includes” used in defining a public officer indicates that the definition is not
restrictive.
The terms “classified, unclassified or exemption service” were the old categories of positions in the civil service.
They have now been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service by P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines - this provided for the organization of the Civil Service Commission), and by the
Administrative Code of 1987.
PRECLARO FALLS UNDER THE NON-CAREER SERVICE CATEGORY (Number 4 in the enumeration)
Non-career service is characterized by:

1. Entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and
2. Tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing
authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made.
The non-career service shall include:

1. Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and
their personal or confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or
confidential staff;
4. Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special
contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the
employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year,
and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of
direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and
5. Emergency and seasonal personnel.
Therefore, Preclaro falls under the non-career service category (formerly termed the unclassified or exemption
service) of the Civil Service. As such, he is a public officer as defined by the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The fact that Preclaro is not required to record his working hours by means of a bundy clock, or that he did not take
an oath of office, became unessential considerations in view of those provisions in P.D. No. 807 and the
Administrative Code of 1987. These provisions clearly include Preclaro within the definition of a public officer.
PRECLARO INTERVENED UNDER THE LAW

(This is a required element for his prosecution under Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act)
Preclaro’s averment that he could not be prosecuted under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because his
intervention was not required by law, but in the performance of a contract of services entered into by him as a
private individual contractor, is erroneous.
To reiterate, Preclaro falls within the definition of a public officer. As such, his duties delineated in Annex “B” of
the contract of services are subsumed under the phrase “wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.”
Among his duties as Project Manager is to evaluate the contractor’s accomplishment reports or billings. Hence, he
has the privilege and authority to make a favorable recommendation and act favorably on behalf of the
government. Some examples of this are signing acceptance papers and approving deductives and additives.
Therefore, all of the elements of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act are present.
Other ruling: Preclaro is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
It is irrelevant from whom Preclaro demanded his percentage share of P200,000.00, whether from the contractor’s
project engineer (Resoso) or directly from the contractor himself (Sta. Maria). That Preclaro made such a demand
is all that is required by Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This element has been
sufficiently established by Resoso’s testimony.
Preclaro’s alleged refusal to see Sta. Maria when the latter tried to arrange meetings with him does not prove that
Preclaro did not ask for money. In fact, getting the amount through Resoso, the project engineer, would be safer
because if Sta. Maria had refused to give money, Preclaro could always deny having made the demand.
Preclaro’s contention that it was impossible for him to make any demands because the final decision regarding
accomplishments and billing lies with the DOST technical committee is unacceptable. Preclaro is part of the
technical committee as the ITDI representative consultant. This is part of his duties under the contract of services in
connection with which he was employed by the ITDI. Even assuming arguendo that Preclaro does not make the
final decision as supervisor or consultant, his recommendations will necessarily carry much weight.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the entrapment itself are not conflicting.
Preclaro insists that when his hands were placed under ultraviolet light, both were found negative for fluorescent
powder. However, this is Preclaro’s own conclusion. It is not supported by evidence. Such self-serving statements
will not prevail over the clear and competent testimony and the report submitted by the NBI’s forensic expert.
Preclaro’s claim that he was set up by Resoso and Sta. Maria is improbable and contrary to human experience. He
claims that they wanted to take revenge on account of Preclaro’s failure to recommend the Jaime Sta. Maria
Construction Company to perform the extra electrical works.
2. The Civil Service Commission
Trade and Investment Development Corp of the PH v. CSC, G.R. No. 182249
[March 5, 2013]
Prepared By: Trixie Arre
● The 1987 Constitution created the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government mandated to
establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and
courtesy in the civil service.
● The CSC's rule-making power as a constitutional grant is an aspect of its independence as a constitutional
commission. It places the grant of this power outside the reach of Congress, which cannot withdraw the
power at any time.
● The laws that the CSC interprets and enforces fall within the prerogative of Congress. As an administrative
agency, the CSC's quasi-legislative power is subject to the same limitations applicable to other
administrative bodies. The rules that the CSC formulates must not override, but must be in harmony with,
the law it seeks to apply and implement.
● The rules that the CSC formulates should implement and be in harmony with the law it seeks to enforce. In
TIDCORP's case, the CSC should also consider TIDCORP's charter in addition to other civil service laws.
FACTS
In 2001, Arsenio De Guzman was appointed as a Financial Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP (petitioner), a
government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080. His
appointment was included in TIDCORP's Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) which was submitted to the CSC —
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Field Office. However, CSC Director Leticia Bugtong disallowed
De Guzman’s appointing because the said position was not included in the DBM’s Index of Occupational
Service.
Appeal to CSC-NCR
TIDCORP Executive Vice President Jane Tambanillo appealed the invalidation to Director Agnesa Padilla of the
CSC-NCR. Tambanillo argues that RA 8494, which amended TIDCORP’s charter, empowers its Board of Directors
to create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and to approve its own compensation and position
classification system and qualification standards. Specifically, Section 7 of RA 8494 provides:
Section 7. The Board of Directors shall provide for an organizational structure and staffing pattern for officers and
employees of the Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) and upon
recommendation of its President, appoint and fix their remuneration, emoluments and fringe benefits: Provided,
That the Board shall have exclusive and final authority to appoint, promote, transfer, assign and re-assign
personnel of the TIDCORP, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding.
All positions in TIDCORP shall be governed by a compensation and position classification system and
qualification standards approved by TIDCORP's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and
audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing
compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once
every four (4) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability.
TIDCORP shall be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and
qualification standards. I t shall, however, endeavor to make the system conform as closely as possible to
the principles and modes provided in Republic Act No. 6758 (Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989).
TIDCORP’s arguments:
1. Section 7 exempts TIDCORP from existing laws on compensation, position classification and qualification
standards, and is thus not bound by the DBM's Index of Occupational Service. Instead, TIDCORP is only
required to furnish the CSC with its compensation and position classification system and
qualification standards so that the CSC can be properly guided in processing TIDCORP's
appointments, promotion and personnel action.
2. Prior to De Guzman's appointment as Financial Management Specialist IV, the position had earlier been
occupied by Ma. Loreto H. Mayor whose appointment was duly approved by Director Bugtong. Thus,
Director Bugtong's invalidation of De Guzman's appointment is inconsistent with her earlier approval of
Mayor's appointment to the same position.
CSC-NCR decision: denied TIDCORP’s appeal

Director Padilla denied Tambanillo's appeal because De Guzman's appointment failed to comply with Section 1,
Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998,(Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Actions), as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, (The Circular for brevity), which
requires that the position title of an appointment submitted to the CSC must conform with the approved Position
Allocation List and must be found in the Index of Occupational Service. (Note: both circulars were published by the
DBM pursuant to its mandate from RA 6758 to establish a position classification system in the government)
Since the position of Financial Management Specialist IV is not included in the Index of Occupational Service, then
De Guzman's appointment to this position must be invalid. Also, Director Padilla pointed out that the CSC had
already decided upon an issue similar to De Guzman’s case with regards to the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) having similar wording with Section 7.
Appeal to CSC-Central Office (CSC-CO)

This appeal was submitted this time by TIDCORP’s President and CEO Joel Valdes and was sent to CSC
Chairperson Karina Constantino-David.
The CSC-CO affirmed the CSC-NCR’s decision since the Circular is explicit in requiring that the position indicated
in the appointment should conform with the Position Allocation List and found in the Index of Occupational Service.
Otherwise, the appointment shall be disapproved. While RA 8494 gave TIDCORP staffing prerogatives, it would
still have to comply with civil service rules because Section 7 did not expressly exempt TIDCORP from civil
service laws.
Also, granting that the CSC-NCR had erroneously approved an appointment to the same position as De Guzman's
appointment, the CSC is not estopped from correcting its officers' past mistakes.
Appeal to the CA
The CA upheld the ruling of the CSC-CO. It ruled that CSC has authority to approve and review De Guzman's
appointment. The CSC has the power to ascertain whether the appointing authority complied with the requirements
of the law; otherwise, it may revoke the appointment. As TIDCORP is a government-owned corporation, it is
covered by civil service laws and is therefore bound by the CSC's jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to
personnel, including appointments.
Further, the CA cited the CSC's mandate under the 1987 Constitution to approve or disapprove appointments and
to determine whether an appointee possesses civil service eligibility. As TIDCORP's charter does not expressly or
impliedly divest the CSC of administrative authority over personnel concerns at TIDCORP, the latter is still covered
by the existing civil service laws on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. Its
appointment of De Guzman as Financial Management Specialist IV should have complied with these rules.
From these set of facts, it can be seen that there is a clash between TIDCORP’s charter (RA 8494) which
was enacted by Congress and the CSC rules, pursuant to CSC’s rule-making power.
ISSUE
In order to determine whether De Guzman’s appointment is valid, the following issues must be resolved:
1. Does the Constitution empower the CSC to prescribe and enforce civil service rules and regulations
contrary to laws passed by Congress? (NO)
2. Does the Circular apply then to TIDCORP? (NO)
RULING
1. The CSC's rule-making power, albeit constitutionally granted, is still limited to the implementation
and interpretation of the laws it is tasked to enforce.
The 1987 Constitution created the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government mandated
to establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service.
It is a constitutionally created administrative agency that possesses executive, quasi-judicial and

quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. While not explicitly stated, the CSC's rule-making power is
subsumed under its designation as the government's "central personnel agency" in Section 3, Article
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Administrative Code then spelled out the CSC's rule-making power in concrete terms in Section
12, Book V, Title I-A, which empowered the CSC to implement the civil service law and other pertinent
laws, and to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the civil service. The CSC's rule-making
power as a constitutional grant is an aspect of its independence as a constitutional commission. It
places the grant of this power outside the reach of Congress, which cannot withdraw the power at any
time.
But while the grant of the CSC's rule-making power is untouchable by Congress, the laws that the CSC
interprets and enforces must fall within the prerogative of Congress. As an administrative agency, the
CSC's quasi-legislative power is subject to the same limitations applicable to other administrative bodies.
The rules that the CSC formulates must not override, but must be in harmony with, the law it seeks
to apply and implement.
As stated in Grego v. COMELEC, [t]he function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. . . . [A]dministrative
regulations cannot extend the law [nor] amend a legislative enactment; . . . administrative regulations
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law[,]" and in a conflict between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, the former must prevail.
2. Section 7 exempts TIDCORP from rules involving position qualification.
The reference of RA 6758 in Section 7 means that TIDCORP cannot simply disregard RA 6758 but must
take its principles into account in providing for its own position classifications. The CSC shall still enforce
position classifications at TIDCORP, but must do this under the terms that TIDCORP has itself established,
based on the principles of RA 6758.
To further expound on these points, the CSC's authority over TIDCORP is undisputed. The rules that the
CSC formulates should implement and be in harmony with the law it seeks to enforce. In TIDCORP's
case, the CSC should also consider TIDCORP's charter in addition to other civil service laws.
The use of "to endeavor" in the context of Section 7 of RA 8494 means that despite TIDCORP's exemption
from laws involving compensation, position classification and qualification standards, it should still strive to
conform as closely as possible with the principles and modes provided in RA 6758.
The phrase "as closely as possible," which qualifies TIDCORP's duty "to endeavor to conform," recognizes
that the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from RA 6758, but it should still try to hew closely with its principles
and modes. Had the intent of Congress been to require TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply with
RA 6758, it would have so stated in unequivocal terms. Instead, the mandate it gave TIDCORP was to
endeavor to conform to the principles and modes of RA 6758, and not to the entirety of this law.
With these findings, De Guzman’s appointment is valid.

Career Executive Service Board v. CSC, G.R. No. 197762 [March 7, 2017]
Prepared By: Jane iskenthilyuuhhh
Topic under: The Civil Service Commission
The dispute in this case concerns the classification of certain positions in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). The Court is asked to determine, in
particular, whether these positions are properly included in the Career Executive Service (CES); and whether the occupants of these positions
must obtain third-level eligibility to qualify for permanent appointment. To resolve these questions, the Court must also delineate the respective
jurisdictions granted by law to the competing authorities involved in this case — the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the Career Executive
Service Board (CESB).
Section 3 of Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall
strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual
report on its personnel programs.
Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, Administrative Code of 1987:

SECTION 12. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient and
effective personnel administration in the government;
(4) Formulate policies and regulations for the administration, maintenance and implementation of position classification and compensation and
set standards for the establishment, allocation and reallocation of pay scales, classes and positions;
(5) Render opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service matters which shall be binding on all heads of departments, offices and
agencies and which may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari;
xxx xxx xxx
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review
decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or
rulings shall be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or
rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of Service beyond
retirement age;
xxx xxx xxx
(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and such other functions as may be provided by law.
R.A. 9406: AN ACT REORGANIZING AND STRENGTHENING THE PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (PAO), AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF
1987", AS AMENDED, GRANTING SPECIAL ALLOWANCE TO PAO OFFICIALS AND LAWYERS, AND PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR
P.D. 1275: REORGANIZING THE PROSECUTION STAFF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE OFFICES OF THE PROVINCIAL
AND CITY FISCALS, REGIONALIZING THE PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND CREATING THE NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE
B.P. 129: AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
FACTS
PAO received a copy of the CESB Report on the CES Occupancy of the Department of Justice. It stated that out of
the 35 filled positions in the PAO, 33 were occupied by persons without the required CES eligibility. PAO Deputy
Chief Mosing sent a letter to CESB Executive Director Allones informing her that the positions of Chief Public
Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, and Regional Public Attorneys (subject positions) were already
permanent in nature pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9406, which accorded security of tenure to the
occupants thereof. In addition, these positions may only be removed for causes provided by law.
Based on the foregoing premises, the PAO requested the deletion of its office from the Data on CES Occupancy for
the Department of Justice (DOJ). CESB, through Deputy Executive Lachica informed Deputy Chief Mosing that the
CESB would conduct a position classification study on the specified PAO positions to determine whether they may
still be considered CES positions in the DOJ.
DOJ Legal Opinion:

While the matter was pending, PAO Deputy Chief Mosing wrote a letter to then DOJ Secretary Leila M. de Lima to
inform her about the communications sent by the PAO to the CESB. DOJ ruled that the claim that the appointments
of the top-level officials of the PAO are permanent is without merit and that the positions of Chief Public Attorney,
Deputy Public Attorney, and Regional Public Attorneys are part of the CES. In addition, they should be CES
eligibles to become permanent appointees to the said position.
They are required to subsequently take the CES examination, and the absence of such would presume that the
top-level officials of PAO are non-CES eligibles, therefore may be removed from office by the appointing authority
without any violation of rights.
The CSC Legal Opinion:

It appears that while waiting for the CESB to respond to its letters, the PAO wrote to the CSC to request a legal
opinion on the same matter, which it later produced. Citing its mandate as an independent constitutional
commission and its authority under the Administrative Code to "render opinions and rulings on all personnel and
other civil service matters," the CSC declared that third-level eligibility is not required for the subject positions in the
PAO.
The Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, and Regional Public Attorneys shall have the same
qualifications for appointment as those of the Chief State Prosecutor, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, and
Regional State Prosecutor, respectively. Prosecution service Act of 2010 states that all these positions have the
same qualifications for appointment as the Presiding Justice of the CA, which includes, among other requirements,
the practice of law. This means that the Constitution and the Civil Service Law prescribe RA 1080 (BAR) as the
appropriate civil service eligibility therefor. Accordingly, any imposition of a third-level eligibility (e.g., CESE, CSEE)
is not proper, if not, illegal under the circumstances.
Thus it is the Commission’s opinion that for purposes of permanent appointment to the positions of Chief Public
Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney and Regional Public Attorney, no third-level eligibility is required but only RA
1080 (BAR) civil service eligibility.
CESB Resolution No, 918:

CESB denied PAO’s request to declassify the subject positions. Citing the Position Classification Study submitted
by its secretariat, the CESB noted that the positions in question "require leadership and managerial competence"
and were thus part of the CES. Hence, the appointment of persons without third-level eligibility for these posts
cannot be considered permanent.
With regard to the question of its jurisdiction over the matter as against that of CSC, CESB states that under
Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292, it is the Board which has the mandate over Third-level positions in the
Career Service and not the CSC. In addition, CESB cited the case of De Jesus v. People:
"where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general which, if standing
alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special must prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must be taken as intended to
constitute an exception to the general act."
WHEREAS, following the above-cited rule, it is clear that Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292 is the
exception to [the] general act pertaining to the authority of the CSC;
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE CSC:

As a preliminary matter, the CSC ruled that it could assume jurisdiction over the appeal, which involved the
employment status and qualification standards of employees belonging to the civil service. It was supposedly a
matter falling within its broad and plenary authority under the Constitution and the Administrative Code.
The CSC also declared that the authority of the CESB over third-level employees was limited to the imposition of
entry requirements and "should not be interpreted as cutting off the reach of the Commission over this particular
class of positions." Moreover, the CESB was declared subject to the revisory power of the CSC, given that an
attached office is not entirely and totally insulated from its mother agency. With respect to the provision in the
Integrated Reorganization Plan on appeals from the CESB to the Office of the President, the CSC construed this
requirement as pertaining only to disciplinary proceedings.
On the merits, the CSC ruled in favor of the PAO officials. It declared that the CESB would be in violation of R.A.
9406 if the latter would require an additional qualification — in this case, third-level eligibility — for purposes of
permanent appointments to certain PAO positions.
It is declared that the following key positions in the Public Attorney's Office do not require third-level eligibility and
CESO rank for purposes of tenurial security: 1. Chief Public Attorney; 2. Deputy Chief Public Attorneys; 3. Regional
Public Attorneys; and 4. Assistant Regional Public Attorneys.
ISSUE
1. Whether the CSC had the jurisdiction to resolve the appeal filed by the PAO and to reverse CESB
Resolution No. 918 -- YES
2. Whether the CSC acted in accordance with law when it reversed the CESB and declared that
third-level eligibility is not required for occupants of the subject PAO positions -- YES
RULING
1. The CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved the PAO's appeal and reversed CESB
Resolution No. 918.
After analyzing and harmonizing the legal provisions pertaining to each of these two agencies, the Court concludes
that the CSC has the authority to review CESB Resolution No. 918. The Court has arrived at this conclusion after a
consideration of: a) the broad mandate of the CSC under the Constitution and the Administrative Code; and (b) the
specific and narrowly tailored powers granted to the CESB in the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the
Administrative Code.
As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has broad authority to pass upon ALL CIVIL
SERVICE MATTERS. Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution entrusts to the CSC the administration of
the civil service, which is comprised of "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."
So during the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission, the specific powers of CSC were enumerated:
“Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, shall establish a
career service, promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, classif[y] positions,
prescribe conditions of employment except as to compensation and other monetary benefits which shall
be provided by law, and exercise all powers and functions inherent in and incidental to human
resources management, to promote morale, efficiency, and integrity in the Civil Service. It shall submit to
the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs, and perform such other
functions as may be provided by law”
But in the final version of 1987, the specific powers of CSC were not enumerated, but instead the inserted the
concept of “CENTRAL PERSONNEL AGENCY”, which they considered all-encompassing. The concept was
understood to be sufficiently broad as to include the authority to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel
actions, to classify positions, and to exercise all powers and functions inherent in and incidental to human resources
management.
The Administrative Code of 1987 further reinforces this view. Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section
12 thereof enumerates the specific powers and functions of the CSC while recognizing its comprehensive authority
over all civil service matters. Section 12, Items (1) to (5), (11), (14), and (19), are of particular relevance to this
dispute.
It is evident from the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions that the CSC, as the central personnel agency
of the government, has been granted the broad authority and the specific powers to pass upon all civil service
matters. The question before the Court today is whether this broad authority encompasses matters pertaining to the
CES and are, as such, recognized to be within the jurisdiction of the CESB.
2. It must likewise be emphasized that the CSC has been granted the authority to review the decisions
of agencies attached to it under Section 12 (11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code.
Since the CESB is an attached agency of the CSC, the former's decisions are expressly subject to the CSC's
review on appeal. The decisions of CESB may only be appealed to the Office of the President if they refer only to
administrative cases involving the discipline of members of the CES because members of the CES are all
presidential appointees.
The CSC correctly ruled that third level eligibility is not required for the subject positions. Nowhere in RA 9406, PD
1275, or BP 129 is there a reference to third-level eligibility and CESO rank as qualification requirements for the
subject positions. It emphasizes that the CESB cannot add to the provisions of these laws, which only
require the practice of law for a certain period of time and presuppose a bar license. To require the occupants
of the subject PAO positions to possess third-level eligibility would be to amend the law and defeat its spirit and
intent.
The CESB effectively amended the law when it required the occupants of the subject PAO positions to
obtain third-level eligibility. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that occupants of the subject PAO positions are
only mandated to comply with requirements as to age, citizenship, education, and experience. Since third-level
eligibility is not at all mentioned in the law, it would be improper for the CESB to impose this additional qualification
as a prerequisite to permanent appointments. To do so would be to amend the law and to overrule Congress.

Admin Digests (I. Law On Public Officers - Basic Concepts and Principles)

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Admin Digests (I. Law On Public Officers - Basic Concepts and Principles)

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A.

Nature and Characteristics of Public Office

Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 116418 [March 7, 1985]

Relevant Provisions / Concepts / Doctrines

Sec. 26. Personnel Actions ​—

(2) THE RESOLUTION DID NOT EFFECT “ABOLITION” OF PUBLIC OFFICES

(3) THE RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE WAS NOT VIOLATED

Relevant Provisions / Concepts / Doctrines

The heirs cannot be a real-party-in-interest.

In the case of Vda. de Mesa vs. Mencias, we ruled:

Cantiga, as succeeding officer to the contested office, is the proper ​real-party-in-interest.

Relevant Provisions / Concepts / Doctrines

Section 7 of Rule 4 E.M. No. 12-040, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366:

No. 1 nominee = 2 years No. 1 nominee= 3 years No. 1 Nominee = 3 years

Datol group’s argument

Ruling of Supreme Court

1. Scope of the Civil Service

Torres v. de Leon, G.R. No. 119440 [January 18, 2016]

Relevant Provisions / Concepts / Doctrines

Relevant Provisions / Concepts / Doctrines

Article XII, Sec. 16, Consti:

TEST OF ECONOMIC VIABILITY:

PD 1084:​ Created the PEA ​(Now the PRA in this case)

GOCC GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY

Refers to ​any​ agency: Refers to ​any​ agency o

STOCK CORPORATION NON-STOCK CORPORATION

Two requisites must concur before one As for non-stock corporations:

If only one requisite is present, ​it cannot be

Relevant Provisions / Concepts / Doctrines

Topic under: Scope of the Civil Service Commission

Article 10-B, Section 2(1) 1987 Constitution:

THE REST OF THE RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

RULING OF LABOR ARBITER:

RULING OF THE CA:

Do the LA and NLRC have jurisdiction over the case of LRTA?

But with regard to illegal dismissal, NO.

Medyo weird yung explanation, but please bear with me!

JURISDICTION OF NLRC OVER LRTA - MONETARY CLAIMS:

JURISDICTION OF THE NLRC OVER LRTA - ILLEGAL DISMISSAL:

STARE DECISIS DECISIONS THAT WERE FOLLOWED BY THE COURTS:

Relevant Provisions / Concepts / Doctrines

Some technical terms found in the facts:

Characters in this case:

ACTUAL FACTS (This is the story na talaga)

YES, PRECLARO IS A PUBLIC OFFICER.

Non-career service​ is characterized by:

The ​non-career service​ shall include:

5. Emergency and seasonal personnel.

PRECLARO INTERVENED UNDER THE LAW

Other ruling: ​Preclaro is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Relevant Provisions / Concepts / Doctrines

CSC-NCR decision: denied TIDCORP’s appeal

Appeal to CSC-Central Office (CSC-CO)

It is a ​constitutionally created administrative agency that possesses executive, quasi-judicial and

2. Section 7 exempts TIDCORP from rules involving position qualification.

With these findings, De Guzman’s appointment is valid.

Relevant Provisions / Concepts / Doctrines

Topic under: The Civil Service Commission

Section 3 of Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution:

Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, Administrative Code of 1987:

DOJ Legal Opinion:

The CSC Legal Opinion:

CESB Resolution No, 918:

Sec. 26. Personnel Actions —

Cantiga, as succeeding officer to the contested office, is the proper real-party-in-interest.

PD 1084: Created the PEA (Now the PRA in this case)

Refers to any agency: Refers to any agency o

If only one requisite is present, it cannot be

Non-career service is characterized by:

The non-career service shall include:

Other ruling: Preclaro is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

It is a constitutionally created administrative agency that possesses executive, quasi-judicial and