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    The Geography of Finitude Myth and Earth

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    International Philosophical _ Quarterly | VOU. ,No.1 Issue No, 193 March 2009 aericies Fale University Sara Beit Gonzaga University Theodore Di Maria, J. University of Guelph John Russom University of Oregon ——_Nameess Virtues and Restrained Speech inthe Analecte Erin ML. Cline Universi of Scranton ‘The Jesuit Magis and the Ethie of Certs Paris Ronald H. MeKinney, SJ. Universiy of Loussille Who Is the Author of the Summa Lambert? ‘Thomas S. Maloney BOOK REVIEWS AND NoTIcES SS Fordham University Facultés Universitaires New York Namur The Geography of Finitude: Myth and Earth in Plato’s Phaedo Sara Brill ROM A ZOOLOGICAL perspective, the Phaedo presents a hestiar 10 be week ‘oned with, References to swans ad swallows, bees ad ull ant, fogs, and dogs, to name just afew, appear thoughout its pages 1a dialogue that takes the ‘question of death sone of its main concerns the varey of Hing things tha verse ‘ts texs noteworthy. This profusion of fe is matched in he Phaclo by 2 profusion lof dscurie epsters, Daring the course ofthe dialogue we encounter the mv of Pociy and song. the quas-clinicaluterances of incantation and charm. the language ‘oF mathematical Pythagecanisi, the eschatological belief ssoiated with Orie oct, andthe thet of enti. Amid this proltration of fogs, we also encounter {our logo out te imnxrtalty ofthe sou, hose Raws demonstrations have bee noted by scholars spanning both Jecades and schools of thought anda myth whose discursive exceses have led 0 an inverse paeiy of discussion in contemporary Phased cometary.” This profusion of son and logos opens up a crucial dimension ofthe Phe as 4 whole. namely its overarching concern with the relationship between mods tiscourse aout death and that entity so enigmstically connected with ie the soul Indeed one ofthe dilogue's most comping featres ts denestation that fear of death implies certain assumptions aboot the nature ofthe soul. Socrates's expressly therapeutic eff to contend with this fear require both the arcu an ential assesment of the assumptions about the soul tha inspive st. He ths ‘connects. discussion of death oan investigation of sulin onde 0 tepice his i {eclocutors’sadess about his death with desire to ere fr their own sus. Because this therapeutic aim i express identified ss persuasion about the nature ofthe Sou. the Phuedo possesses an ireducbly erica dimension that demands the Persusive power ofboth gas and move. This rhetorical dimension allows Plato inturn to deploy both mutos and logs inorder to ilistate the need fora eet {omporinent towards death that nether asserts unwarranted optimism about one's Knowledge ofthe soul nor parayzes inquiry into what the soul is he possibility of such paralysis isillustrated and skew throughout the dakogue {na series of passages that emphasize the morality of logos ite The connection between the dog's various fogo about ising sn dying om the one hand nl its allsions tothe life and death of logos ist om the other, sugzests an iniicy between dow and logos that eceises perhaps it fullest articulation ithe dialogue in Socrates's acount of his ow life (9Se-1024). This mutual implication of seo 8nd foges and is impartance fr phils, is obscured if one focuses on the fe “ogo about the immortality ofthe su insolation fom the fll range ot ran presented inthe dialogue. I is perhaps no surprise that such a focus insptes {CT Yate Une. ress, 1984 an Did Whe, ih and Matas Plats Pha Snore PN ‘on A Croan ce Pal 0 AN Ste that a ae staat hed Seah gre A Cin Pps 8 My SEM ooo lise sccm beast he peso sah The pce tle Pha ie he von seh ata tn shh es THE GEOGRSPHY OF FIOTUDE: ANTHAND EARTH IN PLATO'S PHAEDO 7 ious reception ofthe myth of he can tht follows upon these foot, However, such a response overlooks the fact thal from the cay allusion to Tee 0 the later description ofthe rue earth the Ped is permeate by myth ick. the Four fogethemselvesare infused with mythic imagery from their stat nthe ancient saying that souls reside in Hades (70) o thee use of Homeric and Pythagorean Imagery in what has came to be called the Affinity Argument (T8b-B4b) In the hued, muchos an logos fonction i sucha manner as be neither redible to ‘one another nor understood in isolation fom ane anther? Tn what follows, take this nterdependence between logos ad maths to be in ‘ened by Platoand obs iredacible. Bosh discursive registers ae present case bothare equitedhy an overarching sim of the dialog namely to persue readers ofthe need to ivestga the soul This ehetorical dimension challenges any set. hierarhic distinction be ween the Phacdo's dramatic an argumentative clement, Feismy claim that this challenge applies as well tw any srt hierarchic distinction between gos and zs in the dio, "Move pect. argc that hot the four fg about the anata ofthe soul and the muzhos aout the rue earth serve the dialogues overarching and persistent fr illsteate the need to investigate the sou, Further, both do so by critically ‘engaging witha variety of culturally embedded conceptions sul" While the four ogo! aoa the soul's maonality involve a erica engagement with mathematical, religious, and poetic eonesptions othe soul hey atime ult be fll persis because they rely upon a incomplete consiraal ofthe relationship beticen Boy and soul that denies them meaningful reference tothe lives and deaths of embeded beings. The myth ofthe wue earth proves a necessary complement to these lag by offering critical engagement with the very perspective Irom which Socrates and his interlocutor assess these conceptions~—thechy providing a dimension of Selr-citique thats called or by the four fo —and by loin the question ofthe relationship hetween soul and bedy within the context of ving and dying. ‘The following pages procoed ts by way of briefly atlending to the fis (0 ‘ogo’ about immorality in order to set the context fora extended investigation of| the thie and fourth Hag Friis in these discussions that we encounter Socrates rmostexplicitly contending witha variety of approaches tthe mature of he so and ‘conceding the incomplete character of al of them including his own) when tr to the myth ofthe earth in one to draw out its unique and critical contbution the dialosue's inquiry int the sul 1 “The extended investigation by Socrates ai his interlocutory int the sous i ‘uortalty begins in their continued conversation (Stoke FOB) aoa ception of death that Socrates playfully presente his upologa for his aan ‘donment of his fiends and his conten inthe Hse of death (618. this defense Socrates desenbes the eagerness (putea) with which those won he describes “ariously asthe tue-bom philosopher (66) an those who philosophize nigh) {Ge practice for death by taining o gather their soul o themselves and Was {comportnent withthe body in onder to commune with and tive for (ope yea {hat which is (639-706). Soerates’s sable polysoity the ease with which he sides between a number of discursive registers warns agains reading this defense as & simple expression of what Socrates takes toe te of himself" Thai isthe de- fense's conception ofthe soul thats particularly problematic is suggested hy Cebes. ‘who objets that the sous endurance eyo death isin nee of further discussion (70a-b), Socrates's eager agreement wo offer a amore thorugh sory inalgunaes the fis logos about immorality (705) ‘This fist fagos inherits a deinition of death from the preceding conversation: {deaths the separation of youl and body (6¥e). During the course ofthe conversation Socrates characterizes death as a kind of genesis, one pat of a ceascless eye of becoming. whose specific iferene from becoming ial or large virtue 9 us teins undetermined (71d-e). Theres something deeply sedctive abou his haracterization, especially for Socrates's companions. whe ate mourning already he coming loss of ther fiend. Part of Socrates's work in the dialogue wil he 16 show that just as the fear of death presumes a knowledge of what death is 30 has Sadness about the death ofa fiend presuppose what remains to he demonstrated, "mel, hat sense, (Taal death comprises a essaion, This is tani effort, Fre stub nay event he spzasn hat potia acorn cna hae cae Pus the ppm rn asp nd Pat psy eat me Pes and the seemingly iretitable character ofthe experience of death a Hoss hangs ‘ver the Phaedo trois sla. Nevertheless, s elaying asthe characterization of| ‘deaths genesis yb, eventually and to Socrates's please (8b), proves dis satisfying to af fas (6) of his interlocutor. "The second fags concerning the mirtlity ofthe sou inaugurates change of perspective. Socrates and his intrlocutors mite fom «consideration of perpetil hovering toa consideration of eeralchangelessess this iseussion, the souls capacity to recopnize the filed snving of things appealed oa demonstrating the soul's grasp and recolletion ofthat which can be understood by means of the senses. Simmias otjcts that while the phenomenon of recollection sugges ‘thatthe so precedes th birth of the human being. there is nothing in this account to guarantee that he deat ofthe person taste utr desiaction ofthe soul (7b In onder o contend withthe playlly articulated concern of Simias and (Cees (77d-<) thatthe soul disperses and scatters Oia Koi Bue Davve.) ‘shen separated rom te bods, Secrates must turn to deal explicitly with the dis tinction between soul and body that has unl now diven thoi iseussion of death without itself being examine “Tus, Socrates gis the tid logos wit an investigation ofthe hind of thing that undergoes "seater" According to Socrates, “scaring” isa Tate undergone by things that are composite (otne700), as Suh things are subject to change and ateration. What is nomcompesite does not safer change, alteration oF "seater ing” The fear thi he soul scattered at death relies upon a conception of death 4 the decomposition or dissolution of composite enti Seats then attempts, infamously 0 distinguish systematically between what is composite and what is ‘non-compete along th ines of what is visible and what i invisible and vo assert the souls affinity with shat nisl, on the basis of capacity for reckoning ‘Go-ytop TM), and thebody's aint with what visible 79a-b)- Thus. soul and body ae distinguished long the following ines: soul iemost akin to whats divine, deathles, incligible, single-ormed,indissolube, and aways keeps 10 the sel Same conti, Hoy ie most thin to what shuns dath-bound, manyfoemed Uninet, issluble, and never keeps to the sesame eontion (0) Given the disinetion hetween ray and sou along these lines. Socrates concludes "Well ‘en, since this ow ings sand, n't ody apt he dissolved (vai sta) {quickly and oul in tum pt oe altogether indssoluble 1c). oF something ‘Sse this” (808). This isan enornousl fetal and problematic passage. and there is mut hat thas Been and should cornet he sai abou it Would like to Focus upon the ef fect hi ths consructio of death as dissolution is foray fogs about the su. death isan ativitywhove paradigmatic agent ithe body. and souls distin trom brody in the way that wiibe iy distinc from invisible, den dhe vocabulary that is best suite to account forthe sou is no vocabulary of whats bol and most bt vocabulary of what i eternal and formal, Were the distinction between sol and body tobe all hat Socrates gives an account of in this thd logos, we would be left with the assertion tht the soul is Best understand by and throsh a logs ide forms" However, and this sof wines importance. this nor al that Socrates oes in the hid fogs. Inadion wo distinguishing between soul and boy. Sctates'sthind {gor gives an account ofthe exchange between the vo, fn fat, when Socrates ums to dserbe the various means of investigation tht are avaiable othe sul (79e-a he reveals the inadequacy ofthe Fagor of forms to provide an acount othe soul Sout and body are not so diferent at be incapable of affecting ome another" While the sous capacity to grasp what is eter and changeles aligns soul with What vine and dates the sous eapaciy to investigate by means ofthe senses aligns soul with whats bodily and metal. Moreover, the soul must exert some effort in ‘order not oe alfected bythe body. Further, ithe soul fis to exer this efor ant Instead throws its concern into the oy the om the body 3s could be. The soul self will ecome boli aque os- Ste). Thus. the distinction Betsveen hody and soul is mot a distinction this given 1o the Ovo in completeness: rather, isa disintion that requies some degree of ation: it isachistnction whose fullest expression must be accomplished. The soul's ability to eam—to be educated and nurtired—asserts both its potential simplicity and its frequent complexity. What we gather from Socrates's account ofthe sous relationship tote body isasense of the soul's malleablity: this malls affords ‘comparison wth he body and will standin imeducibe tension with assertions of the souls deathiesses uni the variety of conditionsof the sul ae and at length Consequently. Socrates and his inerlacitors are in need of « means to disinguish between conditions of sul with some degree of sophistication, The possibility of exchange between soul and body ads a dimension of {complexity 10 the soul that challenges the associations that Socrates and his exten eh = * “ THE GEOGRAPHY OF FINTUDE: MYTH AND EARTH IN PLATO'S PHNEDO ” imterlocutors have employed thus far in speaking abou the soul, Because a soul «an become hodylike, certain souls can be more or lss adequately accounted {or by the same vocabulary thal suse to describe Bodily conditions. At he same {ime the sous capacity to grasp what sternal and changeles. as evinced by the Phenomenon of recollection, dies simple aa uncial reduction tothe bodily Consequenty, no mater how precise ose their vocabulary ofthe bay they ae stil n need of ulivating a vocabulary’ for conditions of the Soul thal are not reducible to these ofthe body. Thus, while some souls cam be meaningfully referred to as hungry orthirsty even afer they have eon separated fom the body the agreement between Socrates and his ntelocutors aout the capacities of soul forces them to acknowledge the limit ofthe adequacy of words like “hungry” and “irsty™ in deseibing the soul, They must concede that hunger and this wil always cary a certain taphoricl haze to them when applied to the su. Ths neither @ holy vocabulary nora vocabulary of forms is sufiient to account for the variety of eondions to which a soul is subject. Specifically, the tension between the souls capacity to recollect forms and its complexity. especially a5 expressed hy the varie ofits comm conditions, gives ise ta need for sn acount of Siciousess, Socrates is aloeded a particularly vivid illstration ofthe varieties ofthe soul's cornpt conditions by anumber of traditional storie about he variety of fates tha {soul ean sutras ane after it des In fet, Socrates's account ofthe possbil ties of exchange between soul an Body is infused with the language of myth, He speaks ofa sul infected with the heavy and earthy (ye ites) body (8he~d) and thos incapable of having a genuine death (0M), Unable to overcome thet Tear ‘ofthe snvsible ch shu are stalked instead by a heavy and brooding love for the bodily (rod owjaroeviois erabyyit, Bld-e). Uneasy. ungoiet, eventually rendered visible hy this love for what ible and their fear for what invisible, these souls can be seen haunting the memorials forthe dead (8te-d), So iene ae they from Hes that eventually they tnd their Way into ods again. baies that conespon odbee arto loves ghtonous souls to donkeys, unjust and tyrant souls ta wolves ad akon, just and moderate souls that lacked philosophy to bees ‘hayps an ans (82a-B) Saeraes's commitment to demonstrate a his companions heii i hy an a hy the importance of cae forthe soul tnd 8 persuasive aly inthis combination of Homeric and Pythagorean tations. By means ofthis Fusion of mythic mazes the variety of living things affords Socrates a way of accounting for varity of conditions of the sou. This proliferation of animals provides taxonomy of souls and serves an ethical ordering demanded By the acknowledgment of exchange hetwcen boy ands ‘Thus. Socrates uses animality inthe context of Wansmigration as one means of providing a vocabulary fr vine and vieiousess; an account of varieties of living beings is thereby connected to an acount of psychical conditions. Socrates's tse ‘ot mythic imagery supgests thatthe variety of living Beings can help elucidate the vaiety of souls and thereby provide an alternative 1 the bovis and eidetic vo cabularies that have proven tobe insufficient fr this purpose, ut it remains to be ‘determined how well his language measures upto the demand to give an gecount ‘ofthe sout that is reducible nether othe hod oe othe formal. A his juncture inthe dialogue “ving being is even les clearly accounted for than the Beil oF the eidetie: consequently its capacity to provide an alternate scription ofthe soul hs yet tobe demonstrated. Without a robst account of living being that incides 1 elear indication ofthe staus ofthe living ody with respect to the bedi this ethical zoo!0gy"isptculary dificult to distinguish trom a bodily vocabulary Because inthe Phaedo the primary ethical distinction between virtue and vice i ‘ownded upon the nature ofthe souls relation tothe body the mapping wf vite ad vice ono varieties of living things only punctuates the need Toran account of the living body. Inthe absence of such an account the alignment between modality nd the bodily that was forgedeatly on inthe thied fogs remains deeply ambiguous nd the status of the aplication of baily vocabularies tothe souls iurative oe ‘metaphorical in character resins uncertain” ‘What cannot escape our notice i thal Socrates's se of mythic images highlights this ambiguity and absence rather than oxers them ver Socrates deploys the theme ‘of transmigration tilluate the exchange between by and soul, Thistheme aids ‘he suggestion that one must cre for one's soul Nonetheless it inertetes with & ‘eat distintion between body and soul that would indicate easily the deathlesness ofthe soul onthe basis ofisitference fromthe body, Thus. in the thi one there "emerges tension between the mythic language that Socrates uses to describe the change between body and soul ad he associations used to demonstrate the death lessess of the sou this tension calls for an account of living being that mains anansiered inthe thitd logos and echoes into the fourth ‘Thisourth fogs evolves ou ofthe objections of Simmias and Cees the third Rather han work through he fine points ofeach jection wll simply noe here ‘hat both supply an aemate conception of the relation between soul and bay to those suggested in the third fogs. Accordingly, Socrates's replies to Simm ad {bes wil focus upon the eatonshiphettcen sou and Ba that each objection supplies. Much ofthe fourth gos will involve showing that each objection ether THE GEOGRAPHY OF INITUDE: MOTH AKD EARTH W PLATO'S PUAEDO 8 denies or fils account for some quality oF condition of sou that the objector ‘would want 6 maintain ‘With espect 1 Simmiss's assertion thatthe souls amony of bi cements, Socrates demonstrates hat conceiving ofthe soa a ating o¢ harmony Tals 0 cco fortwo qualities that Simms would want to atbute to the sou tai ‘canbe disposed tobe coneay tothe body in which st fnds self and that there te differences between salsa regards their vinte (931-c). Ts, in replying (0 Simmiass objection, Seraes points once again to the nee for a8 Sophisticated a ‘ocabulary conceming vive and vice as posible, This nea i made even move sressing in his eply to Cees ero cespond t Cebews concer thatthe soul, hile move noble and more euing than the body snot sufficiently distinct from the body as to escape the tisolution that is synonymous with hodily demise, Socrates takes a Famous cit- ‘umspet route tis in he course of his response to this concer that Socrates feels ‘compiled to give his vn aocount of how he came to philosophy and to that move ment he takes tobe definitive of his thought aking refuge in egos. Thoghout his ‘cco of his own intelectual istry. Socrates emphasizes the loss eran ways fof speaking that accompanies philosophical reetion. For instance, upon closer ‘comideration of his ow) understanding of eatses, he loses the ability 4 speak of ‘ase asa function of miei elements and he processes the undergo 96e-97a, Tn fact, loses the ably to speak of case at al fo tine (TH) un he epains some of that capacity it his hypothess of Form and participation (1005-2). And {ven here, a he regains certain surety of speech, it ta poverty-stricken vocab lary to which he iy retured a Fet upon whieh he explicitly remarks and remedies [aterm in his cscussion with Cebes (100d, H0Sh-e), With respect Socrates's hypothesis of participation, what Socrates gains in certainty fe lses in phenomenal resonance shat is werds gai inset they lose in sophistication. Peshaps, trom the perspective of metapyscs. is isnot suprising. but what we must make sure to rots that Socrates himwelf is disatised with his tade-off and seeks some means to gain back the variety und sophistication of vocabulary thate had once possessed {he seeks to get back the phenomenal work Moreover. tis dissatisfaction isnot Simply fetion of some Kind o isyncrasy (philosophical or otherwise on the part of Socrates, This satisfaction shor from an acknowledgment thar the main ‘ject of inguity hee, the soul and its eelaton to death cannot be stticienty a ‘ound for By the vocabulary of forms and ieas. Te pti of termi available to Socrates seme keeps nost inp this hypothesis of participation s inadequate {othe tank. Ths, some neans of regsining a rich an complex vocabulary that a the same time does not solute is initial hypothesis must be found. His means of doing sos to reine his understanding ofthe relationship hetweencontaries and things a act tht will require the ington of 2 meter Rete oom and things shape (uo "This task is taken inthe following manner. Socrates ad Cebes agree tha in “adtion to contearies like Bigness and Smaliness. Hot and Col, there alsa exist ‘things that have contaries (103b) or tha aleays bring the contrary Wo bear when they occu. Those things are named by means of the contri hat come 4 bein them (103b-c). Forinstance, something scaled hot when the contary ofthe Hot somes 4 Bei it Jus 3 the contrary’ il never come ta he is contrary (the Ke fof the Het wl ever cone tobe the idea ofthe Cok, 1030). so the thing in which the contrary comes to he wll never be able 1 come to be the other contrary (he hot thing cannot become cold ad til he itself. The hot ching will peeish eather ‘than adit into itsel the conta of the contrary that his given tise. em ‘cha manner thatthe bot thing brings Bethe contary ofthe Hot. As Socrates suggests. where we wish io etine our vocally abi, ve might come up with ame fr this ot thing peshaps “fie and know that with this ame We are naming ‘coming ko be ofa contrary in thing Tn fact, given the relationship between contrares and things tha Socrates s de ‘loping. he and Cebes are in great need 1 come up with some means of referring to tings in a manner that characterizes the thing 38 coming to be ofa contrary ‘sithout creating the possiblity of eomusing the thing forthe contrary. Such mans oller Socrates a more sophisticated and complex vocabulary than his nial yp ‘xishadallowed hin. 1 ih the "rediscovery" of such ames that Seraes begins to regain arch and varied word -Accotdingly. we se the significance of hese names emphasized asthe conversa ‘ion continues. Socrates brings to bea all ha they have agreed aboot things rd ‘names tothe question of the soul, We can see this emphasis for nstance, i the ae that Socrates now takes to instruct Cebes into how Cebes should speak about these things: "Then go back and speak 10 me from the tepnning. And don't ansner me withthe ters Fuse ope the question hat by tating ea allows. Co give a answer yon the iat ne spoke ofthat safe one-since se another safety coming ot fof what we're sing now Hf you sl ask me wht comes oben the dy By ‘abi he Body Reh nt ge that safe ara wlned a) ansver an say that's Homes insta TH give the fair (aioe pe) ane cing to what we were decusing jst no ad say thats re: Noe when you snk what comes tote ina boy by which the dy wil esc, wil ay that Ws sickest athe thats ever Nor when yo ask what comes tbe a mume by which he number willbe ol, wll a) tats does bt rather that the uni and on fo her things 108%-<) thing wey te re ss] e's ohn ee "Bef b whenerttee he shape (eh el hc an eh saci cna hee eh rh Socrates's instruction of Cehews speech i ohrusve and serves to underscore the sense in which Cebes is leaning 9 Language, developing a way of speaking, cultivating a vocabulary whose significance he has ony ast begun to grasp. Se fondly. Socrates himself notes the refined quit ofthis vocabulary. We cannot ‘of evurse hear this description without some sense of io attached 0 Bat take ito be part of Socrates's point that these refined ames are in fat ned, provided that one urdestand what is Being said by them an what the need for their generation i and "unt all specify the coming tobe, the genesis. ofeonaiesin things. Al hee speeiy aking of relationship that secs for us an intelligible world. Finally. a6 Socrates wil immediately illustrate for Cobos, "souls jus sich a word, Like “re” or "Tever” Ht undiates the genesis of «contrary. More specifically. soul names the coming tobe of life nthe boy As the conteary of life death, the sou, by being the emissary of life, cannot adit death (10SW)2" Becarse the soul cannot adit death, the soul must he t-dying for deahles (kas). We now have ove final constuction of death death 5 the contrary of lie However tis account of death asthe contrary life an ofthe soul as that which always brings life to sar on what comes to poses soul Faves something uns namely hos we are © conceive of hody within this ramework. On the one hand we are not permitted 6 think of bay a simply the contrary to sol, Fr the same reason tht we do nottink of to asthe contaty tothe, Moreover insofar the soul cam he mae to fecome body-fke and tl Bea sol so an ody cant be contrary to one anoth=. Perhaps body. while not ating a the contrary 0 ou is such as to have a comrary in t—death—that i precisely the contary to the thatthe soul somehow possesses. The body’ alignntent with death is cranky a- serte in the third logos. However, were bay to be tha which rings death to bea ‘on what posseses it hen soul could not possess body nor dy sou For the sine reason that ie cannot possessive a ie cao! possess fre, But this would Beto ‘deny the posiility ofan entity capable of possessing Both body 3 sou tats ‘ay: this Would eto deny the possibilty of ving hing. Weare returned then to the ‘ame problem we encountered in the thiedfozos, namely. the ned for an acco of iving being that adresses how the fixing body sands with respect to the oy Inthe absence of such an account, Socrates's alignment of sl with ie and bly with death threatens his capacity to speak of Tvng Beings u Because the soul has been understood as something dethless, 840 the ear of the soul that they must ten, “not oa for this tie in which shat we eal “ing ve” goes on, but for ime as a whole” (107e}. When Socrates points this out ‘would seem a thous he simply passes over the nec for an account of "being alive” Socrates does not goon to olfer a fagos of living being i the sane manner ‘in which he has discussed the immorality ofthe so, But neither does he go on #0 contemplate time as.a whole Insead. Socrates returns to the mythic contest with which the four fags began by describing the ate of the soon Has (1076-108) sn then giving an extended myth (1OSG-I 4) in which he deserts the whole carth and its egions (1084-1 Te) what lies within the earth (11 fe“ 13e) and the jourmeysof souls under its surface (1134-114), Thus, Soertes follows this Furth gos by recounting a description of earth in which death is given a pace on cath and the souls ofthe dead reside in tegions tht are appropiate to them, Is not the temporality of inte that Socrates explores here, but ifs geography! One is provoked to wonder why he conjoins an account of the sou’ fate ater death 0 anaccount ofthe earth. Why provide a myth of the earth at all? ier all. cath has not simply been an innocuous entity in the dalogu. Inthe thi fogs Socrates lgned the eathy withthe bodily and presented both as negative characteristics ‘hata soul could come to have but which a soul could not be rediced (She-dh.™ Inthe myth ofthe rv earth, what had represented the characteristic heaviness of fos mam ts The pee ose cs to he ie by tan wh pe he ‘tec Un ese 73 9 180 ‘pct ureter absense ahs recor hel sana yh hy Smee na o P's Prk Ay NN Sen ee Ne ark Pe 85 p19 Tam ee sgt sme Fa ea ay eds Sct wn ea hen Phi Cambs {SE GEOGRAPHY OF FNETUDE: MYTH AND EARTH IN PLATO'S PHAEDO the body is now outited ith a variety of regions, each of which is appropriate to ‘eran kinds of souls Whats accomplished by the myths emphasise the paces ‘or regions of the earth? ‘We can begin sponding to this question by noting the sharply critical and sel Aeetive tenor of the myth from ssa The myth of the earth is ntxoced with ‘e-eling of what is sid about the souls ate in Hades, reeling whose emphasis ‘on the variety of sous rests in a ertgue of Aeschylus charset Telephus, who tlaimedthe joumey ty Hades ws simple (108) Ite, sates Socrates. the ways {o Hades are many, and he variety of paths available to souls astra their need fa guige andthe wretchalness of those souls who, on count hee iciousness ae beret of guidance (108%), The criti enorof Socrates's re-telling fs maintained throughout hsintialexctange, which culminates in Socrates drawing in question nor only what has heen said about the sous journey in Hades bt what as Been sa out the earth itself: “An! many and wondtous ae the eanh’s gions. and earth itself is neither of the sort not the size i's held be in the opinion of hose wh ‘usualy speak about earths Pve heen persuaded by somebody (108. Socrates's critical engagement with apoetic tation about the soul's journey to Hales serves to underscore tha eriieal engagement he has maintained throughout the fur dogo and also indicates thatthe realm of myth is nota placid elling of accepted doctrine han agonistic bate for shot Thus, Socrates eur to myths nota move from dialectical engagement to uncontested teitry “Moreover. Socrates's myth ofthe ert snot merely oe version of am account of eth that would ve wth thers. ICs not simply a myth about the earth at al, bt

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