DURON VS NLRC
and his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence
Under Art. 283 therefore retrenchment may be valid only when the following
requisites are met: (a) it is to prevent losses; (b) written notices were served on the
workers and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one (1)
month before the effective date of retrenchment; and, (c) separation pay is paid to
the affected workers.
There is no question that an employer may reduce its work force to prevent losses.
However, these losses must be serious, actual and real.3 Otherwise, this ground for
termination of employment would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers
who might be merely feigning losses in their business ventures in order to ease out
employees.
Culled from the above data, the termination of petitioners could not have validly
taken effect either on 25 or 30 September 1990. The one-month notice of
retrenchment filed with the DOLE and served on the workers before the intended date
thereof is mandatory. Private respondents failed to comply with this requisite. The
earliest possible date of termination should be 12 October 1990 or one (1) month
after notice was sent to DOLE unless the notice of termination was sent to the
workers later than the notice to DOLE on 12 September 1990, in which case, the date
of termination should be at least one (1) month from the date of notice to the
workers. Petitioners were terminated less than a month after notice was sent to DOLE
and to each of the workers.
MERCURY DRUG VS NLRC
Dismissal of a dishonest employee is to the best interest not only of management but
also of labor. As a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest, a
company has the right to dismiss its erring employees. An employer cannot be
compelled to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to its
interest, justifying loss of confidence in him. The law does not impose unjust
situations on either labor or management. 7 We therefore find justification in the
termination of private respondent Cesar E. Ladisla's employment by petitioner
Mercury Drug Corporation.
Under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employment
for "fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or his duly authorized representative." Loss of confidence is established as a
valid ground for the dismissal of an employee. The law does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct to invoke such a justification. It is
sufficient that there is some basis for the loss of trust or that the employer has
reasonable grounds to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct
demanded of his position.
Anent private respondent's claim of summary suspension without being given the
opportunity to be heard, the Court takes note that, in addition to the fact that his
suspension was merely preventive pending approval by the Department of Labor of
its application for clearance to terminate the services of private respondent, the latter
was given the chance to defend himself in several instances: at the Police Precinct No.
III, Western Police District, Metro Manila where he was brought for investigation or
questioning immediately after the occurrence of the alleged pilferage of medicines
and where he was given the opportunity to state his defenses, and thereafter, before
the arbitration branch of the Department of Labor where he was required and did
submit his position paper.
The law in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-
destruction of the employer. 11 While the Constitution is committed to the policy of
social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that
every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also
has its own rights, which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, the
Supreme Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his
cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded
the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in
the light of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine
ROYAL CROWN VS NLRC
Petitioner's conclusion is erroneous. Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it
had voluntarily assumed solidary liability under the various contractual undertakings
it submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services. In applying for its license to
operate a private employment agency for overseas recruitment and placement,
petitioner was required to submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking
whereby it assumed all responsibilities for the proper use of its license and the
implementation of the contracts of employment with the workers it recruited and
deployed for overseas employment [Section 2(e), Rule V, Book 1, Rules to Implement
the Labor Code (1976)]. It was also required to file with the Bureau a formal
appointment or agency contract executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor
to recruit and hire personnel for the former, which contained a provision empowering
it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the foreign principal for any of the
violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment [Section 10
(a) (2), Rule V, Book I of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)]. Petitioner
was required as well to post such cash and surety bonds as determined by the
Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures,
rules and regulations, and terms and conditions of employment as appropriate
[Section 1 of Pres. Dec. 1412 (1978) amending Article 31 of the Labor Code].
These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and
other private employment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with its
principal, the foreign-based employer, for all claims filed by recruited workers which
may arise in connection with the implementation of the service agreements or
employment contracts.
PEOPLE VS PANIS
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule
nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The
presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement
whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a
fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers. "
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of
recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in
Article 13(b) win constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective
worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee
is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more
prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be
engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create
that presumption.
CARCEDO VS. MARINE PHILIPPINES
According to the CBA, both the disability assessment and the certification as
permanently unfit for sea service are to be given by the company-designated
physician. These can be overruled by a third doctor jointly appointed by the company
and the union, in the event that the seafarer’s personal physician disagrees with the
evaluations of the company-designated physician. Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC
provides a similar mechanism for determining the disability assessment.
However, it is not only the contract between the parties that governs the
determination of the disability compensation due the seafarer. The Court has ruled
that the provisions on disability of the Labor Code and the Amended Rules on
Employee Compensation (AREC) implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code are
applicable to the case of seafarers.
As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report
to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis
and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days,
the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He
receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his
temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either
partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment
Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded
and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical
attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a
maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this
period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of
course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his
medical condition.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, a partial and permanent disability could, by legal contemplation, become total
and permanent. The Court in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar40 held that the
declaration by the company-designated physician is an obligation, the abdication of
which transforms the temporary total disability to permanent total disability,
regardless of the disability grade.
Indeed, under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are
classified as Grade 1 may be considered as total and permanent. However, if those
injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and
permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a
period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical
treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently disabled.
Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite
assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability within the period
of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer’s medical condition
remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently
disabled.41 (Emphasis supplied.
PHIL NIPPON VS. GUDELOSAO
In Abueg v. San Diego,42 we ruled that the limited liability rule found in the Code of
Commerce is inapplicable in a liability created by statute to compensate employees
and laborers, or the heirs and dependents, in cases of injury received by or inflicted
upon them while engaged in the performance of their work or employment.
The death benefits granted under Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code are similar to the
death benefits granted under the POEA-SEC.47 Specifically, its Section 20(A)(l) and
(4)(c) provides that:
1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount
of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven
Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but
not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of
payment.
xxx
4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-
related injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:
xxx
c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the [Philippine] currency
equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses
at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
Akin to the death benefits under the Labor Code, these benefits under the POEA-SEC
are given when the employee dies due to a work-related cause during the term of his
contract.48 The liability of the shipowner or agent under the POEA-SEC has likewise
nothing to do with the provisions of the Code of Commerce regarding maritime
commerce. The death benefits granted under the POEA-SEC is not due to the death of
a passenger by or through the misconduct of the captain or master of the ship; nor is
it the liability for the loss of the ship as result of collision; nor the liability for wages of
the crew. It is a liability created by contract between the seafarers and their
employers, but secured through the State's intervention as a matter of constitutional
and statutory duty to protect Filipino overseas workers and to secure for them the
best terms and conditions possible, in order to compensate the seafarers' heirs and
dependents in the event of death while engaged in the performance of their work or
employment.
But while the nature of death benefits under the Labor Code and the POEA-SEC are
similar, the death benefits under the POEA-SEC are intended to be separate and
distinct from, and in addition to, whatever benefits the seafarer is entitled to under
Philippine laws, including those benefits which may be claimed from the State
Insurance Fund.54
Thus, the claim for death benefits under the POEA-SEC is the same species as the
workmen's compensation claims under the Labor Code – both of which belong to a
different realm from that of Maritime Law. Therefore, the limited liability rule does not
apply to petitioner's liability under the POEA-SEC.
Based on the foregoing, the insurer itself admits that what is being insured against is
not the liability of the shipowner for death or injuries to passengers but the death of
the seafarers arising from accident.
The liability of SSSICI to the beneficiaries is direct under the insurance contract.
VIRJEN SHIPPING VS. NLRC
Yes, the Supreme Court en banc found the termination of the seamen’s contract
illegal. The contention that the manning industries in the Philippines would not
survive if the instant case is not decided in favor of the petitioner and would in effect
“kill the hen that lays the golden egg” is not supported by evidence. Filipino seamen
are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen from any other country in the
world. It is competence and reliability, not cheap labor that makes our seamen so
greatly in demand. Certainly the seamen are entitled to government protection when
they ask fair and decent treatment by their employers and when they exercise the
right to petition for improved terms of employment, especially when they fell that
these are substandard or are capable of improvement according to internationally
accepted rules.
The seamen did not violate their contracts of employment. The form contracts
approved by the National Seamen Board (now POEA) are designed to protect
Filipinos, not foreign shipowners who can take care of themselves. The standard
forms embody the basic minimums which must be incorporated as parts of the
employment contract. To state, therefore, that the affected seamen cannot petition
their employer for higher salaries during the 12-month duration of the contract runs
counter to the established principles of labor legislation.