6.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.

YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 187512     June 13, 2012. SERENO, J.:

FACTS:  Yolanda Granada and Cyrus Granada got married in 1993. In 1994,  when Sumida
Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed
that from that time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding
efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the
latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.

After nine (9) years of waiting, she filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead
which the RTC granted. The Republic of the Philippines appealed from the decision contending
that Yolanda failed to prove earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus, failed to prove well-founded
belief that he was already dead. Yolanda moved to dismiss the appeal contending that the
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death based under Art. 41, Family Code was a summary
judicial proceedings in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not
appealable. The CA granted the motion.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is
not subject to ordinary appeal.

2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the petition for declaration of
presumptive death based on evidence that respondent had presented.

HELD: Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately executory. Even if
the RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.

1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding
“as provided for” under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the
Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which
the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that,
in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2. Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of
the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the evidence required to
establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required
by Article 41 of the Family Code.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract
a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief is a
state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the
inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating
to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually
control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain
or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the
ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is
still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent
Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother
Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s
relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short,
respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues

that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or
assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also
utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.

The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief”
that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him
presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed,
“[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law.

14. JOCELYN M. SUAZO, Petitioner, vs.

ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 164493               March 10, 2010 BRION, J.:

FACTS: Angelito Suazo  and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old
only.  Without any means to support themselves, they lived with Angelito’s parents while
Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner
urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage,
Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since
lived.  10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36
Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical beating she received.
The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both her psychological report and
testimony concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not
personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that
Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an
effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like
refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer
group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the
next drink and the next drinks” but the CA reversed it and held that the respondent may have
failed to provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still
necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was
clinically or medically identified.  The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was
suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the
product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation.  The evidence that she got from the
petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due
simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the
part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage.
ISSUE: Whether there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
HELD: The Court find the petition devoid of merit.  The CA committed no reversible error of
law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with
Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The
psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she
derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a
directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not
have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of
Angelito’s psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with
respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination
required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the
psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s
purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as
chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases
for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence
holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony regarding
the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate
difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations. 
 It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty
in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations.  Proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential
marital obligations – must be shown.  Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant
a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
22. RENATO REYES SO, Petitioner, vs.
LORNA VALERA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 150677   June 5, 2009. BRION, J.:

FACTS: Renato So, a 17-year old high school student and Lorna Valera, a 21-year old college
student cohabited for about 19 years since they fell in love with each other before they decided to
get married. 

Five years into marriage, Renato filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage for lack of essential and formal requisites as he was merely asked by Lorna
to sign a blank marriage application form and marriage contract and that no marriage ceremony
took place. Renato also claimed that Lorna suffered psychologically incapacity by her refusal
and failure to cohabit and make love with him, does not love nor respect him. 

Lorna would refuse to let him in if he comes home late and in several instances, he has to sleep
in his car. Lorna also refused to practice her profession by selling her dental equipment that he
bought and provided. Instead she joined him in his electronics business and interfered in his
decisions that would sometimes make him lose face before his employees. 

Renato presented clinical psychologist, Dr. Cristina Rosello-Gates who testified that Lorna
suffers from Compulsive Behavior Patterns – evident in her marijuana habit, gambling and
habitual squandering of Renato’s money. Dr. Gates also testified that Adjustment Disorder and
Compulsive Behavior Patterns already existed before her marriage to Renato and that they are
continuing and irreversible.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Renato and Lorna is void on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of Lorna.

RULING: No.

The allegation on nullity of marriage due to absence of the essential and formal requisites of
marriage was negated by the fact that during the trial Renato himself presented a certified true
copy of the marriage contract/certificate duly signed by the officiating officer.

On psychological incapacity, the Supreme Court observed that the parties have been living
together for some time; and now who are tired of each other. To be tired and to give up on one’s
situation and on one’s husband are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can
falling out of love be so labeled.
The statements made by Dr. Gates merely referred to Lorna’s impulsiveness, lack of restraint,
and lack of civility and decency in the conduct of her life. Dr. Gates failed to prove that all these
emanated from a behavioral disorder so grave and serious that she would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; that it was rooted in the respondent’s
medical or psychological history before the marriage; and that a cure was beyond the
respondent’s capacity to achieve.

30. TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.

MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and MARTHA S. DAVID, Respondents.

G.R. No. 169548   March 15, 2010 DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: Spouses Manuel and Martha David, acquired a lot, which was registered in the name of
Martha. The spouses separated de facto, and no longer communicated with each other.
Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan Corp.

Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Reconveyance against Titan.
Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge
and consent, and therefore void.

ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Sale is void by reason of the absence of Manuel’s consent.

HELD: Yes, the property is part of the spouses’ conjugal partnership, even if it is registered only
to Martha’s name.

Manuel was not required to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership.
Rather, the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does
not appear.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. That which is acquired by
onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be
for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses

Absence any proof that it is not part of the conjugal property, it must be deemed to be part of it.
Since the property is part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan required the consent of
both spouses and in the absence of the other spouse’s consent, the Deed of Sale is void.

38. JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner, vs.

JOSE NGO CHUA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 183965               September 18, 2009

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy before the RTC a Petition for the issuance of a decree of
illegitimate filiation against respondent. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who
was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene
had two children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan.
Respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his
daughter. Hearings then ensued during which petitioner testified that... respondent was the only
father she knew; that he took care of all her needs until she finished her college education; and
that he came to visit her on special family occasions. She also presented documentary evidence
to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation.
Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on February 18, 2000,
praying that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, the terms and conditions of which
follows:
1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood
relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and [herein
respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration, admission or acknowledgement...
is concurred with petitioner's brother Allan, who although not a party to the case, hereby affixes
his signature to this pleading and also abides by the declaration herein.
2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her brother's (Allan) civil,
monetary and similar claims but without admitting any liability, [respondent] JOSE NGO
CHUA hereby binds himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS
(P2,000,000.00) and... another TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her brother,
ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother hereby acknowledge to have received in
full the said compromise amount.
3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no more
claims, causes of action or demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs,
successors and assigns and/or against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors
and assigns and/or... against all corporations, companies or business enterprises including
Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty Investment and Development Corporation
where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA may have interest or
participation.
4. JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-demand with respect to
the subject matter of the present petition.
5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the permanent
dismissal with prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment
permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim."... the Court notes that from the
RTC Resolution granting respondent's Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner went directly to
this Court for relief. This is only proper, given that petitioner is raising pure questions of
law in her instant Petition
ISSUE: Whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent,
duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding No.12562-CEB still pending
before RTC-Branch 24.
HELD: The court rules in the negative.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v.
Republic, the Court pronounced that a... judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A
judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise agreement must
comply with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the
contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of...
the obligation that is established. And, like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a
compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and
public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null and...
void, and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect at
all.
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)

The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000
and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner's status and filiation,... i.e.,
whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother
Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay
petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a... necessary
consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to
future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the
Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered
by... the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is... a relationship that must be judicially
established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will
or agreement of the parties.
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000
between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations.
It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative... even by the
parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.
46. MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 169202               March 5, 2010 CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine
passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R.
Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria
Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity
of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport
with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request
to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. Petitioner’s request
having been denied.

Petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President, which dismissed the appeal and ruled
that Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of
1996 “offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment,
or declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for
passport purposes.” The Office of the President further held that in case of conflict between a
general and special law, the latter will control the former regardless of the respective dates of
passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA 8239.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, which denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President. 
The Court of Appeals found no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section 5(d)
of RA 8239. The Court of Appeals held that for passport application and issuance purposes, RA
8239 limits the instances when a married woman applicant may exercise the option to revert to
the use of her maiden name such as in a case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage. Since there was no showing that petitioner’s marriage to Francisco Rallonza
has been annulled, declared void or a divorce decree has been granted to them, petitioner cannot
simply revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport after she had adopted her
husband’s surname in her old passport.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport,
can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of
her marriage.
HELD: Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a married
woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname, or
(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as “Mrs.”

We agree with petitioner that the use of the word “may” in the above provision indicates that the
use of the husband’s surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. Clearly, a married
woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways
provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the
three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not
prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman
marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this interpretation is in
consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.
In the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and who opted to use her
husband’s surname in her old passport, requested to resume her maiden name in the replacement
passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name.
The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the applicable provision in this case is
Section 5(d), which states:
Sec. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. — No passport shall be issued to an applicant
unless the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is satisfied that the applicant is a
Filipino citizen who has complied with the following requirements: x x x
(d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced or widowed or whose marriage has
been annulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the certificate of marriage, court decree of
separation, divorce or annulment or certificate of death of the deceased spouse duly issued and
authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce
decree, annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the woman applicant may revert to the use
of her maiden name: Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized under existing laws of
the Philippines; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, argues
that the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 “limits the instances when a married
woman may be allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport.” These instances
are death of husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage. Significantly, Section 1,
Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239 provides:
The passport can be amended only in the following cases:
1. a) Amendment of woman’s name due to marriage;
2. b) Amendment of woman’s name due to death of spouse, annulment of marriage or
divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or
3. c) Change of surname of a child who is legitimated by virtue of a subsequent marriage of
his parents.
Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside of the purview of
Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married woman may revert to the use of her
maiden name), she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. This
prohibition, according to petitioner, conflicts with and, thus, operates as an implied repeal of
Article 370 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner is mistaken. The conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section 5(d) of
RA 8239 is more imagined than real. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations,
does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in
recognition of this right, the DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the
first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband’s
surname.

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or
continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new
passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage
certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The
DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may
not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA
8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of
marriage. Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden
name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of
her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a
special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title
XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory
construction is that a special law prevails over a general law
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, it is within respondent’s competence to regulate any
amendments intended to be made therein, including the denial of unreasonable and whimsical
requests for amendments such as in the instant case