According to Margaret Levi (1998: 85), the state fosters interpersonal trust among citizens by having the

"ability to monitor laws, impose sanctions on lawbreakers, and provide information and guarantees
about those seeking to be trusted." However, if they are skeptical of “the state's commitment to
enforcing the laws, and if its information and guarantees are not credible, the state's capacity to
generate interpersonal trust will diminish” (Levi, 1998: 86). Government institutions can foster trust by
establishing “bureaucratic arrangements that reward competence and relative honesty among
bureaucratic agents,” because:

A competent and relatively honest bureaucracy reduces the incentives for corruption and inefficient
rent-seeking while also increasing the likelihood of cooperation and compliance... and economic growth.
Citizens and groups who recognize that bureaucrats gain reputational benefits from competence and
honesty will expect bureaucrats to be trustworthy and will act accordingly (Levi, 1998: 87).