Case Digests – Public Corporation

SARCOS v. CASTILLO (1969)

FACTS:
Petitioner Domingo, duly elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged with misconduct and
dishonesty in office by respondent. Respondent alleged that petitioner connive with certain private individuals
to cut and fell timber for their own benefit and to the damage and prejudice of the public and of the
government. Petitioner contended that the said logs were sold in order to raise funds for the purchase of the
police uniforms and arms.

It was on the basis of the administrative complaint that respondent Governor ordered the immediate
suspension of petitioner from his position as Mayor. Respondent Governor decided that there was an urgent
necessity to order the immediate ‘preventive suspension’ of the petitioner in accordance with Section 5 of RA
5185 (Decentralization Act of 1967).

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Provincial Governor has the power to order such preventive suspension under the
Decentralization Act of 1967

RULING:
NO.
It is apparent under Section 5 of the Decentralization ACT of 1967 that respondent Provincial Governor lacks
the authority to order the preventive suspension of petitioner and it is the provincial board to which such a
power has been granted under conditions therein specified. Public officials possess powers, not rights.
There must be, therefore, a grant of authority whether express or implied, to justify any action taken by them.
In this case, no such authority is vested in the provincial governor.

Moreover, the petitioner Municipal Mayor, an independent candidate, and thus of a different political
persuasion, appeared to have been placed at a disadvantage. It would be a realistic assumption that there is
the ever present temptation on the part of provincial governors, to utilize every opportunity to favor those
belonging to his party. At times, it may even prove irresistible. It is desirable therefore that such opportunity be
limited.

RULES ON THE SUSPENSION OF LOCAL ELECTIVES (Section 5 of Decentralization Act)

1. Written subscribed and sworn charges against any
a. elective provincial and city official before the President
b. elective municipal official before the provincial governor or the secretary of the provincial board
concerned
c. elective barrio official before municipal or city mayor or the municipal or city secretary concerned
2. Notify the respondent of such charges
3. Hearing and investigation by the President, Provincial Board and City or Municipal Council
4. If the suspended officer shall have been found guilty as charged before the expiration of the
thirty days, his suspension, in the case of municipal and barrio officials, may continue until the
case is finally decided by the Provincial Board

PURPOSE OF THE DECENTRALIZATION ACT OF 1967

It is to transform local governments gradually into effective instruments through which the people can in a most
genuine fashion, govern themselves and work out their own destinies and to grant to local governments
greater freedom and ampler means to respond to the needs of their people and promote their prosperity and
happiness and to effect a more equitable and systematic distribution of governmental powers and resources.
It is implicit in our constitutional scheme that full autonomy be accorded the inhabitants of the local units to
govern themselves. Their choice as to who should be their public officials must be respected. Those elected
must serve out their term. If they have to be removed at all it should be for cause in accordance with the
procedure prescribed and by the specific officials of higher category entrusted with such responsibility.
FERRER v. CITY MAYOR BAUTISTA (2015)

FACTS:
Respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011 or the Socialized Housing Tax of
Quezon City. It was enacted for the collection of special assessment on the assessed value of lands and only
the registered owners may avail of the tax credit. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 5 was
enacted wherein the proceeds collected from the garbage fees on residential properties shall be deposited
solely and exclusively in an earmarked special account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage
collections.

The instant petition was filed. Respondents relied on the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of
Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235. They argue that the burden of establishing the invalidity of an
ordinance rests heavily upon the party challenging its constitutionality. They insist that the questioned
ordinances are proper exercises of police power.

ISSUE:
Whether the ordinances are valid

RULING:
SP-2095 is valid but SP-2235 is void.
SP-2235
PRINCIPLE OF DECENTRALIZATION
Under the principle of decentralization, the LGUs shall share with the national government the
responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, affirms this authority as it
expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of its
provisions within their respective jurisdictions while establishing a cooperative effort among the
national government, other local government units, non-government organizations, and the private sector.

Therefore, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for
services rendered. The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for
the regulation of an activity.

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SP-2235
Under RA 9003, the authority of a municipality or city to impose fees is limited to the collection and
transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill.
Barangays, on the other hand, have the authority to impose fees for the collection and segregation of
biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from households, commerce, other sources of domestic
wastes, and for the use of barangay MRFs. In this case, the alleged bases of Ordinance No. S-2235 in
imposing the garbage fee is the volume of waste currently generated by each person in Quezon City.
Respondents did not elaborate any further. The figure presented does not reflect the specific types of wastes
generated.

The SC found that the rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable. The classifications
under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of "promoting shared responsibility with
the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources and in
generating waste. Respondent City Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the
amount of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection.

SP-2095
POWER TO TAX - SHT
The rationale of the SHT is found in the preambular clauses of the subject ordinance which is to provide the
City Government with sufficient funds to initiate, implement and undertake Socialized Housing Projects and
other related preliminary activities. Clearly, the SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is
within its power to impose.
POLICE POWER
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, not
only must it appear that the interests of the public generally but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The
reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 (SHT) cannot be disputed. It is not confiscatory or oppressive since
the tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually allows.

On the other hand, ordinances regulating waste removal carry a strong presumption of validity. Municipalities
have a duty to supervise and control the collection of garbage within its corporate limits and pursuant to Sec 16
of the LGC, local government is empowered to enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.

OTHER MATTERS
VALIDITY OF AN ORDINANCE
An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness though is open to
judicial inquiry. As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into:
a. Formal : Whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and
whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law
b. Substantive : Involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under
the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its
consistency with public policy
An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the
prevailing laws. If not, it is void.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. LGUs
must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole. Municipal corporations are bodies politic and
corporate, created not only as local units of local self-government, but as governmental agencies of the state. It
is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent power of taxation.
The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality, cannot assume it.

Subject to the provisions of the LGC and consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, every LGU is now
empowered and authorized to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which
shall accrue exclusively to the local government unit as well as to apply its resources and assets for
productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their governmental or
proprietary powers and functions.
MAGUNE v. HONORABLE SECRETARY ERMITA (2016)

FACTS:
R.A. No. 7842) was enacted establishing, under the administration and supervision of the DOH, the Taguig-
Pateros District Hospital (TPDH). President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 567 devolving the administration and
supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig and it was issued pursuant to LGC. The City of
Taguig and the DOH subsequently entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).

Petitioners, who were employees of the DOH assigned to the TPDH, expressed their objections to EO 567.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief against respondents. The petition prayed that E.O. No. 567 be
declared unconstitutional, illegal and null and void for having been issued in violation of the constitutional
principle of separation of powers and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The RTC dismissed the petition and held E.O. No. 567 valid and constitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether EO 567 is constitutional

RULING:
YES.
DEVOLUTION
EO 567 was issued pursuant to Section 17 of the LGC expressly devolving to the local government units the
delivery of basic services and facilities, including health service. The term "devolution" refers to the act by
which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units
to perform specific functions and responsibilities. It is the policy of the Local Government Code to provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization. Thus,
E.O. No. 567 merely implements and puts into operation the policy and directive set forth in the Local
Government Code.

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF DEVOLUTION

The law favor devolution and in case of doubt, any question shall be resolved in favour of devolution of powers
and of the LGU. The more reasonable understanding of the six-month period is that the framers of the law
provided for the period to prompt the national government to speedily devolve the existing services to
the LGUs. However, it was not intended as a prescriptive period, as to absolutely prohibit the national
government from devolving services beyond the period.

EO 567 IS WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE PRESIDENT

The transfer of the administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig is a result of the
President's exercise of her power of control over the executive department, including the DOH. The
Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of local governments while Section 17 of
the Local Government Code secures to the local governments the genuine and meaningful autonomy that
would develop them into self-reliant communities and effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Therefore, in issuing E.O. No. 567, the President was actually carrying out the provisions of the Constitution
and the Local Government Code. She was performing her duty to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.
MMDA v. BEL-AIR (2000)

FACTS:
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are
homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent received from petitioner
requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular. Respondent instituted against petitioner a
civil case for injunction.

The RTC denied the injunction. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the MMDA has no authority to order the
opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public
traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has the authority to open the Neptune Street to public traffic

RULING: NO.
The scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is
transport and traffic management. The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation
of a system and administration. R.A. No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.

APPLICABILITY OF THE SANGALANG CASE

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. In the instant case, the
basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice. The notice does not cite any
ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis.
Moreover, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. The charter of the MMC, shows that
the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.

HISTORY OF MMDA
The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila Commission (MMC). The MMC
was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering programs
providing services common to the area. The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the
Sangguniang Bayan. Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully
possessed legislative police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had
were all subject to review and approval by the MMC.

President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority
(MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. It ought to be stressed, however,
that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMA's power was limited to the
"delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila.

When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative
region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the
autonomy of the affected local government units."

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given
to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation
of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.
MMDA v. GARIN (2005)

FACTS:
The respondent was issued a traffic violation receipt and then his driver's license was confiscated for parking
illegally. Before the expiration of the TVR, the respondent addressed a letter to MMDA Chairman Oreta
requesting the return of his driver's license. Respondent received no reply hence, he filed a complaint with
application for preliminary injunction contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and
regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of
their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation and thus, violating the due
process clause of the Constitution. On the other hand, MMDA argued that the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f)
of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic
violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature and that the judiciary retains the right to
determine the validity of the penalty imposed.

The trial court ruled in favour of the respondent and held that the summary’s confiscation of a driver’s license
without giving the driver an opportunity to be heard is a violation of the due process. Thus, MMDA filed this
petition and reiterated that license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a
privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and
welfare.  The petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a
taking without due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.

ISSUE:
Whether the MMDA is vested with police power

RULING:
NO. The SC ruled that RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and
that all its functions are administrative in nature. Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The
power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the MMC to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in
the implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. Therefore, the power to confiscate
and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any other legislative enactment is an unauthorized
exercise of police power.

Under Sec 5 (f) of the said law, MMDA has the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations. Thus,
where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative
powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded – and in fact is
duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport
and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations,
traffic engineering services and traffic education programs.
BELEY v. TORRES (1962)
FACTS:
Felix Marbella instituted a civil case against the Chief of Police and others. He alleged that the defendants
have illegally detained his truck. Upon filing of a bond, the said truck was ordered released by the lower court
however, the defendants again seized the said truck thus, Marbella filed a criminal complaint against the
defendant for grave coercion.

The Lower court issued an order directing the defendants to return to the plaintiff the said plate number and
driver’s license. The petitioner registrar objected to the jurisdiction of the lower court is issuing the said order.
Petitioner claimed that the lower court had not acquired jurisdiction either over his person or his predecessor in
office. This was denied by the lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether the court’s order in releasing the plate number and driver’s license was valid

RULING:
NO. The plate number and license were taken by Tan because the truck had not been registered and was
using a plate for a vehicle registered in the name of Agripina Videl, in violation of the Motor Vehicle Law. The
plate was evidently a stolen plate and the same was being used by Marbella for a truck of his own which was
not registered.
MMDA v. TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT (2009)

FACTS:
The DOTC entered into a BLT agreement with MRTC under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to
the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years and upon expiration, ownership would transfer to the
Government. Thereafter, respondent entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC wherein
respondent would install commercial billboards in different parts of MRT. However, the MMDA requested
respondent to dismantle the billboards pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited
installation and display of any kind or form of billboards in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts,
trees, parks and open space. Respondent refused and thereafter, the MMDA proceeded to dismantle the
former’s billboards and similar forms of advertisement.

Respondent filed against the MMDA in the RTC an injunction and in which it granted a preliminary injunction.
MMDA brought a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals (CA) but the CA denied the
petition and affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle the respondent’s billboards and similar forms of advertisement

RULING:
NO. Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case,
MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership
by the former. MMDA cannot simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling. MMDA’s powers were
limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power.

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority". It is an agency created for the purpose
of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery
of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself.
MMDA v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY (2008)

FACTS:
Respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay. Respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the
pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of several laws and the respondents’ constitutional right to
life, health, and a balanced ecology.

RTC ruled in favour of the respondents. Upon appeal, the CA sustained RTC’s decision and ruled that the
decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.
Petitioners maintained that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid
disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency
concerned.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in its ruling

RULING:
NO.
AS TO WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. Mandamus is available to
compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion one way or the other. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a
decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with the provisions under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act
(RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and minimum
operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill and this duty
cannot be characterized as discretionary.

Moreover, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services relating to "flood
control and sewerage management. The MMDA is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is
primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would
necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.

A perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in
which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the
concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters’ account. On the other
hand, Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves
to the removal and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17
requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.
MMDA v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY (2011)
FACTS:
The MMDA was tasked by the SC on its decision to dismantle and remove all structures and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along several rivers and
connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. MMDA is also ordered to establish, operate, and maintain
a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive
and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies. The Committee
recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks and this was viewed as
an encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the
Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether there was an encroachment over the powers of the Executive Branch

RULING:
NO. The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII
of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of
the Court. It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged but also those matters "actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto." Certainly,
any activity that is needed to fully implement a final judgment is necessarily encompassed by said judgment.
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental cases.

Recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee

In order to implement the Decision, certain directives have to be issued by the Court to address the said
concerns and some of which are as follows:

1. MMDA) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal
settlers in Metro Manila who, as of December 31, 2010, own and occupy houses, structures,
constructions and other encroachments established or built along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers,
the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and
connecting waterways and esteros, in violation of RA 7279.

2. The MMDA was also ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
Resolution, on the establishment of a sanitary landfill facility and the MMDA shall submit a report of the
location of open and controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose operations are illegal.

3. The MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila are ordered to jointly submit a report on the
average amount of garbage collected monthly per district in all the cities in Metro Manila.
MMDA v. VIRON (2007)

FACTS:
President Arroyo issued EO 179 which provides for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport
System. Under this, the MMDA was designated as the implementing Agency for the project. E.O. noted, the
primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets and the
inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes thus, MMDA recommended a plan to decongest traffic
by eliminating the bus terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and
convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the Greater Manila Mass
Transport System Project.

Respondent, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus
operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief. Respondents argued that the MMDA is devoid of authority to
order the elimination of their bus terminals under the E.O. which, they argue, is unconstitutional because it
violates both the Constitution and the Public Service Act; and that neither is the MMDA clothed with such
authority under R.A. No. 7924.

RTC ruled in favor of the MMDA but it reversed its first decision and held that the EO was an unreasonable
exercise of police power.

ISSUE:
Whether EO 179 is unconstitutional

RULING:
YES. EO 179 is NULL and VOID for being ultra vires.
E.O. No. 125 issued by President Corazon Aquino reorganized the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications. Under this, the President mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, regulating
and administrative entity to develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of
authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated
programs for transportation and communications. Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish
and administer programs and projects for transportation, it follows that the President may exercise the same
power and authority as she has the power of control over all the executive department.

However, under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is
authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the
President, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the
primary implementing and administrative entity in the development and regulation of networks of
transportation. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement
the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to
undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals.
FRANCISOC v. HON. BAYANI FERNANDO (2006)

FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco, Jr filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and Mandamus to
enjoin respondents from further implementing its "wet flag scheme" ("Flag Scheme"). Petitioner contends that
the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDA’s governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did
not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3)
disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates
"pedestrian rights."

ISSUE:
Whether the Flag Scheme is valid

RULING:
YES.
LOCUS STANDI
A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury. Petitioner meets none of the
requirements under either category. Nor is there merit to petitioner’s claim that the Court should relax the
standing requirement because of the "transcendental importance.

LEGAL BASIS OF THE FLAG SCHEME

All the cities and municipalities within the MMDA’s jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-
jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves
as sufficient basis for respondents’ implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-
jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the
implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities.

HIERARCHY OF COURTS
The petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the Flag Scheme is a reasonable
enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar enactments. This Court is not a trier of facts. Thus,
petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this petition directly with us.