G.R. No.

93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,


vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

SUMMARY:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood"
and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy."1

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous
and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

FACTS:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood"
and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy."1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's
discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording
of the confrontation made by petitioner.2

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication,
and other purposes.”

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of
R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing
with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and
that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
person other than a participant to the communication.4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not
constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible
by certiorari.5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the
instant petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the applicable provision
of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the
parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the
unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the
communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not
constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the
taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her
act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said
act. 10

ISSUE:

1. Whether wire tapping, as an offense, may only be committed by persons who are not
parties to the conversation. NO

2. Whether the substance of the conversation must be alleged in the Information. NO

3. Whether RA 4200 punishes only the taping of a “private communication,” not a “private
conversation.” NO.

RULING:

1. NO. The consent of all parties to a private conversation are required in

recording the same.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-
quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view
held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the
private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to
a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge
of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the
parties themselves or by third persons.

2. NO. What RA 4200 punishes are the acts of secretly overhearing, recording or
intercepting private conversations. So, there is no need to allege the nature of the
conversation in the Information.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General
pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as
well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14

3. NO. Same lang…

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include
verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts"
which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts
about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are,
furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication"
were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill (CHECK
NIYO NA LANG SA FULL-TEXT YUNG EXPLANATORY NOTE.).
G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994

TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner,


vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.

Oscar A. Inocentes & Associates Law Office for petitioner.

Efren A. Santos for private respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

SUMMARY:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse the
decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 entitled "Teresita
Salcedo-Ortanez versus Hon. Romeo F. Zamora, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and Rafael S. Ortanez".

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.

FACTS:

On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita
Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of
the petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to
Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.

Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence
Exhibits "A" to "M".

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence

on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered
evidence.

A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.

A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA was correct in affirming the ruling of the Quezon City RTC admitting into
evidence the cassette tapes containing the recorded telephone conversations of petitioner
Teresita Salcedo-Ortañez. NO.
RULING:

No. The cassette tapes containing the recorded telephone conversations was inadmissible
since it was made without the consent of both parties.

In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence
offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of
petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when
private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. 4

Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such
tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are
as follows:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,

purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections
of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted
provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear
showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same,
the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

G.R. No. L-22187 March 28, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.

ANASTACIO MAISUG, ET AL., defendants,

HERMINIGILDO TADO, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz,


Acting Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo and Solicitor Teodulo R. Diño for
plaintiff-appellee.

Ernesto P. Pangalangan as Counsel de Oficio for defendant-appellant.

BARREDO, J.:

SUMMARY:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Criminal Case No.
V-8884, convicting the appellant Herminigildo Tado of the crime of murder.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of this Court is that the guilt of appellant Herminigildo Tado of
the crime charged in this case has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt; he is hereby
acquitted; and it is ordered that he be set immediately at liberty unless he is held for
another legal cause, with costs de officio.

FACTS:

It appears that at about nine o'clock in the evening of February 17, 1962, a card game
known as "pares-pares" was held at a certain gambling house in the barrio of Tungasan,
municipality of Mandawe, Cebu. Among those present therein were the appellant
Herminigildo Tado the other accused, Anastacio Maisug, who pleaded guilty, Regino Gala,
Alberto Balle, Rodolfo Bregente and Federico Alcuizar. Appellant who owned the cards being
used in the game, was the shuffler, banker and dealer. At about 10:00 o'clock, several
players had already lost their money, among them Anastacio Maisug and Regino Gala. In
apparent disgust, Gala tore one of the cards. This angered appellant who immediately asked
him why he did it. Verbal alterations followed among appellant, Gala and the other players.
Alberto Balle suggested to appellant the use of the joker in lieu of the torn card. At this
juncture, Anastacio Maisug suddenly stabbed Gala on the back from behind with his knife.
Commotion ensued. Later that same evening, Gala was found already dead at a distance of
about 15 meters from the gambling house.

The following day, February 18, 1962, Anastacio Maisug surrendered to the police
authorities of Mandawe, Cebu. He executed a statement (Exhibit A) admitting having
stabbed the deceased Regino Gala in the back from behind and implicating appellant thus:
Earlier that evening of the incident, appellant instructed him to stab anyone who
would make trouble during the card game, and so, when the deceased Gala tore
one of the cards and appellant signalled him, he immediately drew his knife and
drove it into the body of said deceased. On the same day, Rodolfo Bregente and Alberto
Balle executed also affidavits narrating the incident which led to the lulling of the deceased.
Their narration, however, mentioned nothing about any signal allegedly given by
appellant to Maisug.
On March 12, 1962, an information for the murder of Regino Gala was filed against
Anastacio Maisug and appellant. It was alleged therein that on February 17, 1962, both
accused "with deliberate intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, conspiring and
confabulating with each other", stabbed from behind the deceased Regino Gala, "thereby
inflicting upon the latter a stab wound at the left side of the back portion of his body which
produced his death." Upon arraignment, accused Maisug pleaded guilty to the charge and
asked permission to prove mitigating circumstance which he claimed attended the
commission of the offense or his liability. The permission granted, he proved and the court
considered three mitigating circumstances, namely, voluntary surrender, plea of guilty and
drunkenness. Accordingly, the lower court sentenced him on April 16, 1962, to a penalty of
four (4) years prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years prision mayor, as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000 and to pay the
costs. Appellant (Tado), on the other hand, pleaded not guilty, hence trial was held to him.

After due trial, on June 28, 1963 the lower Court rendered the appealed decision. Said the
court:

Based on what appears on record, the Court is convinced that the criminal
participation of the accused Herminigildo Tado in the commission of the offense
charged in the information against him and his co-accused, Anastacio Maisug, has
been clearly and positively established. The evidence shows that it was the said
accused, Herminigildo Tado, who owned the torn playing card; that the said accused
was mad at the deceased Regino Gala when he tore the said card for no justifiable
reason known to said accused; and that due to the act of said deceased, the game
was stopped. The evidence further shows that he (Herminigildo) was the dealer who
shuffled and distributed the gaming cards. According to his own admission, he and
the manager or owner of the game, Emilio Matura, had the understanding that
whatever tong was collected in the game played that night would be divided between
them equally; and that when the game was stopped no more tong was collected. The
Court, finds and declares that the accused Herminigildo Tado participated as principal
by induction because he was the one who instructed and signalled his co-accused
Anastacio to stab the deceased (Art. 248, par. 1, Revised Penal Code).

The allegation of conspiracy and confabulation made in the information against both
has been clearly shown and established by the coordinated acts of both accused such
as the fact that, in the early hour of that evening of the incident, there was an
understanding between both accused that the accused Anastacio Maisug would stab
anyone making trouble in the course of the card game; and that after the deceased
Regino Gala tore the card belonging to the dealer Herminigildo Tado the latter
immediately gave the "go signal" to the other accused to stab the trouble maker who
happened to be the said deceased, Regino Gala. The act of stabbing the deceased
was characterized by treachery because it was done from behind when the victim
was unaware and not in a position to defend himself while the attacker was behind
without exposing himself to any risk arising from the defense that the victim may put
up. Hence the charge of the fiscal against both accused is murder.

xxx xxx xxx

“WHEREFORE, based on all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds and declares
the accused Herminigildo Tado guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, as principal by
induction, of the offense of murder charged in the information and said offense is the
same crime defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and,
considering the absence of any modifying circumstance, the said accused is hereby
sentenced to serve the penalty of life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua) to
 indemnify the heirs of the deceased Regino Gala in the sum of P6,000.00; and to pay
one-half of the costs. It appearing that said accused Herminigildo Tado has been
confined in jail since his arrest on February 18, 1962, up to the present time, he is
entitled to be credited with one-half of his total preventive confinement, and to pay
the costs. The weapon, Exhibit C, and its scabbard, Exhibit C-1 recovered from the
accused are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government.”

It is clear from a careful perusal of the record that the only inculpatory evidence against
appellant Tado are: (1) the statement of Anastacio Maisug in his extrajudicial confession
(Exhibit A) that early that evening of February 17, 1962, appellant instructed him to stab
anyone who would make trouble during the card game; that when the deceased tore one
playing card, the appellant got angry and signalled him to stab said deceased; and that in
compliance with such signal, he immediately drew his knife and drove it into the body of the
said deceased; and (2) the testimony of Alberto Balle to the effect that after the deceased
tore one of the cards, he saw the appellant give a signal to Maisug to stab said deceased.
The trial court considered these as sufficient proof of conspiracy and/or inducement, and
consequently, held appellant liable for the confessed criminal act of Maisug.

ISSUE:

Whether the statement in the extrajudicial confession made by accused Anastacio MAISUG
implicating accused-appellant Herminigildo TADO and the testimony of Alberto Balle were
sufficient to hold accused-appellant TADO liable.

RULING:

NO. The co-accused’s extrajudicial confession and the testimony of the witness
were not sufficient to convict TADO.

By and large, the evidence on record does not engender enough faith that appellant is guilty
of the charge. If somehow it is discernible that it is more the inadequacy of details in the
state's evidence that makes it difficult for Us to arrive at definite conclusions rather than,
perhaps, the actual facts themselves, still We cannot pin responsibility on appellant. That
moral conviction that may serve as basis of a finding of guilt in criminal cases is only that
which is the logical and inevitable result of the evidence on record, exclusive of any other
consideration. Short of this, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it is, even
more, our constitutional duty to acquit him.

As Regards Maisug’s Statement

As the record stands, Maisug's confession which was relied upon by the trial court cannot be
considered as sufficiently dependable evidence to convict appellant, as the trial court did, of
such a grave offense as murder and deprive him of liberty for life. To begin with, Maisug
himself repudiated in open court the portions of his confession incriminating appellant. And
We are satisfied that his testimony in open court when he declared at the separate hearing
for the presentation of his evidence to prove mitigating circumstances, after pleading
guilty, 1 was more candid and natural than his confession. He straight-forwardly owned the
killing of the deceased and denied having been signalled by appellant to do it. "I killed him
by my own volition.... It was my own volition to kill him", he told the court. Besides the
alleged signalling of appellant to Maisug for him to stab the deceased does not appear to be
clearly proven in the prosecution's evidence. Nowhere in the confession of Maisug is this fact
satisfactorily clarified.

With Regard to Balle’s Testimony

It can thus be noted that Maisug gave no indications whatsoever as to what was the
particular signal to be given to him by appellant as well as the one which was actually given
later. Much less did he do this during his testimony, because, as already stated, he
categorically denied having been given any signal by appellant.

In an obvious attempt to have a corroboration of Maisug's confession on this point, the

prosecution presented the witness Alberto Balle who testified thereon as follows:

Q. — Why do you say he agreed with an angry mood?

A. — He agreed with a nodding sign, but with a signal to Anastacio Maisug.

Q. — What signal?

A. — With a sign doing this. (INTERPRETER: Witness holding his right, standing, with
fist closed and making a stabbing motion, thrusting forward.) (TSN, p. 4, Perez)

only to admit in the next breath that:

Q. — You mentioned Anastacio Maisug being signalled by Herminigildo Tado with a

stabbing motion. What did you understand by that?

A. — I do not know the meaning of it. (TSN, pp. 4-5, Perez)

INAMIN NI BALLE NA WALA SIYANG SINABI SA MGA PULIS TUNGKOL SA

“SIGNAL” NA IBINIGAY NI TADO KAY MAISUG DAHIL HINDI NAMAN DAW SIYA
TINANONG TUNGKOL DITO. Further, during the cross-examination, this witness admitted
that when his statement was first taken by the police after the incident, he made no
reference to the alleged signalling by appellant to Maisug although he explained that this
was because he was not asked about it. Indeed, there is nothing in said statement which in
anyway implicated appellant, as there was not even any mention of him therein. As a
matter of fact, Balle did not even say in said statement that Maisug was the one who
stabbed the deceased. The only reference to Maisug therein was as follows:

That I asked my companions to go with me home, and when I stood up to go, I saw
Rodolfo Bregente run and stumbled, then I saw one man now known to me to be
Anastacio Maisug brandishing his dagger. (par. 6, Affidavit of Alberto Balle, p. 3, Trial
Court's Record)

HINDI DAW ALAM NI FISCAL NA MAGTE-TESTIFY SI BALLE PATUNGKOL SA

“SIGNAL” NA IBINIGAY NI TADO (APPELLANT) KAY MAISUG (CO-ACCUSED). SABI
NG SC, HINDI DAW KAPANI-PANIWALA YON KASI BALLE WAS PRESENTED AS A
WITNESS AGAINST TADO. Adding weakness to his evidence, was his admission that it
was only in court that he first told anyone about such fact. If this were true, how come that
the fiscal presented him as witness against appellant? A witness who denies having revealed
to the counsel presenting him at the trial the matter he would testify on is not worthy of
credence, for such testimony is unnatural and contrary to ordinary experience. Lawyers do
not usually present witnesses without informing themselves regarding the facts that they
would prove in the testimonies they would give in court. This is specially true in this case
because, without that detail about the signal in question, Balle's testimony was of no
particular consequence in the government's case and if the fiscal did not know about said
signal, it is difficult to understand why he would still present said witness as, in fact, he did
present him.
G.R. No. 89114 December 2, 1991

FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., petitioner,


vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, MATEO A. T. CAPARAS, AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

Kenny H. Tantuico for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:

SUMMARY:

In this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, the petitioner seeks to annul and set
aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated 21 April 1989, denying his motion for a bill
of particulars as well as its resolution, dated 29 May 1989, which denied his motion for
reconsideration; to compel the respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill of particulars, or
that said respondent be ordered to exclude petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035
should they fail to submit the said bill of particulars; and to enjoin the respondent
Sandiganbayan from further proceeding against petitioner until the bill of particulars is
submitted, claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in promulgating the aforesaid resolutions and
that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy for him in the ordinary
course of law other than the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolutions dated 21 April 1989 and 29 May
1989 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondents are hereby ordered to
PREPARE and FILE a Bill of Particulars containing the facts prayed for by petitioner within
TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice, and should they fail to submit the said Bill of Particulars,
respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered TO EXCLUDE the herein petitioner as defendant in
Civil Case No. 0035.

FACTS:

On 31 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, and assisted by
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035, entitled
"Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. 2

The principal defendants in the said Civil Case No. 0035 are Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez,
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.

Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035 on the
theory that: (1) he acted in unlawful concert with the principal defendants in the
misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion,
blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and
brazen abuse of power; 3 (2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent, by allowing himself to
be incorporator, director, board member and/or stockholder of corporations beneficially held
and/or controlled by the principal defendants; 4 (3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in
unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary
obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in
brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic
plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth ; 5 (4) he (petitioner) taking undue advantage of his
position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his
constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements
and questionable use of government funds; 6 and (5) he acted as dummy, nominee and/or
agent by allowing himself to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth
through government concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be
incorporator, director, or member of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and
Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally
obtained. 7

On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and inspection of documents was denied
by respondent court in its resolution dated 9 March 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a
Bill of Particulars, alleging inter alia that he is sued for acts allegedly committed
by him as (a) a public officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b) as a
private individual, and (c) in both capacities, in a complaint couched in too general
terms and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the factual and legal basis
thereof, and that to enable him to understand and know with certainty the particular acts
allegedly committed by him and which he is now charged with culpability, it is necessary
that plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought therein relative to the averments in
paragraphs 2, 9(a), 15, 7 and 17 of the Second Amended Complaint so that he can
intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and prepare for trial.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration 15 but this was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan
in its resolution 16 dated 29 May 1990.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Complaint is sufficient.

RULING:

No, the allegations on the Complaint were mere conclusions of law unsupported by factual
premises

Hindi nabanggit kung paano na-commit ni Tantuico… very generic

As quoted above, paragraph 9(a) of the complaint alleges that "Defendant Ferdinand E.
Marcos, together with other Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or in
unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their
fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right
and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines,
embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth." In the light of
the rules on pleading and case law cited above, the allegations that defendant Ferdinand E.
Marcos, together with the other defendants "embarked upon a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth" and that said defendants acted "in flagrant breach of public
trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of
right and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines", are
conclusions of law unsupported by factual premises.

Di rin nabanggit kung anong obligasyon ni Tantuico

ang hindi niya nagampanan

Nothing is said in the complaint about the petitioner's acts in execution of the alleged
"systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth", or which are supposed to constitute
"flagrant breach of public trust", "gross and scandalous abuse of right and power", and
"violations of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines". The complaint does not even
allege what duties the petitioner failed to perform, or the particular rights he
abused.

Di man lang nabanggit kung sakop ba ng audit

ni Tantuico yung amount na naitakbo

Likewise, paragraph 15 avers that "defendant Francisco Tantuico, taking undue advantage of
his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his
constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with Defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements
and questionable use of government funds as stated in the foregoing paragraphs to the
grave and irreparable damage and injury of Plaintiff and the entire Filipino people." In like
manner, the allegation that petitioner "took undue advantage of his position as Chairman of
the Commission on Audit," that he "failed to perform his constitutional duties as such
Chairman," and acting in concert with Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos,
"facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements, and questionable use of
government funds as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, to the grave and irreparable
damage and injury of plaintiff and the entire Filipino people", are mere conclusions of law.
Nowhere in the complaint is there any allegation as to how such duty came about,
or what petitioner's duties were, with respect to the alleged withdrawals and
disbursements or how petitioner facilitated the alleged withdrawals, disbursements, or
conversion of public funds and properties, nor an allegation from where the withdrawals and
disbursements came from, except for a general allegation that they came from the national
treasury. On top of that, the complaint does not even contain any factual allegation
which would show that whatever withdrawals, disbursements, or conversions
were made, were indeed subject to audit by the COA.

If the allegations in the Complaint are deficient,

then a Motion for a Bill of Particulars is proper

Anent the contention of the Solicitor General that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of
particulars because the ultimate facts constituting the three (3) essential elements of a
cause of action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth have been sufficiently alleged in the
complaint, it would suffice to state that in a motion for a bill of particulars, the only
question to be resolved is whether or not the allegations of the complaint are
averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable the movant properly
to prepare his responsive pleading and to prepare for trial. As already discussed, the
allegations of the complaint pertaining to the herein petitioner are deficient because the
averments therein are mere conclusions of law or presumptions, unsupported by factual
premises.