Quo Warranto Case Against CJ Sereno

DIGEST: DISSENTING
DISSENTING OPINION
OPINION OF J.OF J. LEONEN
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Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes Sereno

G.R. No. 237428, 11 May 2018

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Facts: See majority decision.

Issues:

1. Whether quo warranto is a proper remedy to oust an impeachable officer.

2. Assuming quo warranto is a proper remedy, whether said remedy already prescribed.
3. Whether Respondent’s failure to submit copies of her SALN to the JBC meant that she failed “to
pass the test of integrity.”
4. Whether the Court’s power of supervision gives it the authority to interfere with the JBC’s
discretion in performing its constitutional mandate.
5. Whether Respondent must be held accountable for her actions in relation to the present case.

Opinion:

1. Whether quo warranto is a proper remedy to oust an impeachable officer. NO

The petition should have been dismissed outright and not given due course. A process to oust an
impeachable officer and a Justice of the Supreme Court is a legal abomination that gravely diminishes
judicial independence and threatens the Court’s ability to assert the people’s fundamental rights.
Granting the quo warranto is tantamount to granting the Solicitor General the competence to
reconsider the determination of the JBC and the President as to the qualifications of any appointed
judge or justice.

The solution to address the problems relating to a Chief Justice is for this Court to call her out or for
her to be tried using the impeachment process if any of her actions amounts to the grave offenses
enumerated in the Constitution. She also has the alternative to have the grace and humility to resign
from her office to protect the institution from a leadership which may not have succeeded to address
the divisiveness and the weaknesses within.

Granting a Petition for Quo Warranto against the Chief Justice - an impeachable officer - is not the
right way to address her inability to gain the respect of the branch of government that she was
entrusted to lead. This is clear from a deliberate, impartial, conscious, and contextual reading of the
entirety of the text of the Constitution. This is the unclouded conclusion if this Court appreciates the
true value of judicial independence.

The Constitution should be read as a singular, whole unit. A verba legis or plain reading of Article
XI, Section 2 of the Constitution is not proper. The words therein, “may be removed,” should be read

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in accordance with the Constitutional framework and the subsequent jurisprudence over the text under
consideration.
o To focus on the word “may” precludes the importance of the entire document and provides a
myopic and unhistorical view of the framework on which legal order rests.
o The framers of the Constitution did not use “SHALL be removed” as it communicates that
removal through impeachment and conviction was mandatory, as opposed to “may” which
should mean that it was an option to remove. Nor was “may ALSO be removed from office…”
used, as it would clearly state the intent for processes other than impeachment and conviction
to remove a sitting Chief Justice.
o The phrase “may ONLY be removed from office” was not also used. But this should be
interpreted within the context of the provision. Specifically, the following must be taken into
consideration: (i) that the Constitution reserves the process of removal through impeachment
and conviction to heads of Constitutional organs; (ii) that the process of removal is
deliberately cumbersome, such as the one year time bar to avoid harassment suits against
impeachable officers and disruption of public service; (iii) that the grounds for impeachment
are weighty and serious to shield impeachable officers from malicious or bothersome suits.
o Constitutional heads are expected to make difficult decisions. In this light, the Constitution
should be read as to provide them incentive to do their duties. Thus, “may be removed”
should be read in light of the principle that impeachment and conviction should be read as the
only process to remove them from their respective office.

Granting the quo proceeding undermines the Constitution. The history of impeachment
proceedings characterizes it as a sui generis proceeding that is both legal and political in nature,
designed for occasional use, and to be reserved only for the most serious offenses enumerated under
the Constitution. The majority’s reference to the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal as
evidence that a petition for quo warranto is not precluded as a method to remove impeachable
officers is misplaced. Such reference ignores the fact that the said Rules only pertain to the President
and the Vice President, which are the only impeachable officers elected by the public. Granting the
quo warranto undermines the sole constitutional mandate given to the JBC to prepare a short list of
nominees as well as the President’s constitutional mandate to select from the JBC’s shortlist. The
rule is that impeachable officers are only removable by impeachment and no other proceeding, such
as disbarment. Even the majority concedes this point.

Granting the quo warranto threatens and undermines judicial independence. Allowing a judicial
mechanism for investigating judicial colleagues suppresses candor and undermines the spirit and
practice of collegiality that has been so entrenched in the Supreme Court. Such a mechanism for
exacting accountability threatens and effectively erodes the principle of independence that the
Constitution has protected. It may even stifle free speech.

Granting the quo warranto would result in dire consequences, as follows:

o First, the Solicitor General, who is not even a constitutional officer, is given awesome
powers.
o Second, since quo warranto is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, we will be ushering in the phenomena of
a trial court judge ousting a colleague from another branch or another judicial region or a
Court of Appeals division ousting another justice belonging to another division or working in
another region. The logical consequence is to diminish the concept of professional collegiality
and independence also among lower courts.
o Third, this Decision would inexorably empower appellate court judges to exercise discipline
and control over lower courts through acting on Petitions for Quo Warranto against other
lower court judges. This will take away this Court's sole constitutional domain to discipline
lower court judges.
o Fourth, there will be no security of tenure for justices of this Court who will consistently
dissent against the majority.

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 o Fifth, this precedent opens the way to reviewing actions of the Judicial Bar Council and the
President. It is an illicit motion for reconsideration against an appointment, even long after the
exercise of judicial power.
o Sixth, we have effectively included another requirement for the selection of judges and
justices even though we are not constitutionally mandated to do so. Through the majority
opinion, we now require the submission of all the Statements of Assets and Liabilities of a
candidate.

2. Assuming quo warranto is a proper remedy, whether the said remedy already prescribed. YES

An action for quo warranto can only be instituted within one (1) year after the cause of action arises
regardless of who institutes the action. This is clear from Rule 66, Section 11 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that:

“Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public
officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one
(1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or
position, arose…”

The public policy behind the prescriptive period for quo warranto is to provide stability and
consistency in the service by limiting the uncertainty to the title to public office. Additionally, the
prescriptive period also aims to protect public funds by way of disbursing salary for two persons, one
illegally holding public office, and another not rendering service although entitled to do so.

The majority cannot refer to Article 1108(4) of the Civil Code to claim that prescription does not lie
against the State in light of the filing of the quo warranto petition. Such article refers to acquisitive
and extinctive prescription as regards acquisition or ownership of real rights, and not prescription in
general. The position of Chief Justice does not fall within the ambit of this article since a public office
is not a property right, hence no proprietary title can attach to it. This is affirmed jurisprudentially as
the phrase “prescription does not lie against the State” was limited to actions of reversion to the
public domain of lands.

3. Whether Respondent’s failure to submit copies of her SALN to the JBC meant that she failed
“to pass the test of integrity.” NO

The finding of the majority based simply on the non-existence of the Respondent’s SALN is
untenable. While the Constitution provides the qualifications of the members of the Judiciary, it also
gives the Judicial and Bar Council the latitude to promulgate its own rules and procedures. JBC-009,
which is the internal rules in place at the time the Respondent applied for the position of Chief
Justice, shows that the determination of integrity is so much more nuanced than merely submitting
documents like SALN or clearances from government agencies. Sound discretion to ascertain an
applicant’s integrity and general fitness for the position lies with the JBC. The duty of the Court in
this matter is to only provide them with context – not to supplant decisions.

Article XI, Section 17 of the Constitution requires the submission of SALN upon assumption of
office. Meanwhile, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(R.A. 6713, Section 8) and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019, Section 7) statutorily
requires government employees to submit their SALN on an annual basis.

As practiced, however, the JBC did not always require the submission of SALN as part of the
documentary requirements for applications or recommendees to the Judiciary. It only did so during
the vacancy left by Chief Justice Corona’s impeachment. Clearly, the JBC recognized that the SALN
is a mere tool in determining if an applicant possesses integrity and is not an actual measure of
integrity. The JBC’s own internal rules recognize integrity as the collection of attributes that tend to
show “the quality of a person’s character.”

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 Failure to disclose assets or the misdeclaration of assets in a SALN only translates to dishonesty if the
accumulated wealth of the public servant is grossly disproportionate to their source(s) of income, and
which cannot be properly explained or accounted for. Ultimately, it is within the discretion of the JBC
to decide that the mere failure to file a SALN or a misdeclaration or omission of assets therein,
without any evidence of disproportionate wealth, cannot be said to be reflective of one’s lack of
integrity. Thus, there is no transgression of the Constitution when the JBC says so.

4. Whether the Court’s power of supervision gives it authority to interfere with the JBC’s
discretion in performing its constitutional mandate. NO

The Court’s power of supervision over the JBC cannot be read as authority to interfere with the JBC’s
discretion in performing its constitutional mandate. At most, the Court’s supervision is administrative
in nature. Supervision is the authority to ensure that the rules are followed, but without the power to
lay down rules nor the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, the power
of supervision involves the authority to order the work done or re-done.

The JBC is a fully independent body. The Court cannot intervene with the JBC’s authority to
discharge its principal function unless the Council commits grave abuse of discretion. In which case,
the Court will then have the right to exercise its power of supervision by means of a judicial review.
In which case, the constitutional transgression must be nothing less than “arbitrary, capricious, and
whimsical.”

Questioning any perceived grave abuse of the JBC must also be subject to a time period. Allowing the
Solicitor General of the current administration to now question the previous administration’s
appointment six (6) years ago would undermine the security of tenure of magistrates.

5. Whether Respondent must be held accountable for her actions in relation to the present case.
YES

Nevertheless, this dissent should not be read as a shield for the Respondent to be accountable for her
actions. Specifically, Respondent must be held accountable for the following actions:
o Speaking sub judice on the merits of the Quo Warranto Petition and her predictions on its
outcome;
o Claiming that the present status quo caused her difficulties due to her constant position
against the administration when her voting record shows that she had sided with the majority
in several decisions favorable to the government, and dissented to support the expanded
powers of the President;
o Presenting inaccuracies in the announcements made by her team of the agreements of the
Court En Banc to suit her personal agenda;
o Reporting to work to control the bureaucracy of the Court – such as the Clerk of Court and its
process servers – when her case is for decision; and
o Engaging in ex parte communications with the sitting justices who will decide her case.

These acts border on the contumacious and at the very least, appears to violate Canon 13 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “[a] lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his case
and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the
Court.”