Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101503

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Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbee

Revisiting generosity in the dictator game: Experimental evidence from T

Pakistan
Hamza Umer
Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University, Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: This paper revisits the influence of unearned money, anonymity of the decisions and religiosity on generosity in
Unearned the dictator game with charity as a recipient. The results of the experiments performed in Pakistan show that
Anonymous women are significantly less generous when donating with earned as compared to unearned money while men
Religiosity are equally generous with both unearned and earned money. The anonymity of the decisions does not sig-
Dictator game
nificantly influence the behavior of both men and women. Moreover, women are more generous than men only
Religious teachings
when the decisions are exercised with unearned money, with earned money there are no significant gender
differences in generosity. Interestingly donating all income is the modal choice in all the treatments and average
Classification:
C91 donations are more than 50% of the income. Lastly subjects with higher religiosity donate significantly more
than those with lower religiosity and their donations are primarily driven by the religious teachings as well.

1. Introduction
Charity organizations across the world often receive generous do-
nations from both men and women. To what extent these donations are
influenced by how the money is acquired by the donor, peer pressure
and religious teachings in a society is an important area of research.
Due to limited existing natural data on the influence of type of money,
peer pressure and religiosity of people on their generosity, researchers
have typically relied on lab experiments implementing the dictator
game to explore generosity of humans. Some of these dictator game
studies include those by Andreoni (1989), Benz and Meier (2008),
Eckel and Grossman (1996), Fisman, Kariv and Markovits (2007),
Fong (2007), Fong and Luttmer (2011), Landry, Lange, List, Price and
Rupp (2006), Li, Eckel, Grossman and Brown (2011), Rondeau and
List (2008), Scharf (2014), Vesterlund (2006) and others. The results of
these studies show that people are usually very generous in the lab and
donate around 28% of their endowment to the recipients (Engel, 2011).
Moreover women are generally found to be more generous than men in
several dictator game studies (for example: Andreoni &
Vesterlund, 2001; Branas-Garza, Capraro & Ramírez, 2018; Croson &
Gneezy, 2009; Dickinson & Tiefenthaler, 2002; Eckel &
Grossman, 1998, 2008; Engel, 2011; Selten & Ockenfels, 1998) or no
significant differences in the generosity of men and women (for ex-
ample: Ben-Ner, Kong & Putterman, 2004; Bolton & Katok, 1995;
Cadsby, Servátka & Song, 2010; Eckel et al., 2011; Henrich et al., 2005).
The behavior of women in other social dilemmas is reported to be
context dependent while average cooperation between men and women
is found to be similar (Balliet, Li, Macfarlan & Van Vugt, 2011). Several
variables can influence generosity in the lab; of them income effect
caused by the unearned money provided by the experimenter, the
anonymity of the decisions and the role of religiosity are important
ones. Can we expect identical donations with unearned and earned
money and in anonymous and non-anonymous decision settings? Can
we expect woman to be more generous even with earned money? Are
religious people more generous than non-religious ones? These are in-
teresting questions and the existing studies have not explored them
substantially. Four of the existing studies make use of the dictator game
(Cherry, Frykblom & Shogren, 2002; Korenok, Millner & Razzolini,
2017; List, 2007; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008) to explore altruistic beha-
vior with money earned by exerting a real effort. These studies however
use subjects rather than charity as a recipient1 and do not explore
gender differences under such a situation. Similarly, two studies
(Carlsson, He & Martinsson, 2013; Etang, Fielding & Knowles, 2012)
explore the effects of unearned and earned money on charity donations,
but these studies do not explore gender differences as well. The work of
Heinz, Juranek and Rau (2012) is probably the first one to report
gender differences under the earned and unearned monetary condi-
tions, however in their work recipients work to generate the

E-mail address: hamzaumer@akane.waseda.jp.

1
The use of subjects as recipients makes it difficult to identify whether the dictators are donating because of pure altruism or because of the beliefs about the
recipient's expectations. For more details see Dana, Daylian and Dawes (2006).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2019.101503
Received 7 May 2019; Received in revised form 24 November 2019; Accepted 14 December 2019
Available online 15 December 2019
2214-8043/ © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
H. Umer
endowment that is subsequently divided by the dictators. The gener-
osity observed in the work of Heinz et al. (2012) could have been driven
by the reciprocal behavior of the dictators towards the recipients, and
hence does not measures pure generosity. Several studies have also
explored the effect of decrease in anonymity on the altruistic behavior
either by making the dictators identifiable to the recipients (for ex-
ample Frey & Bohnet, 1995) or by using stimuli to indicate someone is
watching them (for example Haley & Fessler, 2005; Rigdon, Ishii,
Watabe & Kitayama, 2009) or by making their decisions identifiable to
the experimenter (for example Cadsby et al., 2010). The results from
these studies however do not converge; when the dictators are identi-
fiable, they donate less than when they are not identifiable, the use of
stimuli increases donations while the presence or absence of the ex-
perimenter has no significant influence on the donations.
The influence of religion in shaping the social and cultural norms is
immense in some parts of the world. As 84% of the world's population
believes in a religion2 and several religions propagate donations to the
charitable causes,3 it is important to explore the influence of religiosity on
generosity. Several existing studies report that participation in religious
activities boosts charitable giving (for example: Brooks, 2003, 2004;
Bryant, Jeon-Slaughter, Kang & Tax, 2003, Van Tienen, Scheepers,
Reitsma & Schilderman, 2011; Wang & Graddy, 2008; Wiepking &
Maas, 2009). In the book “Who Really Cares” Brooks (2006) writes that as
compared to non-religious people, “religious people are, inarguably, more
charitable in every measurable way” (Brooks, 2006, page 40). Putnam and
Campbell (2010) also write in their book American Grace that religious
Americans are more generous than secular Americans (Putnam &
Campbell, 2010, page 453–454). Several experimental studies have also
explored the influence of religiosity on generosity in a dictator game; the
results however do not converge. For example, Eckel and Grossman (2003)
find positive relation between church attendance and donations made in a
dictator game, Eckel and Grossman (2004)4 and Bekkers (2007) find no
correlation while Eckel and Grossman (2006) find a negative relation.
Importantly most of these existing studies have been performed primarily
in countries where majority of the population follows Christianity. Scarcity
of studies exploring the influence of religiosity of Muslims that represent
second largest religion and almost a quarter of world's population5 makes
it important to perform research in this direction.
This paper explores gender differences in generosity by observing
donations made to a charity organization with (1) the earned and un-
earned money (2) under the anonymous and non-anonymous decision
settings and (3) explores the relation between religiosity and gener-
osity. It also explores to what extent generosity is driven by religious
teachings. As most of the aforementioned decisions are difficult to study
in a real-life setting, this paper uses lab experiments to explore these
decisions.
This paper presents two experimental studies. As both studies use
the dictator game, the methods used to perform those studies, all ana-
lyses and results are discussed simultaneously in the paper. First study
examines the influence of unearned versus earned money on donations
made to a charity organization. This is achieved by performing the
2
Source: Washington Times. Available online: https://www.
washingtontimes.com/blog/watercooler/2012/dec/23/84-percent-world-
population-has-faith-third-are-ch/
3
Islam for example requires donating minimum 2.5% of the wealth (known
as Zakat) every year.
4
The authors find religions and non-religious subjects have identical price
elasticity for charitable donations. However, income elasticity for charitable
donations for religious subjects (0.90) is significantly higher than for the non-
religious subjects (0.74).
5
Pew Research Center. Source: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2017/04/06/why-muslims-are-the-worlds-fastest-growing-religious-group/
Islam is expected to become the largest followed religion by 2060. Source:
https://www.pewforum.org/2017/04/05/the-changing-global-religious-
landscape/
2
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101503
dictator game experiments with a single-blind procedure. In one
treatment subjects donate with unearned money provided by the ex-
perimenter while in the second treatment, subjects first exert real effort
to earn money and subsequently donate with the earned money. Second
study compares the donations made to a charity organization in an
anonymous (private) and non-anonymous (public) environment only
with unearned money in the dictator game. Both studies are performed
at the same university in Pakistan with students acting as dictators.
The results from the experiments show that women donate sig-
nificantly less with earned than with unearned money, while men do-
nate statistically identical amounts with both types of money. The al-
truistic behavior of both genders does not differ across the anonymous
and non-anonymous decisions. Interestingly in all the treatments
average donations are more than 50% of the income and the modal
choice is donating 100% of the income. The average amount donated
by subjects (pooled for men and women) is found to be significantly
higher as compared to several previous studies performed in the de-
veloped world. Moreover, religiosity is found to have a positive and
significant relation with the amount donated. Subjects having higher
religiosity donate higher amounts relative to less religious subjects, and
their generosity is more likely to be influenced by religious teachings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the
hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 discusses the experimental methods
in detail. Section 4 examines statistical analyses used to test hypotheses
while Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Hypotheses
The experiments are designed to explore the following hypotheses.
2.1. Hypothesis 1
Average donations in the unearned treatment are larger than those
in the earned treatment.
Money earned by exerting effort provides a stronger sense of
property rights and subsequently promotes self-serving behavior
(Danková & Servátka, 2015; Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1994).
Carlsson et al. (2013) also present similar argument and state that the
dictators are more likely to split the unearned money evenly since they
have not exerted any effort to gain the money. Existing studies (for
example: Korenok et al., 2017) also report lower donations with earned
as compared to unearned money. Psychological studies (for example
Arkes et al., 1994) also suggest that unearned or windfall money is
more likely to be spent as compared to earned money. Hence donations
with earned money are expected to be smaller than those with un-
earned money.
2.2. Hypothesis 2
Average donations in the double-blind treatment (study 2) are lower
than those in the non-anonymous treatment (study 1, unearned money
treatment).
Non-anonymous decision setting is expected to induce higher al-
truistic behavior and higher donations as compared to the anonymous
decision setting primarily because of either the experimenter effect or
peer pressure, or because both of them (Zizzo, 2010). Moreover, results
from several studies also show that subjects in the lab experiments
behave less selfish when their decisions are being observed (for ex-
ample: Haley & Fessler, 2005; Rigdon et al., 2009).
2.3. Hypothesis 3
Women donate more than men in all treatments.
Most of the studies on the dictator game report women to be more
altruistic than men (for example, Bachke, Alfnes & Wik, 2014; Branas-
Garza et al., 2018; Eckel & Grossman, 1998; Kamas, Baum & Preston,
H. Umer
2005). Based on the evidence from the literature, women are expected
to be more generous in the current experiments as well.
2.4. Hypothesis 4
The relation between religiosity and generosity is positive.
Even though there are limited studies reporting positive relation
between religiosity and generosity (Eckel & Grossman, 2003), the mo-
tivation for hypothesis 4 comes from the religious teachings that em-
phasize donations. As experiments are performed in Pakistan where
Islam is followed by majority of the population, and Islam stresses a lot
on charitable donations,6 a positive correlation between religiosity and
generosity is expected.
3. Experimental methods
The experimental methods used for performing studies 1 and 2, and
for measuring religiosity of the subjects are explained in detail here. In
this study anonymous (double-blind) procedure refers to the decision
setting where neither peers nor experimenter knows the decision of the
dictators. The dictators make their decisions in a private space. Non-
anonymous condition refers to the decision setting in which subjects
make decisions in the presence of peers and only the experimenter
knows their decision.
3.1. Study 1. Earned versus unearned income
The experiment in study 1 examines the influence of earned versus
unearned money on the donations. The experimental design used for
this study is similar to the existing charity experiments with certain
important additions. It has two treatments. In the first treatment (let's
say unearned treatment) subjects do not work and are provided 100
Pakistani rupees.7 Subjects can either keep this money or donate par-
tially/fully to a charity. Donations are allowed in multiples of ten. In
the second treatment (let's say earned treatment) subjects can earn
money by counting zeros in a sheet containing randomly organized 50
zeros and 50 ones. There are two such sheets and completion of each
sheet gives 50 rupees to the subjects. In total subjects can earn 100
rupees by correctly counting zeros in both the sheets. This task is used
because it requires effort, is independent of prior learning, and has been
already used in the experimental literature (Abeler, Falk, Goetter &
Huffman, 2011). Once subjects earn, they can keep their earnings or
donate partially /fully to a charity. Donations are allowed in multiples
of ten. One famous local charity (Edhi Foundation) that accepts in-
dividual donations and works on several different social issues is se-
lected.8 If subjects want to receive the receipt of their donation, it is
sent to them two weeks after the experiment. Subjects make decisions
in the presence of peers and the experimenter knows their decisions
(non-anonymous decision setting).
A within-subject design is used. Subjects made decisions with un-
earned money in the first round and then with earned money in the
second round. This can however be problematic because subjects may
have donated less in the earned condition not because of the difference
in how they received their money, but because they already donated in
6
For more details about teachings encouraging charitable donations see the
following sources:
http://irusa.org/the-importance-of-charity-and-giving-in-islam/
https://www.zakat.org/en/why-is-charity-so-important-in-islam/
7
At the time of experiment, 100 Pakistani rupees = 0.72 US dollars.
8
Edhi Foundation is the charity organization used as recipient in both stu-
dies. The organization is selected because of its nationwide presence, and its
diverse activities which include ambulance services, medical care, childcare
services, orphanage homes, free education, graveyard services, free food ser-
vices, marriage services, refugee assistance, rehabilitation centers and animal
hostels. Here is the link to its official website: https://edhi.org
3
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101503
the first round. This portfolio effect in choices was first identified by
Holt (1986). One recent study also suggests that people decrease do-
nations with either more experience in experiments or when interac-
tions in the lab do not promote self-interest (McAuliffe, Forster,
Pedersen & McCullough, 2018). However, it is important to mention
here that one of the two decisions was randomly selected by a coin toss
for payment purpose. Both decisions were not paid. Moreover, subjects
had clear information about the random payment mechanism before
they made their decisions. Beattie and Loomes (1997) term this random
payment mechanism as “random problem selection procedure” (RPSP)
and argue that RPSP mechanism induces subjects to treat each decision
as independent and in isolation. Due to this random payment me-
chanism the donations in the unearned and earned treatments are likely
to be independent from each other and hence the ordering effects as
well as strategic behavior is expected to be minimal. There are several
existing studies (for example: Alpízar, Requate & Schram, 2004;
Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1990; Plott & Zeiler, 2005) that have also
used random payment mechanism to control for the portfolio behavior
and ordering effects in experiments. However, I acknowledge here that
even with random payoff protocol in place, there is still a scope for an
order effect – answering the first question could trigger a particular way
of thinking about the decision which could then affect how they re-
spond to the second question.
After subjects exercised their decisions in both rounds, they parti-
cipated in a post experimental survey. The post experimental survey
was designed to primarily measure religious and demographic in-
formation of the subjects. In the experimental literature broadly two
methods are used to measure religiosity. One of them relies on the in-
trospective reports about religious beliefs, feelings and thoughts (for
example: Putnam & Campbell, 2010) while the other one relies on
asking direct questions about the frequency of religious activities (for
example: Ahmed & Salas, 2009; Sablosky, 2014). As first method relies
on asking subjective questions that can carry different weights for dif-
ferent subjects, this paper makes use of the second method and uses the
number of daily prayers offered as a proxy to measure the religiosity of
the Muslim subjects.9 The number of prayers is used as a proxy for
religiosity because: (1) 5 daily prayers are compulsory on every adult
Muslim irrespective of gender (2) Prayer requires significant effort (in
order to pray one has to take out time 5 times every day, perform ab-
lution, wear neat clothes and select clean place or go to nearby mosque
for praying) and hence subjects having strong bond with Islam are
expected to exert this effort.10 Subsequently subjects with higher
number of daily prayers can be expected to be more religious as com-
pared to those with lower number of daily prayers.
The experiments are performed in December 2018 with the help of
paper at the Institute of Business Administration (IBA) located in Karachi
city in Pakistan. Subjects are recruited with the help of an announcement
about the experiment shared on the student events forum. Two sessions
with 37 subjects in the first and 40 in the second are performed (total
male = 38, average age = 21 years; total female = 39, average age = 20
years). The experiment duration is 30 min. Subjects on average earn 143
rupees including a fix participation fee of 100 rupees. The participation fee
is selected based on the hourly earnings of a typical student and on the
recent experimental work of Umer (2018, 2019) in Pakistan. Subjects were
given option to receive the receipt of their individual payments registered
on their name two weeks after the experiment. As no subject opted for the
individual payment receipt donations made by all 77 subjects were de-
posited to the charity organization via online transfer. Experimental in-
structions are provided in Appendix A.
9
Muslims have five compulsory prayers in a day outlined by Islam. All major
sects of Muslims (including Sunni and Shia) agree on these five prayers. The
time at which each of the five prayers starts however differs across the sects.
10
The following two questions were asked to identify the religious orienta-
tion and religiosity of the subjects:
H. Umer Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101503

3.2. Study 2. Anonymous versus non-anonymous decisions Table 1

Summary of donations (Rupees).
Second study examines the donations in an anonymous (private) Unearned (n = 77) Earned (n = 77) Double blind
versus non-anonymous (public) environment only with unearned (n = 80)
money. First treatment of study 1 (unearned treatment) serves the
Average donations 61.49 55.91 57.5
purpose of non-anonymous decisions (subjects make decisions in the
95% CI [54.22–68.76] [48.28–63.54] [50.14–64.86]
presence of peers and the experiments knows their decisions). In study Mode (Amount) 100 Rupees 100 Rupees 100 Rupees
2 a double-blind experimental design is used to study decisions made by Donating 0% 3.9% 9% None
subjects as anonymous dictators (let's call it double blind treatment). Donating 50% 15.58% 16.88% 18.75%
The double-blind procedure maintains anonymity of the decision maker Donating 100% 31.17% 27.27% 28.75%
Avg. donations (Men) 53.82 50.92 50.75
and is based on the work of Hoffman et al. (1994) and Eckel and
95% CI [42.46–65.17] [39.31–62.53] [40.20–61.31]
Grossman (1998). Subjects participate in a dictator game with charity Avg. Donations (Women) 68.97 60.77 64.25
organization as recipient. Subjects can donate 100 rupees (in multiples 95% CI [59.96–77.98] [50.53–71] [53.96–74.54]
of ten) to the charity. The charity organization is identical to the one
used in study 1. Subjects can also keep all the money to themselves if
they do not want to donate. Two sessions each with 20 male dictators calculated to study the effect size for all comparisons. The results of
and two sessions each with 20 female dictators are performed at the these tests are reported in Table 2. To study the influence of religiosity
Institute of Business Administration (IBA) located in Karachi, Pakistan on generosity (data from first study only) a multiple regression analysis
in December 2018. is performed. In order to control for multiple decisions that subjects
Subjects are recruited with the help of an announcement about the made in first study, robust standard errors clustered around individual
experiment shared on the student events forum. Each of the four ses- subject IDs are used. The results of the regression analysis are reported
sions has 21 subjects (total 84 subjects for all four sessions). In each in Table 4. As a robustness test for the effect of earned money on do-
session 21 subjects (same gender) are directed to the dictator room. nations, a fixed effects regression analysis to control for the individual
Upon entering subjects are assigned random numbers. All the subjects subject effects is also performed and the results are reported in
receive 100 rupees as participation fee upon arrival at the place of the Appendix E. All statistical procedures are performed using STATA.
experiment. The participation fee is identical to that used in study 1.
One of 21 subjects in each session is randomly selected from the dic- 5. Results
tator room as an assistant for the implementation of the experiment and
only 20 subjects in each session (total 80 subjects for all four sessions) In study 1 in the earned treatment, all subjects except one com-
make decisions as dictators. The subject is selected for experimental pleted both the tasks correctly. The average money earned in this
procedures in an attempt to control for the experimenter effect. An treatment is 99.35 rupees, which is almost identical to the unearned
experimenter however present at the back of the room oversees the money (100 rupees) in the unearned treatment. Hence both treatments
working of the assistant throughout the experiment. The assistant also are comparable in terms of money with which subjects make decisions.
receives 100 rupees along with the participation fee of 100 rupees. Table 1 provides the summary of donations made by subjects in the
Once all the dictators take seats in the dictator room, the assistant three treatments.
distributes written instructions about the experiment and subsequently Average donations are more than half of the endowment in all the
envelopes containing money. Once all the subjects read the instruc- three treatments. Proportion of subjects donating all of their endow-
tions, the assistant calls the numbers arranged in an ascending order. ment is relatively high (at least one fourth of the subjects donate all of
Subject, whose number is called goes to a private room, makes her their endowment in every treatment). Interestingly when the decisions
decision and leaves. Once all subjects make their decisions, the ex- are completely anonymous (double blind procedure), none of the 80
perimenter opens the envelopes, writes down the amount donated and subjects sends zero amounts.
then makes an online transfer to the charity organization in the pre- Result 1: On average subjects with unearned income (pooled for
sence of the assistant (Eckel & Grossman, 1998). gender) contribute significantly more (61.49%) than subjects with
In total 40 male subjects and 40 female subjects participated in the earned income (56.28%).
experiment as dictators. The experiment was 30 min long. Subjects on For pooled data even though donations with unearned money are
average earned 142.5 rupees including a participation fee of 100 ru- significantly higher than those with unearned money (z-stat = 2.01; p-
pees. The participation fee is identical to that used in study 1. value = 0.04), the effect size is small (Cohen's d = 0.2). Women pri-
Experimental instructions are provided in Appendix B. marily drive the differences between the earned and unearned treat-
ments; they donate significantly more in the unearned than in the
4. Analysis earned treatment (68.97% versus 60.77%; z-stat = 2.01, p-
value = 0.04). This is however a small effect size as indicated by value
In the first study (earned versus unearned) subjects made multiple of 0.3 for Cohen's d. Men on the other hand donate statistically identical
decisions and hence a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test for matched samples amount with both unearned and earned money (53.82% versus 50.92%;
is used for comparison of donations in the earned versus unearned z-stat = 0.81, p-value = 0.42). A very small value of 0.1 for Cohen's d
treatment. For comparison of donations made in the unearned non- also shows this difference is trivial. Women donate significantly more
anonymous (study 1) versus unearned anonymous (study 2) decision than men in the unearned treatment (68.97% versus 53.82%; z-
settings, Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann–Whitney) test for unmatched stat = −1.73, p-value = 0.08)) and the effect size is medium (Cohen's
samples is employed. The gender wise comparisons for both studies are d = 0.5). In the earned treatment there are no significant differences
also performed using Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann–Whitney) test for across men and women's donations (z-stat = −1.02; p-value = 0.31)
unmatched samples. Standardized mean differences (Cohen's d) are and the effect size is small (Cohen's d = 0.3).

4
H. Umer Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101503

Table 2
Statistical tests: donations (as percentage of income).
Donations Unearned Earned z-stat (A) Cohen's d (A) Double blind z-stat (B) Cohen's d (B)

Donations (Pooled) 61.49% 56.28% 2.01**(0.04) 0.2 57.5% −0.25 (0.81) −0.1
Donations (Men) 53.82% 50.92% 0.81 (0.42) 0.1 50.75% 0.35 (0.72) −0.1
Donations (Women) 68.97% 60.77% 2.01**(0.04) 0.3 64.25% 0.08 (0.94) −0.2
z-stat −1.73* (0.08) −1.02 (0.31) 1.93** (0.05)
Cohen's d 0.5 0.3 0.4

z-stat (A) from Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test and Cohen's d (A) Compares donations between the unearned and earned treatments from study 1.
z-stat (B) from Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann–Whitney) test and Cohen's d (B) Compares donations between the unearned non-anonymous treatment from study 1 and
unearned double-blind treatment from study 2.
z-stat from Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann–Whitney) test and Cohen's d Compares donations between men and women for study 1 and study 2.
p-values for z-stat are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%.
⁎⁎
significant at 5%.

Result 1 for the pooled data provides support for hypothesis 1 and is
also in line with the existing results of Carlsson et al. (2013), who find
subjects (they only report pooled data) donate significantly less when
they earn money as compared to when it is provided by the experi-
menter without any effort. The data for women also supports hypoth-
esis 1, however for men it does not holds true. Altruistic behavior of
women rather than men is found to be more sensitive to the type of
income (earned versus unearned). Eckel and Grossman (2008) and
Croson and Gneezy (2009) provide a survey of experimental studies
focusing on gender differences in the behavior. They conclude that the
social preferences of women as compared to men are situation depen-
dent and malleable. In the current study behavior of women is also
found to be more sensitive to the type of income (unearned versus
earned) and hence the gender level results are in line with the general
findings from the experimental literature.
Result 2: On average subjects in the anonymous (double blind) and
non-anonymous treatments donate statistically identical amounts.
A small Cohen's d of −0.1 also shows the differences between
anonymous and non-anonymous treatments are trivial. There are no
significant differences between the amount donated by men (53.82%
versus 50.75%; z-stat = 0.35, p-value = 0.72) and a small Cohen's d
value (−0.1) also supports it. Women however donate less in the
anonymous treatment as compared to the non-anonymous treatment
(68.97% versus 64.25%; z-stat = 0.08, p-value = 0.94). A negative
value for Cohen's d (−0.2) means donations of women across these
two decision settings differ by one fifth of a standard deviation, but
the effect size is small. Hence support for hypothesis 2 is found only
for the data coming from women dictators. Subjects do not act in a
more selfish manner even when their decisions are anonymous.
Culture of being generous promoted by religious emphasis on

Table 3
A comparison of current results with previous results.
Study Procedure Donation t-stat (p-value)

Current study 57.5%

Eckel and Grossman (1996) Double blind unearned 30.1% 7.41*** (0.000)
Fong (2007) 26.1%a 8.49***(0.000)
Fielding and Knowles (2015) 12.7%b 12.11***(0.000)
Current study 61.49%
Li et al. (2011) Non-anonymous unearned 24.5%c 8.20***(0.000)
Current study 56.28%
Carlsson et al. (2013) Non-anonymous earned 29% 8.90***(0.000)

Donation = Percentage of endowment/ income donated (average of all subjects including men and women). t-stat is from the
two tailed tests of means.
⁎⁎⁎
Indicates significant at 1%.
a
Fong (2007) reports donations for three different recipients (single mothers) who are on social welfare. The average
donation reported here represents the average of all three recipients.
b
The authors use two different denominations while the total endowment is identical. Under these two denominations,
dictators are either verbally instructed that they can donate money to the charity or are shown a box having visual clues about
the charity. The number reported here an average of the two denomination treatments but only for the verbal case. The verbal
case is closer to the current experimental design. The average donation for the visual treatment is even lesser than the verbal
treatment (approximately 2% of the endowment).
c
There are two types of charities used as recipients: government and private. The number reported in Table 3 represents the
average of both types of charities. Subjects on average donate 22% of their endowment to the government and 27% of the
endowment to the private charity.

5
H. Umer Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101503

altruism can derive high donations irrespective of the level of anon- Table 4
ymity. These factors are further explored in the discussion following Generosity & religiosity: regression results.
result 5. Variables Donations Donations
Result 3: On average women are more altruistic than men only with
unearned money irrespective of whether the decision is non-anonymous Earned −5.733* −5.733*
(3.203) (3.284)
or anonymous. With earned money average donations by women and
Ref (1 Prayer)
men are statistically identical. 2 Prayers −6.833 −5.364
In the earned treatment men and women donate statistically (8.923) (8.837)
identical amounts (50.92% versus 60.77%; z-stat = −1.02, p- 3 Prayers 13.38 13.27
value = 0.31). A relatively small value of 0.3 for Cohen's d also shows (9.426) (8.79)
4 Prayers 30.60*** 31.04***
the effect size is small. On the other hand, with unearned money ir-
(8.877) (8.296)
respective of whether the decisions are anonymous or non-anon- 5 Prayers 43.75*** 46.46***
ymous, women donate significantly more than men. The effect size for (9.681) (10.86)
the unearned anonymous treatment is small (Cohen's d = 0.4) how- Constant 45.37*** 28.74
(7.008) (53.5)
ever for the non-anonymous treatment the size effect is medium
Controls No Yes
(Cohen's d = 0.5). Hence hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected. Women Observations 150 150
show significantly higher generosity than men only with unearned R-squared 0.311 0.341
money; with earned money no significant gender differences in gen-
erosity are observed. Two of the existing studies on donations made Robust standard errors clustered around individual IDs are in parentheses.
to a charity in a dictator game use earned and unearned monetary
⁎⁎⁎
Significant at 1%,.
scenarios (Carlsson et al., 2013; Etang et al., 2012), however they do
⁎
Significant at 10%. Earned = Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 for
the earned treatment.
not report gender differences. Hence current results are a useful ad-
dition to the literature and provide a new dimension of gender dif-
ferences in generosity dependent on the type of money used for ex-
ercising decisions. observed in the current study. The discussion following result 5 pro-
Result 4: Average donations as percentage of income are sig- vides further details.
nificantly greater than most of the previous studies and donating all Results 5: Religiosity and generosity are positively correlated. On
income is the modal choice in both studies. average subjects with higher religiosity (offering either four or five of
In study 1 (non-anonymous decisions) on average 61.49% of the the compulsory daily prayers) donate significantly more as compared to
income in the unearned while 56.28% in the earned treatment is do- subjects with lower religiosity (offering less than four prayers every
nated. Similarly, in study 2 (anonymous decisions) on average 57.5% of day).
the income is donated. Interestingly the modal choice in both studies is For subjects in study 1, 75 (97.4%) of the 77 subjects declared
donating 100% income,11 which is uncommon in the context of the themselves as followers of Islam14 while 2 (2.6%) did not declare
existing studies. Table 3 compares donations reported by several pre- their religious orientation. Average age of 75 Muslim subjects was 20
vious studies with those observed in the current study. As the endow- years, on average they offered three prayers every day, 18% had other
ment and currency used in the previous studies differ from those in the people depending on them for financial needs and 56% were satisfied
current experiments, donations as percentage of endowment/income with the financial condition of their family (Further details are in
are used for the comparisons. Although it is not a perfect method of Appendix C). For subjects in study 2, there is no information about
comparisons, it can still provide useful insights about the behavior. their religious beliefs because of the double-blind procedure. Hence
Only studies that used university students as dictators and charity as a only data from study 1 for 75 subjects who declared their religious
recipient are selected to keep the experimental design of the current orientation is used to explore the relation between the religiosity and
and previous studies comparable. While the list of such dictator game generosity.
studies is extensive, a few studies are reported here in order to highlight Table 4 reports the output of the multiple regressions model. The
the differences.12 dependent variable is amount donated by subjects in rupees while
In all of the comparisons, percentage of endowment/income do- treatment variable ‘Earned’ takes on a value of one for the earned
nated is significantly higher in the current study (p < 0.01) and is at treatment and zero for the unearned treatment. The variable ‘Prayer’
least twice the amount reported by the previous studies. Interestingly represents five daily prayers. Along with these primary variables in-
all previous studies reported in Table 3 are mostly performed in the fluence of age, gender, financial situation and number of dependents is
developed world13 while the current study is performed in Pakistan also explored in the regression model, however their impact is insig-
located in the developing world. As Pakistan by law is an Islamic nificant at 10%. Table 4 reports regression results only for variables
country and the influence of religion is relatively strong, I focus on the with significant coefficients. The complete regression results including
religious factors to provide a plausible explanation for higher donations all independent variables are reported in Appendix D.
Subjects on average donate approximately 6 rupees less in the
earned treatment (coefficient of Earned variable; significant at 10%)
11
In study 1, in the unearned treatment 27.27% while in the earned treat- as compared to the unearned treatment. Subjects offering 4 prayers
ment 31.17% of the subjects donated all their income. In study 2, 28.75% of the on average donate approximately 31 rupees more while subjects of-
subjects donated all of their income. fering 5 prayers donate approximately 44 rupees more as compared to
12
Eckel and Grossman (1996) study is selected as it is one of the first studies those offering only one prayer a day (results from regression without
that explores generosity using charity organization as a recipient. Fong (2007) controls). As number of prayers indicates religiosity, the regression
is selected as it is one of those double-blind dictator game studies that report results show that subjects with higher religiosity (offering either 4 or
relatively high average donations. Fielding and Knowles (2015) is selected
5 prayers a day) on average make a larger donation as compared to
because it is performed in a country different than USA. Carlsson et al. (2013) is
selected because it is a rare study that observes donations to a charity organi-
zation with earned money.
13 14
Eckel and Grossman (1996), Fong (2007), Li et al. (2011) are performed in The exact question used in the survey is: Which religion do you follow? (a)
USA, Fielding and Knowles (2015) is performed in New Zealand while Islam (b) Christianity (c) Hinduism (d) Buddhism (e) Others (f) Prefer not to
Carlesson et al. (2013) is performed in China. disclose.

6
H. Umer
those with relatively lower religiosity (praying once a day). 44% (33
out of 75) of the Muslim subjects declared they offer either four or
five prayers every day. A relatively high proportion of subjects with
higher religiosity and the average amount donated are correlated but
it does not imply causation.
The influence of religious teachings on the behavior observed in
the lab requires further analysis. Even though subjects with higher
religiosity (offering four or five daily prayers) are found to make
higher donations, to what extent their act of donating is influenced by
the religious teachings? While behavior observed in the lab does not
provide a direct answer this question, I try to explore it indirectly
with the help of answers provided in the post experiment survey.
Subjects selected ‘Personal satisfaction’, ‘Religious teachings’ or
‘Religious teachings & Personal satisfaction’ as their motivation to
donate during the experiment.15 The results show that 12% of the
subjects (9 out of 75) selected ‘Personal satisfaction’, 13% (10 out of
75) selected ‘Religious teachings’ while 75% (56 out of 75) selected
‘Religious teachings & Personal satisfaction’, as their motivation to
donate during the experiment. 33 out of 75 religious subjects (44%)
declared they offer either 4 or 5 prayers. Interestingly 30 of these 33
subjects (91%) either selected religious teachings or religious teach-
ings and personal satisfaction as their prime motivation for donating
in the lab. On the other hand, 22 out of 42 subjects (52.4%) offering
less than four daily prayers selected either religious teachings or re-
ligious teachings and personal satisfaction as their motivation to
donate during the experiments. The proportion of subjects with either
4 or 5 prayers (91%) motivated by religious teachings (either com-
pletely or partly) is significantly higher than those with less than 4
prayers (52.4%; z-stat from test of proportions = −3.59, p-
value = 0.00). This shows that subjects with higher religiosity (of-
fering 4 or 5 prayers) not only donate more but also are more likely to
be motivated by religious teachings as compared to subjects with
relatively lower religiosity (offering less than 4 prayers). While these
results offer limited external validity, a study conducted by the
Stanford Social Innovation Review with a representative sample from
Pakistan also finds that large donations in Pakistan are due to the
culture of generosity driven significantly by the Islamic teachings.16
Hence lab results on both donations as well as motivations behind
those donations are in line with the findings of the Stanford Social
Innovation Review. The results are also in line with the experimental
study of Eckel and Grossman (2003) and survey-based studies
(Brooks, 2003; Bryant et al., 2003; Van Tienen et al., 2011; Wang &
Graddy, 2008; Wiepking & Maas, 2009) that report positive relation
between religiousness and generosity. However, an important dis-
tinction between the current study and previous ones cited here is
that they have been performed in countries where majority of the
population follows Christianity, while the current one is performed in
a Muslim majority country.
6. Conclusions and discussions
The paper explored generosity in the form of donations made to a
charity organization with unearned and earned money and in non-
anonymous and anonymous decision settings. Along with it, the re-
lation between religiosity and generosity is also explored. Men are
found to donate statistically similar amounts with both earned and
unearned money, while women are found to be more generous with
unearned money. Hence the behavior of women is more sensitive to
15
The exact question asked: Which of the following best describes the reason
you made donations in the current experiment?
16
The study ranks Pakistan as one of the most generous countries in the world
because 98% of the population donates at least once a year (Amjad and
Ali, 2018).
Source: https://ssir.org/articles/entry/philanthropy_in_pakistan#
7
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101503
the experimental conditions- a result already supported by the ex-
isting studies (for example: Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Eckel &
Grossman, 2008). The influence of anonymity of decisions on gen-
erosity is insignificant for both men and women and this supports
earlier findings of Cadsby et al. (2010) who try to reconcile the dif-
ferences between Bolton and Katok (1995) and Eckel and
Grossman (1998) based on a claim made in Eckel and
Grossman (1998) that women are more responsive to anonymity. This
result however does not reconcile with that by Dufwenberg and
Muren (2006) who report decline in generosity with a decline in
anonymity. Except in the earned money treatment, women donate
significantly more than men in all other treatments. With earned
money no gender differences in generosity are observed and this is a
new addition to the existing literature on gender differences in gen-
erosity. Lastly average amount donated in all three treatments (un-
earned, earned, double blind) is more than 50% of the income and is
relatively high as compared to the existing studies from the developed
world. While several factors can be behind this generous behavior,
Islamic teachings emphasizing generosity and donating to the chari-
table causes seems to be the most important and evident one. Subjects
with higher religiosity (offering either four or five daily prayers)
make higher donations as compared to subjects with a relatively
lower religious inclination (offering less than three daily prayers).
Moreover 91% subjects with higher religiosity also declared Islamic
teachings or Islamic teachings and personal satisfaction as their prime
motivation for donations made in the lab, while significantly lower
52.4% of the subjects with lower inclination cited religious teachings
as their motivation for donations. This shows that Muslim subjects
with higher religiosity are more likely to donate higher amount, and
their generous donations are primarily influenced by the Islamic
teachings. This result reconciles with the experimental findings for
Christian subjects reported by Eckel and Grossman (2003).
There are few limitations of the study that are highlighted here. In
study 1 (earned versus unearned income), the non-anonymous condi-
tion was actually partially anonymous. Although subjects made deci-
sions in the presence of peers, the decision was not known to their peers
and was known only to the experimenter. It is possible that participants
did not feel that others would know their decision and could be one of
the reasons that no significant differences are found between the non-
anonymous (study 1) and anonymous treatments (study 2).
It has been suggested that higher generosity in the current ex-
periments might be due to small stake size (100 rupees). The stake
size was selected to match average hourly earnings (approximately
103 rupees17 at the time of experiment) in Pakistan. The stake size
was also sufficient to cover the cost of a meal at the university where
experiments are performed (average cost of lunch was 85 rupees at
the time of experiments). Hence the small monetary stakes won't have
a large effect on generosity.18 It has also been suggested that subjects
exercising decisions in the private (double-blind procedure) can still
perceive they are being observed in the lab and hence show higher
generosity. This is indeed a limitation of the lab experiments per-
formed with the double-blind procedure. Similarly subjects with
higher religiosity could be more susceptible to social pressure and
donate more.
Two possible confounds related to comparisons between study 1 and
study 2 also need to be highlighted here. The gender composition in
study 1 (mix gender) and study 2 (same gender) is different and might
17
In 2018 average monthly earnings were 19,270 rupees in Pakistan while
the average hours worked in a month were 188. Using these numbers, the
average hourly wage turns out to be 103 rupees. Source: International Labor
Organization https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/country-profiles/
18
The recent meta-analysis of Larney, Rotella and Barclay (2019) finds small
effect of stake size on donations in the Dictator game. Hence small stake size in
the current study won't have large effect on generosity of the participants.
H. Umer Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101503

have affected the results. However, as Cadsby et al. (2010) do not find expected to be minimal in the current study as well. Group size in study
any significant influence of gender compositions (single sex versus 1 was almost double in each session as compared to that in study 2. The
multiple sex) on donations in the dictator game, these affects are differences in the group size could have influenced the behavior.

Supplementary materials

Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.socec.2019.101503.

Appendix A. Instructions for study 1

Introduction

Thank you very much for taking out time and participating in the experiment. All the decisions that you take during the experiment and your
performance will not be shared with anyone. The data collected through the experiment will be used only for the purpose of research and anonymity
shall be maintained at all levels of research.
The experiment is spread over 30 min. You are not allowed to communicate with each other. You will be given a participation fee of 100 rupees.
During the experiment, based on your decisions, you can earn up to 100 rupees. If anyone is found talking to someone else, he or she will be
disqualified from the experiment and will only receive the participation fee of 100 rupees. The total money earned during the experiment along with
the participation fee of 100 rupees will be paid at the end of the experiment in sealed envelopes to maintain privacy.
Kindly work on your own and if you have any question raise your hand. The experimenter will come to you to answer your questions. Only
relevant questions will be answered. Use of mobile phones, laptops and other electronic devices is not allowed during the experiment.

Tasks

There are two rounds in the experiment; round 1 and round 2. The description of each of these rounds, your possible choices, tasks and earnings
are as follows.

Round 1

In this round you will receive 100 rupees. You will have the option of keeping all the 100 rupees for yourself. You can also donate as much as you
want from the 100 rupees to a charity organization in Pakistan. The details of the charity organization are provided in the section “Charities” at the
end of the instructions. Make sure you read the section “Charities”. You will be given 5 min for this round to reach a decision.

Round 2

In round 2 you can earn money by completing the task of counting zeros in a sheet having randomly placed ones and zeros. For each sheet for
which you will correctly count the number of zeros, you will be paid 50 rupees. There will be two such sheets and in total you can earn 100 rupees for
the two sheets if you correctly count zeros in both of them. You can try multiple times at the answer for each sheet without any maximum limit on
the tries. You will be given 20 min in total for working on both sheets. At the end of the round 2, you will again have the option of donating to a
charity from the money that you have earned in this round.
Kindly note that experimenter will randomly select either round 1 or round 2 for your final payment. The round for payment purposes will be
selected based on the outcome of a coin tossed in front of you. You will not be paid for both rounds. Similarly the amount that you specified for the
charity in the round selected by the experimenter will be paid to the charity. The amount that you specified for the non-selected round will not be
paid to the charity.
Note: Money can only be donated in multiples of ten (for example: 10 rupees; 20 rupees; and so on until 100) in both of the aforementioned
rounds.

Charity organization

For your reference, Edhi foundation has been selected as the designated charity.
Edhi foundation is involved in the provision of:

(1) Ambulance services;

(2) Hospital services;
(3) Children services;
(4) Orphanage homes;
(5) Education services;
(6) Graveyard services;
(7) Free food services;
(8) Marriage services;
(9) Refugee assistance;
(10) Animal hostels.

If you want the donation to be paid by your name and would like to receive the slip as well, then kindly write your name and address/email
address on the envelopes provided to you by the experimenter. The experimenter will send the receipt of donations within 2 weeks from today. Your
name and address shall not be shared with anyone. Alternately you can personally come to the experimenter in his office after two weeks and get the

8
H. Umer Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101503

receipt of payment in person. The experimenter will tell you which office you need to come to.
If you have any questions, kindly raise hand and wait until the experimenter comes to you.
Thank you for your time.

Appendix B. Instructions for study 2

The instructions you are about to read are self-explanatory. No questions will be answered during this experiment. If you have any questions, you
should read back through these instructions. Now that the experiment has begun, please do not talk at all and do not use your cellphones or any other
electronic devices.
The room in which you are seated is referred to in these instructions as room A. You will notice that there are other persons in the room A, who
are also participating in this experiment. One person in room A has been randomly chosen as room assistant to be the facilitator for today's
experiment. The room assistant will be paid additional 100 rupees in addition to the already paid participation fee of 100 rupees. The room assistant
will be in charge of the envelopes as explained below. In addition, room assistant will verify that the instructions have been followed as they appear
here.
In this experiment, persons in room A, yourself included, will have the opportunity to donate either none or any amount (only in multiples of ten)
out of 100 rupees to a charity organization. The details of the charity organization are provided at the end of the instructions.
The remainder of these instructions will explain exactly how this experiment is run. The experiment is structured so that no one, including the
experimenters and the room assistant, will know your personal decision. Since your decision is private, we ask that you not tell anyone your decision
either during, or after, the experiment.
The experiment is conducted as follows: Assistant will distribute a sealed envelope containing ten 10 rupees bills (total 100 rupees) to everyone in
room A. After giving envelopes, the room assistant will call the numbers randomly assigned to you at the start of the experiment. These numbers will
be called in an ascending order. The person whose number is called will then go to the private station and open the envelope privately inside the
private station.
Each of you in the private station must:
First open the sealed envelope. You must decide whether you want to keep all 10 rupees bills to yourself or you want to give any of those 10
rupees bills to the charity organization. Once you have made your decision regarding the money, you will seal the envelope inside the private station,
and then place it in the box at the front of the private station marked as 'Return Envelopes.'
After everyone in room A goes to the private station, makes a decision and puts envelope in the return box, room assistant will transport the box
to the experimenter, who is in the hallway. With room assistant observing, the experimenter will record the data as follows,

(1) Open the envelope.

(2) Record on a blank sheet of paper the amount of money in the envelope.

Once the experimenter goes through all the envelopes, counts and collects all the money, the experimenter will make an online transfer to the
charity organization's account in the presence of the assistant.

Summary

(1) You need to decide whether you want to keep all 100 rupees to yourself or send any amount to the charity organization.
(2) Once you have made your decision regarding how much money to send, you should put the envelope in the box marked 'Return Envelopes’ and
are free to leave the room.
(3) No participant in the experiment, the room assistant, and the experimenter, will know the decision made by you as an identifiable individual.

Charity organization

For your reference, Edhi foundation has been selected as the designated charity.
Edhi foundation is involved in the provision of:

(1) Ambulance services;

(2) Hospital services;
(3) Children services;
(4) Orphanage homes;
(5) Education services;
(6) Graveyard services;
(7) Free food services;
(8) Marriage Services;
(9) Refugee assistance;
(10) Animal hostels.

Thank you for your time.

9
H. Umer Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101503

Appendix C. Details of post-experiment survey

Following discussion reports the details of post experimental questions. The response from these questions is used for the regression analysis.
(1) Question about prayers
How many of the five compulsory prayers on average do you offer every day?

(a) 1
(b) 2
(c) 3
(d) 4
(e) 5
(f) None

Results

Prayer Observations Percent

0 1 1.30
1 10 12.99
2 16 20.78
3 17 22.08
4 21 27.27
5 12 15.58

(2) Question about dependents

How many of your family members are financially dependent on you?

(a) One
(b) Two
(c) Three
(d) Four
(e) More than four

Results

No of dependents Observations Percent

0 69 89.61
1 4 5.19
2 3 3.90
3 1 1.30

(3) Question on financial condition

How satisfied are you with the financial condition of your family?

(a) Highly dissatisfied

(b) Dissatisfied
(c) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
(d) Satisfied
(e) Highly satisfied

Results

Financial condition Subject Percent

Not satisfied 2 2.60
Least satisfied 4 5.19
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 12 15.58
Satisfied 43 55.84
Very satisfied 16 20.78

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H. Umer Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 84 (2020) 101503

Appendix D. Religiosity and generosity: regression with controls

Variables Donations Donations

Earned −5.733* −5.733*

(3.203) (3.284)
Prayer (Ref: 1 Prayer)
2 Prayers −6.833 −5.364
(8.923) (8.837)
3 Prayers 13.38 13.27
(9.426) (8.79)
4 Prayers 30.60*** 31.04***
(8.877) (8.296)
5 Prayers 43.75*** 46.46***
(9.681) (10.86)
Male −6.167
(6.038)
Age 0.0456
(2.318)
Financial condition (Ref: Not satisfied)
Least satisfied 28.5
(23.57)
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 17.8
(21.3)
Satisfied 17.09
(20.55)
Very satisfied 21.95
(21.66)
No. of dependents −3.077
(5.858)
Constant 45.37*** 28.74
(7.008) (53.5)
Controls No Yes
Observations 150 150
R-squared 0.311 0.341

Robust standard errors clustered around individual IDs are in parentheses.

⁎⁎⁎
Significant at 1%,
⁎
Significant at 10%. Male = Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 for male subjects.

Appendix E. Influence of earned money on generosity: fixed effects regression

Variables Donations

Earned −5.58*
(3.078)
Constant
61.49***
(1.54)
Observations 154
R-Squared (Within) 0.042

Robust standard errors clustered around individual IDs are

in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎
Significant at 1%.
⁎
Significant at 10%.

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