1. Legaspi v.
Minister of Finance and developments but likewise the inescapable imperative
GR NO. L-58289
July 24, 1982
By: RM
Topic: Authority of the public officer
Petitioners: VALENTINO L. LEGASPI
Respondents: THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF FINANCE and THE HONORABLE
COMMISSIONER and/or THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Ponente:
FACTS:
· Hon. Valentino L. Legaspi, incumbent member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa,
filed a petition praying that the Court declare PD 1840 "granting tax amnesty and filing
of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes" unconstitutional.
· Said decree was issued by the President under supposed legislative powers granted
him under Amendment No. 6 of the Constitution proclaimed in full force and effect as of
October 27, 1976 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595 and which is quoted as follows:
'Whenever in the judgment of the President, there exists a grave emergency
or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately
on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action,
he may in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or
letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land.'
o Petitioner alleges that since the legislative function is vested in the
Batasang Pambansa, the President may grant amnesty only with the
concurrence of the Batasan, otherwise, patently null and void
o that Amendment No. 6 was not one of the powers granted the
President by the Constitution as amended in the plebiscite of 1981
and
o that the respondents were implementing the questioned decree and
the same tended to affect all taxpayers in the Philippines including
herein petitioner and
o that the questioned decree being the first dated after the lifting of
Martial Law and the April 7 amendment brought to test the validity
of the exercise of standby emergency powers invoked in
Amendment No. 6.
ISSUE: W/N the 1973 Constitution as amended by Plebiscite-Referendum of 1976, retained
the same amendments, more particularly Amendment No. 6, after it was again amended in
the Plebiscite held on April 7, 1981 – NO.
RULING:
· Constitutional provisions are to be interpreted not only on the basis of current
events, but also on the basis of the historical background of their enactment.
Constitutional law is not simply the literal application of the words of the Charter.
o The ancient and familiar rule of constitutional construction that has
consistently maintained its intrinsic and transcendental worth is that the
meaning and understanding conveyed by the language, albeit plain, of
any of its provisions do not only portray the influence of current events
considerations rooted in the historical background and environment at
the time of its adoption and thereby caused their being written as part
and parcel thereof.
· True enough Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Philippine Constitution as amended in 1981
explicitly ordains that the legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa.
Section 2, however, readily reveals that the Batasang Pambansa contemplated in
that Section 1 is the regular assembly, to be elected in May 1984, per Sec. 5(1) of
the same Article. We must keep in mind that at least for the present and until 1984,
what can be properly discussed here are only the legislative powers of the interim
Batasang Pambansa as such.
· the only change consisted of the non-inclusion of the "incumbent President" as
member of the assembly in pursuance of the fundamental objective to separate
the Presidency from the regular legislative body and thereby establish in our
country a modified form of parliamentary government more appropriate for and
suitable to the peculiar conditions of our political development and the
idiosyncrasies of our people, and at the same time introduce into it features that
would strengthen its structure so as to enable the government to cope with
emergencies or abnormal situations, not only like those that presently exist but
even those that might arise in the future.
o Thus, it is characterized with a presidency more powerful than the idea of a
strong President desired by President Quezon and actually embodied in
the 1935 Constitution.
o It is, therefore, evident that the reference to Amendment No. 2 in the
amendments of 1981 was not intended at all to convert or upgrade the
present existing assembly into the regular Batasang Pambansa. To
repeat, what we have now is still the interim Batasang Pambansa
created in 1976.
· Having arrived at the ineludible that the present Batasan is still interim, it also
ineluctably follows that its legislative authority cannot be more exclusive now after
1981 amendments than when it was originally created in 1976.
o even as the interim Batasan which came into being "in lieu of the Interim
National Assembly" by virtue of Amendment No. 2 consequently acquired
"the same powers and its Members — the same functions,
responsibilities, rights and privileges, and disqualifications as the regular
National Assembly and the members thereof", there can be no question
that coeval with the creation of the interim Batasan, Amendment No. 6
came into force and effect.
o And Amendment No. 6 mandates in unequivocal and unambiguous terms
the grant of concurrent legislative authority to an official (the President
[Prime Minister]) who is not in the Batasan itself.
Ration d’tre of Amendment No. 6: (not sure if relevant sa topic, including it just in case)
· the power that Amendment No. 6 vests upon the "President (Prime Minister)" are to
be exercised only on two specified occasions, namely, (1) "when in (his judgment) a
grave emergency exists or there is a threat or imminence thereof" and (2) "whenever
the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly (now regular Batasang
 Pambansa) fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his
judgment requires immediate action."
o The power is to "issue necessary decrees, orders, or letters of
instruction which shall form part of the law of the land."
o As the tenor of the amendment readily imparts, such power may be
exercised even when the Batasan is in session. Obviously, therefore,
it is a power that is in the nature of the other powers which the
Constitution directly confers upon the President or allows to be
delegated to him by the Batasan in times of crises and
emergencies.
· the Constitution has four built-in measures to cope with crises and emergencies. To
reiterate, they are: (a) emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan; (b) call of
the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the barracks; (c) suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (d) martial law.
o Of these four, the people dislike martial law most and would, if
possible, do away with it in the Constitution.
· the adoption of Amendment No. 6 is that in addition to the four measures
authorized in the body of the charter, this amendment is supposed to be a fifth one
purportedly designed to make it practically unnecessary to proclaim martial law, except
in instances of actual surface warfare or rebellious activities or very sophisticated
subversive actions that cannot be adequately met without martial law itself.
o Should matters really go out of hand even after the putting into effect
of the measures aforementioned, under the constitution, without
Amendment No. 6, the only recourse would be to proclaim martial
law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.
NOTE: Check full text for more info about Amendment No. 6 (more on history sya how it
became a law)
4. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan
GR NO. 103501-03
February 17, 1997
SPV
Topic: Liability of Public Officers, Kinds of Duties
Petitioners: Luis A. Tabuena
Respondents: HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Ponente: Francisco
FACTS
- President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the
president’s office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to
the 7 January 1985 memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto
Ongpin.
o Tabuena agreed.
- About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private
secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating
in black and white such verbal instruction.
- In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena,
with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55
Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals.
o On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25 Million,
following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting
the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA
funds, to issue a manager’s check for said amount payable to Tabuena.
o The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao
and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after
which, Tabuena took delivery thereof.
o The P25 Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the office of
Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money
received.
o Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment
and delivery of another P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986.
o The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986 for P5
Million.
- Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter-request for a manager’s check for
this amount.
- Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested
him to do the counting of the P5 Million.
- After the counting, the money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena’s car.
- Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez’ office.
- It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all
the amounts she received from Tabuena.
- Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao
remained at large. One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in
the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves; the volume of
the questions asked were more the combined questions of the counsels.
- On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena
and Peralta filed separate petitions for review, appealing the Sandiganbayan
decision dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of 20 December 1991.
- Tabuena and Peralta now pray that they be acquitted on the ground that they
acted in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation - NO
HELD
- Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation.
Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum.
- The order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the
President himself, the highest official of the land.
o It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued.
o On its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the
payment of an obligation illegal.
 o Even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not
aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would
only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith.
o Tabuena acted under the honest belief that the P55 million was a due
and demandable debt and that it was just a portion of a bigger liability to
PNCC.
o This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one
to act swiftly without question.
- Marcos was undeniably Tabuena’s superior the former being then the President of
the Republic who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such
as the MIAA and PNCC
o Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs
and transactions, such as for instance, directing payment of liability of
one entity to another and the manner in which it should be carried out.  ●
o And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest
official of the land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena’s
compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS
Memorandum.  ●
o Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of Any person
who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose. The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and
Marcos is clear.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M.
Peralta are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and penalized under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan Decision of October 12, 1990 and
the Resolution dated December 20, 1991 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
5. Estrada v. Desierto
G.R. No. 146710-15
DATE: MAR. 2, 2001
By: EAY3
Topic: LIABILITY OF PRESIDENT
Petitioners: ESTRADA
Respondents: DESIERTO
Ponente: PUNO, J.
FACTS:
● It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,
illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
● On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the House of Representative
and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during
which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada  were made
● When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3
billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and
private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling.
● In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President.
● As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting
his vote against Estrada.
● By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of
sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the 11 senators.
● On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined
the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
● Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election.
On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”.
● At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the
14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
Estrada, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for
judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
● Petitioner Estrada makes two contention:
o first , the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman
should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the
impeachment proceedings against him; and
o second , he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or
civil.
ISSUE: W/N the Estrada enjoys immunity from suit.
HELD/RATIO: - NO
● We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must
first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of
petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the
events that led to his loss of the presidency.
● Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to
demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be
prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution.
Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better
situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the
debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment
proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper
criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him,
● "incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during
the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond . Considering the
peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has
been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot
 demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
● The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character . They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption . By no stretch of the imagination can
these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping
him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that
immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is
that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
6. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 128055 / April 18, 2001
By: Sarah Zurita
Topic: LEGISLATORS
Petitioners: MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION
Ponente: VITUG
ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan can issue a preventive suspension order against an
FACTS:
incumbent public official?
● Santiago was the Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
● Complaints were filed against Santiago by some employees for alleged violation of
HELD/RATIO: YES -- SUSPENSION PENDENTE LITE
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019)
RA 3019 Section 13: “any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
● 3 informations were approved and filed: (only the first is relevant and filed w/ SB)
under a valid information… shall be suspended from office.”
○ Legalization of the stay of Chinese aliens in violation of EO 324 (which
prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that
said aliens are disqualified, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said
aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by Santiago)
○ Violation of PD 46
○ Libel
● Sandiganbayan Justice issued an order for the arrest of Santiago; bail at 15k.
○ Santiago posted a cash bail w/o need for physical appearance
○ Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until
her physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in court.
● Ombudsman manifested however that Santiago was unable to come unaided to his
office, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment.
● Meanwhile, Santiago moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that
she be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. TRO issued.
● Court lifted the TRO
● Sandiganbayan issued an order enjoining Santiago from leaving the country in light
of the media reports announcing her intention to accept a fellowship from the John
F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
● Santiago moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice and defer her
arraignment -- DENIED by SB.
● DAMING NANGYARI, DI NAMAN IMPORTANT… (ito na yung main)
● Office of Special Prosecutor (OSP) and Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion to admit 32 amended informations.
○ Santiago moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations.
○ The court denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and
directed her to post bail on the 32 informations
● Santiago, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari assailing the SB
resolution which resolved NOT to disqualify its Presiding Justice and SB resolution
admitting the 32 Amended Informations, and seeking the nullification thereof.
○ The court initially issued a TRO against SB presiding justice to cease and
desist from sitting in the case as well as from enforcing resolution
ordering Santiago to post bail bonds for the 32 amended informations,
and from proceeding with her arraignment until the matter of his
disqualification would have been resolved by the Court.
● The Court directed the OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate the 32 amended
information -- consolidated under the EO 324 case.
● Santiago filed with SB a Motion to Redetermine probable Cause and to dismiss or
quash said information
○ Pending the resolution of this motion, the prosecution filed a motion to
issue an order suspending Santiago.
○ Santiago filed an opposition on the motion for her suspension
● SB RULED: suspended from her position as Senator for 90 days from notice
● The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a
valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or
permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career
service.
● Section 13 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only
in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has
been charged.
● DOCTRINE: Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate
that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only
the particular office under which he stands accused.
● While the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity
of the information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no
hard and fast rule as to the conduct thereof.
○ No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing.
Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate
 opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
against him
● DOCTRINE: The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct
from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution
○ The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or
the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
member.
● the Court may act in the determination of whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
○ The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of
discretion committed by any government instrumentality has evidently
been couched in general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial
interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu.
● Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No
costs
7. Dantes v Caguiao
AM RTJ- 05-1919
June 27,2005
By: MJB
Topic: Liability of Public Officers - Judges
Petitioners: Nestor Dantes
Respondents: Judge Ramon Caguiao
Ponente: Carpio Morales
DOCTRINE: Thus where the law violated is so elementary, like Rule 71 which provides the
scope of a judge’s authority to punish for contempt and the procedure to be followed, for a
judge not to know it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.
FACTS:
● Atty. Nestor Dantes (Dantes) was the counsel in a case for the declaration of nullity of
a deed of sale with a right to repurchase, which was filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC).
● Judge Philbert Iturralde dismissed the complaint. The court found Dantes and his clients
guilty of direct contempt for willful and deliberate forum shopping
● Atty. Dantes filed a motion for reconsideration.
● Judge Ramon Caguioa (Caguioa) was thereafter appointed as the Presiding Judge and
took over the pending case.
● The motion was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The plaintiffs, through
● Atty. Dantes, filed a motion for clarification of said order.
● Respondent judge directed plaintiffs and Atty. Dantes to show cause and explain why
they should not be cited in contempt of Court for using disrespectful language in their
pleadings.
● Atty. Dantes filed a motion requesting Judge Caguioa to specify/particularize the
―disrespectful language used in the pleadings he submitted, which was denied.
● Judge Caguioa then ordered the arrest of Atty. Dantes.
● He requested respondent judge to allow him to post a bond for his provisional liberty
but the same was denied.
● Consequently, an administrative case was filed against Judge Caguiao.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Caguioa is guilty gross ignorance of the law for not granting the
petition to post bail - YES
HELD/RATIO:
● Not every error bespeaks ignorance of the law, for if committed in good faith, it does
not warrant administrative sanctions.
● To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in judgment.
● Good faith, however, in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple
and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins
of error.
● Thus where the law violated is so elementary, like Rule 71 which provides the scope of a
judge’s authority to punish for contempt and the procedure to be followed, for a judge
not to know it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.
● Judge Caguioa’s denial of Atty. Dantes’ request to post a bond for his provisional
liberty violated Atty. Dantes’ right to due process — his right to avail of the remedies
of certiorari or prohibition pending resolution of which the execution of the judgment
should have been suspended. His denial of the request betrayed his ignorance.
● WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance
of law
NOTES: RULE 71 - ROC
● SECTION 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. — A person guilty of misbehavior in
the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court
and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or
higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.
● SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. — The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may
not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition.
The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition,
provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and
conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be
decided against him.
9.) PH RACING CLUB vs. BONIFACIO
G.R. NO. L-11944
 31 AUG 1960
DEINLA
TOPIC: Quasi-judicial officers
PETITIONER: Philippine Racing Club et al
RESPONDENT: Arsenio Bonifacio et al
PONENTE: Bautista Angelo
FACTS:
● In one race at the Sta. Ana Hippodrome belonging to the Philippine Racing Club, Inc., the
competing horses went off to a faulty start. When the barrier was lifted, one of the horses
turned around and blocked the three horses at its left thus enabling the three horses on
the right side to run ahead and gain a good lead.
● The official starter signaled the stewards of the races who were then on the judges' stand
indicating that the race should be cancelled. As his signal went unheeded, the official
starter proceeded to the stand where the stewards were seated to inform them that the
start was bad and in his opinion, the race should be cancelled.
○ Coscolluela, however, told him to "shut up" and allowed the race to go on until its
termination.
● When the winning horses as well as the corresponding dividends were announced, the
betting public showed its disapproval of the result. A commotion resulted which reached
the knowledge of the members of the Commission on Races.
○ Respondents Arsenio Bonifacio, Jesus Cacho, Tomas Sunico, and Victor Buencamino, all
of whom, except the last, were present at the time.
● When they noticed the uproar and were informed of its cause, they sent for the stewards
and made an on the spot investigation. Convinced that the start of the race was faulty,
they decided to cancel it and had their decision announced to the public.
○ In the meantime, while the investigation was going on, the holders of the winning the
tickets were able to cash the same at the ticket windows. The result was that while the
club paid the dividends on the winning tickets it had to refund to the holders of the
losing ones the sum of P5,032.00.
● Because of this incident, plaintiffs commenced the present action before the CFI seeking to
recover from defendants said sum of P5,032.00; plus P10,000.00 as moral damages,
alleging that defendants acted without or in excess of their authority when they ordered
the cancellation of the race and the return of the bets of the holders of the losing tickets,
said acts having caused plaintiffs moral damages for having placed their character and
reputation under public suspicion.
● Defendants disclaimed responsibility alleging that if on the date alleged in the complaint they
annulled the race they did so merely pursuant to their official duties as members of the
Commission on Races and after conducting an on the spot investigation at which plaintiffs
and its employees were heard, and hence they cannot be held liable for damages. They
put up a counterclaim in the amount of P40,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether respondents are liable for damages. NO.
RULING:
● The decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
● As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or executive, is not personally liable
to one injured as a consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official
authority, and in the line of his official duty.
● In order that acts may be done within the scope of official authority, it is not necessary that
they be prescribed by statute, or even that they be specifically directed or requested by a
superior officer, but it is sufficient if they are done by an officer in relation to matters
committed by law to his control or supervision, or that they have more or less connection
with such matters, or that they have more or less connection with such matters, or that
they are governed by a lawful requirement of the department under whose authority the
officer is acting.
○ Under this principle, state building commissioners who, in obedience to a statute,
discharge one who has been employed to construct a state building, take possession of
the work, and place it in the hands of another contractor, are not liable to the former
contractor in damages, since in so doing they are merely acting in the line of their duty.
○ An officer is not personally responsible for the necessary and unavoidable destruction of
goods stored in buildings, when such buildings were destroyed by him in the lawful
performance of a public duty imposed on him by a valid and constitutional statute.
● Where an officer is invested with discretion and is empowered to exercise his judgment in
matters brought before him, he is sometimes called a quasi-judicial officer, and when so
acting he is actually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the
result of an erroneous or mistaken decision, however erroneous judgment may be,
provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer's authority, and
without wilfulness, malice, or corruption.
DISPOSITION
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
NOTES
The action taken by the Commission on Races cancelling or annulling the race held on July
23, 1950 for the reason that there was a faulty start on the part of some horses was in
excess of the authority granted to it by law.
It is true that the Commission on Races has the supervision over all horse races and over all
race officials and employees having connection with their operations, but such power of
supervision cannot be extended to functions which belong to other officials as delimited by
law.
As defined by this Court, supervision only means overseeing or the power or authority to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. It is different from control which includes the
power to alter, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer may do in the performance of
his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the superior for that of his subordinate.
This power of control has been withheld from the Commission.
10. CHAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO. 149613
AUG 9, 2005
By: CLAIRE
Topic: LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF SUBORDINATES
Petitioners: PAMELA CHAN
Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES

FACTS:
· Chan seeks reversal of the SB decision finding her guilty of Malversation of Public
Funds
· Nov 1989 – Chan was hired as Accounting Clerk II & assigned at the Regional Office
of the NBI in Cebu City, discharging the function of Cashier or Collection Officer.
· She went on leave from Dec 7-27, 1995. On Dec 27 1995, Daclan, the auditor from
COA assigned to the NBI, conducted a routine audit exam of the accountability of Chan.
The audit was conducted by Bas who was officially designated by the Regional Director
to act as Collection Officer during her absence. The auditor found that all collections for
the period beginning December 7, 1995 up to the date of the audit, December 27, 1995,
were accounted for, as reflected in her Cash Report dated December 27, 1995 signed by
Bas.
· Jan 24, 1996 – the same auditor conducted another audit exam. Since Chan had
already reported for work, the audit covered the period beginning June 15, 1995. The
auditor found a shortage of P290,228 in Chan’s cash accountability w/c was reflected in
her Cash Report on w/c Chan affixed her signature. The auditor thus issued a demand
letter to petitioner to restitute the missing funds and explain the shortage. In a parallel
move, she sent a memorandum to the Regional Director requesting that Chan be
immediately relieved of her assignment as Collecting Officer. Acting on the
memorandum, the Regional Director issued a Special Order replacing Chan with Gloria
Alvarez effective March 1, 1996.
· Since it is a standard procedure to conduct an audit exam whenever an accountable
officer is replaced, an examination was conducted again and Chan had a cumulative
shortage of cash accountability in the amount of P333,360. The auditor issued a demand
letter requiring Chan to explain the shortage but Chan did not respond.
· COA Region VII filed a complaint against Chan for Malversation of Public Funds in
the amount of P333,360 w/ the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman. Said office found, by
resolution, a probable cause against Chan & recommended filing the corresponding
information against her.
· Chan filed an MR of the resolution on the ground that her entire amount subject
should not be solely charged to her but also to bas since the amount consisted, so she
claimed, in part of “vales” received by Bas from her and of funds collected by Bas
whenever she acted as collecting officer. Motion was denied.
· Chan was thus indicted before RTC Cebu. Then Chan at once filed an Urgent Motion
for Reinvestigation and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance and/or Enforcement of a
Warrant of Arrest w/c was denied by the trial court. On arraignment, Chan pleaded not
guilty.
· During the pendency, Bas remitted P60,787, while Chan remitted P89,760.82 w/c, to
her, satisfied her obligations to the gov’t, having a balance of P182,812.
· RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt, w/ mitigating circumstance that she had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
· Claiming that her right to due process was violated by the denial of her plea for the
conduct of a re-audit, petitioner cites Tinga v. People. However, the court said that the
reliance is misplaced since the ruling was based on the COA’s evaluation of Tinga’s
accountabilities was replete w/ errors. The finding of RTC and SB were not due to any
error in the audits. The liability of petitioner as found by the trial court and the
Sandiganbayan was lower than that found by the COA because there were remittances
made while the case was already pending which were deducted from petitioner's
accountability. On the other hand, the inconsistency between the findings of the trial
court and the Sandiganbayan was due to their different computations as to the actual
amount of remittances, not due to any error in the audits.
ISSUE: WON the court failed to distinguish her liability and that of Bas - NO
RULING:
1. Granted that Bas was given official designation during all the times that she acted
as collection officer, petitioner's liability is not, by that fact alone, mitigated.
Petitioner could still be held liable for the amount unremitted by Bas if it can be
shown that the latter was under her supervision.
2. Chan testified that she had the duty to supervise Bas. Petitioner, nonetheless, could
have shown that she was not remiss in her supervision of Bas, by way of rebutting the
disputable presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code which states: The
failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. Petitioner,
however, failed to do so. Not only did she omit to report the shortages of Bas to the
proper authority upon her discovery thereof; she even practically admitted to having
assisted Bas in covering up such shortages.
3. Petitioner was thus not merely lax in supervising Bas; she actively assisted her in
concealing her shortages to the extent of lending her public funds for that purpose.
Significantly, petitioner acknowledged the illegality of her own act. (This was based on
her court testimony)
4. To make matters worse, petitioner did not only lend Bas those amounts given on
November 7, 9, and 15, 1995. She admittedly extended "vales" to her in the amount of
P112,089.18, and to others, also out of public funds.
5. The grant of loans through the "vale" system is a clear case of an accountable
officer consenting to the improper or unauthorized use of public funds by other persons,
which is punishable by the law. To tolerate such practice is to give a license to every
disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation with the use of public funds. [Meneses
v. SB]
6. The alleged acquiescence of petitioner's superior, even if true, is not a valid
defense. As Ilogon v. Sandiganbayan teaches: The fact that petitioner did not personally
use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not exculpate him from his criminal
liability. And as aptly found by respondent Sandiganbayan, "the fact that (the)
immediate superiors of the accused (petitioner herein) have acquiesced to the practice
of giving out cash advances for convenience did not legalize the disbursements".
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
11. TABUENA v. CA
G.R. NO. L-16290
OCTOBER 31, 1961
Topic: LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; PERSONAL LIAIBILITY
Petitioners: SANTOS TABUENA, ET AL.
Respondents: THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ETC., ET AL.
Ponente: REYES, J.B.L., J.
DOCTRINE: A public officer, by virtue of his office alone, is not immune from damages in his
personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith.
FACTS:
● In Civil Case No. B-152 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, which was an action
for mandamus with damages, judgment was rendered for Tabuena. The dispositive
part of the decision reads:
o "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: (1) The defendant
Eugenio de la Cruz, in his official capacity as Director of the Forest
Research Institute, is hereby commanded to appoint the plaintiff, Santos
Tabuena, to the position of Administrative Assistant II in the Forest
Products Research Institute with compensation at the rate of P2,760 per
annum within five (5) days from notice of this decision;
o (2) The defendant, in his personal capacity, is hereby sentenced to pay to
the plaintiff the sum of P230 a month commencing from June 16, 1958
until he shall have been appointed and assumed office as Administrative
Assistant II in the Forest Products Research Institute, plus the sum of
P3,000 for moral damages and P1,000 for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, aside from the costs of the suit."
● Notice of appeal was filed by De la Cruz
o manifested that no appeal bond was required to perfect his appeal
● Thereupon, Tabuena filed two motions
o asking the trial court to require De la Cruz to file an appeal bond
o praying that, pending appeal, the trial court order execution of its
judgment in so far as it commands the appointment of Tabuena to the
position of Administrative Assistant II
● trial court issued two orders, both dated July 8, 1959
o requiring de la Cruz to file an appeal bond
o directing respondent to comply with that portion of the judgment
ordering the appointment of Tabuena to the position mentioned
● A motion for reconsideration of the above orders was denied.
● De la Cruz then instituted certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals to annul
the twin orders of July 8, 1959 and that of July 31, 1959 denying his motion for
reconsideration.
● the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, annulling both orders complained of
and making permanent the preliminary injunction it had issued.
o sustained the contention of De la Cruz that he was exempted from filing
an appeal bond, as a public officer sued in his official capacity
o with the filing of the notice of appeal, the trial court lost jurisdiction to
order the immediate execution of its judgment
● Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, Tabuena brought to this Court the
instant petition for review by certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N De la Cruz is exempted from filing an appeal bond –NO.
RULING:
● The general rule is that an appeal bond is required for the purpose of paying for
costs which the appellate court may award against the appellant (Sec 5, Rule 41).
● As an exception, an appeal bond is not required of the Government when it is the
unsuccessful party, because no costs are supposed to accrue against the Republic
of the Philippines unless otherwise provided by law (Sec. 1, Rule 131).
● But exemption from the filing of bonds applies only where the action is brought by
or against public officers impleaded merely as nominal representatives of the
Government, and sued purely in their official capacity
o It appears exceedingly clear in this case that De la Cruz was sued not only
in his official capacity as director of the Forest Product Research Institute,
but also in his personal capacity for having acted allegedly in manifest
bad faith, "with the purpose of persecuting, discriminating against or
committing injustice to the petitioner"
o accordingly, the judgment of the court of origin made him personally
liable for damages in varying concepts
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals setting aside the trial court's execution of
its judgment pending appeal is affirmed; the orders of the trial court dated July 8, 1959 and
July 31, 1959, in so far only as they require respondent to file an appeal bond in Civil Case No.
B-152, are reinstated; and respondent De la Cruz is hereby given a period of ten (10) days
from entry of our judgment within which to file his appeal bond in said Civil Case B-152.
12. Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan
GR NO. 1232456
February 18, 1999
By: RM
Topic: Liability of public officer; remedies
Petitioners: CONRADO B. RODRIGO, JR., ALEJANDRO A. FACUNDO and REYNALDO G. MEJICA
Respondents: THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), OMBUDSMAN and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
Ponente:
FACTS:
· Petitioner Mayor Rodrigo, on behalf of the Municipality of San Nicolas, Pangasinan,
entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction for the electri cation of
Barangay Caboloan, San Nicolas.
· Subsequently, petitioner Mejica, Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator,
prepared an Accomplishment Report stating that the Caboloan Power Generation
Project was 97.5% accomplished.
o On the basis of said report, payment was effected by petitioner
Facundo, Municipal Treasurer, to Philwood Construction.
· On 14 August 1993, petitioners received a Notice of Disallowance from the
Provincial Auditor who found, among others, that as per Commission on Audit
 evaluation of the electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project was actually
accomplished.
· Petitioners requested the provincial auditor to lift the notice of disallowance and to
re- inspect the project.
· The Provincial Auditor, however, allegedly did not act on said requests but instead
led a criminal complaint for estafa before the Ombudsman against petitioners and the
President and Project Engineer of Philwood Construction.
o the Ombudsman approved the ling of an information against
petitioners for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 before the
Sandiganbayan.
· Petitioners led before the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information
contending that the institution by the Provincial Auditor of the complaint despite the
pendency of their opposition to the notice of disallowance violates their right to due
process; and that that Mayor Rodrigo at the time of the commission of the alleged crime
occupies a position of Grade 24 and was, therefore beyond the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners' right to due process was violated by the ling of the complaint against
them by the Provincial Auditor – NO.
RULING:
· Petitioners primarily oppose the institution by the Provincial Auditor of the
complaint despite the pendency of their opposition to the notice of disallowance,
violating their right to due process. Sec. 44.6.4 of the State Audit Manual provides:
It shall be the responsibility of the auditor to exercise professional
judgment in evaluating, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of
each case as well as the pertinent provisions of applicable laws, rules and
regulations, the grounds for a charge or suspension/disallowance of an
account or transaction.
It shall be the responsibility of the auditor to exercise sound judgment in evaluating the
written explanation of the accountable/responsible/liable officer concerned for the
purpose of lifting the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90)
day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance.
o The aforequoted provision should be read in conjunction with Section
82 of the State Audit Code, 9 which states that:
(a) charge of suspension which is not satisfactorily explained
within ninety days after receipt or notice by the accountable
officer concerned shall become a disallowance, unless the
Commission or auditor concerned shall, in writing and for good
cause shown, extend the time for answer beyond ninety days.
· A disallowance is the disapproval of a credit or credits to an account/accountable
officer's accountability due to non-compliance with law or regulations. Thus, the auditor
may disallow an expenditure/transaction which is unlawful or improper.
· A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of action to debit/credit the
account/accountable officer's accountability pending compliance with certain
requirements. A notice of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which could
otherwise have been settled except for some requirements, like lack of supporting
documents or certain signatures. It is also issued on transactions or accounts the
legality/propriety of which the auditor doubts but which he may later allow after
satisfactory or valid justification is submitted by the parties concerned.
· Petitioners misinterpreted Section 44.6.4.
o First, petitioners were not charged with suspension but disallowance.
o Second, the "written explanation" referred to in said section is "for
the purpose of lifting the suspension or extending the time to
answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion
into a disallowance," not for contesting a disallowance, as
petitioners wrongfully assert.
o Section 44.6.4., therefore, finds no application in this case.
· Moreover, Section 56 of COA Circular No. 85-156-B imposes upon the Provincial
Auditor the duty to file a complaint before the Ombudsman when, from the evidence
obtained during the audit, he is convinced that "criminal prosecution is warranted."
o The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the opposition to the notice
of disallowance and the motion for re- inspection pending in his
office before he institutes such complaint so long as there are
sufficient grounds to support the same.
o Petitioners' right to due process in so far as the criminal aspect of the
case is concerned, is not impaired by such institution.
· Lastly, the exoneration of petitioners in the audit investigation does not mean the
automatic dismissal of the complaint against them.
o The preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the
investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct from
each other.
§ The first involves the determination of the fact of the
commission of a crime;
§ the second relates to the administrative aspect of the
expenditure of public funds.
o Accordingly, we hold that the Ombudsman did not err in entertaining the
complaint filed by the Provincial Auditor against petitioners, nor the
Sandiganbayan in allowing trial to proceed, despite the pendency of
petitioners' motions before the auditor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued
by this Court on 28 August 1996 LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
14. Canonizado v Aguirre
GR NO. 133132
February 15, 2001
By: RRV
Topic: Resignation
Petitioners: ALEXIS C. CANONIZADO, EDGAR DULA TORRES and ROGELIO A. PUREZA
Respondents: HON. ALEXANDER P. AGUIRRE, as Executive Secretary, HON. EMILIA T.
BONCODIN as Secretary of Budget and Management, JOSE PERCIVAL L. ADIONG, ROMEO L.
CAIRME and VIRGINIA U. CRISTOBAL
Ponente: Gonzaga-Reyes
Doctrine: In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such
circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. There must be a complete
abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment.
Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs from and is accompanied by deliberation
and freedom of choice.
FACTS:
● Respondents are seeking a reconsideration of the Court's 25 January 2000 decision,
wherein we declared section 8 of Republic Act No. 8551 (RA 8551) to be violative of
petitioners' constitutionally mandated right to security of tenure
● As a consequence of our ruling, we held that petitioners' removal as
Commissioners of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and the
appointment of new Commissioners in their stead were nullities and ordered the
reinstatement of petitioners and the payment of full backwages to be computed
from the date they were removed from office.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners truly abandoned their office - NO
RULING:
● Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the
holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof
● In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such
circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. There must be a
complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will infer a
relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs from and is
accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. There are, therefore, two
essential elements of abandonment: first , an intention to abandon and second , an
overt or "external" act by which the intention is carried into effect
● Two ways to abandon an office
○ Non-user
■ a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office
○ Acquiescence
■ unreasonable delay by an officer illegally removed in taking
steps to vindicate his rights
● By accepting the position of Inspector General during the pendency of the present
case — brought precisely to assail the constitutionality of his removal from the
NAPOLCOM — Canonizado cannot be deemed to have abandoned his claim for
reinstatement to the latter position
○ First of all, Canonizado did not voluntarily leave his post as
Commissioner, but was compelled to do so on the strength of section 8 of
RA 8551.
○ In our decision of 25 January 2000, we struck down section 8 of RA 8551
for being violative of petitioners' constitutionally guaranteed right to
security of tenure. Thus, Canonizado harbored no willful desire or
intention to abandon his official duties. In fact, Canonizado, together with
petitioners Edgar Dula Torres and Rogelio A. Pureza, lost no time
disputing what they perceived to be an illegal removal
○ The removal of petitioners from their positions by virtue of a
constitutionally infirm act necessarily negates a finding of voluntary
relinquishment.
● There is no question that the positions of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector
General of the IAS are incompatible with each other. As pointed out by
respondents, RA 8551 prohibits any personnel of the IAS from sitting in a
committee charged with the task of deliberating on the appointment, promotion,
or assignment of any PNP personnel, whereas the NAPOLCOM has the power of
control and supervision over the PNP. However, the rule on incompatibility of
duties will not apply to the case at bar because at no point did Canonizado
discharge the functions of the two offices simultaneously. Canonizado was forced
out of his first office by the enactment of section 8 of RA 8551.
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. However, it is
hereby clarified that our 25 January 2000 decision mandates the reinstatement of Jose
Percival L. Adiong to the NAPOLCOM, together with petitioners herein, pursuant to his
appointment under RA 6975. SO ORDERED
15. Floresca v. Quetulio
GR NO. L-2215
November 22, 1948
SPV
Topic: Termination of Official Relations; Abandonment
Petitioners: Luis Floresca
Respondents: Amparo Quetulio
Ponente: Paras
FACTS
- Floresca was a pre-war justice of peace of Piddig, Carasi and Nagpapalcan, Ilocos
Norte.
- When he was required by the proper authorities to assume his pre-war post after
the liberation, refused to do so and pointed out that the salary of the position
could not then sustain his family.
o He then accepted the position, first, of junior legal assistant and,
secondly, of civilian investigator of the Provost Marshal Office in the
Gabu U. S. Army Air Base at Laoag, Ilocos Norte; that shortly after the
inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines, or on July 27, 1946, the
petitioner accepted the position of senior social worker, PRATRA, for
Ilocos Norte.
- Floresca now prays for his reinstatement to the position of justice of peace.
o He contends that he was not reappointed either upon the restoration of
the Commonwealth Government or upon the establishment of the
Republic of the Philippines, in violation of his constitutional tenure.
- Quetulio, whose ouster is sought by the petitioner, admits her appointment to and
actual incumbency of the position held before the war by Floresca, but asserts her
right to stay in view of the latter’s abandonment of said office.
ISSUE: W/N Floresca can be reinstated as a justice of peace - NO
HELD
- Quetulio’s contention is correct.
 - Floresca’s refusal to go back to his old post and his subsequent acceptance of other
employments, without any pretense on his part that he simultaneously continued
to perform the functions of justice of the peace, clearly show deliberate
abandonment of the latter office.
- In the year 1946, Floresca, in his application submitted to the committee in charge
of passing upon applications for government positions in Ilocos Norte, made it clear
that he wanted to be appointed to any position other than that of justice of the
peace.
- To now reinstate the petitioner would be to allow a government official to
subordinate public interest to personal comfort and convenience.
DISPOSITIVE
The petition is therefore denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
16. Lameyra v. Pangilinan
G.R. No. 131675
DATE: MAR. 2, 2001
By: EAY3
Topic: ABANDONMENT
Petitioners: LAMEYRA
Respondents: PANGILINAN
Ponente: GONZAGA-REYES, J.
FACTS:
● Pedro C. Lameyra was a janitor/messenger in the Municipal Hall of Famy, Laguna.
He was appointed as such on February 2, 1988 under temporary status and was
given a permanent appointment on January 1, 1989 to the same position by then
Municipal Mayor Melquiadez Acomular.
● Mayor Acomular was defeated in the last election for the mayoralty post by
respondent Mayor George S. Pangilinan.
● On August 21, 1995, petitioner Lameyra received a letter from respondent Mayor
Pangilinan informing him that he is dropped from the roll of employees of the local
government unit of Famy, Laguna pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series
of 1994 of the Civil Service Commission due to the following reasons: 1.
Insubordination; 2. AWOL.
● Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Civil Service Commission alleging that he
was a permanent employee and that he was terminated without prior written
notice of the charges and without investigation and hearing, in violation of his
security of tenure and due process. He alleged that the act of Mayor Pangilinan was
an act of political vengeance as he was publicly known to have voted for his
political rival.
● Mayor Pangilinan contends that
o That the dropping of appellant from the payroll was pursuant to
Memorandum Circular No. 12, series of 1994, dated March 10, 1994, of
this Honorable Commission due to insubordination and for being absent
without o􏰀cial leave, and was resorted to when appellant failed to justify
his continued leave of absence without official leave
o failure to comply with the May 31, 1995 memorandum constitute
insubordination and his continued absence without official leave was
deemed and considered as abandonment of employment.
● The Civil Service Commission in Resolution No. 96-0828 dated February 6, 1996
dismissed the appeal and a􏰀rmed the action of the Municipal Mayor in dropping
him from the roll of employees for absence without leave
● Lameyra 􏰁led a motion for reconsideration alleging that he had not earlier been
furnished copy of Mayor Pangilinan’s comment and disputing the version of Mayor
Pangilinan that he refused to report for work. He claimed that upon advice of the
Civil Service Commission in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, he reported for work at the office of
the Vice Mayor Constancio Fernandez, as he was not allowed by the Personnel
Officer to sign his name in the log book.
ISSUE: The petitioner abandoned his employment? - NO
HELD/RATIO:
● Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 12 Series of 1994 provides as follows:
"2.1 Absence without approved leave
An officer or employee who is continuously absent without approved
leave (AWOL) for at least thirty (30) calendar days shall be separated from the
service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. He shall, however, be
informed of his separation from the service not later than 􏰁5 days from its
effectivity which shall be sent to the address appearing in his 201 files.
● It is clear from a reading of the above provision that the no prior notice is required
to drop from the rolls an employee who has been continuously absent without
approved leave (AWOL) for at least thirty (30) calendar days. It appears that solely
on the basis of the certi􏰁cation of the Personnel O􏰀cer/Human Resources
Management Assistant Benito Vicencio to the effect that petitioner did not report
for work for the period from July 6, 1995 to August 6, 1995, and the undisputed
fact that he has not submitted any proof that he actually 􏰁led an application for
leave nor presented any approved leave application for the said period, petitioner’s
termination from the service was upheld by the Civil Service Commission and the
Court of Appeals.
● However, petitioner contests the 􏰁nding that he was absent at all. He claims that
he reported for work but was prevented from signing the log book by the very
o􏰀cer, Benito Vicencio, who certi􏰁ed that he did not report for work on the dates in
question. He alleges in his petition and insists in his reply, that he was not furnished
a copy of Mayor Pangilinan’s comment, and was able to secure a copy only after
receiving a copy of the Resolution of the Civil Service Commission upholding the
termination of his service. This allegation of petitioner, which was raised even in
the Court of Appeals was not disputed by respondent Pangilinan in his Comment
to the Petition nor in his Comment to the Petition filed in the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, the first opportunity that petitioner had to contest the su􏰀ciency of
the evidence to support his dismissal was when he 􏰁led his motion for
reconsideration from the Resolution of the Civil Service Commission dated
February 6, 1996. The three sworn statements which were annexes to said motion
directly controverted Vicencio's certi􏰁cation that he was absent without leave,
cannot be considered new evidence belatedly submitted as there was no notice
and hearing when he was dropped from the rolls. Considering that one of the
 a􏰀ants is Vice-Mayor Fernandez, whose acts as a public o􏰀cial are also entitled to a
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, it would be in compliance
with the requirements of due process to have given said sworn statement due
consideration in view of the circumstances prevailing in this case. This is in
consonance with the respondent’s own theory that petitioner was afforded his
right to be heard when he 􏰁led his motion for reconsideration in the Civil Service
Commission.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the Civil Service Commission for further proceedings in accordance with the
tenor of this decision. cda
SO ORDERED.
17. Zandueta v. de la Costa
G.R. No. L-46267
November 28, 1938
By: Sarah Zurita
Topic: ACCEPTANCE OF INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE
Petitioners: FRANCISCO ZANDUETA
Respondents: SIXTO DE LA COSTA
Ponente: Villa-real
FACTS:
● Quo warranto instituted by Hon. Zandueta against Hon. de la Costa
○ Zandueta is alleging that de la Costa has been illegally occupying the
office of Judge CFI MANILA
● 1st appointment: Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance of
CFI MANILA, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President in his
favor, and confirmed by the Com. on Appointments of the National Assembly.
● CA 145 (Judicial Reorganization Law) was enacted
○ Zandueta received from the President a new ad interim appointment as
judge of first instance of both CFI MANILA & CFI PALAWAN in accordance
with said Act.
● National Assembly adjourned with the Com. on Appointments NOT acting on the
new ad interim appointment of Zandueta
● 2nd appointment: Another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued
for Zandueta -- he took oath
● Zandueta, acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts:
○ Designation of assistant clerk as admin. Officer; Appointment of a lawyer
as notary public; Authorized justice of the peace Iñigo R. Peña to defend a
criminal case the hearing of which had begun during the past sessions in
Coron; Granted a leave of absence of 10 days to justice of the peace
Abordo; Granted a leave of absence of 13 days to another justice of the
peace
● May 1938: Com. on Appointments disapproved the ad interim appointment of
Zandueta, who was advised by the Secretary of Justice
● August 1938: President appointed de la Costa as judge to preside over CFI
MANILA & CFI PALAWAN, and his appointment was approved by the Com. on
Appointments
● De la Costa took the necessary oath and assumed office.
○ President issued the corresponding final appointment in favor of de la
Costa
ISSUE: W/N Zandueta may proceed to question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of
which the new ad interim appointment of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial
District, to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in
his favor.
RULING: NO -- HE IS ESTOPPED.
● It should be noted that the territory over which Zandueta could exercise and did
exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his last appointment is wider than that over which
he could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the former.
○ Hence, there is incompatibility between the 2 appointments and,
consequently, in the discharge of the office conferred by each of them,
resulting in the absorption of the former by the latter.
● In accepting this appointment and qualifying for the exercise of the functions of the
office conferred by it, by taking the necessary oath, and in discharging the same,
disposing of both judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the CFIs of
Manila & Palawan, Zandueta abandoned his first appointment and ceased in the
exercise of the functions of the office occupied by him by virtue thereof.
● GR: when a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly
created or reorganized by law, — which new office is incompatible with the one
formerly occupied by him — , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by
taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by
executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving
the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he
was occupying by virtue of his former appointment and he can not question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed
○ He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new
appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to
accept it by reason of legal exigencies
● If the petitioner believed, as he now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act No.
145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered
him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that
his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to
the power entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a law is
unconstitutional or not.
○ If he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would
later be estopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by
alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is
unconstitutional.
○ He likewise knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim
appointment was subject to the approval of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said commission were
 to disapprove the same, it would become ineffective and he would cease
discharging the office.
● when a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance
of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another
appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance,
in addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new
judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old
one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the
corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to be to
repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new
appointment has been issued
○ said new appointment having been disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he claim to continue
occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment,
having ipso jure ceased in the discharge of the functions thereof.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Wherefore, the petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the
same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner. So ordered.
18. Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres v CA
GR 118883
January 16,1998
By: MJB
Topic: Termination of Official Relations – Acceptance of Incompatible Office
Petitioners: SB of San Andres Catanduanes – V.Mayor Nenito Aquino and Mayor Lydia
Romano
Respondents: CA and Augusto Antonio
Ponente: Carpio Morales
NOTE: Mahaba lang pagkakagawa ko dahil sa Doctrine pero madali lang siya.
DOCTRINE:
Resignation – Defined in Ortiz v Comelec act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he
declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the
incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and
relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority."
● To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must
be:
o (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term;
o (b) an act of relinquishment;
o (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.
Abandonment of Office - voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the
intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. Indeed, abandonment of office is
a species of resignation; while resignation in general is a formal relinquishment,
abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser. Nonuser refers to a neglect to
use a privilege or a right (Cylopedic Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.) or to exercise an easement or an
office (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed.). Abandonment springs from and is accompanied by
deliberation and freedom of choice. Its concomitant effect is that the former holder of an
office can no longer legally repossess it even by forcible reoccupancy.
● There are 2 essential elements of abandonment 
o (1) an intention to abandon and
o (2) an overt act by which intention is carried on.
FACTS:
● Antonio, private respondent, was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay
Catanduanes on March 1989.
● He was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Council(ABC) for the
Municiplity of San Andres Catanduanes.
● Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the President as
Member of the Sanguniang Bayan of the said municipality.
● Meanwhile, DILG Sec. declared the election for the president of the Federation of the
Association of Barangay Council(FABC) void for lack of quorum.
● As a result, the provincial council was reorganized.
● DILG Sec then designated private respondent as a temporary member of the Sanguniang
Panlalawigan of Catanduanes effective on 15 June 1990. Because of his designation,
private respondent tendered his resignation as a member of the Sanguniang
Bayan dated 14 June 1990 to the Mayor of San Andres Catanduanes. Copies of his
letters were also forwarded to the provincial governor, DILG and the municipal
treasurer
● Subsequently, Aquino then the Vice President of ABC was appointed by the provincial
governor as member of the Sanguniang Bayan in place of private respondent.
● Aquino assumed office on 18 July 1980 after taking his oath.
● Subsequently, the ruling of the DILG annulling the election of the FABC president was
reversed by the Supreme Court and declared the appointment of private respondent
void for lacking the essential qualification of being the president of FABC.
● On 31 March 1992, private respondent wrote to the Sanguniang Bayan(SB) of San
Andres regarding his re-assumption of his original position. SB refused.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent's resignation as ex-officio member of Petitioner
Sangguniang Bayan ng San Andres, Catanduanes is deemed complete so as to terminate
his official relation thereto; - NOPE!
2. Whether or not respondent had totally abandoned his ex-officio membership in
Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan
3. Whether or not respondent is entitled to collect salaries - NO SIR!
HELD/RATIO:
First Issue: RESIGNATION
● The resignation was not complete for lack of acceptance thereof of the proper authority
however, an office may still be deemed relinquished through
voluntary abandonment which needs no acceptance.
● In Ortiz vs Comelec, resignation is defined as the “act of giving up of an ifficer by which
he declines his office andrenounces the further right to use it”. It can be express or
implied.
● To constitute a complete and operative resignation the following must be present.
o (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the term;
o (b) an act of relinquishment;
o (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. In the case at bar, there was no
evidence that the private respondent’s resignation was accepted by the
proper authority.
● Although the Local Government Code of 1983 was silent as to who specifically should
accept the resignation it provides that the position shall be deemed vacated only upon
acceptance of resignation and should be acted upon by the Sangunian concerned.
● The resignation letter was tendered to the mayor and copies were sent to the governor,
DILG and the municipal treasurer but none of them expressly acted on it. 
● Furthermore, under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory
provisions as to whom it should be submitted, should be submitted to the appointing
power.
● Therefore, the resignation should have been submitted to the president or to the DILG
as the president’s alter ego.
Second Issue: ABANDONMENT
● Abandonment has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the
holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof.
● Resignation is the formal relinquishment, abandonment is the voluntary
relinquishment by non-user.
● There are 2 essential elements of abandonment  and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime;
o (1) an intention to abandon and
o (2) an overt act by which intention is carried on.
● In the case at bar the first element was manifested on the following instances:
o (1) private respondent’s failure to perform his function as SB;
o (2) his failure to collect the corresponding renumeration for the position,
o (3)his failure to object to the appointment of Aquino as his replacement to SB
and
o (4) his prolonged failure to initiate any act to reassume his post in the SB after
SC had nullified his designation as member of Sanguniang Panlalawigan.
● The second element was demonstrated by the following:
o (1) his letter of resignation,
o (2) his assumption of office as member of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan,
o (3) his faithful discharge of his duties and functions of SP and
o (4) his recept of renumeration for such post.
Third Issue: SALARY
● Having ruled that private respondent had voluntarily abandoned his post at
theSangguniang Bayan, he cannot be entitled to any back salaries.
● Basic is the "no work, no pay" rule.
● A public officer is entitled to receive compensation for services actually rendered for as
long as he has the right to the office being claimed.
● When the act or conduct of a public servant constitutes a relinquishment of his office,
he has no right to receive any salary incident to the office he had abandoned.
● Petition Granted and Assailed Decision is Reversed and Set Aside. No Cost
20.) DARIO vs. MISON
G.R. NO. 81954
08 AUG 1989
TOPIC: Termination of official relations; Removal
PETITIONER: Cesar Dario
RESPONDENTS: HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME and HON. CATALINO
MACARAIG, JR., in their respective capacities as Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of
Finance, and Executive Secretary
PONENTE: Sarmiento
FACTS:
● On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING
A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE,
PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND
PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW
CONSTITUTION."
● Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
○ The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:
○ (a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures,
● Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:
○ SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is
made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
○ SECTION 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of the
organization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then in
force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder.
● The reorganization process actually started as early as February 25, 1986, when the President
called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations beginning
with the members of the Supreme Court."
● Later on, she abolished the Batasang Pambansa and the positions of Prime Minister and
Cabinet under the 1973 Constitution. Since then, the President has issued a number of
executive orders and directives reorganizing various other government offices.
● On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated E.O. 127, "REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF
FINANCE." Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization
of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
● Three days later, on February 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution.
● Incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature
of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement.
● On January 26, 1988, Commissioner Mison addressed several notices to various Customs
officials, in the tenor as follows:
○ Please be informed that the Bureau is now in the process of implementing the
Reorganization Program under Executive Order No. 127.
○ Pursuant to Section 59 of the same Executive Order, all officers and employees of the
Department of Finance, or the Bureau of Customs in particular, shall continue to
perform their respective duties and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity, and that
those incumbents whose positions are not carried in the new reorganization pattern, or
who are not re- appointed, shall be deemed separated from the service.
○ In this connection, we regret to inform you that your services are hereby terminated as
of February 28, 1988. Subject to the normal clearances, you may receive the retirement
benefits to which you may be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations.
○ In the meantime, your name will be included in the consolidated list compiled by the
Civil Service Commission so that you may be given priority for future employment with
the Government as the need arises.
● As far as the records will likewise reveal, a total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau
of Customs were given individual notices of separation.
ISSUE: Whether Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license
upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an
"automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason. NO.
RULING:
● The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution.
○ Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a
result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and
the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them
under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu
thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the
Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also
applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy,
had been accepted.
● The Court considers the above provision critical for two reasons:
○ (1) It is the only provision — in so far as it mentions removals not for cause — that
would arguably support the challenged dismissals by mere notice, and
○ (2) It is the single existing law on reorganization after the ratification of the 1987
Charter, except Republic Act No. 6656, which came much later.
● It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power to effect reorganizations under the
past Constitutions, the above provision comes as a mere recognition of the right of the
Government to reorganize its offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities.
● Other than references to "reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution," there
is no provision for "automatic" vacancies under the 1987 Constitution.
● Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They
are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free
from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure.
● At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of
office (not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by
reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions.
● In the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals
undertaken to comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the Government
is not hard put to prove anything, plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it.
● Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is
a grant of a license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have
validly done under an "automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme
or reason.
● As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for
"automatic" vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a
restraint upon the Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
● What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter envisioned an "automatic"
vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts
had so stated.
● Whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and
necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not be
legitimately stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of
the Revolutionary Government had started.
● Reorganization under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution is not as stern as reorganization
under the prior Charter. Whereas the latter, sans the President's subsequently imposed
constraints, envisioned a purgation, the same cannot be said of the reorganization
inferred under the new Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution seeks to
usher in a democratic regime.
○ But even if we concede ex gratia argumenti that Section 16 is an exception to due
process and no-removal-"except for cause provided by law" principles enshrined in the
very same 1987 Constitution, which may possibly justify removals "not for cause," there
is no contradiction in terms here because, while the former Constitution left the axe to
fall where it might, the present organic act requires that removals "not for cause" must
be as a result of reorganization. As we observed, the Constitution does not provide for
"automatic" vacancies.
○ It must also pass the test of good faith — a test not obviously required under the
revolutionary government formerly prevailing, but a test well-established in democratic
societies and in this government under a democratic Charter.
● Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued
in good faith.
● As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a
dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in
that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.
● Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is
done for political reasons or purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good
faith, no valid "abolition' takes place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab initio.
● There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of
positions, 82 or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
● The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs
hierarchy — except for the change of personnel — has occurred, which would have
justified the contested dismissals.
● There is no showing that legitimate structural changes have been made — or a
reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter — at the Bureau since Commissioner
Mison assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees.
● There can therefore be no actual reorganization to speak of, in the sense, say, of reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions, but a revamp of personnel pure and simple.
● The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel
but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. 86 This betrays a clear intent to "pack"
the Bureau of Customs. He did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to
halt further layoffs as a consequence of reorganization.
● Finally, he was aware that layoffs should observe the procedure laid down by Executive
Order No. 17.
● We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the
Constitution. While the act is valid, still and all, the means with which it was implemented
is not.
● In conclusion, we restate as follows:
● 1. The President could have validly removed government employees, elected or appointed,
without cause but only before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2,
1987 (De Leon v. Esguerra, supra; Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, supra); in this
connection, Section 59 (on non-reappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order No.
127 cannot be a basis for termination;
● 2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and retirement benefits or
upon their option be given reemployment opportunities (CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16;
Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);
● 3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to reorganize the Government
resulting in the separation of career civil service employees [CONST. (1987), supra]
provided, that such a reorganization is made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DATED JUNE 30, 1988,
SEPTEMBER 20, 1988, NOVEMBER 16, 1988, INVOLVED IN G.R. NOS. 85310, 85335, AND
86241, AND MAY 8, 1989, INVOLVED IN G.R. NO. 85310, ARE AFFIRMED.
THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 81954, 81967, 82023, AND 85335 ARE GRANTED. THE PETITIONS
IN G.R. NOS. 83737, 85310 AND 86241 ARE DISMISSED.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS ORDERED TO REINSTATE THE EMPLOYEES SEPARATED
AS A RESULT OF HIS NOTICES DATED JANUARY 26, 1988.
THE EMPLOYEES WHOM COMMISSIONER MISON MAY HAVE APPOINTED AS REPLACEMENTS
ARE ORDERED TO VACATE THEIR POSTS SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF WHATEVER BENEFITS
THAT MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
21. PEREZ V. PROVINCIAL BOARD
GR NO. L-35474
MARCH 29, 1982
By: CLAIRE
Topic: FORFEITURE
Petitioners: HONORATO C. PEREZ
Respondents: PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, HON. EDUARDO L. JOSON, in his capacity
as Governor of Nueva Ecija, and VALENTIN C. ESCUADRO, in his capacity as Provincial
Treasurer of Nueva Ecija
Ponente: ESCOLIN
FACTS:
· An action was filed for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul Resolution
No. 228 of the respondent Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija; to enjoin respondents from
enforcing and implementing said Resolution; and to compel respondents to recognize
petitioner Honorato Perez as acting provincial fiscal
· When former fiscal Celestino Juan was appointed judge of the CFI of Quezon, Sec of
Justice, in AO 388, designated first assistant fiscal Emilio Cecilio of Nueva Ecija as acting
provincial fiscal
· Then Pres. Marcos nominated Honorato for appointment to the position of provincial
fiscal of Nueva Ecija. It appears, however, that the nomination was submitted to the
Commission on Appointments (COA) for confirmation was by-passed upon adjournment
sine die of Congress. The ff day, Marcos designated petitioner as acting provincial fiscal.
· Reacting to the said designation, Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 146
address to the COA, manifesting its opposition to the confirmation of Honorato’s
appointment. Gov. Joson also filed a formal protest w/ the Committee on Justice of the
COA, making known his strong & emphatic opposition to the confirmation. After
submission of evidence, the said Committee resolved not to recommend the
confirmation of Honorato’s appointment.
· During the 6th special session of Congress, Honorato was nominated anew for
appointment to the office in question, but the same was likewise by-passed upon
adjournment of the Congress.
· Aug 11, 1972, Honorato took his oath of office as acting provincial fiscal pursuant to
the designation extended by Marcos; and on Aug 14, 1972 he formally assumed office
· Aug 21, 1972, Provincial Board passed Resolution No 288, ordering Provincial
Treasurer to stop payment of Honorato’s salaries as acting provincial fiscal. The dispute
came when the Provincial Treasurer disapproved Honorato’s requisition for various
office supplies. His salary vouchers were likewise disapproved by the Governor.
ISSUE: WON Provincial Board has the power to pass & enact a resolution not recognizing
Honorato as acting provincial fiscal despite the fact that Honorato assumed office pursuant
to the designation of the president // WON Provincial Board has the power to defy and/or
pass judgment on the validity of the said designation and assumption
RULING:
1. We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the issues raised, this petition having become
moot and academic.
2. We take cognizance of the fact that petitioner Perez filed his certificate of candidacy
for the office of mayor of Cabanatuan City in the local elections of January 30, 1980.
3. The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy constitutes forfeiture of his right to the
controverted office under Section 29 of the Election Code of 1978 which provides:
 "SEC. 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. — Every person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,
shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy.
Members of the Cabinet shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the
filing of certificate of candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the President of the Philippines."
4. A petition instituted to establish petitioner's right to an appointive office is
rendered moot and academic where his right to said office has been forfeited by his
filing of a certificate of candidacy to an elective office.
ACCORDINGLY, this petition is hereby dismissed, No costs. SO ORDERED.
22. DE LLANA v. ALBA
G.R. NO. 57883
March 12, 1982
KCTR
Topic: TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS; ABOLITION OF OFFICE
Petitioners: GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of
Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO
C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA
Respondents: MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUITCO, Chairman,
Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice
Ponente: FERNANDO, C. J.
DOCTRINE: The abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in
good faith suffers from no infirmity.
FACTS:
● Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes,” was passed. It provides that:
o Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and
the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary.
● De llana, Presiding Judge of City Court of Olongapo, filed for Declaratory Relief
and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin Minister of the Budget, Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and Minister of Justice from implementing Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
o alleged that the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been
ignored and disregarded
o imputed lack of good faith in its enactment
● Solicitor General Mendoza filed an Answer.
o pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on the
constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the
power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary
o claimed that allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on
the independence of the judiciary are unwarranted and devoid of any
support in law
ISSUE:
W/N Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is unconstitutional – NO.
RULING:
1. The Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts
and in the process, to abolish existing ones.
● Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power
to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to
certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court.
2. The Batasang Pambansa did not act arbitrarily in enacting the assailed law, but rather, in
good faith.
● A Report was submitted by Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization.
o It is imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of
cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means — much more
so, the poorest and the humblest — can vindicate their rights in an
expeditious and inexpensive manner.
o There is need for a major reform in the judicial system.
o This process of modernization and change compels the government to
extend its field of activity and its scope of operations.
o equally of vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets
● Cabinet Bill #42 was the basis for BP 129.
o The Bill alleged that its enactment would result in, 1.) more efficiency in
the disposal of cases; 2.) improvement in the quality of justice; and 3.)
the reform would fit the court system to the exigencies of present and
future Philippine society.
● The deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa amounted to 590 pages.
o much discussion and research went into this law
3. Abolition of the existing inferior courts does not collide with the security of tenure enjoyed
by incumbent Justices and judges Under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.
● It is admitted that Section 9 of the same Article of the Constitution provides for the
security of tenure of all the judges.
● Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office.
o There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there
is in law no occupant.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this
petition is dismissed. No costs.
25. Loyao v Caube
A.M. No. P-02-1599.
April 30, 2003.
 By: RRV ● Considering the gravity of his offense, we find the recommendation of Judge
Topic: Death ● Loyao that respondent be dismissed from the service to be well-taken. Clearly, he
Petitioners: EXECUTIVE JUDGE LEANDRO T. LOYAO, JR was guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Respondents: MAMERTO J. CAUBE, Clerk of Court II and RICARDO B. QUISADIO, ● To be sure, respondent Caube's death has permanently foreclosed the prosecution
Court Interpreter II, Branch 1, MTC, Maasin, Southern Leyte of any other actions, be it criminal or civil, against him for his malfeasance in office.
Ponente: Per Curiam We are, however, not precluded from imposing the appropriate administrative
sanctions against him. Respondent's misconduct is so grave as to merit his dismissal
Doctrine: The death or retirement of any judicial officer from the service does not preclude from the service, were it not for his untimely demise during the pendency of these
the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. proceedings. However, since the penalty can no longer be carried out, this case is
FACTS: now declared closed and terminated
● A group of teachers filed a complaint against Mamerto Caube Ricardo Quisadio for
Grave Misconduct in Office and Usurpation of Judicial Functions ACCORDINGLY, based on all the foregoing, this administrative matter is CLOSED AND
○ Caube was Clerk of Court II TERMINATED in view of the death of respondent Clerk of Court Mamerto J. Caube.
○ Quisadio was Court Interpreter SO ORDERED
● They alleged that respondent Caube issued subpoenas directing them to appear
before his office for a conference to settle their financial obligations to Ester
Servacio, owner of the Maasin Traders Lending Corporation. Respondent Caube
signed the subpoenas purportedly on authority of Presiding Judge Cunanan.
● Despite the fact that they were not parties to any civil or criminal cases,
complainants appeared before respondent Caube's office, where they met with
Servacio and eventually reached a settlement of the latter's claims. Respondent
Caube drew the necessary compromise agreement, wherein the complainants
agreed to pay the amount of P12,000.00 each to Servacio on or before 30 April
1998, otherwise, formal complaints may be instituted against them.
○ (In short, the Clerk of Court presided over settlement whereby the
teachers paid their debts to Servacio. As if this Clerk was a judge.)
● The complainants argued that the respondent Caube had no authority to issue
court processes against them since they were not involved in any lawsuit.
Moreover, the fact of being subpoenaed and required to appear before the court
was traumatic to them. They also alleged that respondent Caube collected from
them the amount of P500.00 as attorney's fees for his services in preparing the
amicable settlement
● Judge Loyao recommended to the OCA Caube be dismissed, and Quisadio be
suspended.
● While the proceedings were ongoing, Caube died in Cebu.
● The case against Quisadio was dismissed
ISSUE: W/N the administrative liability of a public officer is extinguished due to his death -
NO
RULING:
● The death or retirement of any judicial officer from the service does not preclude
the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable.
● The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official
innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be
fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications . . . If
innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as
he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he
deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable
under the situation.