July 30, 1979

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P.
FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN,
JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN,
ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M.
DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE
LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.

R E S O L U T I O N 

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: ñé+.£ªwph!1

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander
Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died
on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the
names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both
Petitions were ordered consolidated. 

Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments: 

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly
sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership
name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the
individual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such
person or partnership.  1

2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the
name of a deceased partner;   the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of
2

accountancy — a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients
as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade name, strongly
indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of
professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such
firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name."  3

3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that:  têñ.£îhqwâ£

... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible
by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. ... 
4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased
partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the
stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their
respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national
and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 
5

5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's
name;   there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which
6

recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 
7

6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most
countries in the world.
8

The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a
law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a
deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist
from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead." 

The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled
Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile
moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15,
1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although
Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins
and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by
petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.

On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved:  têñ.£îhqwâ£

After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the
Court found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it
required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from
including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court
believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional
ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise
to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the
name "PERKINS" from their firm name. 

Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court. 

The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon,
Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased
partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: 
têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the partners. 
 Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm
name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner. 

It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be
those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be
subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his
name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased
partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly
where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an
agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either
gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not
represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor
the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor.
There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability. 

Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names
of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create
undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who
can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.

B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the
first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and
Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or
partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased
partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to
formal reorganization. 

Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than
of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the
personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can
exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of
lawyers. 9
têñ.£îhqwâ£

As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding

partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the
absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is
a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s
204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied) 

On the other hand,  têñ.£îhqwâ£

... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of
the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good will to be
distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill
and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership
agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied) 
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a
trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy.   10
têñ.£îhqwâ£

A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose
of carrying on trade or business or of holding property."   Thus, it has been stated
11

that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper.  12

The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the
practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.

Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal
Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession
as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public
service, — no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood."

xxx xxx xxx

Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are: 

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money. 

2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity, and reliability. 

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary. 

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment
on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.  13

"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise.   It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
14

ascertained and certified.   The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
15

standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking
of the nature of a public trust."  16

D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association"
in support of their petitions. 

It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased
or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local
custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use.

It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a
deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our
custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse
at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their
firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership
changed.  têñ.£îhqwâ£

The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners
designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by
custom this purports to Identify the active members. ...

There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the
propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of
a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op.
cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied). 

The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased
partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be
guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.

E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by
custom. 

In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners
Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the
firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either
name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or
legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein:  têñ.£îhqwâ£

The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no

statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics of both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association
provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is no question
as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with
the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate
Division of the First Department has considered the matter and reached The
conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied) 

xxx xxx xxx

Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The
use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the
partners. 
18

Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has
been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a
social rule, legally binding and obligatory.   Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must
19

be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.   A local custom as a source of right cannot
20

be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent

evidence like any other fact.   We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the
21

elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a
matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a
juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can
supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter. 

Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system.   When 22

the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist
from including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule
against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak
of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any
partner.   Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
23

countenanced.  24

The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not
be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade."  têñ.£îhqwâ£

... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A

trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers
beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free
competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may
seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire
as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the
member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his
professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor
exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn.
There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of
the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent
and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done
with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of
law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice
according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization and
pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that
spirit. 
25

In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to
legal and ethical impediment.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names
"SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included
in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which
they served as such. 

SO ORDERED. 

Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur 

Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring: 

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being
of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is
out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the
law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the
father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his
brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and
not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera:
'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes

AQUINO, J., dissenting: 

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in
their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name,
notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He
was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office. 

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta
& Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said
firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son,
Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively. 

They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was
established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name
Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation. 

Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased
partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that
the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use"
(Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics). 

I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein. 

Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased
founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and
Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation. 

The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the
law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of
Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication
of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the
firm name was illegal or unethical. 
A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006. *

ROBERTO SORIANO, complainant, vs. Atty. MANUEL DIZON, respondent.

A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006. *

ROBERTO SORIANO, complainant, vs. Atty. MANUEL DIZON, respondent.

Soriano vs. Dizon

The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:
“x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in
preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook
the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone,
but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor.
Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and
Cariño Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop
the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi
driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused
who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged,
stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the
chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but
the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could
be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that
the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he
noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the
accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the
accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter
pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony
corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.” 8

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As
found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-
court settlement with complainant’s family.  But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s family that had 25

sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.26

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:
“The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x.” 28
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness. 29The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.
30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

out-of-court settlement with complainant’s family. 25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s

family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.26
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:
“The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x.” 28
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness. 29The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.
30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

out-of-court settlement with complainant’s family. 25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s

family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.26
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:
“The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x.” 28
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness. 29The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.
30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

n the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found
by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-court
settlement with complainant’s family.25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a
complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s family that had sought a conference
with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.26
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of
having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:
“The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty.
Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each
other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,]
if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death
could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the
incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x.”28
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness.29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty
and condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to
be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession.
They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. “Law is a noble pro- fession,
and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the
law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.”31

Same; Same; Same; Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all
times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.—The actions of respondent erode rather than
enhance public perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be
disbarred. “Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals
who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are
vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in
their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.”

Same; Same; Same; Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all
times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.—The actions of respondent erode rather than
enhance public perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be
disbarred. “Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals
who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are
vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in
their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.”

CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced
his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance 3 and
expeditious collection on their claims. 4 To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called
them and sent them text messages.
 To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit 5 of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.
Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card:6

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation
of the said calling card.7
CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF
FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow
a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the
profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character
of service to which every member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED
PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN’S CAUSE.
This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business
by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a measure to
protect the community from barratry and champerty.18 

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it
during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could
produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and
Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer
should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent
never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s
“referrals.” 

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent

violated Rule 16.04:
“Rule 16.04 — A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.”

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees
for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that
he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise
of his judgment may not be adversely affected. 22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the
case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer
lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an
interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. 23 Either of these
circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or
to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24 

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on
his character and conduct.27For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services
by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
 Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial assistance.”

This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal
profession
However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not
prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and
distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on

lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy
slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from
receipt of this resolution.

 BARRATRY-encourage suits
 Ambulance Chasing – cases are literally solicited from police or hospitals “chasing
ambulance”.
 Linsangan vs. Tolentino
 If di kabayad – still do not encroach rights of clients
 Soliciting legal business not allowed XPN: reputable way

CANON 3 – TRUE HONEST FAIR DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR

STATEMENT OF FACTS

July 30, 1979

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE
FIRM NAME

Next Meeting: Chapter 2

March