G.R. Nos.
147706-07             February 16, 2005 created by a special law and not under the Corporation Code of the Philippines"
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and EFREN L.
ALAS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and
incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? The
petitioner, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), takes the
affirmative position in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Respondent Efren L. Alas contends otherwise, together with the
respondent court.
Pursuant to a resolution dated September 30, 1999 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, two separate informations1 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were
filed with the Sandiganbayan on November 17, 1999 against Efren L. Alas.
The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising contracts
entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief Operating
Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay
Publishing Company which purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the
government.
On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for lack of
jurisdiction, which motion was vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After
considering the arguments of both parties, the respondent court ruled that PPSB
was a private corporation and that its officers, particularly herein respondent
Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. According to the
Sandiganbayan:
After a careful consideration of the arguments of the accused-movant as well as
of that of the prosecution, we are of the considered opinion that the instant
motion of the accused is well taken. Indeed, it is the basic thrust of Republic
Act as well as (sic) Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended by President
Decree No. 1486 and Republic Act No. 7975 and Republic Act No. 8249 that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over public officers unless private
persons are charged with them in the commission of the offenses.
The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal Savings Bank is a subsidiary
of the Philippine Postal Corporation which is a government owned corporation,
the same is not created by a special law. It was organized and incorporated
under the Corporation Code which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 68. It was registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under SEC No. AS094-005593
on June 22, 1994 with a lifetime of fifty (50) years. Under its Articles of
Incorporation the purpose for which said entity is formed was primarily for
business, xxx
Likewise, a scrutiny of the seven (7) secondary purposes of the corporation
points to the conclusion that it exists for business.l^vvphi1.net Obviously, it is
not involved in the performance of a particular function in the exercise of
government power. Thus, its officers and employees are not covered by the
GSIS and are under the SSS law, and actions for reinstatement and backwages
are not within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission but by the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The Supreme Court, in the case of Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied
Services vs. National Housing Corp., 173 SCRA 33, held that the Civil Service
now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or
legislative charters, those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and
not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. The Highest
Court categorically ruled that the Civil Service does not include government-
owned or controlled corporation which are organized as subsidiaries of
government-owned or controlled corporation under the general corporation law.
In Philippine National Oil Company – Energy Development Corporation vs.
Leogardo, 175 SCRA 26, the Supreme Court emphasized that:
The test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled corporation
is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that
government corporation created by special charter are subject to its provision
while those incorporated under the general corporation law are not within its
coverage.
Likewise in Davao City Water District vs. Civil Service Commission, 201
SCRA 601 it was held that "by government-owned or controlled corporation
with original charter we mean government-owned or controlled corporation
while in Llenes vs. Dicdican, et al., 260 SCRA 207, a public officer has been
ruled, as a person whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the
performance of the function of government.
Clearly, on the basis of the foregoing pronouncements of the Supreme Court,
the accused herein cannot be considered a public officer. Thus, this Court may
not exercise jurisdiction over his act.2
Dissatisfied, the People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP),
filed this petition3 arguing, in essence, that the PPSB was a government-owned
or controlled corporation as the term was defined under Section 2(13) of the
Administrative Code of 1987.4 Likewise, in further defining the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, RA 8249 did not make a distinction as to the manner of
creation of the government-owned or controlled corporations for their officers
to fall under its jurisdiction. Hence, being President and Chief Operating
Officer of the PPSB at the time of commission of the crimes charged,
respondent Alas came under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.1awphi1.nét
Quoting at length from the assailed resolution dated February 15, 2001,
respondent Alas, on the other hand, practically reiterated the pronouncements
made by the respondent court in support of his conclusion that the PPSB was
not created by special law, hence, its officers did not fall within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.5
We find merit in the petition.
Section 2(13) of EO 2926 defines government-owned or controlled corporations
as follows:
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined – Unless the specific words of the text or the
context as a whole or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:
xxx xxx xxx
(13) government owned or controlled corporations refer to any agency
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to
public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
government directly or indirectly or through its instrumentalities either wholly,
or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least
51% of its capital stock: provided, that government owned or controlled
corporations maybe further categorized by the department of the budget, the
civil service commission and the commission on audit for the purpose of the
exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities
with respect to such corporations.
From the foregoing, PPSB fits the bill as a government-owned or controlled
corporation, and organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code as a
subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More than 99%
of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to the government while the
rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are/were themselves officers of
PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of
RA 7354, otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for purposes of,
among others, "to encourage and promote the virtue of thrift and the habit of
savings among the general public, especially the youth and the marginalized
sector in the countryside xxx" and to facilitate postal service by "receiving
collections and making payments, including postal money orders."7
It is not disputed that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters whenever charges of graft and corruption are
involved. However, a question arises whether the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the same officers in government-owned or controlled
corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code in view of
the delimitation provided for in Article IX-B Section 2(1) of the 1987
Constitution which states that:
SEC. 2. (1) The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
It should be pointed out however, that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
separate and distinct from the Civil Service Commission. The same is governed
by Article XI, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "the
present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law." This
provision, in effect, retained the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court as defined
under Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which mandated its
creation, thus:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offense committed by
public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.
(Italics ours)

On March 30, 1995, Congress, pursuant to its authority vested under the 1987
Constitution, enacted RA 79758 maintaining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations without any distinction
whatsoever. Thereafter, on February 5, 1997, Congress enacted RA
82499 which preserved the subject provision:

Section 4, Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense,

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional

director, and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758)
specifically including:

xxx xxx xxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or

controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. (Italics ours)

The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of "presidents, directors or trustees,

or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations" within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from making any
distinction with respect to the manner of their creation.

The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the intention of the
legislature to include the presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
of both types of corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it
could have simply made the necessary distinction. But it did not.

It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. Corollarily, Article XI Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution, on the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman (the government’s
prosecutory arm against persons charged with graft and corruption), includes
officers and employees of government-owned or controlled corporations,
likewise without any distinction.1awphi1.nét

In Quimpo v. Tanodbayan,10 this Court, already mindful of the pertinent

provisions of the 1987 Constitution, ruled that the concerned officers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether created by special law
or formed under the Corporation Code, come under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan for purposes of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Otherwise, as we emphasized therein, a major policy of
Government, which is to eradicate, or at the very least minimize, the graft and
corruption that has permeated the fabric of the public service like a malignant
social cancer, would be seriously undermined. In fact, Section 1 of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act embodies this policy of the government, that is,
to repress certain acts not only of public officers but also of private persons
constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.

The foregoing pronouncement has not outlived its usefulness. On the contrary,
it has become even more relevant today due to the rampant cases of graft and
corruption that erode the people’s faith in government. For indeed, a
government-owned or controlled corporation can conceivably create as many
subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code as it might wish, use public
funds, disclaim public accountability and escape the liabilities and
responsibilities provided by law. By including the concerned officers of
government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated
under the Corporation Code within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
legislature evidently seeks to avoid just that.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED

and the assailed resolution dated February 15, 2001 of the respondent court is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE
OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO
MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-
intervenors.
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act
which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan — is being
challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo
Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia,
Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and
documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime
syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro
Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements
of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by
Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management
Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco
Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat
(PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson;
Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo
de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-
intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC,
that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary
execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng
gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel
of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs,
Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved
from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved
in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate
police operation.1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa
modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including
herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the
Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt.
Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those
charged as principal in eleven (11) information for murder2 before the
Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan
allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996
eleven (11) amended informations5 before the Sandiganbayan, wherein
petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop
and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused6 was dropped from
the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. 7 They
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government
officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the
rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest
ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a
Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996),
penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring,
and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,9 the Sandiganbayan
admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction
under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan.
This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even
before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended
informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 229910 and No.
109411 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and
Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No.
84412 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress,
defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said
bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No.
824913 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Resolution14 denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor,
ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5,
1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in
it, but before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting
opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the
Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent
provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of
granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for
reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and
dissenting opinion.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M.
Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases — in fact, no order of
arrest has been issued — this court has competence to take cognizance of these
cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2,
the court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous
vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try
and decide the cases16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all
cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval
hereof." Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors
thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which
petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof
to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan
has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident
involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of
the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue
therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the
old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again
made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under,
namely, that the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make
certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making
it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an
accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous"
provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the
old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution.17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while
Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said
statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post
facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong
Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.18 They further argued that if
their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due
process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal
to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to
the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate
pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the
law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-
intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution19 requiring the parties to file
simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice
thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended
informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the
commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning
Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of
the Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the
nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in
the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of
the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by
public officers and employees including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the
following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue
to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by
law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created
the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in
chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,22 Section 20 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 123,23 P.D. No. 1860,24 P.D. No. 1861,25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and
R.A. No. 8249.27 Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A.
No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or
higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive
Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or
military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise
of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of
the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising
or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over
these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals,
shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In
all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employee, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall apply to all cases pending in any
court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A.
7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended) is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the pricipal accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic
Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or
their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas
from the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the
accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise
covered by the preceding enumeration.
x x x           x x x          x x x
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not
begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before
the word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and
c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal"
that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the
Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject
criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended
information has the rank of Superintendent28 or higher. On the other hand, the
Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to
represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain
cases,29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A.
8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A.
3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379
(the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery),30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14,
and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases),31 or (e) other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee32 holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section
4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with
murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal
Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but
paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4,
R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is
too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of
the offender — that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a,
b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal
participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a
principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply
restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the
criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate
their right to equal protection of the law33 because its enactment was
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan,
is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the
entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness.34
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class,35
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions.
The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public
officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could have been
affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A.
8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of
the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. 36 In the first
instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the
parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and
presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the
jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily
affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of
a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that
Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly
situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply
to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory
provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that
Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those
cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision
under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised
on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of
the Sandiganbaya38 for their participation in the passage of the said provisions.
In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments
against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the
hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator.
Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims
to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of
the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as
amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.39 R.A 8249, while still a
bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250
Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of
Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against
petitioner during the committe hearings, the same would not constitute
sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and
participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress
since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is
the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress,
in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution
to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation.40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application
of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post
facto law41 for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they
can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired
under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249.
In Calder v. Bull,42 an ex post facto law is one —
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which
was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed;
or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different
testimony that the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on
order to convict the defendant.43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the
situation of a person to his disadvantage.44
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he
has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal,
or a proclamation of a amnesty.45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249
is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations;47 or those that define crimes,
treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment.48 R.A 7975, which
amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of
appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a
penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of
procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice.49 Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot
be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal
which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of
R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the
court several times50 considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right
but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure
provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition
against ex post facto laws.51 R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure,
and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex
post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come
within the prohibition.52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or
the mode of trial.53 It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.54
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the
Supreme Court to review questions of law.55 On the removal of the intermediate
review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if
he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome.56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject
provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the
title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it
allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be
expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary
consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only
have one subject expressed in the title57 is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which
the statute seeks to achieve.58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be
given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the
general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the
amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are
germane to that general subject.59 The Congress, in employing the word
"define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since Section 2, Article
VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory
provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as
provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under
the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein
petitioner and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The
elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to
ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule
that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or informations,61 and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors
falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the
offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in
order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.63 This jurisdictional
requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction
over criminal cases committed by the public officers and employees, including
those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office
as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the
new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple
murder was committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed
in relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the
office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his
official functions.65 This intimate relation between the offense charged and the
discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the informations."
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or omissions complied of as constituting
the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language  without
repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in
such from as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is
the actual recital of the facts."67 The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information.68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was
explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was — First; To furnish the accused with
such a descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of
the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction if one should be had. In order that the requirement may be
satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up
of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are
imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense."70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the
amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors
wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection
between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the
offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder
reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman
hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP.
ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP.
RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F.
LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R.
JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F.
CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M.
LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO
A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO
GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as
defined and penalize under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as
follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused
CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO
G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F.
LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R.
JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their
public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National
Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office,
conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and
there willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M.
ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO
G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN
DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR
TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as
officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as
accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by
among others falsely representing that there where no arrest made during
the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque,
Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal
accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there
is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the
said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official
duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate
that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the
latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner
and intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended
information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories
concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely
representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the
accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about
the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made
during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no
indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested
by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly
conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged
in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the
shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos
Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two
places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation
in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in
relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not
see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's
official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as
will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that
the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed
by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That
phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that
would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge
of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial
Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information
alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of
police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . .
special policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and higher
power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his
command . . . supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed
entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations
as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain person without due process
of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this
set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his
orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in
consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the
accused because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance,
though improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been
committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal
motive in committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between
the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in
the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the
victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The
informations merely allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or
extortin the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two
victims, and failing in their common purpose they shot; and killed the said
victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that
shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase
committed in relation to public office "does not appear in the information,
which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in
the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of
the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order
to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge
of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of
the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is
plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby

sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to
transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the said cases.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-4922             September 24, 1951 would depend on whether the weapons used were the offenders' property or part
of their official equipment; and since this matter is extraneuos to the definition
of the crime of murder, the attorneys' qualification or disqualification would lie
MANUEL MONTILLA, as Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur, and
at the mercy of the prosecuting officer. Surely, it could not have been the
FAUSTINO S. TOBIA, petitioners,
intention of the framers of the Constitution to make the operation of the
vs.
provision in question hang on a factual consideration so slender and uncertain;
HON. ZOILO HILARIO, as District Judge of the Court of First Instance
on a contingency that could only be determined after the trial was over, when
of Ilocos Sur, and HON. FLORO CRISOLOGO, respondents.
the attorneys' services were no longer needed.

Dominador D. Pichay and Manuel D. Villanueva for petitioners.

The petition is denied without costs.1âwphïl.nêt
Honesto Ricolcol for respondents.

TUASON, J.:

Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution bars Senators and members of the
House of Representatives from, among other inhibitions, appearing as counsel
before any court "in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office."

This case comes before us on a writ of certiorari to the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur, and involves the consideration of the scope of the aforequoted
constitutional provision. The provincial fiscal and the private counsel for the
complainants seek to have set aside an order of Judge Zoilo Hilario of that court
overruling their objection to Congressman Floro Crisologo's intervention as
defense counsel in Criminal Case No. 129 "for murder with (and) frustrated
murder" against the municipal mayor and three members of the police force of
Santa Catalina, Ilocos Sur.

The information charges that the defendants, "taking advantage of their

respective public positions, conspiring together . . . did then and there . . .
assault, attack and shoot with their firearms" several persons "with the intent to
kill" and did kill one Claudio Ragasa and inflict physical injuries on three
others.

From the allegations of the information it does not appear that the official
positions of the accused were connected with the offenses charged. In fact, the
attorneys for the prosecution of stated that the motives for the crimes were
"personal with political character." It does not even appear, nor is there
assertion, that the crimes were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in
the performance of their official functions.

Judged by the context of section 17 of Article VI, supra, and the proceedings of

the Constitutional Convention, the relation between the crime and the office
contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental.
To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the
legal sense, the offense can not exist without the office. In other words, the
office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statue, such
as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, title
Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.

Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either
murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the
penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary,
took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty
is increased.

But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and
even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the
allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public
officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime.

Incidentally, this might serve as a warning against disqualifying a lawyer

legislator on the basis of what is alleged and not on the nature of the offense
itself. Were the petitioners' proposition sustained, the result would be that in
every case in which the accused is a public officer or employee, the prosecution
could at will keep a member of Congress from entering an appearance as
attorney for the defense. The prosecutor could do this by the simple expedient
of making the necessary averments, even though, as a matter of fact, there was
no evidence that the office held by the defendant had anything to do with the
offense.

By the same token, the fact that, as alleged, the defendants made use of
firearms which they were authorized to carry or possess by reason of their
positions, could not supply the required connection between the office and the
crime. Firearms however and wherever obtained are not an ingredient of
murder or homicide. The crime in question, for example, could have been
committed by the defendants in the same or like manner and with the same case
if they had been private individuals and fired with unlicensed weapons.
Murders or homicides by private persons with guns, licensed or unlicensed are
the general rule and by public officers the exception.

Tested by its consequence, the petitioners contention on this point is, like the
contention discussed in the preceding paragraphs, untenable. Little reflection
will show that this by contention the right of legislators to appear as counsel
[G.R. No. L-14595. May 31, 1960.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE
GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Zamboanga City
and Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN, DETECTIVE JOAQUIN
R. POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO LACERNA alias DODONG,
PATROLMAN MOHAMAD HASBI, SPECIAL POLICEMAN DIONISIO
DINGLASA, SPECIAL POLICEMAN HADJARATIL, SPECIAL
POLICEMAN ALO, and SEVERAL JOHN DOES, Respondents.
Acting City Atty. Perfecto B. Querubin for Petitioner.
Hon. Gregorio Montejo in his own behalf.
C. A. S. Sipin, Jr. for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LATITUDE OF PARTIES IN THEIR
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. — It is elemental that all
parties in a criminal action are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to establish
their respective theories. In the case at bar, the issue of the guilt or innocence of
the accused is bound to hinge heavily upon the veracity of the opposing
witnesses and the weight attached to their respective testimony. Hence, the
parties should be allowed a certain latitude in the presentation of their evidence,
lest they may be so hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be
defeated or appear to be defeated. The danger of landing to such result must be
avoided.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROHIBITION AGAINST SENATORS AND
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM
APPEARING AS COUNSEL IN CERTAIN CRIMINAL CASES; WHEN
PROHIBITION APPLIES EVEN IF THE CRIME CHARGED IS MURDER.
— Although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract,
where the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the
respective offices of the accused, and was allegedly perpetrated while they were
in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions, the
constitutional provision that no Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall "appear as counsel . . . in any criminal case wherein an
officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office . . . (Article VI, Section 17, Constitution of the
Philippines), is applicable thereto.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari, with mandamus and preliminary
injunction, against Hon. Gregorio Montejo, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and Basilan, and the defendants in
Criminal Case No. 672 of said court.
In the petition herein, which was filed by the prosecution in said criminal case,
it is prayed that, pending the final determination thereof, a writ of preliminary
injunction issue, enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of
said case; that, after due hearing, the rulings of respondent Judge, rejecting
some evidence for the prosecution therein and not permitting the same to
propound certain questions, be set aside; that said respondent Judge be ordered
to admit the aforementioned evidence and permit said questions; and that
Senator Roseller Lim be declared, contrary to another ruling made by
respondent Judge, disqualified by the Constitution from appearing as
counsel for the accused in said criminal case. Soon, after the filing of the
petition, we issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, without bond.
In their respective answers, respondents alleged, in substance, that the ruling
complained of are in conformity with law.
Respondents Leroy S. Brown, Mayor of Basilan City, Detective Joaquin R.
Pollisco, Patrolman Graciano Lacerna (alias Dodong) and Mohamad Hasbi,
Special Policemen Dionisio Dinglasa, Moro Yakan, Hadjaratil, Moro Alo, and
several John Does, are charged, in said Criminal Case No. 672, with murder. It
is alleged in the information therein that, during May and June, 1958, in the
sitio of Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of Basilan, Mayor Brown
"organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes", consisting of
regular and special policemen, whom he "armed with pistols and high power
guns", and then "established a camp", called sub-police headquarters —
hereinafter referred to as sub-station — at Tipo-Tipo, Lamitan, which was
placed under his command, orders, direct supervision and control, and in which
his codefendants were stationed; that criminal complaints were entertained in
said sub-station, in which defendant Pollisco acted as investigating officer and
exercised authority to order the apprehension of persons and their detention in
the camp, for days or weeks, without due process of law and without bringing
them to the proper court; that, on or about June 4, and 5, 1958; one Yakan
Awalin Tebag was arrested by order of Mayor Brown, without any warrant or
complaint filed in court, and then brought to, and detained in, the
aforementioned sub-station; that while on the way thereto, said Awalin Tebag
was maltreated, pursuant to instructions of Mayor Brown, concurred in by
Pollisco, to the effect that Tebag be mauled until such time as he shall surrender
his gun; that, once in the sub-station, Tebag, whose hands were securely tied,
was subjected, by defendants Lacerna, Hasbi, Pollisco, Dinglasa, and other
special policemen, to further and more severe torture, in consequence of which
Tebag died; that, in order to simulate that Tebag had been killed by peace
officers in the course of an encounter between the latter and a band of armed
bandits of which he formed part, the body of Tebag was brought, early the next
morning, to a nearby isolated field, where defendant Hasbi fired twice at said
dead body from behind, and then an old Japanese rifle, supplied by Mayor
Brown, was placed beside said body; and that, in furtherance of the
aforementioned simulation, a report of said imaginary encounter, mentioning
Tebag as the only member of a band of armed bandits whose identity was
known, was submitted and respondent Hasbi caused one of his companions to
shoot him on the left arm.
During the trial of said criminal case, respondent Judge rejected the following
evidence for the prosecution therein:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Exhibit A — A report of Capt. F. G. Sarrosa, Commanding Officer of the PC
Detachment in Basilan City, who investigated the case, showing that on June 5,
1958, he and Lt. Clemente Antonio, PAF, found nine (9) detainees in the Tipo-
Tipo sub-station. This was part of the chain of evidence of the prosecution to
prove that persons used to be detained in the aforementioned sub-station by the
main respondents herein, without either a warrant or arrest or a complaint filed
in court.
2. Exhibit C — Letter of Atty. Doroteo de Guzman to the officer in charge of
the sub-station, dated June 4, 1958, inquiring as to the whereabouts of Awalin
Tebag, who, according to the letter, was arrested in his house, by policemen, on
June 4, 1958. Capt. Sarrosa took possession of this letter in the course of his
aforementioned investigation.
3. Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and G-3 — These are the transcript of the testimony of
Tebag’s mother, before the City Fiscal of Basilan City, when she asked an
autopsy of the body of her son.
4. Exhibits J to V — Consisting of the following, namely: a sketch of the sub-
station; pictures of several huts therein, including their relative positions and
distances; a picture depicting how the body of Tebag was taken from a camarin
in the sub-station; a picture showing how Patrolman Hasbi was shot by a
companion, at his request; and a picture, Exhibit T, demonstrating how Mayor
Brown allegedly gave the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, to Hasbi, to be planted
beside Tebag’s body.
Although referred to by Yakan Carnain, Arit, Lianson, Kona Amenola, and
Asidin, in the course of their testimony as witnesses for the prosecution, these
exhibits were not admitted in evidence, which were presented to show how they
were able to observe the movements in the sub-station, the same being quite
small.
5. Exhibits X (a "barong") and X-1 (a scabbard) — Amenola said that these
effects were given to him by Mayor Brown in the latter’s office, and that he
then saw therein the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, which was later placed beside
the dead body of Awalin Tebag.
6. Exhibits DD, DD-1, FF, JJ., KK and LL — These show that on April 28,
1958, Yakan Kallapattoh and Fernandez (Pilnandiz) executed affidavits
admitting participation in a given robbery; that an information therefor (Exh.
KK) was filed against them on May 2, 1958, with the municipal court of
Basilan City (Criminal Case No. 1774); and that, in compliance with warrants
for their arrest then issued, they were apprehended and detained in the sub-
station, thus corroborating the testimony of prosecution witness Yakans
Amenola, Carnain Asidin and Arip to the effect that Kallapattoh and Fernandez
(Pilnandiz) were, together with them, in the aforementioned sub-station, when
Tebag was maltreated and died therein, on June 4, 1958, as well as confirming
Pollisco’s statement, Exhibit TT-18, before the City Fiscal of Basilan City, on
June 21, 1958, admitting that Fernandez was in the sub-station on June 5, 1958,
on account of the warrant of arrest adverted to. Through the exhibits in question
the prosecution sought, also, to bolster up it theory that Kallapattoh and
Fernandez disappeared from the sub-station after Tebag’s death, because the
main respondents herein illegally released them to prevent them from revealing
the circumstances surrounding said event.
7. Exhibits II, II-1, and MM — These are sketches of a human body and
pictures purporting to show the points of entrance, as well as of exit, of two (2)
bullet wounds found on the body of Tebag. Respondent Judge rejected these
exhibits and did not allow Dr. Rosalino Reyes, Chief of the Medico-Legal
Section of the National Bureau of Investigation, to answer questions asked by
the prosecution, to establish that the trajectories of said bullet wounds were
parallel to each other, which, the prosecution claims, would have been
impossible had Tebag been alive when he sustained said wounds.
8. Respondent Judge sustained, also, the objections to certain questions
propounded to said Dr. Reyes, to show that the injuries sustained by Tebag in
the large intestines must have been inflicted when Tebag was dead already, and
did not allow Dr. Reyes to draw lines on Exhibits II and MM, indicating the
connection between the points of entrance and those of exit of said wounds.
9. Exhibits Z, Z-1, Z-2 — These are records of the office of the City Fiscal of
Basilan City showing that the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, two rounds of
ammunitions and one empty shell were received by said Office from the Police
Department of Basilan City on June 17, 1958. These exhibits were presented to
show that said rifle tallies with the description thereof given by prosecution
witness Kona Amenola, in his affidavit, dated June 14, 1958, when said weapon
was still in the possession of respondent Pollisco, and, hence, to establish
Amenola’s veracity.
With respect to the question whether or not Senator Roseller Lim may appear
as counsel for the main respondents herein, as defendants in said criminal case,
the Constitution provides that no Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall "appear as counsel . . . in any criminal case wherein an
officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in
relation of his office . . . (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Const. of the Phil.) . The issue,
therefore, is whether the defendants in Criminal case No. 672 are "accused of
an offense committed in relation" to their office.

Likewise, the following rebuttal evidence for the prosecution were rejected by
respondent Judge, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Exhibits OO to OO-8 — These are daily records of events of the police
department, Lamitan District, Basilan City, including the Tipo- Tipo region.
They do not mention the killing therein, by the police patrol, of any outlaw on
June 5, 1958, thereby contradicting the reports (Exhs. 12 and 12-A) of
respondent Pollisco and Hasbi about it. Respondent Judge did not allow the
record clerk of the City Fiscal’s office to identify said exhibits, upon the ground
that it was too late to present him although when the exhibits were marked by
the prosecution it reserved the right to identify them as part of official records.
2. Exhibits PP, QQ to QQ-3 — Respondent Pollisco had testified that on June
4, 1958, Hadji Aisa inquired about one Awalin; that he told Aisa that Awalin
was taken by Mayor Brown to the seat of the city government; and that he
(Pollisco) suggested that Datu Unding be advised not to worry, because there
was no evidence against Awalin. To impeach the veracity of Pollisco, the
prosecution presented the exhibits under consideration, for the same show that
one Dong Awalin (who is different from Awalin Tebag) was apprehended on
May 27, 1958, and released on bail on June 23, 1958; that Pollisco could not
have truthfully informed Aisa on June 4, 1958, what Dong Awalin had been
taken by Mayor Brown to the seat of the city government and that there was no
evidence against him; for he was then a detention prisoner; and that Pollisco
could not have had in mind, therefore, said Dong Awalin as the Awalin about
whom Aisa had inquired. Indeed, Exhibits TT-13 to TT-16 show that, testifying
before the City Fiscal, respondent Pollisco said that he twice ordered Patrolman
Lacerna on June 4, 1958, to bring Awalin Tebag to him (Pollisco) for
investigation.
A mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an
affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended information that "Leroy S.
Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and . . . special
policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns"
and then "established a camp . . . at Tipo-Tipo," which is under his "command, .
. . supervision and control," where his codefendants were stationed, entertained
criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as
assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law
and without bringing them to the proper court, and that, in line with this set-up
established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders,
his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in
consequence thereof.
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main
respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein
charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular,
of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the
crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his
instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
The case of Montillo v. Hilario and Crisologo, 90 Phil., 49, relied upon by
respondent Judge, in overruling the objection of the prosecution to the
appearance of Senator Roseller Lim, is not in point, for, as stated in the
decision therein:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

3. Exhibits SS to SS-7 — These are the testimonies before the City Fiscal, of
defense witness Mohammad Sali who, on cross examination by the prosecution,
denied having given it. Thus the predicate thereof was established by the
prosecution which sought thereby to impeach Sali’s veracity.
4. Exhibits TT, TT-1 to TT-25 — These are the testimonies, before the City
Fiscal of the main respondents herein, who gave a different story before
respondent Judge. The prosecution thus sought to impeach their veracity as
witnesses in their own behalf, after laying down the predicate in the course of
their cross examination.
5. Exhibits UU, UU-1 to UU-3 — These are sworn statements made by
defendant Hasbi before the City Fiscal. They were presented in rebuttal, after
laying down the predicate, to impeach his testimony in court.
"From the allegations of the information it does not appear that the official
positions of the accused were connected with the offense charged. In fact, the
attorneys for the prosecution stated that the motives for the crimes were
personal with political character. It does not even appear, nor is there assertion,
that the crimes were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the
performance of their official functions." (Italics supplied.)
Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.
Wherefore, the rulings complained of are set aside and reversed and respondent
Judge is hereby enjoined to admit the aforementioned direct and rebuttal
evidence for the prosecution, as well as to permit the formulation, of the
questions already referred to, with costs against the respondents herein. It is so
ordered.

6. Exhibits RR, RR-1, XX and XX-1 — With these exhibits the prosecution
tried to rebut Pollisco’s testimony to the effect that prosecution witness Lianson
Arip had a grudge against him, he (Pollisco) having charged him with theft in
the City Fiscal’s Office. It appears from said exhibits that Arip’s affidavit,
implicating Pollisco, was dated June 8, 1958, whereas Pollisco’s affidavit,
charging Arip with theft, was dated June 20, 1958, so that said statement of
Arip could not have been influenced by Pollisco’s subsequent act.

In contrast with the severe and rigorous policy used by respondent Judge in
dealing with the aforementioned evidence for the prosecution, petitioner herein
cites the liberality with which the lower court admitted, as evidence for the
defense, records of supposed achievements of the Tipo-Tipo sub-station
(Exhibits 9 to 9-G, 10 to 10-I, 17 to 17-C, 19 to 19-A, 20 to 20-I, 21 and 22), a
congratulatory communication (Exh. 24), and a letter of commendation to a
peace officer assigned thereto (Exh. 7), including an article in the Philippine
Free Press (Exhs. 23 and 23 A).

Upon a review of the record, we are fully satisfied that the lower court had, not
only erred, but, also, committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
resolutions complained of, in rejecting the aforementioned direct and rebuttal
evidence for the prosecution, and in not permitting the same to propound the
questions already adverted to. It is obvious to us that said direct and rebuttal
evidence, as well as the aforementioned questions, are relevant to the issues
involved in Criminal Case No. 672. Although it is not possible to determine
with precision, at this stage of the proceedings, how far said exhibits may affect
the outcome of that case, it is elemental that all parties therein are entitled to a
reasonable opportunity to establish their respective pretense. In this connection
it should be noted that, in the light of the allegations of the amended
information in said case and of the records before us, the issue of the guilt or
innocence of the accused therein is bound to hinge heavily upon the veracity of
the opposing witnesses and the weight attached to their respective testimony.
Hence, the parties should be allowed a certain latitude in the presentation of
their evidence lest they may be so hampered that the ends of justice may
eventually be defeated or appear to be defeated. The danger of leading to such
result must be avoided, particularly in cases of the nature, importance and
significance of the one under consideration.
G.R. No. L-64548 July 7, 1986
ROLANDO P. BARTOLOME, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-64559 July 7, 1986
ELINO CORONEL Y SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Jesus L. Santos Law Office for petitioner in L-64548.
Prudencio Cruz for petitioner in L-64559.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Before us is a decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting the 4548 and G.R. No.
64559 of the crime petitioners in G. R. No. 6 of Falsification of a Public
Document, as defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4, of the
Revised Penal Code.
The charge in this case reads in full as follows:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses ROLANDO
BARTOLOME Y PEREZ and ELINO CORONEL Y SANTOS of the crime of
Falsification of Official Document as defined and penalized under paragraph 4,
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
ROLANDO BARTOLOME Y PEREZ, a public officer having been duly
appointed and qualified as Senior Labor Regulation Officer and Chief of the
Labor Regulations Section, Ministry of Labor, National Capital Region,
Manila, conspiring and conniving with the other accused ELINO CORONEL Y
SANTOS, also a public officer having been duly appointed and qualified as
Labor Regulation Officer of the same office, taking advantage of their official
positions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and
falsify an official document, to wit: the CS Personal Data Sheet (Civil Service
Form No. 212) which bears the Residence Certificate No. A-9086374 issued at
Manila on January 12, 1977, by making it appear in said document that accused
ROLANDO BARTOLOME Y PEREZ had taken and passed the 'Career
Service (Professional Qualifying Examination on 'May 2, 1976' with a rating of
'73.35% in Manila' and that he was a '4th Year AB student at the Far Eastern
University (FEU), when in truth and in fact, as both accused well knew,
accused ROLANDO BARTOLOME Y PEREZ had not taken and passed the
same nor was he a '4th Year AB student, thereby making untruthful statements
in a narration of facts.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, January 21, 1982.
RICARDO A. BUENVIAJE
Special Prosecutor
We hold that the proceedings in the court a quo are nun and void ab initio. The
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case.
Under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, which created this special court:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crime committed by public officers and employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title
VI I of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office. (Emphasis supplied).
A careful reading of Republic Act No. 3019 and Republic Act No. 1379 will
reveal that nowhere in either statute is falsification of an official document
mentioned, even tangentially or by implication.
Title VII, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes a wide
range of offenses committed by public officers, from knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment under Article 204 to abuses against chastity in Article 245, but
falsification of an official document is not included. This is punished in Article
171 under Title IV, Book Two, on Crimes against Public Interest.
The nearest approach to the claimed jurisdiction is paragraph (c) of the above-
quoted section, which speaks of crimes committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office. Under existing jurisprudence, however,
the crime imputed to the petitioners cannot come under this heading.
The pertinent case is Montilla v. Hilario, 1 where a municipal mayor and three
policemen charged with murder and frustrated murder retained Rep. Floro
Crisologo as their counsel. The prosecution sought to disqualify him on the
ground that a member of Congress could not appear as counsel "in any criminal
case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office." 2 The Supreme Court allowed his
appearance, interpreting the underscored phrase in this wise:
The information charges that the defendants, 'taking advantage of their
respective public positions conspiring together ... did then and there ... assault,
attack and shoot with their firearms' several persons 'with the intent to kill and
did kill one Claudio Ragasa and inflict physical injuries on three others.
From the allegations of the information it does not appear that the official
positions of the accused were connected with the offenses charged. In fact, the
attorneys for the prosecution stated that the motives for the cranes were
'personal with political character.' It does not even appear, nor is there assertion,
that the crimes were committed by the defendants in fine of duty or in the
performance of their official functions.
Judged by the context of section 17 of Article VI, supra, and the proceedings of
the Constitutional Convention, the relation between the crime and the office
contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental.
To fan into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the
legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the
office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such
as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title
Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either
murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the
penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary,
took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty
is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and
even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the
allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public
officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime.
Montilla must be read with People v. Montejo  3 which laid down the exception
to the basic rule. In this case, a city mayor and several members of the police
were also accused of murder They retained as their counsel Sen. Roseller Lim
who was also challenged on the basis of the same Article VI, Section 17, of the
1935 Constitution. The legislator was disqualified because, as the Court put it,
there was on the face of the information an intimate connection between the
commission of the offense and the discharge of public office that made the
crime an offense committed in relation to the office of the accused.
With respect to the question whether or not Senator Roseller Lim may appear
as counsel for the main respondents herein, as defendants in said criminal case,
the Constitution provides that no Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall 'appear as counsel ... in any criminal case wherein an
officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in
relation of his office ... (Art. VI Sec. 17, Const. of the Phil.). The issue,
therefore, is whether the defendants in Criminal case No. 672 are accused of an
offense committed in relation' to their office.
A mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an
affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended information that 'Leroy S.
Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and ... special
policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns
and then established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo,' which is under his 'command, ...
supervision and control,' where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained
criminal complainants and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well
as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of
law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that, in fine with this
set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his
orders, his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in
consequence thereof.

It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an

element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main
respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein
charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular,
of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the
crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their afraid
offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his
instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.

The difference between Montilla and Montejo is that whereas in the former the
murder was committed outside office hours and for personal or political
motives, the victim in the latter case was killed while he was undergoing
custodial investigation in the police sub-station. The crime in Montejo would
not have been committed were it not for the fact that the accused were actually
discharging official functions at the time.

The case of Montilla vs. Hilario and Crisologo, 90 Phil., 49, relied upon by
respondent Judge, in overruling the objection of the prosecution to the
appearance of Senator Roseller Lim, is not in point, for, as stated in the
decision therein;

'From the allegations of the information it does not appear that the official
positions of the accused were connected with the offers charged. In fact, the
attorneys for the prosecution stated that the motives for the crimes were
personal with political character. It does not even appear, nor is there assertion,
that the crimes were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the
performance of their official functions.'

Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.

In the instant case, there is no showing that the alleged falsification was
committed by the accused, if at all, as a consequence of, and while they were
discharging, official functions. The information does not allege that there was
an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and the
commission of the offense. Besides, falsification of an official document may
be committed not only by public officers and employees but even by private
persons only. To paraphrase Montilla, public office is not an essential
ingredient of the offense such that the offense cannot exist without the office.

Clearly, therefore, as the alleged falsification was not an offense committed in

relation to the office of the accused, it did not come under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It follows that all its acts in the instant case are null and
void ab initio. 4

WHEREFORE, the petitions are granted and the decision of the Sandiganbayan
is set aside, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City, and P/COL. NICOLAS M.
TORRES, P/INSP. ADONIS C. ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y
FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR.,
JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS,
DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO,
ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY
DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
At issue in this special civil action for certiorari  is whether it is the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City or the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction
over the two criminal cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder wherein
some of the accused implicated as principals are members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP).
On 13 January 1994, two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder
were filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against fourteen persons, five of
whom are members of the PNP, namely, P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, P/Insp.
Adonis C. Abeto, Police Officers Mario Lamis, Jose Pahayupan, and Vicente
Canuday, Jr.; the other nine are civilians. The informations, later docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in Branch 47 of the said court, are
similarly worded, except as to the names of the victims, who are Rufino Gargar,
Jr. in the first case and Danilo Lumangyao in the second, thus:
The undersigned hereby accuses JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS,
CHARLES DUMANCAS (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION),
POLICE COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION
AND BY DIRECTION AND/OR INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION),
POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C. ABETO, POLICE OFFICERS MARIO
LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, JOSE PAHAYUPAN, VICENTE CANUDAY, JR.,
DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO,
ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY
DELGADO, ALL AS PRINCIPALS BY PARTICIPATION, CESAR PECHA
AND EDGAR HILADO, BOTH AS ACCESSORIES, of the crime of
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER, committed as follows:
That during the period beginning in the late afternoon of August 6, 1992 and
ending the late evening of the following day in Sitio Pedrosa, Barangay Alijis,
Bacolod City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and concurring in a
common criminal intent and execution thereof with one another, save for the
accessories for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353, 000.00,
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously to wit:
Acting upon the inducement of spouses Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and
Charles Dumancas, under the direction cooperation and undue influence,
exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, taking advantage of his position as Station
Commander of the Philippine National Police, Bacolod City Station, with the
direct participation and cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto, other
police officers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose Pahayupan, Mario Lamis, civilian
(police) agents Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado,
Jaime Gargallano, also taking advantage of their respective positions, and
Dominador Geroche, concurring and affirming in the said criminal design, with
the use of motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and detain one RUFINO GARGAR,
JR. (Criminal Case No. 94-15562 and DANILO LUMANGYAO (Criminal
Case No. 94-15563), shortly thereafter at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening
of August 7, 1992, failing in their aforesaid common purpose to extort money
and in furtherance of said conspiracy, with evident premeditation and treachery
nocturnity and the use of motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said
victims, while being handcuffed and blindfolded; that accused Cesar Pecha and
Edgar Hilado, with knowledge that the said Gargar [and Lumangyao, in Crim.
Case No. 94-15563 were victims] of violence, did then and there secretly bury
the corpses in a makeshift shallow grave for the purpose of concealing the
crime of murder in order to prevent its discovery for a fee of P500.00 each;
aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and prejudice to the heirs of said
victims, to wit:
P 50,000.00 — as indemnity for death;
50,000.00 — actual damages;
300,000.00 — compensatory damages
(Lost income);
100,000.00 — moral damages;
50,000.00 — exemplary damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW (Articles 268 and 248 in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code). 1
These cases were consolidated.
Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Later, they filed their
respective motions for bail. At the hearings thereof, the prosecution presented
state witness Moises Grandeza, the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator
in the commission of the complex crimes. After the completion of his
testimony, the trial court, per Judge Edgar G. Garvilles, granted bail in favor of
only six of the accused, namely, P/Insp. Adonis Abeto, Police Officers Jose
Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr., Charles Dumancas, Edgar Hilado, and
Cesar Pecha. The other eight accused who were denied bail are now detained at
the City Jail of Bacolod City.2
Through the testimony of Grandeza, the prosecution established that in
response to the complaint of spouses Charles and Jeanette Dumancas, P/Col.
Nicolas Torres instructed his men to look for Rufino Gargar and Danilo
Lumangyao who were allegedly members of the group that had swindled the
Dumancas spouses. On 6 August 1992, Police Officer Mario Lamis, together
with civilian agents, namely, Teody Delgado, Edwin Divinagracia, Jaime
Gargallano, Rolando Fernandez, and Moises Grandeza, arrested and abducted
the two swindling suspects. Conformably with Torres's order, the two suspects
were brought to Dragon Lodge Motel. There, they were investigated by Police
Inspector Adonis Abeto and Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente
Canuday, Jr.. They were then taken to the Ceres Compound, where Jeanette
Dumancas identified Lumangyao as a member of the group that had swindled
her. She then asked about the money that the group had received from her.
Upon being told by Lumangyao that the money had already been divided
among his partners long time ago, she said to the accused, specifically to
Dominador Geroche: "Doming, bring these two to the PC or police and I will
call Atty. Geocadin so that proper cases could be filed against them."
Thereafter, the two suspects were transferred to D' Hacienda Motel, then to
Moonlit Inn, then to Casa Mel Lodge, and back to D' Hacienda Motel, where
the two were shot and killed. The team forthwith went to the office of P/Col.
Torres and reported that the killing had been done. The latter told them: "You
who are here inside, nobody knows what you have done, but you have to hide
because the NBI's are after you."3
Thereafter, the prosecution rested its case and the trial court started to receive
the evidence for the accused. Accused Torres and Abeto presented their
respective evidence. Presentation of evidence by the other accused was,
however, suspended because of the motions of several accused for the
inhibition of Judge Garvilles. Despite opposition by the prosecution, Judge
Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing both cases, which
were thereafter re-raffled to Branch 54, presided by herein public respondent
Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes.
On 24 June 1994, the private prosecutors moved for the transmittal of the
records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan on the ground that, pursuant to our
decision of 11 March 1994 in Republic of the Philippines vs. Asuncion,4 the
trial court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged were
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. In his
Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Transmit Records, the State Prosecutor
adopted the motion of the private prosecutors.5
In its order of 15 August 1994,6 the trial court, thru respondent Judge, ruled that
the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the subject cases because the
informations do not state that the offenses were committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers. Citing People vs. Montilla,7 it held that the
allegation in the informations that the accused PNP officers took advantage of
their office in the commission of the offense charged is merely an allegation of
an aggravating circumstance. It further stated that a public office is not a
constituent element of the offense of kidnapping with murder nor is the said
offense intimately connected with the office. It then denied the motion for
transfer of the records to the Sandiganbayan and declared that the trial of the
case should continue.
Relying on People vs. Montejo,8 the prosecution moved to reconsider the said
order.9
On 7 September 1994, 10 the trial court issued an order denying the motion
because People vs. Montejo is not applicable, since in that case there was (a) an
intimate connection between the offense charged and the public position of the
accused and (b) a total absence of personal motive; whereas, in these cases, no
such intimate connection exists and the informations emphasize that the
accused were moved by selfish motives of ransom and extortion.
The respondent Judge then resumed the reception of the evidence for the other
accused. Accused Gargallano, Fernandez, Lamis, Delgado, and Geroche, as
well as his three witnesses, had already completed their respective testimonies
when, upon motion of the prosecution, the respondent Judge voluntarily
inhibited himself on 15 September 1994. The cases were then re-raffled to
Branch 49 of the RTC of Bacolod City.
On 5 December 1994, the prosecution, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed with us a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order challenging the
refusal of the respondent Judge to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan.
On 12 December 1994, we required the respondents to comment on the petition
and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the public respondent or his
successor to desist from proceeding with the trial of the subject cases. 11
On 27 February 1995, after considering the allegations, issues, and arguments
adduced in the petition as well as in the comments of the private respondents,
we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. Most of them submitted their memoranda, while the
petitioner and some of the private respondents adopted their initiatory pleadings
as their memoranda.
On 22 March 1995, private respondent Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas filed an
urgent motion for the grant of bail, 12 which we noted on 15 May 1995. 13
Deliberating on the arguments adduced by the parties, we are convinced that
public respondent Judge Magallanes committed no grave abuse of discretion in
holding that it is his court and not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction
over the two cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder.
At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law governing the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by P.D. No. 1861, which pertinently provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by Law is higher than prision correccional  or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of 16,000.00: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional  or
imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:
(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial
jurisdiction.
(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases
originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, in their respective jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees.
Applying this section, we held in Aguinaldo vs. Domagas 14 that for the
Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies
committed by public officers or employees under Section 4(a) (2) above, it is
not enough that the penalty prescribed therefor is higher than  prision
correccional  or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also
necessary that the offenses or felonies were committed in relation to their
office. We reiterated this pronouncement in Sanchez vs.
Demetriou, 15 Natividad vs. Felix, 16 and Republic vs. Asuncion, 17 In Sanchez,
we restated the principle laid down in Montilla vs. Hilario 18 that an offense
may be considered as committed in relation to the office if it cannot exist
without the office, or if the office is a constituent element of the crime as
defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in
Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code. We also reiterated
the principle in People vs. Montejo  19 that the offense must be intimately
connected with the office of the offender, and we further intimated that the fact
that the offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the
information.20
There is no dispute that the prescribed penalties for the offenses charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 before the court below are higher
than prision correcional  or imprisonment for more than six years. The only
question that remains to be resolved then is whether the said offenses were
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.
Relying on its evidence and on the Montejo case, the petitioner submits that the
crimes charged in the subject cases were connected with public office because
the accused PNP officers, together with the civilian agents, arrested the two
swindling suspects in the course of the performance of their duty and not out of
personal motive, and if they demanded from the two suspects the production of
the money of the Dumancas spouses and later killed the two; they did so in the
course of the investigation conducted by them as policemen. The petitioner
further asserts that the allegations in the informations reading "taking advantage
of his position as Station Commander of the Philippine National Police" and
"taking advantage of their respective positions" presuppose the exercise of the
functions attached to the office of the accused PNP officers and are sufficient to
show that the offenses charged were committed in relation to their office. The
petitioner then concludes that the cases below fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information, 21 and not by the result of evidence after trial. 22
In Montejo  23 where the amended information alleged:
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of
police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and . . .
special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power
guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo, which is under his command
. . . supervision and control, where his codefendants were stationed, entertained
criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as
assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law
and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up
established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders,
his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in
consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the
accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of their official functions and would not have peen
committed had they not held their office; besides, the accused had no personal
motive in committing the crime; thus, there was an intimate connection
between the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563
in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the
victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The
informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or
extorting the sum of P353,000.00, abducted, kidnapped, and detained the two
victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed the said
victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that
shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
The allegation of "taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage of
their respective positions" incorporated in the informations is not sufficient to
bring the offenses within the definition of "offenses committed in relation to
public office." In Montilla vs. Hilario, 24 such an allegation was considered
merely as an allegation of an aggravating circumstance, 25 and not as one that
qualifies the crime as having been committed in relation to public office, It
says:
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and
even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the
allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public
officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime.
Also, in Bartolome vs. People of the Philippines, 26 despite the allegation that
the accused public officers committed the crime of falsification of official
document by "taking advantage of their official positions," this Court held that
the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because "[t]he information
[did] not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of
official duties and the commission of the offense."
Accordingly, for lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or were
intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the
subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court 27 and not
of the Sandiganbayan as insisted by the petitioner.
In Dumancas's and Torres's motions for the early resolution of this case and in
Abeto's Supplement to Comment with Motion to Dismiss all filed in July 1995,
it is contended that even assuming that the informations do charge the accused
PNP officers with crimes committed in relation to their office, still the Regional
Trial Court would have jurisdiction over the subject cases in view of the
amendments to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, introduced by R.A.
No. 7975, which was approved on 30 March 1995, whose Section 2 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sanggunian
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
(a) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
-controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice
to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions
corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent
or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals
from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the
accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise
covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or — controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over them. (emphasis supplied).
As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan partly lost
its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R.A. No.
3019, 28 as amended; R.A. No. 1379; 29 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code; 30 it retains only cases where the accused are those
enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above and, generally, national and local
officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758). Moreover, its jurisdiction
over other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in
relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed penalty, viz.,
that which is higher than  prision correccional  or imprisonment for six years or
a fine of P6,000.00; it is enough that they are committed by those public
officials and employees enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above. However,
it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed
pursuant to or in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 31 2, 32 14, 33 and 14-A. 34
The respondents maintain that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 because none of the five PNP officers
involved therein occupy the rank of chief superintendent or higher, or are
classified as Grade "27" or higher under R.A. No. 6758 and of the five, P/Col.
Nicolas Torres has the highest rank, viz., Senior Superintendent whose salary
grade under the said Act is Grade "18."
Assuming then for the sake of argument that the informations in the said cases
allege that the crimes charged were committed by the five PNP officers in
relation to their office, it would appear indubitable that the cases would fall
within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
further amended by R.A. No. 7975:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions
corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent35 or higher,
or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
However, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at the
time of the commencement of the action. 36 Under the above assumption then,
the cases should have been filed with the Sandiganbayan since at the time the
informations were filed, the governing law was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by P.D. No. 1861. But, would that jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
be affected by R.A. No. 7975?
Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative
enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court
until the case is finally terminated. 37 Hence, the Sandiganbayan or the courts,
as the case may be, cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before
them by reason of R.A. No. 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of
the litigation.
In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
subject criminal cases, as the informations were filed not before it but before
the Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the foregoing assumption that
the informations in the subject cases do charge the respondent PNP officers
with offenses committed in relation to their office so that jurisdiction thereof
would fall under the Sandiganbayan, and assuming further that the informations
had already been filed with the said tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun
yet, the Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the
express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975. That section provides that
upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet
begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases
which were previously cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the
amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the latter courts if
hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in the Sandiganbayan.

It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the

Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be transferred again to the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to Section
2 thereof.

As regards the motions for bail of accused-respondents Jeanette Dumancas and

Nicolas Torres, the same must fail. Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
provides:

Sec. 17 Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the
court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge
thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city. If the
accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case
is pending, bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of said place, or,
if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal
trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

(b) Whenever the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to
be released on recognizance, the application therefor may be filed only in the
particular court where the case is pending, whether for preliminary
investigation, trial, on appeal.

(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail
with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held.

In the instant case, the motions for bail filed by the said accused-respondents
with the Regional Trial Court where the cases against them are pending were
denied sometime in February, 1994

In Enrile vs. Salazar, 38 as reiterated in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, 39 this

Court said: "Only after that remedy [petition to be admitted to bail] was denied
by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court [be] invoked, and
even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate
relief was also available there."

There is no showing that the said accused-respondents have questioned the

denial of their applications for bail in a petition for certiorari either before the
Court of Appeals or this Court. It was only on 26 December 1994, when they
filed their respective comments on the instant petition, that they challenged the
denial premised on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was not
strong. Even if their respective Comment and Reiteration of Motion for
Bail 40 and respondent Dumancas's Motion for Bail 41 filed on 22 March 1995,
were treated as petitions for certiorari, still the same would not prosper for not
having been seasonably filed. While the Rules of Court does not fix a time-
frame for the filing of a special civil action for certiorari  under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, existing jurisprudence requires that the same be filed within a
reasonable period of time from receipt of the questioned judgment or
order. 42 And, in Philec Workers' Union vs. Hon. Romeo A. Young 43 it was held
that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should be filed
within a reasonable period of three months from notice of the decision or order.
Here, about nine to ten months had already elapsed before the respondents
assailed the denial of their motions for bail. In any event, the private
respondents who were denied bail are not precluded from reiterating before the
trial court their plea for admission to bail.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged orders are

AFFIRMED, and the motions for bail of accused-respondents Jeanette
Dumancas and Nicolas Torres are DENIED.

The temporary restraining order issued on 12 December 1994 is LIFTED, and

the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City is directed to immediately resume the
hearings of Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 and to thereafter resolve
them with reasonable and purposeful dispatch.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124644           February 5, 2004
ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner,
vs
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, Executive Clerk of Court
IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Arnel Escobal seeking the
nullification of the remand by the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the
records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Naga City, Branch 21.
The petition at bench arose from the following milieu:
The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a member of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as
the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990,
the petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at
the Sa Harong Café Bar and Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City. He
somehow got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one
Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an amended Information was
filed with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No.
90-3184 charging the petitioner and a certain Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias "Jun
Bombita" with murder. The accusatory portion of the amended Information
reads:
That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court by virtue of the Presidential Waiver,
dated June 1, 1990, with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and maul one Rodney Nueca and accused 2Lt Arnel
Escobal armed with a caliber .45 service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca
thereby inflicting upon him serious, mortal and fatal wounds which caused his
death, and as a consequence thereof, complainant LUZ N. NUECA, mother of
the deceased victim, suffered actual and compensatory damages in the amount
of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVEN & 95/100 (P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE
THOUSAND (P135,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.1
On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the
petitioner from the service under Presidential Decree No. 971, as amended by
P.D. No. 1847. When apprised of the said order, the General Headquarters of
the PNP issued on October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91, preventively
suspending the petitioner from the service until the case was terminated.2
The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the RTC, while
accused Bombita remained at large. The petitioner posted bail and was granted
temporary liberty.
When arraigned on April 9, 1991,3 the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash4 the Information alleging that as mandated
by Commonwealth Act No. 408,5 in relation to Section 1, Presidential Decree
No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested
the Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No.
6975, his suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served the same,
he should now be reinstated. On September 23, 1993,6 the PNP Region V
Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting information on whether
he issued an order lifting the petitioner’s suspension. The RTC did not reply.
Thus, on February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the
lifting of the order of suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day
preventive suspension and pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC denied
the motion on March 9, 1994.7 Trial thereafter proceeded, and the prosecution
rested its case. The petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence. On
July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss 8 the case. Citing Republic of
the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al.,9 he argued that since he committed the crime
in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction
over the case.
On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order 10 denying the motion to dismiss.
It, however, ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether
or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his
office as a member of the PNP.
In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution manifested that it was no longer
presenting any evidence in connection with the petitioner’s motion. It reasoned
that it had already rested its case, and that its evidence showed that the
petitioner did not commit the offense charged in connection with the
performance of his duties as a member of the Philippine Constabulary.
According to the prosecution, they were able to show the following facts: (a)
the petitioner was not wearing his uniform during the incident; (b) the offense
was committed just after midnight; (c) the petitioner was drunk when the crime
was committed; (d) the petitioner was in the company of civilians; and, (e) the
offense was committed in a beerhouse called "Sa Harong Café Bar and
Restaurant."11
For his part, the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p.m. on March 15, 1990,
he was at the Sa Harong Café Bar and Restaurant at Barlin St., Naga City, to
conduct surveillance on alleged drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No.
03-04 issued by Police Superintendent Rufo R. Pulido. The petitioner adduced
in evidence the sworn statements of Benjamin Cariño and Roberto Fajardo who
corroborated his testimony that he was on a surveillance mission on the
aforestated date.12
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner
committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his official
function. The trial court added that upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,13 the
issue had become moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the
jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since
the petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by
Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution
to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion 14 and
R.A. No. 7975. The amendment consisted in the inclusion therein of an
allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the
performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.lawphi1.nêt
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration 15 of the said order,
reiterating that based on his testimony and those of Benjamin Cariño and
Roberto Fajardo, the offense charged was committed by him in relation to his
official functions. He asserted that the trial court failed to consider the
exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was
enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.16
The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the mother of the victim,
through counsel, categorically and unequivocably admitted in her complaint
filed with the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an
official mission when the crime was committed.
On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued an Order
reversing and setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It declared that based on the
petitioner’s evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It
concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto.
It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nueca’s admission in her complaint before
the PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the shooting
happened.
The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and
to allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the
performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and,
conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the
complete records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE and
RECONSIDERED, and it is hereby declared that after preliminary hearing, this
Court has found that the offense charged in the Information herein was
committed by the accused in his relation to his function and duty as member of
the then Philippine Constabulary.
Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Republic v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. No. 180208, March 11, 1994:
(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file a Re-Amended Information
alleging that the offense charged was committed by the Accused in the
performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office, within fifteen
(15) days from receipt hereof;
(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended Information, the complete records of
this case, together with the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during
the entire proceedings herein, are hereby ordered transmitted immediately to
the Honorable Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court, Manila, for
appropriate proceedings.17
On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the
Executive Clerk of Court IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the
records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City,
Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
7975,18 the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the
petitioner had a salary grade of "23." Furthermore, the prosecution had already
rested its case and the petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in the
RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should
continue with the case and render judgment therein after trial.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher,
or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial on May 3, 1996, Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to
for the petitioner to continue presenting his evidence. Instead of adducing his his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27,"
evidence, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be,
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a
RTC. Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide
punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction
over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa
The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the Presiding Justice of the
Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.
The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied
retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a
The petitioner contends that when the amended information was filed with the
substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.23
RTC on February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was still in effect. Under Section 4(a)
of the decree, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case
against him as he was charged with homicide with the imposable penalty of IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. No
reclusion temporal, and the crime was committed while in the performance of pronouncement as to costs.
his duties. He further asserts that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D.
No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes committed by members
SO ORDERED.
and officers of the PNP with a salary grade below "27" committed in relation to
office are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the amendment
thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively. This is
so, the petitioner asserts, because under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, only those
cases where trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan upon the effectivity of the
law should be referred to the proper trial court.

The private complainant agrees with the contention of the petitioner. In

contrast, the Office of the Special Prosecutor contends that the Presiding Justice
of the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law when he ordered the
remand of the case to the RTC. It asserts that R.A. No. 7975 should be applied
retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime
committed by the petitioner when the amended information was filed with the
RTC, by the time it resolved petitioner’s motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995,
R.A. No. 7975 had already taken effect. Thus, the law should be given
retroactive effect.

The Ruling of the Court

The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings
of this Court when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of
origin.

The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the

allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the
time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged
in the Information.19 Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of
the case continues until the case is terminated.20

Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in

relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….21

However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said
law over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is
essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the
offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information.
It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was
committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a
conclusion of law.22 The amended Information filed with the RTC against the
petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between
his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over
the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment
of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed
the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the
elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No.
7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the
law:
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1552             December 16, 2004
DANTE M. QUINDOZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE EMMANUEL G. BANZON, respondent.
TINGA, J.:
On August 9, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received
the Letter-Complaint1 dated August 1, 2002 filed by complainant Dante M.
Quindoza against Judge Emmanuel G. Banzon, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mariveles, Bataan. Complainant charges
respondent with gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion in
connection with respondent’s disposition of Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325, 02-
7326, and 02-7332, all entitled "People of the Philippines v. Dante Quindoza,
et al." for Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and Light Coercion.
The antecedents follow.
On May 8 and 22, 2002 respectively, complainant ordered the disconnection of
the water and electrical service of the housing unit illegally occupied by Renato
Caralipio (Caralipio),2 and the electrical services of the housing unit of Hermito
de Asis (de Asis) for non-settlement of accounts with the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority and expiration of lease.3 Because of the incidents, criminal
cases were filed against the complainant with the court of respondent judge.
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326 stemmed from the incident
involving Caralipio’s house,4 while Criminal Case No. 02-7332 related to the
disconnection of electric service in the house occupied by de Asis.5
On June 4, 2002, the complainant filed an Urgent Motion to Quash in the three
criminal cases on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to allege an
offense. Complainant averred that he is the incumbent Zone Administrator of
the Bataan Economic Zone (BEZ) and that his position has a salary grade "28"
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.6 He contended that it is not respondent’s
court but the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the three criminal
cases.
Complainant claims that in open court during the hearing of his motion to
quash in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326 on June 20, 2002,
respondent ordered his incarceration, without right to file bail, until such time
that he shall have ordered the reconnection of the water and electrical services
of Caralipio and de Asis. According to the complainant, respondent should not
have ordered the reconnection of electricity in de Asis’s housing unit during the
hearings in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326 because the
disconnection incident relating to de Asis is the subject of the third case,
Criminal Case No. 02-7332, and the motion to quash therein was to be
conducted on June 27, 2002 yet.7 He also points out that it was erroneous for the
respondent judge to include the reconnection of the water services in de Asis’s
house because only the disconnection of electricity was complained of in
Criminal Case No. 02-7332.8 Complainant further avers that he made a formal
written request9 for a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes of the June 20,
2002 hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326 to avail of the
proper judicial remedies but respondent refused to release the transcript. He
prays that his pending cases be reassigned to another court and that respondent
judge be ordered to inhibit himself from handling any case involving BEZ or
any of its officers and employees.10
The OCA indorsed the complaint and required respondent to file his comment
thereon.11
Thereafter, respondent submitted his Comment dated September 20, 2002 and
another Comment on November 29, 2002. Respondent has not disputed
complainant’s allegations in the latter’s September 20, 2002 Comment.  He
argues, however, that it is improper and premature for complainant to insinuate
bias and improper conduct on his part when the issues which gave rise to
the Letter-Complaint are still being ventilated in court. 12 He asserts that
complainant should have appealed the assailed order instead of filing an
administrative case against him because as the Court held in Barroso v.
Arche,13 when a litigant disagrees with a ruling of the judge the proper remedy
is not to file an administrative complaint but an appeal which points out the
errors in the decision.14 Respondent further claims that complainant was
arbitrary in effecting the disconnection of water and electrical services of
residents within the BEZ alleging that complainant disconnected the electrical
and water supplies of the occupants who could not afford to file a case against
him, without even bothering to explain the disconnections although they were
effected in violation of due process of law.15 Respondent prays that the
complaint against him be dismissed and that complainant instead be held
administratively and criminally liable for his illegal acts.16
Complainant submitted on October 25, 2002 his Reply, pointing out that
respondent judge failed to refute the charges against him but instead made
unsubstantiated allegations against the complainant.
On March 3, 2004, the OCA submitted its Memorandum, recommending that
respondent be fined Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for oppression and
abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law.
On August 4, 2004, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they
would be willing to submit the case based on the pleadings filed within ten (10)
days from notice. Both parties complied and replied in the affirmative, 17 with
respondent adducing additional documents and arguments in his defense.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Section 4(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No.
824918 clearly provides that employees of the executive branch classified as
Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
not of the MTC. Clearly, any crime committed by complainant, a salary grade
"28" employee, in relation to his office falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The record shows that the crimes allegedly committed by
complainant were in relation to his office as director of the BEZ.
When the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know
it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.19 Respondent judge undeniably erred
in denying complainant’s motion to quash in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325, 02-
7326 and 02-7332 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, as the OCA correctly observed, respondent judge’s act of ordering
the incarceration of complainant and threatening not to grant him bail at the
hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325, 02-7326 and 02-7332 until he shall
have reconnected the water and electric supply connections of Caralipio and de
Asis indubitably constitutes oppression and abuse of authority -
This is a clear case of oppression and abuse of authority. Respondent acted like
a petty tyrant requiring obedience from those around. He had no authority to
order the incarceration of complainant even if the latter refused to comply. In
criminal cases, a court can only do three things: (1) convict the accused and
sentence him accordingly; (2) acquit the accused and release him from
detention if he is detained or cancel his bail if he is bonded; or (3) he can
dismiss the case for any of the grounds provided by law.20
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, gross ignorance of
the law or procedure and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code
of Judicial Conduct21 are considered serious offenses which may be penalized
with either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension
from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months or
a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), but not exceeding
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), may be imposed. However, as
recommended by the OCA,22 a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) is
appropriate. This is the first offense of respondent.
In his Manifestation23 dated September 24, 2004, respondent claims that during
the pendency of the instant case, complainant has been charged with several
criminal complaints for violation of Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code
involving the ex-parte demolition of several houses in Mariveles, as well as
complaints for qualified trespass to dwelling and light coercion, all of which
were assigned to his sala. Complainant has been charged, respondent adds, with
violations of human rights before the Commission on Human Rights.
Moreover, while asserting that complainant was high-handed and tyrannical in
the performance of his duties respondent stresses that complainant filed the
instant case to get even with and force him to be lenient with complainant in the
cases pending before his court.
The Court finds the cases adverted to irrelevant to the resolution of the instant
administrative complaint. If there is merit in the cases against the complainant,
then the same should be decided in the courts concerned, but not in this forum
at this time.
Complainant seeks to disqualify the respondent judge from handling his
pending cases and those that may be filed against the BEZ or any of its
employees and officers. The Court grants the inhibition sought with respect to
the pending cases, including the cases mentioned by respondent in
his Manifestation dated September 24, 2004.
Considering the animosity generated by this administrative complaint between
complainant and respondent judge, it would be in the best interest of justice to
remove any doubt that may be cast upon respondent judge’s ability to resolve
said cases with impartiality. However, there is no basis for respondent’s
inhibition from hearing any other case involving the BEZ or any of its officers
and employees.
However, with regard to cases still to be filed the recusal sought is premature
and therefore should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Court orders respondent Judge Emmanuel G. Banzon,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Mariveles, Bataan, to pay a FINE
in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. He is also ordered to inhibit himself from hearing Criminal Cases
Nos. 02-7325, 02-7326, 02-7332, and 03-7760, 03-7761, 03-7762, 03-7763, 03-
7764, 03-7765, 03-7766 and 03-7781 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Mariveles, Bataan involving complainant Dante M. Quindoza.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 143047 : July 14, 2004] On November 18, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayans September 23, 1999 Resolution.10 The motion was, however,
denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on April 25,
RICARDO S. INDING, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE
2000.11 cralawred
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari , contending
as follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

A.That Republic Act [No.] 8249 which took effect last 05 February 1997 made
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court depend not only on the
Procedure for the nullification of the September 23, 1999 Resolution 1 of the
penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on
Sandiganbayan (Second Division), which denied the petitioners omnibus
the rank and salary grade of accused government officials and employees.
motion with supplemental motion, and its Resolution dated April 25, 2000,
denying the petitioners motion for the reconsideration of the same.
B.That the ruling of the Supreme Court in Lilia B. Organo v. The
Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 133535, 09
The Antecedents
September 1999, settles the matter on the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as a trial court which is over public officials and employees
On January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan with rank and salary grade 27 and above.
charging petitioner Ricardo S. Inding, a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dapitan City, with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense charged was allegedly
3019,2 committed as follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
committed, he was already occupying the position of Sangguniang
Panlungsod Member I with SG 25.Hence, under Section 4 of Rep. Act No.
That from the period 3 January 1997 up to 9 August 1997 and for sometime 8249, amending Rep. Act No. 7975, it is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan
prior or subsequent thereto, in Dapitan City, Philippines, and within the that has jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him.He asserts that under
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Ricardo S. Adm. Order No. 270,12 Dapitan City is only a component city, and the members
Inding, a high-ranking public officer, being a Councilor of Dapitan City and as of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are classified as Sangguniang
such, while in the performance of his official functions, particularly in the Panlungsod Members I with SG 25.Thus, Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No. 1606,
operation against drug abuse, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, and retained by Section 4 of
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, faked buy-bust operations Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.
against alleged pushers or users to enable him to claim or collect from the
coffers of the city government a total amount of P30,500.00, as reimbursement
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Special
for actual expenses incurred during the alleged buy-bust operations, knowing
Prosecutor, contend that Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
fully well that he had no participation in the said police operations against
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, expressly provides that the Sandiganbayan has
drugs but enabling him to collect from the coffers of the city government a total
original jurisdiction over violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended,
amount of P30,500.00, thereby causing undue injury to the government as well
committed by the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
as the public interest.3 cralawred
withoutqualification and regardless of salary grade.They argue that when
Congress approved Rep. Act No. 7975 and Rep. Act No. 8249, it was aware
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116 and raffled to the Second that not all the positions specifically mentioned in Section 4, subparagraph (1)
Division of the Sandiganbayan. were classified as SG 27, and yet were specifically included
therein, viz:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
On June 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion4 for the dismissal of
the case for lack of jurisdiction over the officers charged or, in the alternative, It is very clear from the aforecited provisions of law that the members of
for the referral of the case either to the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal the sangguniang panlungsod are specifically included as among those falling
Trial Court for appropriate proceedings.The petitioner alleged therein that within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
under Administrative Order No. 270 which prescribes the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, he is a
A reading of the aforesaid provisions, likewise, show that the qualification as to
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City with Salary Grade
Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to such officials of the executive
(SG) 25.He asserted that under Republic Act No. 7975, which amended
branch other than the regional director and higher and those specifically
Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan exercises original jurisdiction
enumerated.To rule, otherwise, is to give a different interpretation to what the
to try cases involving crimes committed by officials of local government units
law clearly is.
only if such officials occupy positions with SG 27 or higher, based on Rep. Act
No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989. He contended that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended Moreover, had there been an intention to make Salary Grade 27 and higher as
by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has the sole factor to determine the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
original jurisdiction over the crime charged against him.The petitioner urged Sandiganbayan then the lawmakers could have simply stated that the officials
the trial court to take judicial notice of Adm. Order No. 270. of the executive branch, to fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, should have been occupying the positions with a Salary Grade
of 27 and higher.But the express wordings in both RA No. 7975 and RA No.
In its comment on the omnibus motion, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
8249 specifically including the members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
asserted that the petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the crime, a
among others, as those within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Sandiganbayan only means that the said sangguniang members shall be within
Norte, one of those public officers who, by express provision of Section 4 a.(1)
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said court regardless of their Salary
(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7975,5 is classified as SG
Grade.
27.Hence, the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, has original jurisdiction over the
case, regardless of his salary grade under Adm. Order No. 270.
In this connection too, it is well to state that the lawmakers are very well aware
that not all the positions specifically mentioned as those within the exclusive
On September 23, 1999, the respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan have a Salary Grade of 27 and
denying the petitioners omnibus motion.According to the court, the Information
higher.Yet, the legislature has explicitly made the officials so enumerated in
alleged that the petitioner has a salary grade of 27.Furthermore, Section 2 of
RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 as falling within the exclusive original
Rep. Act No. 7975, which amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, provides that
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because of the nature of these officials
the petitioner, as a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod ofDapitanCity, has
functions and responsibilities as well as the power they can wield over their
a salary grade of 27.[6 cralawred
respective area of jurisdiction.13 cralawred

On October 27, 1999, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion to his

The threshold issue for the Courts resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan has
omnibus motion,7 citing Rep. Act No. 8294 and the ruling of this Court
original jurisdiction over the petitioner, a member of the Sangguniang
in Organo v. Sandiganbayan  ,8 where it was declared that Rep. Act No. 8249,
Panlungsod of Dapitan City, who was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of
the latest amendment to the law creating the Sandiganbayan, collated the
Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and that the
Act.
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to depend
not on the penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its
jurisdiction but on the rank and salary grade of accused government officials The Court rules in the affirmative.
and employees.
Rep. Act No. 7975, entitled An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural
In the meantime, the petitioner was conditionally arraigned on October 28, Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential
1999 and entered a plea of not guilty.9 cralawred Decree No. 1606, took effect on May 16, 1995.Section 2 thereof enumerates the
cases falling within the original jurisdiction of the (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice
Sandiganbayan.Subsequently, Rep. Act No. 7975 was amended by Rep. Act to the provisions of the Constitution; andcralawlibrary
No. 8249, entitled An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under
Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes. The amendatory
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
law took effect on February 23, 1997 and Section 4 thereof enumerates the
cases now falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. b.Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.22 cralawred
For purposes of determining which of the two laws, Rep. Act No. 7975 or Rep.
Act No. 8249, applies in the present case, the reckoning period is the time of c.Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
the commission of the offense.14 Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
criminal case is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
crime.15 However, Rep. Act No. 7975, as well as Rep. Act No. 8249, constitutes
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
an exception thereto as it expressly states that to determine the jurisdiction of
Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher,
the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the
or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
reckoning period is the time of the commission of the offense. This is plain from
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
the last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of these two provisions
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
which reads:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.23 cralawred

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise [exclusive] 16 original

A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of determining
jurisdiction in all cases involving:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
the government officials that fall within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Chapter
a.Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, Rep. Act No. 7975 has
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, grouped them into five categories, to wit:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Section 2, Title VII, [Book II]17 of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher.. .
the commission of the offense:

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up

In this case, as gleaned from the Information filed in the Sandiganbayan, the
crime charged was committed from the period of January 3, 1997 up to August
9, 1997.The applicable law, therefore, is Rep. Act No. 7975.Section 2 of Rep.
Act No. 7975 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined in
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, thus:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Sec. 4.Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:18 cralawred
a.Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,19 where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;20 cralawred
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;21 cralawred
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice
to the provisions of the Constitution; andcralawlibrary
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
With respect to the first category, i.e., officials of the executive branch with SG
27 or higher, Rep. Act No. 7975 further specifically included the following
officials as falling within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher
rank;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an exception to the
general qualification relating to officials of the executive branch as occupying
the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.In
other words, violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 committed by officials in the
executive branch with SG 27 or higher, and the officials specifically
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, regardless of their salary grades, likewise fall Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades issued by the
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Department of Budget and Management in 1989, then in effect at the time that
Rep. Act No. 7975 was approved.For example:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Had it been the intention of Congress to confine the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 only to officials in the Category New Position Title Grade
executive branch with SG 27 or higher, then it could just have ended paragraph
(1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
16.FOREIGN RELATIONS SERVICE
7975, with the phrase officials of the executive branch occupying the positions
of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.Or the category in Foreign Service
paragraph (5) of the same provision relating to [a]ll other national and local
officials classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Foreign Service Officer, Class II27 2328 cralawred
Classification Act of 1989 would have sufficed. Instead, under paragraph (1) of
Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,
Congress included specific officials, without any reference as to their salary Foreign Service Officer, Class I29 2430 cralawred
grades. Clearly, therefore, Congress intended these officials, regardless of their
salary grades, to be specifically included within the Sandiganbayans original
jurisdiction, for had it been otherwise, then there would have been no need for 18.EXECUTIVE SERVICE
such enumeration.It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that words in a statute
should not be construed as surplusage if a reasonable construction which will Local Executives
give them some force and meaning is possible.24 cralawred
City Government Department Head I 2431 cralawred
That the legislators intended to include certain public officials, regardless of
their salary grades, within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
apparent from the legislative history of both Rep. Acts Nos. 7975 and 8249.In City Government Department Head II 2632 cralawred
his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. 1353, which was substantially
adopted by both Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No. 7975, Senator Provincial Government Department Head2533 cralawred
Raul S. Roco, then Chairman of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights,
explained:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
City Vice Mayor I 26

Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
such that only those occupying high positions in the government and the City Vice Mayor II 28
military fall under the jurisdiction of the court.
City Mayor I2834 cralawred
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction over cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the City Mayor II30
principal accused are officials occupying the positions of regional director and
higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation
and Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim 19.LEGISLATIVE SERVICE
capacity at the time of the commission of the offense.The jurisdiction,
therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the Sangguniang Members
Sandiganbayan.

Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I 25

The President of the Philippines and other impeachable officers such as the
justices of the Supreme Court and constitutional commissions are not subject to
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan during their incumbency. Sangguniang Panlungsod Member II 27

The bill provides for an extensive listing of  other public officers who will be Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member 2635 cralawred
subject to the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.It includes, among
others, Members of Congress, judges and justices of all courts.25 cralawred Office of the City and Provincial Prosecutors36 cralawred

More instructive is the sponsorship speech, again, of Senator Roco, of Senate Prosecutor IV29
Bill No. 844, which was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and
became Rep. Act No. 8249.Senator Roco explained the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in Rep. Act No. 7975, thus: Prosecutor III28

SPONSORSHIP OF SENATOR ROCO Prosecutor II27

By way of sponsorship, Mr. President we will issue the full sponsorship speech
to the members because it is fairly technical may we say the following
things:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for
that Court to concentrate on the larger fish and leave the small fry to the lower
courts.This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-
pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets of that court, to
wit:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary
grades were at Grade 26 or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower
courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public
officials whose salary grades were at Grade 27 or higher and over other specific
public officials holding important positions in government regardless of salary
grade;26 cralawred
Prosecutor I26
Noticeably, the vice mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
prosecutors, without any distinction or qualification, were specifically included
in Rep. Act No. 7975 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.Moreover, the consuls, city department heads, provincial
department heads and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, albeit
classified as having salary grades 26 or lower, were also specifically included
within the Sandiganbayans original jurisdiction.As correctly posited by the
respondents, Congress is presumed to have been aware of, and had taken into
account, these officials respective salary grades when it deliberated upon the
amendments to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Congress passed
into law Rep. Act No. 7975, specifically including them within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.By doing so, it obviously intended cases
mentioned in Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep.
Act No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1) (a) to (g)
thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan.

Evidently, the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No.
1606, amended Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, were specifically included
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because the lawmakers
considered them big fish and their positions important, regardless of their salary
grades.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some of the officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) are not classified as SG 27 or higher under the Index of
Indeed, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the
legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute. 37 From the
congressional records and the text of Rep. Acts No. 7975 and 8294, the
legislature undoubtedly intended the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of
Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by the aforesaid subsequent laws,
to be included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if
the accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has
jurisdiction,38 can only be properly interpreted as applying to those cases where
the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among
those specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g)
.Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a.
(1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the
jurisdiction of the proper trial courts where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher.By this construction, the
entire Section 4 is given effect.The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory
construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of
the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce a harmonious whole.39 And courts should adopt a construction
that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat
quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole
of the statute its every word.40 cralawred

In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is a member of

the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City and he is charged with violation
of Section 3 (e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.Members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod are specifically included as among those within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,41 or even Section 4 of Rep. Act
No. 824942 for that matter.The Sandiganbayan, therefore, has original
jurisdiction over the petitioners case docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED.The

Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated September 23, 1999 and April 25,
2000 are AFFIRMED.No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 105965-70. March 20, 2001.]
GEORGE UY, Petitioner, v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON.
OMBUDSMAN AND THE HON. ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., SPECIAL
PROSECUTION OFFICER III, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Before the Court is the Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto of the Court’s ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999
and resolution dated February 22, 2000 that the prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that
the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the
jurisdiction of regular courts.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Court stated in its decision dated August 9, 1999:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the
authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the
regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan."cralaw virtua1aw library
It explained in the resolution of February 22, 2000 that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(t)he clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the
State and regular provincial and city prosecutors under the Department of
Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the
Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the
Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and
for other purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman" primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. . ." And this is further buttressed
by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the
Special Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct preliminary investigation
and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan."
Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction clearly serve to
limit the Ombudsman’s and Special Prosecutor’s authority to cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan."cralaw virtua1aw library
Seeking clarification of the foregoing ruling, respondent Ombudsman raises the
following points:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) The jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan is not parallel to or
equated with the broader jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(2) The phrase "primary jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan" is not a delimitation of its jurisdiction
solely to Sandiganbayan cases; and
(3) The authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases
before the Sandiganbayan cannot be confused with the broader investigatory
and prosecutorial powers of the Office of the Ombudsman."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Thus, the matter that needs to be discussed herein is the scope of the power of
the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation and the subsequent
prosecution of criminal offenses in the light of the provisions of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act [RA] 6770).
We held that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and
employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but
those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well.
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses
committed by public officers and employees is founded in Section 15 and
Section 11 of RA 6770. Section 15 vests the Ombudsman with the power to
investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
x          x       x
Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic component of
the Office of the Ombudsman under the latter’s supervision and control, the
power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 11. Structural Organization. — . . .
x          x          x
(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the Special
Prosecutor and his prosecution staff. The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall
be an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and shall be under
the supervision and control of the Ombudsman.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and
control and upon authority of the Ombudsman, have the following
powers:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is
plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer
or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that
the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. 1
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
particularly in Section 15 (1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11 (4) granting the Special
Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be
construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of
the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as
authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this
authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases
involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The
exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to
investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and
employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the
legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and
employees during their tenure of office. 2
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be
equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of
RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the
Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control
and upon authority of the Ombudsman. 3 Its power to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases.
The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers
and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. 4 To carry out this
duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate
any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of
certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his
supervision and control. 5 The law likewise allows him to direct the Special
Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in
accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one
of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the
Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him
a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in
public office. 6 A review of the development of our Ombudsman laws reveals
this intent.
The concept of Ombudsman originated in Sweden in the early 19th century,
referring to an officer appointed by the legislature to handle the people’s
grievances against administrative and judicial actions. He was primarily tasked
with receiving complaints from persons aggrieved by administrative action or
inaction, conducting investigation thereon, and making recommendations to the
appropriate administrative agency based on his findings. He relied mainly on
the power of persuasion and the high prestige of the office to effect his
recommendations. 7
In this jurisdiction, several Ombudsman-like agencies were established by past
Presidents to serve as the people’s medium for airing grievances and seeking
redress against abuses and misconduct in the government. These offices were
conceived with the view of raising the standard in public service and ensuring
integrity and efficiency in the government. In May 1950, President Elpidio
Quirino created the Integrity Board charged with receiving complaints against
public officials for acts of corruption, dereliction of duty and irregularity in
office, and conducting a thorough investigation of these complaints. The
Integrity Board was succeeded by several other agencies which performed
basically the same functions of complaints-handling and investigation. These
were the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission under President
Ramon Magsaysay, the Presidential Committee on Administration Performance
Efficiency under President Carlos Garcia, the Presidential Anti-Graft
Committee under President Diosdado Macapagal, and the Presidential Agency
on Reform and Government Operations and the Office of the Citizens
Counselor, both under President Ferdinand Marcos. It was observed, however,
that these agencies failed to realize their objective for they did not enjoy the
political independence necessary for the effective performance of their function
as government critic. Furthermore, their powers extended to no more than fact-
finding and recommending. 8
Thus, in the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the members of the Constitutional
Convention saw the need to constitutionalize the office of the Ombudsman, to
give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its
recommendations. 9 The 1973 Constitution mandated the legislature to create
an office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. Its powers shall not
be limited to receiving complaints and making recommendations, but shall also
include the filing and prosecution of criminal, civil or administrative case
before the appropriate body in case of failure of justice. Section 6, Article XIII
of the 1973 Constitution read:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"SECTION 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the
Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan, which shall receive and investigate
complaints relative to public office, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, make appropriate recommendations, and in case of
failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding
criminal, civil or administrative case before the proper court or body."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Implementing this constitutional provision, President Marcos, on June 11,
1978, exercising his power under Proclamation 1081, enacted Presidential
Decree (PD) 1487 creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan. Its principal task was to "investigate, on complaint, any
administrative act 10 of any administrative agency 11 including any
government-owned or controlled corporation." 12 The Tanodbayan also had the
duty to file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative
case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or body if he has reason to
believe that any public official, employee, or other person has acted in a
manner resulting in a failure of justice. 13 It should be noted, however, that the
prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was to
be done by the Tanodbayan through the Special Prosecutor who, according to
PD 1486, 14 had the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation,
file information for and prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of said court.
The Special Prosecutor was then under the control and supervision of the
Secretary of Justice. 15
Shortly after its enactment, PD 1487 was amended by PD 1607 which took
effect on December 10, 1978. The amendatory law broadened the authority of
the Tanodbayan to investigate administrative acts of administrative agencies by
authorizing it to conduct an investigation on its own motion or initiative, even
without a complaint from any person. 16 The new law also expanded the
prosecutory function of the Tanodbayan by creating the Office of the Chief
Special Prosecutor in the Office of the Tanodbayan and placing under his
direction and control the Special Prosecutor who had the "exclusive authority to
conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan; to file informations therefor and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases therein." 17 Thus, the law provided that if the
Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official, employee, or other
person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or
proceedings, he shall cause him to be investigated by the Office of the Chief
Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or
administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the
proper administrative agency. 18
On July 18, 1979, PD 1630 was enacted further amending PD 1487 and PD
1607. PD 1630 reorganized the Office of the Tanodbayan and transferred the
powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan himself.
Thus, the Tanodbayan was empowered to directly conduct preliminary
investigation, file information and prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and other courts. The amendment gave the Tanodbayan the
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan; to file information therefor and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases. 19 Section 10 of PD 1630
provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 10. Powers. — The Tanodbayan shall have the following
powers:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) He may investigate, on complaint by any person or on his own motion or
initiative, any administrative act whether amounting to any criminal offense or
not of any administrative agency including any government-owned or
controlled corporation;
x          x          x
(e) If after preliminary investigation he finds a prima facie case, he may file the
necessary information or complaint with the Sandiganbayan or any proper court
or administrative agency and prosecute the same."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 18 further stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 18. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person. — If the
Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official, employee or other
person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or
proceedings, he shall conduct the necessary investigation and shall file and
prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case before the
Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper administrative
agency."cralaw virtua1aw library
With the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman
was created. The present Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is mandated
to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and to notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof. 20 He possesses the following powers, functions and
duties:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee
of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as
well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original
charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents
relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to
the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in
the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
records and documents.
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant
and with due prudence.
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and
corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination
and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform
such functions or duties as may be provided by law." 21
As a new Office of the Ombudsman was established, the then existing
Tanodbayan became the Office of the Special Prosecutor which continued to
function and exercise its powers as provided by law, except those conferred on
the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution. 22
The frameworks for the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special
Prosecutor were laid down by President Corazon Aquino in Executive Order
(EO) 243 and EO 244, both passed on July 24, 1987.
In September 1989, Congress passed RA 6770 providing for the functional and
structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. As in the previous
laws on the Ombudsman, RA 6770 gave the present Ombudsman not only the
duty to receive and relay the people’s grievances, but also the duty to
investigate and prosecute for and in their behalf, civil, criminal and
administrative offenses committed by government officers and employees as
embodied in Sections 15 and 11 of the law.
Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman
model whose function is merely to receive and process the people’s complaints
against corrupt and abusive government personnel. The Philippine
Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute
erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the
enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses
that may be committed by such officers and employees. The legislature has
vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.
Recognizing the importance of this power, the Court cannot derogate the same
by limiting it only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. It is apparent
from the history and the language of the present law that the legislature
intended such power to apply not only to cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but also those within the jurisdiction of regular courts. The
Court observed in the case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan : 23

"A perusal of the law originally creating the Office of the Ombudsman then (to
be known as the Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent
thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of the Ombudsman was
already vested with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal
cases before the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.

x          x       x

Presidential Decree No. 1630 was the existing law governing the then
Tanodbayan when Republic Act No. 6770 was enacted providing for the
functional and structural organization of the present Office of the Ombudsman.
This later law retained in the Ombudsman the power of the former Tanodbayan
to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. . . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Finally, it must be clarified that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute

cases involving public officers and employees before the regular courts does
not conflict with the power of the regular prosecutors under the Department of
Justice to control and direct the prosecution of all criminal actions under Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules of Court must be
read in conjunction with RA 6770 which charged the Ombudsman with the
duty to investigate and prosecute all illegal acts and omissions of public officers
and employees. The Court held in the case of Sanchez v. Demetriou 24 that the
power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive
authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman provides:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the

direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In
cases cognizable by regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of
the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined (therein). 25
The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the
Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution
of cases cognizable by regular courts."cralaw virtua1aw library

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court’s ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999
and its resolution dated February 20, 2000 that the Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.