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    StrategyAndTacticsNo063 VeraCurz

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    David Sergio Salas Vargas

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    of 73
    stiateby fa Ververtuy g U.S. Invasion of Mexico 2 serne hed July/ August 1977 Bo) ‘The Magazine of Conflict Simulation ‘erevaton: 34,000 Evitor/ Publisher Art Director! Co-Editor James F. Dunnigan Redmond A. Simonsen ‘aor. Soeph ont, Howard Brash Fiche Bera, Gren Costa Fae’ thvt Pos 8 tar: Mork Herman, Brod Hesod, Dav © by. ‘Jranis along Saphen Patch Bb yr, Se Sackson, Thora Weds ahe bedeesen Lay cata, Kato ign, Mantra F Miah Acmnrsragve: Those, ne sigan Dae, Ge” eae arg eer org. at Seon a ortae aneevluewen end Researen aseatanee Marin Carmpion, ‘ewatJore Heya, Stave Uist Lo Neher, Josaph Seon nigra Edirorand Founder Critopher Wagner Die Cutung. Freedman De-Custer STRATEGY @ TACTICS Mogisne i copvight © 1877 by Simulations Teen. ne beset USK Al ight resmned Aol ar Siren Rew ek RYPNCoIO STRATEGY @ TACTICS i puted ‘Shocks of money orders only Bane ad toe |S 81/560 per page for [GREAT BRITAIN & EUROPE: arte and Euopoan customers shoud PUBLICATIONS: CRutentenebon, Cow Pesapte Hal Atincson, Cheshire WA TBSSP, Utd ange ase subscrgven ate rom SPUR ‘Siecunds 8 per yest AUSTHAL A @ NEW ZEALAND resides shoud seer win MALTARY SIMULATIONS PIY LTD. PO. Box 7 suhione Gan, Vctons 3182, Aussie Simulations Publeations, Ine, das nt usualy consider for publation Seated gorws and sree sutras fo Sey or Smulons Sores ese, hone, ates mara deg re Sere seme reaporabany for sh unease The pubcaion of pad agvorgerants in SPI pubteatons dows not {natn a endo by S11 a gpa ot Semone ote SPI $etenarens my apgowing mis publestons Pl resowes he eh To| Pesca ad sovrtooment conse misecing x hari eisee'S the tora st tna etre or the readoshe. ‘Adretsamatsct SP! product at backad by a guarantod crit or cash ‘Shue tapan prompt return ot tw procuct!# the buyers sats In this issue page VERACRUZ 4 US Invasion of Mexico, 1847 Richard Berg Joe Balkoski ‘Simulation: RI VERACRUZ US Invasion of Mexico, 1847 Richard Berg Redmond A. Simonsen The Historical Impact of = DISEASE Sterling Hart OUTGOING MAIL The Editors 2 FOR YOUR EYES ONLY 19 BRIEFINGS 31 FEEDBACK ise sheet) Vox Populi, Vox Dei * separat 3, Business Reply Order Form 4. Special Offer/ Feedback Forms 5. "Feedback SIMULATIONS PUBLICATIONS 44 East 23rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10010 Telephone (212) 673-6103 Looking Ahead to Next Time In SET 64, the game wil be Raid, a tactical simulation of “special frees” operations. Thore wil azo be the same subject, written 3, Mark Herman. A second article wil iecuss the curent situation in Canada in general, nd Quebec in particular, nthe ight of ‘the potenil which exss fora Canadian civ war. Plus our regular fetures. Domestic Subseribors: it ‘you have not received your copy of SBT 64 by 11 November 1977, tly our Customer Service Department. Plase include your Customer Code fand fave of expiration, both of which can be ound on yourmaling label, justabove your name, Foreign Subscribers: wight wooks 1 the above date to allow forthe torpid pace of international nth cover: Ens ofthe than Sth US Intanry Regents sor te toe oe pont af Churubusco, Outgoing Mail Big Tsimmis know i's cliche, but things ai are more than ‘usually hecte araund SPI these days Just str ing through the premises you note thvee guys in ‘one office, two in another, and another wo in 2 third. At aur weekly RED meeting yesterday. Enc Goldberg, asked ebout progtess on his Dascont ‘9p Crete game, responded witha five minute fe ture ~ complete with diagram and xeroxed notos on how he and Greg Costikyan had success aed the tables and plywood boards in oom #4 in order to it wo Cretes and a Word & Sorcery, all wo-map games. They have Carefully calculated that lassuming no one in ‘Seidual weighing over 190 Ibs.| they aven have room foe a couple of playtesters Things are crowded, and the problems we have expurenced inmseting au production schoduin racont months re largely responsible. Games that Should be "inthe Art Department” [inthe can \we'dsoy, it we were inthe fim business) ae diag ‘gingalong taking playtest rooms and developmen faleneray that properly ought to bespent on “cur. font” projects hoch, by the by, consequent tis0 fal behind schedules Well, naw we ara mak ing major efor, not so much 1 “catch up,” but ust to re-estabish the egitmacy ofthe schedule Derse, which had begun, both here and outside of Now York tobe regarded as same sort of scklon ingl joke. We have, with painfuleare, constructed a new schedule. The master schedule i a com puter printaut beoken down into, "milestones winch are dates by which time, for example, @ Din test shoul be sont out, oF the inal version of the map handed in o the Art Department. Hero i summary a the projects that are current onthe books as they stand now (15 June 77} Air War: The RED work i completed, but the game nas ben stalled in tho Art Department Pending competion lat st of War Between the ‘States and this iesueo! ST. Available: 20 July A MIGHTY FORTRESS Reformation and Counter-Reformation, 1532-55 @ Six-Player Game of Negotiation and Confrontation @ Separate Resolution of Political, Military, and Relig jous Conflicts @ Rules for Finance, Divorce Question, and Excommunication On 31 October 1517, Martin. Luther ‘resented his 95 Thesos at Wittenberg and thoreby, in his ator to reform the Church from within, pracitated The Reformation ‘and with i, one of the most violent and im placably host oras in European history. ‘A Mighty Fortress recreates the turbulent era Of the Reformation ttom the viewpont of poltical/rekgious interaction, augmented by rnitary actiwy. ‘The game map depicts Europe trom Spain to the Black Sea and fom Norway 0 the Mediterranean, As individual Game-Tums cover a period of one year each, ‘hero is no terran afferentiation other than bborween land and water. Rather, tho map is designed primarily to illustrate political (e0g7aphy ~ including the splintered duchies and prinapalies that dotied the Continent in the 16th Century. Thus, whie the Ottoman Empire covers the ena Southeastern por tion of Europe ike shugo soid-coor blanket, Central Europe, the battleground for much of the conlict, @ a veritable patchwork quit. Germany slone encompasses seventeen political sub-divisions — e.g., Nassau, Muenster, Brandenburg, Cleve, Ansbach, ‘etc. — while the protteration of talon stats, Such a5 Milan, Savoy, Tuscany, Genos, adds to the problems of the various players. And each player does have quite a few prob joms to concern himself with in his quest to gain an advantage over the other players, Countries and achieve his particular objec twos, Accordingly, the actual aystam of play has boon designed wth simplety In mind Both movement and combat itaguar and singe! are quite base, and the entire game ‘machanvos can be learned in less than fifteen ‘minutes. Each player receives, according to Fis assigned forces, Armies and/or Navies, with the Lutheran ‘and’ Papal players also Feoaving Missionaries at various times. Wile the various Armies and Navies are alike in terms of strength and movement capacity leach player's force composition s distinctive ‘Thus, England recoives eight Armes and sk Navies at the start of the game, while the Hapsburg players begins with twenty five Ar mies and leven Navies, When the game begins, each plaver has his ‘wn sot of objoctives, the attainment of which earnshim points, s the failure to atain thom loses pains. Each country has four possible sets of objectives. At the Start ofthe f9me, ane of these sets is chosen — secretly "tor each player. Of course, al the objec tives ate within historical framework. 30 that basicaly, everyone knows what everyone else is ater, yet the objective sets ore ciffuse {enough — in terms of particular values assign, 8 {0 particular cites or tereitres oF cond tions ~ thatthe players can nover be exactly sure what their opponents. are up to Suleiman the Magrvlicent (the Ottoman player! might have as his objectives (among ‘thers! Vienna and Venice or the Kingdom of Naples and the Papal States may be what ho s after. France may wah 10 expand into The Polatinate and the Netherlands; or she may Be looking elsewhere. What is aways true that no ene can achieve their goals Unaided ‘Another constant isthe Lutheran ployer’s in erative o extn the scope of Protestantism Into. many countries as posible. And, while ‘mast of the other players may, at various times in the game, find itdesicable to promote ‘or acode tothe Protestant caus, rather han Fesist, the Papacy must invariably soek 10 Som the ring tide of Lutheranism. To ths fend, both players receive Missionaries. For tho Papal player, these represent the newiy formad Order of Jesuits, Missionaries are us 4 ta conven or reconvert the prineipaies and counties on the map. And while Mis Sionaries may sometimes be eliminated by force oF Treaty, the surest way to change the feligion of an area is through a head-to-hoad theological contrantation between Mis: Sionaries. These are resolved on the Theological Debate Table. Results on this table include (or the loser imprisonment, ex ia, and even being burnt at the stake Tor ‘And the diplomatic/ politica facet of A Mighty Fortress can be almost Byzantine nit rapiahy shifting allances and arrangements. There is ull st of rules to cover Peace Treaties, UUtimatums, Declarations of War which must bbeannouncedat east one turn prior to anya tack), and Allances. In adition, the Pope has the power of Excommunication, which he ‘may ‘meld against recalcitrant players Vwihin the framework of the rule, that). And the result of al this is political and diplomat at ‘rasphare in which aliances change wtualy fat tho drop ofa de. The French player may have deciged on a campaign against England, ‘nly to see the forces ofthe Ottoman Empire ‘rushed at Vienna, frosing Charles V, the Hapsburg leader, to turn his attention westwards, thus forcing @ rapprochement land alliance between France and the former enemy, England I's tharichness af interplay Combined with the internecine imporatives created by the conflicting objectives of each Player that produce a power polities style ‘ame that wil challenge the abilities of even the most sver-tongued enthusiast. Only one with a truly Machiavellan mind sot ean ave ‘ceed against five strong opponents — op: orents who wil ikaly be around to the bitter fend, as itis virtually impossibie to. completey clminate a player. 4 Mighty Fortress covers the twenty-four ‘years from 1832-1855 and requires up to eight Fours of playing time. Optional rues are pro vided Tor taxation and frances, which add ‘great depth to the game as well as an in teresting problem for tha players: campaign Ing costs money! The Papacy i rch, and i ‘one remains Catholic, the Pope may provide help ~ ithe wishes. Other players must whee ‘and deal, and plan earetuly to avoid going broke Designed by Historian Rudolph W. Heinze ‘wo years ago and extensively payested both by the Gesigner in linais ant here st SPI, 4 Mighty Fortess should rark a one of the most exciting and intiguing diplomatically ‘tented simulations of the past fe years A Mighty Fortress will sell for $9. Available 25 July " eCVacitl75 U.S. Invasion of Mexico 1847 by Richard Berg with Joe Balkoski It is hard to believe that the United States’ most suc- cessful war is its least remembered, especially when ‘one considers what emerged as a result of the war. Militarly, it was an eighteen month period in which U.S. armies won an unbroken string of victories in North Mexico, occupied the California area, and then’ invaded Central Mexico, marching into the heart of the country to capture her capital, Mexico City. Diplomatically it ended, at long last, the bothersome decades of border disputes to the south, opened up vast new territories and focused attention on the Pacific, which in turn led to the Gold Rush of “49 and the great Compromise of 1850. In terms of a general overview of history, the Mexican- ‘American War also proved the woeful inadequacy of the European military system when applied to the New World, The Mexican Army at the time of the war was European-trained and European-assembled to the core — and equally rotten, European commanders and military experts, when viewing the upcoming conflict, in 1846, could not foresee anything but a complete Mexican victory, given the size of her army and her "European'‘a training. But the European system was @ hollow shell that worked with even less validity in the rigid hierarchical Mexican social structure. Text continues atright ‘Scott landed outside Veracruz on March 9, 1847 and took the city March 29. He advanced up the National Highway, defeating the ‘Mexicans at Coro Gordo on Apri 18 (A). He continued up the road, ‘aking Puebla inthe middle of May. Here he rested and reorganized ‘or three months, He headed toward Mexico Cty in August, taking ‘route south of Lake Chalco. He defeated the Mexicans at Con- troras (8) on August 19 and at Churubusco (C) on August 20. He proceeded to the outskirts of Mexico City and fought sction at El Molino dl Rey (0) on September 8. On September 13, 1847 the for ‘res of Chapultepec was stormed and taken in 8 furious action (6 ‘The ection continued nti nightfall as. the Americans pessed through the outer gates of Mexico Cty. The Mexican army under ‘Santa Anna fed tothe north and the Americans entered the cty on the next day. ‘As with European armies of the day (and many Drevious eras) the private solder — the lowly in fantryman — was. recruited from the. lower ‘lasses, while the Otficer Corps came solely from the uppor strata of society. For the late ths often meant oficrs with itl or no background in military matters; for the former, it meant miserable’ morale. Furthermore, the Menican taining produced an army that preferred to fight at long range with musket and atilery. The Mex ican soldier had ite taste for close fighting wath bayonets, as did his American counterpart, and this ditt to raga ie morale. The enti system was exacerbated by 2 by a succession of generals ‘and other leaders who were inept on a scale that ‘dwarfs even the darkest Unian days in the Cv War. (The only contemporary counterpart could ossity be found in the Crimean War, tn years late. The best of the Mexican lot was her mer ural miltary and poltical whirlwind, General Santa Anna; the rest, except fora very fow, were abysmal (On tho other hand, the US solder, while perhaps not as wel raed lin terms of time inthe fed! a8 hia Southorn counterpart, was remarkably adap table and his moralo, despite constant illness and Tavguo, was atten romarkabe, Furthermore, US leadership, while replete with its usual dullerds nd political hacks, was equal tothe task. Her corps of oir offers, most of tham from Wast Point ‘wos a remarkable group that inckided such names ‘8 Jackson, Le, Sharman, Longstreet, Grant Beauregard and MeCielan inal, forthe Americans, twas a mast interesting campaign. Andnowhere did the US troops and of fice shine more under greater adversity and, \kewise, nowhore else di the Mexicans prove 36 monumental ineptin key situations than they oid during General Winfeld Seat’ invasion to cap ture Mexico City in 147. The Veracrur campaign shares a unique place in American mltory history in the US's frst offensive war, it wae our fst ‘otal offensive and amphibious military invasion, and i wos aio the first tme the US ever occupied ' foreign capital. lis success in accomplishing Both was exceptional, and the campaign is 3 perlect microcosm of ane military system on the Fe, pessing another onits way to obivion. Preparation for Invasion The warin the north had gone extremely wal, but It had not produced the desired Mexican ‘sur render. President James K. Polk and tis miltary ‘advisors realized that Mexican pot was stil bent ‘on avitory. and it was obvious tothe US mitary Commanders that a decisive result would have 10 be achieved elsewhere. The only question was where ~ andhow Mexico City, the capital of the country, was the choioe as target. Not only did this great city have miltary importance tin tors of being the potios| and financial center of Mexico), but Tt aso ‘presented much more tothe Mexican populace, being but on the site formery occupied by Tenochtitlan, the capital of the Aztec Empire. It was a beautiful city, probably as beautiful i its ‘wn way in 1847 asi was 325 years earer when Cortez tst saw i. And it was now the target of & USinvasion ‘The main problem was how to gst there Secteary ofthe Navy George Bancroft outhned to the President the various means of approaching the iy. Tha wo most favorable routes seemed 19 be the road fram Tampico to San Luis Potosi — {and thus towards we capital andthe route from Veracruz, the great easter port of Mexico, through the mountains to the capital, the same ‘oute tken bythe conquering Cortes. Discussions ‘wth Naval Commander, Commodore David Con omic o et 71 ‘The War in the North Northern Mexico ‘As the War with Mexico was ostensibly {ought over Texas ~ which the American government had annexed in 1885 and which ‘most Mexicans stil felt, albeit without much Conviction, tobe partof Mexico — itstands to reason that tha war would start there. Thus, in ‘the spring of 1846, after negotiations with Mexico had lapsed into tutlity and the Paredes government had assumed the Presidency (he we hrostie toware the US} President Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor, commander of the US forces inthe Southwest, to proceed towards the Rio Grande and take up positions on the northeast side ofthat river, in what the Americans con- ‘sidered to be their terior. ‘This provoked immediate reaction from the Mexicans who sent a force to Matamoros to ‘oppose any American dvance. After some ‘threatening notes between the wo armies Ithe Americans had some 4,000, the Mex. Jeans about 12,000) Mexican General Mariano ‘Arta sont a sizable force of cavalry across ‘the river on April 24, 1846, and cut up a squadron of Americans under Captain $.8 ‘Thorton. The war wasn, By the beginning of May Taylor had swung in to action. He left» smal force to hold Fort Brown, guarding his supply line to the sea, and headed towards the Rio Grande. ‘His 2,000 men encountored Aista’s 6,000 Mex: ican regulars at Palo Alto on May 8th and rove them ftom the road. On the following ay they advanced to Resaca do la Palme Where they again smashed the Mexican ‘Army, this ume in an excollant defensive post ion behind a creek bed. Two victories in two days was too much for Arata ond heretoated to Matamoros. Tayor than regrouped at Fort Brown, reinforced the area and headed south, Arista, his army low on morale aftr the two ‘defeats, abandoned the ety and headed 10 Linares, wero ho was relieved of command, ‘The Americans now turned their attention towards the key city of Monterrey, 10 the southwest ‘Monterey, 2 city of about 15,000, was in 2 particulary strategic poston. It blocked the ‘mountain passes to Northwest Mexico and Satilo and, if captured by the Americans, ‘could anchor the Norther Mexico defense line and provide base for further incursions into the country. To that end the new Mox- ‘ean commander, Ampudia, fortified it well. It was guarded the ear by mountains and wa nestled against a small river. Its western proach ~ tho Salilo Road — was through @ ‘narrow defile andthe only open terrain was in front of it. Thus Taylor, wie had solidified his Position near the Mio Granda and advanced Cautiously through September, faced 2 well- fortified stone city, erss-rossad In front by ditches and pits and defended bya force fain excess hisown. ‘But Gonoral Wiliam Worth took his brigade fon a flanking manouvor t9 the north, and, with the help of two days of rain and misty fog; cut off the Sato Road and grabbes the heights overlooking the city, Both Taylor and Worth then combined to fight thir way into the city and after @ third day of house-to- house fighting the Mexicans surrendered It \was a brillant vietory for Taylor and Worth and @ major morale. booster for the ‘Americans. Unfortunately, President Polk, ever the political creature, decided that Tayler was {getting too much good press. He informed Taylor that he was not to advance beyond Monterrey. On the same day Taylor roosived that message he sent Worth to the important town of Salilo which Worth occupied io November. Tayior then established his haa- ‘quarters outside Salto and awaited further word: In the meantime a force under Commodore Conner had seized the important port of Tam ico, onthe eastern coast in November. And General John Waol prepared to march into CChinuehwua 1 threaten Durango. But Wool in October, learned of a gathering of forces under Santa Anne at San Luis Potosi with the intent to threaten Tayior's positon. So Wool, instead, marched towards Sato to reinfores Taylor. Polk, by this prio (late 1848), had decided ‘that ‘simply holding the detensive line in Nor ‘hein Mexico (which was totaly controlled by US troops) was not onough, and the plant ‘nade at Veracruz was formulated. To this ‘end Scott was sent to Tayior’snew headauat- ters at Monterey t0 detach troop forthe in vasion. Taylor looked upon the whole idee 3 2 pureiy poteal scheme to dim his poical Star. He was inordinately (and perhaps Fightflly) suspicious of Pok and his cabinet ‘members, and every move Pok made seemed ‘wo full brigades with him already! and head ‘edsouth Whi a thi as takng pice Sante Ann command of tw Mossan forces, wot ite isny Tat he wae sound nth fet ace sto arent of one of Pas re intamous ‘undo: Sans Anse otal coer had uted another setback when he wa rod in et to vane: Hawg epent a yoor {rs0 thre erjoving the local tan 20 10 Soak, he sunt ana ot ho Po The mincod Poi Wat Sota Ata avery Beocetul inantons towards the United Staton Polt, raring took fora way out of thegrowingstorm over ie coming mar, come ‘ip withthe doa of sling San Apne To sto tough the US Sockade of easter Hesican pore, he shoul so atom: Thu, ‘then Paredes wax overtvown tr August of {46 Soma Anna sow hi race ed at Vera, and mode's tramphont any ito the capil, And he into tomas the US wre anything But peaceful By th end of 1848 Sata Aa hd ied an bony oF 25,0. An drng he ang he ta army. ocated ne of tose sang ota war. The Meniane Mcp ah oi on The fees tegcaee American cute and ha saptche t he Mencans bout the propesed Invesion ot Veracruz. Santa Anna now had a choice: march north and fight Taylor or turn south and propare a warm welcome for Scott. With ‘only a minimal grasp ofthe stratagc station ‘Santa Anna chose the former. Santa Anna's easoning wes that the traditionally impreg- ‘able forwess of Veracruz could hold out in- ‘efinitaly while Santa Anne smashed Tayior's “mall army in a quick campaign. What Santa ‘Anna failed to realize was that Taylor had no intention of heading south from his positon, ‘tha way south was blocked by an immense ‘Sesert. As Toyir’s position was strictly ‘defensive Santa Anna would have been safe in turning his attentions towards Scott. In- ‘stand he chose tomarch north. “The trip across the desort was a lving horror {or his troops; alter leaving San Luis Potos| ‘the axmy found litle in the way of sustenance = and less water — and when it reached La Encarnacion, atthe northern edge ofthe trok, ‘the arm hadibeen reduced to 20,000. Stil, it_was easly four times the size of Taylor's force and Santa “Anna had. ac- ‘complished one great thing: he surprised the hel out of Tayi. Taylor saw that his im ‘mediate postion at Agua Nueve was indoten- ‘tole and easily turnable. Leoving @ small Seraon he immediately retrestad to 2 small fanch, somewhat tothe north, called Buen Vista, Here he found a formidable defensive position guarded by creek beds and ditches land with range of low hls to his rear. Santa ‘Anna, thinking the Americans to be fleing, ordered an immediate pursuit inthe dark. To his amazement, as the next day (February 22nd) dawned his weary army eame upon the ‘Americans displayed in ful battle array direct: ty infront of him. A quick look at Toyir’s ‘orton stopped Santa Anna from attacking Irnmediately, but at thee in the afternoon the Mexican launched thelist attack. For three {ull days the 20,000 Mexicans and the 4,500 ‘Amorieans fought the most brutal baie of the war, Enrly Mexican successes wore ‘counterad by sharp American rales, andthe ‘Americans were tray snatched from cer- tain defeat when Taylor mse! artived on the 2rd with reinforcements trom Sattlo. And the two armies Kept batering each other through diving raine and cold ‘unt, on the fevering ofthe 2th, Santa Anna realizes that bis army could ight no more, “The battle was, in a tactical sense, 2 draw. ‘Santa Anna figured that he had enough or tillery and regimental flags to claim a victory, but ina strategic sense the victory was ‘Taylor's for Santa Anna was forced to march his men back over the same route they had taken to reach Buona Vista. Tayor hold hie position against an army fur times his own — ven after being surprised. And Sante Anna? ‘The march back proved even more arduous than the previous journey andthe brave Mex: ‘can soldiers literally dropped by the ‘thousands. The Mexican Army that reached Mexico City in early spring wes @ vertable ‘snadow of the force that had left 3 month tation. The seit-sivied “Napoleon of the ‘West had taken a chapter out of his name- soke’s book — he had done in Mexico what "Napoleon had done leaving Russia. New Mexico Now Mexico was a prize for the US. The city ‘of Santa Fe contalled the major trade routes In the area and its huge open land was an at tractive target. However, New Mexico was a simmering hotbed of Moxican nationalism, 3 hotbed the Americans did not spot unt too int. In May, 1846, Colonel Stephen Kearney and 1800 trontiorsmen left Fort Leaverwvorth and marched 1000 miles into the teritory. Tho "Mexicans had threatened to fight, but no bat- tie materialized during the entire journey. ‘Without fing a shot Kearney occupied alte key ties ana thecapital, Santa Fe, by August 18th Kearney immediately set about to peacefully ‘wansform the tery. In that regard he ap- pointed the popular Charles Bent as governor fd promulgated a series of relatively fenient [aws. He then laid plans for two separate ex ‘editions 10 further extend US military con- ‘ral. ‘The first was led by Alexander Doniphan, Missouri lowyer with @ somewhat unique character, who took his st Missourl Volun- fs and marched against Chihuahua, Fighting two brie but furious bates with his 1800+ men and enduring incredible hardships ‘over the long march, Doniphan captured Chi- ‘nuahua on March 2, 1847. He then tumed Inthe meantime, Keamey left Santa Fe for Colonel String’ Price's ralef column and took 300 weary men and headed for Califor. ria. Halfway there he encountered Kit Car- fon, who informed Kearney that Calflora had fallen. Kearney thon sont hal his men ‘back o Santa Fe and headed to the coast with ‘the agreeable thought of some nico, soft ‘aaron duty. Unfortunately, Carson was Unaware that the Mexican Califomians had revolted against the American occupiers and the 180 men faced another long, hard cam- paign, Furthermore, all wes not wll back in [New Mexico. The local Mexican patriots, see- ing. the absence of any strong military presence, revolted and brutally. murdered Governor Bent. However Price reacted quck- Iy and spent 9 whirtwind two wooks rooting Cut the rebels, finaly smashing them at Taos, "New Mexico wasnow officially American, Californ California proved to be the most important ‘American objective in the West, and the miltary operations in that ares were a joint Iavatland project. Inthe fal of 1845 the President had sont the young Captain John C. Fremant on 9 “scien Ic” expedition tothe West Coast. He arived therein January of 1886 and pitched camp in the Southern area but wae soon askod to leave by the local authors, who viewed his presence as on unnecessary element in an tseady clouded picture. Calforia, it seems, wes coveted by not only Mexico and the United Stats, but Russia as well as England, Fremont marched his men north but reversed his course upon hearing ofthe Impending out- break of the War with Mexico. He then mar- ced to the Sonoma aree, engsged in some ‘minor skirmishes with pro-Maxican forces dnd. then participated in the somewhat Nderous “Bear Flag Revolt” — Witicrous ‘because of its total lack of support. When war ‘wos offically declared the farcical coup became area in thatthe United States now took possession — in name — of the area. Fromont now marched his men towards the ‘Monterey (California, not Mexico) area ‘The navy, in the meantime, had been equslly ‘active. Commodore Sloat and his force took Monterey and then San Francisco, only tobe Invcharge” argument with Fromont. Despite theie dasgreements the two planned a two: ‘pronged attack on therajor Mexican garrison {nthe south, at Los Angeles. Stockton tans ported Fremont’s Cafornia Battalion to San Diego on July 24th where they were to march ‘overland towards A. and then Stockton and the navy steamed towards that harbor to act fs support. Stockton, however, got itchy and decided to aesault on his own. Surprisingly the Mexicans simply abandoned the city and ‘alowed Stockton to occupy iton August 13th ‘without @ shot. Stockton declared himself Governor and reported the situation well in hand. Fremont, heering this, marched north- Wards to gather some now recruits. The stua- tion was anything butwelhin-hand. Near the end of September Stockton was in SSan Francisco when ho received the news: that the Calfornians had revolted. He rushed south, alerting Fremont, only to ind that Los ‘Angeles hed. falien and the rebels were in ‘command. Stackton and Fremont ted to repeat the plans ofthe previous summer but ‘this time the organization was poor, Fremont ‘goto at Monterey instead of San Diego, and fhe whole campaign colapsed. Only the ar tial of Kearney ond his bedragglod 150 men ‘offered any hope, asthe Mexicans now con= troled the inteior and Fremont was off "wandering inthe hinterland somowhore. ‘On December 5th Kearney was ordered tad vance towards San Diego. The next day he fencountered 8 large force of Mexicens and ‘boat them off in the Battle of San Pasaual. Reduced now to 100 tired men, Kearney ‘waited for reinforcements. When none ari fed he took a defensive position on the San Bomnardo River and, on the TOth, repulsed ‘another enemy assault. Despairing of ever Seeing any reinforcements Koarney moved forward again and on the 12th his exhausted force stumbled into San Diego. Hearing of Kearney’ victory Stockton and @ ‘motley ctew of 600 sailors, marines and other ‘assorted irragulars headed for Los Angeles. In arly January of 1847, in a aetes of short Sharp engagements ‘Stockton took Los ‘Angeles. Two days ter Fremont atved with ' force of 400, encountered the remaining Mexican Army outside Los Angeles and ar ranged his own peace terms — much to the furor of both Stockton and Keamay. Califor nia hod fallen, and the only fighting let was betwoon the Americans to see who was in command. omine ate §} er, produced the information that there was no Tampico-San Luis Potosi road, and. Tampico could be akan only by naval forcas. However, there were two goad landing places near Veracruz, and the latter soon became the target sit forthe impending invasion ‘While Conner had stated thatthe best months for campaigning in vs area were Guting the winter Iwhen the éteaded Yellow Fever was not present] he refused to ive estimates on the numbers of ‘mon and the ammount of materia it would need to compli such a mission. This, however, wos ‘supplied by General Wintiid Scott, who was in his element in planning such amanedver. Working ‘through the night to achieve extensive detail, he American Civil War Leaders In the Mexican War 1, Robert E, Lee: The most distinguishec engineer inthe Mexican War. Lee made many personal reconnaissances under fre and was Considered Seot's che! scout. Performed in: Valuable service inthe battos around Mexico iy Lt, Ulysses $. Grant: Fought at Monterrey and Cerro Gordo. Distinguished himself by having a cannon brought up a church tower uring the attack on San Cosmo. grit in Mexico City. Lt R.G-T. Beauregard: Another dstinguish: fed engineer with Scot. Was influential in the decision to attack Chapultepec rather than at ‘ack through the southern poston. Lt. Col. Joseph. Johnston: Leda regiment during the attack on the west face of CChaputepec. Lt. Thomas J. Jackson: Commanded 8 sec tion of artilry that played a crucial roein the bombardment of Chapultepec Lt. George Picket: Raised the fest American ‘lag over the parapet of Chapultepec [Lt Braxton Bragg: Commanded a battery at ‘Buena Vista and Monterrey. Major Jubal Early: Acted 28 Governor of ‘Monterey during the war. LA, George H. Thomas: Fought at Buena Vista with Taylor. Col, Jefferson Davis: Commanded a volun {Wor rogiment, the Mississipp ites, Capt. Henry Halleck: Held 8 statt position ‘throughout the war Lt. George B. McClellan: Fought at Cerra Gordo and Contreras. LL. George G. Meade: Fought with Taylor at Rosca dela Paima and Moniorey. Lt, William 7, Sherman: Hold stat postion ‘throughout the war Capt. Philip Kearney: One of the few ‘American cavalry leaders of the war Led @ ‘dramatic cavalry charge at Churubusco in ‘which he lost is arm, Lt David D. Porter (U.S.N.): Fought with Conner in the Gulf and at he landing at Vera ‘came up with an inital report on October 7, 1846 ‘which set forth the necessary items and man: ower if would need to capture. the port ot Veracruz. Aiquing that to advanos inland without 2 port wath which to secure Supply wos capricious at best, ho estimatod that it would take 10,000 men to seize the city, with sufcient landing craft to put ashore 2500 ofthese plus two ful batteries In the moarnime, despite Polk's desire to maintain rnlitary pressure on the Mexicans inorder to force 8 surrender, General Zachary Tayla, in command of operations in the Monterrey area, brought bout an armistice The not only went drecty ‘against Pok’s strategy, but it also confirmed, at lenet to Polk's way of thinking, that Taylr was in- ‘competent, Polk was, at this ime, inthe process of choosing @ ‘commander for the upcoming invasion and any {chances that Tavlor ~ hero of the war so far — had to fead this campaign went ight down the rain. Polk's choices were somewhat limited at this point. For the political animal, Polk was ex- cecdingly wary of choosing anyone but a Demo- ‘rat for the post, a he was certain that whoever led the invasion would bacome @ national here 4nd, hus, logical chaiee as Presidential cand date in the next election. Unfortunatly. the only ‘generals who ft that description were Ma. Gen ‘ral Robert Patterson and Maj. General Willam a. Neither, though, was acceptable as P son was foreign-born and Butler a totally unknown ‘quantity. For some reason, the wellknown Big enor John Wool was not considared. Wintel a 8 Scott was completely untrusted and dslited by Polk for various reasons, not the least of which was that he was a Wha, ‘A. novel solution then presented itself to Polk ‘when Senator Thomas Hart Benton asked for the ‘command with the rank of Lieutenant General However, that post had to be created by Con ress, and Congress was notin session, Thus, 2 time was starting to run out for successfully aun ching the campaign, the Presdont’s mind gradual- Ty came back to the hated Scott, wose prepara tory workon the invasion had besn excolen. In the meantime, Scott was preparing further panes on the Veracruz problem. He now changed hs manpower asimae o force 4,000 regulars ‘and’ 10,000 volunteers, plus 1,000 Marines and iors supported by tity transports and 140 flat boats, sufficient to land §,000 men and to bat teres of fild guns simultaneous. The depth of Scot's report along with tho lack of other cand dates finaly broke down Polk's resorvos about the ‘late Whig general, and in November the cabi- ret approved the campaign and commend was ‘iver to Scott laboit witha distinct lack of grace on Pok’spart Scott immediately throw himsll into the minute logistical problems of launching the United States fist amphibious invasion, Planning operations of ths type was his motor, and there were few gen fram US history better a thislvel of siategcal ‘operations than Scott. He drew up voluminous Supply ists, planted false stores inthe papers to ‘mislead the Mexicans iwho often got US troop in formation quicker than the American gonerals from this sourcel, and requested specially con: structod surlooais for the landing. The ship-of tho-ine Onio was ceverod tothe Gull to assist in the landing, and then Scott began to requsition Itoops tram Taylor's foree (muh to the latter's fismay and anger. inchiding General Worth’s troops and General Patterson's force (which had lust racantly seized Tampico). Despite the relative inalficency of the War Department, which some: {imos seemed to en the pay af the Mexicans for All'the help they wera in gatting things done, by theme year, 187, the operation was underway, ‘Scott had designated the Islnd of Lobos, about Sty tive mies southeast of Tampico, as the ren Sezvous point Tora his transports. Wort’ div Sion had reached Brazos Santagoe, an island oft tha mouth ofthe io Grande, in mid-January and Patterson's and Twiggs’ divisions arrived in the newly captured Tampico tho following week Seott wrote back 10 Secretary of War Willam Marcy that he intendad to embark his fist troops for the invasion before the and of January, but he had not reckoned with the ineptitude of the War Department. While Scot waited and fured at Lobos, the Wat Department completely botched the acquisition at the transports necessary t0 bring supplies to the fendeevous point. raft scheduled for one port (wont fo another. or jst edn show up ata. Bad ‘ether, inthe form of vicious "Northers,” fouled Unloading atthe varous southern ports and Mex ‘ean coastal towns, and the ante month of February dvindled away while Scott and his sft attemprod to siaighten out the problems. Troops Gnd transports arrived in debs ané drabs, now ‘eluntoer rectus wore diled to Koop ther from, belting into mischve! texcept fr the 2nd Penny Sania, which was quarantined because of an out break of smatipox), and in general choos was ram pant, which was especialy maddening to. the Toaisticalyonentad Scott. The Yolow Fever Season ms rapidly approaching, andthe invasion could wait no longer Finally, on March 2nd, the last of Scot's toons armed (Worth and two arilery companies), and ‘While over haf his stores and ordnanos had yet 10 fartve Scott raised fis pennant. on the Army Steamer Massachusetts and headed for Anton Lleardo, the umnping-off point forthe invasion. Setting the Defense The Mexicans were not completly ile during all this, Despite Scot's attempts to foo! the Mex ‘eans into thinking he was heading 10 roleve Taylor, the Mexican army had gotten wind ofthe impending invasion In January Scott sent orders, wath explanations, to General Butler directing he ‘The Generals United States Major General Winfield Seot: It can be s3id ‘quite easily that Winfield Scott is the mo “underated” field commander in U.S history. Between the Revolution and the Civil ‘War Scott was far and away the finest soldier in America. His strength lay in his sense of ‘veal strategy, which was excallot, and his bly to organize, which was equally excep- tional. He was known to his men as “Old Fuss and Feathers” las opposed to Zachary TToylo’s “Old Rough and Ready" because of hie compulsive attention to detail, He wes not ‘2 great tactician, often leaving that phase of ‘combat to his subordinates (an excallent ‘ample ofthis can be seen at Contreras, when ‘Smith applied tactically what Scott ordered Stategialy) and he was somewhat nsive, politically, often falling to grasp. the hecasstias of the day. He was loathed by SSocratary of War Willam Marcy and even ‘more #0 by President James K. Polk, who {eared Scot as @ potenti Whig candidate in 1848, Ironically, it was Zach Taylor who became President in '48| He had a tremen: ‘dous wll — oF e90, if you prefer and perhaps hie greatest etvangth in a campaign thought by “professional tobe impossible, was that he refused to ever consider the possibilty that he was wrong. As the Duke of Wall ington stated, "He is the greatest ving soldier.” rig, Gen, William J. Worth: Across 23d ‘Stioet ftom the offices of SPI is a majestic ‘monument which reads, “Honor the dead! Under this monument les the body of Gen. Willem J. Worth." Thore follows, long Ising of American victories in the Mexican ‘War in which Worth fought. As Scott was probably the most underrated general in ‘American history, so Worth was probably one ‘of the most unknown given the large role he ‘was to py inthe war, Worth was 52 upon the ‘outbreak of the conflict — professions Sold all his fe, but not a West Pointer. He has been described os "a man of average height but not very stwong, with atin figure ‘and a martial ait he seemed the elegont ‘ter, He ap- Fash and impetuous, aways offending peopl ‘and later apologizing. "A grade ora gravel” fhe used to scream the was always very con, ‘emed with his own advancement). After the ‘war, he deemed himself is us hero and fot “strongly that he might become President. He ‘was the favorite of tha influential newspeper ‘the New Yerk Sun (which explains his monu: iment in that city). Ap able tactician and leader, he was far in advance of most of his contemporaries. Maj. Gen. John A. Quitman: Quitman was nota professional sedier, buta vlunteor who Immediately fe to goneral officer rank. His tactical ability wes for and he was a decent fivisional commander during Scott's car paign. He cistinguished himself tremendously bt the bates outside Mexico City. He appears tohave been something of asolders’ general, {3 he pericipated in the attack on the Belan ‘avita with a red handkerchief atached tothe Bayonet of a soldier's musket. He also rode in {© Mexico Cy during th victory parade with 8 tattered, blood-stained uniform and only ‘one shoe. However, Zachary Taylor com. plained that he was afficted "with unbound. fedvanty.” Maj. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow: Pillow was prob ably the least talented, most unpopular and ambitious general officer in the US Army ‘daring the Mexican War. He was nota prot onal soldier, but one of President Polk's Cronies, It wos sai that he know nothing of ‘war and had ne desire to learn. He was a ma. ‘ot with his men as well, and thoy dotostod him. He dished out punishment fea, During ‘one punishment, ts troops became rather tive. He rade in front of them screaming, ‘Shoot me f you dara m not etait del His contemporaries described hie asa 'con- Sumate fool” an "ass" anda "mass of vanity, feaneat, ignorance, ambition, and want of truth.” He issued propagenda reports ator the war ridiculing Seot, and this general wed to have him arested. However, Pilow pulled stings and Polk brought down Scott, Brig, Gen, David E. Twiggs: “Old Davy” ‘Twiggs was agrizzied old professional soldier, butnota West Porter, He was described as 3 "kind of srow-clad volcano, 2 human Ets, pouring fortha red:hot lod of orders andob- [uration from his crater of a mouth.” He was Tked by his men because he associeted well wth them — he even “cursed them right out ff thai boots." Unfortunately, he appears £9 hhave been something of a doi, aways spo ing for a fight. "He handled his" troops incompetently at Cetro Gordo, as he ep: peared to noglet the location ofthe Mexicans ven though everyone on the feld knew where thay were, Scott sid that ho was "un ‘qualifies to command an army ~ eitherin the presence or nthe absonce of the enemy." A (ert said that "his brains were merely what happened to be left ova from the making of his spina cord.” Maj. Gen, Robert Paterson: Pattorson wa Another volunteer general who showed 3 ‘trong navito towards ritary mattors in the Mexican Wee. He lacked inilative and was ‘considered by historians to be somewhat mock. However, he was wal ied, one vitor Aesoriing him as in the sive of an English Squire, with crtan vry agreeable qualities of his Irish race — when he chose to display ‘move Worth’s roops at Saltlo tothe coast to pre pre for the camoaign. The courier, Leutanant ‘John Richey, sas ambushed by Mesioans and kiled and the orders were soon delivered to the Meucan General Staff (S00 the module on the War nthe Nori), Furthermore, detachments of Mexican cavalry had boen observing the entire ‘operation around Brazos. Santiagos and other Ineations and the conclusion was obvious. The ‘question was, would the Mexicans do anything about i? General Sania Anna made his fatal decision to ‘move north, and his army was being inthe process Of being "buted in the northern desert alter heir Stalemate at Buena Vista (22-23 February, 1847) {An insuttectionspeung up around the capital, but Santa Anna was abe ta merch to Mexico City and, amid the chaos, resume supreme power, Both poltically and miltanly. This state of chaos atthe beginnning of the yaar 11847) was unfortunately not conducive to organizing a defense against the ‘coming invasion. AS eary as Noverner 1846, the Mexicans had read in. New Orleans newspaper of the plan to attack Veracruz by amphibious lan ing. Santa “anna had ordered 6,000 mata 0 assemble there, but bureaucratic incompetence fled to produce any ofthese men on time. By the beginning of March General Mera y Vilama,chiet tengineor ofthe Mexican army, and his highly com potent subordinate, Lt. Colonel Manel Robes, ‘espaired of ever completing the restructuring of the old, crumbing fortiications of the splendid port and its sister fortress, San Juan de Ulua, Re peated attempts to gain funds fox such an under Taking had mot witha distinc lack of enthusiasm ferovera year Veracruz itsll ong a popular spot for oxpatriate Europeans, was an infamous strongpoint. Her water edge was guarded by 2 massive wall with 9 fortatach end ~ Concepcion and Santiago, But het landward defenses were poor, as it was tet that any atack must come from the sea. The land walls were, at best, about fifteen Test high and two-to-the feet thick, Tha town was surrounded by a plain about a half-mile in extent, whieh, in tum, was tinged by waves of sand dunes which oxtod the coast. Thebes feature of tho Veracruz detensive postion was ta the east, just off her Sore. There, on a roof named the Gallegs, wos the fortress of Sar luan deUlua, Bult of satteoral stone faced with grante. Tremendous wal, over sixty feet in height and vrtualy unecalable, sur rounded her, and battries were placed at every ‘concenvable ianding postion, There was room for '2 garrison of 2500, and the entire fortress was con. Sttuctod in a classn, sclntiie manner to with stand an extendod siogs. Hor wals boasted 135 ‘uns, 5 of which were the modem shel variety The point of fact was, however, that Veracruz, by list, was indofonsile. Her walls wore weak and ‘communieation with Ulua was impossible, there ‘being no transports for supplies, ete. But to aban: don the postion and fallback to prevent Scott from reaching the inter was unthinkable in terms of morale, and the idea of evacuating Coullans and fighting with troops to the end oe {cured too late ta implement. In any case there was plonty of ammunition, the town iself was sand- bagged for protection, and all available cannon Wore whipped into working order as Scott's inva sion floila grew nearer As the state mia rumbered about 20,000 tat least on paper: what they were worth anybody's quess but a iow very ow — guess would not be far from wrong) and resident foreign consulates predicted help a fing, the morale a he ety became quite strong The garrison was now led by Ganeral Morales, who nas quite brave and even more popular — nat too capable — and the presence of almost 5,000 men (1200 in San Juan Be Uhl served fur ther to spike the baligerent nature ofthe nhaby tants. While 3,000 + civilians remained and helped pian furthorrsistanco the ery want out, "ether ‘we will triumph, or all of us, withavt a solitary ex option, wil be intared in the ruins.” By the end fof Febuary, and without much assistance from the govarnmentin Moxien Cty, Veracruz flt elt ready to withstand the assault ‘The Siege of Veracruz By March 4 the fist US troops began to steaminto ‘Anon Lizard and by the 8th the entive force them.” He left Scot's army with the volun twors in May 1B47 but later returned. He wos \ellcansidared enough tobe asked to remain inte army after me war. ‘Commodore David Conner: Conner was an excellent naval officer who masterminded Scot’s amphibious assault against Verocr. itis to his creat that thie aseaultaufored al ‘most no casualtias. Conner was an expert seaman and navigator who had served in te Gulf since 1815. Unfors ‘was quite an unhealthy ma fed as a confirmad invalid” and worn and wasted.” Nevertheless, be handled the naval War in the Gulf export unt replaced by Perry. Commodore Matthew Perry: Petty was without a doubt the most famous American ‘seaman ofthis ora, due mostly to hater trip 10-Japan, Perry was not wel-iked by his can: ‘omporaie. He was very coarse and had the ‘character often labeled at this time as a "gra bie” — a socal inforor but ambitious of ficer. He was a competent naval tactician {sis recordin the Gulf during the war show- {4 He aid not get along wall at all wth Con. rer, showing fo grace to the old seaman when hoisting his flag in the Missssipa on March 21, 1847. He was nicknamed “Old Bruin" by hissaiors Mexican General Antonio Lopes de Santa Ann Without a doubt, Santa Anna is the most ‘wcltknown Mexican personnage ofthe 19th Century to Americans. Most Americans, 1 Imembering their stores of the Alamo, picture Sania Annaasavain, stupid butfoon, nothing bt a butcher on the bateteld, These tales fae not far from the rath. He was described a5 “tl, thin, apparently feeble but capable of ‘grat exertions on occasion, with a head that bulged atthe top, aswarthy complexion, with brillant rostess eyes and 2 very clear-cut voice and voluble tongue. He styled himett 12 "Napoloon of the West” and was ance heard to remark, "Were | made God, I should wish tobe something more Santa Anna had made his reputation during Maxico's Napoloone dieorders by hunting ‘down guerrilss and insurgents. By 1830 he ‘was considered to be something of national hero de to is ather shaky defeat ofthe in vading Spanish armies at Tampico in 1829, Thon came the dsastrs in Texas in 1836, fo lowed by the French invasion of Veracruz In 1638 (wine e lost io). Santa Anna's reputation sky-rocketed and plummettad altarnatay in the decade before ‘the American invasion. Apparently the gene- ralisimo had the charisma or shrewdness to win over al social classes to whatever cause he happened to be preaching at the time Isomevhat ike Napoleon). However, Sama ‘Anna — unlike Napoleon — never had the abit to fulfil his vast promises made to his ‘compatriots. This variable 10 his aires. Maj. Gen. Gabriel Valencia: Valencia was 3 rival of Santa Anna's and as such the (wo ‘espised each other greatly. He was described 4 “of average height but unusually broad, ‘with a bullneck deep in hiv shoulders as if some person had tied vo Force a good ide i= to his head witha pile-driver.” Santa Anna, somewhat biased, said "hes an ambitious in subordinate st; he deserves to have his brains blown out.” Valencia turned against the gene ‘alissimo withanarmyat the end of the wa ig. Gen. Juan Morales: Little is known about tis miltary governor of the Veracruz district except that he was fay capable and popular leader. Santa Anna did not ike him because Morales had arranged 2 cold recep tion when the ganeralissimo visited the town in 1848. When the “Americans. besioged \Veracrur Moraes cried, “As God lives, either wo wal triumph otal of us, without a sotary exception, will be intented in the ruins!” NNovortholes, he sunendered the ity — some think ar sooner than he should have. Maj. Gen. Juan Alvares: Alvarez was some thing of a "bourgeois gentihomene, "an “ig rorant peasant from the wilds” who had ad vanced rapidly during the intemal Mexican disorders of the 1890's and 1840's, He sooms tehave been 3 former queria lnader gone re spectabie, even though someone remarked that “he understood only half-savage, part san fighting.” Brig. Gen. Joaquin Rangel Lite is known ‘about Rangol except that he appears to have been an able brigade commander during the battles around Mexico Clty. Me Urgently tied to.arrange a defense of the San Cosme garta in the face of a rush by Worth’s division, and ‘as doing well until badly wounded bya can ‘non fragmant. Rangel seems to heve been Something of » hard.luck case, During the procipitous retreat towards Mexico City in May 1847, Rangel and his staff wero "mug ged" by Mexican bonditos who. left the ‘general nothing tokeepbut hissword. Maj. Gen. Valentin Canalizo: Canalo wos fone of Santa Annas lackeye who was natu ‘mental in the Cerro Gordo disaster after the fall of Veracruz. Ho has boon described as "9 Fie man with 9 big tongue.” His relations ‘with Santa Anna soon deteriorated, however, 25 the generalissimo wert s0 far as to accuse Cenalz0 of colkision with the Americans. “This was akin toa "faithful dog being kicked ‘once foo afta," and after the fall of Mexico City, Canalzo {in conjunction with Valencia) ‘turned against Santa Anna with an army. 10 11,000 men — had arrived. On the morning ofthe 6th, Scott and his enti staff boarded the steerer Petrta and scouted Commodore Conner’s £19 ‘geste landing site, Colado Beach, a sandy spot bout two and a half rile south af Veracruz. The beach ‘seemed to be undefended, and Scott prepared to carryout the invasion mmediately To this end he had organized the invasion force in to thvee divsions. Two of these divisions were en Iiely of regulars, under Generals Worth and “Twiggs, while the volunteer division was under the command of Patterson, (Actually, at this time, those units were stil considered brigades and it ‘wosn’tunti after the capture of Veracruz that they ‘wore assigned the status of divisions!) Worth’s Sivision wes scheduled to comprise the frst wave, {ollowedtay Patterson and Twiaas. Conner, in charge ofthe naval arrangements, had Set March @ Tor the landing, but the threat of 8 “orther” — and the concomittant dstuption of wransport — canceled that date, When the storm {alled to appear, the invasion was definitely set for the following day. The 9th davened a bright sunny dy andthe activity soon grew to 8 frenzied pace Units gathered up thar kts and formed for the troop Wenspors, pannants and flags were unfurl fed wile the shouting of offers and singing of ‘men filed the a In ths inorecibly festive air the boats were gradually loaded. 54,000 oops Clamberad aboard the frigates Ratan and Potomac, the others on lessor vessels. By 11:00 ‘AM the force had completly embarked and the fltila set sail the short dstance toward Veracruz ‘and Collade Beach Salling in @ narrow, single filo, flagship Massachusors futtoring ponnants from with the all 86s, the ships slowy made theit way toward the point opposite the beach and swung around inte thei postions Several ofthe gunboats moved ino line opposite we shore and began shelling the beaches as the troops lowered themsalves into the surfboats, 60 to B0 men per boat. The guns of the forts at Veracruz and Uua thundered in vain at the too dis tant fotila, but only a soltary Mexican ertlery shell was launchd from the beach directly op posite, The US Navy fre quickly dispatched the fer covalty oops in the dunos, and amidst ie mendous cheers the boats baaded for shore uickly they slashed through the foam and General Worth jumped ashore, followed by his ren. The opportunity for counterattack was im ‘The Naval War With Mexico ‘Tho United States possessed absolute naval ‘superiority over Mexico from the frst moment ‘of the war Howover, any preparations for tra ‘tional sa battles were obvieted by the fact ‘that the Mexican Navy consisted of two steamers, one brig, and sx ver craft (al of ‘which took refuge in the port of ANarado tary inthe war, never to sorte). With such a domination over the Gulf, the choice of ‘American naval strategy in the war became Clomentary: the support of land forees in ‘coastal zones, raids along the extensive Mexi- an coasting, blockade, and defense against privateerng. In actuality, these tasks — even Without any opposition — heavily taxed the mall U.S. Navy, and it was hard prossod to fulfil thom. The naval aspects ofthe Mexican War have beon almost ential ignored. even though the U.S. fleet — Ike Its compatriots fn land — met with a similar string of suc- ‘cesses, It must be edmitted, however, that the Navy accomplished those tasks ‘somewhat clumsy. The U.S. Navy entered the Mexican War ina state of fax, The concept of naval technology and design in the erly 1840's was changing ‘rapidly andthe Americans wore hardpressed ‘@ keop pace with it. OF course, steam power had impacted on navies as early 8 the Napo: loonie Wars. The U.S.N. had numerous “sidewheelr” steam frigates, such as the (Mississpo!, Suequehana, and Powhatan, al bul ate in the 1820's. However, these ships ‘only supplemented the pure sang ships of the fleet. Tha U.S, made a breaktwough in sorow propalor design with the Princeton of 1841, butthiship — the only one of tskind at the time — was ani lightly armed. Finally, the Navy was in the process of adopting a new type of explosive naval armament, the Paix: hans shel, which rendered almost every pure Iy wooden ship obsolete. With the Industrial Rovolution in full swing in 1846, itis small ‘wondor thatthe men who ran the U.S. Navy ‘were searching s frantically fora doctrine. ‘At the beginning of the Mexican War, the U.S. Navy consisted of the following ships: ‘ight old ‘ships-of-the-line, from the mighty ‘Pennsylvania of 120 guns tothe more modest Columbus of 80 guns (however, many of these ships were laid up or used as training ‘hips; fifteen frigates, used mostly for erus- ingon distant stations: 23stoops-of-war; nine brige and schoone ‘modern steam vessels. ‘The ships were deployed as follows: Asian Station (Commodore James Bidele): ‘wo vessels ‘Brzall Station: ive vessels African slave parole vessels Pacific Squadron (Commodore John Sloe slevon vessels Home Squadron (Commodore David Con her): Missieippi (Sidewheeler steamer), Princeton (scram propeler steamer, Raritan, Cumberland, Potomac (sail trigates), Falmouth, John Adams, St. Mary's stoops cof-warl, Porpoise, Somers (brigs), Flirt {schoonen. ‘and finally sever Summary of the Naval Actions ihe Mexican War Gulf of Mexico: “The Blockade of Mexico: These orders wore lesued on May 13, 1846 by Congress. By the ‘nd of July 1848, Commodore Conner had tended the blockade from the mouth of the io Grande to about 140 miles south of \eracrur. The West coast was ignored for the time bona, Raid om Alvarado (August 7., 1848): Connor Intended to land troops to seize small Mexican eval vessol inthe harbor. However tho ‘engagement degenerated into a bombard- ‘ment and Conner noisely withdrew. Second Raid on Alvarado (October 15, 1846): This took place because President Polk wanted something for the newspapers to ‘make “noise” about, Conner bombarded the port, but the gunboat McLane ran aground, ‘isordering Conner’s entre column. He called ‘he attack of Raid up the Tabasco River (October 23, 1846): This was a raid led by Commodore [Matthew Pery into one ofthe southern Mex ican states atthe base of the Yucatan Penin- sue, Perry went 75 mies upriver (dospito ‘apid}, dostoying forts and capturing me tchantmen on the way. Strong Mexican resis. tance at San Juan Bautista held up Perry, and hheeventualy withdrew. Capture of Tampico (November 11, 1846); “This was the cond biggest port an the Me ‘can Gulfcoast, but tie Mexicans abandoned the place when they heard that Conner was ‘coming. Asa result, the Commodore took the city without firing @ shot and patrolled ‘sggressivaly upriver. Four small bosts wore Cptured ond converted into gunboats. THs wes a womendous gain for the Home ‘Squadron, who could use Tampico as. base. base. Somers Episode (November 26, 1846}: The ‘crew ofthe American brig Somers performed ‘feat of daring whon they sailedinto Veracruz haroor to burn the blockade-runner Cro ‘They succosaded, but, unfortunately, the riot was an American spy-ship with direct contact with Conner Invasion at Vera Cruz (March 18671: Conner britany plannod the amphibious aspects of Scott's invasion which was carried out without 2 hitch, The Home Squedron than Supported the sioge of Veracruz with ts mas- sive guns. Perry replaces Conner (March 1, 1847): Con- ners advanced age led many to beliove tha isteadership abilty was impaired, (Capture of Tuxpan Apri 17,1847): This port, ‘bout 100 mies north of Veracruz, was the last one on the Gulfcoast to be held by the Mexicans. Perry ran his ships in amid a ferce current, bombarcing the town as he entered the port. Tuxpan fellon the same day. Second Raid up the Tabasco June 13, 1847): Perry decided to take the fortress at San Juan Bautista which had held him off during his ast ‘aid, This time he succeeded and garrisoned ‘the town with 200 men. West Coast Proclamation of Blockade (August 19, 146): Commodore. Stockton ordered a “paper” blockade of Mexico's west coast. However, the Americans did not have the moans to fulfil thi Proclamation. As a result, many southwestern Mexican clios operated mar ‘chant shipping unhindorod throughout the aja California fnvasion (March 30,1967) La Pez, San Lucas, and San Jose (tho chiot towns of the peninsula) were occupied ‘against lie opposition, although 8 Mexican force ater counter attacked (ana flied). boats teached the shore and the men quickly fled lf, to the tuno of the Star Spangled Banner being Played by the dozens of bands brought for tho o By 11:00 PM the enti force had bee ded, abet in somewhat oss order than the fst The achievement was remarkable, nies than five nous over 10,000 men had been put ashore, and not one casualty had been suffered! Even toda this would bea remarkable feat, and, considering thatthe US had never attempted such e maneuve before, the success was astounding. In 1847, it wwassimply unprecedented Thore so doubt that Morales, the gatson com ‘ander, missed an excellent opportunity 10 stike {frat biow atthe point. He hag completly over timated the size ofthe American landing force and ho had no desi to commit hs small gartson to combat naval guns, But a judiciou anding foroes ita 8 208 and perhaps nave given the US commander food tor thought have sont east instead of north — and the was what most experts considered fo be th strongest fortification n North America Sot even the Americans — ‘alt that Vr and especialy Ulia — could be taken without a protcted and costy Siege. But Scott nad no desi 10 enter into an engagement that would " produce massive casualties. This strategy proved to be quite unpopular with the press — and the ‘eading public back home, They wanted to see & us assault, Scott simply wanted t take the ‘ity. He knew that fhe dd it by assault the cost fof Such a victory mould be 30 great that further ‘advance might be virtually impossible agains the To this and he boa hering sand, the encislement and invest ral Morales was maintain ing hispolcy of minimal contact onthe theory he needed al the mon ho had. Ths, in eesonce, played right into Scot's hands. Whi Co ‘adore Conner dress the attention of the guns of Ulua, Patterson's division started its move towards the cy, While supplies were being land: fe (they continued ta do 80 throughout the fst ote on ee 13) - ‘CERRO GORDO: ‘The First Battle ‘The position that Santa Anna had chosen for tis initia defense was near the small hamlet of Cerro Gordo. Santa Anna had inspected the ‘2re0 nea Plan del Ri, five mies southeast of Certo Gordo. Plan del Rio would have been excellent: the highway there assed through a harrow defle and the positon was vitally impossible 10 turn. However, Santa Anna prafered the Cerro Gordo postion because ttadiional Mexican history hols that that post ‘ton wos equaly unapproachable because of the rough, ily torn, f Santa Anna could hold the invaders here they would stil be in "Yellow Fever” country, where the disease would take a fearful tol [At Cerro Gordo the highway wound trough a rapidly dooponing ravine as it moved away {rom the Rio del Plan. As it approached the hamlet it was flanked on the north by a hil named El Tolografo, which was over 800 Toot high and quite steep when approached from ‘the east, and fo the south by a series of ils which broke off into three tongues. The latter ‘commanded the approaching road as well as the edge ofthe plateau (which cropped of in- {0 the canyon for the Rio del Pian). Santa ‘Anna, surveying the position, felt that Seatt ‘would be forced to bring up his artlery by ‘means of the road thus restricting his ine of attack. And to that end he planned he ‘defenses. ‘The inital defending force of 3500 was dst’ ‘ated on the three tongue-tke fills, with 17 ‘guns commanding the position. General La ‘Vega also had charge of the reserves at the fork in the toed to Certo Gordo, a force of some 1400 mon and7 guns. Sante Anna then placed the Third Infantry (100 mean) on top of the huge El Telegrafo with four 4pounders with a seatoring of small contingents to pro. tect the general approach around the area. Andin therear was. strong force of over 000 men including 8 strong cavaiy contingent. Santa Anna reportad to the government that the position was complotely tortiied and predicteda tramp. However, the morale of the average soldier {id not match tho naive fervor of the proud Santa Anna. The camp wos crowded and water was dificult to obtain (the Ro del Plan "asin a deep ravine). More important, many ‘of the troops had fought ~ andlost — at Pato ‘Alt, Buona Vista, Monterey and Ressca de le Palma in the North — and suvvivors of the recent Veracruz siege had lent cadence to their worst fears. Santa Anna orderod all do- sorte shot, which caused no end of mutter ing in the Mexican camp as dosertion was 2 favorite Mexican pastime. Moreover, Santa ‘Anna had only halt heartedly fortiied La Atalaya, a ill some 700 yards in front of El Telografo snd lower than the lator. Santa ‘Anna's engineers fet sronaly that should bbe well garrisoned; Santa Anna, who fl that ot even 2 rab caulé get through his post tion, sont 25 mon. The extreme lot of the Position remsined open, despite tho advo of General Robles, and the Mexican generals talked privately of a disaster. Tho Maxican army was psychologicaly ready for a rout, with, as Jack Bauer puts i, “'..one foot already turned toward the rear.” “The advance screen of Twiggs’ Division had, by Apri 11, reached this postion and by the next day tho onginoors hed scouted tho defenses. Lt. Pierre G. T. Beauregard ‘oported thatthe il in front of I Telografo (Ua Atalaya) could be takon and would thus ‘command the whola Mexican let. Twiggs, however, decided to march his division Staight ahoad. It wasn’t until the advance ‘guard began to draw heavy fre that he with ‘dre, planning a ful assault for the next day. Lekty the two brigades commanded by Pillow and Shields had just arrived, weary fom the long march, and General Patterson, ‘who had been quite sick, took command and Ordered a hat to any further plans. ‘Scott srived on the Téth and ordered a fur- {ther reconnaissance, This time Capt. Robert E. Lee of the Engineers discovered a path \which led to La Ataiaya and Scott decided 19 se it. After clearing the path withthe help of the Engineers Scott ordered Twiggs tomarch his men down Lee's tral, bresk through the Mexican left and cu off ther escape by occu ying the road to Jalapa. The engineers at ‘empied to improve the tral during the six. ‘wenth, butt waslitle more than arough path tvough oak, mesquite and cactus. when “Twiggs division let the folowing morning, ‘The Moxicans quickly spotted Twiggs’: ‘vance and Twiggs, rather than moving {round the Mexican position, otacked't head ‘on, with Twiggs himealf raring "Charge ‘em to hell” They quickly captured the poorly defended La Atalaya, but 9 subsequent charge up Ei Telegrafo was besten back. But the Americans sil held La Atalaya and, more fortunately, the Mexicans assumed they had repuised the ottackers — as Santa Anna refused to bolieve that his ight was In dangor {roman assault. Scot's plans forthe following day, the 18th, ‘were 10 bypass El Telegrafo and cut the road Behind it while Persifor Smith's brigade, Under cavalry Colonel Hamey (Smith was it) ‘was to storm the Mexican fil In the mean- time, Pillows brigade, upon hearing the gun fire was to head towards the Mexican ‘ight and capture the Mexican positions on the three “tongues” above the Rio del Plan; Wont’s division — stil arriving — was to folow Pitow's. Harney attacked fist, leading a furious charge up €1Telegrafo. The brigade struggled up the ‘early impossible ascent fighting thor way to ‘the very breastwarks. Just as they reached ‘the summit, part of Rey's brigade clambered up tho other side of the hil causing the Mex- ‘can troops to flee At the same time Shield brigade crashed out ofthe bush into the Mex- ‘can comp. Stopping to absorb a blast of ‘grapeshot (Shiela himself suffered a grievous wound which should have been fatal but miraculously was not), the brigade hurled ‘self into the camp, sat the Mexican roserve torout and cut the road to Jalapa. Scott's ob jective had been obtained. ‘twas fortunate that things were going wel the north, for Gideon Plow was the entire attack against the Mexican ight. Ha leftlate, marched slowly (although ne was peded by poor tals), sent his troops in piece ‘well-suited. Luckily, the Mexican defendors realized thatthe road behind them hed been utand, rather thanbe isolate, fet discretion thobottor par of valor and ted. “The bate on the 18th lasted loss than thre hours and the sult was the disntogration of the Mexican Army. It wes days before they regained even a semblance of erder,aithough ‘American pursuit netted litle except some of Santa Anna's personal treasure and his wooden leg. By the next morning the “Americans had marched imo the pretty Pil City of Jalapa to tako a brief breather on their ttek toMexico City. 2 CONTRERAS: The Impossible Victory Scott's army completed the march around Chaleo and approached the town of San Agustin, from which point the main road ‘vided, both divisions running north toward the capital. The main fork ran recy north Ward through San Antonia and Churubusco toward the San Antonia Garita (gate). From ‘San Antonio te road ran toward the suburb (of Tacubaya, the town which was Scotts ‘mediate objective, However a reconnaissance by a force of Engineers determined that San ‘Antonio was extremely wolldefended and {ortied. This forced Scott to considor the se ‘cond road out of San Agustin, the roed that fan westward and curved up toward San ‘Angel and thence north to Tacubaya. The problem here was thatthe only wy to reach this road without running into another Mexi- ‘can army was to cross the "Pedropal,” lava field covered with stawn boulders and cut by ravines and chasms; it wasa virtually uneross- ‘ble heap of rock. The Mexicans considered it ‘natural barrier. Unfortunately the Mexicans ‘id aot reckon with the inredibte capabiities ff Robert E, Loe and his compatriot, P.G.T. ‘Beauregard, These intrepid engineers picked ‘oir way across the Pedrogal to its western fedge, discovered a “path” and, at the same ‘ime, Major General Gabriel Valonca's Army ‘of the North, which had just artved at San ‘Angel ‘Valencia was a most incredible military figure, inredibe in that in an army dled with ld incompetence he stood head and shoulders fbove the rest Historian Justin Smith whos ‘phenomenal scholarship isunfortunately mat ‘hed by an equally phanomenaly patronizing fatttude toward the Mexicans) was kind in labelling Valencia a “conspirator.”” @ drunkard,” and "dot." OF Santa Anna's ‘opinion of his immediate subordinate we shall ‘00 more bolow: In any caso, Valencia’ first ction was to withdraw his 8500-man force, tout Santa Anna forbade him from doing this. Soby themoming of August 18, while the US ‘engineers were studying the Pedregal,Valen- {a not only decided to stay, but he advanced his position about four mies along the road kiting the westward potion ofthe lva field to the Ile lage of Contreras. He placod his forces ona small promontory overlooking the rood; the promontory was guarded by a sms Stream thet ran below it, cutting & deep ravine into the rock Late that evening Santa Anna hada change of heart; ho now oedered Valencia to ruteat 0 his position guarding the San Angel road. Valencia refused, despite the fact that Santa ‘Anna's grasp of the general situation was ‘ite accurate. Valencia, howovor, looked Uipon this as his opportunity to win great vic- tory for himeal. I he moved to where Santa ‘Anna demanded, the victory would be his superiors. Under no terms wes he going to let hia moment of glory ip trough his fingers. Santa Anna, not wishing a command con- frontaion, chose to let Valencia assume his

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