Pakistan Iran Relations, A Holistic Preview

1. General. After the independence of Pakistan in August 1947, Iran

had the unique distinction of being the first country to internationally
recognize the sovereign status of Pakistan. By 1950s, Pakistan was a
country surrounded by powerful neighbors like india, iran, China and the
Soviet Union, which could be seen from the Pakistani territory with a naked
eye from across the Wakhan Corridor. The rule of thumb says that while
drafting your foreign policy you must start with your neighbors, but that’s
not what happened in Pakistan. The country rulers were presented with a
choice in Cold War era, as they had to choose between their neighboring
superpower, USSR or the US, a superpower across the oceans with which
they had no cultural or historical links. For better or worse the decision was
made in the favor of Washington over Moscow and that became the
cornerstone of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. The coming decades would
witness events defined by the SEATO, CENTO, the East Pakistan civil war,
the Soviet Afghan war, demise of Soviet Union, emergence of Russia,
Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear deterrence and the western invasion of
Afghanistan and the Middle East.
2. “Foreign policy may be defined as an integrated plan to secure and
enhance national interest”. Consistencies and Variations in National
interests are often the products of a state strategic culture. Strategic
culture is shaped by historical narratives, perception of the enemy, and a
state’s conception of its self. Pakistan and Iran share at least two things in
common that is the threat posed by a hegemonic powers. On the other
hand, Pakistan and Iran has a history of cooperation and have a shared
conception of being Islamic states.
3. Geopolitics of Iran as a Mountain Fortress. To understand Iran,
you must begin by understanding how large it is. Iran is the 17th largest
country in world. It measures 1,684,000 square kilometers. That means
that its territory is larger than the combined territories of France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Portugal — Western Europe. Iran is
the 16th most populous country in the world, with about 70 million people.
Its population is larger than the populations of either France or the United
Kingdom. Under the current circumstances, it might be useful to benchmark
Iran against Iraq or Afghanistan. Iraq is 433,000 square kilometers, with
about 25 million people, so Iran is roughly four times as large and three
times as populous. Afghanistan is about 652,000 square kilometers, with a
population of about 30 million. One way to look at it is that Iran is 68
percent larger than Iraq and Afghanistan combined, with 40 percent more
population.

4. More important are its topographical barriers. Iran is defined, above

all, by its mountains, which form its frontiers, enfold its cities and describe
its historical heartland. To understand Iran, you must understand not only
how large it is but also how mountainous it is.

 
5. Physiography of Iran.Iran’s most important mountains are the
Zagros. They are a southern extension of the Caucasus, running about 900
miles from the northwestern border of Iran, which adjoins Turkey and
Armenia, southeast toward Bandar Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz. The first
150 miles of Iran’s western border is shared with Turkey. It is intensely
mountainous on both sides. Running east along the Caspian Sea are the
Elburz Mountains, which serve as a mountain bridge between the
Caucasus-Zagros range and Afghan mountains that eventually culminate in
the Hindu Kush. The Elburz run along the southern coast of the Caspian to
the Afghan border, buffering the Karakum Desert in Turkmenistan.
Mountains of lesser elevations then swing down along the Afghan and
Pakistani borders, almost to the Arabian Sea.

6. Iran has about 800 miles of coastline, roughly half along the eastern
shore of the Persian Gulf, the rest along the Gulf of Oman. Its most
important port, Bandar Abbas, is located on the Strait of Hormuz. There are
no equivalent ports along the Gulf of Oman until Gawader port formally
comes online. The center of Iran consists of two desert plateaus that are
virtually uninhabited and uninhabitable. These are the Dasht-e Kavir, which
stretches from Qom in the northwest nearly to the Afghan border, and the
Dasht-e Lut, which extends south to Balochistan. The Dasht-e Kavir
consists of a layer of salt covering thick mud, and it is easy to break
through the salt layer and drown in the mud. It is one of the most miserable
places on earth.

7. Population Density of Iran. Iran’s population is concentrated in its

mountains, not in its lowlands, as with other countries. That’s because its
lowlands, with the exception of the southwest and the southeast (regions
populated by non-Persians), are uninhabitable. Iran is a nation of 70 million
mountain dwellers. Even its biggest city, Tehran, is in the foothills of
towering mountains. Its population is in a belt stretching through the Zagros
and Elbroz mountains on a line running from the eastern shore of the
Caspian to the Strait of Hormuz. There is a secondary concentration of
people to the northeast, centered on Mashhad. The rest of the country is
lightly inhabited and almost impassable because of the salt-mud flats.
8. Ethno religious Distribution of Iran Population. Underlying the
external problems of Iran is a severe internal problem. Mountains allow
nations to protect themselves. Completely eradicating a culture is difficult.
Therefore, most mountain regions of the world contain large numbers of
national and ethnic groups that retain their own characteristics. This is
commonplace in all mountainous regions. These groups resist absorption
and annihilation. Although a Muslim state with a population that is 55 to 60
percent ethnically Persian, Iran is divided into a large number of ethnic
groups. It is also divided between the vastly dominant Shia and the minority
Sunnis, who are clustered in three areas of the country — the northeast,
the northwest and the southeast

9. Geopolitical Imperatives on Pakistani Borders. Iran security

vulnerabilities are more focusd towards western borders with Turkey and
Iraq in Zargos Mountains. In case of eastern front, Pakistan and Iran have
now developed a mutual cooperating security mechanism in which both
countries have bilaterally agree to curb terrorist activities and Hotline
among senior border management forces of both side are in place. Iran
only Control the mountains to the east of the Dasht-e Kavir and Dasht-e
Lut, from Mashhad to Zahedan to the Makran coast, protecting Iran’s
eastern frontiers with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Rest of its concentration is
towards western borders and near its own population centers. The other is
to Control the divergent ethnic and religious elements in this box. Iran has
achieved to secure frontiers and is in control of the population inside the
country. The greatest threat against Iran is the one it has faced since
Alexander the Great — that posed by major powers outside the region.
Historically, before deep-water navigation, Iran was the direct path to India
for any Western power. In modern times, the Zagros remain the eastern
anchor of Turkish power. Northern Iran blocks Russian expansion. And, of
course, Iranian oil reserves make Iran attractive to contemporary great
powers. Iran’s security system is strong and its internal issues are well
under control as compared to Pakistan. Ever since the founding of the
Persian Empire, the one thing that Iranians have been superb at is creating
systems that both benefit other ethnic groups and punish them if they stray.
That same mindset functions in Iran today in the powerful Ministry of
Intelligence and Security and the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
(IRGC). (The Iranian military is configured mainly as an infantry force, with
the regular army and IRGC ground forces together totaling about 450,000
troops, larger than all other service branches combined.)

10. Pak – Iran Relations brief History. History of this relationship

dates back with Iran being first country to recognize Pakistan’s. Post
revolution era of 1979 onwards it touched its lowest ebb.  Finally, the
relationship over the years, with change of rule in Afghanistan and arrival of
US forces, Iran kept a close watch on changing events in the region while
keeping its national interests prime. From the outset, there were apparent
differences between Iran and Pakistan.  While the former was a state with
predominantly Shi’ite Muslims, Pakistan was established as a secular
homeland for South Asian Muslims with Sunni majority.  However, the
relationship survived not only because both countries were allied with
America, but also because both Iran and Pakistan were uniformly anti-
USSR members of the Baghdad Pact after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan – a neighbor to both countries. In fact, this common enemy
would continue to serve as a unifying factor even throughout and after the
Iranian Revolution of 1979 and Iran’s resulting reversal of position towards
America.  And it is also important to consider that the shared ethnic
minorities meant shared responsibility for keeping them under control: both
Pakistan and Iran worked together in these early years to suppress a rebel
movement by the Baloch.

a. The Post-9/11 Landscape. The terrorist attacks of September

11, 2001 were a turning point in Iran-Pakistan relations.  Most
immediately, with America’s swift removal of the Taliban from
Afghanistan, it appeared as if relations were going to improve. 
After all, the Taliban were a source of sectarian violence and a
major source of tension in the Iran-Pakistan relationship.  In
fact, in 2001, the two states created the Pakistan-Iran Joint
Ministerial Commission on Security to further cooperation and
collaboration against terrorism, drug trafficking, and sectarian
violence.  In November 2001, Iran’s foreign minister Kamal
Kharazi and Pakistan’s foreign minister Abdul Sattar issued a
 joint statement from Islamabad that “the two countries had
decided to collaborate in Afghanistan’s stabilization.”  Iran
supported the UN’s Bonn agreement which brought prominent
Afghan leaders together to begin planning for Afghanistan’s
future governance. In December 2002, Iran and Pakistan
became co-signatories to the Kabul Declaration on Good
Neighborly Relations. Iran further supported elements of the
new Afghani elite that would act in accordance with Iran’s
security needs by providing aid and loans to Kabul and even
training Afghani soldiers.  Particular beneficiaries of this aid
(much like in the time of the Soviet invasion) were the Herat
Shiites. This cooperation between Iran and Pakistan also
manifested itself in a number of treaties in 2002, including a
Bilateral Trade Agreement and a Defense Cooperation Treaty.
However, the US response was to continue isolating Iran by
boxing them out of positions of influence in Afghanistan. As
Pakistan grew colder to Iranian interests, Iran once again
turned to India as a source of security leveraging.  India has
gone so far as to support Iran’s efforts in Afghanistan, viewing
Iran as a conduit into Afghanistan and as a way of limiting
Pakistani influence.

b. Looking Ahead Progres - Under War on Terror. In January

2010, officials from Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan met and
agreed on a joint framework for cooperation in addressing the
destabilization along their borders.  This was the second such
trilateral meeting, and encompassed economic and security
 topics.  Iranian First Vice-President Mohammad Reza Rahimi
reaffirmed that durable security and stability in Pakistan was
vital to Iranian interests, further underscoring their relationship. 
Despite all of the strains in the countries’ relationship, it
appears that Iran is still committed to fostering good relations
with Pakistan.  In February 2010, Iranian Ambassador to
Pakistan Masha’Allah Shakeri proclaimed that:

“Pakistan, in its capacity as a Muslim state, has a

special status in the macro-strategy of the foreign
policy of Iran, with durable security, stability and all-
round development of Pakistan being Iran’s
neighbor”

c. IPI Project Progress with India. In May 2011, Iranian

ambassador to Pakistan Shakeri spoke in Pakistan, repeating a
quote from President Ahmedinejad that, “there exists no limit for
expansion of cooperation with Pakistan.  In particular, he
underscored the role that energy transactions could have in
fostering a good economic relationship.  Such an emphasis on
economic has been the most recent trend in Iran-Pakistan
relations.  It is for this reason that a recent deal to bring oil to
both Pakistan and India has been considered a “peace pipeline”
and if implemented would become a defining feature of modern
relations between the two countries. Still, disagreements over
the pricing of the pipeline and subsequent oil sales more
accurately demonstrate the current state of Iran-Pakistan
relations: possibility for cooperation undermined by constant
 jockeying for influence in the region.  India was also part of
project but quit due to civil nuclear deal with US which, was
approved by the U.S. Congress on October 1st 2008.
Indeed, this diplomatic façade that covers practical friction
in the relationship bodes lessons for a host of other areas for
potential cooperation, including political stability and nuclear
technologies.

11. Pipeline politics and CPEC. Iran appears to be

convinced that Saudi Arabia and the U.S. are behind the incumbent
PML-N government’s lukewarm response to completing the IP
pipeline project according to the agreement. The state-owned Iranian
Press TV raised concerns about the future of the project after the
change in government took place in Pakistan following the 2013
general elections. With reference to the close association of the
current Pakistani premier, Nawaz Sharif, with Saudi Arabia, it said
that the latter was pushing Pakistan on behalf of the U.S. to abandon
the project.

a. IPI development Progress under US Pressure. During

Sharif’s visit to Iran in May 2014 Iranian supreme leader
Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei had asked him not to
wait for “permission” from other governments to improve
relations between Iran and Pakistan, with an implicit reference
to the IP pipeline project.; other reasons were linked to issues
of the gas price and transit fees, and insecurity in Pakistani
Baluchistan. But after Iran and Pakistan inaugurated the
construction of the Pakistani section of the pipeline in March
 2013 India expressed interest in rejoining the project,
apparently after becoming motivated by the seriousness of the
other two countries involved in the project. An Iranian Oil
Ministry spokesperson said in April 2013 that India was in talks
with Iran to rejoin the project.

b. China Interests in IP Project. Experts believe that if the IP

pipeline project ever materializes, there are more chances of
China joining it rather than India. While China is currently
developing and operating Pakistan’s deep-sea port at Gwadar,
the two countries have also started to construct the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) stretching from Gwadar to
Kashgar in China. Besides the construction of a network of
roads and railways, the option of laying a gas pipeline along the
corridor is also under consideration. The CPEC is expected to
“place Gwadar on the matrix of intense geo-strategic
competition”, with India looking to develop Iran’s Chabahar port.
In October 2014 Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s cabinet
decided to develop the Chabahar port, which many believe is
central to India’s plans to open up a route to landlocked
Afghanistan, where it has developed close security ties and
economic interests, and to gain access to energy-rich Central
Asian states.

c. Pakistan’s Narrative on CPEC and Links with Neighbors.

In Present scenario Pakistan can cash the already
developing CPEC by inviting and involving neighboring
countries stakes in the Project. The CPEC could also improve
 regional connectivity with Afghanistan, Iran and India, because
links of this kind have been provided for in the planned eastern
and western alignments of the corridor in Pakistan. A link from
Taxila through Peshawar and Torkhum will connect the
corridor’s eastern alignment to Jalalabad in Afghanistan.
Regional connectivity with India through the eastern alignment
is planned through the Hyderabad-Mirpurkhas-Khokhrapar link
and the Wagha border, Lahore. The western alignment will
have additional regional connectivity link to Afghanistan through
Chaman and will connect to Iran through the Quetta-Kho-e-
Taftan link. But it still remains to be seen whether or not the
CPEC and Gwadar could become instrumental in forging and
enhancing regional coordination and cooperation. Moreover,
already under development Chahbahar port could also be
included under same umbrella of CPEC as part of one belt one
road initiative, thus developing it into a CPIEC (China Pakistan
Iran economic Corridor).

12. Pakistan and Iran: The Most Important Pearls in the String.
Center of global politics is shifting from West to Asia. The US indeed has
emerged as a sole super power for a time, but some rising powers in Asia
differ with the US objectives in the region. China, with its growing economy
and strategic ambitions recognized the verity that competing US on global
level will take some time. Therefore it has mainly focused on Asia. In this
context, China with its multi dimensional and multi directional growing
influence became a threat to its competitors.
a. Strings of Pearl Strategy. As one analyst contends, “China’s
readiness to negotiate with other regional states and
economically ‘responsible’ power is also a signal to other states
that there are greater benefits to band wagon in China’s
growing weight rather than opposing its rise in any manner”.
China’s economic rise, with its increasing diplomatic weight,
and modernization of military is dubbed by some strategists in
Washington as the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy. Although Beijing
has not officially adopted any such label for its strategic
designs, but the term ‘String of Pearls’ has become an eminent
component of China’s Grand National strategy. ‘Regime
survival, territorial integrity and domestic stability’ which are
China’s major strategic concerns are inevitably associated with
its economy which is at the same time its greatest strength and
vulnerability. For sustaining the pace of economic growth
Beijing relies on external sources of energy and raw material.
For its energy shipments, intra regional and cross continental
trade it relies on sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The
security of these SLOCs is major Chinese concern. Securing
SLOCs for energy and raw material supports China’s energy
policy and is the principle motivation behind the ‘String of
Pearls’. This is how the ‘String of Pearls’ relates to China’s
“Grand national strategy”. The ‘String of Pearls’ is not merely a
stratagem employed to enhance China’s maritime interests. It is
indeed an element that keeps the growth of Chinese economy
persisting at a steady rate (above 9 percent), China’s growing
influence in the region, and an opportunity to provide Chinese
 goods with more promising markets. “Simply put, a ‘pearl’ is a
sphere of influence seeded, secured and maintained through
the use of economic, geopolitical, diplomatic or military means”.
“The ‘Pearls’ extend from the coast of mainland China through
the littoral of the South China sea, the strait of Malacca, across
the Indian ocean, and on to the littoral of the Arabian sea and
Persian Gulf”.

b. Role of Pakistan and Iran in Grand Strategy. An

interesting aspect of Beijing’s ‘String of Pearls’ is that the states
that are ‘problematic’ or ‘unstable’ such as ‘Pakistan’ and ‘Iran’
(problematic, but not unstable like Pakistan) that are shirked by
the International community are “re-energized” through Beijing’s
economic embrace. The two competitors of China, India and
US are significant in this calculus. In the wake of the “Arab
spring” China is trying to increase its foothold in the Middle
East. Since its strategic competition with US has spread across
Asia, China has aligned itself with those states that have
troubled ties with Washington. Some of these states (Pakistan
and Iran in focus) are located at significant geopolitical points.
China employs Pakistan’s card in its strategic maneuverings
with India.

c. Historical Alienation of India from CPEC. Beijing has

long been concerned (at least since the end of the cold war)
regarding any moment in which India will firmly embrace
Washington. On the other hand, India has been supported by
Washington as an alternative power center in Asia. The
 strategic dialogs between New Dehli and Washington since
2010 and the potency of Indo-US strategic partnership has
much to do with the rise of China. The initial cordiality in Indo-
Chinese relations evaporated with India providing refuge to
Dalai Lama in 1959 and border dispute between the two. Thus
the Chinese Hindi Bhai Bhai narrative was reversed in to a
strategic competition since the brief border war in 1962. In the
recent past, China has consistently been asserting its influence
in the border region with violations of the line of actual control
(LAC). Since 2006 these violations are becoming frequent
every year, whereas New Dehli repeatedly issues denials by
pointing towards the opacity of the exactitude of Sino-Indian
border. Conversely, Pakistan’s ties with Beijing have been
improved as a consequence of the deterioration in Sino Indian
ties. From the beginning of 1960s, every decade witnessed
amplified geniality between Islamabad and Beijing. Only in
1990s there were signs of rapprochement between China and
India with high hopes associated on both the sides, but this
Sino-Indian rapprochement was not at the expense of Pakistan-
China relations. Nevertheless, with Indian nuclear tests of May
1998, relations between Beijing and New Dehli suffered a
serious setback.

d. Iran in the folds of CPEC. The deep water port at Gwadar is

the first Chinese traction in the Arabian Sea. It is significant for
China in many respects. The port deters India as a significant
element of Chinese strategic investments that are perceivably
aimed at containing India. The port at Gawadar also links the
Strait of Hormuz with China’s ‘North-South’ Karakuram corridor.
Beijing has regarded Gawadar as significant as the Karakuram
corridor. Beijing feels India is trying to pursue a naval
containment strategy against China and prevent its legitimate
presence in the Indian Ocean”. Containing China is not possible
for India without US assistance. India’s withdrawal from the
Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline is often associated with US
pressures. When India considered backing out of the IPI, it
embarked on the development of Iranian port of Chahbahar that
serves as energy hub in the medium term, and will potentially
serve as a military facility in the long term, which will be a
strategic counterweight against the Gawadar port.
Nevertheless, if one examines strategic viability of Gawadar
and Chahbahar for China and India respectively, Gawadar is at
an edge because of the geographic propinquity of Pakistan and
China. Against India, Pakistan is a strategic leverage for
Beijing, whereas arguably Iran can serve as a game changer in
Chinese global aspirations. Originally Iran has not been
counted in the ‘String of Pearls’. Nevertheless, Iran’s
significance in the ‘String of Pearls’ cannot be discounted.
“Unlike India, Japan, and Russia, Asia’s other major powers;
China has never been in conflict with Iran. Tehran, therefore,
may be likely to wholeheartedly welcome China’s emergence
as the pre-eminent power in Asia, and be Beijing’s long-term,
sincere, and strategic partner. Support for Iran now is an
investment in that future partnership”. One of the significant
 nodes in Sino-Iranian relations is their rejection of US
hegemony and their fear of encirclement by US bases after
Washington and NATO’s invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. It is
hard to digest, but China and Iran were almost at the same side
with respect to the question of US invasion of Iraq. Iran with its
ability to block the strait harms US interests in Iraq and
Afghanistan with its history of conflict with US may be of great
help to the success of China’s policy towards Middle East. In
Persian Gulf Iran is the second largest oil exporter to China
after Saudi Arabia. Iran might serve as an ideal location for
Chinese military base. If China cannot tightly embrace Iran, but
for these reasons it cannot afford to alienate Tehran. Another
aspect of Sino-Iranian convergence where Pakistan also comes
in is the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (IPI).

e. Emergence of IPC Pipeline. As India went to the rear on

IPI because of US pressures, the Speculations about China’s
intentions to replace India has generated a new point of
convergence in China-Pakistan-India relations. The IPI will thus
become Iran- Pakistan-China (IPC) pipeline if China joins at any
point in the future. Like Iran, Pakistan also suffers from severe
economic problems specially the scarcity of energy supplies.
The pipeline will thus serve as Pakistan’s road to political
stability by solving the problem of energy which often questions
the performance of government. It also provides a rejoinder to
the displeasure over American drone policy on Pakistan.
Islamabad is indeed walking a ‘fine line’ by preserving smooth
 working ties with Washington, whereas strengthening relations
with those states (Iran and China) which will benefit Pakistan,
but will certainly cost US policies in the region. Pakistan’s
defiance of US pressure on IPI reflects a trend of anti-
Americanism that strengthens the potentials for Pakistan-Iran
China triangle. There are speculations that China can
announce its intentions to join IPI that on the one hand will
realize Beijing’s vision of ‘land-based access to energy
resources of Middle East’, on the other hand will strengthen
links between different regional organizations specially those
who decry US hegemony.

f. Pakistan and Iran as Part of SCO Organization. Currently

Pakistan and Iran are bidding for Shanghai cooperation
Organization (SCO) membership, which increases the weight of
an already significant China for them. The IPI if proceeds, it will
be a significant jolt to the US influence in the region. It will help
Iran’s economy, will slacken the isolation imposed on Iran, will
make Pakistan’s relations with Washington further tense, and
above all will weaken the sanctions regime against Iran. Finally
if China comes in, it will bring more economic pay-offs for every
one of the actors involved in the project.

13. The Iran-Pakistan-China Triangle. Enhanced cooperation with

Iran on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and floating a
narrative which incorporates the under development Chahbahar port and
over all making it China – Iran – Pakistan Economic Corridor with a
welcome sign for turkey and Afghanistan to join in the initiative. The
flagship project is an integral component of China’s “One Belt, One Road”
initiative, which seeks to promote greater regional connectivity within Asia
and includes the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk
Road. The inclusion of a strategically and geographically significant country
such as Iran hints at an important aspect of Chinese economic policy,
which is not limited to outsourcing industrial capacity through the CPEC
only. It fits into the rationale of gaining greater access into the oil-rich
Middle East, where six of the states in the region are integral members of
OPEC and have historically been allied with the United States due to their
political, economic, and strategic interests. For China, the need to offset
U.S. economic interests in the Gulf requires more states to become a part
of OBOR-related initiatives, with Iran acting as an important stakeholder
given its geographical proximity to the region and its fractious relationship
with the United States. China’s salient and long-standing principle of
respecting territorial sovereignty and forging relationships with states based
upon mutual cooperation and peaceful coexistence also acts as an added
incentive for Iran.

a. Pakistan Iran Border Security in CPEC Scenario. China has

also placed importance on resolving outstanding issues
bilaterally and Iran’s involvement in CPEC allows for greater
opportunities to forge and mend ties with Pakistan bilaterally,
where unit-pricing issues over the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline as
well as cross-border skirmishes on the Sistan-Baluchestan and
Balochistan border have been points of contention between the
two states. Given this, the OBOR connectivity framework gains
added relevance. While the gains of the OBOR are yet to
 materialize, one can be rest assured that statements from
China’s ambassador in Pakistan carry considerable merit as
both Iranian and Chinese interests can potentially converge.

b. Economic Prosperity Vs Terrorist Activities. While

China attaches equal importance to its relations with states
such as Saudi Arabia, an arrangement that would allow Iran to
benefit economically and could simultaneously challenge the
regional and ideological hegemony of Saudi Arabia, serves
Tehran’s interest. Overall, the long term strategy of the OBOR
and the inclusion of strategically significant states could turn out
to be less of a zero-sum game in favor of China and more
about synchronizing interests.

c. Impact of Changing Alliances on Iran and Pakistan. The

changing geopolitical and strategic environment and the
constant influence of major extra-regional powers in the Persian
Gulf and the South Asian regions are a dominant discourse in
Iran and Pakistan. The constant changing alliances since the
end of the Cold War have had wider ramifications for Iran and
Pakistan as well as relations between them. Moreover, China’s
pace of economic growth and military modernization were
laying the foundations of a rising major power. These factors
have complicated the regional security matrix. In many ways,
both the United States and China have played an important role
in shaping ties between Iran and Pakistan. Iran’s relations with
 China were poor through most of the Maoist phase. From 1982
China began to supply arms to an isolated Iran then in the
midst of a war with Iraq. Iran bought tanks, artilleries, armored
personnel carriers, combatant aircrafts and small warships from
Beijing and also bought missile systems and technologies.

d. Irans Interests in Nuclear Technology. Tehran like

Islamabad purchased ballistic missile technology from Beijing,
and also received help for its nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) program. China transferred nuclear technology and
know-how to its civilian nuclear program just as it was doing
with Pakistan. According to French and US intelligence reports,
Chinese experts had supplied technology for reactor
construction and other related activities at Isfahan. Iran was
assisted by China in building its large missile factory at Isfahan.
Tehran received from Beijing not only military arms and
materials but also scientific expertise and technology. A strong
triangular relationship among China, Iran and Pakistan had
emerged by the early 1980s and was strengthened through the
1990s

14. The Recommended Future Course. Following steps can help

revive Pakistan-Iran relations in the right direction that would benefit both
the countries politically, economically and strategically.

a. Restoration of Trust. The most critical phase in the Pak-Iran

relations is the restoration of trust, which for one reason or
another has been a missing link since late 1980s. Restoration
 of trust is of paramount importance because the level of trust
determines the perception of the two capitals about each other,
and that perception works as a guideline during policy
formulation stage. And for Towards harmonization of Pak-Iran
Relationship 106 Margalla Papers 2010 the restoration of the
trust, it is a prerequisite to respect each other’s sovereignty in
true sense. The recently concluded agreement on joint
monitoring of the border should be implemented in true letter
and spirit. There should be no recurrence of deliberate incident
of border crossing by the forces of any country as a hot pursuit.
To avoid the chances of illegal trade and smuggling by criminal
gangs, there is a need to enhance the legal and formal trade
between both countries. The enhanced volume of trade would
increase the stakes and bring interdependency between both
states. In this regard, perking-up the 1949, ‘Treaty of Friendship
to Initiate Trade Relations’57, between both countries will be a
step in the right direction.

b. Promotion of CBMs. In spite of differing point of views of the

two counties on some issues, there have been innumerable
confidence-building measures (CBMs), both at the level of
states and the masses. Indeed these measures did not let the
derailment of the Pak-Iran relationship. Strategists in both
countries acknowledge that, owing to factors like religious
affinity, cultural linkages, and economic compulsions, both
nations cannot afford detachment from each other. In the
changed strategic environment emerging from the
concentration of global players in the region, Pakistan and Iran
must come closer to each other for taking a common stance on
issues of strategic significance, like security that impinge both
with different faces. There is a requirement that both countries
should undertake steps for deeper cooperation in the field of
economy and security. Signing of project like Iran-Pakistan gas
pipeline in-spite of Indian refusal at the critical stage is a very
welcoming one. Pakistan has also refused to accept any
Western/ US pressure on the subject. Even in the event of US
unilateral sanctions and a repeated number of UN imposed
sanctions on Iran; Pakistan has decided to go ahead with the
project. About Afghanistan, both countries are maintaining
good relations with the government of Mr. Hamid Karazai, Dr.
Raja Muhammad Khan Margalla Papers 2010 107 who has
been re-elected as President of Afghanistan. Furthermore,
President Karazai, has recently initiated a reconciliation
process with Taliban and would welcome the help from
Pakistan and Iran at this crucial moment. Both countries also
recognized that people of Afghanistan should have right to
decide their future as per their own wishes. Dealing with
sectarianism in Iran and Pakistan may be left at the discretion
of both governments as their domestic matters. Otherwise,
people of both countries have never considered
inconsequential difference of opinions in religious matters as a
hurdle in their bilateral relations. In all eventualities, had
wisdom prevailed, the anti Muslim lobby should not have been
 allowed to play among the Muslims of various schools of
thoughts (sects).

c. Cooperation in Defence Production. Cooperation in the

field of defence production is yet another area that can be
jointly undertaken by both countries and would address the
security concerns of each. This cooperation can be extended to
the Gulf countries on a later stage, which would bring them
closer to Iran, thus the existing differences between Iran and
Gulf region would be abridged amicably. Depending upon the
level of cooperation, the existing dependency on western
weapon system by these countries could also be reduced in a
future scenario. For the provision of technical expertise, China
could also be incorporated in the joint venture of defence
production as a partner.

d. Stabilization of Afghanistan. Afghan Government and

people should be taken into confidence by redressing their
years old grievances with Iran and Pakistan. Through their
cooperation, Iran and Pakistan must contribute in the re-
construction of the war-ridden country. This step would help in
stabilizing the region and minimizing the chances of sporadic
violence of each other’s territorial limits. Moreover, this would
also keep the extra regional forces away from the region. In the
reconciliation process, each state must respect the national
interests without compromising the Afghan Towards
harmonization of Pak-Iran Relationship 108 Margalla Papers
 2010 interests. The nut results should be that; ‘diplomacy must
get supremacy over the rhetoric and peace over the conflict’.
Cooperating Apparatus.Think tanks, academia, and media are
some useful means that can play a very positive role in bringing
Iran and Pakistan closer to each other. Scholars must visit each
other’s country more frequently. The existing level of people-to-
people contact must be enhanced for the development of
confidence among the masses. The platform of the ECO should
be mobilized for the regional interaction, economic harmony,
and overall prosperity of the region. Over and above, the
existing low profiled security and confidence building measures
need to be set off on war footings.

e. Regional Integration.Pakistan believes that a multi-polar

world order is critical for maintaining both regional and
international peace and stability. The instability stemming from
the US lead war in Afghanistan threatens national and regional
security interests of China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and Central
Asian Republics, therefore Pakistan seeks greater cooperation
with Beijing, Moscow and Tehran to bring about a regional
solution to the war in Afghanistan, because only by returning
peace to Afghanistan the violence centered justification of the
continued US lead occupation of Afghanistan can be brought to
an end. Over the years, Afghanistan has been considered as
a ‘strategic rear’ both by Iran and Pakistan, which perhaps
misled both in 1990s, as they were endeavouring to secure
their respective interests. Now once that phase is over, there is
a need to learn from the past for a positive forward-looking
approach through consensus building. Under the changed
global environment, there is a growing need for both countries
to forget past annoyances and “forge a new long-term common
vision reflecting their common security and economic interests.”
The fleeting rip in the Pak-Iran relations has no sound basis,
thus can be revamped through enhanced interactions at all
levels including masses from both sides. Renaissance of
cultural and religious affinities would go a long way.