MONTAlGNE AND BA YLE

ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDEES

INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

CRAIG B. BRUSH

MONTAlGNE AND BA YLE

VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF SKEPTICISM

Directors: P. Dibon (Nimeguen) and R. Popkin (University of California, San Diego)

Editorial Board:]. Collins (St. Louis Univ.); A. Crombie (Oxford); I. Dambska (Cracow);
H. de la Fontaine-Verwey (Arnsterdam); H. Gadamer (Heidelberg); H. Gouhier (Paris);
T. Gregory (Rome); T. E. ]essop (Hull); A. Koyre t (Paris); P. O. Kristeller (Columbia
Univ.); S. Lindroth (Upsala); P. Mesnard (Tours);]. Orcibal (Paris); I. S. Revah (Paris);
G. Sebba (Emory Univ., Atlanta,.); R. Shackleton (Oxford); ]. Tans (Groningen);
G. Tonelli (Pisa)
Secretaries: P. Golliet (Nimeguen) and Elisabeth Labrousse (Paris)
 CRAIG B. BRUSH

MONT AlGNE AND BA YLE

VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF SKEPTICISM

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MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE / Ig66

ISBN 978-94-011-9678-9 ISBN 978-94-011-9676-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.10071978-94-011-9676-5
Copyright 1966 by Martinus NijhojJ, The Hague, Netherlands
All rights reseroed, i71cluding the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
To my mother
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Without the help of many friends this book eould never have been.
A United States Government Grant under the Fulbright Aet afforded
me two years of profitable study in Paris. I am also indebted to Dean
John G. Palfrey and the Columbia College Committee on Instruetion
for a Chamberlain Fellowship that made it possible to devote a
semester unhampered by teaehing responsibilities to the actual com-
position of these pages. In retrospeet, I do not see how the task eould
have been finished without their generous underwriting.
Columbia University Library has been kind enough to grant me
permission to publish unedited fragments of its colleetion of auto-
graph letters of Pierre Bayle.
Professor Donald M. Frame assumed the taxing burden of reading,
eritieizing, and eorreeting the ungainly first drafts of these chapters.
His patience and sound advice have eonstantly helped me and
taught me. The greatest debt, and the one most difficult to repay
suffieiently, is the debt owed to a teacher from whom one has learned.
Professors Otis E. Fellows and Jean Hytier have also read this
work in manuseript, contributing valuable comments and advice
where my haste or ignoranee needed eorrection.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction. . .
I. Greek Skepticism . 4
II. Skeptieism Prior To Montaigne 18
III. Montaigne's Early Essays . . . 35
IV. The Apologie de Raimond Sebond . 62
V. The New Knowledge - The Essays of 1578-80 . 121
VI. The Final Essays . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
VII. Interim - Seventeenth-eentury Skepticism. 160
VIII. The Gentleman and the Seholar 179
IX. Bayle's Youth . . . . . . . . . 194
X. The Works of the 1680'S. . . . . 21 4
XI. The Dictionnaire historique et critique . 25 0
XII. Controversies. 306
Afterword . . . . . . . . . . . 328
Appendix I. The Sen tenees Inscribed on the Rafters of
Montaigne's Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
Appendix II. Referenees to Montaigne in Bayle's Works 338
Bibliography 344
Index . . . 352
 REFERENCES TO MONTAlGNE AND BAYLE TEXTS

The editions referred to are:

Montaigne, Oeuvres completes, ed. Albert Thibaudet and Maurice
Rat. Bibliotheque de la Pleiade. Paris; Gallimard, 1962. (It is to be
hoped that succeeding printings will not change the pagination of this
useful volume, but the inclusion of strata indicators at present missing
from essays one through eight in Book II may make a difference.)
References will give the book number in capital Roman numerals,
the essay number in small Roman numerals, the page number, and
the letter a, b, or c to indicate that the passage first appeared in 1580,
1588, or on the Bordeaux copy. JV means Journal de voyage.

Bayle, Pierre. Dictionnaire historique et critique, ed. Beuchot, 16 vols.

Paris: Desoer, 1820. (Abbreviated DHC.)
- . Oeuvres diverses de Pierre Bayle, 2nd ed. 4 vols. Trevoux, 1737.
(Abbreviated OD. The notation "OD I B" refers to Bayle's letters to
his family, separately paginated at the end ofvolume one in the second
edition of OD.)

The notations "l" or "r" will be used to indicate the left or right
column of OD or DHC when necessary. References to the Dictionnaire
will indude: (1) the artide title (homonyms will be distinguished, e.g.,
Dante, pahe and Dante, Pierre- Vineent), (2) in superscript an indication
of the edition in which the passage first appeared (p = Projet, 1692;
1 = 1697; 2 = 1702; 4 = 1720, posthumous); the notations 2 and 4
may refer to a newartide or to an addition made to an artide originally
appearing in an earlier edition, (3) the location of the comment, either
in the artide (art.) or in aremark (e.g., c) or in a footnote to a
remark (an Arabic numeral) or rarely in a subsection of aremark (a
Roman numeral).
 INTRODUCTION

It is traditional in the literature on Pierre Bayle to make some refer-

ene e to iVlontaigne as one of the masters of skepticism in whose tracks
he follows, albeit hardly so eloselyas Charron had. Time and again
critics feel the need to mention Montaigne and Bayle in the same
context, sometimes to contrast their brands of Pyrrhonism, more often
to explain similarities in their ideas and methods, which have frequent-
ly been regarded as important steps in the gradual evolution of un-
Christian, even anti-Christian, thought.
Their names were already associated during Bayle's life, for example,
in the mediocre work by Dom Alexis Gaudin, La Distinction et la
Nature du Bien et du MaI, Traite ou l'on combat l'erreur des Manicheens, les
sentimens de Jvfontaigne & de Charron, & ceux de J.Vfonsieur Bayle. In the
nineteen th century, the author of the Dictionnaire historique et critique
wa~ generally elassified as a skeptic; and his name was inevi tably
linked with the essayist's. In his Port-Royal, Sainte-Beuve pictured
Bayle as one of the avowed skeptics in Montaigne's funeral cortege
and spoke of both men as "d'autant pIus fourbes qu'ils ne le sont pas
toujours." His later works show that he revised his opinion on each
somewhat,l but in this he was unusual for his century. Charles Lenient
and Arsene Deschamps each found in skepticism the key to Bayle's
writings, the latter giving Bayle's reading of the Essais in his youth as
a source of his habit of opposing "le pour et le contre" and of dis-
trusting reason. 2 In the one detailed study made in this century of
the inftuence of lVfontaigne on his successor, :\Iaturin Dreano con-
eludes, "Quand Bayle lui-meme pyrrhonise, c'est a la suite de Mon-
1 On lVlontaigne, see Donald ~I. Frame's "Did Montaigne Betray Sebond?" Romanic
RevielO, XXXVIII ([9.+7),3 [[-3[3. On Bayle see Sainte-Beuve's essay in Les Grands Eerivains
franfais, etudes des lundis et des portraits dassees selon un ordre nouveau et annoties par iHauriee Allem,
XVIIe sieele, Philosophes et moralistes (Paris: Garnier, [928), especially pp. ~:n 5-2 [6.
2 La Genese du seeptieisme erudit ehe::. Ba).fe (Liege: Vaillant-Carmanne, [878), p. [20.
2 INTRQDUCTIQ~

taigne. Il approuve ehaeun de ses doutes et ehacune de ses raisons de

douter." 1
The inftuenee of Jean Delvolves important work, Religion, critique
et philosophie positive ehe:::, Pierre Bayle has shifted the emphasis somewhat
in mueh twentieth-eentury thinking, which points to the more af-
firmative side of Bayle's thought, partieularly to his role as a precursor
of the philosophie movement. Rene Doumie's assessment sums up
neatly the two leitmotifs of Bayle eriticism: "Le scepticisme est eontenu
tout entier dans l'~uvre de Bayle. Celui-ci, heritier de la societe des
libertins, fait la transition entre deux epoques et relie ~'lontaigne aux
philosophes du XVIHerne siede." 2 It is the first half of this dual
relationship that concerns us.
How mu ch truth is there in this literary parentage? To what degree
were both thinkers skeptics? Are there any significant differences in
the nature of the Pyrrhonism each espouses? Did skepticism act to
undermine their religious beliefs? What role did it play in the develop-
ment and the expression of their ideas? These are the questions that
are considered in this work. Its primary purpose is to discover what
exactly Montaigne and Bayle thought, not what their readers have
seen in them. They may both be the darlings of the intelleetualliber-
tines, but the question is whether or not th ey are freethinkers them-
.>elves. Secondly, as this study focuses on the subject of skepticism, it
does not attempt a complete evaluation of either man's thought.
Inasmuch as skepticism has many ramificatjons, especially because
both Montaigne and Bayle saw it in the context of religious faith,
these ramifications must be considered, but only to the extent that the
philosophy of doubt plays a role in such allied areas of thought.
Finally, little attempt will be made to assess the validity of arguments
proposed by either author. It is the philosopher's task to judge matters
of systematic consistency and eristic success. Only occasionally will
such considerations be alluded to here. The historian of ideas is inter-
ested primarily in discerning the substance of an author's thought.
Since it must be placed in its historieal context if it is to be understood
accurately, summary oudines of the nature and history of skepticism
have been induded here.
For several reasons, Montaigne and Bayle are considered separately.
The ideas of each author, particularly ~lontaigne's, underwent

1 La Renommee de Montaigne en France au XVIIle siede (.\ngers: Editions de I'Quest, 1952),

P·7 8 .
2 Histoire de la litteraturefranfaise, 34th ed. (Paris: Delaplane, 1916), p. 402.
 INTRODUCTION 3

eonsiderable development, so that any general sehematization of

their content is likely to belie signifieant ehanges. Furthermore,
Bayle's thought differs markedly from the typieal forms of skeptieism
in the sixteenth and seventeenth eenturies; and his originality ean be
made most clear onee a complete discussion of .Montaigne's Pyr-
rhonism has given a good pieture of the tradition Bayle departs from.
The title of this work calls attention to the variations in the thinking
of these two skeptics; indeed its conclusion will be that the differences
are as fundamental as the agreements in their thought. Skepticism as
a philosophie al system adapts itself to many possible points of view;
it is a shoe that can be made to fit any number of feet. At the same
time, skepticism is a frame of mind that may have far-reaching effects
on human charaeter and disposition. vVhatever the divergeneies in
the theories of the sixteenth-eentury essayist and the seventeenth-
eentury seholar, th ey share in some ways a common skeptieal temper,
and it will be our eoneern to show what affinities unite them.
These pages were eomposed before the publication of Elisabeth
Labrousse's two monumental studies, Pierre Boyle: Du poys de Foix el
la eite d' Erasme and Pierre Bayle: Hiterodoxie et rigorisme. I assume that
anyone interested enough to read this work will have read hers, for
they surpass all previous Bayle scholarship and to a large degree
supplant it. Only a very few ehanges have been made in this book as a
resuIt of her findings, and most of those are minor adjustments of facts.
Our interpretations of Bayle's thought agree in all major points -
exeept perhaps the basie one, to what extent it is proper to eall the
seventeenth-eentury philosopher a skeptie. On many oecasions Mme
Labrousse stresses how far Bayle's thought is from a purely skeptical
position, and one feels that she might be quite happy to see the word
"skeptie" omitted from the literature on him. Here I disagree, but
I suspeet that mueh of our difference is in terminology and not in the
substanee of the matter. IfI thought otherwise, I would probably want
to modify my position.
 CHAPTER I

GREEK SKEPTICISM

In the opening chapter of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Hypotyposes)

Sextus Empiricus makes the distinction between three types of phi-
losophy - the dogmatic, the Academic, and the skeptic. Philosophers
of the first group assert that they have discovered some kind ofabsolute
truth; the Academics elaim that no such absolute truth can be dis-
covered; and the third group maintains that it is impossible to say
whether man can attain any truth or not. Sextus Empiricus us es the
words "Pyrrhonist" or "skeptic" interchangeably to refer to this third
doctrine, the one he espouses; and ever since there has been some
confusion over just what is to be meant by the term "skepticism" and
how carefully it is to be distinguished from "Pyrrhonism," if at all.
Does "skepticism" refer to the belief that no knowledge is possible
("I know that I can know nothing") or to the more cautious beliefthat
one cannot say whether knowledge is possible or not ("I can know
nothing; I cannot eve n know that I know nothing")? It is easy to see
why these two positions are so difficult to separate. Any Pyrrhonist
wishing to demonstrate that the only proper attitude is to remain in a
state of doubt must show that no certain knowledge is possible; for if
any single truth could be definitely proven, it would not be possible
to suspend judgment totally. Hence, in order to defend his point of
view, the Pyrrhonist must argu e like an Academic skeptic. This is
true of both Montaigne and Sextus Empiricus, who, while calling
themselves Pyrrhonists, at the same time reject completely the claim
that man's reason can achieve any true knowledge. Sextus is aIways
careful to add that his intention is only to east doubt on all so-called
proofs, his own ineluded. Montaigne does not adhere so elosely to this
strict Pyrrhonist position, but he makes elear his endorsement of the
term "Pyrrhonien" (II: xii, 544a). So we have the somewhat confused
situation in which Sextus Empiricus, a thorough Pyrrhonist, uses the
 GREEK SKEPTICISM 5

word "skeptic" to describe his philosophy and Montaigne, less

completely Pyrrhonist, uses the word "Pyrrhonien" to qualify his
position.
I shall use the word "Pyrrhonism" to refer only to the position that
it is impossible to decide on any question whatsoever. The phrase
"Academic skepticism" will refer to the view that human beings are
incapable by their nature of knowing anything with certainty. These
two designations apply to specifically philosophie al positions. One of
the advantages of this usage is that it leayes the unmodified term
"skepticism" and its adjective "skeptical" free to apply to a general
attitude of doubt or incredulity. For besides the strictly epistemological
position, there is a state of mind or a temperament that can be appropri-
ately called "skeptical." Many of Montaigne's most characteristic
ideas and reactions are part of this over-all disposition, which resembles
dosely the skeptical temperament of his dassical predecessors, eve n
if the essayist may differ from them in the details of his philosophical
theory and on the major point of his Christianity.
There is one usage of the word "skeptical," and it is perhaps the
most common one, that is to be avoidcd. For many people, to be
"skeptical" about something means to deny the truth of an allegation
or philosophy. For example, to be skeptical about the mirades of the
New Testament would imply an active disbelief. This is a particularly
unfortunate usage, for it completely rules out the possibility of a
suspended judgment. It is the dogmatist's definition of skepticism -
a skeptic doubts, therefore he disbelieves; a skeptic has not made up
his mind for something, therefore he is unqualifiedly against it. But
the most characteristic attitude of Pyrrhonism is the open mind or the
suspended j udgment. N either Montaigne nor Bayle is a skeptic in the
sense of being a to tal disbeliever. Skeptics, according to the Greek
derivation of their name, are observers, not unbelievers; they remain
uncommitted in all theoretieal matters, and only mi Id ly committed
in practical concems. lVIen who place particular faith in reason
(rationalists, dogmatists, philosophers, whatever th ey may be called)
find the skeptical attitude especially difficult to understand. Hence
their tendency to confuse skepticism with disbelief.
The earliest skeptics are, of course, the Greeks. In general, the
history of ancient skepticism can be divided into four periods or stages:
(r) the Practical Skepticism of Pyrrho of Elis (ca. 360-275 B.C.)
(2) the Skepticism of the New (or Middle) Academy - Arcesilas
6 GREEK SKEPTICISM

of Pitane (ca. 315-241 B.C.) and Carneades of Cyrene (ca.

213-129 B.C.)
(3) the Systematic Pyrrhonism of Aenesidemus (ca. 100-40 B.C.)
and Agrippa (1St Century A.D.?)
(4) Empiric Skepticism - Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160-210 A.D.) 1
Phyrrho, Arcesilas, and Carneades wrote no works whatsoever; of
the remaining philosophers, only the works of Sextus Empiricus have
survived.
Although mu ch about both the lives of these philosophers and their
thought can only be surmised, the little we do know provides valuable
insights concerning the varieties of skepticism. About Pyrrho the
evidence is contradictory. Diogenes Laertius repeats several stories
(ix, 62-63) which show Pyrrho behaving in a nonsensical way,
theoretically consistent with his belief that no knowledge is certain.
His friends allegedly followed him to keep him from falling otT diffs
or being run over by carts; and he is supposed by have paid no heed
to the calls for help from his instructor Anaxarchus, who had fallen
into a swamp. It cannot be denied that a Greek philosopher was
perfectly capable of the wildest behavoir, but these stories sound like
ill-willed inventions on the part of enemies of the Pyrrhonists. The
portrait of Pyrrho given by Cicero (Acad. pr., ii, 130 and De fin., iv,
43,49) shows him as an ascetic of great moral stature, remarkable for
his lack of concern with any speculative justification for his conduct.
Several facts given by Diogenes Laertius confirm this picture and
indicate that Pyrrho led a normal, even rich, life. He live d to be
ninety, hardly likely if he behaved as foolishly as the anecdotes would
have us believe. 2 He was granted Athenian citizenship; and when
he died, a statue of him was erected in his home city. He was made
high priest of Elis by his compatriots, a position which gives him
priority as the first practicing fideist. It is quite dear that he was
more impressive as a person than as a theoretical thinker. A contempo-

1 This outIine and all quotations from Sextus Empiricus are taken from R. G. Bury's
Introduction to the Loeb Classical Library edition of the Hypatypases (London: \Villiam
Heinemann Ltd., and New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933), p. x..'OC. Other histories
available are: E. Zeller, The Staies, Epicureans and Seepties, translated from the German by
Oswald Reichel (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1892); Victor Brochard, us Scepti-
ques grecs, 2e ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1923); and Leon Robin, Pyrrhan et le scepticisme grec (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1944).
2 Montaigne twice takes up these stories about Pyrrho (II: xii, 48Sa and II: xxix, 683-
684a). In the first instance he scorns them as unbelievable, in the second he uses them as a
marvelous ("quasi incroyable") example of a man capable of practicing his theories in
every day life. See injra, p. 89 note 2. Bayle discounts the same tales in DHC, Pyrrhan D.
 GREEK SKEPTICISM 7

rary of Aristotle, who was twenty years his senior, he is one of the last
of the age of heroic philosophers. Although his name has been
preserved in the technical term "Pyrrhonism," there is some doubt
whether he actually formulated the systematic suspension ofjudgment
attributed to him.l Like Zeno and Epicurus, he sought happiness and
feIt that it could be derived from exalting the mind above circum-
stances and withdrawing the individual into himself. 2 Ethically, he
was a conservative, living in conformity with the customs and laws
ofhis land, while maintaining his intellectualliberty wherever circum-
stances permitted.
Academic skepticism, which tended to remain separate from Pyr-
rhonism as a school of thought, was more concerned with technical
philosophy. Its two greatest representatives were Arcesilas, the fifth
head of the Academy after Plato's death, and Carneades, his fourth
successor, almost a century later. The former is associated with the
doctrine of the incomprehensibility of all things (akatalepsia), which he
set out prove by elaborate argumentation designed to show the
uncertainty of all dogmas, specifically those of the Stoics. Carneades,
who had the reputation in ancient times of the most brilliant of the
Academic controversialists, also aime d to refute Stoical thought,
partieularly as it had been formulated by Chrysippus. His technique
was to use the Stoics' own doctrines to defeat themselves, exposing
wherever possible inconsisteneies or logieal absurdities involved in
them. For example, the Stoics laid great store in divination at the same
time that th ey believed in a totally deterministie fatumo Carneades
liked to point out the uselessness of divination if the deerees of fate
could in no way be avoided. EIsewhere he argu ed that neither the
senses nor reason eould provide any eertain knowledge, for the senses
could not distinguish between a true and a false representation, and
reason (as the Stoics believed) was entireIy derivative from the senses.
The outeome of his attacks was a radical denial of the possibility of
any knowledge whatsoever.

1 Zeller (p. 525) and Broehard lp. 55) believe the epaehe his. Robin (p. 2 [), Bury (pp.
xxx-x.xxi), and Grenier (CEuvres ehoisies de Sextus Empiriclls [Paris: Auber, 1948], p. 12) all
reserve it for Arcesilas.
2 ;\"ote the analogy to Montaigne. Mueh time has been devoted to diseussion of the
Stoie, Pyrrhonist, and Epieurean strains of Montaigne's thought. One of the reasons it is
so diffieult to disentangle these eurrents is that Montaigne is always in agreement with the
basie assumptions shared by all three sects, namely the pursuit ofhappiness through exalting
the mind above eireurnstances and withdrawing the individual into himself. Henee, the
appearance of an attitude that we would be tempted to call Epieurean during a period in
whieh Stoieism predominates is not so surprising as it might at first seem.
8 GREEK SKEPTlCISM

However, he seems to have gone beyond this destructive attack

and attempted to set up a theory of "probabIe" knowledge. Some im-
pressions, he argued, seem more reliable than others (no skeptic ever
denied the reality of appearances), and it is possible to pass judgment
on them. Carneades divides them into the apparently false and the
apparently true impressions. The second group is further subdivided
into impressions that are (a) probable, (b) probable and uncontra-
dicted by other probable impressions, and (e) probable, uncontra-
dicted, and tested. These varying degrees of certainty may induce
corresponding degrees of relative assent, the only kind the skeptic
knows, one int end ed to contrast with the absolute assent ot the Stoics.
In this way Carneades shifts the grounds of argument from questions
of truth, which is an absolute, to matters of certitude, which concern
subjective states relative to experience and subject to vacillation.
Carneades, then, supplied skeptics with a systematic analysis of the
Stoic theory of knowledge, a series of arguments against many par-
ticular Stoic dogmas, and a doctrine of the probable. As will be made
clear later, Pierre Bayle's skepticism is composed of mu ch the same
elements.
In succeeding centuries, the Academy abandoned skepticism
for an eelectic philosophy, and skeptical thought in the Greek world
was represented by two important though obscure figures, Aen-
esidemus (ca. Ioo-40 RC.) and Agrippa (first century A.D.?). Their
great achievement was to reduce the multiple, unorganized dialectics
of thdr Academic predecessors to mo re general systems of reasoning,
known as tropes (or modes of argument). Aenesidemus formulated the
famous ten tropes, while Agrippa, whose name is preserved only in
Diogenes Laertius, replaced these ten with five of his own. Of these
two philosophers we know practically nothing, and their systems would
be lost to us were it not for the Hypotyposes of Sextus Empiricus and a
few pages of Diogenes' Lives of the Philosophers.
The Hypotyposes (or Dutlines of Pyrrhonism) is the great compendium
of dassical skepticism. One of the reasons the works of the other
skeptics have not survived is surely the thoroughness with which
Sextus summarized their arguments. Appropriately enough, wc know
nothing certain about Sextus, neither his dates (probably third
century A.D.), his birthplace, nor where he taught. Even the epithet
"Empiricus" is the source of some mystery. If it means he belonged
to the empirical school of medicine, how can we explain that he
 GREEK SKEPTICISM 9

shows a preference for the methodical school in his Hypotyposes?l What

is clear is that he was one of several physicians adhering to the Pyr-
rhonist school of philosophy. 2 Galen informs us of the nature of empirical
medicine's methodology. It was compounded of three steps: observation
of individual cases, documentation of the experience of other doctors,
and inferences from one set of circumstances to another. In a very
crude way, this early empiricism could be called scientific. It is im-
portant to note that skepticism and scientific empiricism, while quite
different in some ways, are not incompatible, sharing as they do certain
similarities in attitude, primarily a reliance on experience.
Two works of Sextus Empiricus have been preserved, the Outlines
oj Pyrrhonism, which Montaigne read in a Latin translation by Henri
Estienne (1562), and Against the Mathematicians, which is divided into
two quite different parts, Against the Schoolmasters and Against the
Dogmatics. By far the most important of these is the Outlines, especially
Book I, much of the other work being only a mo re detailed treatment
of matters already handled at sufficient length in the Outlines. Little
if any of the material of the Hypotyposes can be demonstrated to be
original; for Sextus is primarily a compiler, somewhat prolix, but
intelligent and conscientious. At times his aim seems to be to refute
every possible position that a dogmatic had held or could have held
in the main branches of philosophy. Argument after argument is
propounded, some ineisive and brilliant, others weaker, and a few
downright silly. The net effect sometimes is to exasperate or bore his
reader, but this is precisely what Sextus aims to do - foree his reader to
throw away his book and with it all dogmatism.
In the opening of the Hypotyposes, Sextus presents the plan of his
work: "Our task at present is to describe in outIine the Sceptic doetrine,
first premising that of non e of our future statements do we positively
affirm that the faet is exactly as we state it, but we simply re cord eaeh
fact, Iike a ehronicler, as it appears to us at the moment" (I: i, 4).
Skepticism, he eontinues, demonstrates how often appearances and
our judgments of them are in opposition, thereby inducing the mind
to suspend its judgment (epaehe) and strive for quietude (ataraxia).
The skeptie doctrine ofliving is to "follow a line of reasoning which,
in aecordanee with appearanees, points us to a life conformable to the
eustoms of our country and its laws and institutions, and to our own

1 Jean Grenier says that the name is simply a title equivalent to today', "Doctor,"
CEuvTes choisies, p. 10.
2 On skepticism and medicine see Robin, Part IV, chap. 1.
10 GREEK SKEPTICISM

instinetive feelings" (I: viii, 17). For the skepties do not deny ap-
pearanees; in faet, appearanees are their eriterion, the only thing th ey
ean know. Therefore, they live in aeeord with appearanees, nature,
the usages of their land, and the rules of their trade.
Sextus begins with the ten modes of Aenesidemus. The first, and the
one reeeiving the longest treatment, is based on the variety of animals.
Animals are generated, Sextus says, in different ways; and we may
assume that they therefore have different pereeptions of the world.
Their sense organs have different forms from ours; their eyes are of
different shape and color; their ears, of different eonstruetion; their
sense of smeIl is frequently more aeute (ef. Montaigne II: xii, 582a
for two borrowings). Some animals have yellow eyes, resembling those
of a man suffering from jaundiee. It is quite possible that the world
seems yellow to them (ef. p. 582a). If this is so, how ean we say that
they pereeive the world as we do? and if their pereeption differs
from ours, how ean we say that one is more aeeurate than the other?
Moreover, animals have different Iikes and aversions: oIive oiI is
benefieial to men, poisonous to bees. In such a ease, who is to say what
its true nature is? (ef. p. 58 la.) "Vater when absorbed by a tree beeomes
its bark, braneh, flower, 01' fruit, just as air breathed into a flute may
be a high or low note. Can wc then determine the essential quaIities
o!'water or air? (ef. p. 584a.) As an extension of this argument, though
not a neeessary part of it, Sextus elaims that animaIs give evidenee
of having every eapacity and quaIity man haso
Even if one assumed that the arguments of the first mod e are invalid
on the grounds that man's superiority to the animals makes the testi-
mo ny of his senses more trustworthy than theirs, there is no eseaping
the second mode, whieh bases the suspension of judgment on the
differenees between men. Men differ both as to the constitution al
peeuIiarities of their bodies (ef. p. 583a) and as to the judgments of
their souIs. It is weIl known that one man's me at is another man's
poison. If two men disagree in their perceptions or in their ideas, how
ean we believe that they have the same knowledge of the world? And
how ean we ehoose between them?
And eve n if it were possible to decide between the two men, we are
stilI faced with the problems raised by the third trope, which stresses
the divergeneies in the evidenee provided by the senses of one man.
A painting appears three-dimensional to our eyes and one-dimensional
to our sense oftoueh (ef. pp. 583a). An appI e seems smooth, odorous,
sweet, and yelIow to us; but we eannot say whether this is beeause
 GREEK SKEPTICISM II

it has four different qualities, or onlyone that appears four different

ways. And who is to say that it does not have other qualities which we
do not perceive because we lack the proper sense organ? (ef. pp. 572a
and 574a.) We cannot explain sight to abIind man (ef. p. 573a). So,
our different senses give us different information, and there is no way
of telling whether th ey give us the same information, or the right
information, or all the information possible.
Furthermore, the fourth mode points out that under different
circumstances, the same sense will give us varying information.
Honey seems sweet to a healthy man, bitter to one who is sick. vVhen
we are old, we do not see things as when we are young (ef. p. 583a).
Our perceptions will depend on whether we are ill, healthy, drunk,
sober, happy, sad, calm, agitated, in motion or at rest. And it is
impossible to decide which is the norm al state of being and use it as a
standard (ef. pp. 584-585a).
These first four tropes all concern the subjective state of the perceiver
and form a kind of logical succession. They force us to suspend
judgment, not about the appearance presented to the percipient, but
about the nature of the object perceived. The remaining six tropes are
less fully developed and follow no particular logical order. Numbers
five, six, eight and nine concentrate on the relation between the ob-
server and the thing observed. Number five, the trope of position and
location, concerns optical illusions and similar deceptive perceptions.
A square tower may appear rounded when perceived in the distance;
an oar seems bent when immersed in water. The sixth mode, the trope
of admixtures, states that nothing is ever perceived except in some con-
text. The ninth mode asserts that the frequency of an occurrence will
determine our understanding of it. No one is terrified at the fact that
the sun disappears in the west regularly everyevening, but the ap-
pearance of a comet in the sky frightens man. lVIuch of our understand-
ing, therefore, depends on the force of habit. As Sextus remarks, the
eighth mode, the trope of relativity, is the most important and sub-
subsumes all the others. It repeats the content of the sixth and states
that nothing exists or is perceived by itself. Both the object and the
subject are in relative states, and so is the relation between them.
Everything then is in flux, and absolute knowledge is impossible. This
sounds like Heraditus. The similarity between the skeptic and the
Heraditean view of the universe made some skeptics daim him as a
precursor to their school. The career of Aenesidemus, whom Sextus
Empiricus accuses of having deserted Pyrrhonism for the philosophy
12 GREEK SKEPTICISM

of Heraditus in his later years, further demonstrates the connection

between the two schools. The difference is that Heraditus, when
faced with contradictory evidenee, such as the honey that tastes sweet
to one man and bitter to another, would conclude that the honey is
both sweet and bitter, or that everything is both true and false, rather
than suspending his judgment as does the Pyrrhonist.
Of the two remaining tropes, the seventh is devoted to the reIativity
of the object perceived. It is the mode of qualities and formations of
underlying objects, and a rather unimportant one. Silver, when
granulated, appears black; when in block form, it appears white;
hence, as its state changes, it gives rise to different sensations; and we
cannot judge which corresponds to its true nature. The tenth mode
deals with the tremendous variety of human customs, laws, and ideas.
Of all the ten tropes this one alone does not apply to objects of per-
ception. It could be maintained that like the others it is merely a
subdass of the more general mode of reIativity; but if this is so, it
nonetheIess is a very special one; for it could lead to questions of the
validity of the reasoning process in general. However, as us ed in
Sextus and in Montaigne, it does not. It underiines the instability of
reason, not its total incapacity.
Directly following the ten tropes come the five tropes of Agrippa,
which are: (I) men's opinions are in disagreement, (2) every pro of
requires another proof in infinite regress, (3) perceptions are reIative,
and therefore unreIiable, (4) proof must not reIy on an unproven
hypothesis, and (5) reasoning involves a vicious cirde,l These five
modes do not replace the previous ten; they supplement them. The
first and the third modes (the diversity of opinions and the reIativity
ofperception) indude all the content of the ten modes of Aenesidemus;
but the other three attack dialectic and logic themseIves, condusiveIy
demonstrating that nothing can be proven. \-Vhereas the ten tropes
all involved judgments with some material content, the five al so take
into consideration the form of any proof regardiess of content. Where
Aenesidemus leaves op en the possibility of reasoning on particular
matters, Agrippa eloses the door to all discussion. 2 So final are the
1 The example given of the vieious eirele is this: every matter in question refers either to
the intelleet or to the senses. How ean one demonstrate the validity of a sense judgment?
If it is deeided to use an intelleetual judgment to demonstrate the validity of the sense
judgment, then how validate the intelleetual judgment? One is involved in the infinite
regress of finding a reason for the reason, or in the eireular argument of proving the senses
by reason and reason by the senses.
2 As Broehard puts it, in Les Sceptiques grecs, pp. 306-307, "Les einq tropes peuvent etre con-
sideres comme la formule la pius radicale et la pius precise qu'on ait jamais donnee du
 GREEK SKEPTICISM

arguments that it would seem that these tropes could only belong to
Academic skepticism, yet for reasons not easy to discover, Sextus elaims
to remain a Pyrrhonist while using them.
After the five modes, Sextus gives two other sets of mod es which are
less important and then discusses in detail a series of Pyrrhonist formu-
las, always insisting that they are not asserted dogmatically. These
formulas are of special interest to Montaigne scholars because six
of them are mentioned in the "Apologie" (p. 485a), and eight such
expressions were painted on the rafters of Montaigne's library along
with three other longer quotations.
Books II and III of the Hypotyposes are devoted to refutations of
individual dogmatic positions in the fields oflogic, physics, and ethics.
Book II, concemed exelusively with logic, contains long elaborations
of the kind of analysis found in Agrippa's five tropes. The first section
of Book III subjects ideas of God, cause, matter, body, motion, rest,
and other concept;; of physics to elose analysis much in the way
Bayle will later. The coneluding chapters handle ethical philosophy
sketchily, limiting themselves mostly to a list of the variety of behavior
sanetioned in different parts of the ancient world.

Jvlontaigne' s Use of the Hypotyposes

This work had a tremendous inftuenee on ~Iontaigne, especially
the chapter on the ten tropes (I: xiv), which eontributed greatly to
the "Apologie de Raimond Sebond," the essay in which Montaigne gives
the most complete development ofhis skepticism. Beeause he rearranges
and teleseopes Sextus' material, it is hard to arrive at an absolutely
accurate count ofhow many borrowings he made from this chapter, but
my tally is an eve n dozen passages eopied al most textually and spread
over thirteen pages of the "Apologie" (pp. 572-585, all in a).l

scepticisme. En un sens, encore aujourd'hui, ils sant irresistibles. Quiconque accepte la

discussion sur !es principes, quiconque ne les declare pas ... connus par une immediate
intuition de l'esprit ... qu'on n'a pas besoin de justifier, ne saurait echapper a cette subtile
dialectique .... En resume, le scepticisme a parcouru trois etapes. Avec Pyrrhon, il conteste
la legitimite de la eonnaissanee sensible, et de l'opinion commune. Avee LEnesideme, il
reCllSe la seienee. Avee Agrippa, s'elevant a un pIus haut degre d'abstraetion, il deelare
impossible la verite quelle qu'elle soit."
1 In my caleulations of his borrowings, I have followed Villey's notes in volume IV of the
Municipal Edition (Bordeaux: F. Pech & Cie, 1920), which are aceurate exeept for an
oeeasional misprinted page number. Villey is extremely eautious in assigning borrowings,
and I see no reasan to ehallenge his authority. In one ease, where Montaigne diseusses
le vraisemblable (p. 544a), I believe that he is prompted by a memory of material in Sextlls,
but there is not a elose enough parallel in his treatment of it to speak of a borrowing, and
Montaigne's refleetions are in a context different from Sextus'. Surprisingly enough, the
essayist does not mentian the Greek Pyrrhonist by name here or anywhere else in the Essais.
 GREEK SKEPTICISM

Approximately twenty other borrowings from other parts of the

Outlines appear elsewhere in the same essay. It is quite possible, eve n
probable, that Montaigne did not use his copy of Sextus for any essay
except the "Apologie." In four others there is material that he could
have found in Sextus or in another source. In each case it is a matter of
unimportant anecdotes or a sentence inscribed on the rafters of his
library.l
If the major portion of the skeptical argument of the "Apologie"
can be found in one form or another in the Hypotyposes, much of the
essay does not have Sextus as its souree. For example, the long de-
velopment on animaIs is taken almost exclusively from Plutarch though
the general point is made in Sextus. 2 Likewise, the tenth trope dealing
with the diversity of human customs, laws, and ideas expresses a truth
dear to Montaigne, and one that occupies a signifieant position in the
"Apologie" in several contexts. The awareness of the relativity of
human ideas and mores was already deeply ingrained in the essayist's
conviction before he read Sextus Empiricus. 3 Re had no need to go
to the Greek philosopher for confirmation of it.
The other nine tropes all demonstrate in one way or another the
fallibility of the senses as a souree of certain knowledge. This is the
discovery that Montaigne made in reading the Outlines, and he used
it as the culminating point in his skeptical argument. No other material
in Sextus impressed him so much, either because he was already in
agreement with the Greek philosopher, or because he was not con-
cernen with purely logical controversies. But when it came to the
senses, Montaigne turned to the Hypotyposes almost exclusively for his
argument. Interestingly enough, and Montaigne was probably not
aware of this, he borrowed mainly from the four tropes that refer to the
unreliability of the subject observing. All the passages that I have

1 Since Montaigne's edition of the Hypotyposes also contained a Latin version of Diogenes
Laertius' life of Pyrrho, it is possible that he went to it whenever he mentioned Pyrrho (only
three times outside the "Apologie"). He couldjust as weil have gone to his copy ofDiogenes.
I think the latter quite probable since I: xiv, one of the earliest essays, related the story
of Pyrrho and the pig. At the time of writing this essay, Montaigne had presumably not
read Sextus Empirieus.
2 Onlyone of the many aneedotes related in this portion of II: xii ean be found in Sextus,
viz. the story of the dog following aseent when he comes to a fork in the road (p. 41 la).
But the same story is told in one of Plutarch's ,ldoralia from whieh Montaigne makes
numerous borrowings to illustrate his argument, including the two stories preeeding and
the two following the incident of the reasoning bloodhound. It seeros safe to say that if
Montaigne had read the Hypotyposes when he composed this part of the "Apologie," he did
not make use of it.
a See I: xxiii, passim; I: xxxvi, 221-222a, and I: xlix, 284-285a - all written before the
"Apologie."
 GREEK SKEPTlC1SM 15

indicated in parentheses occur in the first four modes. This is partiaUy

because they contain Sextus' most detailed arguments, but it also
corresponds in some way to the fundamental bias of Montaigne's
nature. Now the ten modes, and the two arguments in them, the un-
reliability of the senses and the diversity of human opinions, represent
only a part of Sextus' reasoning, the first half of it, if you wish.
But th ey represent almost the whole of Montaigne's ease for skep-
tieism.
Almost all, but not quite. Underiying everyone of the ten tropes is
the erueial matter of the eriterion. Given a variety of evidenee in
opposition, by what eriterion are we to give preferenee to one pieee
of evidenee rather than to another? In order to decide we must adduee
some standard for judgment, and some reason to defend this standard,
and furthermore a reason to justify this defense. This matter of the
eriterion is elucidated rather at length in Sextus' presentation of the
fourth mode; and it oecurs frequently elsewhere in the Outlines,
espeeially in Book II on logic. It is his strongest argument, one he does
not seruple to use time and again in his works. Here is the passage
from the fourth trope that Montaigne eondensed in his "Apologie."
... the disagreement admits in itself of no settlement. For the person who
tries to settle it is either in one of the afore-mentioned dispositions or in no
disposition whatsoever. But to declare that he is in no disposition at all - as,
for instance, neither in health nor sickness, neither in motion nor at rest, of
no definite age, and devoid of all the other dispositions as well - is the height
of absurdity. And if he is to judge the sense-impressions while he is in some
one disposition, he will be a party to the disagreement, and moreover, he
will not be an impartial judge of the external underlying objects owing to
his being confused by the dispositions in which he is placed. The waking
person, for instance, cannot compare the impressions of sleepers with those
ofmen awake, nor the sound person those of the sick with those of the sound

In another way, too, the disagreement of such impressions is incapable of

settlement. For he who prefers one impression to another, or one "circum-
stance" to another, does so either uncritically and without proof or critically
and with proof; but he can do this neither without these means (for then
he would be discredited) nor with them. For ifhe is to pass judgment on the
impressions he must certainly judge them by a criterion; this criterion, then,
he will declare to be true or else false. But if false, he will be discredited;
whereas, ifhe shall declare it to be true, he will be stating that the criterion
is true either without proof or with proof. But if without proof, he will be
discredited; and if with proof, it will certainly be necessary for the proof also
to be true, to avoid being discredited. Shall he, then, affirm the truth of the
proof adopted to establish the criterion, after having judged it or without
 GREEK SKEPTle1SM

judging it? If without judging, he will be diseredited; but if after judging,

plainly he will say that he has judged by a eriterion; and of that eriterion
we sh all ask for a proof, and of that proof again a eriterion (I: xiv, I 12- I 16).
The argument has two sections. First, it is impossible to find a
truly impartial judge; for every judgment is relative to the subjective
state of the judger. Secondly, eve n if such a thing as a subjectively
impartial judge could be found, he would have to give an objective
account of his reason for his decision; and this reason itself would
become the subject of dispute, and so forth. In Sextus' version the two
elements of the argument are given approximately equal treatment,
and each one is elaborated several times elsewhere. Here is :Nlontaigne's
verSlOn:
Au demeurant, qui sera propre a juger de ees differenees? Comme no us
disons, aux debats de la religion, qu'il no us [aut un juge non attaehe a l'un
ny a l'autre party, exempt de ehois et d'affeetion, ee qui ne se peut parmy les
Chrestiens, il advient de mesme en eeey; ear, s'il est vieil, il ne peut juger du
sentiment de la vieillesse, estant luy mesme partie en ee debat; s'il est
jeune, de mesme; sain, de mesme; de mesme, malade, dormant et veillant.
Il no us faudroit quelqu'un exempt de toutes ees qualitez, afin que, sans
prreoeeupation de jugement, il jugeast de ees propositions eomme a luy
indifferentes; et a ee eonte il nous faudroit un juge qui ne fut pas. Pour
juger des apparenees que nous reeevons des subjets, il nous [audroit un
instrument judicatoire; pour verifier eet instrument, il no us y [aut de la
demonstration; pour verifier la demonstration, un instrument; nous voila
au rouet. Puis que les sens ne peuvent arrester nostre dispute, estans pleins
eux-mesmes d'ineertitude, il faut que ee soit la raison; aueune raison ne
s' estahIira sans une autre raison: nous voyla a reeulons jusques a l'infiny
(p. 585 a).
Besides introducing the example taken from debates between
Christians, what Montaigne has don e is to condense Sextus' words.
But he has condensed them in a very significant way. The Greek
philosopher's favorite form of reasoning is the dilemma; the judge is
either in some disposition or none at all; the criterion is true or false;
it is offered with proof or without proof. 'With rigorous and somewhat
numbing insistence, Sextus goes through step after step of dilemma
after dilemma until his reader is overwhelmed. Montaigne rejects
both the form and the length of the argument, preferring a less strictly
logical succession. He is simply not interested in being a logician.
Furthermore, he has reduced the length of the argument about the
criterion a great deal more than he has abridged the argument about
the judge, for he is more concerned with the subjective aspect of the
question than with the objective. The entire second half of Sextus'
 GREEK SKEPTleISM

case is reduced to two sentences, and of those two the force of one has
been slightly diminished. Montaigne translates "criterion" as "instru-
ment judicatoire." The precedent for this is Estienne's Latin rendition
of Sextus, which reads, "nam si dijudicabit phantasias, omnino
dijudicabit criterio, id est, judicandi instrumento." 1 Although in the
remainder of the passage Estienne continues to use the word "cri-
terium," Montaigne avoids it in his translation, fearing perhaps to
use a technical term. This shift in translation is not insignificant. It
seems to me that by selecting the term "instrument judicatoire"
Montaigne tends to rule out the possibility that the criterion might be
logic or self-evidence. But these are the criteria most frequently
claimed by philosophers when deciding between conflicting sense
evidenee. And th ey are ones that Sextus considers at length. My
conclusion would be that even in so small a matter as this, Mon-
taigne's focus of interest shifts away from logic and intelleet. Now
this is true throughout the entire "Apologie." The case against reason-
ing or logic is reduced almost completely to the diversity of opinion
or the unreliability of the senses, which Montaigne calls "le pIus
grand fondement et preuve de nostre ignorance" (p. 59 la).
But a large part of the Hypotyposes emphasizes the absolute inade-
quacy of reason or logic to establish any incontrovertible proposition.
In Book II there are chapters devoted to the questions "Does a criterion
of truth really exist?" "Does anything true really exist?" and "Does
proof exist?" In all cases Sextus concludes that we must suspend our
judgment because the answer to these questions must be negative.
Re lists many arguments, some of them devastating, against the
syllogism and against inductive reasoning. vVe have reason to believe
that Montaigne read these chapters with care, for he took a long
passage from the crucial chapter on the criterion (II: vii, 72-75) and
placed it immediately following the sentences just quoted. But what
is significant is that the passage he chose deals entirely with the sepa-
ration that exists between the senses and the external reality th ey
apprehend. In other words, the most telling of Sextus' arguments
never appealed to Montaigne. Re read them, but he us ed others.

1 Quoted by Villey, Municipal Edition, Vol. IV pp. 274-275.

 CHAPTER II

SKEPTICISM PRIOR TO MONTAIGNE

Within a century's time, more or less, after Sextus Empiricus, Christi-

anity became the offieial religion of the Roman Empire; and skepticism
virtually disappeared as asehool ofphilosophy, or turned up only in a
new context. We need not be concerned with the debates between the
patristic apologists and pagan philosophers. Much of the intellectual
history of this period is lost simply because the ultimate success of the
Christians resuIted in the obliteration of pagan works. What is im-
portant for our purposes is the fact that from its very inception
Christian thought frequently repudiated rationalism and philosophy
in order to eulogize the virtues of faith in God and His revelation.
The general position harmonizing Christian faith with skepticism
goes by the nineteenth-century name fideism. According to the
Catholic Encyclopedia, fideism is "a philosophical term meaning a system
of philosophy or an attitude of mind, which, denying the power of
unaided human reason to reach certitude, asserts that the fundamental
act of human knowledge consists in an act of faith, and the supreme
criterion of certitude is authority." The stand of the Church on this
matter is explained as follows:
It must be noted that authority, even the authority of God, eannot be
the supreme eriterion of eertitude, and an aet offaith eannot be the primary
form of human knowledge. This authority, indeed, in order to be a motive
of assent, must be previously aeknowledged as being eertainly valid;
before we believe in a proposition as revealed by God, we must first know
with eertitude that God exists, that He reveals sueh and sueh a proposition,
and that His teaehing is worthy of assent, all of whieh questions ean and
must be ultimately deeided only by an aet of intelleetual assent based on
objeetive evidenee. Thus fideism not only denies intelleetual knowledge,
but logieally ruins faith itself.!
According to this offieial doctrine, formulated in modern times,
1 Catholic Encyclopedia, artide "Fideism."
 SKEPTICISM PRIOR TO MONTAIC;';E '9

certain propositions known as the preambles of faith can be demon-

strated conclusively by reason. Among these are the three indicated
above, the existence of God, the fact that He has given us a revelation,
and the fact that He is trustworthy. To hold that these three are
demonstrated only probably, and not conclusively, is semi-fideism.
Concerning other articles of Christian faith, namely the mysteries,
such as the incarnation, the redemption, and transubstantiation,
there is no question of fideism, for theologians have universaIly held
that they cannot be proven by reason and must be accepted on faith
in the authority of Scripture. IntegraI fideism, however, asserts that
all Christian dogmas in effect com e under the classification ofmystery,
inasmuch as they cannot be certainly known by reason without divine
assistance. 1
Prior to the sixteenth century, many of the most important Christian
thinkers had established precedents for various degrees of fideism.
Saint Paul provided Christian skeptics with verses that they never
tired of quoting, for example First Corinthians i. 19-21, "For it is
written 'I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the cleverness of the
clever I will thwart.' Where is the wise man? \'lhere is the scribe?
Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom
of the world? For since, in the wisdom of God, the world did not
know God through wisdom, it pleased God through the folly of what
we preach to save those who believe," 2 or First Corinthians viii.2,
"If any one imagines that he knows something, he does not yet know
as he ought to know," or Romans xi.33, "0 the depth of the riches
and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his
1 The definition of fideism adopted here is the conservative Catholic one used by Herman
Janssen in his Montaigne fideiste (Nijmegen and Vtrecht: Dekker and van de Vegt and van
Leeuwen, '930). Other authors define the term less precisely: Popkin in the Preface to his Histo-
ry of Scepticism and E. D. James in "Scepticism and Fideism in Bayle's Dictionnaire," French
Studies, XVI ('962),3'5, merely mention the incapacity ofreason to prove any proposition
unaided by faith. Most religious encydopedias or dictionaries of philosophy (e.g., Baldwin,
Lalande, Foulquie) are conspicuously silent or distressingly vague on fideism. Lalande's
artide in the Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie points out that the word, originally
coined by French Protestant theologians, varies in its usage. I have chosen this restricted
definition, first because it is precise enough to be useful, and second because it corresponds
to severaI dear declarations of Bayle's conceming faith and reason. Although some authors
would indude the immortaIity of the soul among the dogmas demonstrable by reason
alone, I do not give it much consideration because I cannot see how it can be called a
preamble offaith. One must remember that the concept of fideism is a modem one, and that
many precise philosophical distinctions familiar to the modem world were unknown in the
greater part of the sixteenth century. See Lucien Febvre's Le Probteme de l'incroyance au XVIeme
sieele, la religion de Rabelais, L'Evolution de I'Humanite, no. 53 (Paris: Albin Michel),
385-386.
2 Montaigne uses this in II: xii, 480a; Bayle quotes it is his Eelaircissement sur les pyrrhoniens
in DHC, XVI, 3'2.
20 SKEPTICISM PRIOR TO MONTAlGNE

judgments and how inscrutable his ways!" Saint Paul built no

systematic philosophy, and any attempt to construct one on the basis
of his Epistles can only raise as many difficulties as it resolves, but
there can be no denying that his insistence on faith in Christ and
through Christ presupposed adistrust ofreason and philosophy.
Likewise, the most important of the Pauline theologians, Saint
Augustine, displayed marked anti-rational tendencies. Catholic
apologists may defend his orthodoxy in this matter, and not without
some grounds; in fact, Saint Augustine's thought can be understood
as the greatest early attempt to fuse philosophy and religion into a
hybrid creation, since known as theology, the rational analysis of
dogma. Therefore, Saint Thomas represents a continuation of the
tradition of Augustinian intellectualism; but it is just as true that
Calvinism and J ansenism also stern largely from the Bishop of Rippo's
fervent pietism and its unintellectual, even anti-intellectual, elements.
Between credo ut intelligam and intelliga ut credam, it seems clear to me
that Saint Augustine favors the first. The Augustinian interpretation
of the fall of man and the consequent radical corruption of human
nature, which rendered reason totally useless without grace, allies
itself easily with fideism and even Academic skepticism. The saint him-
self had known a period during which he subscribed in a general way
tü Academic skepticism; and when he later wrote to combat it in the
Cantra Academicas, he succeeded in preserving for theologians of future
generations much of the skeptics' reasoning. Re himself to ok a neo-
Platcnist stand, clairning that while no pure truth could be expected
to come to us through the senses, divine illumination could give us
knowledge; but his Platonism did not always satisfy medieval doctors.
Similarly, the great minority movement in medieval philosophy,
nominalism, denigrated reason's capacity to achieve any valid know-
ledge. 1 For the nominalists, no universals existed, only individual
entities. Any abstract concepts were products of the mind onlyand
did not correspond to reality. The only kind of knowledge possible,
then, was the intuitive cognition of individuals.
Gilson finds a growing reaction in the late Middle Ages against the
preponderantly rationalist theologies of the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries. Thinkers like Duns Seotus and William of Ockham were
1 See Etienne Gilson, The History of Christian Philosophy in the Aliddle Ages, 2 vols. (New
York: Random House, 1954), John Herman Randali, Jr., The Alaking of the Modem Jldind,
revised edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press for the Houghton Miffiin Company,
1940), pp. 203-215, Hiram Hayden, The Counter-Renaissance (:'oIew York: Grove Press, Inc.,
1960) on nominalism.
 SKEPTICIS~! PRIOR TO MO~TAIGNE 2I

concerned that Greek necessitarianism, if allowed to dominate theology,

might reduce the absolut e liberty of God. Because it rested on faith,
·William of Ockham went so far as to deny that theology could be a
science. In 1347 Nicolas d' Autrecourt ("the Hume of the Middle
Ages" - Gilson) burned publidy a treatise of his and several letters
containing propositions of fideistic tendencies. These nominalist theo-
logians bear witness to the surprising extent that skepticism penetrated
so me schools of late medieval philosophy; in so far as they strongly
opposed rationalism in the interests of a more mystical theology, they
contributed to the development of fidcism.
In the history of medieval thought and the growth of rationalsim,
especially Paduan rationalism, much has been made of the so-c alle d
doctrine of the "double truth." Taking their cue from Ernest Renan,
French scholars such as Charbonne! and Busson have found a con-
tinuing tradition of thinkers who felt that two so rts of truth could bc
distinguished, philosophical and theological. Baldly stated, their conten-
tion was that certain dogmas - primarily the immortality of the soul -
could be demonstrated to be false according to philosophie al standards,
but true according to revelation. In fact this is a gross oversimplification
ofthcir ideas, even a misrepresentation oftheories that did not depart as
much as has been daimed from the generality of thought at the time.
Broadly speaking, the Paduan school of philosophy recast medieval
Averroism and concluded that Aristotelian philosophy disagreed with
certain fundamental Christian dogmas about the immortality of the
soul, the nature of divine Providenee, and the nature of mirades.
These philosophers did not reject Christian dogma, but they stead-
fastly maintained that philosophy (reason) was not necessarily in
accord with theology (faith). Aristotle, who in the ~fiddle Ages had
been a bulwark of Christian theology, was now made into one of its
principal opponents by some of his commentators. The Paduans and
their successors were confirmed rationalists, and they daimed to
be Christian. Both they and their books were subject to continual
attacks by the faithful, whether Protestant or CathoEc, on the grounds
that despite their fideist protcstations they were "atheists" or "a-
christs." And in sixteenth-century France one of them, Etienne Dolet,
paid for his beliefs at the stakc. \Vhether or not the accusations made
against these men individually were founded is hard to say, for they
may have been personally devout; but in the long run, their influence
contributed enormously to the downfall of theological dogmatism and
the evolution of fideism or deism in religion.
22 SKEPTICISM PRIOR TO MONTAlGNE

What is important for our immediate purposes is that the rationalists

may be loosely called fideists as are Montaigne and the school of
"nouveaux pyrrhoniens" that succeeded him. It is essential, however,
to remember that though the Paduans and the Phyrrhonists agreed
in their fideist concIusions, th ey arrived at them for completely differ-
ent reasons. There is a world of difference between the two men-
talities. Tell a skeptic that reason rejects an artide of faith, and he is
not disturbed (nor does he believe you, for reason cannot prove any-
thing). Tell a rationalist that reason and dogma are not in agreement;
and he is in a quandary, forced to choose one or the other; and it is
always possible that he will ding to reasan rather than faith, for he
wishes to subject all matters to rational discussion. It is therefore in-
correet to group the Pyrrhonist fideists among the rationalists.l
The distinetian between fideism founded on rationalism and fideism
founded on Pyrrhonism might not bc so important if the revival of
Greek skepticism had not taken place in the context of the debates
between Catholics and Protestants during the period of the Counter
Reformation. 2 Martin Luther, in launching the Reformation, had
raised the problem of the criterion in questions of faith. In the
Leipzig Disputation of 1519 and in The Babylonish Captivity of the
Church (1520), he inaugurated his attack on the until then firmly
established standard of truth, the tradition and authority of the Roman
Catholic Church. Rejecting the authority of the Pope, he even decIared
that all men have "the power of discerning and judging what is right
and wrong in the matters of faith." 3 This affirmation of the liberty
of the individual conscience in matters of religion represented a
complete revolution in Christian thinking. "To Catholics ... this
must have sound ed completely incredible. For centuries, asserting
that apropositian stated a religious truth meant that it was authorized
by Church tradition, by the Pope, and by Councils. To daim that
1 Busson regards the Pyrrhonists as a special case of rationalism; see especially p. 357 of
his Le Rationalisme dans la litterature franfaise de la Renaissanee (Paris: Vrin, 1957). This is a
second edition, considerably revised, of his thesis Les SOllrees et le developpemenl du rationaiisme
dans ia litteratllrefran,aise de la Renaissanee (I53J-I6oI) (Paris: Letouzet & Ane, 1922).
2 The relation between skeptical arguments and the controversies of the Reformation is
clearly described in Popkin, History of Skepticism, chapter I, on which I have drawn largely.
Popkin feels that it is a "historieal accident" (p. 16) that Sextus Empiricus was published
only at the end of the sixteenth century. The choice of the term "accident" seems unfortunate.
As Popkin himself has shown, both translators, Estienne and Hervet, chose to defend their
editions on the grounds that they would be useful against misguided religious theories.
They were fully aware of the implications of Pyrrhonism in religious controversy. "Vithout
the debates inaugurated by the Reformation, they would have been less attracted to Sextus.
3 The Appeal to the German Nobiiily, in Documents qf the Christian Church, ed. Henry Bettenson
(New York: Oxford Press, 1947), p. 277. Cited by Popkin.
 SKEPTICISM PRIOR TO MONTAlGNE 23

these standards could be wrong was like denying the rules of logic." 1
Henceforth, both Catholics and Protestants were forced to defend not
only their differing dogmas, but also the criteria on which they based
these dogmas. The standard of the Roman Church remained the
authority ofits traditions as represented by the Pope and the Councils. 2
But Protestants found themselves in a difficult position. For Luther,
and later for Calvin, Scripture alone did not furnish the entire criterion.
To it was added the inner conviction or faith that persuaded the reader
of sacred texts, and this inner certitude or faith based on the exami-
nation of the word ofGod stood against all the tradition of the Church.
Luther's famous words at the Diet of vVorms, "On this I take my
stand. I can do no other. God help me. Amen," amount to his decla-
ration of his criterion: "My conscience (as it examines Scripture)
persuades me." It is immediately apparent that such a postion implies
complete liberty of the individual conscience, erring or not, in religious
matters; and Luther's earliest writings (until 1525) conform to such
a conclusion. 3 Catholics were quick to point out that such a criterion
would lead inevitably to anarchy in matters of faith, and history soon
justified their argument. 4 The almost immediate appearance of anti-
Trinitarians, "Spirituals," and Anabaptists, and the violence during
the Peasant's Revolt of 1525, demonstrated that Luther had let loose
a pandemonium of religious scets. Scripture did not lend itself ex-
clusively to the interpretation he gave it, as he had nalvely assumed
in the beginning. Lutherans were put in the awkward position of

1 Popkin, p. 3.
2 "The Holy, fficumenical and General Synod of Trent ... perceiving that this truth
and this discipline are contained in written books and in written traditions, which were
received by the Apostles from the lips of Christ himself, or, by the same Apostles, at the
dictation of the Holy Spirit, and were handed on and have come down to us; following the
example of the orthodox Fathers, this Synod receives and venerates, with equal pious
affection and reverenee, all the books both of the Newand the Old Testaments, since one
God is the author of both, together with the said Traditions, as weil those pertaining to
faith as those pertaining to morals, as having been given either from the lips of Christ or
by the dictation of the Holy Spirit and preserved by unbroken succession in the Catholic
Church ... " Bettenson, Documents, p. 367. This pronouncement was made by the fourth
session of the Council, April 8, 1546.
3 For the development of Luther's theories and practicrs in the matter of religious
freedom, see Joseph Lecler, S. J., Tolerance and the Rdormation, trans. T. L. Westlow, 2 vols.
(Xew York: Associated Press, and London: Longmans, 1960), Bk. III, chaps i, v, and viii.
~ As early as [530 Sebastian Franck founded his movement on the "invisible and eternal
word of God." The letters ofCaspar Schwenkfeld of [527 and 1528 maintain that there is a
gap between the word of God and its expression in sacred writings. \\'hat these groups
wished to promote above the \etter of Scripture was its spirit, or the Holy Spirit of some
mystic or invisible ehurch. Such ideas were to be found throughout Europe from the earliest
days of the Reformation and eaused the Protestants considerable doctrinal embarrassment
and political probIems. See LecJer, Tolerance, Bk. III, chaps. ii, iii, and Bk. VII, chaps. i, v.
 SKEPTlC1SM PR10R TO MQ;',nA1GNE

defending against the Catholics a subjective criterion while trying to

prove it objectively valid in their arguments against splinter Protestant
movements.
In the controversies that were to ensue over the criterion in religious
matters, neither side claimed that reason alone was its mainstay; and
both were wiIling to argue that reason's role in their religion was
slight. vVhichever source was chosen, Scripture or tradition, each side
felt itself on firm grounds; but Pyrrhonist dialectics could be applied
against either criterion, and in fact were in the seventeenth century.
In practice, it turned out that the Pyrrhonist temperament, with its
conservatism and moderation, seems to have appealed more to the
Catholics; for th ey first made use of skepticism in their apologetics.l
It occurred to the Catholics that their dogmas could be accepted
on authority without the aid of reason before it occurred to the
Protestants that their interpretations could be accepted on faith
without the assistance of reason. It is ironic, but true, that despite
Luther's conviction that reason was powerless in matters of faith
Protestantism originaIly displayed more dogmatism in its attitude
than did Catholicism. It was only later that the Roman Church
officiaIly declared that human reason un assisted by grace could
demonstrate at least the preambles of faith.
One must not assume that skeptical logic and arguments enten~d
immediately into the debates. Generally speaking, before Montaigne
skepticism had little importance in the thought of the sixteenth
centcry.2 vVhat we find is several works which do not necessarily
show signs of influencing each other, and which do not always take
sides with Pyrrhonism even though they present its case with varying
degrees of completeness.
The first of these works, and the onlyone written by an author who
had read Sextus Empiricus, is the Examen vanitatis doctrintE gentium,
written around 1510 and published ten years later by Gian Franceseo
Pico della Mirandola (1470-1533), nephew of the famous Pico. 3
1 Popkin gives an interesting account of the stands taken by Calvin, Luther, and Erasmus:
History of Seeptieism, pp. 2-9.
2 Busson would like to build a case for a somewhat greater prevalence of skepticism than
is likely. Villey, Strowski, and Popkin all agree than no school or continuous tradition of
skepticism can be found, but rather a few isolated examples in particular cases. See Busson,
RationaZisme, chap. viii, pp. 233-237, and chap. xiii, pp. 410-41 I ; Villey, Les SouTees et l'tivoZution
des Essais de Alontaigne (Paris: Hachette, 1908), II, 165; Fortunat Strowski, Montaigne,
2nd ed. (Paris: Alcan, 1931), pp. 119-146; and Popkin, History of Seeptieism, pp. 17-·1-3.
3 See Strowski, pp. 125-130; Villey, II, 166; Popkin, pp. 19-21; and Louis I. Bredvold,
The IntelleetuaZ Alilieu of John Dryden, Ann Arbor Paperbacks AA3 (Ann ,\rbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1956), pp. 28-29.
 SKEPTICISM PRIOR TO MO:\"TAIG~E

This book does not seem to have made much of an impression on the
learned world (pace Strowski). Villey coneludes that Montaigne did
not use it on the grounds that where he used similar material, he
probably went to another source, for example Sextus, whom he
followed more elosely than Pico had.
One author, who, according to Villey, did make use of Pico, is the
curious figure Cornelius Agrippa (or Agrippa von X ettesheim).l A.n
immensely learned man, he led a varied and insecure life during
which he married three times, lived in France, Spain, Italy, and
Germany, and became a linguist, soldier, doctor, astrologer, scholar,
lawyer, and cabalist. Dependent through most of his life on court
pensions, he seems to have been a most inept courtier. He refused at
first to read Louise de Savoie's horoscope when he was assigned to
her court as a physician; and then when he yielded to her insistence,
he had the honesty or gaucherie to predict only ill for her, in which he
was prophetic. Having devoted a large part of his life to erudition, in
1526 he wrote a diatribe against all learning under the very mis-
leading title Declamation on the Uncertainty and Vanity of the Sciences. 2
Anyone who reads De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum hoping to
find in it a compendium of skeptical philosophy is sure to be dis-
appointed. Even in the sixteenth century its readers could not take it
too seriously. Tahureau in his Dialogues and Louis Turquet in his
1582 French translation regard the book as a facetious work, intended
as a manual of paradoxes and anecdotes for the courtier who wants
so.nething witty to say.3 The final chapter of the book is a eulogy of
the jackass as the wisest and soberest of animaIs.
This eulogy makes one think of Erasmus' Praise of Folly, and there
are many points of similarity between Erasmus and Agrippa. The
main point of the De incertitudine ... is not that the various human
sciences are uncertain and filled with doubt; but that theyare trump e-
ry impostures which may become dangerous preoccupations and lead
man away from concern over his salvation, away from the simple
moral life into luxury and debauch (chap. CI). For Agrippa (if we
are to take him at his word) the revival of learning has been actively
bad for the human race and has only spread heresy (chap. C). The

1 Villey II, 166. On Agrippa (q.86-1535), see Bayle's artide in DHC; Villey, I, 61-62,
II, 175-181; Strowski, pp. 130-133; Hayden, pp. q.5-15+ and passim; Popkin, pp. 23-25;
and John Ferguson, Publications of the Edinburgh Bibliographical Society, XII (1925), 1-23.
2 De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum declamatio invectiva ... first published in 1530 at
Antwerp.
3 Villey, II, 177-178.
 SKEPTlCISM PRIOR TO MONTAlGNE

single study that Agrippa recommends is the study of the Scriptures,

which yields elearly all the knowledge a man need have.
In the course of a hundred and two chapters, Agrippa manages
to condemn depravity and worldliness in every seetion of soeiety.
Courtiers, financiers, lawyers, soldiers, nobles, monks (of course),
farmers, prostitutes, doctors, astrologers - all are corrupt, all have
lost the original innocence of man before the fall. Agrippa is par-
ticularly harsh on the professions he had practiced, medicine, as-
trology, and law. In his satire any remark, no matter how ridiculous,
finds a place. Mathematicians are criticized for not having squared
the cirele, shepherds for imprisoning animaIs, fishers for providing
unnourishing food. Naturally, some of his denunciations are meant
seriously and aroused enmity. The venality of the church, the in-
justice of the Inquisition, the lubricity of the monastic orders, the
presumption of Papal decrees, the idolatry of Catholic practice, and
the futility of church ceremonies and holidays do not go unridicuIed. 1
Amid all this confusion there can be found some genuine criticism
of reason, aIbeit non e of it systematic. Agrippa takes great pIeasure
in moeking the technical vocabulary and sophistic distinctions of the
erudite, coneluding that much of their knowledge and many of their
disputes are purely verbal. Mter listing at Iength the divergencies of
opinion among scholars, he condudes that they cannot know any-
thing, or else th ey would not disagree. Here he is often at his most
effective. In his first chapter, an important one because :Nlontaigne
borrcwed several times from it, he states that every science is based on
first principIes that cannot be proven and cannot be discussed. But
such rigorous arguments, no matter how diffusely reasoned, are few in
Agrippa, and never presented carefully or consequentially.
Agrippa's work hardIy deserves to be called skeptical. It is more
moralistic and anti-intellectual. Nevertheless, it was widely read (the
BibIiotheque Nationale lists six editions between 1530 and the French
translation of 1582), and undoubtedly created some interest in thinking
aIong potentially skeptical lines. Moreover, it provided both Mon-
taigne and Guy de Brues with a convenient storehouse of anecdotes

1 Such ideas, and a letter wrongly assigned to Agrippa (ef. Bayle, Dictionnaire, Agrippa N)
gave rise to false accusations that Agrippa was a Protestant. Grenier ((Euvres choisies de
Sextus Empiricus, p. 25) and Panos P. Morphos in his critical editian of The Dialogues of Guy
de Eruis, Johns Hopkins Studies in Romance Literatures and Langllages, XXX (1953), p. 77, still
consider Agrippa a Protestant. Though Cornelius Agrippa was professedly a Catholic, his
books did not fare well in the hands of the Church. Condemned by the Sorbonne in 1541,
his entire works were proscribed by the Counci! of Trent in 1564.
 SKEPTICISM PRIOR TO MOl\"TAIG:\'E

and lists of eonftieting theories held by the philosophers of the past.

There is absolutely no doubt that Montaigne used Agrippa, borrowing
from him almost textually on mare than one oecasion.! Only two
essays, the "Apologie" and "De la ressemblanee des enfans aux
peres" (II: xxxvii), make use of material from the De incertitudine et
vanitate scientiarum. In the ease of the second essay, all the borrowings
give ammunition to Montaigne in his attack on doetors (though he
is eonsiderably less vitriolie or seabrous than his souree). In the
"Apologie" Villey finds twenty-four passages in whieh Montaigne may
have relied on the De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum, ofwhieh fourteen
resemble Agrippa very elosely. The lists of divergent theories on the
nature of the soul (pp. 524-525a), of its seat in the body (p. 525a), of
the metaphysieal strueture of the universe (p. 52Ia), or the eomposition
of semen (p. 539a) follow Agrippa almost word for word. Montaigne
repeats Agrippa's erroneous statement that Valerius Maximus is
witness to Cieero's low estimate of learning in his old age (p. 48 ra).
These and the other passages that eome from Agrippa are illustrations
and examples for Montaigne's arguments. The essayist went to
Agrippa for erudition, not for his eonvietions.
After Agrippa, the interest in skeptieism in France seems to have
inereased somewhat though it must be remembered that sinee Sextus
was unknown, Cieero's Academica and Diogenes Laertius were the
prineipal sourees of knowledge about it. 2 Men like Pierre Bunel and
Arnould du Ferron, fideists and anti-rationalists, used material from
the Academica to support their views. In the 1540's the eirele of
Petrus Ramus show ed considerable indination towards Academie
1 One interesting case gives incontrovertible proof that ~lontaigne's source could only
be Agrippa. In the "Apologie" (p. 477a) the essayist refers to "Valentian, ennemy dedare
de la science et des lettres," making two mistakes. The more usual form for the Roman name
is Valentinian, and among the three Roman emperors of that name none seems particularly
inimical to letters. However, both the error in fact and the misspeHed name appear in the
editions of Agrippa's De incertitudine . .. (chap. I) though the correet speHing occurs in the
Opera. No other work that Vill ey knows gives this error. See his note vol. IV, 237 in the
Municipal Edition.
2 The best summary of this period is to be found in Popkin, History of Scepticism, pp. 25-30,
whom I follow here. One of the best known passages relati,"e to skepticism is Rabelais's
chapters 35 and 36 of the Tiers Liure, in which Panurge consults the "philosophe ephectique
et pyrrhonien" Trouillogan, who answers all Panurge's questions evasively. His evasions,
however, are not the typieal dialectic of dassical skepticism. ,3,.t the elose of the scene
Gargantua suggests that the most learned philosophers of the day belong to the sehool
of the "pyrrhoniens, aporrheticques, scepticques et ephectiques" (technical terms probably
from Diogenes Laertius). Busson cites this as evidence that skepticism was widespread:
Rationalisme, pp. 234-235. Popkin's view that this comic episode should not be given too
much weight as a historieal or philosophical document seerns mo re sound: History of Scep-
ticism, pp. 21-22. The whole scene is conceivably based on a similar passage in Lucian's
Philosophiesfor Sale.
 SKEPTICISM PRIOR TO MONTAlGNE

philosophy. Ramus himself is remembered primarily for his attack on

Aristotelian ethics and logic in his Animadversiones AristotelictE (1543).
Although his personal conviction seems to have been that man would
do best to abandon philosophy and return to religion, his fideism soon
drew criticism; and he was considered a "nouvel academicien." 1
Some years later, in 1557, a member of the Ramus eirele, Guy de
Brues, made his contribution to the discussion with his Les Dialogues
de Guy de Bruis contre les nouveaux Academiciens. 2 Brues does not present
the arguments of the Academics sympathetically and is defending
himself and Ramus (whom he mentions twice \vith praise)3 from
accusations of skepticism by upholding a concept of reason derived
haphazardly from Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and others. In his dedicatory
epistre to the same Cardinal of Lorraine to whom Hervet was later to
dedicate his translation of Sextus, Brues deelares his purpose in
writing the dialogues: " ... j'ay mis peine en ces miens dialogues de
prevenir la jeunesse, et la destourner de croire ceux qui disent que
toutes les choses consistent en la seule opinion, s'effor~ans par mesme
moien d'abolir et mettre a mespris la religion, l'honneur de Dieu, la
puissance de nos superieurs, l'autorite de la justice, ensemble toutes
les s~iences et diseiplines." No one has doubted the sincerity of Brues'
desire to help the youth of France. Even if he was a skeptic, there is no
evidence that he was an infidel in any way; and in his preface he
specifically asks the reader to be sure to read to the end of the dialogues
in order to become acquainted with his final position.
Be:;ides defending the cause of reason, Brues was conscious of taking
part in the effort of the PIeiade to introduce serious literature in the
French language. His is the first work in French dealing exelusivcly
with philosophy. Unusually enough, he chooses as speakers in his
dialogues the contemporary figures Pierre de Ronsard, Antoine de
Bai'f, Jean Nicot, and Guillaume Aubert. There are three dialogues.
In the first, which composes almost half the book, Bai'f assumes the
role of a skeptic while Ronsard defends the forees of reason. Bai'f
opens his case by deelaring that man's lot is mise rabI e, more miserable
than the animals', for they live according to nature while man long
ago left the Golden Age behind him and has degenerated ever since.
Following Cicero elosely, he argues that reas on is uncertain because
1 On Ramus, see Busson, Rationalisme, chap. IX, pp. 266-273.
2 For de Brues, see Panos P. Morphos' edition of the Dialogues; Villey, II, 169-173;
and Popkin, pp. 31-33.
3 Pp. 88 and 113-1 q. of the original edition. This pagination is given in Morphos' text
and index.
 SKEPTICIS:'vI PRIOR TO MO::-.rTAIGNE 29

the senses are unreliable. Without undertaking a dialeetieal scrutiny

of epistemology (Brues was unacquainted with Sextus Empiricus),
he insists that the variety of opinions among philosophers demonstrates
his thesis. Rather quickly and obligingly, BaiJ backs down on his
skepticism re the senses and agrees with Ronsard that after all white
is white and fire is hot; but he stiIl maintains that the divergence of
opinions refutes sufficiently any claim of validity for reason. Here
follows a list of such opinions on the nature of matter, the formaI ele-
ments of the universe, Aristotle's theory of form, mattel', and privation,
the plurality of world s, the movements of the heavens, the make-up
of the soul, its seat, its immortality, and so forth interminably.
Ronsard counters with a many-faceted theory of knowledge. First
of all, our senses in their normal state report accurately what they
perceive. But they are only windows on the world that allow im-
pressions to pass to the mind, endowed with a certain common sense,
which relays them to the imagination, memory, and judgment.
Between them these faculties manage to make knowledge out of
sensation; but one must not overlook a final faculty of the mind, one
which has immediate intuitions of universals, the one true knowledge.
Visibly impressed, BaiJ yields to Ronsard's superior judgment.
The remaining two dialogues, this time between )ricot and Aubert,
with Ronsard and Balf taking minor roles, follow the same format. In
the second Aubert declares all morality relative, since virtue changes
from man to man, from nation to nation, and from one moment to
another, all this documented by impressive catalogues of diverse
opinions. A long development on Nicot's part resolves itself into the
position that man's soul has in it innate ideas of virtue, and that with
proper education, prayer, and God's help men may overcome the
temptations of the flesh and the promptings of the ego.
In the third dialogue the subject is law. According to Aubert laws
are nothing but human artifacts which often betray the interest of
the legislator. They are not founded on reason as their great variety
demonstrates, and th ey perpetrate and perpetuate political and
economic inequities. In answer to all this Nicot argues that behind the
welter of human institutions lies natural law, a constant universal,
which is to be contrasted with the changing and flexible particulars.
As is obvious, this discussion follows the pattem set in the two previous
dialogues.
Despite the inadequacies ofits arguments, Brues' work is not without
distinetion. It is in French; it is purely philosophical and testifies to
30 SKEPTICISM PRIOR TO MO:"l'TAIG~E

the freedom its author felt to deal at length with questions ofphilosophy
without reference to theology. Its cumbersome lists of the variety of
opinion are impressive by their exhaustiveness and give no little
weight to the constantly repeated argument "how can we explain the
manifold opinions and laws without being reduced to skepticism? "
Montaigne read the Dialogues and made use of them in his Essais.
Villey finds seventeen borrowings, all but three in the "Apologie";
and these three could have come from Brues or elsewhere. 1 Three
times in the "Apologie" Montaigne lifts sentenees al most word for
word from Brues; one on Aristotle's privation, one on the unity of the
soul and its seat in the brain, and one on the foolish teehnical terms
of palmistry.2 In several other cases, it is high ly likely that Montaigne
went to Brues and other sources, such as Agrippa, for his lists of the
opinions of the philosophers. But it is surely not just as a compendium
oflists that the Dialogues appealed to the essayist. Montaigne could not
have helped being fascinated by the incrimination of the legal code
and the judieial system, the long treatment of the relativity of morals
(and the morality of moderation), Bai:f's and Aubert's praise of the
state of nature and the condition of the animals, the repeated attacks
on foolish erudition, and finally, but most important of all, the con-
stantly reiterated theme of the diversity and contradiction in every
field of human affairs. These are all preoccupations of Montaigne's
that he discusses in the "Apologie" and elsewhere. Villey likes to
regard the Dialogues as a sort of index of the state of mind of a man
such as Montaigne, skeptical by nature, but as yet unfamiliar with
the clinehing arguments of Sextus Empirieus. 3
Sextus had been virtually unknown throughout the Middle Ages.
Only two medieval manuscripts, both Latin translations of the Hypo-
typoses (one of them erroneously attributed to Aristotle), have come to
light. The Greek text appeared in Italy in the fifteenth eentury and was
gradually disseminated over Europe. 4 But still, excepting Gian Fran-
eesco Pieo della Mirandola, no author shows signs of having read
Sextus Empirieus in any form before the 1562 publieation in Paris of
Henri Estienne's Latin translation of the Dullines of Pyrrhonism. Seven
years later, in 1569, Gentian Hervet, secretary to the Cardinal of

See vol. IV of the Municipal Edition, p. xix.

1
Compare Montaigne pp. 522a, 528-529a, and 5.pa, with Brues pp. 60-61, 79 and 78,
2
and 94 respectively.
3 SOUTces et üolution, II, 173.
4 Richard H. Popkin, History of Skepticism, pp. 1 i- 18 discusses the manuseripts and
printed editions of the works of Sextus.
 SKEPTICISM PRIOR TO MO:'\TAIG:'\E 31

Lorraine, published an edition containing both the Hypotyposes in

Estienne's translation and his own Latin version of the Adversus
mathematicos. The Introductions to these two editions are illuminating,
for th ey show the purposes which the translators claimed to have in
mind when they presented Sextus to the learned world'! Estienne
adopts an attitude of persiflage as he addresses Henri de Mesmes, to
whom he dedicates his edition. 2 He suspends his judgment on the
question whether the book treats serious matters ofnot; he cannot say
that he understands its content. The year before, after an almost fatal
bout with the quartan fever, he felt disgusted with learning in general.
One day he entered his library (covering his eyes to avoid the sight
of so many hateful books) and stumbled across achest containing
arno ng other trivialities some Pyrrhonist writings. Finding his manu-
script of Sextus, he read it with pleasure; for it was the best medicine
for someone suffering from excessive study of letterso Hc could not
approve of everything in the book, for example the denial of such
obvious things as motion; but nonetheless he preferred the Pyrrhonist
suspension of judgment to some of the rash affirmations of dogmatists.
To speak more seriously, he and everyone else knows that dogmatists,
when they come to consider God, finallyend up in an atheist position.
(Whom Estienne has in mind is not clear.) But skeptics suspend their
judgment and are driven by a natural instinct to accept God and His
Providenee. Nonetheless, Estienne would not consider himself a
skeptic; nor would he wish to convert anyone to Pyrrhonism. His
re;lsons for publishing Sextus are three: first, to confound the dogma-
tists and cure them of their disease of impiety; second, to spare those
who have a moderate taste for philosophy a lot of work, for they will
find many matters clearly resumed in Sextus; and finally, to provide
material for students of philology and history.
It is easy to see that Estienne's defense ofhis publication is somewhat
hesitant and apologetic. He feels constrained to insist that the book is
not dangerous, and that much of its worth lies in the digest of infor-
mation on classical schools of philosophy that it contains. Its positive

1 These Introductions are discussed in Popkin, pp. 31-36, 67-68. A Freneh translation
of Estienne's is availabIe in Grenier and Goron's (Euvres choisi,s de Sextlls Empiricus, pp. 21-24.
Latin excerpts from Hervet's are in Maturin Dreano's La Pensie religieuse de A10ntaigne
(Paris: Gabriel Beauehesne et ses fiIs, 1936), pp. 256--257.
2 Henri de Mesmes (Henricus Memmius), 1532-1596, seigneur de Roissy and MaIassise,
Iater ehaneellor of the kingdom of Navarre. His memoirs have been pubIished by E. Leroux,
La Vie publique et privee de Henri de !v[esmes (Paris: E. Lerom::, n.d.). In 1570 Montaigne
dedieated Etienne de La Boetie's transIation of PIutareh's "Rules of Marriage" to him.
See inira, pp. 39-40.
 SKEPTICISM PRIOR TO MONTAlGNE

value is that it may preserve religion from the rash conclusions of

imprudent dogmatists. The truth is so evident that Sextus' ideas
cannot be harmful, and may be useful.
Hervet's Introduction is somewhat more serious in tone. An active
participator in the French Counter Reformation, he dedicates his
translation to the Cardinal of Lorraine, brother of the Duc de Guise,
and one of the future principals of the Ligue. Like Estienne, he claims
to have come across Sextus accidentally. In his case it was a copy of
the Adversus mathematicos in the cardinal's Iibrary which he had found
while looking for some reading for a trip. On examining it, he was
persuaded of its potential utility because it showed convincingly that
no human art or science could withstand the arguments raised against
it. Hence, only God's revelation provides us with a sure source of
knowledge. Such a philosophy can be extremely helpful in combatting
Calvinists and contemporary Academics. (Once again it is not certain
just whom Hervet has in mind.)
Both translators saw in Pyrrhonism a valuable weapon against the
adversaries of true piety, and in neither case do we have any reason
to distrust their statements. When Greek skepticism first appeared in
the sixteenth century, it was immediately employed in the controversies
the Reformation had given rise to. Not until David Hume was skepti-
cism to be presented as a purely secular theory of knowledge, and he
introduced new arguments unknown to the Greeks. Before his time
skeptical theses were always regarded, if not genuinely, at Ieast
offici:llly, as the prelude to an assertion of the primacy of faith. To
many minds of the late Renaissance there was no prima facie conflict
between Christianity and skepticism, and it was not infrequently
claimed that the two fit weIl together.
Later, Catholics were to use Pyrrhonist reasoning in their arguments
against Reformed religion, but for aImost twenty years after Estienne's
translation, no important book betrayed the influence of Greek
skepticism.1 Then in 1580 and 1581 two significant works, the first
edition of Montaigne's Essais and the Q.uod nihil scitur of the Portuguese
doctor Francisco Sanchez (or Sanches), 1552-1623, were pubIished.
By coincidence Sanchez' treatise and the Pyrrhonist sections of Mon-
taigne's "Apologie" seem both to have been composed in 1575-76.
Despite many possible connections between the two authors, no

1 For treatment of several minor authors of the end of the 16th eentury who indieate an
aequaintanee with these works, but who are interested more by their historieal than philo-
sophie eontent, see Popkin, pp. 36-38.
 SKEPTICISM PRIOR TO MONTAlGNE 33

influenee between the two works ean be proven. 1 Since Sanehez was
Montaigne's junior by almost twenty years, it is likely that if they did
meet, the essayist would have influenced the young student; the reverse
seems hardly probable. The faet remains that th ey may have been
related through Montaigne's mother, and that th ey both live d in the
vicinity of Bordeaux (Sanchez in his adoleseence) and both attended
the college of Guyenne as sehoolboys. So it is impossible to rule out
completely the chanee that they knew each other.
Whatever the case, their books differ considerably despite their
common interests and certain inevitable similarities. That they should
both reject the validity of the senses as a source of knowledge, that
they should be struck by the separation of man the observer from the
world he observes, that they should both insist on the variety and
contradictions of human opinion and the instability of each man's
being cannot surprise anyone; for these are the cornmonplaces of
any serious form of skepticism.
Sanchez differs most radically from Montaigne in that his work
examines Aristotelian epistemology earefully and then rejects it. 2
His arguments extend weIl beyond the mere consideration of the
senses and concentrate methodically on the destruction of the syllo-
gism, the analysis of the concept of cause, and the critique of all uni-
versals. (None of these matters coneerned Montaigne in the "Apologie"
except by implication or in passing.) Having refuted Aristotle,
Sanchez goes on to explain his own idea of what knowledge is: the
perfect apprehension of a thing ("Tei perfecta cognitio"). This is nominal-
ist language and implies an experiential rather than intellectual
cognition of individual things. But if it is the only sort of knowledge
that Sanchez will admit could be possible, he also cites numerous
reasons why it is unattainable. Both the mind knowing and the thing
being known are subject to inherent limitations which preclude any
perfect knowledge; for no object ever occurs in such complete isolation
that it ean be known. Likewise, man changes from moment to moment;

1 Villey, Sourees et ivolution, I, 209-210, finds no material in the Essais of 1580 that comes
from the Quod nihil scitur (to explain such a borrowing it would be necessary to assume
Montaigne's familiarity with a manuscript of the work) and onlyone possible memory of
Sanchez in 1588 (the sentence "Je s/1ay mieux que c'est qu'homme, queje ne s/1ay que c'est
animal, ou mortei, ou raisonnable," III: xiii, I 046b). A similar idea could have been found
in Agrippa (chap. VII).
2 Francisco Sanchez, Operaphilosophica, ed. Joaquim Carvalho (Coimbra, 1955), pp. I-53,
gives a convenient modem edition. Strowski's lively summary, lVlontaigne, pp. 133-146, is
still the best introduction to the work, conveying as it does the vigorous, personal tone of
Sanchez' style.
34 SKEPTICISM PRIOR TO MONTAlGNE

his senses are subjective and inconstant; and they cannot bridge the gap
between themselves and outer reality. Our cognition of the external
world is unsure; and although our experience of our own selyes
is vastly more accurate, it is also mu ch less clear and orderly. So, on
all fronts we find perfect knowledge beyond our reach.
The result of Sanchez' theoretical analysis, then, is "quod nihiI
scitur," and his position would seem to be Academic skepticism. But
like Carneades he allows the possibili ty of an inferior kind of knowledge
that may be probable, but never sure. l This imperfect science is to be
based on observation and experience controlled by judgment. Sanchez
readily admits that most men are not satisfied with such a limited
knowledge, and that few have the requisite sound judgment to attain
even it.
His hesitant empiricism has led most historians to regard him as a
moderate advocate of experimentalism and a precursor of Francis
Bacon. 2 Although there can be no denying that Sanchez' theory is
radically skeptical, more Academic than Pyrrhonist one might even
say, he in no way departs from logic or tradition when he espouses a
mild reliance on experience, As has been indicated, Sextus Empiricus
and other ancient Greek Pyrrhonists belonged to the school of em-
pirical medicineo In fact, after publishing Quod nihil scitur, Sanchez
wrote several short medical tracts. There is no incompatibility,
logical or temperamental, between Pyrrhonism and empiricism; for
Pyrrhonists do not deny the reality of appearances; instead, they make
appearance their criterion for action.
Montaigne and Sanchez are in fundamental agreement on several
points, ones that I hope to showare crucial for Montaigne. Each is
aware of the impassable distance that separates man from outer
reality; each therefore finds that man knows or may know himself
better than any object; and each rejects the realm of intellectual
certainty for a simpler observation and judgment of personal experi-
ence.

1 He signed a letter to Clavius "Carneades Philosophus." See Opera philosophica, pp.

146-153.
2 Hayden, p. 238. Popkin, p. 42, cites other authorities for this opinion, but wishes to
reject it, or at least shift the emphasis from Sanchez' moderate empiricism to his dogmatic
skepticism.
 CHAPTER III

MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSAYS

Since the beginning of the twentieth century Montaigne scholarship

has been increasingly aware that many, though not all, of the diffi-
culties and apparent contradictions raised by the rich variety of ide as
in the Essais can be enlightened and sometimes resolved if we keep in
mind that the essayist's point of view evolved as he wrote, so that
what we have is the record of a developing mind, not a static one.
The Montaigne who wrote the earliest chapters of 1571 was to change,
both as a man and as an artist, in the course of the years. In the last
essay he composed before publishing his book in 1580, he tells us that
he recognizes this development, but is unwilling to eliminate anything
he had written (II: xxxvii, 736-737a).
Pierre Villey's Les SOUTees et Nvolution des Essais de /lrfontaigne (Ig08),
surely the single most important work of erudition in the history of
Montaigne scholarship, established with great accuracy the dates of
composition of most of the essays, and explained in considerable
detail the steps in the growth of Montaigne's thought. Scholars have
generally accepted both his contention that Montaigne's ideas evolved
and his oudine of the direction in which th ey unfolded.! The evolution
Villey found can be briefly summarized as follows. Up on retirement
to his chäteau, Montaigne, unoccupied and uninspired by the routine
of managing his estate, compiled from his reading short chapters
1 Hugo Friedrich's very fine book Montaigne (Beme: Francke, 1949) succeeds about as
far as is possible in treating Montaigne without adhering to a chronological scheme, but
he exposes hirnself to questionable methods of analysis (as when he chooses to handie the
1580 and 1588 levels of "Que philosopher c'est apprendre ä. mourir" together, p. 33).
Dr. Armaingaud stubbomly and unconvincingly preferred to consider the essays of every
period Epicurean; see his Introduction to the (EuvTes completes. In faimess to Villey it must
be noted that he clairns to analyze the development of the Essais, not of the essayist; see
his Preface to the second edition of Les SouTces et l'evolution (Paris: Hachette, 1933). (He
does not always manage to live up to this claim - e.g., I, 54-55.) I do not think that it is
really possible or desirable to keep the two separate. As the book evolved, the author too
changed.
 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSAYS

eomposed of several aneedotes, all relating to some general theme.

Very shortly, he began to inerease the relative importanee of his
own refleetions without abandoning the practice of wholesale and
uneritieal reliance on written sourees for his illustrations and subjeet
matter. Certain of these primitive essays, however, deaIt with
questions of eoneern to their author and betray eonsiderably more
personal interest than the rest. Most of these ean be loosely ealled
"stoie."
Sometime in the vieinity of 1576, stimulated by his reading of
Sextus Empirieus, Montaigne underwent a skeptieal "crisis" whieh
resuIted in the renuneiation of all dogmatism, whether metaphysieal
or moral. Liberated from doetrinal constraints, he began to see man as
a ereature ineapable of attaining any eertain knowledge or any
ethieal edifieation through the efforts of reason.
But like the "stoie" phase of the earlier essays, this radical skeptieism
was short-lived, though not without great importanee; for it cleared
away all sorts ofpreeoneeptions and left Montaigne free to eoncentrate
on his study of himself and his self-portrait. The essays from 1578 to
1580 show a remarkably different, more confident Montaigne who
has learned the immense richness of his own personalityand the liter-
ary method of exploiting it in the essay. His former hero, Cato of
Utica, is replaeed by a new ideal of human perfeetion, Socrates, whose
preeepts "Know thyself" and "Aecording to your power" beeome
central to the art of naturalliving. This last stage in the development,
sometimes misleadingly termed "Epicurean," eomprises all the
writings of the later editions as weIl as the ess ay s eomposed in the
years 1578-80.
Helpful as Villey's divisions are, they ean lead to dangerous
oversimplifieations if not used with eireumspeetion. For example,
it would be ineorreet to proeeed as if every stoieal idea belonged to
the period 1571-72. Not infrequently the lines of demarcation are
blurred by overlapping. Montaigne's use of Seneca is a ease in point.
Many of the essays of the first years contain long passages that are
hardly more than translations ofSeneca. Then, in 1588, he is negleeted,
only to eome baek into favor in the marginaI additions of the last
years whieh quote him ninety times and translate his ideas in more
than seventy instanees.l It is often truer to say that Montaigne
enriehed his earlier ideas than that he rejected them. What is frequent-

1 Villey, SOUTees et evolution, I, 215-216.

 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSAYS 37

ly apparent is that a limited or partial comprehension has been put

into a larger and freer context. Finally, l\;Iontaigne's habit of retuming
to his chapters and expanding them can cause the student some
embarrassment. There is ample evidence that several of the early
essays had material added to them before they ",ere published in
1580, so that they are actually composites of several layers. Dis-
tressingly enough, these are sometimes the most important essays.1
The greatest dangcr of an overemphasis on the chronological
evolution of Montaigne's thought is the tendency to overlook the
unchanging elements of his temperament and his ideas. From the
very beginning Montaigne is a moralist, concemed with discovering
human nature and the way to live in this world. Be is constantly
aware, thou gh to differing degrees, of the vanity of human beings,
their inconstancy, and the absurdity of mu ch of their behavoir and
many of their opinions. In ethics, politics, and religion he always
advocated and practiced conformity to tradition. And although his
program changed considerably, he was at all times convinced that
the art of living depended on the cultivation of the proper attitudes in
one's soul. Finally, it is my contention that his fundamentally skeptical
temperament is an unchanging component of his mentality.2 More-
over, each of the permanent traits of the essayist listed above is emi-
nently compatible with skepticism of temperament, as I hope to
show. In the words of Professor F rame,
His mental temper, for example, seems always to have been skeptical.
Skeptical in the etymological sense of one who judiciously stops to look before
he takes a mental leap, who considers all sides before he commits himself.
Skeptical because his mind is always more sensitive to diversity than to
uniformity; because nature, as he sees it, has made things mo re uniike than
like, so that all comparisons are lame and all statements oversimplifications.
Skeptical because his historieal and personal perspective always reminds
him that the views of his time, his country, and himself are by no means
absolute truths. Skeptical from experience and judgment, which have shown
him his own intellectual follies and those of others. Skeptical finally because
he is deeply aware of the unceasing change in us and in all earthly things
which keeps anything constant and permanent like absolute truth from
dwelling in us. 3

1 For example. see Villey's comments on I: i, I: x.x, and I: xx.xix in any of the following:
Vol. IV of the Municipal Edition, either ofhis editions of the Essais, or the Sourees et evolution,
I 336-380, where each essay is considered separately.
2 Friedrich and Frame are the two sound :Montaigne scholars who give the most support
to this position. Ralph "Valdo Emerson's intuitive study, brilliant as it is, falls afoul of his
conviction that skepticism leads inevitably to moral indecision.
3 lvfontaigne's Discovery of lvIan (:\'ew York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 8.
 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSAYS

Before M ontaigne' s Retirement

The earliest indication we have of Montaigne's distrust of reason is
to be found in the first book he ever published, his translation of
Raymond Sebond's Liber creaturarum sive Theologia naturalis. This
theologieal eompendium by a fifteenth-eentury Spanish professor had
enjoyed a great vogue in the sixteenth eentury, espeeially in France.
When Montaigne eame to publish it in 1568-69, a little mo re than
two years before he began to write his first essays, it had already
known twelve editions in its eomplete Latin text, and one eomplete
translation in Freneh, as well as nine printings of an abridgment in
Latin, and three Freneh editions of the abridgment. 1 Although it
was popular among Catholies as a sort of vulgarization of the eom-
plexities of theology, it had been eensured in Rome in 1558-59.
When the Couneil of Trent eame to revise the list of prohibited books
in 1564, however, the body of the Theologia naturalis was taken off
the list; and only the Prologue remained proseribed. It is probable
that the Prefaee did not pass the eensor beeause it makes exaggerated
claims for the effieaey of reason as an instrument for proving matters
of faith, thereby denying by implieation the importanee of God's
gift of faith through graee. vVhatever the eause of the eondemnation,
Montaigne's rendition of the Prefaee serupulously redueed Sebond's
assertions, and was never put on the Index. 2
vVhere Sebond ealls his rationalist doetrine "neeessary," Mon-
taigne ealls it "useful." The Spanish theologian asserts that he will
make known "all" the errors of the pagan and infidel philosophers and
that his system will expound the "whole" body of Catholie faith,
proving it "infallibly" true. Montaigne translates: "par sa doetrine
[the book's] se maintient et se eognoist la foi Catholique." Most
important "every truth neeessary for a man" is ehanged to "the
truth in so far as natural reason ean know it." Sebond clairns that his
teaehings will make man believe hrmly in the Bible, the re by implying
that the truths of Seripture ean be found in nature. His translator is
mu ch more eareful when he assigns to Sebond's rational arguments

1 On Montaigne's translation see AbbeJoseph Coppin's i\1ontaigne Tradueteur de Raymond

Sebond (Lille: More!, 1925). The editions of Sebond's work are treated on pp. 13-16.
Further information and discussion is to be found in Maturin Dreano, La Pensee religieuse
de Montaigm, pp. 90-11 I.
2 Coppin, pp. 67-70, and Dreano, pp. 1°4-106, give paralle! texts from the Latin and
Montaigne's translation. Frame lists a few further divergencies between the Latin and
French te.xts of the Prologue in his "Did Montaigne Betray Sebond?" Romanie Review,
XXXVIII (1947),318, n. 68.
 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSA YS 39

the role of planting the foundations of what is expressed obscurely in

the Bible. Nothing in this Preface would indicate that Montaigne is
a pure fideist. Had he been, he might have left out the entire Preface,
or rewritten it, though editions of his time all contained it.! What he
did simply was to tone down the exaggerated pretensions of reason;
he did not eliminate all the clairns.
Did Montaigne know that the Prologue had been censured? The
fact that he made such pointed adjustments in it is the only evidence
available. 2 It is possible that his revisions corresponded to his own
personal skepticism about reason's adequacy in matters of faith. One
does not have to conclude that wIontaigne was infiuenced by the
Church's condemnation. Whatever his motives may have been, the
crucial point is that the future author of the "Apologie" is showing a
limited distrust of reason. Furthermore, he goes out of his way to;
for he was not obliged to translate the Preface at all, particularly if
he knew that it had been condemned.
In the following year, again at Paris, Montaigne published such
works of Etienne de La Boetie as he had been able to find among his
friend's papers. Among the six dedicatory letters in this volume is
one dated April30, 1570, to Henri de Mesmes, who had known La Bo-
etie well. It begins with along, contrived specimen of reasoning quite
likely to confuse any reader on his first try:
Monsieur, c'est une des pIus notables folies que les hommes facent, d'em-
ployer la force de leur entendement a ruiner & chocquer les opinions
ccmmunes & receues, qui no us portent de la satisfaction & du contentement.
Car la ou tout ee qui est soubs le ciel, employe les moyens & les outils que
nature luy a mis en main (comme de vray c'en est l'usage) pour l'agence-
ment & commodite de son estre: ceulx icy pour sembler d'un esprit pIus
gaillard, & pIus esveille, qui ne re<;:oit & qui ne loge rien que mille fois
touche & balance au pIus subtil de la raison, vont esbranlant leurs ames
d'une assiete paisible & reposee, pour apres une longue queste la rempIir en
somme de doute, d'inquietude, & de fievre. Ce n'est pas sans raison que

1 The first edition of Seband to appear without the Prologue was published in 1581 in
Venice. The Prologue remained on the Index until 1892: Herman J anssen, Jvlontaigne
fideisle (Nijmegen and Utrecht: Dekker and van de Vegt and van Leeuwen, 1930), p. 33n.
2 One [act should be mentioned. Montaigne owned two books by Bernardino Ochino,
the Disputa ... alla presenza del corpo di Giesu Ghristo nel sacramenta della Gena (Basel, 1561)
and Il catechismo (Basel, 1561). All the works of this author had been put on the Trentine
Index (1564). On the title page of the second is Montaigne's signature, the words "Liber
prohibitus," and a dedication to Pierre Charron, to whom the essayist gave the book in
July 1586. Ochino's defection from the Catholic Church in 1542 (he had been Superior
General of the Capuchins) was widely known. His works are violently anti-Catholic. It
would require no imaginatian and little investigation to learn that his works were condemned.
The case of Sebond's Prologue is somewhat different.
 MONTAIGNE'S EARL Y ESSA YS

l'enfanee & la simplieite ont este tant recommandees par la verite mesmes.
De ma part j'ayme mieulx estre pIus a mon aise, & moins habile: pIus
eontent, & moins entendu. Voila pourquoy :Monsieur, quoy que des fines
gens se mocquent du soing que nous avons de ee qui se passera icy apres
nous, commc nostre arne logee ailleurs, n'ayant pIus a se rescntir des choses
de c;a bas: j'estime toutefois que ee soit une grande eonsolation ala foiblesse
& brievete de ceste vie, de croire qu'elle se puisse fermir & allonger par la
reputation & par la renomee: & embrasse tres-volontiers une si plaisante &
favorable opinion engendree originellement en nous, sans m'enquerir
eurieusement ny comment ny pourquoy (pp. 1361-62).

Not a very important passage, and its expression is so involved

that it is almost diffieult to believe Montaigne is speaking sineerely;
but for what it is worth, it does betray several eharaeteristie attitudes.
Montaigne finds reasoners ridieulous beeause they give themselves
a good deal of trouble, often only to destroy an opinion that gives us
eonsolation. The Bible is right to reeommend simplieity; as for
Montaigne, if an id ea seems natural and agreeable, he will accept it
without bothering to inquire too elosely. It so happens that the idea
in question involves the issue of the immortality of the saul, but that
in no way ehanges Montaigne's somewhat nonehalant attitude. vVhat
most interests him is the foolishness of reasoners; for he sees the whole
matter as a moralist in terms of the psyehology of men, not in terms of
a theologieal question.! In sum, we find the essayist semi-joeularly
refusing to be eoneerned with speeulative arguments in a matter of
faith, and ridieuling those who are.

The Earliest Skeptical Essays

Around two years later, in 1572, Nlontaigne eomposed the short
essay "C'est folie de rapporter le vray et le faux a nostre suffisanee"
(I: )L"'{vii), the most thoroughly skeptieal of his works written before
the "Apologie." 2

1 One might also add that the implied argument that what is comfortable may be
accepted as true is one that Raymond Sebond advances in chapter LXVIII and that
Montaigne later criticizes by implication in II: xii, 422a.
2 For purposes of convenience, I will accept the standard date for the "Apologie," 1576.
I will later suggest, as do Grace Norton, Villey, Lanson, Plattard, Porteau, and Frame,
that this date applies to only parts of the "Apologie," other parts being composed both
before and after 1576. Several considerations suggest that it is not unsound to stick to the
accepted date in a general way. First, it is the most Pyrrhonist passages that belong to that
year or elose to it. Secondly, almost no essays have been assigned to the years 1575-77
except the "Apologie" and one or two others with skeptical content. The essays that are in
contrast to the" Apologie" fall into two major groups, each securely dated, the one 157 I -7-1"
the other 1578-80. Redating sections of the "Apologie" will barely affect its central position
between these two groups.
 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSAYS

The essay opens with the statement that weak and empty souls,
such as those of women, children, the common people, or the sick,
are more gullible, more easily persuaded than others.1 On the other
hand, it is "une sotte presumption" to reject something as false
simply because it does not seem plausible. Formerly Montaigne
felt pity for people who accepted unbelievable tales of enchantmcnts
or sorceries.
Et, apresent, je treuve que j'estoy pour le moins autant a plaindre moy
mesme: non que l'experienee m'aye depuis rien [ait voir au dessus de mes
premieres ereanees (et si n'a pas tenu a ma euriosite); mais la rai so n m'a
instruit que de eondamner ainsi resoluement une ehose pour [auee et im-
possible, e'est se donner l'advantage d'avoir dans la teste les bornes et li mit es
de la volonte de Dieu et de la puissanee de nostre mere nature; et qu'il
n'y a point de pIus llotable [olie au monde que de les ramener a la mesure de
nostre eapacite et suilisanee (p. 178a).
If a mirade is to be defined as anything reason cannot fathom, then
we are surrounded by such mirades, only we do not notice them
because we have become accustomed to them. So we are wrong to
say mirades do not exist, simply because we are blind to them.
"Il faut juger des choses avec pIus de reverence de cette infinie
puissance de Dieu et pIus de reconnoissance de nostre ignorance et
foiblesse" (p. I7ga).
Furthermore, in some cases it is equally presumptuous to reject
the testimony of men of great judgment. We may be skeptical when
we read Froissart or Boucher: but who would be so rash as to doubt
the veracity or authority of Cresar, Plutarch, Pliny, or Saint Augus-
tine? It is dangerous and thoughtless to disdain what we cannot
comprehend.
In the religious debates of the day, Catholics are wrong to give
an inch in their beliefs. First, it is bad tactics; and secondly, they
may learn that they have yielded a most important artide of faith
without realizing it, just as Montaigne Ollce had belittled certain
points of his Church's observance, only to find when he consulted
learned men, that th ey had a very solid foundation. Why can't we
remember how changeable our judgment is? "La gloire et la cu-
riosite ce sont les deux fleaux de nostre arne. Cette cy nous conduit
a mettre le nez par tout, et celle la nous defant de rien laisser
irresolu et indecis" (p. r8ra).
Several things in this essay call for commentary. Twice Montaigne
refers to an earlier time when excessive reliance on his own reason
had led him astray. In the first case, he scoffed at predictiolls, en-
chantments, and sorcery, all of which, we must remember, might
belong to the world of natural science in the si.'üeenth century.2 In
1 Here and eIsewhere detailed summaries of an essay are set in solid type.
2 See C. S. Lewis, English Li/eratl/re in the Sixteenth Century (="ew York: Oxford Press. 195-!,).
pp. 4- 1 4.
 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSAYS

the second, he to ok exception to certain practices in Catholic ob-

servanee (not dogma). When did Montaigne have these attitudes? Re
gives no help in answering this question; for in each case he only tells
us that it was "autrefois," a sufficiently elastic term to apply to any
period of his life. l In the matter of church observances, I tend to
believe that he is referring to a time before 1562. In that year Mon-
taigne, while in Paris, eagerly swore allegiance to the Catholic Church
in compIianee with an ordinance of the Parlement of Bordeaux.
During the same stay at Paris, it is probable, though not certain, that
he asked Adrian Tumebus' opinion of Sebond's Theologia naturalis, and
was glad to hear him recommend it. This is also the year that Etienne
de La Boetie composed a memoir proposing a moderate but impraetieal
program for restoring religious unity to France. In view of the extra-
ordinary intimacy and empathy between the two friends, it is unlikely
that Montaigne's opinion differed substantially from La Boetie's in
this essential matter. So various bits of evidence indicate that by 1562
Montaigne had taken a strong stand on the side of the Catholic
Church. Since nothing betrays any later leaning towards the Reform
(and the issue here is between Catholic and Protestant, not believer
and unbeliever), I would suggest that in this case Montaigne is
referring to some time in his twenties or earlier.
But in the other matter of enchantments and sorcery, I can see no
clue that will help ascertain the period the essayist has in mind. For
in such matters, Montaigne's judgment stays pretty well suspended,
somf'times accepting, sometimes rejecting supematural causes of
events. At al most every period of composition we find Montaigne
first on the side of credulity, then on the side of incredulity, depending
on what his purposes are at the time. 2 Critics who see in Montaigne a
rationalist emphasize his disparagement of superstition and witchcraft,
and th ey are right to call attention to such passages; for they are among
the most interesting in the Essais, and may well represent their
author's most genuine inclination. What is important to underscore
here is that at the outset of his career as an essayist ~Iontaigne had
already left behind him any desire to dogmatize on occuIt subjects.
What sort of arguments does Montaigne use in "C'est folie de

1 Onee Montaigne used this word to refer to Etienne de La Boetie's death almost twenty-
five years after it oeeurred: III: iv, 8 [3b.
2 Paseal may be referring to I: xxvii in his Pensee 8 [3: "Afiracles. Que je hais eeux qui
font les douteurs de mirades! Montaigne en parle eomme il faut dans les deux endroits.
On voit, en I'un, eombien il est prudent; et neanmoins il eroit, en I'autre, et se moque des
ineredules." For further treatment of the question ofmiracles, see infra, pp. 140-141, 143-146.
 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSAYS 43

rapporter le vray et le faux a nostre suffisance" to support his Pyr-

rhonist attitude? Here, as everywhere else, he views the subject as a
moralist. vVhat he condemns most in dogmatic rationalists is their
"presumption" (p. I na and I79a), "hardiesse" (p. I 80a), and "te-
merite" (p. I80a), eve n going so far as to call the exercise of private
judgment in ecelesiastical questions "bestise et ignoranee" (p. I8Ia).
The two scourges of our soul are "curiosite," a word frequently used
by Montaigne as a derogatory term, and "gloire" (vainglory, pride),
its natural companion in the eyes of the moralist. The virtues of the
more modest Pyrrhonist, who suspends his judgment, are "reverenee
de cette infinie puissance de Dieu et ... reconnoisance de nostre
ignorance et foiblesse" (p. I79a). No understanding of Montaigne's
skepticism can be adequate unIess it keeps constantly in mind that
for him the moral equivalents of Pyrrhonism are lack of presumption
on the one hand and reverenee on the other. The skeptical temperament
is consistently modest, and to this extent Montaigne is consistently
skeptical.
Explaining his position, Montaigne elaims that it is reason, and not
experience, that has taught him to avoid jumping to conelusions about
the miraculous. It might at first seem paradoxical that he invokes
reason in order to persuade us to abandon it. Howelse shall a skeptie
argue against one who believes in reason? The skeptics' case is all
the more convincing for being fought with their opponents' arms.
As Montaigne so clearly sees in the "Apologie" (pp. 483-485), a
Py'rrhonist does not turn away from debate, argument, or reasoning;
he rather delights in them. What he renounees is the claim to absolute
knowledge, and it is reason whieh eonvinees him ofits own fallibility.l
But if Montaigne did learn from reason, just what did he learn? In
this essay, Montaigne uses very little reasoning to support his thesis
that things are too eomplex for us to passjudgment on them. Only later
in the "Apologie" will his logical ease be presented. For the moment
he relies principally on mo raI eonsiderations and the appeal to au-
1 In my opinion, Zeitlin misunderstands this essay. According to him, it "resists the
inroads of skepticism in the name of reasan and gives comfort to credulity by a critical
staternent of the lirnitations of human intelligence" Essa)'s, I, lv. As he uses the word
"skepticism," it means disbelief, not the suspension of judgment. The whole case for Pyr-
rhonism seems to have escaped him here, and consequently his understanding of this essay
and several others suffers. At the root of this misconception lies Zeitlin's conviction that
"Montaigne himself was by constitution a rationalist," ibid. He is not the only critic to
rnake l'vIontaigne into a rationalist, but he is the soundest. Less sound is Armaingaud (see
his long introduction to the (Euvres compLetes, I). At the bottom of the list comes Fran<;ois
Tavera, whose book L'/die d'humanit. dans .'vIontaigne (Paris: Champion, 1932) I would
norninate for the title of the siiliest work on :-VIontaigne.
44 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSAYS

thority to establish his points. He does use, however, one proof, and
one that would go far if elaborated. His argument is that we have no
sure standard of what a miracle is, in other words the argument of
the relativity of the criterion. As he states it, it is habit that gives us our
criterion of the miraculous or the impossible. Therefore, our concept
of what constitutes a miracle is unreliable because unconsidered.1
Montaigne does not extend his argument so far as to suggest that any
standard intended to judge the miraculous must be founded on
unprovable assumptions.
In the absence of a sound criterion, he suggests that we must accept
some accounts of miracles because of the authority of the testimonial
to their authenticity. If we read in Bouchet about the miraculous
powers of Saint Hilary's relics, we are not bound to accept his word.
But when Plutarch is our source, it would be rash to place our judgment
above his. The key then to a position taken by a skeptic is not reason,
but a sound man's judgment (his own or another's). Montaigne was
to have much mo re to say later about the faculty ofjudgment. 2
In the examination of this short essay we find three important
contexts that color Montaigne's first major expression of his Pyr-
rhonism, three contexts that will appear again and again in the strongly
skeptical passages of the Essais. The first of these is his fideism, not a
carefully articulated fideism here, but a deep-felt distaste for reasoning
and theorizing where God is concerned. Excessive rationalism inevi-
tably concludes by legislating against the infinite capacity of the
divinhy. "C'est se donner l'advantage d'avoir dans la teste les born es
et limites de la volonte de Dieu et de la puissance de nostre mere
nature" (p. I 78a). In "Qu'il faut sobrement se mesler de juger des
ordonnances divines" (I: xxxii), an essay of the same period, a similar
condemnation of theory-makers appears:
Le vray champ et subject de l'imposture sont les choses inconneus ...
Il advient de la qu'il n'est rien creu si fermement que ee qu'on sl;ait le
moins, ny gens si asseurez que ceux qui nous content des [abIes, comme AI-
chimistes, Prognostiqueurs, Judiciaires, Chiromantiens, ~Iedecins, "id
genus omne." Auxquels je joindrois, si j'osois, un tas de gens, interpretes et
contrerolleurs ordinaires des dessains de Dieu, faisans estat de trouver les
causes de chaque accident, et de veoir dans les secrets de la volonte divine
les motifs incomprehensibles de ses operations; ... (pp. 213-2qa).3
Somewhat the same idea is in the "Apologie," p. soGa.
1
See infra, pp. 128-130.
2
Here and in many other instanees the text quoted will differ slightly from the words
3
of the Pleiade edition referred to, beeause the words cited follow the 1580 text (though
not its punetuation or spelling). Readers wishing to eheek the variations, usually minor,
 MOl'<TAIGNE'S EARLY ESSAYS 45

In this passage both rational theology and superstitious belief are

repudiated on the same grounds: they apply reason to things it eannot
know. Human perversity meddIes with mysterious things and would
rather have a fantastie explanation than nonc at all. In such eireum-
stanees, theology ean be every bit as mueh a pseudo-seienee as hand-
readingo The association of theology with the rankest quaekery need
not make us suspicious of Montaigne's intent here. He is outright in
his eondemnation of soothsayers, but eautious in his treatment of men
who claim to know God's will.l They run the risk of eontaminating
something holy. In a parenthctieal remark in "De la eoustume et de
ne ehanger aisement une loy reeeüe" (I: xxiii), Montaigne even implies
that men are somewhat exeusable when th ey founder in questions
of religion; "je laisse a part la grossiere imposture des religion s, de
quoy tant de grandes nations et tant de suffisans personnages se sont
veus enyvrez: ear eette partie estant hors de nos raisons humaines, il
est pIus exeusable de s'y perdre, a qui n'y est extraordinairement
esclaire par une faveur divine" (p. Ioga).
About Montaigne's fideism it must be said that it has a somewhat
negative quality. To disparage the presumption of reason is not quite
the same thing as a eall to faith or a eulogy of its powers. \Vhilc quiek
to see the intelleetual and moral defeets of his opponents, Montaigne
has very little to say about the virtues of subrnission to authority or
of piety in general. As he sees it, the Christian's part is prirnarily the
passive one of reeeiving God's gifts with gratitude. "Suffit a un
Citrestien eroire toutes choses vcnir de Dieu, les reeevoir avee
reeonnoissanee de sa divine et inserutable sapienee, pourtant les
prendre en bonne part, en quelque visage et goust qu'elles luy soient
envoyees" (p. 2 qa).2 The reeognition of God's wisdom and a reverent
refusal to question His will are the hallmarks of this fideist piety. It
may seem to be a minimum sort of piety, but it is nevertheless a feeling
NIontaigne frequently expresses. \Vhenever the essayist writes in a

between different editions of the Essais will find Armaingaud's (Euvres completes, 12 vols.
(Paris: Conrad, 1924-41) most helpful, thou gh it neglects the 1595 posthumous text.
The Municipal Edition contains all the variants, but often in an inconvenient form which
requires constant re ferenc e from one page to another and some caution if one is to avoid
errors. Paul Porteau's edition of the "Apologie" gives clearly all variants. Almost all the
truly significant changes are mentioned in the Pleiade text.
1 In "Qu'il faut sobrement se mesler de juger des ordonnances divines," already quoted
from above, Montaigne censures a kind of argument used on mo re than one occasion by
Raymond Sebond (Armaingaud, X, 9 and 19, in chaps. CCVI and CCVIII): "Mais je
trouve mauvais ce que je voy en usage, de chercher ä. fermir et appuyer nostre religion par
le bonheur et prosperite de nos entreprises" (p. 214a).
2 POllrtant means "for this reason," not "nonetheless,"
 MONTAIG;-m'S EARLY ESSAYS

Pyrrhonist vein, his thoughts and his vocabulary become more Christ-
ian than elsewhere, and nothing he says indicates awareness of any
conflict between Christianity and his skepticism, or any other of his
convictions. 1
The second leitmotif in Montaigne's Pyrrhonism concerns the
order of nature rather than the order of God, but parallels exactly
the essayist's concept of God's limitless will. For to insist that some-
thing we cannot conceive is impossible is to put limits on nature, just
as to debunk a mirade is to put limits on God's power. God and nature
share the same quality of infinitude, and man is foolish to think he can
impose laws on either. Each can work mirades beyond our power to
understand. The terms "God" and "nature" appear side by side in
the crucial sentence rebuking those who pretend to know "les bornes
et limites de la volonte de Dieu et de la puissance de nostre mere
nature" (p. 178a). The surest testimony ofhow dose they are in Mon-
taigne's mind is to be found in a correction he made after 1588. vVhere
earlier editions had read "il fautjuger des choses avec pIus de reverenee
de cette infinie puissance de Dieu" (p. 1 79a), Montaigne crossed out
the word Dieu and substituted nature for it. 2 This is not to say that
for Montaigne God and nature are the same thing, far from it. It only
me ans that when speaking of the infinitude of possibilities, the essayist
thinks of either God or nature. Several other phrases in this essay show
Montaigne's sense of the profusion of possibilities is linked to his
skepticism. He has learned not to "condamner ainsi resoluement une
chose pour fauce et impossible," (p. I]8a); it is "une temeraire pre-
sumption" to hope to know ''jusques ou va la possibilite" (p. 1 79a).
These are not casual expressions; they represent the principal
conviction on which Montaigne bases his Pyrrhonism. The world is
simply too rich for us to presume to rule out any possibility. At the
base of his philosophy lies a certain Heraditean belief that everything
is true, or at least possible, and that to deny this is an impoverishment
of our being. 3 The sense of the infinitude of possibilities express es itself
in many ways in Montaigne's works; in philosophy it led to Pyrrho-
nism. vVe see it elsewhere in his awareness of the relativity of human
ethics. It is reinforced whenever diversity and inconstancy impress
him - and when don't they?
1 The one possible exception is his treatment of suicide in II: iii. But here it is his humanist
creed, not his Pyrrhonist doctrines, that elashes with Christianity. See infra, pp. 58-59.
2 Villey suggests the change is due to the influence of Cicero whom Montaigne had just
cited in a passage added to I: x.xvii: Essais (1930-31), I, 346, n. 2.
3 Friedrich, Montaigne, p. 173, writes, "Sein Weltbild ist, gross gesagt, heraklitisch."
 MONTAIGNE'S EARL Y ESSA YS 47

In this world where God's will is inexplieable and infinitely beyond

our ken and where nature and human nature present infinite variety
and infinite possibility, the refleetive man mayaccept his beliefs with
fideistie aequiescenee, but he also needs some practieal eriterion by
whieh to live. Montaigne almost instinctively postulates that the
best thing to do is to follow tradition, whether in eustoms, in law,
or in religion; and as he was to say later, both philosophieal and
Christian doetrines agreed in supporting obedienee to tradition
(II: xii, 562a, I: xxiii, I I gb), not necessarily beeause tradition is better,
but merely because it is no worse than any other possibility and beeause
ehange in any form is likely to entail unforeseen eonsequenees as
Montaigne had learned when he undervalued eertain points in his
ehureh's observanee. This fundamentally eonservative point of view
eonstitutes the third context in whieh his Pyrrhonism develops. And
like the other two, a permanent element in ~Iontaigne's make-up,
it is not presumptuous and not ineompatible with skepticism.1
Analysis of this short essay shows then that even in his earliest
period Montaigne had already abandoned rationalist dogmatism in
matters offaith or the supernatural and had developed a fully eonseious
and mature Pyrrhonist attitude, aware of its eonsequenees both
intelleetual and praetieal. Although "C'est folie de rapporter le vray
et le faux a nostre suffisanee" does not represent the main preoeeu-
pations of his thinking at the time, it eoineides with not a few of the
matters that eoneerned him in other essays and helps to explain the
importanee they have for him and the attitudes he takes to them.
For exampIe, Montaigne diseusses the miraeuIous in two early
essays. "Des prognostications" (I: xi), only two paragraphs long in the
1580 version, eontains the story of the Marquis de Saluee, who was
persuaded by his belief in predietions to quit the side of Francis I
and go over to the Spaniards. Montaigne is surprised at his behavior,
eommenting that "our religion" had abolished most divinatory
practiees, and that the few that still remain are examples of "la

1 It is impossible to resist the temptation to mention here an addition Montaigne made

after 1588 to "C'est folie de rapporter le vray et le faux a nostre suffisance," for it gives
the moral conclusion Montaigne felt at that time was most consonant to a Pyrrhonist-
Heraclitean philosophy. "Si I'on entendait bien la difference qu'il y a entre I'impossible
et I'inusite, et entre ce qui est contre I'ordre du cours de nature, et contre la commune
opinion des hommes, en ne croyant pas temerairement, ny aussi ne descrayant pas facilement,
on observeroit la regle de: Rien trap, commandee par Chilon" (p. 179c). No word in the
primitive text of I: xxvii related the ethics of moderation to skepticism, but it is by no means
inconsistent with the conservatism and the denunciations of presumption expressed every-
where in the essay.
 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSAYS

fon;enee curiosite de nostre nature, s'amusant a preoccuper les choses

futures, comme si elle n'avoit affaire a digerer les presentes" (p. 42a).
This condemnation of credulity, diametricaUy opposed to the ess ay-
ist's position in "C'est folie ... " in no way results from the work of his
critical reason. Both the Church and pagan philosophy had con-
demned various practices of divination, and Montaigne accepts
their authority. In the a text he places more emphasis on Christian
opposition to divination. In the e additions, having recently read
Cicero's philosophie essays, he quotes and paraphrases material from
them. He refuses to take a totally Pyrrhonist attitude about divines
who claim to read the future because they are guilty of impiety and
foUy as weU as of dogmatism. The conclusion of this essay may resemble
critical reason's; its method does not.
In the second essay, "De la force de l'imagination" (I: xxi), Mon-
taigne mo re than lives up to his professions in "C'est folie ... " that he
is unwilling to caU something impossible or false, for he cites numerous
utterly incredible examples from Cornelius Agrippa's De occulta phi-
losophia, such as the story of the king who grew horns in his sleep for
having seen bullfights the day before, or tales of women who can kill
each other with the evil eye. Despite the somewhat light-hearted mood
of the essay (Montaigne calls it a "caprice," p. I02a), the totallack
of judgment with which he selects the examples in his argument has
upset some critics (e.g., Zeitlin), and evidently disturbed Montaigne
himself; for he concludes the 1580 version of the essay with the sentence
"les Histoires que je recite, je les renvoye sur la conscience de ceux de
qui je les tiens" (p. I04a).
It is worth remarking as a slight justification of Montaigne's
judgment that if he did accept these fantastic stories from Agrippa, at
least he rejected Agrippa's explanations which exemplify beautifully the
inanities of the "scientific" jargon of his day. According to the occul-
tist, what happened to King Cyppus was that during the night the
"corniferous humors" in his blood rose to his head and produced
horns.! Montaigne contents himself with recounting the incident.
Paradoxically enough, the major import of this most credulous
ess ay is "il est vray semblable que le principal credit des miracles, des
visions, des enchantemens, et de tels effects extraordinaires, vienne de
la puissance de l'imagination agissant principalement contre les ames

1 Three chapters of Agrippa are reproduced in toto in Vol. IV of the Municipal Edition,
pp. 466-468. They also appear in Villey's very fine artide, "Une source inconnue d'un
essai de Montaigne," Revue de ['Histoire Litteraire de France, XIX (1912), 802-817.
 MONTAIG~E'S EARLY ESSAYS 49

du vulgaire, pIus molles" (p. 97a). Stories, believable and unbelievable,

are marshalled to convince us that there may indeed be a natural
explanation for seemingly unnatural things. This derives from Mon-
taigne's constant distaste for calling anything impossible. He is
concerned here with extraordinary events, not supematural ones. In
this veryessay, Montaigne says that he distrusts the testimony of
magicians (p. I03a). Although he does not say why, it seems clear that
the reason is that they find supematural causes for extraordinary
phenomena. Every tale taken from De oeeutta phitosophia comes from
the chapters in which Agrippa finds natural causation rather than
magical intercession, and Montaigne supplies other stories from his
own experience to reinforce them. His father had seen a cat in his
own back yard transfix a bird by staring at it (p. I03a). He has heard
of a man who received as much benefit from a doctor going through
the motions of an enema as from one really administering medicine
(p. I02a). The conclusion is that human (or animaI) nature is far
more complex than we may suspect and that the boundaries of the
natural must be extended far enough to include many unfathomable
events. As ever, the fault of the theorists is that they bind nature by
laws which have no foundation in reality and do not recognize that
natural forces may be eminently mysterious.
Two additions at the end of the essay indicate that Montaigne's
sense of the variety of possibilities did not leave him in later years,
but rather became more explicit.
(il) Les diseours so nt il. moy, et se tiennent par la preuve de la raison,
non de l'experienee: ehaeun y peut joindre ses exemples: et qui n'en a
point, qu'il ne laisse pas de eroire qu'il en est assez, veu le nombre et
variete des aeeidens humains .... (e) Aussi en l'estude que je traitte de nos
moeurs et mouvemens, les tesmoignages fabuleux, pourveu qu'ils soient
possibles, y servent eomme les vrais. Advenu ou non advenu, il. Paris ou il.
Rome, il. Jean ou il. Pierre, e'est tousjours un tour de l'humaine eapaeite,
duquel je suis utilement advise par ee reeit. ... Et aux diverses le-;ons
qu'ont souvent les histoires, je prens il. me servir de eelle qui est la pIus rare
et memorable. Il y a des autheurs, desquels la fin e'est dire les evenements.
La mienne, si j'y s-;avoye advenir, seroit dire sur ee qui peut advenir. ...
Aux exemples que je tire eeans, de ee que j'ay oui, faiet ou diet, je me su is
defendu d'oser aiterer jusques aux pius iegeres et inutiles circonstances.
1tfa eonseienee ne falsifie pas un iota, ma seienee je ne s-;ay (p. I04).

Anything possible, anything humanly possible, this is what interests

Montaigne as an observer of life's comedy.
50 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSAYS

Other Essays of the Early Years

So far we have been primarily eoneerned with reason as it search es
for the truth. Even in the earliest essays it is cIear that Montaigne
is highly wary of any eoncIusions dogmatieally asserted. Ahost of
eomments in other essays of this period apply more or less directly to
the effeetiveness of reason in morality, as it seeks to know the good,
and above all as it seeks to live the good life.
Among the first essays written, those modeled on the genre of the
lefon, one might seleet as typieal in eontent, thou gh longer than most,
the essay "De l'ineertitude de nostre jugement" (I: xlvii). In it the
questions whether it is wiser for a general to press a vietory to the Iimit
or not, whether soIdiers should be riehly or poorly armed, whether or
not the leader of an army should display himself prominently, and
whether it is to one's advantage to fight on foreign or home so il are
all diseussed with examples showing that there is something to be said
for either alternative. The opening sentenee makes use of a quotation
from Homer that Montaigne had painted on the rafters of his Iibrary;
"e' est bien ee q ue diet ee vers:

il y a prou Ioy de parler par tout, et pour et eontre" (I:xlvii, 27oa).

The finaI sentenee reads: "mais, a le bien prendre, il semble que nos
eonseils et deliberations en despendent bien autant, et que la fortune
n'estpasplusineertaine et temeraire que nos diseours" (I: xlvii, 276a).
Fortune is fiekle, having infinite possibilities at her disposal. The best
laid plans of miee and men ... Hardly unusual ideas, but they are
repeated again and again in these little ehapters, and th ey are the first
charges made in the ease against reason. In praetieal matters planning
and deliberation is uncertain, and in the last analysis futile. "Tant
e' est ehose vaine et frivole que l'humaine prudenee; et au travers de
tous nos projeets, de nos eonseils et preeautions, la fortune maintient
tousjours la possession des evenemens" (I:xxiv, 125a). "Car eeuxIa
surpassent toute follie, d'autant que l'impiete y est joinete, qui s'en
adressent a Dieu mesmes, ou la fortune, eomme si elle avoit des
oreilles subjeetes a nostre batterie" (I: iv, 26a). The role of reason,
then, whatever it may be, must be severely limited; for ultimately it
is powerless to advise us with eertainty in pragmatie matters. 1

1 Montaigne suggests one interesting mora! conclusion to be drawn from the ornnipotence
offortune. "Voyla pourquoy, en cette incertitude et perplexite que nous aporte I'impuissance
de voir et choisir ce qui est le pIus commode, pour les difficultez que les divers accidens et
 MONTAlGNE'S EARLY ESSA YS Sl

If fortune may upset all the prudent designs of our reason, eustom
puts blinders on it. "De la eoustume et de ne ehanger aisement une
loy reeeüe" (I: xxiii), a eonservative essay as its title indieates, bears
tangentially on the matter of reason in several ways. The fundamental
eoneern of this essay is to defend outward eonformity to usage and to
law, but the mere faet that they need defense indieates that something
is wrong. In faet, eustom is so powerful that it makes human behavior
both unreasonable and unnaturaI. "Le prineipal effeet de sa puissanee,
e'est de nous saisir et empieter de teIle sorte, qu'a peine soit-il en nous
de nous r'avoir de sa prinse et de r'entrer en nous, pour diseourir et
raisonner de ses ordonnanees" (p. Il4a). The assumption behind
Montaigne's thinking in this essay, an assumption never earefully
elaborated, is that there is something - it may be reason, it may be
nature - that is more sound than eustom, but powerless to combat it.
Lists of opposing usages are eited in 1580, and greatly inereased in 1588,
to demonstrate eustom's sway.l
In the development of his thoughts in this essay, Montaigne eomes
to two somewhat eonflieting positions on the relations between eustom
and reason. The first, and more skeptieal, marvels at reason's plia-
bility as it attempts to justify eustoms. "Que ne peut eIle [eustom] en
nos jugemens et en nos creances? Y a il null e opinion si fantasque ...
qu'elle n'aye plante et estably par loix es regions que bon luy a
semble?" (p. 109a.) This thought is left undeveloped in 1580, perhaps
beeause the author's main intention was not to debunk reason, but to
leg~timate eustom's elaims on us. But in both 1588 and later, Montaigne
elaborated. "( b) J' estime qu'il ne tombe en l'imagination humaine
aueune fantasie si foreenee, qui ne reneontre l'exemple de quelque
usage public, et par eonsequent que nostre raison n'estaie et ne fonde .
. .. (e) La raison humaine est une teinture infuse environ de pareil
pois a toutes nos opinions et moeurs, de quelque forme qu'elles soient:
infinie en matiere, infinie en diversite" (pp. 109- I 10). If Montaigne
did not at first use this argument that no eustom is essentially more
rational than another sinee all are equally defended by reason, it is
beeause his skepticism, fully developed in some areas, had not totally

cireonstanees de ehaque chose tirent quant et eile, le pIus seur, quand autre eonsideration
ne nous y eonduiroit, est a mon advis, de se rejetter au parti ou il y a pIus d'honnestete
et de justice; ... " (1: xxiv, 127a).
1 Two other essays from this period may be mentioned. "De I'usage de se vestir" (1:
xxxvi, 221a) finds Montaigne ehaffing at the omnipresent restrietions plaeed on him by
customs, and "Des eoustumes anciennes" (1: xlix, 28sa) comments on "eette continuelle
variation des choses humaines."
52 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSA YS

pervaded his thinking. Later he was quick to see how it abetted his
innate conservatism. Nonetheless, at this time, his conclusion is that,
whether against the counsels of reason or not, one must conform. In
other words, besides being subject to the vagaries of fortune, reason
must be confined by adherence to custom in social and political
matters. l
As is so often the case, the themes to be handled with greater pro-
fundity and perception in the later essays appear in the earlier ones,
but divorced from each other in separate essays. Their marriage later
will prove an exciting and adventurous thing. But for the moment
th ey live alone, static, single-minded, and somehow less human,
because less complete. "C'est folie de rapporter le vray et le faux a
nostre suffisance" is the Pyrrhonist essay par excellenee. "De la
coustume et de ne changer aisement une loy receüe" exemplifies
Montaigne's counsel to the prudent to obey the conventions of his
time, while leaving their judgment uncommitted and free. Each of
these essays concentrates more or less completely on specialized and
isolated topies. Now, of all the topics the one that most interests
Montaigne in these years, the one that inspires several essays of
major significance, is the freedom of the inner life, always aprime
preoccupation of the essayist's. Allegiance to the Church and con-
formity to lawand custom may weIl take care of matters of external
conduct, but just where do they get us? and do th ey make us happy?
or free? or virtuous? or even comfortable? In the most personal essays
of the first years Montaigne tells us that a wis e man will distinguish
himself from the brutish insensitivity of the vulgar by exerting his
will and his reason in hopes that th ey may succeed at least in allevi-
ating the buffets of chanee if th ey cannot avoid them. \Vhat is significant
about this attitude in terms of the essayist's skepticism is that his
distrust of reason, already relatively definite in speculative matters,
does not carry over at all to his moral philosophy, which is founded
on the assumption that reason (and will power) more than anything
else is the salvation of the wis e man, beset as he is by the shackles
of custom and law as weIl as the uncertainty of fortune and the ills
natural to the human condition.
There is good reason to believe that Montaigne's allegiance to the

1 As Friedrich says, speaking of the essayist's fideist obedienee to authority, "Montaignes

Konservatismus ... bewegt sich in verwirrenden Widersprüchen und ist doch vollkommen
aufrichtig. Er gibt sich gar keine Mühe, diesen Widersprüchen auszuweichen. Er will sie.
Denn sie sind er selbst" (p. 142).
 MONTAIGNE'S EARL Y ESSA YS 53

ideal of the sage is due in part to his fidelity to the memory of Etienne
de La Boetie, whose friendship, described in I: )L'{viii, was the deepest
emotional experience of the essayist's life. In a letter to his father
probably written in I563, Montaigne describes the long and painful
death that his friend faced with a "courage invincible." Wishing to
die a Christian and Catholic death, for which he had been preparing
for some time, La Boetie strove to quit the world in a manner befitting
his philosophy, attempting to appear livelier than he actually felt,
and giving death-bed admonitions to those around him to lead the
virtuous life. Montaigne was profoundly moved.
Je luy dis "". que jusques lors j'avois pense que Dieu ne nous donnast
guierres si grand avantage sur les aeeidens humains, & eroyois mal-aysee-
ment ee que quelquefois j'en lisois parmy les histoires: mais qu'en ayant
senti une telle preuve, je louois Dieu de quoy ee avoit este en une personne
de qui je fusse tant ayme, & que j'aymasse si cherement: & que eela me
serviroit d'exemple, pour jouer ee mesme rolle a mon tour. Il m'interrompit
pour me prier d'en user ainsi, & de rrionstrer par effeet que les diseoUl"s
que nous avions tenus ensemble pendant nostre sante, nous ne les portions
pas seulement en la bouehe, mais engravez bien avant au eueur & en l'ame,
pour les mettre en exeeution aux premieres oecasions qui s'offriroient,
adjoustant que c'estoit la vraye prattique de nos estudes, & de la philo-
sophie (p. 1353).
It would seem then that not only Montaigne's enduring admiration
for the heroic virtues of ancient philosophy, but also his faith that such
a philosophy could be actually practiced, rested on the ever-pres ent
memory of his friend's example. This helps to explain why his earliest
essays are so impregnated with amoraI philosophy quite unsuited to
his temperament.
One of the best examples of this ethic can be seen in "De la solitude"
(I: )L'l:Xix), an essay which like several others draws heavily on material
in Seneca's Letters. True solitude, Montaigne insists, is not simply
physical withdrawal from affairs, but a total detachment from any
emotional involvement with life. There are more factors than one
that may contribute to such detachment from the cares of the world.
A naturally sluggish or insouciant disposition may help substantially
to create the proper attitude. But Nlontaigne does not place much
value on his good fartune in having a disposition not easily excited.
As he sees it, retirement seems necessarily to require an effort. Not that
he would recommend an excessive effort that actively sought mis-
fortunes in the manner of some philosophers and some religious
ascetics. Like the robust man who never travels without piUs, the
essayist wants to prepare for the worst.
54 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSAYS

Je voy jusques a quels limites va la neeessite naturelle; et, eonsiderant le

pauvre mendiant a ma porte souvent pIus enjoue et pIus sain que moy, je
me plante en sa plaee,j'essaye de ehausser mon arne a son biaiz. Et, eourant
ainsi par les autres exemples, quoy que je pense la mort, la pauvrete, le
mespris et la maladie a mes talons, je me resous aisement de n'entrer t'n
effroy de ee qu'un moindre que moy prent avee teile patienee. Et ne puis
eroire que la bassesse de l'entendement puisse pIus que la vigueur; ny que
les effeets du diseours ne puissent arriver aux effeets de l'aeeoustumanee
(p. 238a).
This crucial passage sheds light on manyaspeets of Montaigne's state
of mind as he wrote his Senecan essays. Re notiees the beggar who is
happier than he is, but is unable to consider his example worth
following. J ust as he refuses to rely on his impassive nature, so he
rejects sufferance based on habit as a sufficient safeguard. Loftiness of
"entendement," "les effects du discours," and "vigueur" are the
me ans he cannot help believing will attain the invulnerability he
seeks. They will free him from the "effroy" of death, sickness, poverty,
and "mespris."
This whole frame of mind is negative and apprehensive.l Rappiness
and freedom (the terms are always inseparable for Montaigne) are
reduced to freedom from care or fear and preparation for adversity.
The pleasures of the present yield to the claims of potential future
iil s, which can be forestalled in part at least by an effort of the will
aided by the imagination and reason. The blessings of such a state do
not seem particularly appreciable in either sense of the world. 2
The list of four evils feared by Montaigne in "De la solitude" is
reduced to three in I: xiv: death, poverty, and pain, the last one being
new. The title of this essay "Que le goust des biens et des maux depend

1 Frame, in his Montaigne's Discovery of Man, p. 37, has judiciously preferred to call
Montaigne's humanism in this period "apprehensive," pointing out that to call it stoical
humanism may be misleading (it is eelectic) or redWldant (humanism at the time meant
stoicism ofa sort). Nonetheless, he and all Montaigne scholars find thernselves at a loss for a
convenient term to replace "stojc." I somewhat favor the word "Senecan" because- of the
frequent translations and paraphrases of the Latin author in the early essays.
2 1 am aware that one passage of "De la solitude" (the paragraph on pp. 24Q-241a
ending "Il faut retenir a tout nos dents et nos griffes l'usage des plaisirs de la vie, que nos ans
nous arrachent des poingts, les WlS apres les autres et les alonger de toute nostre puissance.")
belies some ofwhat 1 have been saying. Zeitlin in his commentary of this essay (I, 389-391)
suspects,and 1 agree with him, that several sections were added to the earliest form of! : xxxix.
Both the opening and the elosing pages are notably full of borrowings from Seneca, whose
absence from some of the middle passages makes them conceivably interpolations. The
paragraph in question differs radically from the dominant tone of the essay, and interrupts
somewhat awkwardly the train of thought. The opening of the sentence following it is "Or,
quant li la fin que Pline et Cicero nous proposent, ... " a referenee to a topic begun two
and three pages before. It is exactly the sort of phrase Montaigne is forced to add in later
years in order to bridge the gap made by an insertion.
 MO:-;TAIG~E'S EARLY ESSAYS 55

en bonne partie de l'opinion que nous en avons" is more affirmative

than is the essay itself, for in it Montaigne is visibly trying to persuade
himself that such a useful proposition is true. Re opens by saying that
it would be very consoling if we did have the power to give whatever
form we desired to adventitious occurrences. For example, he has a
whole battery of anecdotes about common people who faced exe-
cution unperturbed, even jokingly. Re tells for the first time the
story of how Pyrrho persuaded the passengers of a ship in distress not
to be afraid by pointing to the philosophie calm of a pig which was
untroubled by the danger. This is hardly the best choice of illustration
if one is out to prove that reason should allay fears, for it seems to
demonstrate just the opposite. After all, it was not the pig's stoical
humanism that gave it tranquillity. And yet Montaigne is so firmly
convinced that reason alone can provide succor against adversity
that he us es this incident as part of his argument, even though it is
more than slightly inappropriate. See how he makes use of it:
Pyrrho le Philosophe, se trouvant un jour de grande tourmente dans un
batteau, montroit a eeus qu'il voyait les pIus effrayez autour de luy, et les
eneourageoit par l'example d'un poureeau, qui yestoit, nullement effraye
ny soueieux de eet orage. Oserons-nous done dire que eet avantage de la
raison, dequoy no us faisons tant de feste, et pour le respeet duquel nous
nous tenons maistres et empereurs du reste des ereatures, ait este mis en
llOUS pour nostre tourment? A quoi faire la eognoissanee des choses, si no us
en perdons le repos et la tranquillite, ou nous serions sans eela, et si eIle
nous rend de pire eondition que le poureeau de Pyrrho? L'intelligenee qui
nO:lS a este donnee pour nostre pIus grand bien, l'employerons-nous a
nostre ruine, combatans le dessein de nature, et l'universel ordre des choses,
qui porte que ehaeun use de ses utils et moyens pour sa eommodite et
advantage? (pp. 54-55a.)
To answer yes seems unthinkable - at least until one writes the "A-
pologie de Raimond Sebond."
So much for death. Pain is a different matter; and we are only
deluding ourselyes if we quibble over words like the philosopher
Posidonius, who suffered greatly from an acute malady, but refused to
admit that the pangs were an evil. "Pourquoy pense-il faire beaucoup
de ne l'appeIer pas maI? Icy tout ne consiste pas en l'imagination.
Nous opinons du reste, c'est icy la certaine science, quijoue son rolle.
Nos sens mesme en sont juges.
Qui nisi sunt veri, ratio quoque falsa sit omnis
Lucretius" (p. ssa).l
1 (If they are not true, then all reason is false.) Diversity of opinion, the superiority of
56 MONTA1G:.'-./E'S EARLY ESSAYS

There is onlyone procedure possible in facing pain: "il se faut

opposer et bander contre" (p. 58a). The examples of women bearing
the agonies of childbirth, of Spartan and Roman heroes, and of Christ-
ian fortitude should guide us. Montaigne concludes with an ex-
hortation. "Or sus, pourquoy de tant de discours, qui no us persuadent
de mespriser la mort, et de ne nous tourmenter point de la douleur,
n'en empoingnons no us quelcun pour nous? " (p. 68a.)
Reading this essay in its original form leayes one with the impression
that it is not as convincing as it might seem. :Montaigne's arguments
are strained, exaggerated, and sometimes illogical. He resorts to
rhetorical questions, almost as if unsure himself of the answer. He is
trying to persuade himself, for it would be useful if he could. Con-
vinced as he is that a great and lofty saul can dominate the evils of
life, he wonders if some philosophy might not be effective in his case}
"De l'inconstance de nos actions" (II: i) is a particularly good
example of the essayist's obstinate faith in reason's potential despite
evidence to the contrary.
En toute l'anciennete, il est malaise de choisir une douzaine d'hommes
qui ayent dresse leur vie a un certain et asseure train, qui est le principal
but de la sagesse. Car pour la comprendre tout'en un mot, dit un ancien, et
pour embrasser en une toutes les reigles de nostre vie, c'est vouloir et ne
vouloir pas, tousjours, mesme chose; .,. C'est un mot de Demosthenes,
dit on, que le commencement de toute vertu, c'est consultation et delibe-
ration; et la fin et perfection, constance. Si par discours nous entreprenions
certaine voie, nous la prendrions la pIus belle; mais nul n'y a pense ...
(p. 5 16a).
Virtue consists in constancy, the product of right wiIling or right
reasoning. "Ceux qui s'exercitent a contreroller les actions humaines,
ne se trouvent en nulle partie si empeschez, qu'a les r'appiesser et
mettre a mesme lustre: car elles se contredisent quelque fois de si
estrange fa!Son, qu'il semble impossible qu'elles soient parties de
mesme boutique" (p.3ISa). The key term here is "se contredisent";

man's reason over the animals, and now the validity of the senses - all three are major
topies in the "Apologie." On onlyone will Montaigne really ehange his position, namely the
superiority that reason endows man with, and he will use the story of Pyrrho's pig more
logieally in the "Apologie" to give it the eonclusion it warrants. (Both it and the Posidonius
ineident appear side by side on pp . .j.6g-.j.70a.) The other two - that the diversity of opinion
demonstrates the power of the soul to control its beliefs and that feelings such as pain are
real - will be maintained in the "Apologie."
1 The same attitude prevails in the famous "Que philosopher e'est apprendre il mourir"
(I: xx). Self-diseipline and meditation on death are reeommended as the best regimen for
preparing to die. Like "Que le goust des biens et des maux ... " I: xx rejeets the insoucianee
Df the yulgar souls and ends with an exhortation to eultivate stoical fortitude.
 MO~TAIG~E'S EARLY ESSAYS 57

moral integrity appears a logical, consistent thing to Montaigne, a

force counteracting the diversity and variability that is in us, a force that
therefore opposes the most pervasive component of human psychology,
its mutability. And if even the ancients hardly achieved constaney,
that does not alter in the least Montaigne's conviction that it is the
foundation of virtue. Cato of Utica serves as his example. As for
himselfand the restofhumanity, "nous sommes tous de lopins, et d'une
contexture si monstrueuse et diverse, que chaque piece faict son jeu.
Et se trouve autant de difference de nous a no us mesmes, que de nous
a autruy" (p. 32Ia). What Montaigne would ask ofreason is to make
us consistent - and therefore virtuous. But nature is diverseo In a
sense, then, the virtue he admires is unnatural, attainable for only the
rarest souls. For the moment Montaigne does not have enough
confidenee in himself or in nature to dedare outright that so exalted
a virtue must be rejected, or at least left for others to aspire to. But
reaching for the moon is an awkward, uncomfortable exercise, and
futile too. After a while the strain becomes too great; one has to relax.
In this essay Montaigne is placing reason and its virtues far beyond his
reach. He will shortly abandon the attempt to attain them, for the
attempt will seem like lunaey.
Even in the most Senecan of the essays, Montaigne had been aware
that there were eraeks in the wall he wished to build around himself
and that its foundations might weIl be weak. More than once he had
been reminded that the nonchalanee of the ignorant seems every bit
as dficacious as the austerity of the sage (I: xiv, 5 ra; I: xx, 82, 84, 95a;
I: xxiii, I I 3a; I: xxxix, 238a). Despite his insistence that we must meet
at least death head on, he had recommended diversionary tactics in
some essays (I: xii, 46a; I: xiv, 68a; I: xx, 84a). Finally he had frequently
implied that his own nature was not intended for such exalted conduct
asheadmires (I:x, 4ra; I:xx, 86a; I:x..xvii, 225a; I: x..xxix, 237,24ra;
II: i, 316a).
In "De l'inconstance de nos actions" the instability of mankind as
a whole seemed only another demonstration of the superiority of
the self-willed rational man. In the succeeding essay, dated by Villey
at 1573-74, hence later than the essays considered heretofore, his
reflections on the vice of drunkenness are mu ch more Pyrrhonist (in
the sense that he is undecided how to evaluate it) and much more
skeptical (in the sense that he is suspicious of the exorbitant demands
made on human nature by dassical doctrines of virtue). Montaigne
personally dislikes drunkenness because it is "grossier et brutal"
 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSA YS

(p. 322a); but the ancient moralists (Seneea even), whose authority
he willingly aeeepts, took a more lenient view of it, and debated the
question whether the sage's soul eould not resist the foree of wine.
Commenting on this pointless argument, the essayist writes:
A eombien de vanite no us pousse eette bonne opinion que no us avo ns de
nous! La pIus reiglee arne du monde, et la pIus parfaiete, n'a que trop
affaire it se tenir en pieds et a se garder de ne s'emporter par terre de sa
propre foiblesse. De mille, il n'en est pas une qui soit debout et rassise un
instant de sa vie; et se pourroit mettre en doubte si, selon sa naturelle eon-
dition, eIle y peut jamais estre (pp. 327-328a).
So we find here that even the sage is subjeeted to the limitations
imposed on him by nature (the limitations Montaigne mentions are
exclusively eorporeal). Furthermore, the essayist's sense of diversity -
so eonsonant with his Pyrrhonism - makes him suspeet that no man's
soul ean be naturally straight and eomposed. Henee, by implieation,
the classical ideal of constancy advoeates eonduet that is neither
natural nor human. Considering the more austere examples of virtue
and other extraordinary behavior, such as extreme valor in the heat
of battle or poetie and religious inspiration, the essayist concludes that
th ey are the effeets of furor or frenzy, not reason. "Et a raison d'ap-
peler fureur tout eslaneement, tant loüable soit-il, qui surpasse nostre
proprejugement et diseours. D'autant que la sagesse c'est un maniment
regle de nostre arne, et qu'elle conduit ave e mesure et proportion ... "
(p. 33oa). If then, the more rigid virtues are unnatural, perhaps
impcssible in the last analysis, and surpass the power of reason, there
remains another sphere in which wisdom guides the soul moderately
and responsibly.
In "Coustume de l'isle de Cea" (II: iii) composed at the same date
as the preeeding essay, Montaigne is even more positive in his eondem-
nation of efforts to become superhuman. His subjeet is the Stoic geste
par excellenee, suicide. His final position on self-slaughter is not
clear to us, as it may not have been to him. Among other eriti ei sm s of
suicide, Montaigne argues that it is cowardly and un-Christian. He
sees reasons both for and against resorting to it; and if he is generally
against it in theory, as would seem to be the case, he never los es his
admiration for the heroism of certain suieides. But he does see that
to take one's life is the act of a very negative philosophy, and no
solution to the search for happiness: "La securite, l'indolence, l'im-
passibilite, la privation des maux de cette vie, que nous achetons au
pris de la mort, ne nous apporte nulle eommodite. Pour neant evite
 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ES SA YS 59

la guerre celuy qui ne peut jouyr de la paix; et pour neant fuit la

peine, qui n'a dequoy savourer le repos" (p. 334a). For the first time
he finds a radical inadequacy in the morality ofreasoned self-discipline
proposed by the humanists. Even if it were attainable, which is doubt-
ful, its ultimate remedy, suicide, indicates how little it has to contribute
to the enjoyment of life.
Although Montaigne grew increasingly dissatisfied with the austere
virtues of contemporary humanism, nowhere in the early essays did he
explicidy abandon the traditional concept that reason should take
control of the conduct of our life. However, he did see elearly that in
addition to reason experience could provide great assistance in
answering questions central to moral philosophy. In "De l'exerci-
tation" (II: vi), one of the most interesting essays, both in its primitive
form and in its later additions, he describes an incident that occurred
probably shortly before his retirement.1 Having been almost killed
when he and his horse were overthrown a short distance from his
chateau, he was bome with great difficulty, more dead than alive,
back to Montaigne where he slowly regained life. His period of conva-
lese ene e was infinitely mo re painful than the two or three hours when
he was elosest to death. As he describes his recovery, the lesson that
Montaigne draws from his experience is that the act of dying itself is
probably not difficult or painful at all since the mind and bodyare
too weakened to feel it.
Considering that for Montaigne to philosophize meant to leam to
die, (I: xx), this experience and the instruction he got from it must
have mattered gready to him. But surprisingly enough, the accident
predates the writing of the essays of 157 I -72 so pervaded with his
preoccupation with death and the necessity of preparing for it. In all
these essays, onlyone passage (I: xx, 88-8ga) bears a elose relation-
ship to the ideas of "De l'exercitation." vVhy do the Senecan essays
forget so completely to mention the very consoling lesson that Montaigne
had drawn from a quite reeent experience? It hardly seems possible
that the true import of his accident did not occur to him until several
years after the event. The explanation, it seerns, is that when Mon-
taigne wrote these essays, he was not subjecting the dicta of his elassi-
eal authorities to critical appreciation in order to see if th ey corre-
1 He says that it was "pendant nos troisiesmes troubles ou delLxiesmes," i.e., between
1567 and 1571. He seerns to ineline toward the later date. Aremark deleted after the 1582
edition of the Essais places the occurrence four years before the composition of II: vi. The
date of the essay, then,lies between 1571 and 1575, presumably in the vicinity of 1573-74,
the date of the surrounding essays.
60 MONTAIG0iE'S EARLY ESSAYS

sponded with his own personal convictions and experience. It had

not yet occurred to him to explore Michel de Montaigne's ideas; he
was repeating, as weIl as he could, the wisdom of others whom he and
his generation admired and considered the greatest exemplars of
human achievement. If he could not really believe everything the
dassical Stoics said, he believed most firmly in them and did not
conceive the possibility of an alternative to their doctrines. On the
particular matter of the painfulness of death, his personal opinion,
even from the time of his friendship with Etienne de La Boetie, had
differed from the ideas of many others.1 But he did not for that re-
linquish his allegiance to the precepts of ancient philosophy concerning
the sage's need to prepare for it. It is only after he began to write and
to refleet on what he was saying that he realized gradually that the
humanists' answers to the problems of the human condition were not
his.
By way of summaryone may say that non e of the early essays are
the product of the mature and comprehensive mind of :yrontaigne's
later years; nevertheless, they eontain, seattered and unsystematic,
most of the components of the final essays. They show dearly that the
essayist had already renounced dogmatism in matters of faith or
speculations about the supernatural, without, however, giving up
bdief in either. Within these areas his Pyrrhonism is complete,
consistent, and fully developed, logieally and temperamentally re-
lated to his abiding sense of the innumerable possibilities of nature
and }-js fideist belief in the inscrutability of God.
But in the realm of practieal activity, always the chief coneern of a
moralist, Montaigne's partial and somewhat forced allegiance to the
edectic humanist philosophy of his time runs athwart his intellectual
skepticism. His faith in reason is seriously restricted by his awareness
that human activity is ultimately in the hands of fate. Moreover, the
idea of permitting reason to undertake any reform of lawand custom
is repugnant to his deep-seated eonservatism. Reason, exduded from
any critical role in social and religious matters, is principally concern-
ed with the inner adjustment of a man to his life. Its task there is to
persuade man that he can withstand the future adversities of life with
rigor and constancy. A program of repeated self-conditioning would
succeed in distinguishing the sage from the unthinking mob, not so
much in his behavior as in his attitude. Although reason's funetion

1 II: vi, 354a. This is confirmed by Montaigne's account of La Boetie's death (p. 1349).
 MONTAIGNE'S EARLY ESSA YS 61

(which it shares with any other faculty that can help it) is limited,
laborious, and merely defensive; it is nonetheless of great importanee
because it applies to the only activity where man is free and has some
real power over himself.
Various indicators show that Montaigne had to make almost as
much effort to believe in this program as to carry it out. To be free of
fear he was wiUing to use any technique, not just his reason and will
power, provided, of course, that it worked. The more he examined the
extraordinary lives of the Stoic heroes, the more he realized that they
were infinitely removed from him in disposition. Furthermore, their
goals were unnatural, perhaps unattainable; their conduct, immoder-
ate and sometimes more frenetic than truly reasonable; and their
achievements, negative and unproductive. As his disenchantment with
the stern precepts of dassical morality grew, NIontaigne turned,
hesitantly at first, to his own experience in order to find the art of
living suitable for him. But before finding it, he was to renounce
momentarily all trust in reason; and for him reason meant largely the
ethics of self-discipline and the apprehensive preparation to face the
iUs of life.
 CHAPTER IV

THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

The Theologie naturelle

Raymond Sebond's book, the Theologia naturalis sive Liber Creatura-
rum, the work which the "Apologie de Raymond Sebond" purports
to defend, had long been known at the chateau of Montaigne. Accord-
ing to the essayist, Pierre Bunel, a humanist scholar of Toulouse, left
a copy of this book as a parting present to Pierre Eyquem, the father
of the future apologist, recommending it as a "most useful" book,
appropriate to the time because it provided an antidote against
Lutheranism, which was beginning to undermine the traditional faith
of the Catholic Church.1 Although the date of Bunel's visit to Mon-
taigne is unknown, it was most probably between his return from
Italy in 1538 and his death in 1546, hence during Montaigne's
ehildhood.
The book he left behind is a curious one. About its author we know
little more than Montaigne did. 2 His name appears in many forms:
Sebond, Sabaude, Sabonde, Sebon, Sebonde, Sebeyde, Sibiude, and
others. Coppin decides that he wrote the Liber creaturarum (seu naturte)
seu Liber de Homine propter quem sunt creaturte alite between 1434 and
1436, dying in April 1436, two and a half months after finishing the
work. 3 His 330-ehapter book, written undoubtedly as a reaetion
against the nominalist tendencies of the theology of his day, claims to
prove the eontents of Holy Writ beyond any doubt and without
difficulty - moreover without referenee to Seripture or any other
authority, and without relying on the reader's previous knowledge of
grammar, logie, liberaI arts, physies, or metaphysies. It is an ambitious
1 II: xii, 415-41 6a. On Bunel, see Zeitlin, Essays, II, 484-485, and Busson, Le Ratianalisme
dans la littlratur. fran~ais. de la Renaissance, ehap. IV, i.
2 "Tout ee que nous sc;avons, e'est qu'il estoit Espaignol, faisant professian de medeeine il
Thoulause, il y a environ deux eens ans" (p. 417a).
3 eoppin, A1antaigne traducteur de Raymond Seband, p. II.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAVvlOND SEBOND

project; and it must be said for Sebond that at times his work is
impressively persuasive, though at others lamentably naive and in-
consistent.
Sebond maintains that God has given man two books to study, the
book of nature and Holy Scripture; th ey contain the same lesson
though in different terrns. The first half of the Tlzeologia naturalis
(up to chap. CCX) examines the book of nature. Since man knows
himself better than he knows anything else, it is by looking into his
own nature that he willlearn about God. Sebond's idea of examining
human nature is to state that in the natural world we find four
orders of existence: being (i.e., material objects), living (i.e., plants),
feeling (i.e., animals), and intelleet (i.e., man). All these things have
a source or creator which must sh are the qualities of the things He
created, but in such a way that in Him they become pure Being with
no imperfections. 1
Further inquiry into the nature of God permits Sebond to demon-
strate the existence of the Trinity by analogy with human nature.
Man may create in two ways, as an artisan when he creates a house,
or as a father when he creates an infant. Likewise God created the
world as an artisan and the second person of the Trinity as a father.
(The humor of the analügy, of course, escapes Sebond.) The Holy
Ghost, which is explained as the emanation of love from the Father to
the Son and from the Son to the Father, causes some difficulty; so
Sebond devotes a rather long chapter to clarifying its nature by com-
paring it to the Latin verb system. God the Father is similar to an
active verb; God the Son, to a passive verb; and the Holy Spirit, to
a deponent verb, active in meaning but passive in form. 2
At this point, anticipating Pascal's argument of the wager, Sebond
gives his eri te rio n for determining the truth of a proposition. When
faced with two possibilities, man need have no doubt which one is
true, for he must choose the one that contributes more to his dignity

1 Coppin (Montaigne tradueteur, p. 72) finds that the few inaccuracies of translation in
Montaigne's French version of the Liber ereaturarum tend to be concentrated in the metaphysi-
eal chapters on God's Being. Sebond's arguments about Being occasionally sound like
Spinoza; for example, there cannot be two Beings, for that would imply an imperfection
in Being. On the other hand, lacking Spinoza's rigorous logic, Sebond does not see the
inconsistency in maintaining both that God must ha. e all the qualities he gives His creatures
and that he must be incorporeal.
2 This chapter, on the verb system, number LIV, is five pages long in Armaingaud's
(Euvres eompletes de AfieheI de Monta~gne, IX, 83-88. All references to the ThioIogie naturelle
will be to this edition, to be designated simply as "Armaingaud." - I remember being told as
a child in confirmation elass that the Holy Ghost could be compared to the objective case
(or was it the genitive?) ofa pronoun.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

and his comfort. "Son ignorance ne luy peut servir d'excuse, et ...
ceste seule intention d'approuver ee qui est a son profit et a son
utilite luy sert d'une suffisante et juste occasion de croire." 1 "Pour
example, on no us propose, il y a un Dieu: il nous faut soudain ima-
giner son contraire, il n'y a point de Dieu: et puis assortir ees choses
l'une a l'autre, pour voir laquelle d'elles convient pIus a l'estre et au
bien, et laquelle y convient le moins." 2
Returning to the consideration of man, Sebond concludes that he
is truly the emperor of the universe, far surpassing in nobility the rest
of creation, whose express purpose is to serve the needs of mankind.
Culminating a magnificently circular argument, he decides that
"l'ordre de l'univers no us apprend que l'homme est la tres-parfaite et
tres-accomplie ressemblance de son createur." 3
Many chapters follow on the infinite obligation that man owes
God, on the necessity of loving spiritual rather than physical things,
on the need for salvation, and so forth. The divinity ofJ esus is demon-
strated on the grounds that he is the only man ever to claim to be the
Son of God, that God's honor would not all ow a hoax so important to
Rim to be perpetrated, that the Christians have flourished, and that
the only group to await the coming ofa God-mdn, the Jews, have been
reduced to a pitiful state.
Sebond next undertakes the consideration of the Bible, the second
book God has given man. The word of God need have no defense and
should be believed only because it is God's; for to give any proofs of
it is to believe the proofs, not God's word, and to place more value in
them than in God. Nonetheless, it is necessary to show that the Bible
is God's word. This can be easily demonstrated by its tone of authority
and the exaltation of its content. In these chapters Sebond makes
considerable modifications on the far-fetched claims of the Preface
about the power of reason. In fact his position becomes orthodox and
avoids the heresies of fideism or excessive rationalism.
Car sans le cognoistre [God] comme s~auroit-on qu'il fut autheur de la
Bible, et comme croiroit-on a la Bible qui traicte sans argumenter et san s
raisonner de tant de matieres hautes et ardues, si on ne s"avoit que Dieu en fust
1 Armaingaud, IX, I 17 (chap. LXVII). Quotations are from Montaigne's translation
because Sebond's Latin is diffuse and occa;ionally obscure. Montaigne's judgment, "ee
livre est basty d'un Espagnol barragoine en terminaisons Latines" (p. 415-416a), is just.
French citations have been compared with the originaI for accuracy of content.
Z Ibid., p. 119 (chap. LXVIII).
3 Armaingaud, IX, 210 (chap. CXXI). The eirele is this: to find God's nature, we must
deduce it from man's; from contemplation of God's nature, we can deduce that man is
created in His image.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 65

l'autheur? Voila pourquoy je disois ailleurs, qu'il faut premierement

feuilleter le livre des creatures et avant le livre de la Bible. Car celuy la
no us apprend a cognoistre Dieu, sa grandeur, ses proprietez et ses condi-
tions: il sert d'introduction, de porte d'entree et de lumiere aux sainetes,
escritures, et a la verite l'un livre presuppose l'autre.l
And later:
Or la Bible traicte une doctrine eeleste et supematurelle, doctrine
surpassant par sa profondeur incomprehensible, le jugement, la raison et
l'intelligence de tout homme: comprenant un grand nombre de propositions
esi eve es d'une distance infinie au dessus de toute imagination et conception
humaine, et consistant en choses si ardues, si obscures, et si divines qu'il est
entierement impossible qu'aucun homme les ait de soy trouvees ou produic-
tes, veu qu'elles excedent de bien loin la portee de nostre invention, dis-
cours et suffisance. 2
Among the examples of mysteries contained in the Bible that eannot
be established by reason alone, Sebond lists the inearnation, virgin
birth, transubstantiation, and the Trinity (despite the faet that he had
attempted to deduec the Trinitarian nature of God in his own book
only a hundred and fifty ehapers earlier).
In the rest of his work Sebond argues, stiIl without referenee to
Seripture, that the major tenets and praetiees of the Christian religion
are logieal. Perhaps the greatest tour de foree of the entire book is his
treatment of the fall of Adam and Eve. Re never onee mentions their
names, but deduees from a study of human nature that (I) man must
have faIlen, (2) it must have been the first man who fell, (3) his wife
must have fallen with him, (4) she must have been more at fault than
he, (5) the fall involved sexual sin, (6) it was a sin of disobedienee, (7)
the law disobeyed was in the form of a prohibition, (8) the penalty of
death was predieted in the prohibition, (9) the sin was eommitted at
the instigation of an outside foree, and (IO) that souree must have been
a fallen angel. 3 It is a very impressive performance, and must have
seemed eonvineing to many. Sebond's readers may weIl have feIt that
with a little thought they or anyone else eould have dedueed on their
own most of the major doetrines of Christianity. Similar demon-
strations of the logieal neeessity of the inearnation, virgin birth, and
redemption are also given.

1 Armaingaud, X, 30 (chap. CCXI).

2 Ibid. X, 33-34 (chap. CCXIII).
3 Armaingaud, X, chap,. CCXXXVIII-CCXLII. One sample of his proofs: since the
entire human race is in a state of sin, it is obvious that the sin must have been committed by
the common father of the race; otherwise some humans would descend from pure stock and
show no signs of degeneration.
66 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

The final ehapters diseuss the sacraments, the organization of the

Church, the nature and locations of Heaven, Hell, and Purgatory,
and the Last Judgment. In the course of this long book the only
major portion of Catholic dogma not treated, as far as I ean see, is
hagiolatry. When Montaigne asked Adrian Turnebus about the
Theologia naturalis, he answered "qu'il pensoit que ee fut quelque
quinte essenee tiree de S. Thomas d' Aquin" (II: xii, 41 7a). Coneerning
the subject matter Sebond handIes, Turnebus was right; the Liber
creaturarum is a sort of popularized, secular Summa; and many of its
positions (e.g., transubstantiation) were as conservative for the time
as were Thomas's. But Turnebus showed none of the judgment Mon-
taigne so admired in him if he meant to imply that Sebond's argu-
ments reprodueed the force of the Divine Doctor's.

Montaigne and Sebond

Such is the book that Montaigne set out to defend in his "Apologie
de Raymond Seband." To many readers the defense has seemed
weak, and to so me it is perfidious; for little of the "Apologie" seems
to have Sebond in mind and many passages are in disagreement with
the Spanish theologian's most basic beliefs. The question just what
Montaigne's attitude towards the book he translated was has led to
eonsiderable divergenee of opinion and some puzzlement on the part
of scholars.
Montaigne himself is in part responsible for the confusion about his
true sentiments vis-a-vis the work he had translated. He is off-hand,
eve n deceptive, in his terminology.
Or, quelques jours avant sa mort, mon pere, ayant de fortune reneontre
ee livre sous un tas d'autres papiers abandonnez, me eommanda de le luy
mettre en Fran<;ois. Il faiet bon traduire les autheurs eomme eeluy-la, ou
il n'y a guiere que la matiere a representer; mais eeux qui ont donne
beaueoup ala graee et a l'eleganee du langage, ils sont dangereux a entre-
prendre. C'estoit une oeeupation bien estrange et nouvelle pour moy; mais,
estant de fortune pour lors de loisir, et ne pouvant rien refuser au eomman-
dement du meilleur pere qui fut onques, j'en vins about eomme je peus; a
-quoy il print un singulier plaisir, et donna eharge qu'on le fit imprimer; ee
qui fut exeeute apres sa mort (p. 416a).
Montaigne seems to be dissociating himself as much as possible from
the translation. It was not he, but his father, who first suggested the
id ea, and then only after coming across the book quite by accident.
The translation was made for his father ("de le LUY mettre en Fran-
c;ois"), and not for publication. It was a strange and new undertaking
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAI,HOND SEBOND

for Montaigne, made possible by the fact that he was luckily unoccu-
pied at the time. Finally, the book itself had little stylistic merit, and
therefore translating it was not a risky enterprise.
Does this account give us an accurate picture of the facts? And if
not, why is Montaigne so diffident about his translation? Certainly
the statement that it was only several days before he died that Pierre
Eyquem asked his son to set about the task of writing out a French
version of the Theologia naturalis is misleadingo In the dedication to his
father, dated from Paris the 18th ofJune 1568, the day Pierre Eyquem
died, Montaigne says that following his father's instructions, given
"l'annee passee," not merely several days ago, he has put Sebond in a
dress "a la Fran<;oise." The publication of Montaigne's translation
which came to nearly a thousand pages, was not finished until six
months after this letter was written. Chances are that he spent more
than a year on his edition. Coppin has shown that Montaigne worked
carefully, taking some pains to vivify the ineptitudes of the original's
style. l All the evidence indicates that he to ok his translation seriously.
When he tells us in the "Apologie" that he had already spoken to
Adrian Turnebus about Sebond's book, he clearly shows that his
intcrest was not occasioned entirely by his father's re quest, for Turne-
bus died in 1565, and the most probable date of his meeting with the
future essayist is 1561-62 when both were in Paris, at least six years
before the translation was finished.
Montaigne's diffidence in the "Apologie" about the TMologie
naturelle may be due in part to a feeling that translating was an un-
suitable occupation for an aristocrat. 2 Furthermore, we have reason
to believe that he did not care overmuch for the work he put into
French. In the dedicatory letter to his father he says that all the credit
for having the book translated belongs to Pierre Eyquem (pp. 1360-
6 I). Moreover, he did not take many pains about the publication, for
the original edition was left in the hands ofprinters who allowed many
errors to appear in the finished product. 3 Finally, the adjustments he
made in the Preface testify to the fact that he had so me real reservations
about the validity of Sebond's grandiose pretensions.
It is certainly true that ten years later, when he defended the book,
his estimate of it is quite guarded. Re records his agreement with

1 Montaigne tradueteuT, p. 99.

2 On this attitude in general, see Friedrich, lHontaigne, pp. 19-22.
3 i'vfontaigne tradueteuT, p. 45-46. Montaigne criticizes his printer in the "Apologie,"
p. 424, n. 3.
68 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

Pierre Bunel's recommendation of the Theologia naturalis as an antidote

against immoderate free examination of dogma, a Lutheran malady
which could easily degenerate into "un execrable atheisme" (p. 4I6a).l
The danger is that the "vulgar," which indudes almost everyone,2
might acquire the "hardiesse" to evaluate opinions it had held in
"extreme reverenee," and eventually be led to discard all the artides
of its creed. Against the dangerous temptation of critical examination,
Sebond's book may be used to reinforce wavering submission to the
authority of the Church.
:Many people, "et notamment les dames"(p. 4I7a), have read the
work; and Montaigne finds himself called upon to defend "leur livre"
(not his own).
Je trouvay belles les imaginations de eet autheur, la eontextUl'e de son
ouvrage bien suyvie, et son dessein plein de piete. , .. Sa fin est hardie et
courageuse, ear il entreprend, par raisons humaines et naturelles, establir
et verifier eontre les atheistes tous les articles dc la religion Chrestienne:
en quoy, a dire la verite, je le trouve si ferme et si heureux que je ne pense
point qu'il soit possible de mieux faire en eet argument la, et eroy que nul
ne l'a esgale (pp. 416-417a).
Reading this we feel Montaigne exercising considerable caution in
his evaluation of the Liber creaturarum. Re is correct in saying that its
purpose was full of piety, and its construction well organized. No one
would deny that. Its ideas are "belles," but it undertakes a bold task
when it tries to prove Christian faith with reasons that are merely
"humaines et naturelles." Along such lines of argument it is as solid
and successful as possible, but no more. No one has equaled it in "en
eet argument la."; Montaigne does not add that few have tried such
an argument, and no one could succeed in it; but the rest of the "A-
pologie" shows that this is what he thought.
Now Montaigne's conception of "eet argument Ul" is somewhat
unjust to Sebond. In the second half of his theology, when discussing

1 Montaigne's use of the word "atheism" here may be loose by modern standard s, for it
does not necessarily imply the denial of the existenee of God, a charge that Montaigne never
made against Protestants or freethinkers. Seven pages latcr in a 1580 passage, further
reinforeed after 1588, Montaigne declares that speeulative atheism is an unnatural and
monstrous doetrine, hard to implant or maintain in a human mind. In the sixteenth eentury
"atheism" eould mean the denial of God's Providenee, of the inearnation, or some other
central proposition about the nature of God. Saint Paul in Ephesians ii. 12 makes a similar
weak usage of the word "atheist." It ean often be taken simply to mean "ungodly." I believe
that this is the case here, but I cannot prove it. (On the word "atheist," see Lucien Febvre,
Le Probteme de l'incroyance au XVIeme sieele, pp. 138-153.)
2 This remark is crossed out on this page in the Bordeaux copy, but substantially the
same thing is added, perhaps at the same time, on p. 55+ towards the end of the essay.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 69

the Bible and the mysteries of Christian religion, Sebond retracts his
earlier contention that reason can demonstrate infallibly all the articles
of faith. Janssen is correct in saying that in the last analysis Sebond's
position is that reason can prove, but not find, many of the Catholic
dogmas. But he is quite wrong in saying that Montaigne realized this
and thought of Sebond as a fideist like himself; for the essayist later
remarks that Sebond's opponents are happy to argue with him because
"illeur semble qu'on leur donne beau jeu de les mettre en liberte de
combattre nostre religion par les armes pures humaines, laquelle
ils n'oseroyent ataquer en sa majeste pleine d'authorite et de comman-
dement" (pp. 425-426a).1 Rightly or wrongly, Montaigne believed
that the book he was defending presented a theology based purely on
reason.
According to the "Apologie" two principal objections are made to
the TMologie naturelle, first that Christians are mistaken in wishing to
support their faith by "raisons humaines," and secondly that Sebond's
arguments are too weak to establish their points. The first objection
would indicate that fideists were not unknown at the time. They could
have been Paduan rationalists who saw reason and revelation in
opposition to each other, or Pyrrhonist Christians like Montaigne
who were persuaded of reason's innate weakness. 2 \Vhatever the case,
he treats their objection, which is actually his own conviction, with
"douceur" and "respect," wishing that a man versed in theology
would take it on, rather than he, who knows nothing in such matterso
HiJ position is that reasons such as Sebond's may support, not prove,
beliefs already established by God's grace. The Spanish doctor's design,
as Montaigne conceives it, and perhaps had always conceived it, is
overambitious.
Toutefois je juge ainsi, qu'a une chose si divine et si hautaine, et surpas-
sant de si loing l'humaine intelligence, comme est cette verite de laquelle
il a pleu a la bonte de Dieu nous esclairer, il est bien besoin qu'il nous pres te
encore son secours, d'une faveur extraordinaire et privilegee, pour la
pouvoir concevoir et loger en nous; et ne croy pas que les moyens purement
humains en soyent aucunement capables; ... C'est la foy seule qui em-
brasse vivement les hauts mysteres de nostre Religion (pp. 4I7-418a).
This does not me an that books such as Sebond's are useless.
1 Hermannjanssen, Montaignefideiste, p. 44. Coppin points out the weaknesses ofJanssen's
argument in "Sur une interpretation nouvelle de l"Apologie de R. Sebond,'" Revue du
Seizieme Sieele, XVII (1930),314,321.
2 Coppin, Montaigne tradueteur, p. 143, belieyes Montaigne is referring to mystics "qui se
defient du raisonnement et qui preferent la voie affective." His contention remains to be
proven.
70 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBaND

Mais ee n'est pas a dire que ee ne soit une tresbelle et tresloüable entre-
prinse d'aeeommoder eneore au service de nostre foy les utils naturels et
humains que Dieu no us a donnez. Il ne faut pas douter que ee ne soit l'usage
le pIus honorable que nous leur s<;aurions donner, et qu'il n'est oeeupation
ny dessein pIus digne d'un homme Chrestien que de viser par to us ses
estudes et pensemens a embellir, estandre et amplifier la verite de sa ereanee .
. .. Il faut ... aeeompaigner nostre foy de toute la raison qui est en nous,
mais tousjours avee eette reservation de n'estimer pas que ee soit de nous
qu'eIle depende, ny que nos efforts et argumens puissent parfaire une Sl
supernatureIle et divine seienee (p. 4I8a).
The Livre des creatures might op en the way to faith and serve as a
first guide for an "aprentis"; "la foy venant a teindre et illustrer les
argumens de Sebond, elle les rend fermes et solides" (p. 425a). Mon-
taigne admits to having known one learned man who had been
dissuaded of his errors on reading Sebond.
The second objection, that Sebond's arguments are weak, requires
more lengthy consideration. As in the case of the first objection, Mon-
taigne agrees in part with his opponents' thesis; for he will maintain
that any rational argument is weak. He does, however, believe that
among purely human arguments Sebond's are "aussi solides et autant
fermes que nuls autres de mesme condition qu'on leur puisse opposer"
(p. 425a). This actually is damning with faint praise, since it is only
saying that they are every bit as inadequate as other arguments. All
Montaigne can do to meet this objection is to counterattack.
The defense of the Theologie naturelle is in truth apologetic. Montaigne
agrees at least in part with both objections and therefore cannot answer
them categorically. He is forced to admit that Sebond's work is weak,
though no weaker than another; yet it may be useful, as long as we do
not expect too much ofit, as its author had. 1 Nothing in Montaigne's
defense of Raymond Sebond seems either insincere or inconsistent
with the fideist positions already expressed in the earlier essays. If
Montaigne really turned against the Livre des creatures, as some have
maintained, why did he have it republished in 1581 after going to the
trouble of inserting no less than 229 corrections in his own copy of
the very faulty 1569 edition? 2

1 This judgrnent "weak, but useful" is the one suggested by Frame in his "Did Montaigne
Betray Sebond?" Romanic Review, XXXVII (1947),315-321. As he points out, Montaigne
applied the word "utile" to the Theologia naturalis twice, once in the "Apologie" (p. 416a),
onee in the Prefaee of his translatian when he ehanged Sebond's term "necessaria" to
"utile." (None of the discussions that I have seen written since this artide add anything to it,
or even seem to be aware of its existence.)
2 Alain Brieux report ed the discovery of this eopy of the Tihologie nall/relle in "Autres
souvenirs de Montaigne," Bibliotheque d'Humanisme et de Renaissance, X,X (1958), 370-376.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

In summary, we have evidence of Nlontaigne's admiration for

Sebond's book(I) in 1561-62 (?) when he spoke to Adrian Turnebus,
(2) in 1568 when he translated it, (3) in 1578-79 when he wrote a
qualified defense of it, and (4) in 1581 when he devoted some care to
republishing it after rereading it. We have evidence that Montaigne
knew the book was weak (I) in 1568 when he revised the Preface, (2)
in 1572 when he wrote his first fideist essay, (3) in 157 1-80 when he
neglected almost completely to borrow from it as he wrote his essays,
in which, moreover, more than one comment confticts with propos-
sitions advanced in the TMologie naturelle, (4) in 1578-79 when his
apology was so lukewarm in its defense, and (5) in the years after
158 I when he refused to reconcile any of the passages in his Essais
which did not agree with the book that he had reread carefully and
when he made long additions to the "Apologie" most injurious to
rationalist theology (pp. 5 I 0-5 I 7). His attitude was consistently one
of wary respect, which may have diminished to a certain degree after
1569, but did not disappear completely.
So far I have considered only :Wlontaigne's defense of Sebond and
not his counterattack against Sebond's opponents. In that part of the
"Apologie," the essayist alludes only twice to the Spanish theologian,
once in the phrase "ces gens icy, qui trouvent les raisons de Sebond
trop foibles" (p. 520a), and once in the phrase "vostre Sebond"
(p. 540a), neither of which are important (except for the fact that
NIontaigne does not say "my" Sebond or "our" Sebond). And yet
the counterattack takes up over ninety percent of the original essay
(158 pages out of 170 in the Dezeimeris and Barckhausen reprint of
the 1580 edition). As a matter of fact, of all the 170 pages no more
than two or three can be considered real defenses of Sebond; and they
are very concessive in tone as we have seen. How does the rest of the
essay square with the protestatiom of the introductory pages concern-
ing Sebond?
First, it must be noted that Montaigne's tactic of counterattack
does not require him to defend a single argument of Sebond's. He
intends to destroy utterly his opponents' faith in human reason,
thereby silencing them so completely that they will not dare enter
into debate with Sebond. Montaigne, then, could have composed
this section without mentioning the Theologia naturalis and yet without
in any way betraying it. The attack on reason is not merely an elusive
tactic; it is the very best Montaigne could honesdy do, being as he was
a confirmed believer in obedience to the authority of the Church in
spiritual concerns.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIJfOND SEBOND

Such a tactic must automatically involve a real repudiation of

Sebond's basic premiss (or at least what Montaigne incorrectly
believed was his basic premiss), namely that purely human reason
without divine intercession was capable of attaining the truths of
religion. Montaigne finds just the right image for his procedure when
he says "c'est un co up desespere, auquel il faut abandonner vos
armes pour faire perdre a vostre adversaire les siennes, et un tour
seeret, duquel il se faut servir rarement et reserveement" (p. 54oa).
He is at least honest about what he is doing and does not pretend to
conceal the implications of his method. Besides, his defense against
the first objection has already shown quite dearly that he believes
that Sebond's arguments (or any man's) cannot provide an absolute
foundation for faith.
Nonetheless, during a considerable section of the counterattack it
seems as if Montaigne is going out of his way to contradict the author
he had translated. If he had meant to reject his rationalist methods,
there was no necessity to condemn the condusions Sebond drew using
them. But time and again 1:Iontaigne's positions represent real re-
versals of Sebond's; and in one or two cases it is eve n possible that he
is contradicting Sebond specifically, and not someone else holding
the same idea. On several very fundamental ideas the essayist is
strongly opposed to the author he is defending. l Montaigne protests
at length that the universe was not created for man, that the animaIs
are not merely man's servants, and that they possess faculties of reason
and imagination. But chapter after chapter of the Theologia naturalis
demonstrates that man is the emperor of the universe, the only
creature endowed with the capacity to recognize God's works and
glorify Him. 2 Furthermore, Montaigne shows his strong antipathy for
attempts to understand God in terms of human nature, to limit His
omnipotence by asserting that He cannot die or go back on His word,
or to explain His incomprehensible attributes with meaningle~s
formulas. But in each instance we find Sebond speaking in precisely
the way the essayist condemns. Montaigne says that he has "always"
considered it irreverent and thoughtless to say that God could not do
something (p. 507a). Allowing for some exaggeration in the word
"always," it is still quite possible that when he translated Sebond, at
1 Coppin, Montaigne traducteur, pp. 153-157, 159-165 lists such contradictions.
2 Glaring contradictions between the two points of view are evident if one compares the
following passages in the "Apologie" and the TIzeologie naturelle (Armaingaud edition):
II: xii, 427a to IX, 157-158; II: xii, 427a to IX, 154; II: xii, 430a to IX, 101-102, 103;
II: xii, 437a to IX, 102, 162; and II: xii, 46o-46w to X, 315.
 THE APOLOGIE TO RAIMOND SEBaND 73

the age of thirty-five or so, he condemned such expressions. So one

can say that all Montaigne would find to criticize in Sebond are his
ideas of God, of man, and of man's place in nature, the three cardinal
points on which he builds his whole theory. Such striking disagreements
between the Spanish theologian and his apologist have led some
critics to regard the "Apologie" as a betrayal of Sebond of the most
perfidious sort. As Sainte-Beuve wrote in his brilliant, but very mis-
taken, portrait of Montaigne : "Le rõle de Montaigne en tout ee chapitre,
une fois bien compris, est singulierement dramatique; il y a toute
une comedie qu'il joue, et dont il ne pretend faire dupe que qui le
veut bien. Montaigne sur Sebond joue le meme personnage que
Bayle sur les Manicheens." 1
It must be remarked at first that mu ch of what Montaigne does say
about God can be found in Raymond Sebond. This is partly due to
the fact that Sebond's reasoning is sufficiently broad (inconsistent, if
you will) to indude somewhat diverse points of view. The nullity of
man, when compared to the absolute perfection and mystery of God, is
affirmed in the Theologia naturalis. Sebond begins his book with the
proof that God is pure Being. The essayist ends the "Apologie" on
the same note. Each remarks that Christians are characterized by
their belief in what is hard to believe. In various places Sebond states
that God is all-powerful, mysterious, infinitely distant from man, and
so forth. As Catholics and Christians, Montaigne and Sebond had to
agree on some matters, but it is far easier to find their differences (14
pages in Coppin) than their common ground (2 pages in Coppin).2
These very real disparities in their points of view are the strongest
evidence for Sainte-Beuve's accusations of bad faith. Montaigne did
write a defense of Sebond and in it he heartily condemned the Spanish
theologian's ideas. No amount of interpretation can change these
facts. Is it possible to account for them in a way that would preserve
Montaigne's integrity and avoid the charge of duplicity?

1 Port-Royal, 7 voh. (Paris: Hachette, 1867-71), II, 34-1-. AIso in Les Grands Eerivains
franfais, Etudes des Lundis et des Portraits elassees selon un ordre nouveau et annotees par Maurice Allem,
XVIe Sieele, Les Prosateurs (Paris: Garnier, 1926), p. 240. In his artide "Did Montaigne
Betray Sebond?" Frarne analyzes exhaustively Sainte-Beuve's comments on Montaigne,
showing how completely unfounded the conelusions of the Port-Royal are. The critic's
understanding of Bayle is perhaps just as mistaken as his concept of Montaigne's intentions
in the "Apologie."
2 Montaigne traducteur, pp. 149-165.
74 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

The Composition oJ the Apologie

Zeitlin is the first critic to have offered a convincing theory to
explain the major difficulties concerning Montaigne's defense of
Sebond.1 He asked two significant questions. vVhat after all was the
occasion for writing the "Apologie"? And was Montaigne really
thinking of Sebond when he wrote it? The crux of the matter lies in
considerations of chronology. Our best evidence would indicate that
Montaigne was asked to defend Sebond by Marguerite de Valois
sometime after the fall of 1578. But there is good reason to believe that
large portions of the final ess ay date from the years 1573-76. If Mon-
taigne thought of Sebond at all while writing them, and he may weIl
have in so me instances, he was not concerned at the time with de-
fending him. vVhen asked later to speak in his defense, Montaigne was
in an awkward situation; for his personal opinion persuaded him that
the Liber creaturarum's worth was definitely limited. His embarrassment
shows in the qualified praise he gives it and in the indirect method he
chose to defend it. Nonetheless, weak as Sebond's work was, it could
be useful either for an apprentice seeking faith, or as an antidote to the
very dangerous habit of subjecting dogmas to critical examination, a
habit that could result in ungodly beliefs ("atheisme"). Therefore, the
book did deserve defense. At some point it occurred to Montaigne that
he had already written a great deal of material which could be used in
support of his counterattack on the objectors. Rather than rewrite old
essays, he incorporated them in a single essay that was finally. to be
six times longer than the next longest essay published in 1580.
The hypothesis that the "Apologie" is a composite of ur-essays put
into a framework established only later has been suggested by Grace
Norton, Villey, Coppin, Lanson, Porteau, Zeitlin, and Frame. As far
as I know, no careful study has ever denied it. 2 It has the advantage of
accounting for the length of the essay, its disorganization, its contra-
dictions, and its repetitions. And it reduces the charge of perfidy to
negligenee or forgetfulness of Sebond on Montaigne's part.
That Montaigne did not compose the "Apologie" before the winter

1 Zeitlin, Essays, II, 487-495, gives an admirable review of the question of the essayist's
supposed treachery to Sebond as weil as his solution. His notes to the "Apologie" are the
most thorough study of the essay in detail. Although I disagree with several of his interpre·
tations, they deserve careful readingo Frame's "Did Jlvlontaigne Betray Sebond?" recounts
various unsuccessful explanations of the matter and adds considerably to Zeitlin's argumenta·
tion.
2 Roger Pons in "Etude sur la pensee religieuse de Montaigne. L' 'Apologie de Raymond
Sebond,'" Information Litteraire, VI (1954), 45, maintains that the "Apologie" is a unitary
construction without offering any argumentation.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAli'vIOND SEBOND 75

of 1578-79 seems fairly weU estabilshed. This depends on the identi-

fieation of the princess for whom he undertook the defense of Sebond.
Joseph Coppin's artide "Marguerite de Valois et le Livre des creatures
de Raymond Sebond" 1 remains the definitive diseussion of this
question, and has gone unchallenged. Montaigne's remarks to the
princess (pp. 540-542) teU us that she was of great authority, that she
knew more than one court, that she had her own retinue, that she was
daily instrueted in religious and philosophie al argument, that she
might be exposed to some of the "nouveaux docteurs," that she was
Catholie, that she probably knew Latin (p. 453), and that she was
beautiful. Montaigne's tone when he advises her to follow moderation
and to avoid innovation in her opinions and her eonduct suggests that
he is speaking to someone younger than he (in 1578 Marguerite de
Valois was twenty-six; Montaigne, forty-five). All these things are true
of Marguerite de Valois. The only other princess who has been sug-
gested is Catherine de Bourbon, Henri de Navarre's younger sister. 2
But she was a Protestant, and the idea of writing a defense of Sebond
for anyone but a Catholic is untenable.
Coppin first pointed out that Marguerite's religious fervor was
enhaneed by a book she read in 1576 while imprisoned by Henry III.
The deseription in her Mimoires suggests that the book in question may
be the Thiologie naturelle. 3 Even if the identifieation is not absolutely
sure, it is eertain that Marguerite's religious reading began only in
1576; and that if it was she who requested that Montaigne write an
ap'Jlogy, it must have been after that date, and not during his trip to
the eourt at Paris in 1574-75.
vVe do not know of any period when the essayist was at eourt in
1577 or 1578. Furthermore, there is every reason to suspect that he
and the princess met sometime during her visit to Gascony, but just
when cannot be determined, for mo re than one possibility is open. It
eould eonceivably have been in September or October 1578 while she
was in Bordeaux and surrounding areas. At this time the essayist had

1 Revue du Seizieme Sieele, X (1923), 57-66.

2 By Graee Norton in Studies in Alontaigne, (Xew York: Maemilian, 1904), Appendix B,
and Gustave Lanson, Les Essais de ,Hontaigne, (Paris: Mellottee, 1930), p. 145-146 n. The
reason given is that she is younger than her sister-in-Iaw. She was twenty in 1578.
3 See Coppin, "l'vfarguerite de Valois ... ," pp. 59-62. She speaks of "ce beau livre
universel de la nature." Dreano, in his Pensie ,eligieuse, considers this designation a elear
indication of Sebond's work. Noting that there was some confusion about the book's name,
he coneludes, "En pareille incertitude, on ne peut guere demander ii. "'larguerite de nommer
le livre de Sebond pius clairement qu'elle ne l'a fait" (p. 260). I cannot imagine Marguerite
at a loss what to call the book she had read.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

probably just retumed from a stay at the spa Eaux-chaudes (Aigues-

caudes). He could have seen the princess a year later when he made a
second trip for his health's sake, this time to Bagneres-de-Bigorre, not
too far from Nerac, where wlarguerite's court was at its most brilliant.l
The date of the genesis of the "Apologie" would seem to be no earlier
than 1578, and may weIl be even as late as the fall of 1579.
Montaigne could not honestly defend Sebond's reasoning, but he
could use his "Apologie" as the pretext for an impassioned co unter-
attack against the presumption of dogmatists. 2 His major concem
would be the contrast between human knowledge and divinely in-
spired faith. The subject tumed out to be a big one with many rami-
fications.

The Text of the Counterattack: Man and the Animals Compared

The critique of knowledge is long, discursive, and only vaguely
organized. Many outlines of the" Apologie" exist; they all agree in the
main, but tend to diverge as th ey beeome more detailed. 3 Any attempt
to give a systematie plan of the essay is bound to run into trouble, first
beeause Montaigne is notoriously digressive in everything he writes,
seeondly beeause the work is quite eertainly a eomposite of several
essays.
Montaigne himself gives the most authoritative indieations of the
plan of his eounterattaek, though they are few and sometimes mis-
leadingo Having named the second objeetion to Sebond, he announees
a rebuttal in four steps:
Le moyen que je prens pour rabatre eette frenaisie et qui me semble le
pIus propre, e'est de froisser et fouler aux pieds l'orgueil et humaine fierte;
leur faire sentir l'inanite, la vanite et deneantise de l'homme; leur arraeher
des points les ehetives armes de leur raison; leur faire baisser la teste et
mordre la terre soubs l'authorite et reveranee de la majeste divine (p. 426a).

1 Jean-H. Mariejol states categorically that the two met in the autumn of 1578, though
without proof; see his "Marguerite de Valois, reine de Navarre, en Gascogne," Revue de Paris,
XXIX (1922),526. He also believes that the advice to the princess to be moderate in her
opinions and conduct refers to the life at the court in 1579 (p. 779), and explains it as a brief
addition made just before publication of the Essais in 1580. For the dates of the trips to the
spas see Villey's note on the composition of II: xxxvii in volume IV of the Municipal Edition.
2 He had a solid precedent for his procedure in Henri Estienne's Apologie pour Hirodote,
which, though supposedly defending the Greek historian, mentions him only eight times
in two volumes, and even convicts him of the charge he is being defended against. See
Frame's "Did Montaigne Betray Sebond?" pp. 321-323.
3 Paul Porteau's outline in his critical edition of the "Apologie" (Paris: Aubier, 1937)
is the most ambitious, and in my opinion the least successful. Other outlines can be found in
Frame's "Did Montaigne Betray Sebond?" p. 324, Villey's Sourees et evolution, 2nd ed., II,
174 and Zeitlin's Essays, II, 495.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 77

Re follows this program roughly. Re first compares man to the ani-

maIs (pp. 427-465) with the intention of destroying the human
presumption that considers itself superior to the animal kingdom
("froisser et fouler aux pieds l'orgueil et humaine fierte"). Next comes
a lengthy portion on the failures of man' s knowledge to improve him
morally or to arrive at any undisputed conc1usions (pp. 465-539).
This corresponds only somewhat to "leur faire sentir l'inanite, la
vanite et deneantise de l'homme"; for this section is concerned prima-
rily with the failures of philosophy, and not with the "deneantise de
l'homme." Before continuing his argument, 1fontaigne halts to warn
the princess that his final tactic (pp. 542-586), the demonstration that
man cannot attain any certain truth ("leur arracher des points les
chetives armes de leur raison"), is a dangerous one, to be used only
as alast resort. Finally (pp. 586-589), he affirms that God alone
belongs to the world of being, and that man, in the imperfect world of
becoming, cannot rise up to Rim without extraordinary assistance
("Ieur faire baisser la teste et mordre la terre soubs l'authorite et
reveranee de la majeste divine").
The forty-three page section that opens the counterattack begins
with the qualification that the apologist will concern himself with
human reason unaided by any supernatural foree, as the opponents of
Sebond would wish: "Considerons donq pour cette heure l'homme
seul, sans secours estranger, arme seulement de ses armes, et des-
pourveu de la grace et cognoissance divine, qui est tout son honneur,
sa force et le fondement de son estre" (p. 427a). The onus of the argu-
ment will be to show that in nature man has no honor or dignity above
the other creatures. Inevitably Montaigne will contradict mu ch of
Sebond while maintaining this position, and it is in this section mo re
than any other that he forgets the Spanish doctor, perhaps attacks him.
Before the main body of the argument there is a two-page preamble
which opposes man to the creatures above him, the stars. Montaigne
asks the same questions here that he will ask in much more detail
concerning the creatures inferior to man.
Pp. 427-429: Who has persuaded him that the heavens were
created for his service? How can hc say that they do not have
intelligence? If our reason teaches us in astrology that all human
acts, emotions, and desires come irrevocably under the influence
and control of the stars, how can it then presume to know their
nature?
This passage and another Eke it further on in the "Apologie"
(pp. 559-560b) seem Eke confessions that Montaigne accepts the
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

theory of astrological determination, a "scientific" assumption common

in his day. Careful reading of these sentences, however, shows that
Montaigne may simply be accepting astrological determinism as a
hypothesis, not a conclusion, in order to turn reason against itself.
The marathon rhetorical question (pp. 428-429a) is express ed in the
form "if astrology is true, as our reas on judges, then how can we claim
empire over the universe?" Montaigne inserts the comments "selon
que nostre raison no us l'apprend et le trouve" and "comme juge nostre
raison," not necessarily to denote his own assent, but rather to under-
line reason's own self-destruction. If Montaigne believed in some kind
of celestial determination, it was only in a general way. His Pyr-
rhonism and his faith in God's omnipotence both militate against
any such theory.
The keynote of the comparison of man with the animaIs is set in its
opening sentence: "La presomption est nostre maladie naturelle et
originelle. La pIus calamiteuse et fraile de toutes les creatures, c'est
l'homme, et quant et quant la pIus orgueilleuse" (p. 429a).l The
purpose of aligning man against the animaIs is not so much to prove
the nullity of human reason as to condemn human presumption, but
the two ideas tend to be joined inasmuch as man' s claim to superi-
ority usually rests on his rationality. The following resume will make
clear just how much of the essayist's treatment departs from purely
skeptical questions. If the "Apologie" were only a Pyrrhonist tract,
and not also a fideist defense of religious humility, much of this section
woulc! be even more inappropriate than it is.
Pp. 430-433: If we cannot communicate with the animaIs,
neither can they communicate with us. Since th ey seem to under-
stand each other weIl, the fault may be in our understanding, not
theirs. Besides, we can see in them every talent man haso Their
artifacts, such as the swallow's nest or the spider's web, excel ours
and result, like ours, from their intelleet.
Pp. 433-437: But nature has not shortchanged man. In general,
"nous ne sommes ny au dessus, ny au dessoubs du reste: tout ee qui
est sous le Ciel, dit le sage, court une loy et fortune pareille. Il y a
quelque difference, il y a des ordres et des degrez; mais c'est soubs
le visage d'une mesme nature" (p. 436a).2
Man must be forced to stay within the boundaries set him by

1 The second sentence may weil be modeled on a saying of Pliny's that appeared on the
rafters ofMontaigne's library and is cited as the final words ofII: xiv, p. 595a. See Appendix
I, nwnber 4I.
2 The Biblical reference is to Ecclesiastes ix. 3, a verse that Montaigne had copied in a
corrupt fonn on the ceiling of his library. It is also used in I: xx.xvi, 22 la. See Appendix I,
number 4.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 79

nature, which gives him no essential preeminence over the other

creatures. If he thinks that his intellectual capacities exalt him,
"c'est un advantage qui luy est bien cher vendu et du quel il a bien
peu a se glorifier, car de la naist la source principale des maux qui
le pressent: peche, maladie, irresoluiton, trouble, desespoir"
(p·437 a ).
Pp. 437-464: Since animaIs produce the same results as men, we
should conclude they have the same faculties, and not attribute
their talents to instinct; for such an argument would admit that they
were more under God's or nature's care than we are. The fox
who listens for running water underneath the ice reasons before
he exposes himself to the danger of falling through. Like man,
animaIs hunt, use simples for medicine, learn by instruction, eve n
teach themselves. And elephants appear to have religion. Then
follows a string of stories, many quite fantastic, to show that animaIs
are as smart as humans, the conclusion being that, as :Montaigne
ordinarily clairns, there is more difference between one human and
another than between a man and an animal.l
A further series of anecdotes proyes that the animaIs are actually
superior to man, physically, intellectually, and morally. A certain
fish has the power to stop the forward motion of a ship. Animal
conduct evinces more justice, loyalty, marital fidelity, gratitude,
teamwork, arithmetical skill, great-heartedness, and clemency than
does man's. Continuing his "cock and bull stories" (the phrase is
Frame's), :NIontaigne concludes with the miraculous haleyon, for
whom the sea itself is becalmed while it makes its elaborate nest, a
structure far exceeding any human artifice in complexity and skill.
Pp. 464-465: In conclusion, we attribute to animaIs the most
paIpable quaIities: peaee, repose, security, innocence, and health,
and reserve for ourselyes either imaginary qualities or ones that we
do not have, such as reason, knowledge, and honor. The Stoics
give their hand away when they teIl the story of Ulysses and Ciree.
They say that UIysses should permit himself to be transformed into
the most foolish of men rather than into an animal, that he should
sacrifice all his wisdom in order to keep his human constitution.
Montaigne accepts this frank confession on the part of the Stoics
as an admission that all the philosophy they pride themselves on
is achimerieal superiority; for wis e and virtuous beasts would still
be beasts, "ny ne seroyent pourtant comparables a un homme
miserable, meschant et insense. C'est don e toute nostre perfection
que d'etre hommes" (p. 46Sa).
Of all the sections in the "Apologie de Raymond Sebond" this one
applies the least directly to the case for skepticism. Only three or four
paragraphs condemn reason explicidy by listing the ills that result
from the rational faculty.2 This is not a very impressive showing for
1 The same id ea opens "De l'inequalite qui est entre nous," I: xlii.
2 Pp. 437 (quoted in our summary), 464, and 465 (in the paragraph linking this section
80 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

thirty-eight pages. Their connection with Pyrrhonism, of course, is the

moral one that intellectual dogmatism is a detestable form of human
presumption. We have already seen that this association was a natural
one for Montaigne's mind.!
In order to deflate such presumption, Montaigne reminds his
opponents that man is lodged in the lowest and basest portion of the
universe, its center. Far from being a position of privilege, the center
of the universe was regarded by the cosmology of the sixteenth century
as its refuse heap; and Hell was securely located in the depths of
the earth, the point farthest distant from the empyrean. 2 Man's
place is among the lowest creatures, those that walk, and even among
these he has no legitimate claim to superiority. Montaigne's language
leayes no doubt that presumption is the target he is aiming at: "ee
n'est par vray discours, mais par une fierte vaine et opiniatrete que
nous no us preferons aux autres animaux et nous sequestrons de leur
condition et societe" (p. 465a).
Most ofhis case against man's arrogance relies on overstatement and
unbelievable fish stories accepted without critical judgment. Mon-
taigne found these stories in two dialogues of Plutarch's MaTalia, which
he borrowed from unabashedly, often without even altering the words
of Amyot's translation. Well over a half of ""Vhether Land or Sea
Animals are Cleverer" (a more correet title would be "Both Land and
Sea Animals are Clever") appears in these pages of the "Apologie."
It provided Montaigne with most ofhis tall tales about the human and
supcrhuman qualities of animals. The second opuscule, sometimes
referred to as the Gryllus, is "Beasts are Rational" (an accurate title
would be "The Life of an Animal is Preferable to the Life of a Man").
It contains a debate in which the pig Gryllus convinees Ulysses that
the animal condition has advantages over the human condition,3
and furnished Montaigne with two major arguments, that animals'

to the succeeding one). In my opinion the cause of this paucity of Pyrrhonist argument is
that these pages originally formed an independent essay written without the "Apologie"
in mind. When Montaigne incorporated it into II: xii, he did not succeed completely in
harmonizing it with his purposes. He made some adjustments, the most important ofwhich
seems to have been the inclusion of the material on pages 433-437. :-.ro less an authority
than Villey has suggested that these pages may be an interpolation made in 1578--80
(Municipal Edition, IV, 279).
1 Supra, p. 43.
2 See Arthur O. Lovejoy's Great Chain of Being (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1936), pp. 101-102. Reprinted with the same pagination by Harper Torchbooks, New York,
1960.
3 The Ulysses-Circe story that terminates the section on animals does not come from this
essay, but from another of Plutarch's, "Common Conceptions against the Stoics."
 THE APOLOGIE TO RAIlvIOND SEBaND 81

desires are more natural than men's and that instinct is more excellent
than reason. The first work raises animaIs to man's level; the other
puts them above man. Neither reaUy disparages reason. The one
admires it and attributes it to animals; the second admires instinct
more than reason without specifically condemning the latter. The
attitudes of the two dialogues are not entirely in agreement, and
neither is necessarily of service for a skeptic.1 What use is it to show
that man shares his reason with the animaIs? This frequently repeated
idea presupposes that reason is beneficial.
In fact, Montaigne has some difficulty adapting his material to his
purposes. Throughout this section as a whole, he seems to alternate
between the exaggerated argument that animaIs are actuaUy superior
to men and the more moderate position that both are the children of
nature, essentiaUy similar, though different in degree. The compilers
of his day repeated endlessly two themes: first, that man was intel-
leetuaUy superior to the animals, and secondly, that he was physically
inferior to the beasts. 2 The Plutarch passages deny the first assertion.
Pages 433-437 deny the second and wish to exculpate nature from
accusations of having created man weak and helpless. Here we see a
maturer assessment of the relative merits of men and animaIs. Both
are the products of nature, and as such worthy of respeet according to
their capacities. In "De la cruaute," (II: xi), where the essayist has no
axe to grind, he gives a yet more balaneed statement of his beliefs:
Mais, quand je reneontre, parmy les opinions les pIus moderees, les dis-
eou,'s qui essayent a montrer la prochaine ressemblanee de nous aux
animaux, et eombien ils ont de part a nos pIus grands privileges, et avee
eombien de vraysemblanee on no us les apparie, eertes, j'en rabats beaueoup
de nostre presomption, et me demets volontiers de eette royaute va ine et
imaginaire qu'on nous donne sur les autres ereatures. Quand to ut eela en
seroit adire, si y a-il un eertain respeet qui nous attaehe, et un general de-
voir d'humanite, non aux bestes seulement qui ont vie et sentiment, mais
aux arbres mesmes et aux plantes, Nous devons la justice aux hommes, et
la graee et la benignite aux autres ereatures qui en peuvent estre eapable.

1 Professor Frame has pointed out to me that the "Sommaire" introducing "Que les
best es brutes usent de la raison" in Amyot's translation contains some interesting Christian
interpretations of Plutarch's essay. Amyot remarks that the Greek moralist had gone astray
in his argument because he failed to realize that the privilege man has over the beasts is his
knowledge ofGod, not simply his reason, " ... si la raison, qui est la guide de I'ame, n'a autre
adresse que de soi-mesme, certainement on peut dire que l'homme est la pIus miserable
creature du monde," (EuuTes mOTa/es (Paris: Estiennet Vallet, 1597), I, 582. This corresponds
quite elosely to Montaigne's fideism. The essayist, however, does not say, as does Amyot,
that man surpasses the animals because he has a religious nature (he implies the opposite
when he speaks semi-seriously of the elephants' religion, p. 416a).
2 See Villey, vol. IV of the Municipal Edition, 219, note to p. 163, I. 26.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

Il y a quelque eommeree entre elles et nous, et quelque obligation mu-

tueHe (p. 414a).
The comparison of man and the animal kingdom is a somewhat
inconsistent episode of the counterattack, exaggerated to the point of
being facetious, and pertinent only because it applies tangentially to
the theme of human presumption. The most presumptuous of the
dogmatists, and the ones most fiercely ridiculed in the "Apologie,"
are the Stoics. The greater part of these pages seem unaware that the
accusation of arrogance applies to Stoic philosophers and weakens
their position. Only the final illustrations involve them explicitly in the
discussion and testify that at so me point Montaigne beeame eonscious
of the implications of his comparison of man and the animals. His
desire to put man back in nature entailed a condemnation of much of
the aristocratic philosophy he had adhered to in the first years.
"ees cupiditez estrangeres, que l'ignorance du bien et une fauce
opinion ont coulees en nous, sont en si grand nombre qu'elles chassent
presque toutes les naturelles; ... les animaux so nt beaucoup pIus
reglez que nous ne sommes, et se contiennent avec pIus de moderation
soubs les limites que nature no us a prescripts" (p. 450a). Like the
beggars and the "vulgaire" whom Montaigne could not help noticing
in the early essays, the animals too point to the possibility that if the
high road to virtue is too steep, the low road may do.

The Failures of Philosophy

Tne second episode in the counterattack (pp. 465-540) is the longest
and most perplexing in many ways. Its subject, generally speaking, is
the ineptitude of dogmatic philosophy or the hollowness of human
knowledge. The episode begins with several introductory pages
(pp. 465-480) that Zeitlin entitles "Simplicity and Ignorance exalted
above Intelleet and Learning." This is not an illogical continuation
of the conclusion of the comparison of animaIs and men. These pages
contain the strongest expressions of criticism directed against stoical
humanism and its ideal the sage to be found in the essays of the first
two books.
The transitional paragraph nicely resumes one of the attitudes of
the previous episode and introduces the question whether the mental
faculties are anything but useless in the conduct of life.
Mais, pour revenir a mon propos, nous avo ns pour nostre part I'ineon-
stanee, l'irresolution, l'ineertitude, le deuil, la superstition, la sotieitude des
choses a venir, voire, apres nostre vie, l'ambition, l'avariee, la jalousie,
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

l'envie, les appetits desreglez, forcenez et indomptables, la guerre, la

mensonge, la desloyaute, la detraction et la curiosite. eertes, nous avons
estrangement surpaie ce beau discours dequoy nous no us glorifions, et cette
capacite dejuger et connoistre, si no us l'avons achetee au pris de ce nombre
infiny de passions auxquelles no us sommes incessamment en prise (pp.
465-466a ).
This list of sixteen sources of misery resultant from the possession of
"discours," reminiscent of the earlier one, "peche, maladie, irreso-
lution, trouble, desespoir" (p. 437a), indudes several passions and
sins as well as qualities directly dependent on reason. "Discours"
here is all mental activity, not simply the intelleet. In the section to
follow, the object of attack is definitely restricted to the intelleet and
the philosophers.
Pp. 466-468: The most learned men of Greece and Rome, Aris-
to tle and Varro, did not suffer the less from physical ailments such
as the gout, or from fear of death, or from jealousy of their wives.
And Aristotle has been accused of serious moral deficiencies. An
accurate count would probably show that there are more excellent
men to be found among the ignorant than among the learned.
Pp. 468-476: All philosophers of all sects agree that the greatest
good is tranquillity of mind and body.l It would seem that in
compensation for our puny state of being nature has given us int el-
lectual presumption. Our imagination is our only excellenee, and
it is an imaginary one. Let Cicero dedaim about the infinite
bcnefits gain ed from the study ofietters; the merest village housewife
leads a more gentle and constant life than his. His presumption, and
Seneca's too, would make him the equal of God. As long as man
thinks he has some power of his own he will never recognize his
debt to his master. Look at the results of philosophy. Posidonius
is foolish to pretend he is any less smitten with pain because he has
control of his speech. Pyrrho's pig or a muIeteer furnish philosophy
with the best example of fortitude against death, pain, and other
discomforts.
Perhaps insensitivity to ills entails an equal insensitivity to the
pleasures of life, but life is so miserable that most of it is pain, and
our greatest well-being is simply the absence of ills. "J e dy donq que,
si la simplesse nous achemine a point n'avoir de maI, eile nous
achemine a un tres-heureux estat selon nostre condition" (p.473a).
Philosophy's advice to remember the happier moments of the past
and to try to block misfortunes out of our memory amounts to
advising us to have recourse to ignorance. Most philosophers would
1 This is perhaps the last sentenee one would expeet to find in the "Apologie." All
philosophers of all see ts in agreement! Much of the later portions of II: xii is devoted to the
disagreement among philosophers. On p. S6Ia, Montaigne will eite the diversity of opinion
on the same matter, the sovereign good, as evidenee ofreason's weakness. I eannot eoneeive
of the essayist's writing this sentenee after he had read Sextus Empirieus.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAUJOND SEBOJVD

gladly accept a state of tranquillity and pleasure founded on igno-

rance ifit could be maintained in constancy and order. Philosophy's
final remedy, to recommend suicide, is no more than pleading the
case for complete insensitivity.
Pp. 477-480: Ignorance makes men better as well as happier.
Saint Paul says the ignorant will storm heaven. The Romans of the
republic may have had garlic on their breath, but they had nothing
on their consciences. "L'incivilite, l'ignorance, la simplesse, la
rudesse, s'accompaignent volontiers de l'innocence; la curiosite, la
subtilite, le s<;:avoir trainent la malice a leur suite; l'humilite, la
erainte, l'obeissance, la debonnairete (qui sont les pieces principales
pour la conservation de la societe humaine) demandent une arne
vuide, docile et ne presumant rien de soy" (p. 4 na).l Christians
in particular recognize that curiosity is an ill innate in man, for
it was the source of the original fall of the human race. The Bible
declares that man is only ashes and dust; the divine being is so far
above him that man cannot know Rim at all by his reason. The
more unbelievable a thing is, the more aChristian finds reason to
believe it. When we speak of God's wisdom, justice, or power, we
are speaking of things we cannot really comprehend. The weakness
ofhumanjudgment, not its acuity, helps us to achieve acquaintance
with God's truth.
The content of this passage falls into three parts, a preamble, the
praise of ignorance because it is more effective than philosophy as a
source of tranquillity, and the praise of ignorance as aChristian virtue.
The central portion of this episode (pp. 468-476) is important for our
understanding of the development of Montaigne's thought, as it
reverses quite radically the positions he had clung to in the first
years. 2 Its main theme, the praise of ignorance, a paradoxical position
already taken in the sixteenth century by Erasmus and Agrippa, can
easily be exaggerated. Montaigne may weil not be one hundred percent
1 Relying largely on this sentenee for support, Zeitlin writes, "It ought to be easy to see
through this language to the real purpose of Montaigne .... he has very deep ly at heart 'the
preservation ofsoeiety' and he fears the danger to diseipline that must result from applying
rational tests to the traditional dogmas. In such a situation there is nothing for it but to eut
sharply asunder the provinees of reason and religious faith and, in the interest of the social
good, to subordinate the former to the latter. Montaigne in that sense eould not help being a
'fideist,'" Essays II, 49B. Zeitlin, who is eontinually on the hunt for arriere-pensees to Mon-
taigne's thought, everywhere finds eonservatism in the essayist's ideas (in this he is eorreet).
But he goes on to suggest that this eonservatism stunted the development of many sides of
Montaigne's thinking and prevented him from showing hirnself as he really was - a rat ion-
alist deist (in this he is wrong). There are many places in the Essais where the desire to
preserve social unity takes preeedence over other coneerns (e.g., II: xii, 492-493a, e), but this
is not one of them. The context here is predominantly religious; social eonsiderations are
incidental.
2 I consider these pages the core of an essay eomposed prior to l'.Iarguerite de Valois's
request for a defense of Seband. The seetions preeeding and following this material (pp. 465-
468, 477-480) are strongly fideist. Treatment of fideism is reserved for later in this chapter,
pp. 110- 11 5.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 85

ingenuous in these pages. As elsewhere in the "Apologie" (e.g., the

animals), he is overstating his case. Ifhe is rejecting all mental activity
in prcference for stultifying insensitivity, and he seems to bc, we must
be careful to remember that he is on the attack. It is more enlightening
to concentrate on the ideas he is denouncing than on those he is
praising. Here he is marshalling his forees against the humanist
philosopher. The evidence against him is not new; for before now
Montaigne had frequently commented on the courage of the "vul-
gaire," but always to reject it as unworthy of a man of understanding.
The strategy of diverting one's thoughts from adversity, hitherto
acceptable, though not completely reliable as a defense against the
ills of life, now is cited as proof positive that philosophy can only
recommend ignorance as the best practice. Reason had previously
advised constant reflection on death and pain; knowledge now seems
to Montaigne to be the source of much needless discomfort. "Lors que
les vrais maux nous faillent, la science nous preste les siens" (p. 470a).
In summary, the life of the ignorant has everything that philosophy
aspires to except "l'ordre et la constance" (p. 475a). Xow constancy is a
major virtue of the classics, and one that Montaigne had already shown
his distrust of because it is simply beyond the capacities of human
nature.! It is to be replaced as the goal of ethics in the maturer essays
by the more humble and more attainable quality of order with which
it is joined in this sentence. In these pages we see how completely
Montaigne has abandoned many of his early allegiances; philosophy
is made to give way to ignorance; the tension of a soul straining to
withstand adversity yields to insouciance; and the aristocratic ideal
of the sage must recognize the rights of the muIeteer. 'Vhat remains is
the need for order.
One page of this section is of special interest, for in it Montaigne
takes the grimmest attitude towards life that is to be found anywhere
in the Essais. Simplicity, he says, brings us to a very happy state,
according to our condition, if it makes us totally insensitive; for the human
condition consists only of an assortment of iUs, so me less painful
than others. The apprehension Montaigne feIt in the first essays
becomes stronger when he realizes that the remedy he had once
trusted, philosophy, is an illusion .
. . . mais la misere de nostre eondition porte que nous n'avons pas tant
a desirer qu'a craindre, et que l'extreme volupte ne nous touehe pas eomme
une legiere douleur. ... Nostre bien estre, ee n'est que la privation d'estre
1 See supra, pp. 56-57.
86 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

mal. Voila pourquoy la seete de philosophie qui a le pIus faict valoir la

volupte, eneore l'a eHe rengee a la seule indolenee. Le n'avoir point de maI,
e'est le pIus heureux bien estre que l'homme puisse esperer (p.472a).
When he eame to reread this passage after 1588, Montaigne broke
a rule that he kept faithfully on the whole, and made an insertion
intended to correet his original idea rather than reinforee it.
Crantor avoit bien raison de eombattre l'indolenee d'Epieurus, si on la
bastissoit si profonde que l'abort mesme et la naissanee des maux en fut a
dire. Je ne loue point eette indolenee qui n'est ny possible ny desirable. Je
suis content de n'estre pas malade; mais si je le suis, je veux s<;avoir que je
le suis; et si on me cauterise ou incise, je le veux sentir. De vray, qui des-
racinerait la eognoissanee du maI, il extirperoit quand et quand la eognois-
sanee de la volupte, et en fin aneantiroit l'homme.... Le maI est a l'homme
un bien a son tour. Ny la douleur ne luy est toujours a fuir, ny la volupte
tousjours a suivre (p. 473c).
This is his final statement on pain, which had seemed to him the
prineipal human adversity in "Que le goust des biens et des maux
depend en bonne partie de l'opinion que nous en avons" (I: xiv). It
is the price of pleasure; without it we would have insensitivity, which
is not to be aliveo It is mo re than merely a necessary evil; it is one of the
eonditions of sentienee, and as such, good. But for a moment, after he
had lost his faith in philosophy, and before he had learned to live with
the extreme pain of his kidney stones, he eould see nothing in life but
the necessity of avoiding pain at any price, no matter how extreme.
The praise of simplicity and ignorance may have pleased him as a
remedy to the dogmatists' presumption, but as a reeipe for life it
meant the abandonment ofhis last best hopes. It produeed the bitterest,
most negative pages he ever wrote.
To introduce the next episode in his development, Montaigne uses
one of the few sentenees that give some so rt of oudine of the trend of
his argument. "Si me faut-il voir en fin s'il est en la puissance de
l'homme de trouver ee qu'il cherehe, et si cette queste qu'il y a em-
ploye depuis tant de siedes, l'a enrichy de quelque nouvelle foree et
de quelque veri te solide" (p. 480a). There are two questions: ean man
know anything eertain? and has he found any truth? The apologist
takes up these questions in reverse order.!

1 It might be claimed Il la rigueur that the defense of Pyrrhonism immediately following

does aetually show that man ean attain no knowledge. This would mean that Montaigne
lives up to his outline sentenee, but it falsifies the funetion of the final seetion of the" Apologie,"
the argument from the weakness of the senses. Taking the whole essay in the form we know,
it is easier to say that Montaigne follows his program in reverse order.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

Pp. 480-482: Speak~ng honesdy, man must confess that the

outeome of his long search is simply that he has learned his igno-
ranee. The wisest man that ever was feIt his only wisdom lay in
reeognizing that he knew nothing. Montaigne's taetie will be to use
the great philosophers to prove his ease; for it would be too easy if
he had only to eonvict the ignorant erowd, whieh neither feds nor
judges, of having no knowledge.
Pp. 482-493: Philosophers fall into three groups: those who
think they have found the truth, those who deelare that the truth
eannot be found (the largest and most noble seet), and those who
suspend their judgment. Pyrrho and the skepties, who say they are
stilllooking for the truth, refuse to affirm that it ean or eannot be
found. This suspension of judgment gives them ataraxy, a peaeeful
state of being, exempt from agitation and our would-be knowledge,
"d'ou naissent la erainte, l'avariee, l'envie, les desirs immoderez,
l'ambition, l'orgueil, la superstition, l'amour de nouvellete, la
rebellion, la desobeissanee, l'opiniatrete et la pluspart des maux
eorporels" (p. 483a). Pyrrhonists argue without passion, taking
any side; for their purpose is to east doubt in the minds of others.
Whether they win or lose is immaterial, for in each case someone's
reasoning has proven weak. If you argue that snow is white, th ey
will contend it is black. If you argue that it is neither, they will
eontend it is both. They use reason to investigate and to debate,
not to decide. Montaigne describes their doctrine as best he ean,
for it is obseure, and even its authors are not always elear.
In praetical matters, Pyrrhonists lend themselves to their natural
inelinations, the impulses of their passions, and the laws and tra-
ditions of their eountry and trade. The stories about Pyrrho's
stupid and unthinking conduet simply make no sense. Re intended
(Q lead a full, human life, using and enjoying all his faculties. But

he renouneed as illusions the privileges of judging, knowing,

commanding, or establishing the truth. 1 No doctrine eould be
humbler, or more ready to reeeive from above divine command-
ments.
Two of the three types of philosophers admit that they doubt or
do not know; and if one examines the dogmatists elosely, one is
forced to admit that their assuranee was merely a posture. Aristode,
for example, is very eareful to mention the opinions of others, and
sometimes keeps his own so well hidden that no one ean teU what
it is. "(a) C'est par effeet un Pyrrhonisme soubs une forme (e)
resolutive" (p. 487). Philosophers undertake the hunt knowing
there will be no eateh; but th ey enjoy it, like Democritus, who
wanted to figure out why his figs had a particular honey taste.
When his serving girl told him she had put them in a honey jar,
he was angry that she cut offhis investigation while he was enjoying

1 This list originally read "de juger, de connoistre, de sc;avoir, d'ordonner, d'establir."
After I S88 the essayist replaced the first three infinitives with "de regenter."
88 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

it. Montaigne just cannot persuade himself that Epicurus, Plato,

and Pythagoras to ok their atoms, ideas, and numbers seriously.
"Aucunes choses, ils les ont escrites pour le besoin de la societe
publique, comme leurs religions; car il n'est pas deffendu de faire
nostre profit de la mensonge mesme s'il est besoing: et a este
raisonnable, pour cette consideration que plusieurs opinions qui
estoyent sans apparence ils n'ayent voulu les espelucher au vif aux
fins de n'engendrer du trouble en l'obei'ssance des loix et coustumes
de leur pays" (p. 492a).
The year Montaigne composed these pages, which give his best
description and defense of Pyrrhonism, is fixed with considerable
certainly by the evidence of two medallions he had east in 1576.1
On one side of each were his coat of arms encircled by the collar of
the order of Saint Michel and the words "Michel Seigneur de Mon-
taigne." On the obverse was a picture of scales in balance enclosed by
busy Bourishes. Around the rim of one was written 1576 'EITEXn 43.
The second medallion (which is now lost, but is testified to by Payen
and the catalogue of the museum of Perigueux) is exactly the same as
the first except that the figure is 42 instead of 43. Since the numeral
refers to Montaigne's age at the time the medallions were struck, one
of them was molded before February 28, 1576, the other later in the
same year. 'E7t€Xw is the "mot sacramental" of the Pyrrhonists.
Whether the medallions were struck for use in caleulation, as gaming
pieces, or for commemorative purposes, we cannot say. But th ey
provide us with the very valu abI e fact that early in 1576 Montaigne
had already allied himself in a most significant way with Pyrrhonism.
Re had adopted the motto E7t€XW that he had learned from reading
Estienne's translation of the Hypotyposes in 1575 or in the first month
of 1576.
It was surely at this time that Montaigne inscribed on the rafters
of his ceiling a whole series of Pyrrhonist maxims including ten 01'
eleven taken from Sextus Empiricus. 2 Fifty-seven quotations in all
have been deciphered, four of which were covered over by a later
inscription. 3 Twenty-six ofthem appear in the Essais or are commented
on (two ofthem twice), all in passages composed before 1580. Sixteen

1 Alain Brieux's artic1es in Bibliotheque d'Humanisme et de Renaissance, "Petit Tresor de

souvenirs de Montaigne" (XIX, 1957, 265-293) and "Autres Souvenirs de Montaigne"
(XX, 1958,370-376) give the latest information on the medallions.
2 The sentenees are reprodueed in Appendix I. Four of the Pyrrhonist expressions inseribed
on the rafters appear in these pages of the "Apologie."
3 Since one of these provides the theme of I: xiv, the first layer may wel1 be from the
period of 1572. The majority of the sentences, however, belong to the time of the essayist's
greatest skeptical intensity.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 89

of these twenty-six are quoted in the "Apologie." Significantly enough,

three quarters of them come from either Sextus Empiricus or the
Bible, a typically fideist combination. Now even though the inscriptions
were in front of Montaigne's eyes when he wrote Book III of the
Essais, he never used them there or in the marginaI notes on the Bor-
deaux copy. The sentences, the medallions, and the Pyrrhonist
portions of the "Apologie" belong, then, to the same moment in the
development of Montaigne's thought.l Villey refers to this moment
as the skeptical "crisis."
Montaigne's description of Pyrrhonism both as a philosophie al
position and as a doctrine for living shows profound appreciation and
insight; his picture of Pyrrho as a man corresponds rather elosely to the
ideals ofhis last essay "De l'experience" and shows his desire to under-
stand skepticism as a moralist, not simply as a theorist. "Il n'a pas
voulu se faire pierre ou souche; il avoulu se faire homme vivant,
discourant et raisonnant, jouissant de tous plaisirs et commoditez
naturelles, embesoignant et se servant de toutes ses pieces corporelles
et spirituelles en regle et droiture" (p. 485a).2 Pyrrhonism, Montaigne
sees, far from preeluding the use of reason, delights in debate, but
always without parti pris. Though eager to argue, it is not contentious.
A 1588 addition based on Cicero's Academics states "Ils se sont reservez
un merveilleux advantage au combat, s'estant deschargez du soing de
se couvrir. Il ne leur importe qu'on les frape, pourveu qu'ils frappent;
et font leurs besongnes de tout. S'ils vainquent, vostre proposition
eloehe; si vous, la leur" (p. 484b). Pyrrhonism creates a tranquil state
of mind free from many harmful passions and anxious cares. "Vaut il
pas mieux demeurer en suspens que de s'infrasquer en tant d'erreurs
que l'humaine fantasie a produictes? Vaut il pas mieux suspendre sa

1 The opening sentence of "Que nostre desir s'accroit par la malaisanee" (II: xv), a
maxim inscribed on the ceiling (number 38 in Appendix I), is the only place outside the
"Apologie" where ~fontaigne uses material that could come only from Sextus. The cvidence
is fairly conclusive that the Hypotyposes was read at onlyone period in the essayist's life.
2 As I have already mentioned (supra, p. 6,) II: xxix gives a very different interpretation
of Pyrrho, repeating several incidents, both flattering and derogatory, found in Diogenes
Laertius. That Pyrrho could so faithfully practice the suspension of hi, judgment Montaigne
finds "quasi incroyable," but nonetheless true. Be respeets Pyrrho, but eannot hclp
showing that his philosophy led to some ridiculous and some valorous deeds. Villey
tentatively dates this essay in the vicinity of 1578, primarily because ofits position in Book
II. It could have been written conceivably before ~[ontaigne read Sextus Empiricus. It
would be somewhat surprising if Nlontaigne wrote this second appreciation of Pyrrho
after writing the one in the "Apologie." Such for the moment seems to be the case, but it
has not been proven. At one period he feIt that, correctly understood, Pyrrho represented
the wisest practical philosophy. Even if later he came to see Pyrrho himselfin a different
light, he continucd to advocate the same qualities he had once seen in him.
90 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

persuasion que de se mesler a ces divisions seditieuses et quereleuses? "

(p. 484b.) Finally this doctrine is submissive and distrustful of inno-
vation, hence eminentIy harmonious with Montaigne's social and
religious conservatism.l
The apologist's second thesis, the attempt to herd all the dogmatic
philosophers into the skeptic camp, is hardly impressive. If he wishes
to deny that the dogmatists really believed they had found the truth,
he must account for their persistence in philosophizing. If all philoso-
phers are actually Pyrrhonists in disguise, Montaigne is in the un-
comfortable positian of having to find so me rationale for them, since
he has assimilated even the dogmatists to his point of view. This
is a good deal mare difficuIt than exonerating Pyrrhonism from the
unfounded accusation that its logical consequence is intellectual and
moral inertia. All he finds to say is that philosophy may support useful
social and religious frauds and that it fills a natural human need to
satisfy curiosity. It is unusual to see curiosity spoken of so kindly.
Montaigne, who himself was immensely curious, ordinarily regards it
as one of the scourges of mankind. 2 The essayist's lame arguments
resuIt from his predicament.
These first three episodes in the counterattack present no proofs
whatsoever that reason is incapable of attaining the truth. vVhen he
portrays Pyrrhonism, Montaigne inevitably becomes involved in the
theories of Sextus Empiricus; but his interest is not to validate any
arguments against dogmatism so much as to show how Pyrrhonism
work.> as a practicing philosoph)'. The concIusions of the Pyrrhonists
are simply explicated, not debated. The import of the first three sec-
tions as a whole is that the evidence of the animaIs, of the un-
lettered, and of the philosophers themselves all goes to show that
reasan is at least dispensable, at the most troublesome. It can serve
only as a pastime or as a spurious prop for socially beneficial doctrines,
but no more. Montaigne probably never really believed that the mental
and intellectuaI faculties of man were totally worthIess, but in his
attack on opinionated presumption he takes this position. It is in these
sections that we find him using exaggerated and irresponsible argu-
ments. Trying to prove that the mind is useless or harmfuI is not the
same thing as proving that reason is inconcIusive and fatally weak; but

1 Lanson misses the point when he argues that integraI skepticism would result in inertia,
Essais, p. 164.
2 See I: xxvii, 181a, II: xvii, 618a, and in the "Apologie," pp. 465a and 477a (cited supra
pp. 82-83, 84).
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIAJOND SEBOND gl

th ey seemed to be the same to Montaigne, for whom faith in reason

had meant faith in Cato. When reading Sextus Empiricus convinced
him of the total impotence of reason, he saw little alternative but to
reject the life of the mind and to praise ignorance. He could claim to
continue in his respeet for the ancient sages only by denying that th ey
really practiced speculative philosophy at all, a truly strange thesis.
Later he could revere Socrates immensely, though not for his ration-
ality. But first he repudiated everything he had believed in, and he did
a thoroughjob ofit.
The ensuing episodes represent a long review of the results of theo-
retieal reason, as it attempts to understand God, the soul, and the
body.
Pp. 493-507: Of all the human opinions of God the one that
most pleases Montaigne envisions Him as "une puissance incompre-
hensible, origine et conservatrice de toutes choses, toute bonte,
toute perfection, recevant et prenant en bonne part l'honneur et la
reverenee que les humains luy rendoient soubs quelque visage, sous
quelque nom et en quelque maniere que ee fut" (p. 493a). Pagans
who made the sun their god seem the next most excusable because
the sun is so far removed from anything we know. But to make men
into gods is the worst form of religion; Montaigne would rather
reverenee animals, for most worship of human divinities reduces the
dignity of God rather than exalting man.
When Plato gives us detailed outlines of the underworld, Mon-
taigne cannot believe that he is talking seriously. We should teIl
Plato that no picture of the afterlife based on anything man has
known in this world can be valid, as Saint Paul testifies. To say
that only man's spirit survives is to admit that man does not survive
at all, "Car nous sommes bastis de deux pieces principales essen-
tielles, desquelles la separation c'est la mort et ruyne de nostre
estre" (p. 500a).
To continue with the inanities of human reason, what answer is
there to this argument? The gods made man fallible; therefore,
they are responsible for his failings. How then can they punish him
justly? If Epicurus argu ed this way, Plato would have no reply.
Reason stumbles in all fields of inquiry, but nowhere mo re than in
divine matterso Who should realize this better than Christians?
Even with "la sainte lampe de la verite qu'il a pleu a Dieu nous com-
muniquer, nous voyons pourtant journellement, pour peu qu'elle
[reason] se demente du sentier ordinaire et qu'elle se destourne ou
esearte de la voye tracee et battue par l'Eglise, comme tout aussi
tost eIle se perd, s'embarrasse et s'entrave, tournoyant et Hotant
dans cette mer vaste, trouble et ondoyante des opinions humaines,
sans bride et sans but" (p. 50ra).
StilI reason tries to put limits on God; "nous le voulons asservir
aux apparenees vaines et foibles de nostre entendement, luy qui a
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

fait et nous et nostre cognoissance" (p. 504a). We say that nothing

can be made from nothing; therefore, God could not have made
the world without matter. As if we knew the laws of the universe!
"Ve, who live in one small corner of the whole, can see only local
laws, not universal ones.
Human reason itself persuades us of a multitude of possibilities
far beyond its comprehension. Philosophers have always believed
in the plurality of worlds, and there is no basis for the belief that
the laws of this world apply to others. Our own world shows a-
stonishing variety. If we can believe Pliny and Herodotus, so me
races of men hardly resemble us.! In India there are men without
mouths who exist on aromas as their sustenance.
Without going so far afield, there are many things in our own
experience that belie the rules reason would seek to establish. The
world is full of mirades: "car, aller selon nature, pour nous, ce
n'est qu'aller selon nostre intelligence, autant qu'eIle peut suyvre
et autant que nous y voyons; ce qui est au dela, est monstrueux et
desordonne" (p. 506a). Reason is so little capable of handling the
familiar that we cannot say if this life is actuaIly death, and death
really life. 2
Pp. 507-510: Certain ways ofspeaking about God hardly seem
reverent. "Je ne s<;ay si la doctrine (b) ecdesiastique (a) en juge
autrement et me soubsmets en tout et par tout a son ordonnanci::,
mais il m'a tousjours sembU qu'a un homme Chrestien cette sonc
de parler est pleine d'indiscretion et d'irreverance: Dieu ne peu t
mourir, Dieu ne se peut desdire" (p. 588a). The Phyrrhonists are
in special trouble because of the assertive nature of language. They
are forced to daim that when they say "I doubt" their assertion
itself is subject to its own doubt, like a purgative that is carried aw ay
itself along with the rest. (Here Montaigne adds in 1588 that he
himself has chosen the motto "Que s<;ay-je?" in order to avoid
assertion.) Among the cases ofirreverent use oflanguage, Montaigne
indudes the Protestant argument that God cannot be in heaven
and in several places on earth at the same time. Likewise, other
Christians fall into the error of subjecting God to necessity. Saint
Paul says that man has made himself foolish, thinking he was wise.
This section, along with the episode concerning the animaIs, contains
the most explicit rejection of the ideas of Raymond Sebond, not only
his general proposition that reason can describe the nature of God and
his works, but also mo re specific assertions of his concerning the
afterlife, on anthropomorphism, and the omnipotence of God. Of
course, there are some areas of agreement, notably on the infinitude
of God. But it is these pages more than any others that could be cited

1 lVfontaigne negIects to mention that PIiny and Herodotus discredit these very stories
that they reIate.
2 Montaigne here quotes a verse of Euripides on his ceiIing, number 28 in Appendix 1.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 93

as evidence for Sainte-Beuve's charge that Montaigne, like Bayle, is

actually destroying the religion he claims to defend. And the accusation
is based on some fact, for Montaigne consistently refuses to accept as
condusive any rational proofs of Christian dogma. ::\:Iany of the so-
called demonstrations he ridicules are indeed absurdities; but among
the arguments he literally scoffs at (especially in the later additions)
are the argument from design, the argument of the Creator as first
cause, and arguments proving the bounty of God by His gifts to man.
These have always been favorites with Christians, and the first two
at least have received the official recognition of the Catholic Church.
Montaigne goes even further and mentions, though only briefiy, the
sort of objections that could be raised against Christian reasoning.
The list of the ori es rejected by Montaigne is impressive. To have
made gods human can only have come from "une merveilleuse yvresse
de l'entendement humain" (p. 497a). But what of the Christian
doctrine of the incarnation? No awareness of this world is possible for
those in the afterlife (pp. 498-499a j. This kind of thinking totally
condemns the popular conception of Hell, such as Dante saw it.
When discussing the afterlife, Montaigne insists that it is not our
real self that survives unless it be both bodyand soul. The dissolution
of the union of bodyand soul is "la mort et ruyne de nostre estre"
(p. 500a). And for support he quotes the pagan materialist Lucretius,
twice in 1580 and three more times in 1588.1 The question how God
could justifiably punish man for the faults He put in human nature,
a problem on which Bayle was to write repeatedly, is raised; and
Montaigne condudes that it cannot be answered (p. 5ooa). The
1 Zeitlin writes: "It is on the religious beliefs of the ancient philosophers, on their ideas
concerning God, the soul, and immortality, that ~Iontaigne now centres his attention,
and his manner of expressing his opinions does not leave much doubt as to the nature of
his own belief on these matters. However important he might think it that the masses
should adhere unquestioningly to the traditional teachings of the Church, it is clear that
for his own mind these teachings had no validity. It is not the voice either of an orthodox
Christian or of a convinced skeptic, but of a high-minded deist ... He utters a denial of
personal immortality which it is impossible to mistake, no matter how much he may shelter
himself behind Epicurus or utilize it as a proof of the impotence of the human reason ... "
Essays, II, 506. Zeitlin does not take into account Montaigne's repeated belief that Christ i-
anity (and he probably me ans Catholic Christianity in opposition to Protestantism) correetly
views human nature as a composile of bodyand ,oul equally. On the page in question, the
essayist is repudiating the id ea that only the soul survives in the afterlife. In II: xvii, v{fitten
probably at about the time of the final composition of the ".-\pologie," .\Iontaigne writes:
"Les Chrestiens ont une particuliere instruction de cette liaison: car ils s<;avent que la justice
divine embrasse cette societe et jointure du corps et de I'ame, jusques il rendre le corps
capable des recompenses eternelles; et que Dieu regarde agir tout I'homme, et veut qu'entier
il re<;oive le chastiement, ou le loyer, selon ses merites" (p. 623a). Isn't this an acceptance of
personal immortality that it is impossible to mistake? And one that repeats the point of the
sentence that Zeitlin finds such a clear denial?
94 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

practices of human religion, such as putting God in houses or offering

him sacrifices are ridiculed (p. 50Ia). But what ofCatholic churches, or
their doctrine that the mass is a sacrifice? Montaigne asserts that the
plurality ofworlds is rationaUy probable, but such an idea is a mockery
of the whole Christian concept of the history of the creation and re-
demption of man.!
The additions made in 1588 and later to these pages seem equally
elose to unorthodoxy. A long list of alternate theories of the divine
nature proposed in antiquity (pp. 495-497e) leads to the conelusion,
not that th ey are damnable, but that th ey are instructive about human
nature and the weakness of reason. Might not some readers conelude
that all theories about the nature of God are mistaken? (If th ey did,
Montaigne would agree. The existence of God is not in question here,
only His nature.) Seven consecutive pages (pp. 5 I 0-5 I 7) contain
nothing but additions to the 1580 essay, and in these pages are many
potentially dangerous passages. For example, Montaigne ridicule'>
')ome very pious reasoning, such as the inference that the universe had
a creator and that creator is God. "Vhen he mocks ancient legends of
virgins impregnated by gods, how can one help thinking of the virgin
Mary? (p. 5I2-5I3b, e.) He repeats Xenophanes's remark that if
lions had gods, they would be in the form of lions, and dramatizes it
ir.. the form of a gosling who elaims that all the universe is made for
its service (p. 5I4b).2 When he scorns the minor deities of the heathens,
each one with its special provinee, "moyens entre la divine et l'humaine
nature, mediateurs, entremetteurs de nom a Dieu; adorez par certain
second ordre d'adoration et diminutif; infinis en tiltres et offiees; les
uns bons, les autres mauvais" (pp. 5I5-5I6e), a freethinking reader
might well infer that he is speaking by indirection of the devils and
the Catholie saints.
If one assumes that Montaigne is being intentionally dishonest and
malielous in these pages, it is easy to conelude that he is perfidiously
undermining the religion he purports to defend. But the assumption
of malice on his part is essential, for he is very elear in stating that the
souree of all the errors he ridieules is human vanity and presumption
in judging God by standards that simply do not apply to him. "C'est
a l'advis de Socrates, et au mi en aussi, le pIus sagement juge du eiel
See Lovejoy, The Great Chain <if Being, p. 108 /f.
1
This passage is so elose to one in Sebond (Armaingaud, IX, 158-159, chap. XCVI)
2
that it seems like a parody of the Spanish theologian. Both Coppin (fvlontaigne traducteur,
p. 157, where the passages are quoted) and Frame ("Did Montaigne Betray Sebond?" p. 317)
raise the possibility that Montaigne was thinking specifically of Sebond.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBO.VD 95

que de n'en juger point" (p. 5 I 7c). "L'homme est bien insense. Il ne
s<;:auroit forger un ciron, et forge des Dieux a douzaines" (p. 5IIC).
Such statements and scores of others like them can be overlooked
only on the hypothesis that Montaigne did not mean them when
he wrote them. That is assertion, not proof.
It is another thing to say that, whether he knew it or not, lVlontaigne
was filled with deist or un-Christian ideas. This is what Lanson means
when he says, somewhat enigmatically, "l'auteur pouvait etre un bon
croyant; le livre est incroyant." 1 There can be no denying that
Montaigne's God is austerely impersonal and distant, but that this
was bad Christianity and bad Catholicism at the time the Essais were
composed is impossible to believe. The earliest opinion on the ortho-
doxy of the Essais is simply that the book received permission to be
published. The privilege of the 1580 edition allowed Millanges to print
the essays "pourveu qu'ilz soient approuves par lVlonsiegneur l' Ar-
chevesque de Bourdeaux, ou san Vicaire, et un ou deux Docteurs en
theologie." 2 The Roman Papal court examined the Essais in 158 I
and found nothing to criticize in the "Apologie." Ninety-five years
later, in 1676, the Essais were put on the Index, where th ey remain
today. vVhen they were written, both they and their author seemed
within the bounds of orthodoxy. If in his time Montaigne was ortho-
dox and sincere, others who come later may decide he is not Christian
enough for them. If he had fideist tendencies, he was using one of
the most devastating polernieal devices of the Counter Reformation.
If l:e leaned to deism, it is enough that the Church did too.
"Voyons si nous avons quelque peu pIus de clarte en la cognoissance
des choses humaines et naturelles" (p. 5 I 7a) begins the succeeding
episode in the co unter attack. The principal example of the failure of
human science is to be the abortive attempts to understand the soul,
but two prefatory and one supplementary sections surround the body
of his argument.
Pp. 5 I 7-5 I 9: When learned men investigate phenomena that
their own reason tells them are unknowable, they do not hesitate
to forge fantastic and false theories. Judging from their astronomy one
one wouId think that the scholars had sent carpenters and painters
up to the heavens to set up compIicated machinery in the skies.
Epicycles, eccentric and concentric movements are pure fictions of
the mind unwilling to call it quits when it is beyond its depth.
The same is true of the theories of psychology. Given absolute

1 Les Essais de lvlontaigne, p. 264.

2 Dezeimeris and Barckhausen, II, 365.
96 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

liberty in their speculations, the learned doctors stiIl find human

nature too varied to come under their control: "nostre condition
porte que la cognoissance de ce que no us avons entre mains, est
aussi esloignee de nous, et aussi bien au dessus des nues, que celle
des astres" (p. 5I9a).
Pp. 520-523: Don't the know-it-aIls who find Sebond's reasons
inadequate see the difficulties th ey have in knowing their selves?
We see that our fingers move at our command, that other parts
move without our bidding; but how a mental impression can
produce a physical reaction, no one has been able to say. Yet men
continue to accept the eliehes of the past about the union of the
bodyand the soul without subjecting them to any examination.
Instead th ey rush to employ their reason, "util soupple, contour-
nable et accommodable a toute figure" (pp. 520-52 ra), to patch up
the uncontested theories. And so the world is fiIled with lies and
inanities. "ee qui fait qu'on ne doute de guere de choses, c'est que
les communes opinions, on ne les essayejamais; on n'en sonde point
le pied, ou gist la faute et la foiblesse; on ne debat que sur les bran-
ches; on ne demande pas si eela est vray, mais s'il a este ai ns in ou
ainsin entendu. On ne demande pas si Galen a rien dit qui vaille,
mais s'il a dit ainsin ou autrement" (p. 520a).
Given a group of postulates it is easy to fabricate a system; as in
geometry, our axioms can take us as far as we want, because the
conelusions have been assumed in advance. Accept the presup-
positions, and the rest is beyond your control. Each science has its
undebated foundations. The dialectician relies on the grammarian;
the geometrician, on the mathematician; the metaphysician, on the
physicist. If you challenge an assumption, you are immediately
tol d there is no arguing with those who deny basic principles.
The only firm principles are those that come from God; in all
other cases, the telling argument is to combat the assumptions of
your opponent, for no presupposition has any more authority than
another unIess so me reason can be given for it. Therefore, subject
every assumption to doubt, especially the most general ones. You
must ask for proof that fire is hot, that snow is white. A cannibal,
or any other creature of nature, might answer such a challenge by
throwing you in the fire and as king if it did not feel hot; and his
answer might weIl be better than any philosophy could give. But
philosophers, who want to subject everything to reason, who have
left their natural eondition and demand proofs, do not have the
right to argue in sueh a way. They must show that what a man feels
and what appears true to him is in fact true; or else "qu'ilz me quit-
tent leur profession, qui est de ne recevoir ny approuver rien que
par la voye de la raison: e'est leur touche a toutes sortes d'essais;
mais eertes e'est une touche pleine de faucete, d'erreur, de foiblesse
et defailIanee" (p. 523a).
If reason knows anything, it should know its own dwelling place.
Ifwe eannot rely on its findings about itself, where ean we believe it?
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIlvJOND SEBOND 97

Pp. 523-538: "Or voyons ee que l'humaine raison no us a

appris de soy et de l'ame" (p. 523a). Montaigne rapidly lists sixteen
eonfiicting theories on the composition of the soul, and nine different
seats assigned to the soul by ancient philosophy. Chrysippus locates
it near the heart beeause we put our hand on our breast when we
take an oath and beeause we lower our jaw towards the breast
when we say Eyw. Fine reasoning! Plato defines man as a two-
footed animal without feathers.
But to return to the soul, Montaigne's single example demon-
strating the vanity of reason, the most probable ("vray-semblable")
of the opinions is that there is onlyone soul which resides in the
brain and governs the body as a sailor controIs the movements of
a ship. Different eoneepts of the origin of the soul have been pre-
sented, among which is the Platonic idea that all our knowledge is
recollection of what the soul knew in another world. This opinion
is untenable because (I) we remember only what we have learned
in this world, (2) it reposes on confiicting assumptions that the soul
is so strong that it is immortal, but so weak that it is somehow
smothered by being imprisoned in matter, and (3) the soul's worth
is to be measured here, in this world, and not according to its per-
feetions elsewhere (otherwise it would be an offensive injustice to
assign to the soul its eternal state on the basis of its short life on the
earth when its powers had bcen diminished by the fiesh).1
The majority opinion of the ancien ts regarded the soul as mortal,
being born with the bodyand dying with it. As evidenee they eited
its inconstaney, its inability to withstand the effects of aIcohol,
illness, or drugs. The bite of a rabid dog could destroy all the phi-
losophy and wisdom of a Socrates or a Cato. The combination of an
immortal soul and a mortal body seemed hard to accept to the
ancients. Philosophy is nowhere so at a loss as on the subject of the
immortality of the soul. Even when revelation has given man the
truth, his reason stumbles as it tries to demonstrate this doctrine.
"Toutes choses produites par nostre propre discours et suffisanee,
autant vrayes que fauces, sont subjectes a agitation et debat" (p.
535a). The Tower of Babel is an apt symbol of the confusion man
introduces into any matter, even something so uniform as the truth,
when he exereises his human reason.
Pp. 538-539: Reason falters just as mueh when it eomes to the
body. To showall the confusion of medical scienee would be too
arduous. One example will do; the re are multifarious explanations
of procreation and the composition of the male semen. There is
not eve n agreement on how long a time elapses between fertilization
and birth. Montaigne himselffavors eleven months. All in all, then,
man cannot say that he knows even himself.
1 Here is another passage that refutes Zeitlin's contention that l'.fontaigne does not
believe in the immortality of the soul. One of the apologist's arguments against Plato is
that the Greek philosopher's theory confliets with the Christian concept of rewards in the
afterlife.
g8 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

This episode and the one preceding it take up Montaigne's critique

of reason. In general, one fact, the diversity of opinion among phi-
losophers, strikes his attention as conelusive evidence that human
reason cannot be relied on to produce the truth. But the nature of the
argument is slightly different in the two sections. In the first Montaigne
could assert categorically as a Catholic fideist that the reasoning of the
pagans (and of some Christians) about God had gone astray. The
many theories, arguments, and practices he cites are all proofs that
reason has been wrong or far wide of the truth. However incompre-
hensible he may insist that God is for human reason, he nevertheless
argues from the assumption that God exists and has revealed Himself.
His conelusion can be, and is, the absolute incapacity ofreason without
grace in such subjects. He is free to scorn, mock, and belittle as much as
he will. Actually, he does not condemn the heresy of rationalist theo-
logies as mu ch as their inanity. The fundamental error, one that
Christians can make as weIl as heathens, li es in measuring God by
human standards or worshiping Him in rituals betraying their human
source. On the other hand, Montaigne willingly admires the misguidcd
piety behind such human errors. In the additions after 1588 he goes
so far as to say that devout pagan religions were acceptable to God,
and he reduces his condemnation of the false reasoners by saying that
!le is not so much displeased as instructed by their weaknesses. Here as
elsewhere in the "Apologie" it is not the theological, but the human
reality that impresses him.
\Vhen discussing God, Montaigne coneludes (or assumes) that we
must suspend our judgment because to hope to understand Him by
reason alone is irreverant and futile. Other agencies, such as grace or
revelation, must be looked to for knowledge. \Vhen discussing "les
choses humaines et naturelles," this is not entirely the case. The
knowledge of certain human matters, such as the immortality of the
soul, is definitely fixed by ecelesiastical doctrine; but in other areas,
and especially in "les choses naturelles," no such limitations apply.
That reason cannot define God need not mean that it is totally in-
conelusiveo But if reason cannot understand itself and human or
natural things, then it is truly weak; for there is nothing it can under-
stand. In the theological argument the variety of opinions led to the
conelusion that all opinions but one (Catholic doctrine) were wrong.
In human matters Montaigne, if he is to be truly Pyrrhonist, must
argue that all opinions are unverifiable. As a matter of fact, he con-
tinues to argu e in much the same way as he had in the previous section.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 99

He scoffs at manyabsurd theories that have been advanced, but this

is proof of human irrationality only, and it implies that we can know
these arguments are invalid. Among the many concepts of the soul,
Montaigne even singles out the one that is the most probable as if
sound reasons could be given against the others In other cases, he
says that the explanations given by the learned are merely fictions,
products of the imagination, not the reason. This comes elose to stating
that any rational system must be by definition an artifieial structure,
and unverifiable; but it is not quite saying that. The possibility that
among all the divergent theories one is right and can be show n to be
so remains open. Montaigne personally feIt that the diversity of
opinion was evidence enough to discredit reason; for it is almost the
onlyargument that he uses, and it is certainly the one he uses most
often and most effectively. But it is not a proof of reason's incapacity.
However, a few passages push the point to its logical conelusion, the
problem of the criterion. These passages are not many. That one of
them occurs at the beginning of this episode testifies, I believe, to the
fact that the essayist is aware that his position is different because he
can no longer retreat to the fideist stronghold of Church doctrine
now that he is discussing natural phenomena.
The reason so many questionable seiences are given credence
according to Montaigne is that no one bothers to challenge their
first prineiples. Once these are accepted reason can build whatever
it wills. But deny the assumptions and all the conelusions fall with
theIn. "A ceux qui combatent par presupposition, illeur faut presup-
poser, au contraire, le mesme axiome dequoy on debat. Car toute
presupposition humaine et toute enuneiation a autant d'authorite
que l'autre, si la raison n'en faiet la difference. Ainsin illes faut toutes
mettre a la balance; et premierement les generalles, et celles qui nous
tyrannisent" (p. 552a). What does Montaigne mean by saying that
any assumption has as mu ch authority as another unIess reason makes
the difference? Is this, as Zeitlin thinks, a slip on the essayist's part,
an unconscious admission that despite all his argument he really has
faith in reason? 1 It could be. If so, it certainly is a glaring contra-
diction on Montaigne's part; and one cannot help wondering why he
did not cross it out in later editions as he did so many little phrases,
1 Essays, II, 507. "This would-be skeptic seems to find it impossible to shake himself
free of his faith in the arbitrating power of reason. However he may juggle with the word,
pronouncing 'true and essential reason' to be lodged solely in the bosom of God, he cannot
dispense with a conception of its human utility." (The context here is not one of human
utility.)
100 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

many far less obviously out of place than this one. On the other hand,
it is possible to understand this sentence without making it into a
contradiction of the "Apologie's" main argument. Montaigne is
saying that all assumptions are equally valid in human reasoning
unIess reason can make a distinction between them. In these argu-
ments (human ones) it is up to reason to make the distinction between
valid and invalid hypotheses. The whole point of this page is that
rationalists create for themselves the problem of proving their basic
assumptions by insisting that reason alone must arbitrate if th ey are
to be persuaded. Accordingly only cannibals, animaIs, and those who
have not left their natural state can be allowed the privilege ofbelieving
in appearances. vVhat Montaigne may well me an here is not that
reason has the capacity to choose between hypotheses, but that it
cannot avoid debating them.
The critique ofreason goes very deep here. Any system ofknowledge
is based on presuppositions, and presuppositions are equally debatable;
therefore, no proof is possible that they are right. Montaigne does not
make clear what sort of systems he has in mind. In the preceding para-
graph he had mentioned geometry as an example of a system built on
hypotheses. This would mean that his argument applies to closed logical
(a priori) systems, which cannot be stronger than their axioms and
postulates.! But the other example he gives of an assumption to be
debated is the assertion that fire is hot because it feels hot. This would
mean that he is referring to a posteriori knowledge of the external world.
In such a case, he is clairning that it cannot be established because of
the unreliability of the senses and the lack of a verifiable criterion. It
is useless to try to determine which kind of knowledge is under con-
sideration. It is not in the least bit sure that Montaigne was aware of
the distinction between the two of them. The important thing is that
he mentions both sorts of knowledge and indicates quite briefly their
fundamental weaknesses. The rest of the "Apologie" devotes many
pages to proving the unreliability of the senses, which Montaigne
regarded as the best and most damaging weapon the Pyrrhonists had.
These pages come as close as Montaigne ever will to the consideration
1 In "Comme nostre esprit s'empesche soy-mesmes" (II: xiv), a short essay probably
composed in the vicinity of 1576, Montaigne gives another of his rare arguments against
abstract reasoning, this time drawn from the paradoxes of mathematics. His examples,
taken almost surely from the memory of conversations with Jacques Peletier du Mans
mentioned in II: xii, 555a, display his lack of familiarity with mathematics; but one of them
is fairIy valid. When geometry speaks of two lines that approach each other constantly
without ever meeting, it Ratly contradicts experience. One may conclude that reason can
prove absurdities to be true.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 101

of a priori logic; and he has the essential argument concerning it,

even if he does not follow it through with the rigor of a logician.

The Warning to the Princess

At this point, two third s of the way through the counterattack, comes
a strange interruption, the warning to the princess. In it are most of
the details on which the identification of Marguerite de Valois is based.
Pp. 540-542: Montaigne cautions the princess that "ee dernier
tour d'escrime icy" is an extreme remedy and advises her to defend
Sebond "par la forme ordinaire d'argumenter" (p. 540a), for his
method involves abandoning one's arms in order to disarm one's
opponent. It entails broaching the last limits of knowledge, which
like all extremes are defective. Our mind is "un util desregle, dan-
gereux et temeraire" (p. 54Ia), so much so that almost all the finest
minds of the day have degenerated into licentious thinking or
conduct. Therefore, it is right to restrain it, in studies and elsewhere.
In the same way, it is best to defend Sebond in the habitual way,
unIess some one of the "nouveaux docteurs" should try to show off
his ingenuity in the princess's presence. Then, this antidote of
1vIontaigne's may preserve her and her courts from the venom that
endangers her salvation.
One point that has given rise to a certain amount of discussion is
the matter of the "nouveaux docteurs." vVho are they? Against whom
is the "Apologie," and more specifically the counterattack, written?
The first and obvious answer is the Protestants. The words "nouveau"
and "nouveltez" frequently recur in the Essais in reference to Protes-
tantism. 1 Bunel had recommended the Theologia naturalis to Pierre
Eyquem as a counteragent to the Reform, and :NIontaigne approved
of his action. Furthermore, Marguerite, for whom the essay is written,
is residing in a Protestant court; she accused her preceptor Choisnin
of being a Huguenot who disguised himself as a Catholic. 2 Finally,
when Montaigne seeks to humble individual reason before the author-
ity of the Church, he is formulating one of the strongest Catholic
arguments against the Reformed Churches, which he considered
guilty of intellectual arrogance. A comment of his written after I588
(I: lvi, 304-305c) shows his annoyance at the presumption ofProtestants
who believed that every man of intelligence necessarily agreed with
them, whether he dared admit it or not.
However, his line of attack applies equally weIl to the rationalists
who would replace faith by reason to one degree or another; and

1 A few examples: II: xii, 416a, 478a; I: xxiii, ,,8b; I: xxviii, 193a.
2 Dreano, Pensee religieuse, p. 262.
102 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

several comments suggest that Montaigne envisages rationalists as his

adversaries. In the very paragraph that mentions the "nouveaux
docteurs" he is dismayed at the opinions and morals of the excellent
minds of his century. Re had spoken of the enemies of Sebond as those
"qui n'ignorent rien, qui gouvernent le monde, qui s<;avent tout"
(p. 520a). Mariejol belieyes that "le maI du moment, c'etait moins
l'incredulite que l'indifference." 1 The worldly and the uncommitted
seem to him to be the objects of the apologist's argument. Mariejol
takes his thesis a bit too far. First, he would like to exclude the Protes-
tants from among those Montaigne is attacking on the basis that the
essayist knew and admired the leaders of the Protestant cause. But
this is to overlook completely the mentality of the "politiques," who,
though good Catholics, were not militant against the persons of schis-
matics. 2 It is most probable that Montaigne directs his counterattack
against both Protestants and rationalists at the same time without
making too clear a distinction between them. Mter all he regarded
Lutheranism as the first step towards irreligion ("atheism").

The Critique of Judgment

Pp. 542-543: The ancient minds, freer and more vigorous,
produced a wealth of different sects, each onejudging independently;
but modem education is sufficiently standardized and authoritarian
for its pupils to have lost the capacity for criticaljudgment; and the
merest Bummery, such as palmistry, passes unchallenged.
Theophrastus thought that human knowledge, under the guidance
of the senses, was capable of judging the causes of things in a certain
measure only, but that first causes always remained outside its
provinee. Such a view is moderate, but we cannot trust human
curiosity to stay within moderate bounds; its attitude is likely to
be this: "Having learned by experience that where one man fails,

1 "Marguerite de Valois en Gascogne," p. 529.

2 Mariejol offers two other reasons, both very weak. First, he says the Protestants would
not be grouped in Montaigne's mind with the stargazers, enchanters, and mountebanks
ridiculed in the paragraph succeeding the mention of the "nouveaux docteurs." But that
the essayist regarded the "nouveaux docteurs" as so gullible, or the Protestants as any less so,
is not sure. Secondly, he suggests that Montaigne may have attaeked all intelleetuals, but
had only eertain ones in mind. This is one of those arguments that rely on ferreting out the
hidden intentions of the author. It ean be neither refuted or supported. :\Iariejol considerably
weakens his case when he deseribes the indifferent minds Montaigne allegedly attacks. He
says they were the sort that used worldly terms such as "fortune," "the heavens," and "the
stars" in place of more reverent terms. Unfortunately for :\Iariejol. :\fontaigne himself
would be one of the first guilty of such a charge. One of the practices in the Essais mildly
censured by the Master of the Sacred Palaee in Rome was preeisely that :\Iontaigne used the
word "fortune" too loosely. (Montaigne defends this usage in an addition made in 1588,
I: lvi, 308b.) Finally, no passage in the "Apologie" seerns aimed at religious indifferenee,
except perhaps one written after 1588, p. 423c.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 103

another succeeds, I shall investigate newand uncharted fields,

hoping in all modesty that a second may learn from my efforts,
however weak they are. In this way, knowledge will grow from
century to century." 1 Correetly understood, Theophrastus' position
rules out such thinking; as long as first principles or causcs cannot
be known, the entire structurc of knowledge tumbles.
The Academie skepties, though persuaded that certain knowledge
was impossible, nonetheless allowed that probable opinions could
be established. The opinion of the Pyrrhonists is much firmer and
more accurate; 2 for they maintain consistently that the probable
cannot be distinguished from the improbable unIess we have a
sound criterion of what is true. "Ou nous pouvons juger tout a
faict, ou tout a faict nous ne le pouvons pas. Si nos facultez intellee-
tuelles et sensibles sont sans fondement et sans pied, si dies ne font
que fioter et vanter, pour neant laissons nous emporter nostre
jugement a aueune partie de leur operation, quelque apparenee
qu'elle semble nous presenter ... " (pp. 544-545a). This is a matter of
all or nothing; either man can find the truth or he eannot.
We can casily see that things are not perceived accurately. If
th ey were, there would be no disagreement about them. vVine
would not taste different to a sick man and a healthy man. If we
really could perceive something without altering it in the process,
"au moins se trouveroit il une chose au monde, de tant qu'il y en a,
qui se croiroit par les hommes d'un consentement universel" (p.
545a). But there is no uncontested proposition.
Not only is there no accord between men, but our ownjudgment
reverses itself. "Combien diversement jugeons nous des choses?
combien de fois changeons nous nos fantasies?" (p. 546a). What
Montaigne believes now, he believes totally; but it has happened
a hundred, a thousand times that he has judged false today what he

t Neither Montaigne nor any editor, so far as I know, indicates that these words ("Ayant
c:>saye par experience ... ee n'est que la mienne," p. S,j.3a) are not the essayist's own, but
rather the expression of an apparently cornrnon sense idea that ~Iontaigne wishes to reject.
I would put them in quotation marks as an indieation that they represent a point of view
not integral to the "Apologie." This seems to me the only way to explain the sudden shift in
thought. There are many precedents in other essays for this procedure of presenting an
opinion Montaigne disagrces with - and they were never indicated by any distinguishing
punctuation in Montaigne's day. Several such examples can be seen in the "Apologie" itself,
e.g., pp. 511-S12b. Such passages can very easily mislead even attentive readers, for they
look a.~ if they were the essayist's own thought when they are exaetly the opposite. A perfect
example of this sort of diffieulty occurs later in II: xii on the sllbject of the senses. Here is the
(a) sentence: "De toutes les absurditez la pius absurde est desavoüer la foree et effeet des
sens" (p. 576). Out of context it is a c1ear affirmation quite eontrary to the meaning of the
".\pologie." After 1588, Montaigne, aware of the possible ambiguity, makes a short addition:
"Des toutes les absurditez la pius absurde (e) aux Epicuriens (a) est desavoüer la force et
effect des sens."
2 After 1588 Montaigne made an unfortunate change in this sentenee so that it read
more "probable." Since the purpose of the paragraph is to leject the idea of something
"probable," his emendation created a contladiction not in his original text. The Freneh
involves a play on the words "vray" and "vray-semblable."
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

held true with all his force yesterday. "Au moins faut il devenir sage
il ses propres despans" (p. 546a). It does not take a major calamity,
such as the gout, to upset our judgment. A cold will do as weIl as
pneumonia. This is so true that there is hardly a single hour in a
lifetime when we are in a stable, normal state. And in the case of
minor maladjustments, we are unlikely to be aware of the distortion
th ey cause in our reason.
Now Montaigne keeps a elose eye on himself, having little else to
do. He hardly dares admit how much weakness he finds in himself.
In good weather, Montaigne is "honneste homme"; in bad,
grouchy. One way before dinner; another, after. And if the soul is
shaken by physical stimuli, it is all the more disturbed by its own
passions. Without these passions the soul might be completely
inert, like a ship becalmed, Montaigne himself, while not particu-
larly subject to strong passions, has experienced the destructive
effects they can have on his reason in the case of sexual attraction.
Re used to tensc himself to fight passion's onslaught, but in vaino
The knowledge of his own changeability has accidentally pro-
duced in Montaigne a eertain eonstancy of opinion. Indeed he has
hardly altered his original and natural opinions; for no matter how
appealing some innovation may be, he is always afraid to los e
something in the ehange.
Pp. 553-555: The works of the ancien ts are so strong that they
always sueeeed in persuading ~lontaigne as he reads them, even
though they eontradiet each other. The ease with whieh they endow
their eonflieting opinions with foree demonstrates elearly the weak-
ness of their proofs. For eenturies it was assumed that the heavens
moved until some ancient, and then later Copernieus, deeided to
believe that it was the earth that moved. 'VVhenee Montaigne eon-
eludes that it makes no differenee whieh theory is right. A scientist
one e tried to persuade Montaigne that the ancients had been en-
tirely mistaken in their understanding of the nature and movements
of the winds. How then, Montaigne says, did they get where they
were going if they had their direetions reversed? Pure chanee.
"J e luy repliquay lors que j'aymois mieux suyvre les effets que la
raison" (p. 554a). Reason and hard faet often conflict; the Pyrrho-
nists use all their reasoning for the sol e purpose of destroying the
appearanees of experience, "et est merveille jusques ou la souplesse
de nostre raison les a suivis a ee dessein de eombatre l'evidenee des
effeets" (p. 555a). To have disagreed with Ptolemy's geography in
his day would have been to Pyrrhonize, and yet a whole new
hemisphere has sinee been diseovered.
Pp. 560-571: Among the most impressive proofs of reason's
indeeision is the faet that men cannot teU what is good for them.
Christians humbly and wisely eontent themselves with praying
God that His will be done. If we are to make our own moral rules,
what eonfusion results! The most probable ("vraysemblable")
advice reason gives is to obey the laws of one's own country, which
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND [05

is merely to abandon oneself to the whimsicalities of tradition.

Truth should be universal; and if man had any well-founded idea
of justice, he would never yield his judgment to the vagaries of law
and custom. Must Montaigne give in to the opinions of a prince who
may change the laws with every fleeting passion? "J e ne puis avoir
le jugement si flexible" (p. 563a).
One cannot take seriously the claim that positive law is founded
on so me immutable natural law, for there is not one single law
universally accepted by the consent of all nations. "Il n'est chose
en quoy le monde soit si divers qu'en coustumes et loix" (p. 564a).
Montaigne has hcard of a judgc who wrote "question pour l'amy"
in the margin of his book whenever the precedents were equally
strong on both sides of the case. In something as complex as the
lawevery eas e becomes a "question pour I'amy."
If Heraclitus bdieved that all things contain every aspect we
can find in them, Democritus concluded exactly the contrary, that
they have none of the qualities we see in them. Pyrrhonists would
say that they do not know whether honey is bitter or sweet, or both,
or neither.
After the warning to the princess, Montaigne embarks on a new
stage in his development. He intends to prove that reason cannot
achieve any knowledge. Up to this point, with a few major exceptions,
he has been intent on exposing the failure of philosophy, i.e., human
reason has achieved no knowledge.l The first point he makes in this
section, the diversity of judgment, is not actually new; for from a
philosophical standpoint it is essentially the same argument he had
used when he discussed the variety of opinions about the human soul.
What is new is the appeal to personal experience and the care with
which Montaigne organizes his reasoning. No reader familiar with
the essayist's later style can fail to appreciate how markedly the open-
ing pages of this section (pp. 542-553), differ from the rest of the
"Apologie." They are frankly the most interesting part of a work that
is often ponderous and slow-moving. Here and only here, he us es his
techniques of self-portraiture and rdies on his own experience, his own
variability, his own struggles against passion, as the prineipal evidence
he brings forth to support his case for skeptieism. 2 More than that, under
the flexible, personal style is a very carefully organized and tightly
planned argument. Montaigne first denies the possibility of any half-way
measures in epistemoIogy. Either man can know, or he cannot. That
he cannot is shown by the fact that the perceptions of one man dis-

1 The major exception has already been discussed, pp. 99-[01.

2 This very obvious change in style is good evidence that these pages were composed later
than many other parts of the counterattack.
106 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

agree with those of another. Moreover, the perceptions of a single

person are at varianee from time to time because his judgment is
subject to the influence first of the body, then of the passions. And
with each step of his development Montaigne shows by implication
that there is no way of ascertaining what is the normal state of being
in which the judgment is sound, that is to say, a criterion is lacking.
This is the most carefully planned of all the sections of the "Apologie" ;
and, unIike many of the earlier pages, it never argues irresponsibly.
It presents onlyone side of the facts (man's instability) ifwe compare
it to later essays in which Montaigne is concerned with finding the
universal elements of human nature (e.g., III: ii and III: xiii). Butif
one-sided, it is never sophistic.
In the ensuing pages (pp. 553-555) the focus shifts from judgment
to reason, which is so absolutely adaptable that it can serve any cause,
no matter howabsurd. The vulnerability of the natural sciences, such
as geography, astronomy, and medicine, is cited as conclusive evidence
that reason has been wrong and may be wrong again. The practical
thing to do is to disregard all specuIations and rely on facts.
There are several indications in the critique ofjudgment that Mon-
taigne's attitude has evolved somewhat from the very strong partiality
for Pyrrhonism evineed in previous sections of the "Apologie." First,
he dissociates himself slightly from the Pyrrhonists, whose doctrine, he
admits, "ne peut a la verite loger en nostre imagination que mal-
aiseement" (p. 544a). This is hardly the same as his earlier attempt
to pr~ve that even the dogmatic philosophers must have been aw are
of the truth of Pyrrhonism. On another occasion, he marvels at how
effectively the diaIectic of the skeptics denies the most evident facts,
such as our movement or speech. Their example supports his case
against reason inasmuch as th ey use it against what seems obvious
"avec une pareille force d'argumentation que no us verifions les choses
pIus vray-sembIabIes" (p. 555a).1 But in his admiration for their skill,
Montaigne admits that some things are really more probable than
others. This is not a complete departure from Pyrrhonism, for Sextus
himself admits that skeptics live according to appearances, but it is a
shift in emphasis in the essayist's thinking. Mter all, some thirteen
pages earlier, he had taken pains to reject the idea of probable truth.
The rejection seems more theoretieal than sincere; for in this paragraph
Montaigne, at the same time he disparages reason, expresses his
1 Following sixteenth-century usage, it is possibIe that "pIus vray-sembIabIes" is a super-
Iative form.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 1°7

preference for experience, which appears far sounder to him than any
merely rational argument. The third time he mentions the Pyrrhonists,
he does the sam e thing, agrees with their theory, but shows more
concern for practicality. He explains that they do not hold their
doctrine of ataraxy dogmatically, but out of natural impulse just as
they proteet themselves from an evening breeze. Now the substance
of all three of these remarks can be found in the previous pages discuss-
ing the followers of Pyrrho, but not the attitude that Pyrrhonism is an
extreme position, and as such a little curious.
The underIying cause of this difference is that ~fontaigne is now
considering a different subject. He has absorbed the Pyrrhonists'
critique of reason, their conservatism, and to a certain extent their
suspension of judgment. Where he cannot help disagreeing with them
is on this last matter. It is too negative a point of view for :Wfontaigne,
who places positive value on the cultivation of his judgment. The
Pyrrhonists have taught him that it must never be a dogmatic judg-
me nt, that it is easily swayed, and that he must be wary of it. His
own experience has taught him that it is variable and quickly per-
suaded. More than that, it has taught him to have a healthy distrust
of his pliable mind. Here, more than anywhere else in the Essais, he
devotes himself to proving that one's judgment can never be abso-
lutely sure of anything. And he admits that his own is highly ftighty.
But he also sees that we can learn at out own expense, that if we are
sufficientlyon guard against committing our judgment too rapidly, we
may produce an "accidental" stability in ourselves, not out of inertia,
but out of conscious prudenee. From the vantage point of such a
constancy, Montaigne is free to deplore the infidelity of the English
nation, which has changed something as fundamental as its religion
three or four times within his memory. Likewise, he acquires a certain
integrity, which allows him to disapprove of the ftoating seas of popu-
lar opinion; "je ne puis pas avoir le jugement si ftexible" (p. S63a).
Such a categorical statement fits iIl with the general mood of the
"Apologie" and represents a stage in his evolution beyond the point
of pure skepticism. It is not an abandonment of the skeptical attitude,
for during the period ofhis greatest loyalty to the Pyrrhonists he never
felt that integral Pyrrhonism entailed inactivity. But it displays a real
concern for finding some way to make ajudgment, rather than keeping
the faculty of judgment in suspenseo Onlya few pages in the "Apolo-
gie," and only a few remarks on these pages, show this positive attitude;
but they cannot be overIooked. Having completely disowned reason,
the essayist begins to embrace experience.
108 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

The Critique of the Senses. Conclusion

The final pages of the "Apologie" contain the culmination of the
counterattack based largely on the ten tropes of Sextus Empiricus and
a short fideist condusion consisting mostly of a passage from Plutarch.
Pp. 571-586: The theories ofHeraditus bring Montaigne to the
consideration of the senses, which provide the greatest proof of
human ignorance. Now all knowledge reaches us via the senses.
"La science commence par eux et se resout en eux" (p. 572a).
Without the senses we would be no better than a stone. We are so
dependent on them that to maintain that fire does not give off heat
is the height of absurdity according to our lights.
Montaigne's first point is that we may not have all the senses
necessary to apprehend reality, and we have no way of knowing if
we do not. For example we do not see magnetic waves, and some
animaIs seem to have sharper senses than ours. Any man can find
coundess examples ofhow the senses mislead us. And the deductions
of the intelleet are incapable of changing the effects that appearances
have on us. Put a philosopher in a net stretched between the towers
ofNotre Dame; and he will stiIl feel dizzy, no matter how much his
mind may know that he is secure.
If the senses deceive the understanding, the reverse is also true.
The woman we lav e seems more beautiful than she is. "II semble
que l'ame retire au dedans et amuse les puissances des sens. Par
ainsin, et le dedans et le dehors de l'homme est plein de foiblesse et
de mensonge" (p. 580a).
When we compare our senses to those of the animaIs, we find that
they do not always agree with us in their judgment of things. "Pour
lejugement de l'action des sens, il faudroit don e que no us en fussions
prcrnierement d'aecord avec les bestes, seeondement entre nous
mesrnes. ee que nous ne sommes aueunement ... Or nostre sembler
estant si incertain et eontroverse, ee n'est pIus mirade si on nous
diet que nous pouvons avouer que la neige nous apparoit blanche,
mais que d'establir si de son essenee eIle est teIle et a la verite,
nous ne nous en sc:;aurions respondre: et, ee commeneernent es-
branle, toute la seience du monde s'en va necessairement a vau-
l'eau" (p. 583a). A earpenter cannot hope to build a house with a
right angle that is defeetive; how ean we construet knowledge if our
rneasuring instrument, the senses, is inaeeurate?
To judge appearanees we would need a eriterion. To verify the
eriterion we would need a proof; and to verifY the proof, a eriterion.
If appearances eannot be relied on, then rnaybe reason will do. But
every reason needs anather reasan to support it, and so forth in
infinite regress. Neither senses nor intellect ean seize an external
thing, for they are both internaI and can report only their own
impressions. And to aet aeeording to appearanees will not work,
beeause appearances contradiet eaeh other. To try to chaase between
two eonflieting appearanees requires a eriterion again.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 109

Pp.S86-S8g: Finally, neither ourselves nor the external world has

any stability. Both the knower and the thing known are in constant
flux, so there can be no communication between them.
Nor can we have any communication with unchanging being
(God). Here follows a two and a half page quotation from Plutarch
on the mutability of human existence and the constancy of divine
nature. "Man always changes, and never is anything; for every
moment is a passage from one state to another, a sort of perpetual
dying. True being is unattainable to man; for by its nature it must
be eternal, not subject to change (or else it would be becoming).
Of God only can it be said that He is."
Another pagan (Seneca) called man a vile thing unIess he rose
above himself. But we are only men; you cannot stretch your stride
beyond the length of your legs. Man cannot raise himself above his
own state: "il s'eslevera, abandonnant et renon<;ant a ses propres
moyens, et se laissant hausser et soubslever par la gd.ce divine:
mais non autrement" (p. s8ga).

The Meaning of the Apologie

This analysis has shown that the "Apologie" contains many different
elements that are not always in harmony. It is almost as diverse as
the opinions of the philosophie al sects Montaigne invokes. And yet
for all its repetitions and minor contradictions, it is a whole which has
a certain unity. It is after all the skeptical ess ay that Montaigne wrote.
His longest work by far, it is also a centralone, both in its positian in
the Essais and in its importance for understanding his thought. It is
the only chapter that undertakes a serious consideration of technical
phllosophical and theological matterso From the middle of the seven-
teenth century until the end of the nineteenth century readers of
Montaigne tended to regard it as the focal point of his ideas, and
its device "Que s<;ay-je?" has been popularly interpreted as the
summatian of his thought. Modem opinion has rightly directed
its attention to later essays such as "De l'institution des enfants,"
"De la pnesumption," and all of Book III as exemplifying the
maturest and most deeply personal expressions of the essayist's
mind; but this compendium of Pyrrhonist fideism remains basic to
a full comprehension of his mental make-up. It gives us the best
evidence of his state of mind during the period 1575-78, for the only
other essays assigned to these years (II: xivand II: xv) are so dated
because of their resemblance to the "A.pologie." The fact that II: xii
is a composite constructed in I S78 or 1579 does not me an that it cannot
be considered as a unit; on the contrary, it proyes most conclusively
just what manner of ideas Montaigne inevitably associated with his
110 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIlvIOND SEBOoVD

abiding skeptieism. The essayist himself went to the trouble here as

nowhere else in the 1580 edition of blending his thoughts into as
systematic a declaration as he is eapable of, furnishing us with a very
valuable doeument on the nature of his Phyrrhonism.
The "Apologie" was written as a defense of Montaigne's religion.
No matter how peeuliar that defense or that religion may seem to
his readers, this essay is more eoneerned than any other with re-
ligion and gives the best information about Montaigne's Christianity.
It is astonishing how many pages return to pious affirmations of one
sort or another'! Of the twenty-six times l\Ifontaigne quotes from the
Bible in 1580, sixteen oeeur in the "Apologie."
Now Montaigne was only an amateur in philosophy and theology.
Neither faseinated him the way human nature did. One may therefore
expect eertain deficieneies in his logic when he handIes highly eompli-
eated or abstruse matterso N evertheless, the eogency of his system as
a whole is impressive. The first quality of the God of the "Apologie"
is His immensity and extreme distanee from man. He belongs to the
order of Being, and as such remains entirely out of the reach of man,
a ereature of Beeoming. Any communication between God and man,
whether to instiIl faith in man or to give him moral worth, must be
initiated from above. His Providenee, like everything else about Him,
is inserutable, but definitely good, though of a goodness totally
different from human virtues. Again and again Montaigne insists that
to me asur e Him in any way with human terms is irreverent. Man's
impicus presumption is nowhere mo re evident than in his attempt
to debase the animaIs and to equal himself to God. 2
By an aet of supreme liberality, God has rev eale d His truth to
mankind, a truth so far surpassing the intelleetual eapacity of man
that it ean be implanted in his mind only by an extraordinary act of
graee. Man is so vain and contentious that he deforms completely the
meaning of the Scriptures, the clearest, purest, and most perfect word
in existence. If this sublime doctrine did not transcend all purely
human understanding, the ancient philosophers, the most excellent
of men, would have discovered it. Instead they fiounder pitiably when
they attempt to inquire into divine matters or live in accordance to
God's laws. Christians owe an unending debt of gratitude to their

1 The following remarks will be based primarily on pages 416-424, 426, 429-430, 467,
478-480, 486-487,492-501, 5°3-5°4, 507-508, 523, 535-536, 546, 563, 569-570, 587-589·
2 For the material in this paragraph see 425a, 429-430a, 478a, 47ga, b, C, 493a, S04a,
509a, 561a, s86-s8ga.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND III

God for His revelation, especially for the promise of eternal life con-
tained in it.!
This idea of God determines Montaigne's concept of religion. First,
it must be founded exclusively on faith. Real and essential reason
resides only in God, and man's feeble intelleet is totally impotent to
handIe sacred questions. For a true Christian the mysteries and
incredible things of religion are opportunities to affirm his faith and
utter dependence on God. The more reasonable a doctrine is, the less
genuinely religious. This is why the simple and the ignorant enjoy
God's favar and were chosen as His apostles, for the very weakness of
their judgment made them more op en to miraculous truth.
Nonetheless, reason is a gift of God's, and its finest role consists in
embellishing and amplifying the truths of faith. Faith alone can give
form to the inchoate matter of reason, but under its guidance reason
may find so me of the marks divinity imprinted on creation. Reason
may be sufficiently malleable and amorphous to defend any dogma at
all, but among the systems it can support are the doctrines of the
Christian religion. Some men are so made that they derive comfort
from supplementing their faith with arguments of reason, and a
proselyte may benefit from rational proofs of dogma. 2
But real faith, which lodges in us as an "infusion extraordinaire,"
does not need such stays. With only a drop of it we could move
mountains, for its source is divine and should manifest itselfin miracu-
lous ways. It would inevitably produce a moral transformation in men,
and the fact that Moslems surpass Christians in virtue shows con-
clusively how little true faith is found in men. A genuine Christian
should be distinguishable by his conduct. Faith binds us inevitably
to God by His grace and renders us obedient to His authority.3
Opposed to such genuine faith is merely human faith, which Mon-
taigne fears is far more prevalent. vVhen speaking of it, he uses the
word "nous," thereby including himself among those who do not have
the more stable so rt offaith. It is quite probable that this is not merely

1 See pp. 418a, 42Sa, S3S-S36a, s63a, S6g-S70a. In addition to the "Apologie" one
other essay in 1580 concerns religion, "Des prieres," I: lvi. A short essay, impossible to date
surely, it gives some important information confirming the declarations of II: xii. I sh all
take the liberty of referring to it from time to time here. In it, Montaigne shows the same
reverenee for God's word we see in the "Apologie." Taking a typically Catholic position, he
expostulates against the Protestant practices of translating and interpreting the Bible and
profaning its sacred word by singing Psalms on all occasions. Such usages, he feels, are danger-
ous and tend to demean the sanctity of revelation by making it too familiar.
2 See pp. 418a, 424a, 42Sa, 478-47ga, 486a, S23a.
3 See pp. 418a, 419a, b, 424a, 467-468a, c.
112 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

the modest editorial we; nor is it a pious deeeption on the essayist's

part.! The hallmarks of faith founded on human eonsiderations are
that it ean be shaken by love of innovation, politieal foree, or the
vogue of aseet, and that it frequently serv es as a eover for the basest
passions, such as hatred, ambition, eruelty, greed, detraetion, and
sedition. "Nostre religion est faicte pour extirper les viees; elle les
eouvre, les nourrit, les incite" (p. 42IC). If men loved God, not with
divine faith, but solely with simple belief, they would love Him above
all riches, honor, or friends. Such, unfortunately, is not the ease. Some
men actually feign a faith th ey do not have; others delude themselves
into believing that they are truly sincere in their convictions. (Specu-
lative atheism is too unnatural a doctrine to exist to any appreciable
extent.) If one were to weed out of the armies of the religious wars the
few men who were fighting purely for a good eause, either their faith
or their loyaIty to their monarch, there would hardly be a full com-
pany left. If the righteous side does not prosper in the wars of religion,
it is because God owes our human passions no support. 2
All this goes to show that we adhere to a religion in our own human
fashion, out ofhabit, out ofrespect for the authority of some Christians,
from fear of eternal punishments, or from hope of eternal rewards.
Another religion, appealing to the same sentiments, would persuade
us as easily. "Nous sommes Chrestiens el mesme titre que nous sommes
ou Perigordins ou Alemans" (p. 422a). This is deplorable, but it is the
natural resuIt of the fact that we are only human. Such is the funda-
mental truth of the "Apologie." We are only human; to aseribe our
nature to divine Being is impiety; to claim to be greatly superior to
the animals, nature's other creatures, to aspire to certain knowledge,
to believe that we can master the inherent debilities of our condition,
all these are presumption and folly - but then they too are human.
"L'homme ne peut estre que ee qu'il est, ny imaginer que selon sa
portee" (p. 50Ia).3
1 Janssen would have us believe that Montaigne is pretending to be among those with
human faith in order to inspire the sympathy ofhis readers: jl,lontaignefidiiste, p. 46. Marcel
Raymond argues convincingly against this in his "Entre le Fideisme et le naturalisme
(A propos de l'attitude religieuse de Montaigne)," Festschrift, Ernst Tappolet, (Basel: Schwabe,
1935), pp. 243-244. Raymond's artide is possibly the best descriptive surnmary of the
essayist's religion.
2 See pp. 418-42Ia, c. "Des prieres" shows a similar concern for the purity ofmotives.
Montaigne disapproves highly of people who pray half-heartedly without being in as pure
a state of soul as possible. (This is one of the opinions censured when the Essais were examined
for heresies in Rome.) The best prayer is one of gratitude and submi5sion, like the Lord's
prayer, and not one of request (p. 303a). He also approves the Protestant severity against
the use of the Lord's name (pp. 306b and 309a).
3 An interesting addition made after 1588 recognizes the concessions that even Christianity
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 113

Montaigne's theory of faith corresponds exactly to his theory of

reason. J ust as we must distinguish human reason from the knowledge
imparted by divine revelation, so we must distinguish true faith, the
gift of grace, from merely human faith. God's truth and His faith are
as inaccessible to men as He is Himself. Montaigne's respect for both
is all the greater for their distance from paltry humanity.
If we take the "Apologie" to me an no more than it says, it is indeed
the most religious essay Montaigne wrote, pervaded throughout with
respect, submission, gratitude, eve n unwavering faith in God. It
presents a cogent and consistent view of the immeasurable gulf
separating God and man. If Montaigne sees only the human side of
this duality clearly, that is the natural consequence of the point of view
he is presenting. Yet the faith of the "Apologie" has dissatisfied most
students of Montaigne, except possibly Citoleux. 1 Sainte-Beuve and
many others simply refuse to take it at its word. J anssen, and presuma-
bly the Catholic Church, find it heretica1. 2 Even Dreano feels forced to
subtitle his conclusion "Pourquoi Montaigne n'est-il pas devenu
meilleur?" Indeed the "Apologie" and the remainder of the Essais
lack so me of the most characteristic Christian sentiments, primarily a
sense of the drama of the incarnation and redemption of man (the fall
is mentioned). Christ Himself is alluded to only once in the essay, and
then indirectly.3 The absence of Christ symbolizes aptly the lack of
mediation between Montaigne's God and man. Countless critics have
commented on the distance between the divinity and the human race
in this essay, not infrequently with the conclusion that this separation
makes it easy for Montaigne to neglect religion in his thinking. Where
has to make to the imperfections of human nature; "la majeste divine s'est ainsi pour nous
aucunement laisse circonscrire aux limites corporels: ses sacremens supernaturels et celestes
ont des signes de nostre terrestre condition; son adoration s'exprime par offiees et paroles
sensibles: car c'est l'homme qui croid et qui prie" (p. 494c). Catholic crucifixes, altar
paintings, organ music, and other appeals to the senses seem weil founded to Montaigne.
1 The literature on Montaigne's religion is enormous, presenting him as everything
from a rigorously Catholic theologian (Citoleux) to a determined freethinker (Armaingaud).
For reviews of the various positions, see Frame, "Did Montaigne Betray Sebond?" pp. 297-
298 and Jean Guiton "Ou en est le debat sur la religion de Montaigne?" Romanic Review,
XXXV ([944),98-115. Since the publication of these artieles Clement Selafert has adopted
a position elose to Citoleux's in L'Ame religieuse de AIonlaigne (Paris: Nouvclles Editions
Latines, [951); Maurice Weiler has revived Armaingaud's theory in POllr Connaftre la penst!e
de J\lIonlaigne (Paris: Bordas, [948); and Frame, in Alontaigne's Discovery rif Alan, pp. 77-78
has re,tated the most general opinion that the essayist is a sineere, but moderate, Catholic.
2 Henri Daniel-Rops reports in "l\;Iontaigne et l'Index" that Pope Pius XII expressed the
hope that the Essais might someday be taken off the Index: Bulletin de la Sociile d.s Amis de
J\lfontaigne, 3rd Series, no. 9 (1959),4-6.
3 In a verse from Saint Paul the phrase "est re avecques Jesus-Christ," meaning in the
afterlife, appears (p. 422a). It is also conceivable that the sentence quoted in note 3, p. [[ 2
refers by paraphrase to the incarnation.
114 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

Christians feel a deep sense ofsin and guilt, Montaigne speaks ofhuman
weakness, folly, or wretchedness, all of which are unavoidable as
components of human nature. The need for amendment is as absent
here as in "Du repentir" (III: ii). The austerely inhuman God of the
"Apologie" seems un-Christian to the extent that Christianity is the
religion of God made man. Of the three persons of the Trinity, the
Son is absent; and the Holy Ghost, if present, is banished to the highest
heavens, whence He descends seldom. It is not surprising if commen-
tators see deistic tendencies in such thought. I personally think that
Raymond's analysis is more felieitous. He maintains that Montaigne's
God resembles most elosely a mystic's by His infinitude and His
glory. But Montaigne does not have a mystic's temperament; for he
is passive before the majesty of God, does not seek to live with Him
intimately, and knows no secret, inexpressible moments of communion
with Him. Finally, the essayist does not see God everywhere immanent
in nature as consistently as mystics do; for nature remains God's
bounteous creation, not His dwelling place. In Montaigne's later
thought, mu ch of his religious sense is short-circuited away from God
to nature. God remains grandly apart, and the faith in His munificence
is less frequently expressed than the faith in nature's goodness (though
the two appear together). The cure for man's corrupted state resides
I:lOre in the return to nature than in the return to God; for nature,
thought difficult to reach, is still mu ch nearer, and potentially within
man's grasp, as God can never be. \Ve have already seen how similar
the characteristics of God and nature could be in "C'est folie de rap-
porter le vray et le faux a nostre suffisance." 1 The rapprochement
of the two terms is not to be expected in an essay such as the "Apologie,"
where the eleavage between God and man is so emphasized. None-
theless, twice in one paragraph concerning the instincts of the animals
we find God and nature mentioned as partners: "il est pIus honorable
d'estre achemine et oblige a regleement agir par naturelle et inevitabIe
condition, et pIus approchant de la divinite, que d'agir regiement par
liberte temeraire et fortuite" (p. 437a).2 Ifreferences to God become
somewhat less common in the essays of 1588, it is partly because
Montaigne comes more and more to believe that God is in His heaven,
and all is weIl on earth, at least in nature's hands.
The prime Iimitation on Montaigne's skepticism is the major
proviso that divine revelation, as interpreted by the Roman Church,
1 Supra p. 46. See also infra, p. 155.
2 I date this passage 1572-74. I ts last words are "favorise de Dieu et de nature."
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 115

cannot be subjected to doubt. The Pyrrhonism of the "Apologie" is in

the service of its religion. The two complement each other rather well.
The majesty of God is reinforced by the impotence of man, who must
depend entirely on Him for any truth he may know. God's to tal
incomprehensibility becomes less disturbing when we remember that
nothing at all can be known by man. The Christian virtue of simpli-
city is enhanced by the fact that all intellectual inquiry after truth by
purely human means is the effect ofspiritual pride or foUy. Pyrrhonism,
Montaigne feels, is immensely useful for Christianity.
(a) Il n'est rien en l'humaine invention ou il y ait tant de verisimilitude
et d'apparence. Cette-cy presente l'homme nud et vuide, recognoissant sa
foiblesse naturelle, propre a recevoir d'en haut quelque force estrangere,
desgarni d'humaine science, et d'autant pIus ap te a loger en soy la divine,
(h) aneantissant sonjugement pour faire pIus de place a la foy: (e) ny mes-
creant, (a) ny establissant aucun dogme (h) contre les observances commu-
nes; humble, obelssant, disciplinible, studieux; ennemijure d'hreresie, (a)
et s'exemptant par consequant des vaines et irreligieuses opinions intro-
duictes par les fauces sectes. (h) C'est une carte blanche preparee a prendre
du doigt de Dieu telles formes qu'il luy plaira y graver (p. 486).
But if his Pyrrhonism is compatible with his religion, certain of its
procedures clash with Christian ideas, as Marcel Raymond has
pointed out. When Montaigne asks us to consider man alone "sans
secours estranger, arme seulement de ses armes, et despourveu de la
grace et cognoissance divine" (p. 427a), he is asking us to take seriously
what is in Christian eyes "une hypothese irrealisable." 1
Christian man is indee d not alone; and to think of him as such is, in
a way, to deny Providenee and the possibility ofsalvation. Now Mon-
taigne denies neither of these; but his Pyrrhonism, if not supple-
mented by his fideism, does. And when he devotes so much of his
attention in later essays to this man alone without God, he does seem
to move in the direction of a brand of ethical paganism, more politely
called his "humanism."
As a fideist work, the "Apologie" must be directed against theo-
logical rationalists of any form (Catholic, Protestant, or atheist). As a
Pyrrhonist work, its opponents are principally the philosophie al
dogmatists. Foremost among these for Montaigne are the Stoics, who
represent moral philosophy in general. Their doctrine of the power of
reason to control and order our life is exposed to sharp criticism in
more than one section of the "Apologie." In a purely fideist document,

1 Raymond, "Entre le fideisme et le naturalisme," p. 241.

116 THE APOLOGIE DE RA.IMOND SEBaND

they have no place; but much of the "Apologie" was initially com-
posed without a specifically religious context in mind. Significantly
enough, when Montaigne came to construct his Pyrrhonist omnibus,
he still feIt the necessity to indude the attack on Stoicism. This is not
surprising; for as he was already a fideist to a great extent before he
read the Hypotyposes, the most telli ng effect of the demolition of reason
must have been the relinquishing of his allegiance to the stoic co de of
living by reason. vVe have already seen how seriously Montaigne's
stoical humanism had been undermined by 1574. The coup de grace
was delivered in the name of Pyrrhonism. This is a matter of major
significance to him. The terrninal paragraph of the "Apologie" shows
how intimately Christianity and anti-Stoicism are related in his
thinking. Humanist philosophy errs most grievously in its vainglorious
assumption of man's power to achieve dignity through his own efforts.
Since those efforts are held to be the products of his reason's work,
Pyrrhonism effectively supports Christianity in its contempt for pagan
hybris. Not a single word in the final paragraph would indicate that
it concludes a long attack on reason, for reason is merely the shield
that protects as best it can the arrogance of heedless self-inflation.
(a) A cette conclusion si religieuse d'un homme payen [Plutarch] je
veux joindre seulement ee mot d'un tesmoing de mesme condition pour la
f~n de ee long et ennuyeux discours, qui me fourniroit de matiere sans fin:
o la vile chose, dict-il, et abjecte, que l'homme, s'il ne s'esleve au dessus
de l'humanite! (e) Voyla un bon mot et un utile desir, mais pareillement
absurde. Car (a) de faire la poignee pIus grande que le poing, la brassee
pIus grande que le bras, et d'esperer enjamber pIus que de l'estandue de
nos jambes, eela est impossible et monstrueux. Ny que l'homme se monte au
dessus de soy et de l'humanite: car il ne peut voir que de ses yeux, ny saisir
que de ses prises. Il s' eslevera si Dieu lui preste extraordinairement la main;
il s'eslevera, abandonnant et renon'Sant a ses propres moyens, et se laissant
hausser et soubslever par les moyens purement celestes. (e) C'est a nostre
foy Chrestienne, non a sa vertu Stolque, de pretendre a cette divine et
miraculeuse metamorphose (pp. 588-589).1
Another group excoriated by the "Apologie" is the men oflearning.
Their "sciences" rest on unproven assumptions, are often purely
imaginary, and sometimes downright silly. The ruptures with tra-
dition made by men like Copernicus and Paracelsus merely teach the
prudent man to pay no attention to the speculations of the learned and-
to rely exclusively on experience. The opening paragraph of the

1 The originaI ending of II: xii, Iess emphatically Christian, has already been given, supra,
p.lOg.
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND 117

"Apologie",!-dmits that learning (or knowlcdge) is a useful quality,

but then goes on to say that it cannot make man either happy or wise.
The belief of the ancients that knowledge can make us virtuous may
be true, but only if subject to careful interpretation. Montaigne does
not share his father's uncritical admiration of men of learning at all.
They are potentially dangerous, for they may destroy religion or
unsettle government with their noveIties. An abiding element in
Montaigne's Pyrrhonism is his distaste for the meddlesome dogmatist
and his desire to change things. Submission to authority, a virtue of
the unlearned, seems highly preferable to social engineering. As an
ethical document then, the "Apologie" directs its criticism against
the vain pretensions of the stoic humanists, the ineptitudes of the
intellects, and the heedlessness of the innovators.
Now in these matters, Montaigne's Pyrrhonism only strengthens or
confirms opinions he already held. They are opinions that Sextus
Empiricus sh are d with him. The Greek doctor of the third century
and the French nobleman of the sixteenth century had kindred men-
talities. Both scorned theoretical reason and attacked it with great
vigor, using any weapon at hand. For both, Pyrrhonism was not so
much a system as a method of attack, using reasan to destroy itself
and to undo the presumption or conceit of their opponents. l Both
conelude by adopting a pragmatic conservatism, which th ey find in
no way incompatible with the suspension of intellectual judgment.
Montaigne borrows his most effective arguments from Sextus, but
in borrowing them he adapts them. Those tending to nullify logic,
Montaigne neglects in favor of the arguments based on the fallibility
of the senses, the diversity of opinion, and the relativity of morals.
But even as he uses these, he strips them of the abstract, logical form
they had in the Hypotyposes, reducing their wordiness and illustrating
them with a greater variety of examples from everyday experience.
The net effect of reading Sextus Empiricus is to make one tired of
reasoning and disgusted with alllogic. But the net effect of reading the
"Apologie" is quite different; one feels a universe reeling in uncertain-
ty. Nowhere is Montaigne more impressive than when he invokes
the dizziness of the philosapher trying to walk a plank between the
towers of Notre Dame. Instead of fabricating a long discourse on the
criterion in order to conelude that it does not exist, as Sextus did,

1 By coineidenee the prineipal target of both of them was stoieal dogmatism. For Mon-
taigne this meant the moral philosophy of the Stoies; Sextus was more eoneerned with their
metaphysies and epistemology.
118 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

Montaigne lives up to his device and keeps asking the embarrassing

question "Que s<;ay-je?" If snake venom kills a man, and human
spittle is fatal to snakes, which is poisonous? No matter what Montaigne
looks at, he sees unsurety. Is the judgment sound? It is subject to the
suasion of bodily states such as nausea or of unpleasant sounds such as
a rasping file. But what is more distressing is that it is subject to its
own instabilities; its every state is colored in one way or another.
There is nothing fast to cling to; everything turns to water; and the
world is full of surprising moments when terrifying possibilities sudden-
ly appear. "Quand je me joue a ma chatte, qui s<;ait si elle passe son
temps de moy pIus que je ne fay d'elle?" (p. 43oc.)
Where Sextus Empiricus was content to accept apearanees for
what they were and live with them, lVlontaigne is far more upset at
the confusion in the world, where even the few things he had held
sacred crumble beneath examination. In 157 I, retiring to his chateau,
he had abandoned the active life and world ly ambition in search of
solitude. This solitude entailed cutting emotional ties with the world
as much as possible. His most profound attachment had long since
been broken with the death of Etienne de La Boetie. We know that
Montaigne feIt no passionate involvement with his wife, or family, or
one daughter. Nor could he maintain any great interest in running his
estate. Although he determined to follow his father's policy of im-
proving the ancestraI home, he later admits that he did not live up to
the beginnings Pierre Eyquem had made. Besides, he was generally
awkward, uninformed, and uninterested in domestic matterso The
learning of a scholar held no temptations for him; even reading in
the ancients could sustain his interest for only a short time. Any
program of self-improvement through exertion to strengthen his soul
now seemed completely impossible to him. The evolution of Mon-
taigne's state of mind during the first years of retirement is one of
inereasing isolation as he renounees oeeupation with ambition, estate,
family, study, humanist virtue, and knowledge of any sort. Eaeh
movement is a reduetion or an abandonment of his interests, until
there is virtually nothing left but Montaigne himself.
The skeptical period represents the eulmination of this clearing of
the ground. For a while, discouraged with all external ties, Mon-
taigne is also profoundly pessimistie about the worth and potential
of man's internaI eondition too. Religion and knowledge are debased
by the mere faet of being human, for man is a \vTetched thing. Time
and again the inference drawn from the Pyrrhonist or fideist arguments
 THE APOLOGIE DE RAli'vJOND SEBOND 119

of the "Apologie" is that man is a miserable creature. The wariness

and apprehension about life manifested in the early essays is intensi-
fied in the "Apologie." This is to some degree a natural, though not
necessary, consequence of the essayist's extreme view of God's majesty.
The Bible, especially Saint Paul and Ecclesiastes, is frequently cited
as witness to man's ignorance and puniness; "la saincte parole declare
miserables ceux d'entre nous qui s'estiment: Bourbe et eendre, leur
dit-elle, qu'as-tu a te glorifier?" (p. 478a.) In general, Christianity
and Pyrrhonism combine to imply a most dejected view of the human
condition. "La pIus calamiteuse et fraile de toutes les creatures, c'est
l'homme, et quant et quant la pIus orgueilleuse" (p. 429a). Powerful
as an imperial army may be, "c'est tousjours l'homme foible, cala-
miteux et miserabIe" (p. 453a). "Moy qui m'espie de pIus prez, qui
ay les yeux incessament tendus sur moy, comme celuy qui n'ay pas
fort a-faire ailleurs ... a peine oseroy-je dire la vanite et la foiblesse
que je trouve chez moy" (p. 548a). The inscriptions on the rafters
of the library confirm the deep pessimism of the essayist in the years
around 1576. Taken a's a group they are a grim document. Twenty-
three of them, mostly from the Hypotyposes and Ecclesiastes, but also
from Euripides, Homer, Pliny, and Michel de l'Hospital, deny the
possibility of knowledge.1 Twelve repeat the theme of man's intel-
lectual presumption. 2 Among some of the more pessimistic sayings
we find that the happiest life is one without thought, that we are
nothing but phantoms and shadows, that man is only clay, and that
valüty is in all things. 3 The few maxims that could be interpreted
positively present only the most guarded optimism. "i'vIen are tor-
mented by the opinions they have of things, not by the things them-
selves," 4 and "Enjoy the present with good humor; the rest is beyond
your control" 5 taken together could produce the attitude typicalof
the last essays that man has it in his power to feel immense enjoyment
out of the rich gift oflife. But they could just as weIl be interpreted to
me an that life is full of self-inflicted torments and man can do nothing
about it. One of the most famous of the inscriptions is Terence's
"Homo sum, humani a me nihil alienum puto," situated on the wall directly
within line of sight from Montaigne's desk. An affirmation of the
essayist's humanity - think nothing human foreign to him? Perhaps
1 Nos. 2, 6, 13, 14, 22, 27-30, 38-42, 49-52, 54-57.
2 Nos. 3,12, 17-19,23-26,35,36, H. Numbers 46 and 48 are !ideist.
3 Nos. 5, 8, 15, 33.
4 No. 45.
5 No. 37.
120 THE APOLOGIE DE RAIMOND SEBOND

this is SO; but when Montaigne used this verse in "De l'yvrognerie"
(p. 328a), he adapted it slightly to make it serve as a eriticism of the
Stoies' pretensions to raise themselves above their natural weaknesses:
"Let him not believe anything human (Le., frailty) foreign to himself."
It would seem that this quotation originally was meant to remind
Montaigne of his defieieneies, not his privilege of being a full human
being. Anyone reading the fifty-seven sayings must have the feeling
that th ey are the expression of a strongly despondent mentality.
The final pagcs of the "Apologie" eontain the longest eitation from
any work in all the Essais. Perhaps nothing Montaigne read in Plu-
tareh impressed him as mueh as these words; at least he never relied
so heavily on another author to express his ideas. The point of these
pages is that we eannot cven say of man that he is. Constancy,
knowledge, worth, and even being are denied man in the "Apologie."
This, it seems to me, is the true meaning of the skeptieal "crisis."
If "crisis" is the right word, "skeptieal" tells only part of the truth.
Intelleetually it meant the total rejeetion of any philosophie dogmatism
and a strong suspieion of an opinion too stubbornly held. But far mo re
important, morally or humanly, it meant the isolation of man in his
misery and impotenee, the negation of any potential human worth,
mo raI or intelleetual, and the severanee of man from even as simple a
tlling as the sense of his own being.
 CHAPTER V

THE NEW K~OWLEDGE

THE ESSAYS OF 1578-80

The greater part of the "Apologie" is a eounterattaek rather than

a defense, just as skeptieism in general is an aggressive attitude in
philosophy whieh refuses to establish any system and eontents itself
with destroying the assuranee of its opponents. Montaigne eontinued
in his later essays to hold in eontempt the objeets of his skeptieal
attack in the "Apologie," the inanities of the so-e alle d learning of his
day, the arroganee of dogmatie philosophers, the artifieiality and
futility of the stoie moral eode, and the totally unfounded claims of
reasan to be an instrument for determining the truth. Some of
the mo re paradoxieal positions of the "Apologie," such as the praise
of ignoranee, he will persist in maintaining, though in a modified
form. Others, such as the equality between man and the animaIs, he
will pretty mueh negleet, even deny.
'l'he greatest modifieation will appear in his pessimism and dis-
eouragement over the potentials of human nature, partieularly the
possibility of aehieving stability of being and happiness. Even in the
earliest period, Montaigne had been far from optimistie about the value
of life. When the discovery of Sextus Empirieus' foreeful arguments
destroyed what little faith he had in reason and widened the gulf
between man and the world around him, it seems clearly to have
strengthened the essayist's pessimist strain and to have laid waste all
human pretensions to dignity. Montaigne's hope and trust lay ex-
clusively in the goodness of a God who seemed all the more distant
from man preeisely beeause He is good.
On the other hand, the last essays are filled with a confidenee in
the worth of this life and the pleasures to be gain ed from living it
appropriately, an attitude that is in marked eontrast with the gloomier
passages of the "Apologie." The major question that sh all eoneern us
is how mueh the development from pessimism to optimism entailed
122 THE NEW KNOWLEDGE

a reduction or abandonment of Pyrrhonism and by what steps this

change was accomplished.
Surely a most important personal experience contributing to his
self-confidence was Montaigne's reaction to his affiiction in 1578 with
the kidney stone, the most painfuI of diseases, and one that he dreaded
above all others, having seen how cruelly it tormented his father.
Experience gradually taught him that he could withstand the extreme
misery of the most violent attacks with considerable fortitude and far
less effort than he would have thought necessary.l Pain had seemed to
him the most frightful of human adversaries in "Que le goust des
biens et des maux depend en bonne partie de l'opinion que nous en
avons" (I: xiv), but he learned from his bouts with the stone that he
was capable of living with pain in its most severe form. This only
confirmed his belief that the faculties of the soul often trouble our
repose more than events themselves. The apprehensions of the first
years could no longer hold mu ch meaning for him since he knew that
he could survive quite creditably the worst that fate could offer him.
But the greatest discovery Montaigne made was that there is a kind
of knowledge of immense fascination and utility that he could apply
himself to unceasingly and profitably. The unreliability of the senses
might forever elose to man any true cognition of external things,
icretrievably separated from him by an unbridgeable gap; but one
thing man could know, and that was himself. The statements he made
in the "Apologie" that man cannot know even the nature of his own
bodyand soul remain true; for the knowledge that Montaigne sought
of himself was descriptive, not systematic. Re would have been de-
lighted to know such things as how his father transmitted to him a
hereditary propensity for the kidney stone, but he feared that any
explanation would be more difficult to believe and fantastic than the
fact itself (II: xxxvii, 742a). Re attempted no theories ofhow heworked,
but simply a case history of his humors and thoughts. About them he
couId be sure; in fact, no one else in the world could know this subject
as weIl as he, nor couId anyone elaim to have known any subject
better than Montaigne knew his (III: ii, 783b).2 With the possible
exceptions of Socrates and Freud, no man in vVestern civilization has
devoted himself so exelusively to the study of himself as Montaigne.

1 See II; xxxvii, passim.

2 Because self-study becomes a pennanent element in Montaigne's life from this point on,
I shall allow myself some liberty to consider his stalements about it composed at different
periods.
 THE NEW KNOWLEDGE 123

Scholarly learning or knowledge of external things he makes no

claim to. Nor does he care much to learn things that do not apply
to himself.
J e souhaiterois bien avo ir pIus parfaicte intelligence des choses, mais Je
ne la veux pas achepter si cher qu'elle cOliSte. :Mon dessein est de passer
doucement, non laborieusement, ce qui me reste de vie. Il n'est rien pour-
quoy je me veuille rompre la teste, non pas pour la science mesme de quelque
. grand pris qu'elle soit. Je ne cherche aux livres qu'a m'y donner du plaisir
par un honneste amusement; ou, si j'estudie, je n'y cherche que la science
qui traicte de la connaissance de moy mesmes, et qui m'instruise a bien
mourir et a bien vivre . .. (II: x, 388a).1
Re recognizes that this is an unusual attitude: "le monde regarde
tousjours vis a vis; moy, je renverse ma veue en dedans, je la plante,
je l'amuse la. Chacun regarde devant soy; moy, je regarde dedans
moy: je n'ay affaire qu'a moy, je me considere sans cesse, je me
contrerolle, je me gouste. Les autres vont tousjours ailleurs, s'ils y
pensent bien; ils vont tousjours avant; moy je me roule en moy mesme"
(II:xvii, 64W).
The first result of self-study invariably appears to Montaigne to be
that we learn just how great are our weaknesses and insufficiencies.
Almost every time he speaks ofhis self-examination this is the prineipal
conclusion he mentions. Such was the ease in the one passage in the
"Apologie" where the subjeet eomes up (p. S48a). In "De la pr<e-
sumption" (II: xvii), the essay of 1578-80 most eoneerning itself with
self-knowledge, he writes, "Or mes opinions, je les trouve infiniement
hardies et constantes a condamner mon insuffisanee" (p. 64W). And
such remarks ean be found elsewhere (I: xxvi, 14Sa; I: liii, 2g6a).
The ignoranee and irresolution that Montaigne discovers are the
same that had impressed him in the "Apologie" when he was not
coneerned with writing about himself. One passage is as good a summary
of the philosophy of that essay as one eould ask for:
... j'ay en general cett'humeur, que de toutes les opinions que l'ancien-
nete a eues de l'homme, celles que j'embrasse le pius volontiers et aux-
quelles je m'attache le pius, ce sont celles qui no us mesprisent, avilissent
et anneantissent le pIus. La philosophie ne me semble jamais avoir si beau
jeu que quand elle combat nostre presomption et vanite, quand eHe re-

1 The same ideas appear in a late addition to II: vi; "Il y a plusieurs annees que je n'ay
que moy pour visee a mes pensees, que je ne contrerolle et estudie que moy; et, si j'estudie
autre chose, c'est pour soudain le coucher sur moy, ou en moy, pour rnieux dire. Et ne me
semble point failIir, si, comme il se faict des autres sciences, sans comparaison moins utiles,
je fay part de ee que j'ay apprins en cette-cy: quoy que je ne me contente guere du progrez
que j'y ai faict" (p. 3S8c).
124 THE l\'EW KNQWLEDGE

eonnoit de bonne foy son irresolution, sa foiblesse et son ignoranee. Il me

semble que la mere nourisse des pIus fauees opinions que nous ayons, et
publiques et partieulieres, e'est la trop bonne opinion que nous avo ns de
nous. ees gens qui se logent a ehevauehons sur l'epieycle de ~Iereure, il
me semble qu'ils m'arraehent les dens: ear en l'estude que je fay, duquel le
subjeet e'est l'homme, trouvant une si extreme variete de jugemens, un si
profond labyrinthe de diffieultez les unes sur les autres, ta nt de diversite et
ineertitude en l'esehole mesme de la sapienee, vous pouvez penser, puis que
ees gens la n'ont peu se resoudre de la eonnoissanee d'eux mesmes et de leuI'
propre eondition, qui est eontinuellement presente a leurs yeux, qui est
dans eux: puis qu'ils ne s<;avent eomment branle ee qu'eux mesmes font
branleI', ny eomment nous peindre et desehiffrer les ressorts qu'ils tiennent
et manient eux mesmes, eomment je les eroirois de la eause du mouvement
de la huietiesme sphere, et du flux et reflux de la riviere du Nile? La
euriosite de eonnoistre les choses a este donne aux hommes pour fleau, dit
la sacrasainete parole. ~Iais, pour venir a mon partieulier, il est bien
diffieile, ee me semble, que nul autre s'estime moins, voiI'e que nul autI'e
m'estime moins, que ee que je m'estimc (pp. 61 7-618a).
What is most interesting about this passage is the detaehment with
whieh Montaigne ean regard the philosophers, even those he agrees
with. It is his "humeur" that enjoys the "beau jeu" of those who combat
vanity and presumption. Dogmatists irk him, but he does not bother to
refute them at length; instead he simply turns to a mo re interesting
subjeet, himself.
Most of the statements about self-knowledge oeeurring in passages
from 1588 and later demonstrate NIontaigne's inereasing under-
standing of the subjeet and its ramifieations. It beeomes such a passion-
ate preoeeupation of his that hi~ soul needs other pastimes to divert it.
Most people need outside interests in order to exereise their faculties.
With Montaigne the opposite is the eas e ; th ey allow his mind to
relax from the effort of self-study; "ear son pIus laborieux et prineipal
estude, e' est s' estudier a soy" (III: iii, 797 b). This is hardly a comfort-
ing oeeupation beeause it always brings us baek to our own foibles.
Human nature prefers to direet its attention anywhere but to itself,
just as nature has direeted our vision outward rather than inward. The
speetacle of our own nullity would be painful; so, most people attempt
vainly to fabrieate theories about the stars, or th ey denigrate the
eorruption of the state, rather than their own failings. They do not
follow the adviee of the Delphic oracle, "Know thyself," adviee
whieh Montaigne interprets as follows:
Regardez dans vous, reeonnoissez vous, tenez vous avous; vostre esprit
et vostre volante, qui se eonsomme ailleurs, ramenez la en soy; vous vous
eseoulez, vous vous repandez; appilez vaus, soutenez \-ous; on vous trahit,
 THE :\'EW K:\'OWLEDGE 12 5

on vous dissipe, on vous desrobe avous. Yoy tu pas que ee monde tient
toutes ses veues contraintes au dedans et ses yeux ouverts a se contempler
soy-mesme? C'est toujours vanite pour toy, dedans et dehors, mais eHe est
moins vanite quand eHe est moins estendue. Sauf toy, 6 homme, disoit ee
Dieu, chaque chose s'estudie la premiere et a, sclon son besoin, des limites
a ses travaux et desirs. Il n'en est une seule si vuide et necessiteuse que toy,
qui embrasses l'univers; tu est le scrutateur sans connoissance, le magistrat
sans jurisdiction et apres tout le badin de la farce (III: ix 979-g80b).
This analysis of human vanity, the busyness with which men avoid
facing themselves and legislate for others, is one of the profound
insights of Montaigne's self-study. If men could be made to concern
themselves with themselves, rather than meddling with others, th ey
might arrive at the kincl of modesty that Montaigne preaches. "Si
le monde se plaint de quoy je parle trop de moy, je me plains de quoy
il ne pense seulement pas a soy" (III: ii, 782-783c). One of the many
paradoxes of self-study is that its egocentric concentration, rather
than being presumptuous, is truly modest.
Self-knowledge makes any other sort of learning quite superfiuous.
Here is another of the paradoxes of Montaigne's Pyrrhonism. The
fact that man cannot possibly know anything at aUleads to the result
that the best he can do is keep a close eye on himself. But, happily
enough, this furnishes him with the one so rt of knowledge that is both
necessary and useful for him. Moreover, it can provide him with
everything he need know. The example of Socrates shows that wc
need little learning in order to know how to live, and that the little
wc need is within ourselves. "Toute cette nostre suffisance, qui est
au dela de la naturelle, est a peu pres vaine et superfiue. C'est beaucoup
si eUe ne nous charge et trouble pIus qu'elle ne nous sert. Ce sont des
excez fievreux de nostre esprit, instrument brouillon et inquiete (sie).
Recueillez vous; vous trouverez en vous les arguments de la nature
con tr e la mort vrais, et les pIus propres a vous servir a la necessite: ... "
(III:xii, IOI6b). "De l'experience que j'ay de moy jc trouve assez
dequoy me faire sage, si j'estoy bon escholier. Qui remet en sa me-
moire l'excez de sa choIere passee, etjusques ou cette fievre l'emporta,
voit la laideur de cette passion mieux que dans Aristote, et en con<;:oit
une haine pIus juste.... La vie de C<esar n'a poinct pIus d'exemple
que la nostre pour nous; et emperiere et populaire, c'est tousjours une
vie que tous accidents humains regardent. Eseoutons y seulement;
nous no us disons tout ee de quoy nous avons principalement besoing"
(III: xiii, I05Ib).
All the knowledge any man requires is available to him through
126 THE l';EW KNOWLEDGE

introspection. This would seem to be a radically differrent position

from what we find in the "Apologie"; it certainly is a more hopeful
one. But it is far from being facilely optimistic. For the essayist, self-
scrutiny provides constant evidence of his shortcomings. "De l'ex-
perience" (III: xiii), the last complete essay that Montaigne composed,
in which he seems to be trying to give a final statement of the results
of his self-study, makes elear how true he has stayed to the insights of
the "Apologie," even after moving beyond them to a fuller point of
Vlew.
L'advertissement a chacun de se cognoistre doibt estre d'un important
effect, puisque ce Dieu de science et de lumiere le fit planter au front de
son temple, comme comprenant tout ce qu'il avoit a nous conseiller....
Les difficultez et l'obscurite ne s'apen;oivent en chacune science que par
ceux qui y ont entree. Car encore fault il quelque degre d'intelligence a
pouvoir remarquer qu'on ignore, et faut pousser a une porte pour s~avoir
qu'elle nous est elose.... Moy qui ne faicts autre profession, y trouve une
profondeur et variete si infinie, que mon apprentissage n'a autre fruict que
de me faire sentir combien il me reste a apprendre. A ma foiblesse si souvent
recogneue je doibts l'inclination que j'ay a la modestie, a l'obeyssance des
creances qui me sont prescrites, a une constante froideur et moderation
d'opinions, et la hayne a cette arrogance importune et quereleuse, se
croyant et fiant toute a soy, ennemye capitale de discipline et de verite.
Oyez les regenter: les premieres sotises qu'ils mettent en avant, c'est au
stile qu'on establit les religions et les loix.... L'affirmation et l'opinias-
trete sont signes exprez de bestise (pp. IOS2-S3b).
In the "Apologie" Montaigne renounces definitively the hope that
reason can lead him to any knowledge or virtue and turns from the
search for absolutes to the examination of himself, only to find the
same lesson of ignorance being taught in a much more personal and
useful way.
What are the methods ofself-study? Just exactly how does one know
oneself? The first requirement (and Montaigne at one point implies it
may be the onlyone, III: ii, 783b) is scrupulous honesty. "De la
prresumption," the first essay devoted to the discussion of self-ex-
amination, already shows awareness of this. Although he is not speak-
ing of honesty to oneself so mu ch as honesty to others, he elaims that
he is one of the rare people ofhis day who detest deception. Ifhe does
not say everything he thinks, at least he never says anything he does
not think. "Un coeur genereux et noble ne doit point desmentir ses
pensees; il se veut faire voir jusques au dedans tel qu'il est, car il n'y a
rien qui ne soit digne d'estre veu" (p. 630a). In the succeeding essay,
"Du dementir," he returns to the subject, expressing a thought that
 THE :'-IEW KNOWLEDGE 127

was to become increasingly important to him, "le premier traict de la

corruption des moeurs, c'est le bannissement de la verite' (p. 649a).
In later years, he singled out lying more and more as a most vicious
practice. "En veri te le mentir est un maudit vice. Nous ne sommes
hommes, et ne no us tenons les uns aux autres que par la parole"
(I: ix, 37c).1 Most important, however, for self-study is the need of
being honest with oneself. About this Montaigne speaks little and
hardly sees it as a problem. Re repeats Seneca's story of his wife's
fool who went blind, but refused to recognize her blindness and kept
complaining of the darkness in the house (II: xxvi, 66g-67oa). This
symbolizes accurately the condition of most men who do not realize
that the faults they see in others actuaIly lie within themselves. But
such a reflection is relatively rare in Montaigne's works. It is usuaIly not
so much a matter ofmen's self-delusion as the fact that they simply do
not take the trouble to study themselves.
Si, eomme nous, qui nous estudions, avo ns apprins de faire, ehaseun qui
oid une juste sentenee regardoit ineontinent par ou eHe luy appartient en
son propre, ehaseun trouveroit que eetteey n'est pas tant un bon mot, qu'un
bon eoup de fouet a la bestise ordinaire de son jugement. Mais on re\oit
les advis de la verite et ses preeeptes eomme adressez au peuple, non jamais
a soy; et, au lieu de les eoueher sur ses moeurs, ehaseun les eouehe en sa
memoire, tres-sottement et tres-inutilement (I: xxiii, 1I4c).2
The second faculty that helps man in his examination of his own
nature is his memory, the subject that follows directly on honesty in
"De la pr<esumption." "C'est un outil de merveilleux service que la
memoire et sans lequel le jugement faict bien a peine son offiee: eIle
me manque du tout" (p. 632a). Montaigne speaks on several oecasions
about memory, usuaIly to say that his own is terribly weak and puts
him in most embarrassing situations. 3 But it is clear that the principal
benefit to be gained from one's memory is the constant reminder it
gives us of our changeability and irresolution. It provides the raw
material necessary for our judgment in its evaluation of ourselves. It
is the memory of our own faults or mistakes, and the memory of our
own lapses of memory, that put us on guard against having too high
expeetations of ourselyes in the future. If a man is not to forget himself,
he needs a sound and honest memory. But he must not desire to
overstock it with useless or pedantic knowledge. Experience shows that
too much learning may hinder the function of judgment; and Mon-
1 See also I: xl, 247b, e; III: i, 77ge; III: v, 823b; III: ix, 944b, e; and III: x, 997b.
2 See also the first sentence of I: lii, 296a.
3 See I: ix, 34-37a, b, e; II: xii, 4Ha; III: ix, 939b, e; and III: xiii, 1051b, e.
 THE ::-.1EW KNOWLEDGE

taigne at all times scoffs at the useless, cumbersome erudition of the

scholar, an erudition that does not necessarily make him either wis e
or good and may act only to hobble his personal judgment.
It is sound judgment that becomes the key concept of many of the
essays of 1578-80. It is the principal faculty required for self-study and
at the same time the most important benefit gained from self-
knowledge. The reliance Montaigne had earlier placed on reason is
transformed into the cultivation of judgment, a faculty peculiarly
appropriate to a skeptic. Reason tells us what is right; judgment
decides between doubtful propositions. One does not appeal to
judgment for the product of four times eight; its special domain li es
in fields where a choice must be made between uncertainties. Reason
pretends to be universal; judgment can only be individual. Reason
enslaves us with its laws; a man'sjudgment is accountable to no one
but himself. Reason falls almost inevitably into dogmatism; judgment,
even when firm, recognizes the rights of other men's judgments to
disagree with it.
Like self-knowledge, judgment entails several paradoxes. To be
sound, it must admit its own weakness and be willing to change.
De eeey suis-je tenu de respondre, si je m'empesehe moy-mesme, s'il y a
de la vanite et viee en mes discours, que je ne sente poinet ou que je ne soye
capable de sentir en me le representant. Car il esehape souvent des fautes a
nos yeux, mais la maladie dujugement consiste a ne les pouvoir apereevoir
lors qu'on les offre a sa veue. La seienee et la verite peuvent loger ehez no us
sans jugement, et le jugemenr y peut aussi estre sans elles: voire la reeon-
noissanee de l'ignoranee est l'un des pIus beaux et pIus seurs tesmoignages
de jugement que je trouve (II: x, 388a).
Of all his qualities, the one on which Montaigne prides himself is his
judgment; but he realizes that no one has ever felt that he lacked suf-
ficient judgment. 1 As a matter of fact, to feel unsure of one's judgment
is only to show that it is highly developed; "s'accuser en ee subject la
ee seroit s'exeuser; et se condamner, ee seroit s'absoudre" (II: xvii,
64oa). Montaigne believes that his opinions are sound; but so does
everyone else, and the only evidence he can offer is that he does not
esteem himself highly. More than most men he cares for himself and

1 Montaigne changed his original word "jugement" to "sens" in the Bordeaux copy.
His reason was perhaps this. Good sense does not examine itself or verify itself. Good judg-
ment, however, can examine itself and is capable of introspective self-assessment. Everyone,
Montaigne had written, feels he has good judgment. Later, more aware of the peculiar
qualities of judgment, he substituted the word "sens" to avoid confusion between his brand
of judgment and mere common sense, which need not be self-conscious.
 THE NEW KNOWLEDGE 12 9

IS concerned more about himself than about his friends or ac-

quaintances, or his renown. Nonetheless, his opinions hardily dis-
parage his worth. This is the best proof he can give of the strength
of his judgment; it outweighs his self-Iove.
Another of the paradoxes of judgment is that it does not exercise
itself hastily, but prefers to remain suspended, even in practical
matterso
(a) Par ee que es choses humaines, a quelque bande qu'on panehe, il me
semble qu'il se presente foree apparenees qui nous y confirment, de quelque
eoste que je me tourne, je me fournis tousjours assez de raisons et de vray-
semblanee pour m'y maintenir. Ainsi j'arreste ehez moi le doubte et la
liberte de ehoisir, jusques a ee que l'oeeasion me presseo Et lors, a eonfesser
la verite, je jettc le pIus souvent la plume au vent, comme on diet: e'est a
dire, je m'abandonne a la merey de la fortune: une bien legere inelination
et eireonstanee m'emporte ... L'ineertitude de mon jugement est si
egalement balancee en la pluspart des oeeurrenees queje compromettrois
volontiers a la decision du sort et des dets ... (e) La raison humaine est un
glaive double et dangereux .. " (a) Ainsi, je ne suis propre qu'a suyvre, et
me laisse aysement emporter a la foule: je ne me fie pas assez en mes forees
pour entreprendre de commander, ny guider, ny mesme conseiller ...
Notamment aux affaires politiques, il y a un beau champ ouvert au bransle
et a la contestation: . .. (II: xvii, 637-638).
Naturally all this leads to a recommendation of conservatism and
obedience to authority in politic~. Conscious of the faults of the
laws and the state, he is just as conscious of the faults of any
proposed changes and would prefer stability to instability in all cases.
So Montaigne'sjudgment ofits own free will surrenders its function in
matters of state policy. Likewise, though he speaks his mind openly, he
is willing to yield his judgment's conelusions to the authority of more
learned men in intellectual questions. Re personally finds the Axiochus
of Plato a weak work; more capable minds assure him that it is
genuinely Plato's, and Montaigne finds in this a warning to his
judgment that it must not always believe itself. (In fact, scholars
began to consider the Axiochus apocryphal at the time Montaigne was
writing.)
In other places Montaigne speaks ofhisjudgment in quite a different
way, emphasizing how totally it is his, and not subject to the authority
of others. l "Car les pIus fermes imaginations que j'aye, et generalles,
ce sont celles mesmes qui, par maniere de dire, nasquirent avec moy.

1 This is exactly the same contradiction noted earlier, and in very similar contexts, supra,
pp. 51-52 (where it is a matter of reason) and p. 107 (where it is a matter of judgment).
 THE NEW KNOWLEDGE

Elles sont naturelles et toutes miennes. J e lcs produisis crues et simples,

d'une producton hardie et genereuse, mais un peu trouble et irnpar-
faiete ... " (II: xvii, 64Ia). Classical authors may support his opinions,
and he freely ealls on them when they do; but th ey do not originate
his ideas, for that he alone can do. One of the advantages of having
a mind unduttered by learning is that the judgment is free to excrcise
itself without reference to authority.
Which then is the case? Is Montaigne'sjudgment humble and willing
to submit to authority, or free from the rule of the judgment and
example of others? There is no simple answer. \\"henever it is a matter
of obedienee to religious or political authority, the essayist always
would rather submit. Not only is such a course easier, but he genuinely
feels that it is reverent and unpresumptuous. In most cases there will
be no dash between his personal integrity and the dictates of authority,
particularly ecdesiastical authority, to which he always submits. 1 In
politics, he obeys the legitimate powers, or avoids public life and re-
sponsibility wherever possible. In matters of opinion, he maintains
with increasing assuranee his absolute independence - which, he say:;
again and again, is not to daim that he is necessarily right, only that
he is necessarily himself, even to the point of condemning himself.
"Le jugement tient chez moy un siege magistral, au moins il s'en
dforce soingneusement; il laisse mes appetits aller leur trein, et la
haine et l'amitie, voire et celle queje me porte a moy mesme, sans s'en
alterer et corrompre. S'il ne peut reformer les autres parties sel on soy,
au r:l.oins ne se laisse il pas difformer a elles; il fait son jeu a part"
(III: xiii, I052b).
In the essays of 1578-80, which are so concerned with elaborating
the id ea of judgment (more so even than the later ones), it is to be
expected that reason would be given rather short shrift; and such is
the case. Much of what is said simply repeats thernes al ready familiar.
Montaigne's disbelief in the sciences of his day is given its strongest
expression in "De la ressemblance :-les enfans aux peres" (II: xxxvii),
where medicine receives lengthy and devastating treatment. Re is
sure that nature has provided medicines for our maladies, but he
doubts very much that man has found them, and he is persuaded that
most of the science of the medical professian is worthless. The doctors
1 See for example III: ii, 784b: "Exeusons iey ee que je dy souvent, que je me repens
rarement; adjoustant tousjours ee refrein, non un refrein de eeremonie, mais de naifve et
essentieHe submission; que je parle enquerant et ignorant, me rapportant de la resolution,
purement et simplement, aux ereanees communes et legitimes. Je n'enseigne point, je
raeonte."
 THE NEW KNOWLEDGE

themselves are indisereet enough to furnish the greatest proof of this

by their constant quarrels and disagreements amongst themselves.
For every plausible prescription of theirs Montaigne can supply an
equally plausible one proposing exactly the opposite regime. His
experience at the baths has taught him just how little unanimity there
is in the regimens recommended. The physicians' subject is so complex,
and their remedies so specific, that it hardly seems possible that they
do not go wrong frequently. Montaigne imagines a drug administered
for the purpose of cooIing the kidney becoming confused or lost and
not arriving at its destination or malfunctioning one e there. Generally
speaking, experience does not show that patients recover any more
promptly or frequently than those who do without benefit of the medi-
cal profession, such as Montaigne's family or the common peopIe.
This essay proposes a whole grab-bag of reasons for lack of confidenee
in doctors, some of which rely on experience, while others indude a
rather thorough case against the inevitable ignorance of doctors.
"Des cannibales" (1: xxxi) resumes in a new context the idea that
reas on is so ensIaved by custom that it cannot see or evaluate dearly
anything unfamiliar; "de vray il semble que nous n'avons autre mire
de la veri te et de la raison que l'exempIe et idee des opinions et
usances du pais ou nous sommes" (p. '203a). 'Ve call the cannibaIs
barbarous, when in point of fact their life in the state of nature often
surpasses all our civilization in health, simpIicity, and virtue.
"De la cru au te" (II: xi) begins with an interesting introduction on
the topic of virtue. Following standard dassical doctrine, the essayist
distinguishes virtue, the product of exertion, from simpIe, inna te
goodness, which seems less admirable to him because it is not the
result of reason's work. But Montaigne stops himself and admits
that it suddenly occurs to him that if this were true, Socrates, the
greatest soul he knows, could not qualify as virtuous. Socrates seems
so far above the others that it would be inappropriate to imagine that
he had to make an effort to attain virtue. lnstead, he seems to have
had a noble nature whose greatest pleasure lay in simply being virtu-
ous. Thus, there are three dasses of good men: the naturally innocent,
who are good by temperament and without refleetion, the virtuous,
who achieve grandeur by the exertion of their reason against their
passions, and the truly extraordinary souls in whom reason and virtue
are wedded without effort. NaturaIness, virtue, and high-mindedness
mayall resemble each other. This leayes open the possibility that the
way to true virtue li es not through reason exdusively, but perhaps
 THE NEW KNOWLEDGE

through a temperamental conditioning that approximates Socrates'

innocence. The language of this essay shows that Montaigne's earlier
concepts of virtue have been modified without being entirely a-
bandoned. His initial reaction is still that the stoic humanists have the
recipe for virtue through the tlexing of the reason in a struggle against
natural passions. And this kind of thinking recurs throughout the
essay. He even says once of Socrates that he had corrected his own
naturally evil tendencies. But the general tenor of his thinking here is
to qualify and amplify the idea of virtue. Austere self-discipline no
longer seems the highest form of goodness; it is onlyone of three.
Reason no longer has the monopoly on goodness; and even gr anti ng
it a certain role, Montaigne says that he does not find it difficult at all
to believe that the passions can be controlled. All in all, then, stoic
humanism does not come off very weU; where it once reigned, it is
nowonly one of sever al alternatives, and not the most admired of thern.!
In one essay in particular, "De l'affection des peres aux enfans"
(II: viii), reason comes back into its own as the antidote to unregulated
natural passions. If such a thing as a natural law exists, Montaigne
supposes that the first such law would be that every creature seeks its
own good, and the second that every creature loves its offspring
with a particularly strong affection. He disapproves of this paternal
lOve when it is immoderate. Since our natural inclination may weU be
excessive if it is not regulated by reason, God has endowed man with
"quelque capacite de discours" so that he may aet aceording to the
liberty of his judgment, and not follow the dietates of nature blindly
as animals do. "La seule raison doit avoir la conduite de nos incli-
nations" (p. 366a). If a child (or a parent) behaves in a way worthy of
our love, then we may yield to our natural movements because they
are reinforced by reason. 2 On the other hand, the passions of nature
should not prevail so overwhelmingly that we excuse our children's
failings indiscriminately. The correet relationship is one of love for
them as children and respeet for them as human beings if they deserve
it. "J'ay, de ma part, la goust estrangement mousse a ees propensions
qui sont produites en nous sans l'ordonnance et entremise de nostre
jugement" (p. 366a). What concerns us particularly is the very strong
expression of the id ea that nature (or natural passions) must be regu-

1 For further remarks against the Stoics, see II: xxxiii, 711-712a; II: x.xxvii, 738-739a,
74oa .
2 The same idea appears in II: x.xxvii, 742a where Montaigne remarks that any natural
propensity (he is speaking of his distrust of doctors) is vicious unIess reason agrees with it.
 THE NEW KNOWLEDGE 133

lated by reason. There is little mention of the word "judgment" in

this essay, somewhat surprisingly sinee judgment is the faculty that
evaluates the worth of human beings.l The opposition is clearly
drawn between nature and reason, and it is just as clearly reason that is
preferred. Such a position is rather unusual in the later essays, where
the follies of human reason are frequently contrasted to the benevo-
lence and wisdom of nature. In other essays, for example "De la
colere" (II: xxxi, 6g2a) it is the judgment that is troubled by passions.
But here, when seeking an instrument to counteract the effects of
instinct, Montaigne finds in reason the most obvious ally. This is not
precisely the same role that was assigned to reason in the Senecan
essays, where it counteracted the effects of hardship; but it is one that
reminds us of Stoic or Epicurean doetrines of virtue.
"De l'institution des enfans" (I: xxvi) proposes the sort of education
that a man with only a limited faith in learning or reason could
espouse. Montaignc is decidedly not interested in the academic
curriculum of his student. To his way of thinking the education of his
day dwelt too much on purely verb al skills intended to teach the
pupil to speak and write correctly. Montaigne prefers to teach him
to think and act correctly. The objeet of education, after all, is not to
produee a scholar, but a man; henee, an adequate tutor will devote
himself to the physical, social, and moral formation of his pupil as
mu ch as to his intelleetual development. Filling his memory with the
ideas of the philosophers is to no avail if he cannot make use of them
and j udge them.
Il faut qu'il emboive leurs humeurs, non qu'il apprenne leurs preeeptes.
Et qu'il oublie hardiment, s'il veut, d'ou illes tient, mais qu'il se les sc;aehe
approprier. La verite et la raison sont communes a un ehaeun, et ne sont
non pIus a qui les a dites premierement, qu'a qui les diet apres. Les abeilles
pillotent dec;:a dela les fieurs, mais elles en fo nt apres le miel, qui est tout
leur; ee n'est pIus thin ny marjolaine: ainsi les pieces empruntees d'autruy,
il les transformera et confondera, pour en faire un ouvrage tout sien: a
sc;avoir son jugement. Son institution, son travail et estude ne vis e qu'a le
former (pp. 150-15Ia).
A sound judgment is the hallmark of an edueated man. To this end,
readings in historyand travel in foreign lands will furnish the young
mind with a variety of human experienees. "Tant d'humeurs, de
seetes, de jugemens, d'opinions, de loix et de eoustumes nous ap-
prennent ajuger sainement des nostres; et apprennent nostrejugement

1 See for example II: i, 321a and III: xiii, 1055b.

134 THE NEW KNOWLEDGE

a reconnoistre son imperfection et sa naturelle foiblesse; q ui n' est pas

un leger apprentissage" (p. 157a). The most important thing in the
development of a healthy judgment is to teach it not to be opinionated.
"Qu'on luy propose cette diversite de jugemens: il choisira s'il peut,
sinon il en demeurera en doute" (p. 150a). The pupil will Iearn that
he can be at fault, and that he must yield gracefully as soon as he
recognizes his error. "Qu'on luy face entendre que de confesser la
faute qu'il descouvrira en son propre discours, eneare qu'elle ne soit
aperceue que par luy, c'est un effect de jugement et de sincerite,
qui sont les principales parties qu'il cherche" (p. 154a). Needless
to say, this is a pedagogy founded on basically skeptical attitudes;
it seeks to produce an open mind. This mind will not necessarily be
empty at all. Montaigne is persuaded that once his pupil's judgment
has been formed, he will pick up rapidly the necessary elements of
formaI learning with little effort. Anyway, book-Iearning is super-
fluous for a man who knows how to limit himself to a natural life. The
subtleties of false logic will only make him laugh and he will not even
bother to try to refute sophistry.
Philosophy will serve to guide him in his moral evolution. By
philosophy Montaigne does not mean speculative metaphysics, but
the gay science of intellectual inquiry. The jovial discussion of serious
matters such as one finds in Plato's Symposium is the best image of
true philosophy.l And the virtue it inculcates is high-spirited without
being light-headed. In this we see a newoptimism, strikingly different
froIT' the apprehension of the Senecan essays and the gloom of some
of the pages of the "Apologie." Montaigne believes firmly that the
proper educatian will produce a man ofsoundjudgment and cheerful
prabity, and that there will be nothing arduous in this education. In
an addition made after 1588 he advises the tutor to strangle his
student or put him out to pasture if he shows so perverse a nature that
he does not love valor and virtue, but the temper of the great majority
of the essay is undeniably optimistic about the value of educatian and
its ability to achieve its goal to teach a young man "to know him-
self, and to know how to die weIl and to live weIl." Montaigne's

I Several passage. of I: xxvi are devoted to eulogies of philosophy and its usefulness in
morat education. Setting as his goal the cultivation of a soundjudgment, :\Ilontaigne inevitably
indudes a certain interest in developing his pupil's discursive faculties, among them reason.
In later additions to this essay, we find some very strong assertions in favor of the rational
direction ofbehavior (note that this means practical reason, not speculative reason). In the a
version, however, it is surprising how carefuIly Montaigne concentrates on judgment and
avoids reason.
 THE NEW KNOWLEDGE 135

intelleetual Pyrrhonism li es at the base of his concept of an edueated

mind, but it has joined forees with a moral confidenee and assuranee
(not dogmatism) that eannot be found in the earlier essays.
The essays of 1578-80, then, are thoroughly impregnated with the
lessons of skeptieism, but they advanee beyond the merely intelleetual
appreeiation of Pyrrhonism to the praetieal matter of building a
philosophy ofliving around self-knowledge and the faculty ofjudgment.
It remains only to point out that the newart form that Montaigne
evolved for the expression of his ideas, the essay, is closely related to
his skeptieism. In the first essays, he aets as an almost anonymous
eompiler assembling aneedotes assiduously, but exereising hisjudgment
very little. When he reeasts the ideas of the dogmatist Seneca, he
refrains rather earefully from injeeting his own personality into his
works. The influenee of the more various, subtle, and unassertive mind
of Plutareh may have had so me effeet in opening up the gates of self-
expression as his authority eame to outweigh the more die ta tori al
Stoieism of Seneea. But generally speaking, it is only after the "A-
pologie" that he beeomes aware of the original proeedures of the essay
form. Having repudiated the reality of absolute truth, he speaks now
of the reality of his self. He is liberated from the onus of being right,
and may be merely Montaigne. So long as he keeps in mind that he
is expressing only his own moral eonclusions, he is free to play the
role of the moralist. "Ce n'est pas ici ma doetrine, e'est mon estude;
et n'est pas la le<;on d'autruy, e'est la mienne" (II: vi, 357a). "Car
aussi ee sont ici mes humeurs et opinions; je les donne pour ee qui est
en ma creanee, non pom ee qui est a croire. J e ne vise iey qu'a de-
eouvrir moy mesmes, qui seray par adventure autre demain, si
nouveau apprentissage me ehange. Je n'ay point l'authorite d'estre
creu, ny ne le desire, me sentant trop mal instruit pour instruire
autruy" (I: xxvi, 147a). Only in a handful of essays of the 1580 edition
is Montaigne fully aware of the novelty of \vhat he is doing, but in
them he sees clearly the implieations of his method. He is making
trials ("essais") of his judgment (I: 1, 28ga; II: xvii, 637a) or of his
naturalfaculties (1:xxvi, 14Sa). Any subjeet will do; for if it is a
thorny one, he will go as deep into it as he ean, but no farther, thereby
showing that he has the judgment not to overextend himself. If it is
a slight matter, he may be able to give it some solidity or see it from
so me unusual angle (I: 1, 28ga; II: xvii, 62 la).
What is most eharaeteristie of Montaigne's essais of his judgment
is his deep sense of the faet that inseribing his opinions is also por-
 THE NEW KNOWLEDGE

traying himself, or in other words, that the only truth he can com-
municate with absolute certainty is the truth about himself. He might
have contented himself with conveying undogmatically his ideas or
judgments as a Pyrrhonist observer of the human condition; but he
does not; he goes mu ch farther and in "De la pnesumption" gives a
physical and mental portrait of Michel de Montaigne. He is aware that
in doing this he is undertaking a newand unprecedented enterprise,
full of difficulty (II: vi, 3S8c) . No reason ean be given for his self-
portrait other than the paramount need he felt to eommunieate
himself. In 1580, though still relatively new at the art of self-por-
traiture, he eould affirm that he was himself the subject of his book
("Au leeteur"). In fact, that was only partly true. A whole series of
shorter essays, mostly in Book I, did not betray the personality of
their author any more than the average anthology of lefons did. But
Montaigne had become conscious in the last years that he intended
above all to write about himself. To regard Montaigne simply as a
moralist or to esteem that his real intent is primarily to edify his
readers is to falsify OT negleet his most truly original achievement and
to underevaluate his repeated declarations that he is not teaching so
much as displaying himself. No artist in hil>tory has succeeded as
Montaigne did in self-portraiture. Self-consciousness, self-awareness,
and self-study were his credo and his profoundest experience. They
resulted, in part at least, from his Pyrrhonist realization that the
world outside himself must remain alien to him. Without this skep-
tical persuasion he might never have come to self-portraiture. It was
a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of the "essai." His often
reiterated admissions of his own ignorance, his insistence that he
does not me an to teach, but to portray, his conviction that he is
merely putting his own judgment to the test, the consequent liberty
he feels to discuss anything and to be completely personal, all these
are intimately associated in his mind with the refusal to be dogmatic.
If he could not speak with assuranee of what lay outside himself, he
could speak of Michel de Montaigne; indeed, he had no choice. An
author who writes about himself may place great value on that self,
or may present it as the only thing he knows. A self-portrait, if it is not
to be the work of an egomaniac, must almost inevitably be of a skeptic.
 CHAPTER VI

THE FIN AL ESSA YS

In 1580 Montaigne had accounted for his book by saying that it

was intended really as arecord for his family and friends (II: xviii,
647a). If he published it, he daimed that it was in part only to save
himself the trouble of recopying manuscripts (ibid., n. 5). Later,
however, stimulated by the success of the first edition,l he feIt much
less need to apologize for writing about himself. If nothing else, it had
helped to occupy him; and it had made him a more meditative reader
as he sought dassical authorities to corroborate his opinions (II: xviii,
647-648c). Moreover, his study of himself had the surprising effect of
stabilizing, perhaps even reshaping that very self. "Moulant sur moy
cette figure, il m'a fallu si souvent dresser et composer pour m'ex-
traire, que le patron s'en est fermy et aucunement forme soy-mesmes.
Me peignant pour autruy je me suis peint en moy de couleurs pIus
nel:tes que n'estoyent les miennes premieres" (ibid.).
Self-study is undoubtedly the fundamental lesson conveyed by the
Essais. And in the later editions Montaigne is conscious that it is a
universallesson applicable to all mankind, not just a faney of his own.
In 1580 he had been hesitant to dedare the universality of his book.
One essay, "De la pra:sumption" (II: xvii), affirms in a parenthetical
remark (p. 617a) that the subject of his study is man, but later on
(p. 636a, n. 4) states that his subject is himself, a more aecurate esti-
mate of that particular essay. The most basic evolution in his thought
between the last essays of 1580 and those of the later editions lies in
his conviction that what he has learned about himself belongs to all
mankind. Although he is writing about himself, he envisions a larger
audience for his work, and composes it "non sans dessein de publique
instruction" (II: xviii, 648c).
1 See Villey, Les SOUTces et /'ivolutian des Essais de Montaigne, II, 244-248, and Frame,
Montaigne's Discovery of Man, pp. 120-124.
 THE FINAL ESSAYS

His credentials as a teacher for humankind are founded on the fact

that every man bears within him the entire form of the human con-
dition (III: ii, 782b). If this were not true, the knowledge gained by
his study of Michel de Montaigne could not be extended to apply to
others. Moreover, even an undistinguished life such as his (this after
having been mayor of Bordeaux for two terrns) contains lesson enough
for a good student.1 Given these conditions, he mayelaim with modesty
to furnish instruction for others, not just for himself. If nothing else,
he can provide a good example of what to avoid by publishing his
imperfections (III: viii, 8ggb and III: xiii, I056b). And his self-con-
fession may inspire others to look more carefully at themselves
(III: v, 822b, e).
All in all, he feels that other studies are without comparison less
useful than his own (II: vi, 358c). In fact, he has learned so much
about human nature by listening to his own that he can elaim to
be a passable judge of people; on occasion he has even proven to
know other people better than they knew themselves. Hence, he could
recommend himself for the position of personal advisor to a sovereign,
having as he does the requisite honesty and judgment to talk frankly
to his ruler, not scholastically or systematically, but as an observer of
the king's smallest actions, capable of reading their inner motivations
and weighing the effect they produce on others.
All this amounts to the fact that Montaigne does have a kind of
knowledge that goes beyond self-awareness. Being, both his own and
other men's, is no longer a elosed book to him. Though subject to a
great many limitations, this knowledge embodies a denial of the total
Pyrrhonism of the "Apologie." And yet, it remains consonant with the
findings of that essay in many ways.
The first and major limitation on the universality of his knowledge
is that each man differs from every other in some way. The very
essay stating that every man bears the entire form of the human con-
dition also admits that each man, if he listens elosely, will find in
himself a "forme sienne, une forme maistresse" (III: ii, 78gb). If I
understand Montaigne here, he is speaking of an inborn temperament
that constitutes our own nature as opposed to human nature. This is
something ineradicable. Philosophy, education, and custom cannot

1 See suprn, pp. 125-126. The difference between the attitudes of 1580 and later is pretty
clearly that at first Montaigne sees in a humble life material enough to exercise one's
judgment; later he sees in it material enough to know all human nature and to lead a fuIly
human life, even more full in some ways than a public life.
 THE FINAL ESSAYS

uproot it, though they may perhaps modify it (III: ii, 788b).
And it is something that no one but ourselyes can know. "Il n'y
a que vous qui sc;ache si vous estes lache et cruel, ou loyal et de-
votieux; les autres ne vous voyent poinct, ils vous devinent par con-
jcctures incertaines; ils voyent non tant vostre nature que vostre
art" (III: ii, 78Sb). The most important practical result of this is that
each man must find his own way to conduct his life. However general
the laws of wisdom or morality may be, they will have different
applications for different men. "Puis que la philosophie n'a sc;eu
trouver aucune voyc pour la tranquillite, qui fust bonne en commun,
que chacun la cherche en son particulier!" (II: xvi, 60S-606c.)
Certain examples of moral heroism, such as the elassical sages or
Christian saints, remain far enough distant from :\lontaigne's nature
for him to recognize that his judgment must accept them for what
th ey are and not hope to be able to know them weil enough to imitate
them. In a similar manner the truly ignorant or unthinking people
are quite diffcrent from him, though far eloser than the great souls.
vVith a modesty that does not seem feigned to me, he admits that his
"maistresse forme" is his ignorance (I: 1, 290c). Perhaps he is bettcr for
being aware of his own inanity; he doesn't know (III: ix, 979b). To
whatever degree he abandons skepticism in the light of his new know-
Iedge, the great majority of his statements tend to place considerable
restrictions on this knowledge. It must be partial in so far as each man
is different from every other man. And ifit is wise, it will always admit
its ~wn ignorance; for that is one thing all men share.
Both the later essays and the Journal de Vlij'age provide multiple
evidence that Pyrrhonism and fideism where permanent parts of
Montaigne's make-up. The special interest of the Journal is that its
author never suspected that it would be published or read by anyone
other than himself; therefore, he had no reason to dissemble or to
pretend to be more modest than he was, especially in the sections he
did not dictate to his secretary, but composed himself. The Journal
provides some of the strongest evidence in support of Montaigne's
personal faith. l We see him attending mass and taking communion
on several occasions. In Rome during Holy vVeek he spent five hours
visiting the seven churches recommended as penance procedure. He

1 For a recent exchange on l'vlontaigne's religious practices, see Henri Busson's "La
Pratique religieuse de Montaigne," Bibliotheque d'HumaTlisme et de Renaissance, XVI (1954),
86-95, and Dreano's amwer, with comments by Busson, ibid., 212-217. Both believe in
Montaigne's religious sincerity, but differ as to how profoundly Christian he was.
 THE FINAL ESSAYS

was scandalized at the talking and nonchalant behavior of the dergy

during masses he attended (lV, 1206). He remarked on the pleasurable
pastimes of attending sermons and theologieal arguments (lV, 1230).
At every stage of his journey he showed his euriosity about the loe al
religious monuments and praetiees, whether Catholie, Protestant,
or Jewish. While in Rome, he witnessed a eircumcision (lV, 1214-15).
In Germany he noted the disagreement among Lutherans over the
interpretation of their founder's doetrines, and the animosity between
Lutheranism and other Protestant seets (lV, 1148-51). He reeords
one theologieal diseussion that he had with a Lutheran over the
nature of God's presenee in the bread and wine (lV, 1148). He had
learned from previous talks with Calvinists that eertain followers of
Luther felI into the error of ubiquitism, namely they alIowed God's
presenee in the universe everywhere, thereby denying the speeial
miraeulous quality of the host. As a fideist, Montaigne would feel that
this was yet another example of how reason goes as tr ay when it treats
abstruse questions of dogma. It is interesting to see him diseussing
such a teehnical point in theology. Despite several disclaimers in the
Essais, Montaigne was obviously not totally averse to theological
debates. The overwhelming impression created by his actions during
his trip is that it is quite impossible to give mu ch credit to the accu-
~ation that he harbored any hostility towards Christianity.
Little in the Journal is specificalIy skeptical. Montaigne remarks on
how vai n a thing medicine is (lV, 1271). He enjoys collecting the
doctl)rs' contradictory opinions on how to make use of the various
watering places he visits. He was delighted when a young Italian lord
insisted that he act as arbitrator between consulting physicians (lV,
1285).
Mirades are mentioned on numerous oecasions. lVlontaigne or his
secretary repeat, without approving or denying them, the miraculous
legends attached to churches they visit. l At Loreto there are innumer-
able accounts of mirades reeorded in annals (lV, 1249), but what
interests Montaigne partieularly is the most reeent ones. The only
miraeulous event related in the entire Journal that he seems to have
accepted as genuine is the case of a young Freneh nobleman who had
suffered long from a painfully swollen knee that the surgeons of Paris
and Italy had been unable to cure (lV, 1250). During a previous visit
to Loreto, he had dream ed one night that he was cured, only to awake
1 Dreano lists at length the allusions to miraeulous events, La Pensee religieuse de Montaigne,
pp. 299-3 0 3.
 THE FINAL ESSAYS

and find that it was so. Both he and his retinue could vouch for the
truth of his account. After careful inquiry, Montaigne condudes "il
n'est possible de mieux ny pIus exactemant former l'effaict d'un
mirade" (JV, 1250). In the following sentences, with much more
reserve, he notes that multilingual versions of the miraculous transpor-
tation of the little house, allegedly the one in which J es us was born,
could be read in Loreto. This mirade, in no way verifiable, does not
interest him as much as the experience of the nobleman. The Journal
indicates that its author was constantly interested in miraculous events,
that he inquired about them frequently, that he usually noted that
they were allegations, not proven facts, but that he nowhere denied
their possibility. He seems more prone to believe in natural mirades,
such as cures, than in supernatural ones. His curiosity is aroused; his
judgment stays suspended.
His account of an exorcism he witnessed at Rome is singularly ob-
jective, so much so that one might weIl suspect that he was not very
convinced by the proceedings. The disquisition of the prelate on his
experiences in exorclSlng spmts does not seem to have impressed
Montaigne, and may even have caused some ironic refiections on
his part.
Et a dix ou douze jantil'hommes qui estions la, fit plusieurs eontes de eest
seianee et des experianees ordineres qu'il en avoit, et notamment que, le
jour avant il avoit deseharge une fame d'un gros diable, qui, en sortant,
poussa hors eeste fame par la bouehe des elOtiS, des epingles et une touffe
de son poil. Et paree qu'on Iui respondit qu'elle n'estoit pas eneore du tout
rassise, il dit que e'estoit une autre sorte d'esperit pIus Iegier et moins
malfaisant, qui s'y etoit remis ee matin-Ia; mais que ee janre, ear il en s<;ait
Ies noms, les divisions et pIus partieulieres distinetions, estoit aise a eseon-
jurer (JV, 12 I 9-20).
Nothing in the Journal shows Montaigne being too credulous about
relations of supernatural events, and nothing shows him being a
disbeliever. As far as we can teIl, his attitude seems quite like what one
would expect from reading the Essais in I580.
In the Essais themselves we find that the additions made to the
"Apologie" after I580 likewise do not show any modification of the
ideas originally expressed. In general, the argument of the senses and
the comparison of man to the animaIs receive the least augmentation.
Under the infiuence of his reading of Cicero's Academica Montaigne
made considerable elaborations on his defense of Pyrrhonism (pp.
484-488b, c).l The longest intercalated passage (pp. 5IO-517b, e)
1 See Villey's Sourccs et ivolution, I, 100-104 and II, 3°9-315. Villey concludes that
 THE FINAL ESSAYS

reinforees his fideism by eontinued sareasms about the rational

arguments of theologians'!
Among the essays of Book III, three apply speeifieally to the
question of human knowledge. The most thoroughly skeptieal of these
is the short essay "Des boyteux" (III: xi); and yet, surprisinglyenough,
it is the one that is most frequently eited as proof that Montaigne's
rationalism is aseendant in his later years. 2 In the eonclusion of the
essay, Montaigne states that if the dogmatists go to one extreme in
their assuranee, Carneades goes to the opposite extreme in his pro-
fession of total ignoranee. Man is immoderate in all things and knows
no limit to his fancies. Villey (Sources, II, 3 I I) and Zeitlin (Essays,
III, 416) eonsider this remark evidenee that Montaigne is no longer
willi ng to associate himself with Pyrrhonism. This is making a foot
out of six inches. Carneades was not a Pyrrhonist, but an Aeademie;
and the theory Montaigne is diseussing is Aeademie skeptieism. In
the "Apologie" he had made a fairly clear distinetion between the two
sehools; and, as we sh all see, several erueial eomments in Book III
eontinue the distinetion (whether eonseiously or uneonseiously).
Even if the closing paragraph of "Des boyteux" denounees Carneades
for his exeessive point of view, it is mare than obvious that epistemo-
logieally Montaigne's opinion in this essay is pure fideistie Pyrrhonism.
The introduetory paragraphs express his mild amusement that the
ealendar has just undergone yet another reform, the second he had
known in his life. In October 1582 ten days were omitted in order to
reetify errors in the ealeulation of the solstiees. The ehange was tan ta-
mo unt to moving both heaven and earth, and yet it had no effeet what-
soever on daily life; farmers still knew when to plant; merehants still
knew what day was market day. Nobody knew there had been an
error; nobody feIt any improvement in the new ealendar. "Tant il
y a d'ineertitude par tout, tant nostre apereevanee est grossiere"
(p. I003b). How weak our reason and its learning must be if it cannot

Montaigne's position shifts from Pyrrhonism to a beliefin the "relativity" of our knowledge.
The distinetion is not entirely c1ear to me. Be that as it may, it is not the additions to the
"Apologie" that provide evidenee to eonfirm Villey's opinion. So me of the strongest
insertions are in the most Pyrrhonistie pages.
1 Janssen maintains, eorreetly I believe, that rvlontaigne's fideism never ehanges. Among
other additions to the "Apologie" he eites a slight but signifieant ehange made after 1588.
vVhere the text had read that we must not expeet that human arguments ean "parfaire" the
divine knowledge of leligion, l\tlontaigne substituted "atteindre il" for "parfaire." This
e1irninates any possible misunderstanding of his point. For the a text, see Supra, p. 70.
2 Zeitlin's eomments in his translation of the Ess~ys, III, 407-.p6, give a good summary of
the historieal baekground of this essay; but they exaggerate Montaigne's rationalism. Villey,
too, it seerns to me, has a tendeney to misconstrue this essay: Sourees et ivolution, II, 344-353.
 THE FINAL ESSA YS 143

even measure a year after so many years. In this ease it really does not
matter very mueh beeause life will go on just as weIl whether the
ealendar is right or not.
The same is not true in matters of witeheraft, for there a human life
may be quite literally at stake. Montaigne emphasizes the gravity of
soreery trials. "A tuer les gens, il faut une darte lumineuse et nette;
et est nostre vie trop reele et essentielle pour garantir ees aeeidens
supematurels et fantastiques" (p. IOogb). It is undoubtedly this hu-
manitarian eoneem that makes him take a stand in this essay quite
different from the average one of his day when some of the eruelest
witeh hunts of European history to ok place. Jean Bodin, hardly one
of the least enlightened mind s of his time, was a demon when it eame
to demonology and proposed that even those who did not believe in
the existenee of soreerers should be punished. Montaigne eoneeivably
has this remark of Bodin's in mind when he writes that some authors
would forbid him to doubt.
He is rather eautious not to ehallenge the public laws against
witeheraft. "Qui mettroit mes resveries en eompte au prejudiee de la
pIus ehetive loy de son village, ou opinion, ou eoustume, il se feroit
grand to rt, et eneores autant a moy" (p. IOIOb). He is only arguingthe
other side of the ease as best he ean in order to enlighten his reader's
judgment, not to bind it. This sounds a little speeious. One must
remember, however, that ;\Iontaigne was always loath to propose
any ehange in law. The one suggestion he does make here is that it
miJht bc wise to allow eourts of law to admit that they did not see
any way to understand eertain diffieult cases. They eould then legally
suspend judgment (p. I008b). After all, Montaigne will aeeomplish
pretty mueh all he needs if he ean dispose his reader's judgment to
doubt flimsy evidenee of "viteheraft and then appeal to his sense of
humanity in hopes that it will hesitate to pass sentenees of death. He
spares no argument in this eause.
He does not doubt that soreerers may exist. Seripture is dear on
that point, giving "tres eertains et irrefragables exemples" (p. I008b).
God's word eannot be questioned, but perhaps His word is the only
sure witness to a mirade. "Il me semble qu'on est pardonnable de
meseroire une merveille, autant au moins qu'on peut en destourner et
elider la verifieation par voie non merveilleuse. Et suis l'advis de sainet
Augustin, qu'il vaut mieux paneher vers le doute que vers l'asseuranee
es choses de diffieile preuve et dangereuse ereanee" (p. IOogb). Mirades
 THE FINAL ESSAYS

in matters of faith only, and demonstrated in the manner of faith only,

that is the position that seems best to Montaigne.1
It is a question of faet, not a question of law, that is at issue here.
And facts are not as easy to demonstrate as one might think. First, we
must be sure that an aUeged event aetuaUy took place. Reason often
gives systematic aeeounts of events that never oeeurred, for it is
capable of eonstrueting whole worlds without the least solidity. The
vanity and emptiness of baseless reasoning conform so weU to the
vanity and emptiness of our own nature that humans let themselves
be taken in without the least resistanee. The basis of an ineredible
story may be no more than the slightest of aetualities. Montaigne
understands weU the psyehology of the teUer of taU tales, for he
himself will elaborate on his own stories to make them seem persuasive.
All men, reeognizing where the weakness li es in their tales, pateh
them up or beeome espeeiaUy assertive on that partieular point. The
resuIt is that the last man to hear the tal e is mo re informed and more
affirmative than the first. In some instanees, instead of arguing
against so-eaUed evidenee, Montaigne would eut the Gordian knot
and fiady deny the allegations (p. IO rob). Assertiveness always raises
his haekles. "On me fait hayr les choses vray-semblables quand on me
les plante pour infallibles.J'ayme ees mots, qui amollissent et moderent
la temerite de nos propositions: A l'avanture, Aueunement, Quelque,
On diet, J e pense, et semblables" (p. ro07b). If anyone ehaUenges
Montaigne, he willingly reverts to serupulous honesty; but he finds in
diseussions with others that most men are offended when you are
ineredulous or prefer not to believe their aUegations.
In cases ofsoreery, must we believe a man who himselfis amazed by
what he relates? Montaigne has heard all sorts oftales about wondrous
events, men seen at one place in the morning and at another very far
away that same evening. But isn't it easier to believe that two men
have lied, or been eonfused, than to believe that a human being has
been borne from east to west on a broom? Several years earlier,
Montaigne had had the opportunity of examining a self-eonfessed
witeh. Re heard her storyand the proofs offered against her, but he

1 In III: viii, 921--922b, Montaigne had agreed to accept the word of a respectable
authority - here Tacitus - when it recounts a miraculous event. It is obvious that he finds it
hard to credit everything Tacitus says and pleads as an excuse for his author that the role of
historian required him to register popular beliefs about Vespasian, whether true or not.
Montaigne is repeating his earlier admonition to give credence to certain authorities only
(see supra, p. 44). At the same time, he is admitting that these authorities do not always
guarantee the accuracy of reports they repeat.
 THE FINAL ESSAYS

could only condude that she needed hellebore (a cure for insanity)
more than hemlock. Even confessions are not enough to convince him
of sorcery; after all, he has heard of people who confessed to poisoning
men who were later fo und alive and healthy. When he hears a tale
surpassing our understanding, Montaigne would advise "que nous
soustenons nostre jugement aussi bien a rejetter qu'a reeevoir" (p.
Ioo7b).1
Allour thinking on the supematural goes wrong. We try to apply
natural standards (reason and experience) to matters that can only be
gu aran teed by supematural testimony; that is to say, we confuse the
realms of the natural and the supematural. On other oecasions we
fabricate mirades where none exist. Finally, we persist in overlooking
the truly incomprehensible (or miraculous) things of which we do have
real evidenee. "J usques a cette heure, tous ees mirades et evenemens
estranges se cachent devant moy. Je n'ay veu monstre et mirade au
monde pIus expres que moy-mesme. On s'apprivoise a toute estrangete
par l'usage et le temps; mais pIus je me hante et me connois, pIus ma
difformite m'estonne, moinsje m'entens en moy" (p. IOo6b). A human
being is mirade enough without our attributing superhuman q ualities
to a sorcerer.
The basic difficulty is simply that man by his nature is not given to
know the causes of things. "La cognoissance des causes appartient
seulement a celuy qui a la conduite des choses, non a no us qui n'en
avons que la souffrance, et qui en avons l'usage parfaictement plein,
selon nostre nature, sans en penetrer l'origine et l'essence .... Le
determiner et le s<;avoir, comme le donner, appartient a la regence et
ala maistrise; a l'inferiorite, subjcction et apprentissage appartient le
jouyr, l'accepter" (p. IO03c). This idea, that it is man's lot to receive
and to enjoy, rather than to know or command, permeates the last
essays. It is part of the" (b) ignorance forte et genereuse, qui ne doit
rien en honneur et en courage ala science, (c) ignorance pour laquelle
concevoir il n'y a pas moins de science que pour concevoir la science"
(p. IOo8).
1 Because Montaigne never denies the existence of mirades, but only advises that judg-
ment be suspended, I would call this essay thoroughly Pyrrhonist in spirit. Üthers regard it
as the culminating expressian of the essayist's critical reason. It is certainly an example of
skepticism being used against superstition, but does that make it an example of critical
reason? If so, is there any standard for d~tinguishing skepticism from critical reason? In
I: xxvii, l'vlontaigne used fideist and skeptical arguments to defend belief in miraculous or
incomprehensible things. Here he uses them to attack excessi\e credulity. The conclusions
are somewhat different (only somewhat). The arguments are the same. Pyrrhonism rejects
both rationalbm and credulity. Rationalists do not seem to understand this, and discount
one halfofthe argument; after all, how can a man in his right mind reject their point ofview?
 THE FINAL ESSA YS

The theory of this essay is completely in accord with what Mon-

taigne had written in the "Apologie." Aside from things attested to
by God, nothing can be known by man. Reason is too unstable to be
credited; and most facts are merely allegations by humans, whose fal-
libility is innate. In keeping with his new introspective knowledge
Montaigne does, however, suggest one rather reliable standard for
judging probabilities. It is easy to formulate, but as the rest of the
Essays show, is a far more complicated matter than would at first
seem to be the case. It is simply not to credit anything superhuman
about a human being. Because sorcery is not human, Montaigne is
willing to be especially incredulous about it (p. 100gb). It is par-
ticularly to his credit, given the witch-hunting climate of his day,
that Montaigne's judgment is swayed by considerations not only of
what is human, but of what is humane. "Apres tout, c'est mettre ses
conjectures a bien haut prix que d'en faire cuire un homme tout vif"
(p. rorob).
The two other essays in which Montaigne comments obliquely on his
method for establishing the truth are "De l'art de conferer" (III:
viii) and "De l'experience" (III: xiii). In the first, he calls dis-
cussion the most fruitful and natural exercise of the mind, and gives
the ground rules for a worthwhile discussion. The majority of what
he has to say concems how a gentleman will enter into discourse, but
not a few ofhis comments necessarily bear on the whole matter ofhow
to find the truth. The truth itself is not the only, or even primary,
objective of discussion. 1 However, so me form of truth may turn up,
and Montaigne gladly yields to it. "Je festoie et caresse la verite en
quelque main que je la trouve, et m'y rends alaigrement, et luy tends
mes armes vaineues, de loing que je la vois approcher" (p. g02b).
Without any explanation of how or why, Montaigne assumes that
the truth can be recognized - an assumption that is obviously a
contradiction of much of the "Apologie" and of "Des boyteux."
Other statements in the same essay, however, clearly maintain just
the contrary, namely that we are not bom to attain any solidly
founded truth. "ear no us sommes nais a quester la verite; il appartient
de la posseder a une pIus grand puissance. EIle n' est pas, comme
disoit Democritus, cachee dans le fons des abismes, mais plustost
eslevee en hauteur infinie en la cognoissance divine" (p. go6b). We

1 In III: iii, 802b, the essayist had written that the goaIs of association with "honnestes et
habiles hommes" were "la privaute, frequentation et conference: I'exercice des ame3,
sans autre fruit."
 THE FINAL ESSAYS

must be content with the chase without counting on the catch. Hence
the most important thing for Montaigne is to be sure that a discussion
is conducted well, without tendentiousness.l
The quality that most fits him for proper discussion is his willingness
to abandon his opinions. He holds them lightly and is more roused
than offended by contradiction.
J'entre en eonferenee et en dispute avee grande liberte et faeilite, d'au-
tant que l'opinion trouve en moy le terrein maI propre a y penetrer et y
pousser de hautes ra<;:ines. Nulles propositions m'estonnent, null e ereanee
me blesse, quelque eontrariete qu'elle aye a la mienne. Il n'est si frivole et
si extravagante fantasie qui ne me semble bien sortable a la produetion de
l'esprit humain. Nous autres, qui privons nostre jugement du droict de faire
des arrests, regardons mollement les opinions diverses, et, si no us n'y pres-
tons le jugement, no us y prestons aiseement l'oreille. Ou l'un plat est vuide
du tout en la balanee, je laisse vaeiller l'autre, sous les songes d'une vieille
ep. gorb).
Here again we see Pyrrhonism defending a mitigated credulity. Even
the rankest superstitions, like avoiding thirteen at table, merit some
credit. They count only when absolutely no other consideration
weighs against them, but then th ey do co unt.
Montaigne never wrote a discourse on the method of arriving at
knowledge. The nearest he came to a statement of methodology is
in "De l'experience" (III: xiii), and it is a disappointing one for anyone
looking for a precise and sure system. It has not discouraged critics
from seeing in him a precursor of Baconian scientific empiricism. 2
Actually, it is only the introductory pages of the essay that handIe
questions of knowledge; the main body relates Montaigne's personal
experience of his disease, and then more generally his bodily habits
and dispositions. Much of his subject matter is trivial, but the n his
point seems to be that a great deal of life is nothing more than trivia.
Montaigne starts with the declaration there is no more natural
desire than to have knowledge. Reason and experience are the two

1 There is an obvious analogy here with his ethical doctrines. Since virtue, either Senecan
or Socratic, may not be attainable, let us content ourselyes with order and the absence ofvice.
2 Villey is tempted. See Sourees et ivolution, II, 367-375 and his artide "La Place de
Montaigne dans le mouvement philosophique," Revue Philosophique de la France et de I' EtrangeT,
el (1926),338-359. Lanson, us Essais de Montaigne, pp. 279-282, would have us see in the
essayist the beginnings of both Descartes's rationalism and Bacon's empiricism, but particu-
larly the second. Villey speaks of Montaigne's positivism. Although each is careful not to
exaggerate, I find it very dangerous methodologically to speak ofprecursors. It is no help to
point out that Montaigne's empiricism, such as it was, was too faint-hearted to develop into
full-blown Baconian science. A very good case could be made that the essayist is a forerunner
of Freudian psychology, probably as good a case as either Villey or Lansan makes out in the
matter of Bacon. It would not increase our understanding of Montaigne very much.
 THE FINAL ESSAYS

sources of our knowledge; and if experience is the weaker and less

noble of the two, it does not deserve to be condemned since the truth,
no matter how arrived at, is of paramount importance. This is one
of several commendations of reason to be found in his later writings.
In most of them he is saying that reason may find the good; but
this case is unusual because here, as in the sentence cited from "De
l'art de conferer" (supra, p. 146) he considers it capable of finding the
true. Obviously his attitude towards reason is less suspicious than it had
been in 1575-76. This is especially true when he is speaking in gener-
alizations. '\Nhen he comes to particulars, when he begins to delve into
a subject, in short when he turns to self-portraiture, his tone invariably
changes and he sounds more skeptical. These sentences, the opening
lines of "De l'experience," are pretty much the last kind word Mon-
taigne has to say about reason in a sixty-three page essay. And they
are immediately followed by ten pages that deny quite forcefully that
any significant universal truths can be discovered. 1-Iontaigne may
indeed believe in a general way that reasan can discern the truth; but
when he gets to the heart of the matter, his left hand takes back a great
deal of what his right hand had given out.
Both reason and experience, he says, take on such a diversity of
guises that we cannot tell which one to lay hold of. The one truly
universal quality seems to be variety. "Nature s'est obligee a ne rien
faire autre, qui ne fust dissemblable" (p. 1042C). Montaigne effectively
rules out the possibility of any universal knowledge at all on the
grounds that life is too diversified to be subject to a generallaw.
(b) Comme nul evenement et nulle forme ressemble entierement a une
autre, aussi ne differe nulle de l'autre entierement. (e) Ingenieux meslange
de nature. Si nos faees n'estoient semblables, on ne sryauroit diseerner
I'homme de la beste; si elles n'estoient dissemblables, on ne sryauroit dis-
eerner I'homme de l'homme. (b) Toutes choses se tiennent par quelque
similitude, tout exemple eloehe, et la relation qui se tire de l'experienee est
toujours defaillante et imparfaiete: on joinet toutesfois les eomparaisons
par quelque eoin (p. 1047).
Whatever generalization can be made, and it would seem difficult to
make any, it can give only a partial truth. 1 "Les hommes mescognois-
1 Montaigne's digressive comments make an interesting application of his principle that
no generalization is true in more than a vague way. Positive laws face the same difficulties
as naturallaws. To be really helpfu! both kinds of law should be simple, general, and few in
number. But the facts are too complex to be contained by any system of man-made laws
(except perhaps among innocents like the cannibals). Hence the immense confusion of the
French legal corpus in which laws and their glosses are multiplied ad infinilum. The same
malady plagues the Protestants, who had hoped to curtail doctrinal controversy by making
Scripture their rule of faith. Excessive reasoning corrupts the laws of both govemment and
religion.
 THE FI~AL ESSAYS 149

sent la maladie naturelle de leur esprit: il ne faiet que fureter et

quester, et va sans cesse tournoiant, bastissant et s'empestrant en sa
besongne, comme nos vers de soye, et s'y estouffe" (p. I044b). Giving
this thought a religious turn, as he so often does when speaking of man's
incapacity for knowledge, Montaigne continues, "il n'y a fin en nos
inquisitions; nostre fin est en l'autre monde" (p. 104Sb).
After several paragraphs about his personal experiences with the
law, Nfontaigne turns to his essay's topic by saying that we are
unlikely to gain any profit from the experiences of other unIess we
have learned to benefit from our own experiences, which should
suffice to teach us everything we need know. His lengthy analysis of
the avenues to knowledge concludes not unpredictably with self-
knowledge. "Je m'estudie pIus qu'autre subject. C'est ma metaphi-
sique, c'est ma phisique" (p. 1osob).l
In general then, in 1S88 and later, on the few oecasions when Mon-
taigne takes up matters associated with epistemology, he continues
to speak in skeptical tones, if not always purely Pyrrhonist tones.
Twice we have found him saying that man is born to search for truth,
each time concluding (fideistically, one might maintain) that God
alone knows it. vVhen Montaigne thinks seriously about the limits of
knowlcdge, he invariably returns to his skepticism (as in "De l'ex-
perience"). But when he comes to passing judgment (as in "Des
boy teux") , his general inclination to reserve his judgment is enriched
by his knowledge of human nature. Like many skeptics before him,
he sought some standard of the probable, and the standard he finds
is himself. His study of human nature in himself is supplemented by
the study of history, which gives him the experiences of other men,
but, once again, he always ai ms to apply what he finds in history to
himself. The resuIt of his careful introspection is that he may have a
summary understanding of the human condition, including princi-
pally man's vanity and incapacity for knowledge.
Upon this picture of the human condition, he constructs a way of
living. And it is in his ethics, rather than in his theory of knowledge,
that we will see him showing more confidenee in the accomplishments
of reason. As an instrument for finding the truth, reason is an out-
standing failure. As an instrument for guiding daily conduct, it has
its uses. Montaigne never explicitly makes the distinction between
pure and practical reason, but careful assessment of his use of "la
raison" and allied terms shows that he wrote quite consistently as if
1 The succeeding passages have already been discussed, supra, pp. 125-126.
 THE FINAL ESSA YS

he were aware of the differenee. Reason as a souree of opinions seems

too imaginative and volatile to Montaigne: "le eorps rec;oit les charges
qu'on luy met sus, justement selon qu'elles sont; l'esprit les estant et
les appesantit souvant a ses despens, leur donnant la mesure que bon
luy semble" (III: x, g84b).1 In epistemology, reason's flightiness is a
great drawbaek; in ethics, it may be an advantage. The freedom of
the mind to understand the world in its own way (already mentioned
in the "Apologie," p. 545a) provides man with a tremendous power
ifhe us es it eorreetly.2 The soul may exaggerate minor ineonvenienees
into major iUs; but likewise it may reduee the effeet of major iUs,
until they seem like minor, or at least unavoidable, ineonvenienees.
This does not apply very well to something as substantial as physieal
pain; but even if the saul eannot reduee the pain, it ean eontrol its
attitude towards it (I: xiv, 57-58e, 67e). The attraetive quality of
reason, then, is its freedom. We may have to teaeh our knees to bend,
our reason, never (III: viii, gl 3b). Beeause the most vital part of his
life is the aetivity of his saul (mind, reason, judgment), Montaigne
finds great satisfaetion in its liberty.
In "De l'utile et de l'honneste" (III: i), there is an interestingremark
about liberty and reason. Some prinees require total subservienee to
their demands. To them Montaigne says that he must be asIave only
t0 "la raison," and that he seareely sueeeeds in that. Luekily the laws
help him out by deeiding for him what he must do, and he follows them
as his authority. The question is just exaetly what he means by "la
raisoa" here. We find him using this word in several ways in the
Essais, of whieh two in partieular stand out: (I) "raisan" may refer to
an intelleetual faculty of the mind, or (2) it may designatc what is
appropriate or proportionate. Now, in this passage, Montaigne eannot
mean merely his own intelleet, for "la raison" is some universal of
great enough importanee for him to give it preeedenee over the
authority of his sovereign. Furthermore, he adds that when he cannot
follow "la raison," the law provides apractieal substitute for it; and
yet, think how many times he has pointed out elsewhere that laws are
flagrantly unreasonable (e.g., I: xxiii, I 16a and III: xiii, I047 b). "La
raison" here clearly means "what is right"; its signifieanee is mu ch
eloser to the Latin word "ratio" than to the English word "reason."
Montaigne is saying that he eannot be asIave to kings, but only to

1 Montaigne uses the word "esprit" here. For a quotation using reason in the same sense,
see supra, p. 5 I and the discussion of III: xi.
2 See Frame, Montaigne's Discovery of Man on the "happy paradox." pp. 85-90.
 THE FINAL ESSAYS

what is right. 1 This is one of several passages in which "la raison"

is used in a sense quite similar to Ciceronian "right reason," a sort of
universal or naturallaw that makes what is moderate or appropriate
right. It is at the same time natural, ethical, and rational.
Modern philosophical thought readily admits that ethics is the
least surely verifiable of all human studies. And yet in the history of
thought, rationalism in moral philosophy betrayed considerably
greater staying power than did rationalist physics, theology, or meta-
physics. Philosophers and moralists admitted that th ey could not be
sure what was true before they confessed to being uncertain about
what was good. The undermining of ethical dogmatisn began with
the attack on the concept of universallaw, either natural or positive.
In politics particularly there came to be increasing recognition
of the Machiavellian truth that policyand morality required different
modes of thought, often irreconcilable. Montaigne is among the most
forceful Renaissance thinkers to recognize the relativity of social
morality in law, custom, and politics. In the "Apologie," for example,
he denies that natural laws exist (pp. S4Sa and S63-S64a).2 But in
the majority of the essays, Montaigne tries to draw the line between
public and private morality and hopes to maintain his personal
integrity in the face of the encroachments made upon it by the
realities of the French religious wars. It never seriously occurred to
him to doubt the worth of most of the dassical or Christian virtues. It
must not be forgotten that beyond all the Pyrrhonism of the "Apologie"
lay the essayist's fideist faith in Christianity, perhaps the most morally
oriented of all religions. Montaigne divorced his faith in God from
any rationalist basis. Re never completely succeeded in divorcing his
theory of private moral standards from belief in a kind of reason.
In Book III we find him maintaining in a few instances that there is
in man some sort of instinctual awareness of moral values, and he
calls this reason. In "Du repentir" (III: ii), one of the profoundest
essays, Montaigne writes: "Il n'est vice veritablement vice qui
n'offence, et qu'un jugement entier n'accuse: car il a de la laideur et
incommodite si apparente, qu'a l'advanture ceux-Ia ont raison qui
disent qu'il est principalement produict par bestise et ignorance"
(p. 784b). When a man's vices become apparent to his reason, th ey
1 "What is right" is, of course, one of the base meanings of "la raison" in French. Note
that Montaigne has always felt that following the law, reasonable or unreasonable, was right.
For a particularly strong statement of this in 1588, see III: ix, 934b.
2 A 1588 addition modifies this only slightly when it states that although they probably
do exist, man cannot discover them (p. 564).
 THE FINAL ESSAYS

lllJure it and produee repentanee, whieh is like a raw ulcer in our

eonseienee. Other sorrows reason reduees; it augments repentanee.
\Vhen Montaigne wrote that viee is perhaps the resuIt of ignoranee,
he had good reason to be cautious. The rest of the essay serves to
qualify to a great extent the assertions of the first pages. He realizes
that not all vices are recognized as such by reason; nor do th ey all
produce repentance. Some people seem to have become attached to
deeply rooted sins as aresult either of their deliberations or of their
temperament. In such cases we cannot say that the sinner's reason
and conscience truly condemn his faults; on the contrary, they excuse
them and rationalize them. Reason is powerless in these people; they
therefore lack repentance.
The outcome of his meditations on repentance (which Montaigne
had presented in the first pages of his essay as a manifestation ofreason
in morality) is that it becomes all but impossible of achievement in
most cases, and can rightly apply only to sins that are accidental and
do not eorrespond to our deepest being. For true repentance "il faut
que Dieu nous touche le courage. Il faut que nostre conseience
s'amcnde d'elle mesme par renforcement de nostre raison, non par
l'affoiblissement de nos appetits .... On doibt aymer la temperance
par eIle mesme et pour le respeet de Dieu, qui nous l'a ordonnee, ... "
(p. 795b). In the "Apologie" Montaigne argued that man could not
achieve knowledge without divine grace (which is heretical); here a
somewhat analogous situation applies. Although he allows that either
con~cience or grace may produce repentance (and thereby saves
himselfperhaps from heresy), his personal code comes elose to rejeeting
natural repentanee.
Aetually the virtue that this essay is most concerned with is the
orderliness of a well-regulated life. It is not a matter of the
outstanding vices that reas on recognizes, nor of the extraordinary
virtues of men in high position. If Montaigne succeeds rather weIl
in maintaining order in his life, and he implies that he does, it would
be largely because of a lumpish disposition that is hard to dislodge from
its normal tranquil state, and also perhaps because his sense ofhis own
unity and integrity does not allow him to hide from himself defects of
his nature. This essay, then, is another expression of the need he feels
to keep hisjudgment ofhimselfas uncorrupted as he can. As happens in
"De l'experience," it opens on what seems like an expression of con-
fidenee in reason (here moral reason). But the mo re Montaigne con-
siders the matter, and the more he speaks of himselfrather than ofman
 THE FINAL ESSAYS 153

in general, the mo re he is forced to reduce the role of reason to the

point where its efficacy all but disappears.
In doing so he raises what seems to me to be the fundamental
question concerning the role ofreason in Montaigne's ethic, the matter
of self-improvement. If man can improve himself without divine
assistance, it must be through the exercise of his mental faculties; but
just howand to what degree he can is not clear. Two things seem
fairly unalterable. One is human nature, which is full of vanity. Only
grace can dIeet any alteration in that. The other is each man's
inborn disposition. About reformation of this indelible character
Nlontaigne is not consistent; his comments fall about equally into two
categories, those that admit of some self-improvement ana those that
reject it. When speaking of himself, he i5 required by modesty - or is
it sclf-knowledge? - to admit that he has changed without being abI e
to say whether or not in the direction of improvement or degeneration
(III: ii, 795c and III: ix, 94Ib, c). On one occasion, rejecting the Stoics'
formula of self-discipline, he recommends that men follow his example
and do everything in their power to avoid passions so that the necessity
to control them may not arise. "Qui ne peut atteindre a cette noble
impassibilite Stoicque, qu'il se sauve au giron de cette mienne stu-
pidite populaire. ee que ceux-Ia faisoient par vertu, je me duits a le
faire par complexion" (III: x, 997b). This sentence is on the surface
self-contradictory. How can one teach oneself ("je me duits") to do
something by temperament ("complexion")? No amount of special
int~rpretation can remove the paradox implicit in this idea. Precisely
because it is an umesolved inconsistency, it truly represents the di-
rection Montaigne's ethical thinking took. vVe see the sam e situation
when he speaks of Socrates. Here he is under no obligation to simulate
a false modesty; his declarations nevertheless contradict each other.
Sometimes Socrates is endowed with a nature above any taint of
corruption (II: xi, 402a; III: xii, I035c); on other oecasions the power
of his reason has enabled him to transform his nature (II: xi, 408a;
III: xii, I035b, I037c).l Now if Montaigne is undecided whether to
attribute Socrates' goodness to nature or reason, we may assume that
he is being sincere, not just modest, when he speaks the same way
about himself. He never made up his mind finallyabout reason's efficacy
as ameans of self-improvement, probably because his introspective

1 III: xii, 1035-37 gives a good picture of Montaigne's variations in this matter. Among
other things he specifically declares that uniike Socrates he, Montaigne, has not corrected his
"complexion" by the force of his "raison."
154 THE FINAL ESSAYS

study ofhimself offered no conclusive evidence for either side of the case.
However hesitant his faith in man' s ability to better himself may
have been, one thing is sure; Montaigne expected the improvement,
if such were possible, to come from reason, and definitely not from
religion. False piety is too easy to simulate for him to have any faith in
the power of devotion (III: ii, 79 Ib). He has often noted howeasily
supercelestial opinions accommodate themselves to subterranean con-
duct (III: xiii, I09Se). In keeping with his analysis of faith in the
"Apologie," he is a ware of the few exceptions where divine intercession
creates a sublime soul that lives in religious ecstasy (III: xiii, I09Se).
He speaks of these souls as truly venerable and insists that th ey know
the one life of perfect pleasure. But they are entirely exceptional and
marginaI to his experience. Failing grace, man cannot rely on either
learning or religion to reform him.
Diray-je ee ey en passant: queje voy tenir en pIus de prix qu'eIle ne vaut,
qui est seule quasi en usage entre nous, certaine im age de preud'homie
scholastique, serve des preceptes, contrainte soubs l'esperance et la crainte?
Je l'aime teIle que les loix et religions non facent mais parfacent et authori-
sent, qui se sente de quoy se soustenir sans aide, nee en nous de ses propres
racines par la semence de la raisan universeIle empreinte en tout homme
non desnature. Cette raison, qui redresse Socrates de son vicieux ply, le
rend obelssant aux hommes et aux Dieux qui commandent en sa ville,
courageux en la mort, non parce que son arne est immorteIle, mais par ee
qu'il est mortel. Ruineuse instruction a toute police, et bien pIus dommage-
able qu'ingenieuse et subtile, qui persuade aux peuples la religieuse ereance
suffire, seule et sans les meeurs, a contenter la divine justice. L'usage nous
faict veoir une distinction enorme ent re la devotion et la conscience (III:
xii, I037c).

Religion (especially Protestant religion, which seems clearly implied

here), scholastic probity, any system appealing to the rewards of
virtue - none of these is as sound a foundation for morality as the
grain of universal reason (by which the essayist probably means God's
reason) implanted in a natural man (implying that some unnatural
men may lack it). To say, as he does here, that the only genuinely
reliable basis of virtue is a straight conscienee is hardly unusual. Good
sense agrees, and it is a natural cansequence of the essayist's interi-
orizatian of all qualities. What is surprising in the light afhis skepticism
is his insistence that conscienee itself is rooted in natural reason.
At some maments his reliance on this reason is remarkable. Two
particularly clear statements of its primacy appear in the additions
after 1588. "(a) Que sa conscienee sa vertu reluisent en son parler, (e)
 THE FINAL ESSAYS 155

et n'ayent que la raison pour guide" (I:xxvi, 154e). "Ladouleur,la

volupte, l'amour, la haine so nt les premieres choses que sent un enfant;
si, la raison survenant, elles s'appliquent a eHe, eela c'est vertu" (III:
xiii, 109Ie). The faith here expressed in reason may weU be a logical
development of the faith in God that remained untouched by the
Pyrrhonism of the defense of Sebond. With the passage of years, the
content of this faith seems to have changed somewhat. The goodness of
God is more and more frequently translated into terms of the goodness
of His creation, nature. "(b) Pour moy donc, j'ayme la vie et la
cultive teIle qu'il a pleu a Dieu nous l'octroier. ... J'accepte de bon
coeur, (e) et recognoissant, (b) ce que nature a faict pour moy, et
m'en agree et m'en loue. On fait tort a ce grand et to ut puissant don-
neur de refuser son don, l'annuler et desfigurer. (e) Tout bon, il a faict
tout bon. 'Omnia qwe secundum naturam sunt, tEstimatione digna sunt'"
(III: xiii, 1093-94).1
Among the elements of God's creation is human reason, which,
imperfect as it is, must be good. Montaigne regarded Sebond's book
as weak, but useful. His final assessment of reason, though not so
clearly thought out, would seem to be quite similar. It is weak,
deplorably weak, as are all components of the human condition; but
it must be useful, first because it is part of a good creation, and secondly
because nothing else gives an adequate foundation for the conscience.
Now this reason is emphaticaUy not the faculty that inquires after
truth. It is amoraI instinct that belongs to nature and resembles in part
a nlore complete universal reason ("la semance de la raison universeUe").
Though incomplete, however, it can be sufficient under certain con-
ditions; just as self-knowledge, itself a very limited knowledge, is ad e-
quate for human needs and appropriate to the human condition.
Montaigne's sense of the vanity of man, based partially on his Pyr-
rhonism, did not succeed in destroying his faith - and it is a faith -
in the goodness of God and nature. He is a metaphysical optimist. He
hardly believes that this is the best of all possible worlds; but it is
good, at least as good as need be for the man wise enough to live in
accordance with his nature and the bounty offered to him by the world.
Nothing in nature is useless, even vices may be of service (III: i, 768b).
A misshapen child may seem monstrous to us; but that is only because
our vision is limited; in God's eyes nothing is monstrous. "De sa toute

1 "Everything that is according to nature is worthy of esteem," Cicero, De jinibus, III, vi.
Note how easily Montaigne's mind moves from God to nature. (For other examples of God
and nature used almost interchangeably see III: vi, 878b, supra, p. 46 and p. 114.)
 THE FINAL ESSAYS

sagesse il ne part rien que bon et commun et regie; mais nous n'en
voyons pas l'assortiment et la relation" (II: xxx, 69rc). The kind of
piety we find in the mature thought of Montaigne is a modest self-
effacement before the goodness of nature and the bounty of God, a total
trust in His benevolence and gratitudc of His gifts. "En ceste universa-
lite, je me laisse ignoramment et negligemment manier a la loy
generale du monde. Je la sc;auray assez quand je la sentiray. Ma
science ne luy sc;auroit faire changer de route; eIle ne se diversifiera
pas pour moi. C'est folie de l'espcrer, et pIus grand folie de s'en mettre
en peine, puis qu'elle est necessairement semblable, publique et com-
mune. La bonte et capacite du gouverneur no us doit a pur et a plein
descharger du soing de son gouvernement" (III: xiii, lOsoc). As long
as we know that nature is beneficent, there is no need to know its laws.
The intellectual quality that Montaigne most admires in his last
essays is wisdom, and it is almost a misnomer to call it intellectual.
Any wisdom that attempts to be purely mental and neglects the
physical side of man seems "inhumaine" (III: xiii, lO86c), and there is
no true wisdom that does not have some folly in it (III: v, 8r8b).
Wisdom recognizes the fraiIty of man without feeling resentment or
wishing it were otherwise, for it sees the goodness of creation. I ts
great secret is to know just how much we owe to ourselyes (III: x,
984b, c). As ever, when discussing Montaigne's late thought, we come
back to the question of self-knowledge and self-evaluation. It is easy
to teIl a man to be wise, but immensely difficuIt to practice what one
preat:hes. "C'est un precepte salutaire, certain et d'aisee intelligence:
Contentez vous du vostre, c'est a dire de la raison. L'execution pourtant
n'en est non pIus aux sages qu'en moy. C'est une parolle populaire,
mais eIle a une terrible estandue. Que ne comprend eIle? Toutes
choses tombent en discretion et modification" (III: i:'I:, 966b).1 However
hard it may be to determine what is the wis e thing, Montaigne prefers
wisdom that is "gaye et sociale" (III: xiii, r097),2 for the most express
mark of wisdom is constant enjoyment (I: xxvi, r60c). Ofcourse, the
wisdom in question must be appropriate to the human condition;
Montaigne has no desire to be more than a man. If our condition is
nothing but weakness, why, let us recognize it as just that and then
enjoy to the limit what is given to us. "lVIoy qui me vante d'embrasser
si curieusement les commoditez de la vie, et si particulierement, n'y

1 Note the use of "raison" to mean "what is right or appropriate."

2 These are the last French words of the Essais. III: v, 822b uses the terms "gaye et civile"
to mean the same thing.
 THE FINAL ESSAYS 157

trouve, quand j'y regarde aussi finement, a peu pres que du vent.
Mais quoy, nous sommes par tout vent. Et le vent encore, pIus sage-
me nt que nous, s'ayme a bruire, a s'agiter, et se contente en ses propres
offiees, sans desirer la stabilite, la solidite, qualitez non siennes"
(III: xiii, I087b).
Ralph vValdo Emerson chose Montaigne as the man most repre-
sentative of skepticism in Westem civilization. What the Essais
represent is not a theory or a philosophy of Pyrrhonism so much as
the mentality of skepticism taken in the broadest sense. In Montaigne,
perhaps as in no other great artist, we can see the reality of the doubting
temperament. Because his mind was associative and refused to see
any question without relating it to a more general maral context, the
study of his skepticism inevitably involves the consideration of a wide
range of subjects. The fact that man is incapable of achieving absolute
knowledge entailed for the essayist considerable consequences, conse-
quences that he did not deduce systematically, but ones that were
constantly present in his consciousness or elose to its surface.
As a system ofknowledge he espoused Pyrrhonism. Ifit is during the
years when the parts of the "Apologie" were being composed that
Pyrrhonism most dominated his thinking, it is nevertheless true that
both before and after that period he never could bring himself to see
anything but temerity in man's claims to knowledge. Like most
skeptics he is particularly interested in renouncing, even ridiculing,
speculative reason. Its attempts to explain the facts seldom succeed and
often resuIt in lamentably weak reasoning. His strongest argument
against the futility of reasoning attacks not the intellectual faculty
itself, but the uncertainty of the sense data it would interpret. Because
the senses appear irretrievably weak to him, ~lontaigne denies that
human beings can achieve any veridical knowledge by purely human
means. In the last analysis, however, he is convinced that reason itself
is much less reliable than eve n the senses, and he will always give
precedence to a fact over any logic. But that does not mean that he
looks to facts for knowledge; for if they can supply any, it cannot be
of a very general nature. The world is too unsure, nature too variaus,
the possibilities too diverse for anything as feeble as man to be abI e to
extract truth from being. That the truth must be hidden gives witness
to the fraiIty of man, yes, but also to the richness of creation.
This creation is the work of a beneficent God in whom alone lies
truth. Strange as it may seem to modem minds, nothing is more
elosely related to Montaigne's Pyrrhonism than his piety. The mare
 THE FINAL ESSA YS

fallible man is, the greater God seerns. To Montaigne's way of think-
ing, Christianity is never more right than in its low estimate of the
human condition. Man was not created to know, but to receive from
above what Providenee apportions to him. vVhen he strives to attain
knowledge, he attempts to transcend his own limitations, thereby
falsifying his nature and incurring deplorable consequences. First of
aU, he usuaUy fails and produces the wrong answers. As aresult, he
may be misguided or ridiculous. In many cases he inflicts misery up on
himse1f. Anybody who has taken medicine or practiced Senecan
austerity should know this. Most important, he commits grievous moral
sins when he thinks he possesses the truth. He is irreverent when he
pretends to qualities that do not be10ng to him; and he becomes
dogmatic, which is detestable and potentially dangerous; for dogmatic
men, sure of their own rightness, rebe1 against authority, whether
religious or politieal. A due sense of reverenee and of one's own fallibility
are the surest cures for the immoderations Montaigne most dislikes.
Submission to the order of things in religion means grateful devotion to
the majesty of God, in politics means obedienee to established powers,
and in philosophy means the admission of ignorance. There is nothing
of the reformer in Montaigne's skepticism; there is nothing of the infide1
in his Pyrrhonism. Conservatism and Catholicism never seemed to
bim in any way incompatible with the doctrines of Sextus Empiricus.
Like all Pyrrhonists, he required apraetieal code for living; like
most of them he was willing to suspend his judgment and follow the
traditions of his time and his country. This moral pragmatism applied
primarily to external behavior. At all times (with the possible ex-
ception of a short period when he was most strongly influenced by the
radical skepticism of the Hypotyposes) he was struck by the necessity of
maintaining some kind of moral integrity founded upon the dictates
of reason and conscience. Although the form such virtue would take
changed considerably from the earliest essays to the latest, he con-
sistently related it to reason, particularly when it was a matter of
combatting the passions. His maturer opinion tended to reduce
greatly the role ofreason without entirely eliminating it from morality.
He became convinced that his own conduct could be best regulated
on the basis of an introspective self-appraisal that could fortify his
judgment of his own capabilities and permit him to live according to
his own nature. Se1f-study is the most fruitful discipline of the soul;
for it can teach man to make the proper use of his attributes, among
which is reason, in the conduct of living.
 THE FINAL ESSAYS 159

But it is not merelyas a doctrine or as a theory that Montaigne's

Pyrrhonism is interesting. He never intended to be a philosopher or a
systematic thinker, and in this he is true to his penchant for suspending
his judgment. The primary quality of his mind is that of the observer,
impartial and clear-sighted because unattached. He persisted in secing
all life in terms of purely human reality without letting any precon-
ceived theory impinge on that reality. His own peculiar sense of
piety was particularly adapted to this concentration on human values;
for it set God - and therefore truth and to a certain extent goodness -
far above the arena of human affairs, leaving men free to playout
their own comedy unencumbered. In the early essays, :Montaigne
observes impersonaUy, and for the most part without commitment.
His deepening sense of his own isolation, surely promoted by his
acquaintance with the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, led him to
become an observer of himself because he distrusted the reliability of
his knowledge of the external world. The somewhat unusual outcome
of his skepticism was that his essays became increasingly personals
not impersonal. Skepticism is a great liberating force in Montaigne',
development, for it allows him to be himself and to indulge himself
to the fullest extent in the rich diversity of his own nature and the
gifts oflife. Vanity, weakness, and ignorance may be his and all men's
qualities; but there is immense richness of experience to be gained by
observing them and participating in them. To distrust reason need
not mean to abandon all mental activity. Knowledge may be out of
man' s grasp, but insight (in-sight) is eminently available. By concen-
trating on the one thing he could know, himself, Montaigne strove to
forge his own judgment. By devoting his efforts to cultivating the
observer in himself, he could in a sense double the experience of
living; for not only could he feellife passively; he could also assay it,
gage it, and seize it more firmly by observing himself as he lived it.
After all skeptesthai in Greek means to consider or to observe. In this
sense Montaigne gives us the fuUest appreciation of the meaning of
skepticism.
 CHAPTEX VII

INTERIM - SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTICISM

A century and two years passed between the 1580 publication of

the "Apologie de Raimond Sebond" and the appearance of the first
major work of Pierre Bayle's. During these years philosophical and
religious controversy often turned on the Pyrrhonist problems so
forcefully expressed in Montaigne's resurrection of the epocM of Sextus
Empiricus. 1 When the essayist himself was not the center of debate,
either his predecessor or his literary heirs, primarily Charron, often
provided the focus of controversy.
The fideist principle that reason could provide no solid foundation
for any truth was quickly adopted by many of the most significant
figures of the Catholic Church in their campaign against the Refor-
mation. Pierre Charron (1541-1603), holder of many positions in
the church including those of canon of Agen, Cahors, and Condom,
hac1 made the acquaintance of the essayist by 1586 when he received
from the master of Montaigne a gift copy of Ochino's catechism (a
book on the Index). They soon became good friends. Montaigne,
having no male heirs, left Charron the right to bear his arms. The
Catholic prelate recognized his indebtedness by making the essayist's
brother-in-Iaw the heir to his property. But the real debt was literary;
for Charron borrowed largely, almost literally, from the Essais and
incorporated their diffusely organized ideas in his two most important
works Les Trois Veritez (1594) and La Sagesse (1601). In them he argu es
against Protestant dogmatism that absolutely nothing can be proven
1 Several partial histories of this period have been written. Richard H. Popkin's The
History of Scepticismfrom Erasmus to Descartes, which I follow in this chapter, is the best and the
elosest to the subject of this disscrtation. Popkin intends to supplement his study with more
volumes in the hopes of bringing his history up to the present. Other works of major impor-
tance are: Henri Busson, La Pensie religieus3franraise de Charron li Pascal (Paris: Vrin, 1933),
Rene Pintard, Le Libertinage trudit dans la premiere moitii du XVIIeme sieele (Paris: Boivin, 1943),
and Alan M. Boase, The Fortunes of lvfontaigne, A History of the Essays in France 1580-1669
(London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1935).
 SEVENTEENTH-GENTURY SKEPTlGISM

or known by human reason, whether it be the nature of God, the

immortality of the saul, natural sciences, or anything derived from either
the senses or the intellect. The one way to avoid erroneous opinions, he
reasons, is to hold none at all until the grace of God inspires man with
truth. Likewise, in ethics true virtue comes alone from God's inspi-
ration, although Charron shows that natural monlity can make man
good to a rather great degree. The surest method of preparing for
divine grace lies in the humiliation of man's presumption, one of the
most vicious and misleading forms of which is the Protestant habit of
subjecting Scripture and dogma to the examination of the individual
conSClence.
It was only with difficulty that Charron's champions succeeded in
publishing the enlarged version of La Sagesse in 1604. Later the Parle-
me nt of Paris was to condemn the work as dangerous. Nonetheless,
Charron's radical fideism was not without powerful supporterso One
indication of his enormous influence can be found in the fact that
La Sagesse enjoyed 25 editions between 160 I and 1672 while the Essais
had 35 between 1580 and 1669. Charron's work is much more philo-
sophical and religious than the Essais, lacking their concem with
personality. It was instrumental in the dissemination of :Nlontaigne's
ideas, which might have Leen less clearly known otherwise.l
"For about seventy-five years after the Council of Trent, there
seems to have been an alliance between the Counter-Reformers and
the 'nouveaux pyrrhoniens,' an alliance aimed at annihilating Cal-
vinism as an intellectual force in France." 2 Among the fideist apolo-
gists of the Counter Reformation can be listed Maldonado, Franc;ois
Veron, Cardinal du Perron, Cardinal Bellarmine, Father Gontery,
Jean-Pierre Camus (Bishop of Belley), Nicolas Caussin (confessor of
Louis XIII), and Father Ogier, who defended Charron after the violent
attacks of Pierre Garasse. 3 There are even fideist overtones in some
of the works of Saint Francis de Sales, who knew and admired the
Essais in the 1580 edition. 4 Although many of these ecclesiastics were
1 La Sagesse was put on the Index in 1606. French publishers traditionally paid little
heed to the Index. Pierre Bayle's complete works, already censured in Rome, were edited
and published by the Jesuit press of Trevoux in 1727 with the fictitious notation that they
were printed in The Hague.
2 Popkin, History of Scepticism, p. 67.
3 Numerous laymen of fideist tendencies could be cited: Etienne Pasquier, Pierre de
l'Estoile, Guez de Balzac, and Mlle de Scudery.
4 Boase, Fortunes of Montaigne, p. 130, finds no significant inHuence of the essayist on the
saint. Strowski regards the Essais as the secular work that Saint Francis de Sales most
admired; see his Saint Franfois de Sales, nouvelle edition revue et corrigee (Paris: Plon, 1928),
p. 78. Be that as it may, the point is that fideism was not regarded with suspicion in Gatholic
cirdes.
 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTICISM

Jesuits, the greatJansenist theologian Saint-Cyran (Jean Duvergier de

Hauranne) also wrote in defense of Charron against Garasse.
The most fascinating figure among the Catholic apologists is the
Jesuit Fran<;:ois Veron (1575-1649), who was freed from his duties as
a teacher and as a member of his order, so that he could become His
Most Christian Majesty's ollicial convertor in the controversies against
Calvinism. He had permission to attend any Calvinist meeting or
service and enter into debate under the king's auspices. Veron de-
veloped a "machine of war" intended to demolish the foundation of
the reformers' faith, the interpretation of Scripture. He opened his
attack by inquiring how the ministers knew that the books of the
Bible were the 'Word of God. To answer that an invincible inner
persuasion made them believe was an admission that the criterion
of faith was not Scripture itself, but some sort of insight - and that
insight might deceive them. Furthermore, the divergent views of
Calvin, Luther, Zwingli, and others showed only too clearly that
Holy Writ required interpretation and that it did not provide clear
standards for undertaking such interpretation. Should a Calvinist
answer that reasonable inferences could determine the articles offaith,
he was trapped; for then he made reason his criterion, not just the
Word itself. And nowhere in Scripture was there any guarantee of the
rules of logic, much less any description of them. NIoreover, reason
could go wrong. Finally, relying on the evidence of reason was not
really an act offaith. The Protestants were put in a frightful quandary;
for no matter what criterion they used, Scripture, inner persuasion,
or reason, it was subject to serious doubts. vVhen Calvinists claimed
that Veron was introducing the most destructive sort of Pyrrhonism
into matters of religion, and that his arguments would destroy reason
in any human endeavor whatsoever, he countered that he was con-
cerned only with the interpretation of Scripture. If the Calvinists
held that centuries of theologians had been wrong in their readings of
the true meaning of the Bible, what guarantee did they have that
they too were not wrong? In other matters, reason could indeed be
relied on; but on the specific matter of faith, it was beside the point.
The Protestant replies to Veron by Jean Daille (1594-1670) and
Paul F erry (159 I - 1669) tended to reverse the stand of the original
reformers by upholding the validity ofreason, but they were not wholly
successful against such asubtle reasoner as the J esuit father. Catholics
did not feel embarrassed by his "machine of war" because th ey took
refuge in the bastion of tradition and the kind of fideist conservatism
 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTICISM

Montaigne had formulated. They constantly accused the reformers of

rebellious schism and presumptuous innovation. Secure in the feeling
that reason was weak, they found in skepticism a strong argument for
keeping to tradition. Consequently it is not surprising that the Catholic
Church could tolerate some of the most radical Biblical criticism of
the century. The Oratorian scholar Richard Simon (1638-1712)
could take refuge in the authority of church tradition as he demon-
strated textual inadequacies (even in the Vulgate) and exposed the
linguistic obscurities of the Old and New Testaments.! Conservative
Protestants could only be scandalized as Scripture was increasingly
handled by the techniques us ed in the textual criticism of elassical
authors.
They did, however, find a counterattack against the "machine of
war" by turning its arguments against the Catholic tradition. If
Pyrrhonist considerations could apply to the interpretation of the
Word of God, they could apply just as weIl to the interpretation of the
words of the church fathers and the councils, especially because they
were hardly unanimous in their opinions. This retortion would not
affect a pure fideist who relied on the grace of God to supply the
artieles of faith, but it worked admirably against any defense of tra-
dition. Protestants like Daille were at first hesitant to use such a reply
and preferred to argue that their religion came eloser to the meaning
of the church fathers than did the Catholic faith. But in the second
generation, especially in the debates aroused by Pierre Nicole's
(1 6~5-g5) two works, Prejuges legitimes contre les calvinistes (1671) and
Les Pretendus Riformes convaincus de schisme (1684), Pyrrhonist arguments
were employed by either side to disparage the criterion of faith of
the other. 2
The introduction of Sextus Empiricus' reasoning did not affect
only the religious debates, however. It had enormous repercussions
in the philosophie world, too. In the generation following Montaigne
a group of thinkers generally referred to as the "libertins erudits"
professed a brand of Pyrrhonism that has often been considered
dangerous to the interests of religion. The principal figures in this
group are Franc;ois de La Mothe le Vayer (1583-1672), Pierre Gas-
sendi (or Gassend) (1592-1655), Gabriel Naude (1600-53), and Guy
Patin (1602-72). United in their admiration of Sextus Empiricus,

1 See Paul Hazard, La Crise de la conscienee europeenne 1680-1715 (Paris: Boivin & Cie., 1935),
Part II, Chap. iii.
2 For Bayle's comments on this matter see infra, pp. 223-224, 232-234, 298-299.
 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTICISM

Charron, and Montaigne and in their denunciations of Aristotle,

they were particularly concemed with exempting themselves from the
errors of popular superstition and fanaticism. 1 Neither the librarian
N aude nor the doctor Patin are as important for their philosophy or
skepticism as for their humanist erudition. La Mothe le Vayer, on
the other hand, was a convinced Pyrrhonist, ,whose works emphasize
particularly the relativity of religious and ethieal practices. Accepting
the ten tropes as a new Decalogue, he seomed the physical sciences as
a kind of blasphemous presumption and discredited metaphysics and
theology, relying on divine illumination alone for knowledge. 2 All
in all, his Pyrrhonism is a lifeless version of Montaigne's except in
the extreme degree to which he makes faith totally blind.
Gassendi's skepticism is considerably mo re interesting and more
complex, falling as it does in two periods. 3 As a professor at the Aca-
demie of Aix en Provence, he had developed his critique of Aristotelian
science, which he published in part in 1624 under the title Exer-
citationes adversus Aristoteteos. Espousing the akatalepsia (incomprehensi-
bility ofthings) of the Greek Academics in preference to the dogmatics'
arrogance, he argu ed that all knowledge is derived from sense ex-
perience. Even syllogistic reasoning depends on premisses which
ultimately rest on sense data. Moreover, as Sextus Empirieus had
shown, the conclusion of every syllogism has already been assumed in
its premisses, so that it produces no new knowledge. Now it can easily
be demonstrated that the senses provide men with nothing mo re than
appearances and convey no information about the essenee of things;
therefore, nihil seririo In other works Gassendi used similar reasoning
to extend his criticism from Aristotelian epistemology to Renaissance
naturalism, Platoni e idealism, the new philosophy of Descartes, or
any other form of science that claimed to be abI e to move from ap-
pearances to the essenee of things. 4 All this, of course, is completed by
1 Pintard's very eareful researches conelude that Montaigne had almost no influenee on
Gassendi and very little on La Mothe le Vayer (who cites the Essais only five times as
eompared with 150 times for Diogenes Laertius). Naude and Patin, however, show great
admiration for the essayist. All four regarded Charron very highly. See Le Libertinage erudil,
pp. 139, 162, 595·
2 So at least he writes. Most eritics doubt the sincerity of these fideist concessions. In his
artide in the Diclionnair8 historiqu8 et critique Bayle says that the case against La Mothe le Vayer
cannot be proven. Richard H. Popkin, Alan Boase, and perhaps other modem scholars
admit the possibility of La Mothe le Vayer's sincerity. They deserve attention.
3 See Henri Berr, Du Sceplicisme de Gassendi, ed. and trans. in part by Bernard Rochot,
Centre International de Synthese (Paris: Albin Michel, 1960), valuable primarily for the
numerous French translations of Gassendi's Latin.
4 See Berr, Du Scepticisme de Gassendi for excerpts from his works against the Rosicrucian
Robert Fludd, Descartes, and Herbert of Cherbury. See also Popkin, History of Sceptidsm.
 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTlCISM

the assertion that nothing Gassendi says refers to the truths of faith.
Gassendi, however, had two heroes among the classical philoso-
phers; besides Sextus Empiricus, there was Epicurus, whose atomism
the French philosopher strove to make orthodox in a work, the
Syntagma, that he never allowed to be published during his lifetime
despite the considerable interest it had aroused in intellectual circles.
The principal task of the Syntagma was to find a media via between
Pyrrhonism and dogmatism, primarily through areconstitution of
classical atomism, the theory that best explains appearances. In a
position in many ways similar to Locke's and modem empiricism,
Gassendi attempted to show that if knowledge is necessarily limited
to the phenomenal world, it is still possible to arrive at some genuine
science in this restricted area. Reasoned inferences, especially when
they can be confirmed by predictive experiments, may be able to lead
the mind to conc1usions about the conditions of experience, even about
conditions that are not at first evident. UnIike his friend Mersenne,
Gassendi did not expect mathematics to pay a significant role in his
science; and unIike Galileo, Campanella, or Descartes, neither he
nor Mersenne expected to penetrate as far as the essenee of things.
Whenever he encountered any dogmatic doctrine, traditional or
scientific, his Pyrrhonism came to the for e ; at the same time with
utmost prudence he endeavored to establish some basis for experi-
ential knowledge. It was within the ranks of the skeptics that the best
hesitant formulations of a moderate theory of knowledge were made.
The multiple attacks on reason in both theology and philosophy
naturally gave rise to rationalist counterattacks, many ofwhich showed
far more passion and ignorance than reason. The Jesuit Garasse,
himself somewhat fideistic, poured forth vituperation on Charron and
the Pyrrhonists, accusing them of being covert atheists. Likewise,
Mersenne, Cotin, Guez de Balzac, and others wrote hostile denunci-
ations of the impieties inherent in skepticism. But not all the refutations
of the new Pyrrhonists consisted entirely in abuse. Several authors,
inc1uding the Protestants Daille, Ferry, and Pierre Chanet and the
Catholics Yves de Paris and Charles Sorel, attempted to counter the
attacks of the skeptical school by reviving Aristotelian epistemology.
Although the senses do lead us astray, they claimed, with the help of
sound reasoning man can eliminate errors ofjudgment. Under norm al
conditions a healthy man perceives accurately the nature of the outer
world. :Moreover, the common notions, verified by the universal
consent of humanity, supply an adequate foundation for syllogistic
166 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTlCISM

reasoning. It should be immediately apparent that these defenses of

reasan are wide of the point and simply do not recognize the force of
Sextus Empiricus' arguments. They do not answer the questions; they
avoid them.
Two important, but unsuccessful, attempts to restore rationality
were made by Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648) and Jean de Silhon
(1596-1667). In 1624, the same year that Gassendi published the
first part of his critique of Aristatle, Cherbury's De veritate appeared.
It divided truth into four dasses, the truth of things, of appearances,
of concepts, and of the intellect (the common nations). In a long and
somewhat muddy analysis Cherbury maintained that the truth of
things could be attained by the concurrence of data derived from the
other orders of knowledge. The point was to be sure that all sorts of
conditions were fulfilled and that no inappropriate standards were
applied; then the perceptian ofan object could be called accurate. The
most important instrument for the discovery of truth lay in the com-
mon nations, which are determined by the universal consent of man-
kind. Naturally, Cherbury's theory was subject to real objections.
The skeptic Gassendi raised the problem howone could explain the
immense diversity in philosophical theories if the common nations
were in fact universal.
J ean de Silhon, who admired Montaigne but rather consistently
condemned the dangers of the essayist's ideas,llikewise endeavored to
refute the Pyrrhonists. His argument, or rather arguments, are
curiaus in that they foreshadow partially both Descartes's cogito, ergo
sum and Pascal's wager; but in neither case did he see the import of
his contentions. For example, his version of the cogito depended on
the metaphysical principle that whatever acts must exist; but he did
not prove the validity of this principle. After a series of partial re-
sponses to Pyrrhonists, sam e of which amounted to stampi ng his foot
and saying that truths must be known to mankind or nothing would
make any sense, he finally admitted that physical (Le., irrefutable)
demonstrations were few, and that in many cases one had to rely on
moral demonstrations which could provide only a limited degree of
assurance. This distinction between types of demonstration, already
made by Descartes, and later to be made by Protestants induding
William Chillingworth and Pierre Bayle, recognized that the skeptics
had reduced men to dependence on probabilities rather than certain-
ties.
1 See Boase, Fortunes of lVIontaigne, pp. 178-185.
 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTlC1SM

The turning point in the history ofskepticism came with the brilliant
Cartesian response to the perplexities posed by Montaigne. Quite as
the essayist had, Descartes felt forced by the instability of life and
customs to turn within himself for knowledge. U nlike his predecessor,
however, he did not restrict himself to self-knowledge, but claimed to
have fo und a universal truth.
In order to find this truth he adopted the famous system of methodi-
eal doubt. Realizing that the most certain truths were to be found in
mathematics, he examined them and saw that th ey were clear and
distinct propositions whose fundamental quality was their self-evi-
denee, or in other words, the fact that they cannot be denied, Mathe-
matics seemed to show that human reason, or "la lumiere naturelle,"
is an intuitive faculty that has the capacity of distinguishing the true
from the false, provided that it is presented with a true proposition and
a false one to choose from. If it has to choose between two false pro-
positions, or two propositions that contain some truth and some
falsity, it cannot possibly reach the right answer. Therefore, a philoso-
pher must simplify and clarify his propositions until finally he comes to
a clear confrontation of a true and a false proposition. In such a case,
every man will seleet the true one because he cannot resist it. The
problem is to find a totally clear idea. Here is where skepticism is
immensely helpful; it eliminates all sorts of false conceptions, such
as the belief that colors and odors actually exist in the outer world.
As an integral part of his method, Descartes accepted every single
Pyrrhonist argument, and even formulated them in new, more
forceful ways, First, the ten tropes are summarized by the dream
hypothesis. Since we have clear and convincing perceptions in dreams,
how can we be sure that all life is not hallucination as they are?
Second, against the validity of reason he raised the truly startling
demon hypothesis. Suppose that an evil spirit works systematically to
deceive mankind in all its thoughts and all its logic. Is there any fact
that emerges undeniable in the face of such a supposition? This idea
was far more devastating than any as yet proposed by Pyrrhonists. If
Descartes could find some sure answer to it, he could claim to have
destroyed skepticism at its strongest.
The answer he found, the single truth that no Pyrrhonist could
challenge, was the famous cagita, ergo sum.1 This truth was the foun-
dation on which he constructed both his method and his philosophie al
1 Its precise [ormulation is ego cogito, ergo sum, sive existo, see Discours de la mithode, ed. by
Etienne Gilson (Paris: Vrin, 1947), note to p. 32, 1. 19.
168 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTICIS~f

system. Several things must be remarked about it. First, according to

Descartes it is derived in no way from any sense perceptions; therefore,
none of the arguments of the ten tropes apply to it. To reason "I
walk, therefore I exist" or "I feel hungry, therefore I exist" would be
fallacious; for in each case one is relying on the testimony of the senses,
which may weIl deceive. Descartes's answer to the skeptics is "You
doubt, therefore you know you exist while YOll are in the process of
doubting." Secondly, the cagita is not the logical conclusion of an
unexpressed syllogism with the major premiss "All thinking things
exist." 1 It is meant to be the outright statement of a truth which does
not entail any assumptions and which no man could conceivably
deny. The Pyrrhonist analysis of the syllogism, then, does not apply
to the cagita because it is an insight, not a piece of reasoning. So at
least Descartes feit. Thirdly, this Cartesian first principle proyes the
existence of something, something that thinks. Other self-evident
propositions such as "two and two make four" or "the interior angles
of a triangle are equal to a straight angle" could conceivably apply
only to non-existent objects. The cagita is an ontological argument
establishing that the world of ideas does actually exist. As such it is
extremely important because the Pyrrhonists kept repeating that we
have no way of knowing anything about the outside world. Now the
cagita does not teach us about the outside world; but it does make
a very significant beginning, as far as Descartes is concemed, because
it does prove the existence of one thing at least. Fourth, and perhaps
most important, the discovery of the cagita validates the method of
systematic doubt and its criterion of self-evidence. In his empirical
analysis of mathematical certainty Descartes had decided that "!'evi-
denee" endowed a theorem with certainty. Be then set out in search
of a new kind of proposition, a metaphysical proposition, that was
as certain as any mathematical one. In the process of his search, he
had formulated the demon hypothesis, one which undermined even
the solidity of mathematical reasoning. 2 Nonetheless, he succeeded in
finding his one solid truth, the cagita, and that truth reconfirmed the
worth of self-evidence as a criterion and doubt as a method. It is only
after the discovery of this truth that hc asserts the principle that self-
evident (i.e., indubitable) propositions are true. 'Vithout the cagita

1 Gassendi so considered it and criticized Descaltes's logic. On this point see Gilson, note
to Uje pense, donc je suis," p. 32, I. 19, and Descartes's letter to Clerse\ier at the end of the
Fifth Objections to the Meditations.
2 The demon hypothesis occurs only in the J'v[editations, not in the Discours.
 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTICISyI 16 9

he would have had no way to measure the efficacy of self-evidence in

metaphysics. The centrality of the cogito to all his thinking is a truly
amazing thing.
Given his criterion, Descartes constructed systems of metaphysics
and physics. Note that he does not claim to deduce them directly from
the fact of the cogito. Re deduces them from the operation of his natural
reason as it distinguishes clear and distinct propositions that he cannot
deny (that are self-evident). If one of his theories turns out to be based
on principles that are not clear and distinct, he will reject it; but he
does not have to reject "l'evidence" because that is founded on the
cogito.
There is a crucial assumption that Descartes must make in his
system, namely that external reality conforms to our clear and distinct
ideas. If he does not make this assumption, he would simply have
proven that the mind can construct all sorts of self-evident systems
which might exist purely within it and have nothing to do with the
outside world. In the answers to the second objections, he makes this
his Axiom V, and admits that it is fundamental to his system. Now
among the clear and distinct ideas that man has (ones not derived from
the senses, but from his awareness of his thought processes) is the idea
of God, the infinitely perfect Being. According to Axiom V that idea
could not exist clearly and distinctly within minds unIess something
corresponding to it existed outside the mind. God therefore exists.
Furthermore, our idea of Rim includes the concept that Re is too
perfect to deceive mankind by implanting in humans clear and dis-
Ünct ideas that are untrue. In the long run, then, it is God's veracity
that guarantees human reasoning based on clear and distinct ideas.
Starting from the eogito, Descartes ereets an elaborate superstructure
to defend himself against the skeptics, whom he confounds by having
final recourse to theological considerations. He attaches his system to
the authority of God. Popkin has pointed out that this Cartesian
solution resembles in some ways the typical Protestant answer to the
Catholic "machine of war." The Protestants answered Catholics that
th ey felt absolutely certain of their reading of the Bible, and that the
Holy Ghost illuminated them directly. Descartes answered the Pyr-
rhonists by saying that he felt absolutely certain about clear and
distinct ideas and that God's veracity proved them true.
Descartes realized that propositions endo\ved \\-ith mathematical
self-evidence were rare and could be found only in certain limited
fields of knowledge. He endeavored to prove that they extended to
 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTICISM

metaphysics and physics, but he carefully avoided the attempt to find

them in other realms, particularly in the domains of sense information
or matters of faith. In all practical matters, he insisted that man had
to content himself with moral certitude; and sinee religion dealt with
the very practical matter of one's salvation, it belonged to the realm
of moral certitude. Reason must withhold assent from any proposition
that is not self-evident. The human will, however, is not so restricted
and can give assent to any number of propositions which belong to
domains where mathematical certainty is impossible. Recognizing
the infallibility of the Roman Church, Descartes held that reason
could only help to establish the eredibility of revelation, but that
it could not hope to explain or understand the mysteries of faith.
For that the natural light of reason was supplemented by the super-
naturallight of grace.
Another and more humble sort of moral certitude belonged to the
simple realities of sense experience. It was perfeetly legitimate accord-
ing to his system to believe that Rome is a city in Italy, even ifmathe-
matical proof could not show that this is so. Such assurance was not
an inferior degree of certitude, but rather the only appropriate one
for the human will in its practical functioning. It could not, however,
be called an intelleetual certitude.!
Needless to say, objections rose on all sides to Descartes's impressive
refutation of skepticism. The dogmatists were horrified at the demon
hypothesis and the strength it could give to obdurate doubters. The
skeptics complained that methodical doubt was no real doubt at all,
only a sham one on which Descartes erected a new dogmatism. Every
step of his reasoning was subjected to severe criticism, much of which
showed how little his opponents understood his meaning. But some
very telling objections were raised, usually pointing out that the severe
skeptical arguments of the First Meditation were so strong that th ey
undid the system constructed in the sueceeding Meditations. Gassendi
asserted that subjective certainty could not be a true criterion of an
idea's validity because men are in fact subjeetively convinced of
contradictory things. To this Descartes had to answer that they were
deluded in the propositions that th ey chose to call clear and distinct.
If th ey truly scrutinized their theories, they would recognize that they
were not so self-evident as they had seemed. A conscientious Cartesian
had to reject any idea that could be doubted on clear and distinct
1 Se-e Gilson, Discours, note to p. 37, Il. 30-31. As will be made clear, Bayle subscribed to
these Cartesian principles (which are not innovations, but go back at least to Aristotle).
 SEVENTEEPiTH-CENTURY SKEPTICISM

grounds; for his criterion was irrefutability, not just subjective per-
suasion. The fact that men were stubborn and subject to their own
preconceived prejudices did not invalidate the rights of Descartes's
criterion.l
Mersenne raised a much more difficult problem in the Second
Objections when he pointed out that some theologians have held that
God can deceive man. Against this Descartes had no very sound
answer. He replied first that God had various ways of speaking to
mankind and secondly that it did not matter if a few men were totally
persuaded of a falsity that he and Mersenne could not possibly believe.
In effect all Descartes was saying was that it was self-evident that
God could not deceive, so there. This was an admission that although
he was persuaded, he could not always persuade others of the truth,
so great is human perversity.
Another very strong criticism is variously called the Cartesian cirele
or the Arnauld cirele. Arnauld and Gassendi noted that the new
philosophy proved the existence of God by reason and then proved the
validity of reason by appealing to God's truthfulness. 2 Descartes
answered that his reasoning was not circular at all. There are two
kinds of truths. The first, one sees intuitively and elearly, such as
God's existence. The second are arrived at by deductive demon-
strations, not by insight. Affirming the validity of his criterion by
reference to God's veracity belongs to this second dass. Such demon-
strations founded on our memory of achain of reasoning do not
cOirespond to immediate visions. How Descartes expected this to
break the circularity of his argument, I am not sure - unIess he was
simply saying that it was not truly circular because the chain of logic
had a starting point (the cogito) and proceeded in onlyone direction
which could not be reversed. It was a confirmation of the criterion,
but not its foundation. 3
A final argument, one that Descartes called "l'objection des ob-
jections," disputed the contention that elear and distinet ideas actually
represent external reality. This was simply to assert, as all Pyrrhonists
had, that human knowledge cannot extend beyond the confines of

1 Popkin finds Gassendi's objection stronger than I do: History of Scepticism, pp. 203-205.
Descartes's theory is perfectly capable of handling it. In actual practice Descartes hirnself
may have been deluded into aeeepting as self-e"idenees ideas that were far from clear and
distinet, but Gassendi would have to plOve that there are clear and distinet ideas that are
false ifhe is to upset the eriterion totally.
2 Second Objeetions and Fourth Objeetions.
3 Gilson seems to find this evasive logie eonvineing, note to p. 38,11. 18-lg.
 SEVENTEENTH-CE~TURY SKEPTICISNI

the mind. It might be true that everyone of Descartes's principles was

self-evident and that any rational man had to accept them; still, that
did not me an that they accurately represented reality. Against this
Descartes had no reply except to complain that such a position ef-
fectively ruled out the possibility of any knowledge whatsoever. The
attacks up on his heroic attempt to revive the forees ofreason succeeded
in showing at least that his system was op en to dispute at every step,
that his criterion might be no more than subjective conviction.
Descartes's truly original philosophy gain ed many adherents, but it
did not silenee the Pyrrhonists.
Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) liked to eÜe the example of Descartes's
most illustrious successor, a second great mathematical mind, Pascal
(1623-62), as evidence that reason's sublimest efforts resulted in its
humbling itself before faith.1 Pascal's vision of the human eondition is
too complex to be defined as merely fideist or skeptical; nonetheless,
he was only too persuaded by the force of the Pyrrhonist argumEllts
of the First Meditation, which he cited as the strongest weapons in
the artillery of the skepties (Pensee 434).2
The Pyrrhonists, he saw, would always be right so long as there
were dogmatists on the earth (Pensee 374). On the other hand, inte-
gral Pyrrhonism, total suspension ofjudgment, he eonceived as human-
ly impossible. Men instinctively trust their senses to give them ad e-
quate knowledge of the external world, no matter what subtleties
philosophers may fabrieate against sense data. Thus nature eonfounds
Pyrrb.onists, by appealing not to reason, but instead to instinet and
feeling, which Pascal believed superior to the intelleet. "Le creur sent
qu'il y a trois dimensions dans l'espace" (Pensee 282). Reason has to
have recourse to some other domain for the foundation of its princi-
ples - and in the last analysis it is the realization that man has his
origin in a good and wise God that validates what limited worth
reason haso The order of the heart has to take preeedenee over the
order of the head. 3
1 Dietionnaire historique et critique, Pascal G and Zenon, philosophe epieurien D. See Pascal's
Penst!es, number 272 in the Brunsehvicg edition: (Euvres de Blaise Pascal, ed. Leon Brunschvicg
and Pierre Boutroux, 14 vols., Les Grands Eerivains de la France (Paris: Hachette, 1914-23).
2 Edouard Droz in his Elude sur le scepticisme de Pascal considere dans le lh're des Penst!es (Paris:
Alcan, 1886) rejects Victor Cousin's thesis that Pascal's thought ean be explained as a
constant struggle against skeptical doubts. Although he overstates his case by defining reason
vaguely and by confusing skepticism with incredulity, Droz is right when he elaims that the
Jansenist never undenvent a crisis in which his Christian faith was in doubt and that
philosophical skepticism of a restricted sort plays a role vastly subservient to Christian
revelation in Pascal's thinking.
3 Pascal's crushing evaluation of Descartes, and rationalism in general, was - "inutile et
 SEVENTEENTH-CENTUR Y SKEPTICISM 173

When Pascal prepared his notes for an apology of Christianity,

he made it clear that he expected to persuade libertines by appeals
to the heart as weU as to reason. Ifhe believed that sound metaphysical
proofs of God's existence could be formulated - and it is debatable
that he did - he saw that Christian faith, as opposed to deism, could not
be founded on them. And so he turned from philosophy and sought
to persuade his readers of the truth of his religion by proofs of a differ-
ent nature. "Le creur a ses raisons que la raison ne connalt point"
(Pensee 277). His position exemplifies fideism, not so much as the
debasement of reason, but as the exaltation of faith and the vision it
gives.
Another critic of Cartesian philosophy was the polymath Pierre-
Daniel Huet. 1 Seventeen years older than Bayle, this Catholic scholar,
whose house in Paris coUapsed under the weight of his enormous
library, produced almost as many works as the author of the Dic-
tionnaire historique et critique. As second tutor to the Dauphin under
Bossuet, he conceived and directed the important series of scholarly
editions of classical authors ad usum Delphini. His most skeptical work,
and his favorite if we are to believe its editor, the De imbecillitate
mentis humaTltE (1723), written in the early 1690's at the time Bayle was
beginning to work on his Dictionnaire, was published only after his
death. He had shown some skeptical tendencies, however, in earlier
works. In the Demonstratio evangelica (1677), dedicated to the dauphin,
part of his proof of the divinity of Scripture rested on the uncertainty
and confusion of geometrical axioms and postulates. Geometry was a
tissue ofimaginary elements such as lines without breadth. Its methods
were good; but its foundations, he claimed, were hardIyas clear or as
demonstrable as the ones he set for his own proofs of Scripture. Huet's
statements could not be caUed genuinely skeptical, except for the
rather unusual disparagement of mathematics. The Demonstratio
evangelica as a whole displayed the curious credulity of a pedant making
a show of his erudition. His four axioms were these: (I) any book is
authentic that has been considered authentic by all age s in a closed
and continuous series;(2) any history is true which narrates events in
the way they are narrated in many other contemporary books, or

incertain" (Pensee 78). He condemned philosophy as not worth an hour's trouble (Pensee 79),
for even if reason could persuade a few men, their conviction soon yielded to new doubts
(Pensee 143).
1 On Huet, see Abbe Leon Tolmer's monumental Pierre-Daniel Huet (I63O-I72I) Humaniste-
physicien (Bayeux, Colas: n. d.) andjoseph d'Avenel, Histoire de la vie et des ouvrages de Daniel
Huet iveque d'Avranches (Mortain: Lebel, 1853), useful for its su=aries of Huet's ideas.
174 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTICISM

books nearly contemporary to the events; (3) any prophecy is true that
predicted things later born e out by events; and (4) any faculty of
prophecy comes from God. The use Huet made of these propositions
was, at the very least, imaginative. Finding analogies between Biblical
narrative and elassicallegend (the contemporary histories ofaxiom 2),
he coneluded thatJoshua and Hercules were the same person reported
in two different traditions, and that Moses had his counterparts in
Mercury, Osiris, Bacchus, Pan, Prometheus, :Minos, Orpheus, Romu-
Ius, and Priapus, to name only a few! 1
In r689, Huet published his Censura philosophitE cartesiantE, a work that
Bayle knew and referred to in his Dictionnaire. 2 The critique of Des-
cartes is varied and occasionally acute. Many of Descartes's ideas are
hardIyas original as th ey seem, having been held by elassical philoso-
phers. Huet takes great pleasure in finding predecessors for every
Cartesian theory, physical or metaphysical (it is in this context that
Bayle quotes from the Censura). The analysis of the cogito is lengthy:
why does Descartes refuse to doubt that he thinks? Why is the cogito
more certain than "The whole is greater than any of its parts?" If
God can make two contradictory propositions true, as Descartes
belieyes, why could He not make it true that a thinking thing does not
exist? Moreover, the cogito is a deceptive piece of reasoning. Every
thought contaius three elements, the thinking mind, the object thought
of, and the thought process itself. Now what is the object of thought in
the cogito? Is it correct to conelude, "I am thinking of the sun,
thert>fore I exist?" To say that thought is thinking of itself is absurd,
for the end of an action cannot be that action itself. "I think I am
thinking, therefore I am" would have to be rephrased to read "I
think I thought, therefore I am." But in that case the cogito is not an
immediate insight, as Descartes believed, but rather a piece of reason-
ing based on memory and subject to all the Pyrrhonist arguments
about memory, ones that Descartes elaimed he had avoided. The
cogito really amounts to no more than "I think I thought, therefore
maybe I am." In twelve chapters, Huet summarizes every possible

1 In the understatement of the nineteenth century, d'Avenel concludes, "En somme,

toute cette partie de la Demonstration parait peu admissible," Huet, p. 163. Bayle knew Huet's
work and referred to it frequently in footnotes. In a letter to his father he admired the author's
erudition, but not his judgment, "mais au fonds il emplole indifferemment les raisons
probables & les raisons convaincantes; il fait Ileehe de tout bois, il appille sur des faits qui
ne sont gueres certains" (OD I B, 116 r, 1 April 1679).
2 Anselme, arcMveque de Cantorbiri 1 A, Brunus, Jordanus 1 E (Huet quoted), Kepler 1 E,
Leucippe 1 B (quotation), Pereira 2 I (quotation).
 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTICISM 175

objection, perceptive or obtuse, that had been raised against Des-

cartes's first truth. Moving to the criterion of self-evidence, he finds
multiple deficiencies. Re mentions first the Cartesian cirele, then that
elarity is no helpful criterion since different things seem elear to
different men. Average men would all agree that the statement "The
sun is shining" is far elearer than "I think, therefore I am." On the
other hand, philosophers would say that there is no proposition that
is absolutely elear and distinet because every idea has been challenged
by s?me philosopher at some time. Even Cartesians, who agree on
their criterion, disagree in their conelusions. AIso, how does one prove
that a elear and distinet idea is true? By saying that we perceive
elearly and distinctly that elear and distinet ideas are true - but that
is circular argument.
The summation of Huet's skeptical opinions in the De imbecillitate
mentis humanIE, written shortly after his censure ofCartesian philosophy,
was not made public until both he and Pierre Bayle were dead. The
general purpose of the book is to advocate the wisdom of a moderate
Pyrrhonism: but the argument shows none of the perception of Gas-
sendi' s media via. Book I is devoted to proving the case that reason
cannot find the truth. Man is not given to know celestial certitude and
must content himself with earthly knowledge, which is subject to
varying degrees of assurance. After quoting Scriptural proofs of reason's
weakness, Ruet turns to a succinct repetition of the elassical argu-
ments against knowledge derived from the senses or from reasoning.
A f~w chapter are devoted to Cartesian philosophy, generally showing
that Descartes's dream argument and his demon hypothesis confute
all the elaims of "l'evidence." Re then lists fifty pagan philosophers
(ineluding Plato and Aristotle) and several religious sects (ineluding
the Essenes and the Brahmins) that have adhered to one form or
another of skepticism. In Book II he undertakes to establish the ground
rules for legitimate philosophy. First, man must give up the hope of
having a perfect knowledge of external reality. According to Saint
Thomas, Saint Augustine, Suarez, and other religious authorities,
faith alone can serve as the source of true knowledge; it even guarantees
in some sense the common notions and Cartesian reasoning, provided
that th ey recognize their own limitations, the most important ofwhich
is that all ideas are founded on the information of the senses and
therefore fundamentally fallible. Ruet recommends a modern ec-
lecticism that subjects all sciences to the artieles of faith, adheres
only to probable truths in practical matters, and suspends its judgment
17 6 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTICISM

when experience is not clear enough to establish any certainty. In

the last book he defends his position against the standard specious
objections to Pyrrhonism, insisting on the separation, but compati-
bility, offaith and reason. His work express es the mod era te skepticism
of a rather humdrum mind, intelligent enough not to be dogmatic,
but determined that a little bit of Aristotle, a little bit of Epicurus, a
little bit of Descartes, and a large dose of faith can produce different
degrees of certainty.
Another curious brand of skepticism is presented by a younger
acquaintance of his, the Abbe Simon Foucher. In the very significant
article Pyrrhon of the Dietionnaire historique et critique, Bayle referred
to one of Foucher's most important arguments in a debate with
Malebranche. Directly after the publication of La Reeherehe de la
veriti (late in 1674), Foucher responded with his Critique de la Reeherehe
de la viriti.! Malebranche answered nastily and disdainfully in the
preface to the second volume of La Reeherehe de la verite. Despite further
attempts on Foucher's part to engage him in debate, the Oratorian
remained aloof, saying that Foucher simply did not understand his
ideas. The difference was finally settled through a reconciliation ar-
ranged by a third party. Each continued to write, ignoring the other.
In his later works, Foucher intended to defend the reputation of the
Academic skeptics by arguing that th ey did not really believe that the
truth could not be found. Their basic tenets were "de ne se fonder que
sur des Principes incontestables, & de n'en tirer que des consequences
necessaires." 2 Among the truths they accepted were that the senses
were fallible, that one should cultivate doubts on particular questions,
and that virtue is its own reward. Foucher expounds with enthusiasm
his astounding concept of the Academics, who, he says, agreed with

1 The titles of Foucher's works - and their content - are confusing and repetitious.
In the following list the word "recherche" is capitalized when it refers to Malebranche's
work. The Dissertatjons sur la recherche de la veriU ou la logique des academiciens, containing the
kemel of all his ideas, was published in a very limited edition in 1673 before the appearance
of the Oratorian's work. Subsequent books are the Critique d81aRecherche de la veriU (1674),
Reponse pour la Critique a la priface du second volume de la Reeherehe de la urite (1676). Nauvetle
dissertation sur la Recherche de la lIirite (1679), Dissertation sur la recherche de la verili, contenant
I'apologie des acadernielem (1687), and DisStrtntions sur la recherche de la viriii contenant I'histoire
et les principes de la philosophie des academiciens (1693). The present analysis is based primarily
on the last of these works. Foucher's argument against Malebranche will be mentioned later,
infra, pp. 261-262. On Foucher, see Richard H. Popkin "L'Abbe Foueher et le probleme
des qualites primaires," XVIIeme Siecle, 33 (1956), 633-647, and Henri Gouhier, "La
Premiere Poh:mique de Malebranehe," Revu, d'Histoire de la Philosophie, I (1927), 23-48,
168-188.
2 DissllTtations sur la recherche de la t'mte contenant I' histoire et {es principes de {a philosophie des
acadimiciens (Paris: Jean Anisson, 1693), p. 145.
 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTlCISM

Plato's method and Aristotle's spirit though they denied the literaI
doctrines of both philosophers, In the Same way th ey were very elose
to the Cartesians. If followers of Descartes would only give up such
erroneous ideas as the identity ofmatter with extension and the radical
separation of matter from thought, they would be good Academics
and would join Foucher in the search for truth. This search is the
first principle of all Academics according to Foucher's original and
debatable notion of Academic philosophy. Although he is not willing
to admit that a general criterion of the truth can be found, he belieyes
that a few basic principles and some particular truths have been
discovered and that the system for ordering them is mo re or less elear.
The progress in the sciences of astronomy and physics and the invention
of printing and the microscope lead him to suspect tha.t the truth, as
yet undiscovered, may be before mankind. The proper work of the
investigator is to study carefully and undogmatically what few first
principles seem sure. "Il n'est pas tems de batir, il faut encore creuser
pour appuyer des fondemens; & no us sommes encore aujourd'hui
dans la meme ignorance ou l'on etait du tems des Academiciens"
(p. 79). The only error more pemicious than excessive dogmatism is
excessive Pyrrhonism, which abandons the search for truth. Given the
state of man's ignorance, Foucher can only propose a vague program
of well-intentioned inquiry along philosophieallines.
Pascal, Huet, and Foucher all came after the first round of contro-
versy over Cartesian philosophy; and each was persuaded that the
Pytrhonists had won the debate. In different ways, each tried to
transcend the impass by defending mildly the case for reason. The
intense religious fervor of Pascal, the only profound thinker of the
three, saw in the psychology of the soul an order of the heart capable
of the most important kind of certainty; he seomed reason, not because
it was fallible, but because it was beside the point. It sought knowledge
when salvation was the only legitimate concem of man. Huet, an
anatornist and scholar, wished to preserve the rights of erudition and
experimentation by an undogmatic form of semi-empirical eelecti-
ei sm founded vaguely on faith. Foucher strove to reclaim even phi-
losophy itself by endorsing a general program of the investigation of
fundamentals, but he was necessarily unable to be precise in his
appeal to the Cartesians to abandon dogmatism.
The controversies over the new philosophy hardly succeeded in
killing it. Indeed, in the latter part of the seventeenth century the
greatest philosophers and many of the most significant theologians,
 SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SKEPTICISM

particularly the Jansenists and the Calvinists, could not avoid the
influence of Descartes. l His criterion of self-evidence, his endorsement
of the mathematical method, his radical critique of the senses, his
persuasion that abstract reasoning was the surest road to knowledge,
all these gain ed partial or complete acceptance. Apart from the J esuits,
almost every philosopher was to some degree a Cartesian. Even John
Locke, usuallY regarded as the arch opponent of rationalism, was
permeated with concepts that sternmed from the French philosopher.
In the long run it was to be his friends and successors that dealt
Descartes the most devastating blows. Spinoza, whose Improvement of
the Understanding was little more than a second version of the Discours,
Spinoza, who reasoned more geometrico, who founded his system on the
principle that a clear idea represents reality accurately (Axiom VI of
his Ethics), Spinoza, following Cartesian methods, produced a system
universaIly abhorred as the ultimate in atheism. Malebranche, who
spoke of himself in his early years as a disciple of Descartes's, denied
that the existence of matter could be proven by reason and claimed
that although all truth was to be found in clear and distinet ideas,
those ideas were not man's but God's and that man could never have
a clear conception ofwhat an id ea is. But the most incisive reduction of
Cartesian philosophy to skepticism was to be accomplished by a
Protestant in Holland, who early in life beearne an adherent of the
new thought. Pierre Bayle believed that Descartes's cogito could
silenee Pyrrhonists; he preferred the dualist physics of the French
philosopher to the empiricist theories of Gassendi or Locke; he agreed
that self-evidence, however defective it might be, was the only
possible rational criterion of truth; and at the same time, he provided
Pyrrhonism with the strongest expression it had known since Mon-
taigne.

1 See Francisque Bouillier's Histoire de la philo>ophie cartisienne, 2 vols. (Paris: Durand, and
Lyons: Brun & Cie, 1854), which, though somewhat outdated, is still the only general study
on the fortunes of Cartesianism. See also Paul Dibon and others, Descartes et le cartisianisme
hollandai, (Amsterdam: Editions Fran<;:aises d'Amsterdam, and Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1950). Finally, some very detailed accounts of the dissemination of Cartesian
ideas can be found in J. D. Spink's French Freethought from Gassendi to Voltaire (London;
Athlone Press, 1960).
 CHAPTER VIII

THE GENTLEMAN AND THE SCHOLAR

In January 1676, two months after Pierre Bayle had turned twenty-
eight, the Essais were proseribed by the Roman Catholie Chureh.1
As a man who lived largely in Protestant milieus, Bayle was quite
unlikely to be aware of this eensure; at least, he never mentions it in
his writings; and one remark of his eoneerning the silenee of the
Parlement de Paris about the Essais (108), suggests that he did not
know it. 2 His lifetime spanned a period in whieh the attitude of the
Freneh intelleetual world towards the essayist underwent a radieal
ehange. 3 During the first half of the eentury, little eritieism was
direeted against the Essais in any form. Guez de Balzae's stylistie
reproaches, published in 1657, mild as they were, and later the harsh
eomments in the Logique of Port-Roy al (2nd edition, 1662) as well as
the eensures of Bossuet, Malebranehe, and Paseal, all testify to
mounting animosity toward Montaigne as too worldly in his morality,
too skeptieal in his philosophy, too self-eentered in his portrait, and too
gross in his language. From 1580 to 1669 editions of the Essais had
been published every two or three years; then for fifty-five years, not
a single eomplete edition appeared, and only two severely truneated
versions. Finally, Pierre Coste's monumental 1724 edition was publish-
ed in London, but not in France until the following year.
Pierre Bayle was raised in rural Protestant France (Comte de Foix),

1 Boase was unable to determine precisely what made the church put the Essais on the
Index. Although it was probably their fideism, it eould have been the seeular morality of
Montaigne's later thought. See Alan M. Boase, The Fortunes of Afontaigne, A History of the
Essays in France, r58o-r669 (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1935), p ..P7.
2 The numbers in parentheses in this ehapter refer to Appendix II, a list of all the refer-
enees to Montaigne in Bayle's works. This llst has been prepared in order to avoid immensely
eumbersome footnotes giving referenees to both authors.
3 See Alan M. Boase, The Fortunes of Montaigne, Pierre Villey, Montaigne devant la postirite
(Paris: Boivin, 1935), and Maturin Dreano, La Renommie de Afontaigne en France au XVIIle
sieele (Angers: Editions de l'Ouest, 1952).
180 THE GENTLEMAN A:-.rD THE SCHOLAR

perhaps far enough from the intelleetual influenee of Paris to be un-

aware of the growing disfavor of the essayist. Desmaizeaux, relying
probably on the report of Bayle's first eousin onee removf'rl, Charles
Bruguiere de Naudis, reports in his Vie de Bayle (DHC XVI, 44 r)
that the future philosopher's preferred readings in his early twenties
were Plutareh and Montaigne.1 How mueh truth there is in this
eomment is diffieult to determine. We know that at the age of 24,
while working at Copet as tutor for the Comte de Dohna, Bayle
devoted many of his study hours to making an abridgment of Plut-
arch'sLives, a task he eontinued for six years. 2 In Deeember 1672 and
in the following month, we find two quotations (1,2) from the Essais
in letters written to Basnage and Minutoli. But these letters are filled
with eitations from dassical authors and referenees to modern works.
The presenee of two from Montaigne among so many others is not
particularly remarkable and does not prove Desmaizeaux's statement
that the Essais exereised a great influenee on Bayle's youth. 3
It is undeniable, however, that Pierre Bayle knew NIontaigne's
work extraordinarily well. No major Freneh writer of his era shows
so great a familiarity with their eontent or respeet for their author.
We find no less than sixty-nine quotations from the Essais in Bayle's
writings eovering the period from 1672 until 1706, the year he died.
On twenty-four oecasions Bayle refers to the Essais for corroboration
of his ideas. Taking into aecount other allusions to the essayist, one
arrives at the figure of 123 remarks in all. 4 Although sometimes dis-
agreeing with the sixteenth-eentury lettrist, on no oecasion does
Bayle say anything to disparage him. This amounts to an impressive

1 This remark first appeared in 1708 in the English translation of Desmaizeaux's earliest
version of Bayle's biography. See Ruth Elizabeth Cowdriek, The Early Reading of Pierre Bayle
(Seranton, Pennsylvania: Mennonite Publishing House, 1939), p. 18. The following remark
whieh does not appear in the Freneh versions of the biography, is probably spurious.
"Coneeming the latter, he us'd to teIl his Friends in Mirth, that if all the Copys of his
Essays were lost to the World, he eou'd retrieve 'em to a Tittle, so often had he read 'em over."
2 Cowdrick, Early Reading, p. 55. His notes are preserved in the Thott eolleetion in
Copenhagen.
3 In her biography, Pierre Bayle: Du pays de Foix Il la eite d'Erasme (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1963) Elisabeth Labrousse uneovers not a few misleading statements in the seetions
of the Vie de Bayle devoted to the seholar's ehildhood. De Naudis eoneealed the poverty ofhis
relatives and their intransigent Protestantism whenever he could.
4 Impressive as this figure is, various faetors reduee its importanee. Bayle had a mania
for preeise seholarship; he frequently appealed to authoritative authors to support his views;
and he sought to eonvey his lack ofpartisanship by quoting liberally from others. One must
a1so keep in mind his tremendous produetivity. The Dietionnaire has 44 quotations from the
&sais and 32 other referenees to Montaigne in one way or another. It also has no less than
nine thousand pages in Beuehot's 4° edition. This means one quotation per 200 pages - and
every page is studded with quotations.
 THE GENTLEMAN AND THE SCHOLAR

endorsement. Other figures may appear more frequently in Bayle's

works - Varillas and Moreri, whose historieal errors he corrects, Jurieu,
whom he condemns unceasingly after 1693, Vergil, so frequently cited
by alllearned men of the seventeenth century, perhaps even Boileau,
a great favorite ofhis, perhaps also La Mothe le Vayer, whose scholar-
ship and liberaI opinions impressed him - but Montaigne's is certainly
one of the minds that most constantly attracted Bayle. This is all the
more remarkable in the light of the disfavor that had become the
essayist's lot.
The edition that Bayle used was Les Essais de !vIiehel de Montaigne,
Nouvelle Edition Enriehie et Augmentee aux marges du nom des Autheurs qui y sont
eitez. Avee les Versions des passages Grees, Latins, et Italiens. A Paris, chez
ChristophileJournel, 1659,3 vols., in 12°.1 Re knew his way around the
Essais weIl enough to repeat an anecdote about Antisthenes (85) in
the Dietionnaire without referring to the specific essay.2 On an-
other occasion (45) he quoted Saint Jerome, citing Montaigne as
his source for the saint's words! Who would think of looking among
the Essais for Mohammed II's letter to Pope Pius II (46) except a
man thoroughly familiar with them?3 Pierre Bayle had a phenomenal
memory for details, but that alone cannot explain his thorough ac-
quaintance with the Essais, for few books present more difficulties for
someone trying to locate a passage. One must assume that he read
them on several occasions.
Two such occasions are clearly identifiable. The Nouvelles Lettres
de i' auteur de la Critique generale de l' Histoire du ealvinisme, written in the
last months of 1684, contains the greatest concentration of material
from the Essais (13 entries in Appendix II) to be found in any work
of Bayle's other than the Dietionnaire, which was composed over ten
years. It can be safely assumed that Bayle read Montaigne somewhere
around the time he wrote the Nouvelles Lettres. Another occasion,

1 The Bibliotheque nationale lists 6 copies of this edition, one of them containing the
name plate of Pierre-Daniel Huet. Volume I is 556 pages and 24 pages of index; Volume II,
827 pp., and 47 pp. of index; Volume III, 6\0 pp., 34 pp. of index. Based on Mlle de Gour-
nay's posthumous edition, it includes her preface, her dedication to Richelieu, and asummary
life of the author drawn from the Essais thernselves. Bayle complained of the inadequacy
of the index in this edition (48). Like any true scholar he suffered frequently from the lack
ofa good index, which he called "l'ame des livres" (DHC 2 Antonio A, 1561).
2 The fourth edition includes the reference. (The incident is listed in the index of Bayle's
edition.)
3 On the other hand, Bayle passes up perfectly obvious opportunities to quote memorable
passages. For example, in DHC 2 Bongars M he cites de Thou rather than the essayist on the
early age at which Etienne de La Boetie composed the Contr'un. Likewise, the isle of Cea has
its own artide (DHC 2 Zia) with aremark on suicides and no reference to II: iii.
 THE GENT LE MAN AND THE SCHOLAR

much more difficult to date, came at the time of the composition of

the Dictionnaire article Sebonde. Wishing to ascertain whether Mon-
taigne called Sebond a convert from Judaism (Remark A), Bayle
skimmed through the entire "Apologie," but in vain - for the very
good reason that no such remark exists in II :xii. Since the Dictionnaire
was written between July 1692 and October 1696 (DHC 1 Priface n.
13, XVI, 5 r), we have a general idea of when Bayle reread the
"Apologie." 1
The question must inevitably be raised why there is no article in
the Dictionnaire devoted to Montaigne. Other literary figures of the
sixteenth century, notably Marot and Ronsard, receive long treatment,
but the author of the Essais is conspicuously absent. Montaigne joins
very distinguished company here; for articles on such major figures as
Socrates, Plato, Seneca, Pliny, Livy, Augustus, Cicero, Ficino,
Rabelais, Sir Thomas More, and Descartes are all lacking. Mucia,
Pompey's wife, is there, but without her husband (which is not
inappropriate, considering her conduct). Hundreds of such lacunre
and whimsicalities could be cited. Moreri, whose Dictionnaire Bayle is
ostensibly correcting, had a short article on Montaigne (based on the
Essais, La Croix du Maine, and de Thou) which could have provided
the justification for an article on Bayle's part. There can be no ex-
planation for the exclusion of the essayist from the Dictionnaire his-
torique et critique; and the question is, after all, not a very important
one. Bayle simply felt no occasion to write such an artide.
That Montaigne was on his mind throughout the composition of the
Dictionnaire is clearly proven by the frequent references to him (27
1 Ifwe could be sure that the article Sebonde was composOO at the time Bayle was working
on the letter S and not earlier, it would be possible to assign a more accurate date. A comment
includOO only in the first edition of the DHC at the end of Rochefow:auJd A notes that the
article Wlll> written in May 16g6. A similar comment (Soan, Fauste M, n. 92, 367 I), fixes the
composition of Socin atJuly 1696. The article Sebonde would then seem to be datable roughly
inJune 16g6. This is, however, hypothetieal. During 1696 Bayle was rushed by the impatience
of his printer to finish the dictionary. Already in the article PeirllSe, he apologizOO for the
relative skimpiness of the last letters of the alphabet. He had completoo a large portion of
the allottOO pages and was forcOO to sacrifice some articles for which he had material ready
and to rOOuce the length of others. Many of the later articles, then, may be presumed to be of
early composition. The demands of prootreading imposed on the encyclopedist during
16g6 were especially onerous and left him little time for composition. In a letter to de Naudis,
20 February 16g6 (OD I B, 177 r), Bayle explains that he was receiving copy at the rate ofsix
sheets (24 folio pages) a week. Three days later, he wrote Minutoli that the letter M had
been printed, which represented approximately two thirds of the Dictionnaire (unpublishOO
fragment of the autograph letter 43 of the Columbia collection). In the next eight months he
was to proofread the remaining third as well as compase a considerable part of it. Several
of the most philosophieal passages (Pauliciens, Pblira, &rarius, Soan) are accurately datOO by
Bayle himselfas written in 1696. This hectic activity leayes open the strong possibility that
many shorter articles at the end of the alphabet had already been prepared.
 THE GENTLEMAN AND THE SCHOLAR

citations in DRC1). The "Apologie" provided the historieal material

for the artiele Sebande. The artiele Dioscorides is primarily a pretext
for remark B (A in DRC 1), in which a comment from "Des prieres"
(I :lvi) and an artiele by Moreri occasion a long analysis of the pagans'
ignorance about God. Another artiele, Charron, which appeared first in
the 1702 edition, was certainly composed with Montaigne in mind; for
in it Bayle defends both the Essais and his own work from charges
of impiety. All we can conelude is that Bayle thought of Montaigne
repeatedly during the composition of each edition of the Dictionnaire,
but never decided to inelude an artiele on him.
Nevertheless, his numerous references provide a rather complete
picture of his appreciation of Montaigne. Re speaks of him as "l'in-
comparable Montaigne" (65), "dont l'esprit sera admire pendant
qu'il y aura des connaisseurs" (52). Though the French elassicists
generally deplored the style of their Renaissance predecessors, Bayle
particularly savored the beauties of Montaigne's prose, "son vieux
Gaulois, qui a souvent pIus de graces que Ies periodes les pIus etudiees
de nos puristes" (4). Re did not object to modernizing certain ar-
chaisms in the new editions of minor authors; but it was his opinion
that "Comines, Montaigne, et quelques autres eerivains dont les
principales beautes so nt inseparables de leur style, seront a couvert
des attentats des tradueteurs" (106).1 Bayle himself had no qualms
about using a slightly old-fashioned expression upon oeeasion.
Re did not, however, intend to model his style on Montaigne's.
A produet of the ep och in whieh the French elassicists were developing
rules for the improvement of prose style, he somewhat resented the
purists' restrietions on voeabulary, but went along with many of
their other demands, especially in matters eoneerning elarity of
thought, and labored to make his own style as elear as possible. Re
devoted eonsiderable time to the elimination of hiatus from his
sentenees, and worked at the rather pointless task of rewriting any
prose phrases that contained poetic meters (DRC 1 Priface, XVI, 6-7).
Above all, he cultivated the periodie sentenee, paying extraordinary
attention to avoiding ambiguous pronoun referenee. :\'"othing could be
further from Montaigne's praetiee. 2 In one thing Bayle recognized his

1 Boase, The Fortunes of j1ilontaigne, pp. 303-304, mentions Plassac-~Iere's horrendous

attempts at modemization of the Essais.
2 In a letter to Jean Rou, dated 21 February 1696 (OD IV, 723 I), Bayle's criticism of
Seneca's style shows how far he is from modt'ling his own ideas on the style of the Essais.
"Ceux qui se servent du stile coupe ont moins de peine a õter les equivoques; ils recommen-
cent une periode presque a chaque ligne. C'est prendre le parti le pius facile; un paresseux
 THE GENTLEMA~ AND THE SCHOLAR

kinship to the essayist; his uncontrolled tendency to digress (2). He

frequently apologized for it in his works, which he wrote at great speed
and without any prearranged order - much, I would say, to their
detriment. But a certain amount of variety and unprcdictability,
Bayle said, could add a real charm in authors who manage to violate
the classical rules successfully. "Les Essais de Montaigne sont un autre
exemple de l'irregularite heureuseo Si l'on mettait dans ee livre la
beaucoup de methode, l'on en õterait les principaux agremens" (107).
More than the style of the Essais appealed to him. One of the major
pleasures he derived from reading them lay in their "gauloiseries." A
bachelor, whose sexual life was in all probability niI, he confined his
debauches to his reading and had a taste not infrequently found in
scholars for off-color and slightly licentious books. (He did not,
however, like Rabelais's vulgarities.) In order to enliven his Diction-
naire, he included numerous amusing anecdotes and comments,
many in French, not a few in other languages, in which case he left
their content untranslated contrary to his usual practice. Approximate-
ly one fifth of his quotations from the Essais (13 out of 69) come from
"Sur des vers de Virgile" (III :v). Eight of these, as weIl as four others
(30, 55, 56, 57), were included in the Dictionnaire purely for purposes
of entertainment. Bayle wryly inserted one of the most amusing in
~he article on Martin Luther (33). As he anticipated (100), his work
was accused of being obscene. In defense, he shield ed himself behind
Montaigne. Five times (95, 100, 101, 102, 110) he referred to the
liber-ties of the essayist as an example that he could legitimately follow,
clairning in addition that he had beenjudicious in omitting some of the
strongest passages in the Essais.
Montaigne interested the historian in Bayle for two reasons. As
Naude had commented (171), the Essais could be considered a useful
compilation of historieal anecdotes and judgments, a sort of source
book. Unable to find the classical account of a story that had caught
his imagination, Bayle willingly relied on Montaigne for a racy detail
about the courtisan Flora (23, 105) or for an incident concerning the
philosopher Democritus (50, 70, 90). Naturally enough, Montaigne's
s'aeeommode fort de eela. Vous & moi, Monsieur, qui nous sommes aeeoutumez au stile lie,
& qui enfermons le pius de pensees que nous pouvons dans une periode, nous sommes en
effet pius eourts que eeux qui se servent du stile eoupe, & neanmoins les mauvais juges
s'imaginent que nous emploions pius de paroles. Ils ne savent pas qu'il n'y a gueres d'Eerivain
dont le Verbiage soit pius grand que eelui de Seneque. Cieeron mettroit dans une periode
de six lignes, ee que Seneque dit dans six periodes qui tiennent ehaeune huit ou neuf lignes.
Mais quoi qu'il en soit, nous avons mille peines a õter les equivoques." Bayle's loose
epistolary style makes clear how little the "stile lie" was natural to him.
 THE GENTLEMAN AND THE SCHOLAR

authority in ancient history was not as great as some earlier writer's,

and Bayle searched for his souree's source (eventually finding it in
both the cases above). ünee, Bayle takes Montaigne to task for re-
peating an error of Cornelius Agrippa's (60), but more often he ad-
mires the essayist's honesty in naming the author from whom he
draws his material (30). As a historian, Bayle insisted on serupulous
adherence to one's sourees and eareful judgment of their aecuraey.
Re felt that Montaigne live d up fairly well to both requirements,
citing with approval the essayist's intelligent evaluation of the mirades
recounted by Tacitus (66) 1 and his soundjudgment ofhistorians (20,
63) and their assessments of their material (32). Re also finds in
Montaigne support for his own condemnation of the satirieal spirit in
other authors (S8). In short, then, Bayle respected his predecessor's
practice as a historian because it lived up to his own sense of "le
pyrrhonisme historique" in a general way.2
A historian, by the nature of things, must be astudent of human
psyehology. For many of his readers, Montaigne is most impressive as
a moralist of deep insight into human nature. Bayle also chooses a
large portion of his quotations for this reason. Re cites Montaigne as
a moralist almost exactly as often as he ciles him as a historian. 3
Writing of the Cardinal of Lorraine's desire to be honored as a theo-
logian when his real talent lay in his statesmanship, Bayle introduces
Montaigne's remarks on Caesar's disproportionate pride in his engi-
neering skills (3 I). The essayist's comparison oflegal and ecdesiastical
eloq uence (47) and his analysis of the diffieul t posi tion of a man owing
a debt greater than he ean pay (S I) enrich the encydopedist's his-
torieal commentaries. Montaigne's humanitarian eondemnation of
torture struck Bayle with its critical wisdom (IS, 80).
In a few eas es Bayle cites the essayist's general assessments of man-
kind. Re favors the more pessimistie passages of the Essais and more
than once disagrees with Montaigne's judgment on the grounds that
he laeks a sufficient appreciation of the frailties of human nature.
1 See supra, p. 144, note 1.
2 For "le pyrrhonisme historique" see infra, pp. 253-256.
3 Such a tally can only be approxirnate because of the many borderline cases where it is
impossible to separate the historian from the moralist. ;\onethdess, using all precaution, I
find 17 clear instances of each category in the Dictionnaire, and a similar equality in the
quotations in the muvres diverses. Most students will find it surprising that Bayle should make
such frequent use of the Essais as a historieal document. It is \Vorth mentioning in pas,ing
that Comelia Serrurier strives to proV(' that Bayle can be most justly regarded as a morali;t
rather than as a philosopher or skeptic or historian. See her Pierre Bayle en Hollande (Lausanne:
Imprimene Cooperative la Concorde, 1912), passim. This appears to me to be the least
convincing point in an otherwise informative work.
186 THE GENTLEMAN AND THE SCHOLAR

Where Montaigne had hoped that a pragmatic approach could be

able to inculcate virtue in his imaginary pupil, Bayle cannot accept the
possibility that education will succeed in reforming human depravity
(in this case sexual)." 'On nous apprend a vivre,' dit-il [Montaigne],
'quand la vie est passee. eent escoliers ont pris la verolle avant que
d'estre arrivez a leur Ie<;on d' Aristote de la Temperance.' Mais si l'on
voulait moraliser sur l'histoire poetique, on dirait a Montaigne que
cette aventure du fils de PeIee est un avertissement qu'on a beau faire
prendre le devant a l'education, eHe ne laisse pas de succomber sous le
poids de la nature" (I7). In "Des livres" (II:x), Montaigne had cen-
sured Guicciardini for his refusaI to attribute any human acts to
honorable motives. Bayle cites this passage (27), prefacing it with his
comment that "bien d'autres" would agree with the Italian historian.
In a second reference to the same passage of the Essais, Bayle agrees
with Montaigne, but in a backhanded way.
M. Descartes a raison de desapprouver qu'on "suppose to us les hommes
mechans"; et eela me fait souvenir que Montaigne, tout edaire qu'il etait
sur les defauts du genre humain, ne trouve pas bon que Guicciardin attribue
a de mechans motifs toutes les actions qu'il rapporte dans son histoire. Il
est sur qu'il y a des gens qui se conduisent par les idees de l'honnetete, et
par le desir de la belle gloire, et que la plupart des hommes ne sont que
mediocrement mechans. Cette mediocrite suffit, je l'avoue, a faire que le
train des choses humaines so it rempli d'iniqutes, et imprime presque partout
des traces de la corruption du cceur; mais ee serait bien pis, si le pIus grand
nombre des hommes n'etait capable de reprimer en plusieurs rencontres
ses mauvaises indinations, par la crainte du deshonneur, ou par l'esperance
des louanges. Or, c'est une preuve que la corruption n'est point montee
au pIus haut degre. Je ne considere point ici les bons efTects de la vraie
religion; je regarde l'homme en general (g8).

Fear of dishonor and the hope of praise (neither a particularly

Iaudable motivation) seem to Bayle the forees that work against the
totaI corruption of human behavoir. From such a point of view,
Guicciardini would come eloser to the truth than Montaigne.
The longest quotation from the Essais appears in a letter supposedly
sent to Bayle and reproduced in the Nouvelles Lettres de i' auteur de la
Critique generaie de l'Histoire du calvinisme (I2). It cites the bitter pages
of "De Democritus et Heraelitus" (I :1) induding the following
sentence, the first part of which Bayle capitalizes, "Je ne pense point
qu'il y ait tant de malheur en nous, comme il y a de vanite, ni tant de
malice comme de sotise: no us ne sommes pas si pleins de maI comme
d'inanite; nous ne sommes que miserables comme no us sommes viIs."
 THE GENTLEMAN AND THE SCHOLAR

Bayle heartily agrees with the essayist's picture of humanity here,

thou gh he would criticize Montaigne's attitude of mockery elsewhere
in the essay, preferring the detached indifference of Seneca (96). It
is the passages of the Essais exposing human corruption or weakness
that Bayle most appreciates; if he has any comment to make, it is
usually to the effect that the sixteenth-century moralist could have
gone eve n further in his disparagement of man's frailties.
Among the many allusions to Montaigne as a historian or a moralist,
there are surprisingly few to him as a thinker or a philosopher.
Disons en passant qu'un auteur lalque et sans caractere doit jouir d'une
pIus grande liberte de dire tout ee qu'il pense qu'un docteur en theologie,
qu'un predicateur, qu'un professeur; ear on presume que de teHes gens
n'avancent rien que sur le pied de le<;:on, et qu'ils souhaitent de persuader
leurs sentimens. Des lors on suppose qu'ils ont bien examine leurs dogmes;
et quand on songe a leur caractere, on se laisse facilement entrainer au
poids de l'autorite. Mais si l'on songe que e'est un lalque non titre qui
parle, on ne s'en ebranle point; on regarde ses opinions particulieres comme
des enfans exposes, et par eonsequent son pyrrhonisme ne tire pas a eon-
sequence. Il est donc vrai que le venin qui pourrait etre dans les eerits de
Montaigne serait sans comparaison moins dangereux que eelui qui se
trouverait dans les livres de Charron ( 103).
Bayle carefully refrains from admitting outright that the Essais con-
tained dangerous ideas; but asserts that if they did, they are in part
excusable as the work of a layman. EIsewhere in the notes to the artiele
on Charon (49) he takes up his favorite paradox, that men ofseemingly
audacious opinions often live most honorably. ":vlontaigne, qui
parait si au-dessus des prejuges, et si bien fourni de la pretendue force
de l'incredulite, avait une mollesse d'äme qui ne lui perrnettait pas de
voir 'egorger un poulet sans deplaisir,' ni d' entendre patiemment
'gemir un lievre sous les dents de ses chiens.''' 1 In another passage, we
see the same kind of attitude, "Montaigne, qui n'etait pas fort devot,
proteste qu'il avait naturellement de l'aversion pour le mensonge"
(81) .
In Bayle's eyes, then, the essayist is not "fort devot." This is not
the same thing as saying that he is irreligious, and Bayle was aw are
that Montaigne could be quite reverent. Re approved of the essayist's
censure of the reIigious insensitivity in one of 1-Iarguerite de Navarre's
stories (72). On another occasion he cites a passage from the" Apolo-

1 Italics mine. Bayle's works abound in examples of the disparity between the professed
beliefs of men and their conduct. This is one of the least of examples, and not a very impressive
one at that.
188 THE GENTLEMAN AND THE SCHOLAR

gie" on the psychology of those whose faith is half-hearted (5). From

the few pieces of evidence available, it would seem safe to conelude
that Bayle regarded Montaigne as more liberaI than libertine.
What of Montaigne's Pyrrhonism? The "Apologie" does not
occupy a significantly large place in Bayle's works. Outside the artiele
Sebonde, it is quoted five times and referred to twice, but non e of these
passages is very elosely related to skepticism.l The most frequent
allusions (gl, g6, g8) are to the section on the animaIs, a subject that
Bayle discussed at length, siding mo re or less with Montaigne against
the Cartesian concept of the beast-machine. "Il semble qu'il [Mon-
taigne J ait voulu que l'apologie de Raimond Sebon [Ut en partie cclle
des betes" (g8). Re does not elaborate on Montaigne's defense of the
animaIs beeause he assumes his readers are familiar with it (9 I).
The largest eollection of quotations from the "Apologie" appears in
the artiele Sebonde. The artide itself is very thin, commenting on the
scarcity of information about the Spanish theologian. In the remarks
Bayle quotes almost everything Montaigne has to say about the book
he translated and its author. 2 In remark D Bayle repeats Montaigne's
deseription of the two objections made against the Theologia naturalis
and his intention of defending it by a counterattack, about which hc
writes: "Ceux q ui connaissen t Nfon taigne se peuvent aisemen t imaginer
11. vaste carriere qu'il se donna." And that is all. Rere is a perfect
opportunity for Bayle to discuss at length the Pyrrhonism of the "A-
pologie," and yet he does not.
The fact of the matter is that in his published works Bayle very
seldom wrote of the essayist's skepticism. In a letter of 3 I January 1673
to Minutoli, he cites Montaigne and La Mothe le Vayer as two
moderns who openly professed Pyrrhonism. Many years later in the
Reponse aux questions d'un provineial, Part I, he mentions that Montaigne
"dans sa maniere sceptique" prescribes hellebore rather than hemlock
for witches (8g). Once, in a key skeptieal passage of the Dictionnaire,
he supports his argument with a quotation on "les mauvais effects de
1 The quotations are: men have less true faith than they think (5); Montaigne sometimes
misunderstands his own Essais (6); Protestants and Catholies reversed thernselves on
tyrranieide when Henri de Navarre beeame heir to the Freneh throne (17); the story of
Demoeritus and the figs (50) ; and the effeets of partiality on judges ("question pour I'amy"
cited with this passage) (64). The two references are both to the Demoeritus aneedote (70,
ga). The "Apologie" oecupies about one-sixth of the Essais; quotations from it represent one-
twelfth of the to tal of Bayle's eitations of Montaigne (if we eonsider those in the article
Sebande, the proportian is rectified).
2 Although he repeats most of the pertinent passages, Bayle seems unaware of how very
qualified the apologist's respeet for Seband was. He concludes in tht" article itself that the
Theologia naturalis must have had some worth because Montaigne admirt"d it so much.
 THE GENTLEMAN AND THE SCHOLAR 18 9

la dispute" (53), concluding at the end of the note that "le seul moyen
d'avoir quelque certitude est d'ecouter uniquement la simplicite de
l'Ecriture, sans aucun egard aux raisons subtiles et captieuses de ses
docteurs." 1 In the Pensees diverses he quotes from "Des boyteux"
(III :xi) on the folly ofmen who seek explanations for events that never
occurred (4). This is the one truly skeptical passage he cites. 2 Finally,
when defending his Dictionnaire historique et critique, he again pleads the
example of the essayist. "Apres tout, oserait-on dire que mon Dic-
tionnaire approche de la licence des Essais de Montaigne, soit a
l'egard du pyrrhonisme, soit a l'egard des saletes? Or Montaigne
n'a-t-il point donne tranquillement plusieurs editions de son livre?
ne l'a-t-on pas reimprime cent et cent fois? ne l'a-t-on pas dedie
au grand cardinal de Richelieu? n'est-il pas dans toutes les biblio-
theques? Quel desordre ne serait-ce pas, queje n'eusse point en Rol-
lande la liberte que Montaigne a eue en France?" (I02.) That is all
that can be said of Bayle's overt references to Nfontaigne's skepticism,
and it is not much. 3
Various reasons contribute to this surprising situation. \Vhen
Bayle wished to declare himself on Pyrrhonism, he wrote about
philosophers such as Pyrrho, Zeno, Carneades, or the like. Re frequently
quoted the important skeptical figures of the seventeenth century such
as Gassendi, La Mothe le Vayer, or Naude. On technical matters he
refers to technicians, and not to amateurs such as :tVfontaigne. Much
more important is the fact that his brand of skepticism was consider-
ably different from the essayist's.4 In all Bayle's works there is scarcely
a handful of comments on the unreliability of the senses and only a

1 In a footnot(", Bayle refers to the Logique of Port-Royal which quotes the same passage
with approval. (He refers to Part III, chapter XIX, Section vii; in modem editions it is
chapter XX.)
2 In the body of the text he quotes the same chapter of L' Art de penser to the effeet that
Montaigne knew the faults of man without recognizing his gr("atness.
3 I cannot agree with Dreano when he writes "Quand Bayle lui-meme pyrrhonise, e'est il
la suite de Montaigne. Il approuve ehaeun de ses doutes et chacune de ses raisons de douter,"
La Renommie, p. 78. There is little evidenee for either remark. Dreano also spends considerable
effort showing that Bayle's intention is to exculpate Montaigne in the eyes of the Protestants.
There is no explicit statement on Bayle's part to corroborate this. In so far as the encyclopedist
is defending the essayist (and he does not seem to feel the need to), he would naturally wish
to recommend him to both Protestants and Catholics. It is hard to believe that he thought
of Montaigne in the context of religious controversy or of his Catholieism; he nowhere
speaks of Montaigne's adherence to the Roman Church or of any anti-Protestant remarks
in the Essais.
4 I am immensely endebted to Richard H. Popkin's challenging article "Pierre Bayle's
place in 17th century Scepticism" in Pierre Bayle, le philosophe de Rotterdam, itudes et documents
publiis sous la direction de Paul Dibon, (Amsterdam: EIsevier, Paris: Vrin, 1959). Popkin is the
!irst to make clear the divergencies between Bayle's and Montaigne's skepticisms.
Igo THE GENTLEMAN AND THE SCHOLAR

few more on the variability of human judgment. The two arguments

for Pyrrhonism that most persuaded Montaigne are not important
for the philosopher of Rotterdam, whose attack on the foundations of
knowledge was directed against speculative philosophy or theology,
and primarily against Cartesian "evidenee." Thus he necessarily
employed arguments that differed from the essayist's. Montaigne and
the "pyrrhoniens erudits" that followed him had been so successful
in their undermining of the senses that the new philosophy had been
forced to establish its criterion of the truth on different grounds. In
a way it is true that all Cartesians are convinced Montaignians.
When they refer to the unreliability of the senses, th ey are only
admitting what they and Descartes have taken for granted. They
never intended to erect their systems on such shifting sands as the
sense data. Anyone wishing to refute the criterion of the new philosophy
was obliged to find fresh arguments, for he could assume that his
opponents would agree with him on the validity of the central portions
of the "Apologie." No wonder Bayle does not depend on Montaigne
for his Pyrrhonist assertions. One of his greatest originalities lies in
the new form that he gave to skepticism.
The battered and time-worn eliehe that Bayle continues a skeptical
tradition established by Montaigne, but forced to go underground,
as it were, during the seventeenth century only to rise again with
renewed energy in the philosophie movement, simply will not stand
up under careful analysis. His skepticism is not the same as Mon-
taigne's; and both of them would have disagreed with several of the
characteristic views of the "philosophes," primarily their trust in
reason, their concern with political reform, and their anti-Christian
attitudes. Nothing in Montaigne, least of all his fideist skepticism, was
intended to undermine the cause of religion. That he seemed impious
to many Christians of later generation s, such as Arnauld and Male-
branche, is due to their different concept of Catholicism and their
misunderstanding of his meaning and his intentions. Bayle does not
seem to me to have been such an uncritical reader of the Essais. The
only misinterpretation I can see in his statements about Montaigne
is that he overestimated the essayist's admiration for Sebond's work,
and the net effect of such a misinterpretation could hardly be the
conelusion that Montaigne was in any way irreligious. Bayle under-
stood the nature of Montaigne's Pyrrhonist fideism and saw elearly
that it could not assist him in his skeptical arguments.
Of course, there are a great many affinities that link Bayle to
 THE GENTLEMAN AND THE SCHOLAR

Montaigne. Such would have to be the case of any two minds of

Pyrrhonist tendencies. Many of these affinities will become obvious
in the course of the analysis of Bayle's works. It is even quite possible,
thou gh not demonstrable, that it was his early reading of the Essais
that contributed most substantially to the formation of some of Bayle's
skeptical attitudes. But it cannot be sufficiently emphasized that the
characteristic form that Bayle's skepticism to ok could not have been
the result of the influence of Montaigne.
One of the most noteworthy things about Bayle's statements con-
cerning Montaigne is that nowhere does he mention the self-portrait.
Nor does he seem particularly interested in the human matters of
daily living that so fill the last essays.l It is significant that the figure
of Socrates drawn in the Essais, a book that Bayle knew so well, never
seems to have impressed the encyclopedist. 2 For Bayle was by temper-
am ent a scholar, and the aspects of Montaigne that were foreign to
a scholar's way of thinking remained alien to Bayle - or at least to his
works. The world of books had incredible importance for the Protes-
tant refugee. It was books that he studied and cultivated, not himself.
He could put meticulous care into ascert3.ining a fact or pursuing an
argument. The rest of the world, outside of conversation with men of
letters, meant almost nothing to him. Cornelia Serrurier pointed out
the startling impersonality of his letterso Though he lived in Holland
there is not a single mention of a canal, dyke, or dam, much less any
other indication of local color. Except for the political news and the
weather, his letters could have been written from Rome or Hong
Kong. 3 Literally all he asked of the world was the tranquillity neces-
sary to study his books and the means to live a most modest life. Re had
no desire to travel or to accept any position that would put him in the
public eye in any way. Re disliked teaching and rejected at least one
offer of a position. He dreaded the "entremangeries professorales"

1 The one quotation that reflects somewhat Montaigne's inquiry into the mysteries of
personality comes from "De I'experience," where he admires the versatility of great souls
capable of giving thernselves entirely to conversation or dining when they are about to
undertake the storming of a city (6 I).
2 'Nhat he has to say on Socrates is astonishingly meager: he was a IIlOralist rather than a
philosapher (DHC 2 Euclide art., 312 r); his ideas on God are the best one can expect of a
pagan, namely that it is wrong to try to know what God wishes to keep hidden (DHC 2
Ariston C, 347 r); he went too far in his renunciation ofscientific inquiry (DHC 2 Anaxagoras
R, 53 i); and a few other references, primarily of a historieal nature. Never once, when
speaking of Socrates, does Bayle mention Montaigne's name.
3 See Comelia Serrurier, Pierre Bayle en Hollande, pp. 42-46, for a penetrating analysis of
Bayle's temperament. "Contrairement il. Theophile Gautier, Bayle etait - trait essential de
son caractere - un homme POUT qui le monde exterieUT n' existait pas, un vrai savant de cabinet."
 THE GENT LE MAN AND THE SCHOLAR

(OD IV, 708 r) attendant upon membership in aeademies. He sought

not to be involved in any way with the magistrates of Holland. There
is no false modesty in his words when he writes his brother Joseph,
"Pour ee qui est de moi, a vous parler en confidenee, j'ai si peu
d'ambition que je ne voudrois pas un poste fort eelatant, quand meme
j'y serois propre, ee que je ne suis point du tout; je me eonnois, je ne
suis fait que pour un etat moien entre la derniere obseurite & l'eelat, &
j'aequererai toujours pIus d'approbation dans un petit theatre que
dans un grand. C'est le tour de mon esprit, le peu d'opinion que j'ai
de mes forees, l'aversion pour l'intrigue, une sante peu affermie, un
peu trop d'amour pour le repos qui sont eause de ee que je viens de
vous dire" (OD IV,134 r, 3 October 1682).1 His consuming passion
was research, to whieh he often devoted fourteen hours a day. His
greatest loyalty was to the international society of the republic of
letterso He strove to make his works as impersonal as any set of strong
opinions ean be. 2 In the Dictionnaire he was scrupulously careful to
advance nothing without indicating his source. Only the critical
eommentary was his, and that he would defend relentlessly, not
because it was his, but because it was the result of an objective,
reasoned analysis that he felt was irrefutable. The impersonality of
the intelligent seholar was the role he assumed in public and wished to
inspire in other authors.
Nothing could be farther from the spirit of Bayle than Montaigne's
introspective cultivation of his own personality. When one thinks of
the generally low opinion Montaigne had of scholars, of his need to
affirm his own individuality, of his distaste for theoretieal philosophy
or theology, the differenees between the two men become striking. It
was with the eyes of a seholar that Bayle looked at Montaigne. He
admired his literary charm and skill. Disenchanted with the efforts of
so me purists of his day to legislate exeessively in the world of belles-
lettres, he elaimed the privilege of enjoying the same liberties in style
and subjeet matter that Montaigne had enjoyed. He especially relished
the ribaldries of the essayist and sought to enliven his writings similarly.
He agreed fully with the depiction ofhuman frailty that he found in the
Essais. He respected the prudence with whieh Montaigne had exercised
his judgment. The skeptical turn of mind with its distrust of contro-

1 See also OD IV, 146 l for an eloquent passage on his desire for the tranquillity of
obscurity.
2 The only book that appeared originally with his name on the title page was the Diction-
naire, and then only because his publisher would not have been granted a privilege without it.
 THE GENTLEMAN AND THE SCHOLAR 193

versy and dissension, its tolerant attitude toward other opmIOns, its
humanitarian respeet for the man who holds them, its insistenee that
moral eonsiderations take preeedenee over all others, these things in
Montaigne appealed to Pierre Bayle; and he willingly used the es-
tablished authority of the essayist to reinforee his own observations.
For he regarded Montaigne as a elassie, whose "savoir et bel esprit"
(2) belonged to the republic of letters, As a elassie, he had authority
and his least remark earried weight. As a elassie, he deserved study
and eould be quo te d in any context. And among the elassies, he was
one of Bayle's favoritcs.
 CHAPTER IX

BA YLE'S YOUTH

Bayle was thirty-four years old before he saw a major work of his in
print. Our knowledge of his life and ideas for the years before 1682 is
based largely on his long letters to his family and a few Latin works
on technical matters ofphilosophy. From a study ofthem several facts
become clear. First, the Calvinist faith of his youth seems totally
sincere. Secondly, it existed in an inquiring mind whose liberaI atti-
tudes might at first blush seem incompatible with true piety. Thirdly,
both his enthusiasm for Cartesian philosophy and his skeptical interests
date from his student years.
The most interesting incident of his youth is his double conversion.
As a twenty-one year old student in philosophy at Puylaurens, his
Protestantism had been sh aken by the argument of a Catholic tract to
the effect that the Reformed Church had no authoritative body on
earth for the establishment of dogma. After five months at Puylaurens,
he departed to continue his studies at the Jesuit academy of Toulouse,
a school whose high quality attracted the sons of many Huguenot
families. There, one mon th later, he converted to the Catholic Church
and completed the two-year philosophy course with the financial
support of the bishop of Rieux. He even hoped to convert his older
brother Jacob, and to this end wrote a somewhat pompous letter
asking him to come to Toulouse to discuss a matter vi tal to his sal-
vation. 1 The consternation of his family was great, as was the joy of

1 This letter and other doeuments eoneeming Bayle's eonversion are eonveniently
assembled in Desmaizeaux's Vie de BaJole, published with the Dictionnaire, XVI, 45-50. The
letter eonfirms his eoneem with the need for an infal1ible authority. "Et en effet, quelle
apparenee que Dieu laisse tomber l'eglise ehretienne dans la ruine et dans la desolation,
qu'illui eaehe toutes ses cJartes, qu'illa prive de toutes ses lumieres, et qu'en meme temps
il revete un homme du eommun, un simple partieulier, d'une abondanee de grace si
extraordinaire qu'il soit eomme le restaurateur de la veri te ... Il est bien pius de l'ordre de
la providenee de Dieu, et du soin que le Saint-Esprit prend des fiddes en gouvernant
l'eglise par la communication de ses lumieres de laquel1e il gratifie les lieutenans du fils de
 BA YLE'S YOUTH 195

the Jesuit instructors, who made a considerable show of his public

defense of his theses. His Catholicism, however, was not of long
duration. After seventeen months he returned to the church of his
family. According to his later account of the matter (OD II, 739 l),
it was the excessive Catholic devotion of "creaturcs" and the impossi-
bility of transubstantiation that caused his second conversion.l The
two reasons he gives for his reconversion, idolatry and the Eucharist, were
elosely related in the eyes of the Huguenots, who were often forced to
make obeisances to the host when it pass ed in a religious procession.
His return to Calvinism was a courageous act which exposed him
to considerable danger, for the law at the time required relapsed
Protestants to leave the kingdom. Bayle was forced to depart in
secrecy and remain hidden until he reached Geneva at the age of
twenty-two, never to see his family again. Later, when he returned to
France, he assumed a false name (Bele, which was pronounced differ-
ently from Bayle 2) and resorted to several strategems in his corre-
spondence with his family in order to conceal his identityand his
whereabouts. Whatever may have been the exact nature of his
reversion to the Calvinist cause, he did not act in any way hypo-
critically; for he last some very real advantages by his change of
religion. 3 vVhat can be said is that the young Bayle's mind was
sufficiently op en to undertake a critical examination of his beliefs and

Dieu en terre, que ee soit l'eglise qui instruise, qui corrige et qui reforme les particuliers et les
abue qu'ils pourraient laisser couler dans leur eonduite, ou qui !es guerisse de leurs erreurs,
que non pas que les particuliers rHorment l'eglise et la redressent de nouveau" (DHC XVI,
48 I, 15 April 1670).
1 In a letter to Pinsson de Riolles, quoted by DesmaizeatLx (DHC XVI 263 r) and
publisherl by Gerig and Van Roosbroeek, Romanic Review, x...'''::III (1932), 207-210, he
merely says, "les premieres impressions de l'education ayant regagne le dessus, je me erus
oblige de rentrer dans la religion ou j'etais ne." The two aecounts are not necessarily
eontradietory; for Pinsson de Riolles was a Catholic, whom Bayle may not have wished to
offend by mentioning transubstantiation.
2 It had more than one syllable, was probably sounded "Ba-i-Ie" (ef. Labrousse, Pierre
Bayle, p. 4, n. 14).
3 Jean Delvolve concludes, unfairly it seems to me, "Bayle en quittant Toulouse n'est pius
un homme de foi," Religion, critique et philosophie positive chez Pierre Ba)'le (Paris: Akan, 1906),
p. I I. Charles Lenient, in his Etude sur Bayle (Pari;: Joubert, 1855), p. 26, writes "il ne resta
pius en lui qu'un scepticisme incurable, mai dissimule sous quelques apparences de devotion
exterieure et de respeet pour les livres saints." I mueh prefer "V. J. Barber's view that it
was reason, not faith, that Bayle learned to distrust, "Pierre Bayle: Faith and Reason," in
Moore, "Villiam, Rhoda Sutherland, and Enid Starkie, The French lHind, Studies in Honor of
Gustave Rudler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952). Karl C. Sandberg, Faith and Reason
in the Thought of Pierre Ba,yle 1670-1697, University ofWiseonsin Dissertation, 1961 (Ann Arbor
61-2978), gives an interesting account of the conversion. The most exhaustive and thorough
analysis of this period is to be found in chapters 3 and 4 of :\Ime Labrousse's biography,
rich in material previously unknown. She rejects Delvolves point of "iew with impressive
force.
196 BA YLE'S YOUTH

to change them when they did not seem well grounded. He had been
originally persuaded by the Catholic arguments against individual
examination of religious dogmas, that is, by the Pyrrhonist machine
of war us ed so frequently by Catholic apologists. But his second con-
version was motivated by different considerations, one of which was
a matter ofrational theology (transubstantiation cannot be explained),
the second of which was purely religious (the idolatrous practices of
the Roman religion). His retum to the fold cannot be construed as the
result of his skeptical convictions at an early age. Upon arriving in
Geneva, he wrote to his brother Jacob,
Nous ne sommes pIus dans le tems du mystere; no us sommes dans le tems
de la manifestation, si bien que ne goutans pas le bien que nous attendions
en esperance seulement, mais en ayans la pleine et entiere iouyssance il
ne reste pIus que de se rejoüir au Seigneur qui a fait cette grand'ceuvre et de
luy en rendre graces immortelles. Pour moy, j'ay regarde ma sortie hors de
cette ville superstitieuse ou j'ay fait quelque seiour avec la meme ioye
qu'ont ceux qui habitent sous les poles de revoir le soleil apres une absence
de six mois ... Continuons a loüer Dieu chacun de notre cote pour tous
ses bienfaits et prenons sa coupe de delivrance invoquans son saint nom
avec tous ses bien aimez et ses fidelles serviteurs. 1

There is every reason to believe that during the years following

his retum to Calvinism, his religion was sincere; for his family expected
him to become a minister as his father and older brother had. His
younger brother Joseph also intended to become a c1ergyman, but
died before finishing his studies. When he first heard of Joseph's
vocation, Bayle wrote him: "Puisque vous vous sentez de l'inc1ination
au Saint Ministere, il faut donner la et attendre de la Grace du bon
Dieu un heureux succez, et la benediction de vos veilles et de vos
labeurs. Je le prie tres instamment de vous accompagner de ses faveurs
les pIus particulieres et en vous recommandant a sa Grace, je vous
recommende la crainte de son nom, l'assiduite et la constance dans
l'Etude ... " 2 Pierre Bayle, however, felt no real call to the ministry.

1 Letter dated 2 November 1670, edited by Gerig and Van Roosbroeck in Romanic Review,
XXIII (1932), 216-217, verified by consulting the autograph (Columbia I). In quoting
from the autograph letters, I have maintained the original spelling. Some revision of the
punctuation is inevitable because the ink has faded or is unelearo Standard abbreviations,
except for proper names, will be written out in their full form. There is no purpose in writing
"lentem(en)t" when "lentement" will do, and at least one abbreviation ("qi" for "que")
can be confusing.
2 In a letter of 16 J uly 1678. Except for the last 14 words, this passage was ornitted by the
editors of Trevoux when they published Bayle's letters to his farnily in OD I B. The originai
is number 62 in the collection of manuscript letters owned by Columbia University. The
history of the collection and publication of Bayle's letten has been deciphered with pains-
 BA YLE'S YOUTH 197

While astudent in Geneva, he was officiaIly registered as a "proposant,"

but seems to have soon abandoned any intention of becoming a
member of the clergy. Re wrote to his brother Jacob, clairning that
his voice was ill adapted to preaching sermons and that there were a
good many more ministers than positions open for them; nonetheless,
he did not formaIly abandon his registration in studies of divinity
(OD I B, 21 1,2 July 1672).1 Six and a halfyears later, after having
been a professor of philosophy for three years at the Protestant
Academy of Sedan, he was stiIl being pressed by his family on the
same subject. vVhen Jacob proposed that he resume the study of
theology, he replied that he would reconsider his recent negative
answer, "quelque peu d'apparence que je voie d'abord a m'y bien
pouser (sic)" (OD I B, 107/,26 November 1678 - date and text rectified
according to Columbia autograph 68). Although he must have been
somewhat annoyed by the persistence with which he was advised to
undertake a career in the church, his answers to his father's exhor-
tations remained gentle. 2
As long as there was a member of the immediate family to corre-
spond with, Bayle continued writing frequent, lengthy letters, asking
for his family's prayers of entrusting them to God's care. 3 When

taking accuracy and incredible erudition by Elisabeth Labrousse in her Inventaire critique de la
correspondance de Pierre Bayle (Paris: Vrin, 1961), an extremely useful book that has been
a helpful guide in studying the Columbia collection. The eighteenth-century Catholic editors
systematically eliminated various passages, those dealing with the persecutions suffered by
the Huguenots before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, those !ike the one cited above
containing expressions of Protestant piety, those revealing the poverty of the Bayle family,
and many others for less obvious reasons. See pp. 27-30 of the Inventaire.
1 NIme Labrousse notes that Bayle was not strictly honest in his !etters home at this time,
for he delayed announcing his departure to the environs of Geneva to assume the job of
tutor at the Count of Dohna's. This move had entailed suspension of his theological studies.
2 "Prions ee grand Dieu de qui depend toute donation & tout don parfait de seconder si
bien nos voeux & nos efforts, qu'enfin nous puissions venir il bout de toute sorte d'obstaeles
il sa gloire et il l'edification du prochain et au salut de nos ames" (OD I B, 1151, I April 1679
- the last fourteen words have been restored following manuscript 75 of the Columbia
collection). "Assistez-moi par vos saintes prieres afin que Dieu me donne la force de fournir
il ma charge [i.e., his teaching], & d'avoir quelque tems il moi pour songer aux fim que vous
m'avez indiquees [i.e., the ministry], chose il quoi jusques ici il m'a ete irnpossible de me
preparer efficacement" (OD I B, 120 I, 12 October 1679). The proofreaders of the 2nd
edition of the (Euvres diverses allowed innumerable eITors to be printed. Obvious ones of
fauIty gender or number wilI be corrected in quotations without bothering the reader with a
collection ofuseless (sie) notations. Likewise, the punctuation ofboth OD and DHC will be
modernized, for their editors seem to folIow the very confusing rule of inserting a comma
before every que. In some cases this only obscures the meaning of Bayle's very long sentences.
3 "Je me recommende toujours il vos bonnes et saintes prieres et vous remercie de ceIIes
que vous faittes toujours pour moi,je fais la meme chose pour vous tous, priant notre commun
Pere eeleste de vous benir abondamment du ciel en haut de la terre en bas chacun en sa
vocation" (unpublished section of Columbia autograph 52, 24-July 1677 to Jacob). See also
OD I B, 62 r, 3 September 1675 to Jacob.
198 BA YLE'S YOUTH

Joseph showed his unhappiness at not being able to leave home in

order to study, Pierre Bayle wrote: "Il est trop juste que vous soulagiez
le chef de la famille en tout ce que vous pourrez, mais ce devoir
prejudicie a vos etudes; patience. Il est pIus necessaire d'obeir a Dieu
que d'etudier. J'ai passe par le meme chernin, & mes etudes s'en
ressentent ... " (OD IB, 47 I, 26 June 1675.) Up on Joseph's death,
his condolences to his father betray the harshness of Calvinist piety.
"Votre longue experience, mon tres-bon Pere, vous a si fort apris le
peu de fond qu'il faut faire sur les choses d'ici bas, combien tout est
sujet a vanite, combien Dieu renverse les choses les mieux etablies,
combien il sappe les fondemens de nos plaisirs temporels ... que
j'espere que vous resisterez en bon chretien & en homme de cceur
dans la grande vieillesse a eette rude epreuve .... il en faut toujours
venir la, que Dieu ne veut pas que no us sOlons heureux en ee monde"
(OD I B, 150-151, 18 May 1684 - text reetified slightly according
to Columbia autograph 106).1
Besides giving testimony to Bayle's eontinuing Calvinist faith, the
letters of the early years provide valuable information eoneerning his
intelleetual development. After being exposed to the eomplexities of
Peripatctie philosophy by the Jesuits of Toulouse, he studied under
Calvinist theologians in Geneva and made the aequaintanee of
Cartesian philosophy. A partieularly interesting letter (OD I B, 8-12,
21 September 1671), written to his father a year after his arrival in
Geneva, shows the tendeneies ofhis thought and the "liberal" attitude
permissible in diseussing religious topics with the elderly minister.
The first topie the young student takes up is the dispute between the
universalists and the partieularists, which had spread from France to
Geneva many years before. 2 In 1635 Moses Amyraut (see his artide
in DHC) had defended the thesis that God desires all men's redemption
and grants to every man a universal, but not effieient, graee. His
opinions were unfairly misrepresented and violently attaeked by

1 Note that this letter was written after the publication of the Pensies diverses. The same
death occasioned the following startling remark in a letter to Jacques Lenfant, minister at
Heidelberg and friend ofJoseph's: "Je l'amois tendrement, & il m'aimoit peu·etre encore
davantage. Dieu soit louc~, qui l'a voulu retirer de ce monde, & me priver des consolation,
que j'en attendois!" (OD IV, 616 l, 8 August 1684, cited by Desmaizeaux, Vie dr Bayle,
DHC XVI, 76 r.)
2 Annie Barnes, Jean Le Clerc (1657-17:]6) et la republique des letlres (Paris: Droz, 1938), chap.
I, gives a useful summary of the history of Genevan Protestantism at this period. This
scholarly and lively book is indispensable for the history of the ambiance in which Bayle
lived. For more details on the theological issues, see Walter E. Rex's, Essays on Pierre Bayle
and Religious Controversy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), chap. III. Mme Labrousse
gives a fine analysis of young Bayle's letter in her biography, pp. 101-107.
 BA YLE'S YOUTH 199

Pierre du Moulin, theologian of Sedan (who was the grandfather of

Pierre J urieu and his wife). Alexander Morus introduced universalism
to Geneva, where he taught it at the university until his departure in
1648. It remained a subject ofcontention until 1669 when the political
authorities brought an end to the controversy, in part because of
external political threats, and required all participants in the dispute
to sign a formulary that had been composed earlier at the time of
I\forus' professorship. The net efIect, as Bayle explained it, was a sort
of truce reached on common grounds of dogma permitting each man
to retain his own conviction on a matter that was not fundamental to
orthodoxy. Bayle arrived on the scene a year after the event; but
people were stiIl divided, though silent, on the matter. It was his first
exposure to the ways of intra-party religious controversy, and he
reacted characteristically.

La division eommenc;a par les Professeurs, ear e'est l'ordinaire que les
pIus Savans soient les prerniers en jeu dans les affaires de eette nature ....
Or comme j'ai oüi souvent parler de l'etat ou on s'est vu en ee pa"is a
l'oeeasion de la Graee, j'ai eu un peu de euriosite de eonnoitre les deux
opinions. J'avois toujours cru sur la foi de 1\;1r. du ?\Ioulin que l'opinion
de Mr. Arnirault etoit tres-dangereuse & tout-a.-fait erronnee. ... je
eommenc;ai arne doutter que la passion s'etoit melee dans l'Eerit de NL du
Moulin, & qu'il falloit oüir les deux partis avant que de rien eoncIure en
faveur de l'un ou de l'autre. Et en effet j'ai trouve que le ~L Amirault que
1\;1. du Moulin a eombatu dans son livre, est un fantarne & une chimere que
M. du Moulin a bätie de son bon plaisir ... enfin ee qu'on appeile disputer
de mauvaise foi & en sophiste a ete for bien mis en pratique par le grand M.
du Moulin. (OD I B, 9 1 with slight modifieations aeeording to Colurnbia
autograph 2).

Consulting the works of Frederic Spanheim, Bayle concluded that

Scripture could be cited to support both sides of the question, that
the matter was of little consequence for one's salvation, and that
Amyraut should not have been so bedeviled for an opinion that would
have been blameless even without support from Scripture.

C'est dire tout ee que Ies autres disent, exeepte que e'est attribuer a
Dieu pIus de cIernenee & donner un pIus vaste eharnp a sa miserieorde, ee
qui n'est pas a mon avis une pensee indigne de eette patienee & de eette
bonte que Dieu temoigne a toutes les ereatures jusqu'aux petits eorbeaux;
& je ne erais pas qu'il soit defendu de penser de la divinite des choses qui
tournent a sa gloire, eneore que no us n'a10ns autre fondement de penser
ainsi que ees notions universelles qui sont eornmunes a tous les homme s
(OD I B, IO I).
200 BA YLE'S YOUTH

Other things being equal, Bayle prefers to accept dogmas emphasizing

Cod's benevolence. What he deplores most is the vitriol of the authors
cngaged in the controversy. "J'ai eu le plaisir de voir, si toutefois il
n'y a pas pIus de sujet de pleurer que de se divertir en voiant les
foiblesses de l'homme, que pour etre Professeur en theologie, on n'en
est pas moins le joüet des passions, de la colere, de l'envie, & de la
vengeance" (OD I B, 10 I). One of the unending themes of Bayle's
later career as an author was the futility, destructiveness, and vicious.:.
ness of theological controversy. We see here his desire to observe
dispassionately the issues at stake and the conclusion that he draws
from the ignominious conduct of the participants. ~Ien are creatures
of passions and bad faith, especially professors of theology.
The letter continues with a description of the Academy. Of the
three professors of theology, Bayle prefers Tronchin, the universalist
and the least rigid, admiring his independence of thought and the
freedom with which he points out the errors or illogic of some of the
most respected Protestant works. Tronchin had given a particularly
lucid commentary on the sacrament of the communion, pointing out
the misconceptions of the early Calvinists.

Pour marque qu'au commencement on n'entendoit pas trop bien ce que

c'etoit, il apportoit les passages de notre Catechisme ou il est dit que c'est
un secret surmontant notre entendement, mais toutefois tres-certain, etc. Il
disoit qu'il n'en faloit pas venir la et qu'il y avoit de moyens fort faciles et
me me populaires d'expliquer cette bienheureuse communion. Au reste
vom ne sauriez croire quels avan ta ges il tire de la philosophie de Mr des
Carte s dont il fait assez ouverte profession, pour combat re ceux de l'Eglise
Romaine. En effet comme par les principes de ce grand homme, le lieu
n'est autre chose que le corps meme, ce qui se prouve par des raisons cIaires
comme le jour, on met a bas une legion de chicanes et de distinctions creuses
dont il se sont munis pour se sauver des absurdites qui naissent de poser un
meme corps en plusieurs lieux, en leur disant que comme selon leur propre
aveu le corps de Jesus Christ ne se multipIie pas, les Iieux aussi qu'il occupe
ne peuvent pas se multiplier puisque le lieu que le eorps de J. C. oeeupe
et le corps me me de J. C. so nt une seule et meme ehose. J' a pporte cet exem-
ple seulement car si ie voulois toueher ce que nous pouvons concIure en
faveur de notre croyance de ce que Mr. des Cartes et ses seetateurs enseig-
nent touchant l'impenetrabilite de la matiere, la nature de l'extension, et des
accidens, etc. je n'aurois jamais fait. (OD I B, 10 r: the words from "il
disoit ... " line 4, are from Columbia autograph 2. 'Valter E. Rex quotes
the same lines in the Bulletin de la SocidU de l' Histoire du Protestantisme Franfais,
CV (1959), p. 102).

Cartesian philosophy seerns, then, to the young Bayle to be quite

 BA YLE'S YOUTH 201

eompatible with the Protestant eause. 1 He hopes that with its help a
ratianal theology eould explain even a mystery such as the Eueharist.
Continuing his letter, Bayle expresses his interest in the young
professor Chouet's specialleetures in Cartesian philosophy. Sinee the
subjeet matter of the lessons is the venom of vipers, quieksilver,
the barometer, the siphon, and the like, he is obviously referring
to Cartesian physies, which he was to defend as the best available
in the works of his later years. 2
He then turns to a question of Scriptural interpretation. How can
the two accounts of the death of Judas, that he hanged himself, and
that he threw himself from a rock, be reeoneiled? Saurnaise had
suggested that differing rumors about his suicide had spread in
Jerusalem and that "sur eela les Apõtres sans autrement s'informer du
fait, ont ecrit eette mort, les uns conformement a l'opinion de quel-
ques-uns, les autres, a ee qu'un autre vaudeville leur en avoit appris"
(OD I B, I I T, the word "vaudeville" appears only in the autograph;
the published text is modified slightly). Bayle finds this way ofexplain-
ing Scripture hardly correct; "e'est l'exposer un peu trop aux foi-
blesses des histoires communes," and he is afraid that several Protes-
tant commentators have done more ill than good by their lack of
respeet when th ey eritieized Scripture. As for the umesolved matter of
Judas' death, his father will indeed oblige him by giving him his
thoughts on the question.
It must be remembered that this letter was written to a minister of
the church (and of the older generation); yet young Bayle did not
hesitate to speak to his father about Scripture in a way that seems
flippant. He feIt no qualms about asking him an insoluble question
about the historieal aecuraey of the New Testament, at the same time
protesting his respeet for Holy Writ. He spoke at length with frankness
about the bad faith of Calvinist theologians in their quarrels. Re also
displayed his interest in the new philosophy of Descartes. It is weIl to
keep these facts in mind, for th ey show that the ideas and attitudes he
later published may be compatible with asineere faith that would

1 In a later letter of 1675 (OD I B, 60 I), he again remarks on how Cartesian philosophy
may be turned against transubstantiation. His published works return to this idea on many
oecasions as we shall see.
2 Bayle remained in epistolary relations with his teaeher until at least 1697. Mme
Labrousse's InDentaire lists eight letters from him to his fonner student, two of whieh were
published in part in the NcuDe/[es de la republique des lettres, March 1685, V, and DHC 2
Sadeur G. No letters ofBayle's to Chouet have been found. Chouet was one of the first French
Protestants to espouse Cartesian philosophy, See Walter E. Rex's monograph, Essays on
Pierre Bayle and Religious ControDersy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), chap. IV.
202 BAYLE'S YOUTH

not seem shocking to a firm Calvinist. The one view of his that was
soon to change was his evident interest in a rationally defensible ex-
planation of the mysteries. Tronchin to ok exception, presumably with
Bayle's approval, to the official doctrine that the Eucharist, while sur-
passing our understanding, was still "tres-certain." ~Iuch of Bayle's
later thought will adopt the very attitude Tronchin condemned.
On the twenty-first of September, 1671, writing to Jacob, Bayle
again re tu ms to the question of Scriptural criticism, so troublesome
for Protestants, who founded their doctrines on revelation. The
sequence of' his thoughts betrays his indecision. All translators, he
begins, even Erasmus and Beza, have feIt the urge to make minor
adjustments in the text in order to make it read more sensibly (OD
I B, 14 I). The divergent readings of different manuscripts prove
"invincibly" that th ey cannot all be correet and that some choice
must be made. It would seem logical, then, that reason or common
sense must dictate which reading is to be selected. "Je trouve que
c'est fort affoiblir l'autorite des ecritures, & qu'il faudroit bien se
garder de la soumettre a la raison des hommes qui, selon leurs differ-
entes passions, chercheroient divers sens a un meme chapitre, & ne
voudroient jamais demeurer d'accord de la conjecture de leurs ad-
versaires, comme font les Critiques a l'egard des passages d'un Virgile,
c'un Horace, & d'un Ciceron" (OD I B, 14 r). It is undeniable that
some texts could be made logical by small adjustments of the most
rudimentary kind. For example, John viii. 22 reads, "Then said the
Jews, 'Will he kill himself, since he says "Where I am going you cannot
come?"'" A slight modification of the Greek original would read "Is
he going to a foreign land?" instead of "Will he kill himself?" Bayle
would like Jacob to discuss this verse with his learned friends and then
report their opinion to him. He realizes that scholars can dream up
"eent jolies chimeres" to explain the text as it now stands.
In a way that is typical of his remarks in the Dictionnaire historique
critique, Pierre Bayle here exposes a complex exegetical religious
question without coming to any personal resolution. He seems to be
of two minds. The churches of the Reformation inevitably try to hold
that Scripture is clear, and the young student at the Academy of
Geneva is especiaIly sensitive to the dangers inherent in controversy
between professors over the letter of sacred texts. At the same time his
critical sense teIl s him that reason may be able to serve a valid function
here.
In matters of philosophy we find two main themes that predominate
 BA YLE'S YOUTH 2°3

in Bayle's thought - skeptieism and Cartesianism. Both were to be

eonstant preoeeupations throughout his life. During these years, it is
the Cartesian strain that is the more obvious, but Bayle had long
refleeted on Pyrrhonism. The first mention he makes of it appears in
a lengthy letter to Vineent Minutoli, written in January r 673 from
Copet where Bayle was preeeptor to the ehildren of the eount of
Dohna. Relying quite largely on Cieero's dialogues, he gives a short
summary of the history of ancient philosophy, similar in some ways to
IvIontaigne's remarks in the "Apologie." The letter, whieh smacks
of a student's exercise, sheds no light on its author's personal per-
suasion.1 N onetheless, it testifies at least to his interest in Pyrrhonism,
toward which he shows no hostility.
In r674-75, while at Lambertville outside of Rouen, Bayle read
La Mothe le Vayer's Dialogues d' Orasius Tubera and some of the works
of Gabriel Naude. His comments show how he reacted to works
commonly considered the most Pyrrhonist and dangerous among the
publieations of the generation following Montaignc:
Il y a bien de l'erudition, mais il y a encore pIus d'impiete: ee sont des
coups de jeunesse, je l'avoue: je ne sai pourtant pas si l' Auteur [La ~Iothe
le Vayer] s'en est repenti; eal' toute sa vie il a ecrit pour la defense du
Pirrhonisme d'une maniere qui ne sentoit pas son arne devote. Je tiens 1J.
de la Mothe le Vayer & M. ~aude pour les deux Savans de ee siecle qui
avoient le pIus de leeture & l'esprit le pIus epure des sentimens populaires;
mais parce qu'ils font trop les esprits forts, ils nous debitent bien souvent des
doctrines qui ont de periHeuses consequences. J\1. Kaude dans son Apologie
des Grands-Hommes aceuses de magie conclut presque a nier toutes sortes
de soreeleries, & eela iroit bien loin qui le voudroit poussel'. Dans un autre
Livre qu'il fait sur les eoups d'Etat, il fait une longue liste de tous les fins
Politiques qui ont acquis du credit par la persuasion ou l'on etoit qu'ils
eonferoient ave e Dieu. Peu s'en faut qu'il ne mette notre :Vlolse a leur tete,
& eela avec un adoueissement si mince en faveur de la Foi que les conseien-
ees timorees en erieroient volontiers au meurtre, au blaspheme. Dans ee
Livre il etablit Ies pIus pernicieuses maximes de Machiavel; & il a raison de
dire que tout le monde les condamne, mais que presque tous Ies Souverains
Ies pratiquent. Je vous assure que ee Livre n'est gueres chretien (OD I B,
57,21 July 1675 to Jaeob Bayle).

Bayle rarely eondemned the impiety of an author on the basis of a

book expressing freethinking ideas. Even here in a private letter, we
see his eaution in making an accusation of bad faith. Naudes hook is
hardly Christian; La Mothe le Vayer defends Pyrrhonism in a way that

1 He calls Academic philosophy (not Pyrrhonism) a "maladie" (OD IV, 541 i).
 BA YLE'S YOUTH

"ne sentait pas son arne devote." Does this imply that Pyrrhonism can
be defended in aChristian way? All Bayle says is that it may be un-
Christian. Here at the age of twenty-seven, he already displays the
impersonality so characteristic of his mind that it becomes one of his
most personal traits. His judgment of Naude is typical of the extreme
prudence he always exercised in his writings, a prudence that is
justice itself, but can be irksome to minds that want definite assertions.
Naude almost rejects all brands of sorcery, a point of view that could
have consequences if pushed too far, but just what consequences are
not specified. Timid consciences may cry blasphemy at his doctrines.
Bayle does not. He suggests, and goes no further, when it is a matter of
judging the probity of an author's intentions. This is his constant
attitude, and he could have wished others had done the same for him.
Moreover, he gives the devil his due and recognizes the unsurpassed
scholarship of both men (he will cite them frequently in his works
later). Lastly, they are not subject to popular errors; and in this th ey
could not be more in ac cord with his own proclivities.
\Vhatever his assessment of La Mothe le Vayer's Pyrrhonism and its
compatibility with religion, Bayle himselfwas soon to grow increasingly
skeptical in his philosophy and theology. In May r681, shortly before
the Academy at Sedan was closed down, he considered leaving France
for northern countries. Re wrote to Jacob that he did not expect that
his adherence to the new philosophy would stand in the way of his
finding a position.
Le Cartesianisme ne fera pas une affaire; je le regarde simplement eomme
une hypothese ingenieuse qui peut servir a expliquer eertains effets naturels,
mais du reste j'en su is si peu ent et e que je ne risquerois pas la moindre
chose pour soutenir que la nature se regle & se gouverne selon ees principes
la. PIus j't~tudie la Philosophie, pIus j'y trouve d'incertitude: la differenee
entre les Seetes ne va qu'a quelque probabilite de pIus ou de mains; il n'y
en a point encore qui ait frappe au but, & jamais on n'y frappera apparem-
ment, tant sont grandes les profandeurs de Dieu dans les ceuvres de la
nature, aussi bien que dans eelles de la graee. Ainsi vous pouvez dire a
M. GaiIlard [who had offered to help find a position for Bayle] que je suis
un Philosophe sans entetement, & qui regarde Aristote, Epicure, Descartes
comme des inventeurs de conjectures que I'on suit ou que l'on quitte selon
que l'on veut chereher plutöt un tel qu'un tel amusement a l'esprit (OD
IB, I26 l).

This is the first declaration ofBayle's personal Pyrrhonism thatwe have.

Note that it is made to a Protestant minister and that it is intended to
be used as a recommendation of Bayle's fitness for achair in philoso-
 BA YLE'S YOUTH 20 5

phy.1 The works of both nature and grace are impenetrable myster-
ies and will evidentIy remain so. Philosophie systems, therefore, can
be no more than conjectures of varying probability.
But among those conjectures BayIe was always to show a strong
leaning for Cartesian thinking, especially its physics, in his published
works and in the philosophy course he taught. In 1675 he had won the
competition for the chair in philosophy at Sedan, one of the most
conservath'e of the Protestant academies of France. His first two
years there were particularly arduous for him because of the strenuous
labors involved in composing and dictating his lessons and because
of the meagerness of his salary. The initial year was devoted to logic
and required him to assume the role of a Peripatetic, a role he found
tiresome, but necessary. As he later wrote his younger brother (OD
IB, 77 i, 6 May 1677), Iogic is a harsh discipline "de dure digestion,"
but an immensely helpful one, for "Ies lieux communs de Theologie ont
leurs chimeres & leurs abstractions ere us es, il y faut passer un jour;
c'est pourquoi accoutumez-vous de bonne heure a faire joüer I'imagi-
nation, & a I'exercer sur Ies concepts & Ies formalites. Ce sera d'usage
dans la suite, ... il n'est rien de pIus redoutable qu'un habile homme
qui est bon Logicien, il vous renverse les Livres les pIus solides, & a
moins que d'etre bon Logicien il est impossible de lui tenir tete." 2
But what the apprentice instructor really looked forward to was the
second year of his course, the year devoted to physics, when he could
treat Cartesian philosophy and the atoms of Gassendi. Towards the
mic!dle of that year, he wrote toJoseph: "Pour moije suis Peripateticien
presque par tout hormis en Physique, dans laquelle je suis entierement
contre Aristote pour M. Descartes" (OD I B, 74 r, 28 March 1677).
The Cours de philosophie that Bayle taught was first published posthu-
mously in the Oeuvres diverses. 3 There is little unusual in the courseo It
is divided into sections on logic, ethics, general physics, partjcular
physics (astronomy, weather, the cause offountains, along with other
miscellanea), and metapysies. Elementary and deseriptive, it gave
1 This interested motive in no way militates against the sincerity of Bayle's words. His
later publications make it only too c1ear that he is speaking accurate1y.
2 Note the Pyrrhonistic implication that a good debater can destroy any position, even
the strongest. This was to be a prineipal point in Bayle's skepticism, and his training in
scholastic dialectics under the Jesuits of Toulouse always stood him in good stead in any
dispute. He also implies that a sound logician will be able to hold his own in a controversy-
by counterattacking it would seem; at least such was Bayle's later practice. He himselfwas
a fiendishly subtle arguer. His enemies would have taken the word "fiendishly" literally.
3 Although he taught from 1675 to 1693, it is highly likely that much of the course was
composed during his years in Sedan. A few remarks (mention of the Dutch logician Burgers-
dyck) sound as if they were added in Holland.
206 BAYLE'S YOUTH

its teaeher little free rein to express himself.1 In the seetions on physies,
Bayle is Pyrrhonist to the extent that he eontents himself not infrequent-
ly with aeeounts of the opposing systems without demonstrating
any strong preferenee for any one of them - albeit his inelination to
Cartesian theory and the Coperniean hypothesis is rather elear.
The seattered remarks in the Cours eoneerning the foundations of
rational knowledge eonfirm in general the Cartesian prineiple that
the one sure standard of truth is the "evidenee" of a elear and distinet
idea. "La lumiere naturelle" serves to reveal clear and distinet ideas
to man without the aid offormallogie (OD IV, 218, 219,479).
Donc dans quelque science que ee soit, pourvD. qu'on entende bien la
question proposee, & que la connexion des termes soit necessaire, on peut
avec la seule Logique naturelle tirer des condusions dont on ne doutera
point & dont on saura qu'on ne doit douter. Ce qui confirme cette verite,
c'est que sans le secours de la Logique artificielle ceux qui en ont etablie
les regles en ont compris la certitude. Donc par une pareille raison on peut
comprendre sans la Logique artificielle la certitude des principes & des
condusions de la Physique, de la Geometrie, & des autres Sciences. (OD
IV, 2I8. The Latin original is given in the facing column.)

Most human error does not eome from faulty eonsequenees based on
valid assumptions, but from mistaken first prineiples. Philosophy,
th.erefore, must eoneentrate on finding true first prineiples more than
on mere logie. 2
Integral Pyrrhonism, for example, ean be refuted by the use of the
cogito, ergo sum (OD IV, 484-486). That is why the cogito may be
legitimately ealled the first of all prineiples. No Pyrrhonist has ever
doubted his own existenee as a eonseious being, and onee he has
reeognized the validity of the cogito, aeeording to Bayle, he ean be
made to accept not only the propositions of geometry and logie but also
the existenee ofGod, of the world, and of the immortal soul. But always
the first prineiple for the purpose of eonfounding Pyrrhonists must be
the cogito, whieh also proyes (this against the Epieureans) that the
mind does have ideas that are not derivatives of sense data. Among
such ideas Bayle lists the concept of God, who has never been observed
by the senses, the pereeption ofthought itself, whieh is not an objeet of
the senses, and the deduetions of mathematies, such as the qualities

1 Defending himself from attacks by Jurieu, Bayle later wrote that he had never taught
the subject matter of the Pensies diverses in his course (OD IV, 702 rl.
2 Many of Bayle's future writings will deny his assertion that men are likely to deduce
accurately the consequences of their first principles.
 BA YLE'S YOeTH 20 7

of a thousand-sided polygon whieh has never been pereeived. In all

this, of eourse, Bayle is following Cartesian prineiples exactly.
But at the same time he makes several significant statements that
place restrietions on the criterion of self-evidenee. One of the most
distressing is the principle that some self-evident propositions are
ineomprehensible (OD IV, 217). For example, it is self-evident, and
therefore true, that matter is infinitely divisible. And yet, one cannot
imagine the way in whieh this is aetually the ease nor reconeile its
truth with numerous absurdities that seem to be deduetible from it.
One might well ask how valuable is the eriterion of "evidenee" if it
leads to such obscurities. Bayle does not pursue such lines of thought;
he merely coneludes that philosophy's task is to prove that something
is so, not how it is so.l Secondly, beeause of the inherent corruption
of human nature, the fundamental prineiples of morality have less
"evidenee" for men than do those of metaphysies. A few may be uni-
versally reeognized, such as the Golden Rule, or honor for one's
parents, or the necessity of ehoosing the lesser of two eviIs; but others
are the subjeet of debate. Finally, philosophieal truth is not the only
truth; for revelation gives men truths every bit as certain as philoso-
phy's propositions. In effeet, there are two standard:;; or guarantees of
a truth: reas on and revelation. Either logie or faith may produce
absolute eertitude, but only logie produees eertitude and elarity
(OD IV, 249). The other eriterion, faith, will eonfer varying degrees
of eertitude depending on its souree. Faith in the word of human
beiI1gs eannot be sure beeause men ean lie; faith in God must be sure
because God eannot deceive.
In the last seetion of the course, the metaphysics, Bayle retums to
the veracity of God. He points out that the cogito is the first prineiple of
knowledge in onlyone eapaeity - the destruetion ofPyrrhonism. From
another point of view, it is not the first principle; for it requires some
guarantee that elear and distinet ideas are valid ones. This guarantee
can only eome from the propositions that God eannot deeeive and that
Re has endowed man with a truth-pereeiving faculty that He has
underwritten. "La eonnoissanee de Dieu entant que vrai est la pre-
miere regle de la verite" (OD IV, 478). Bayle is here caught in the
"Cartesian eirele" that reason proyes God's perfeetion and God's

1 This is not quite the same as the modem scientific point of view, which is willing to
content itselfwith measurable qualities ofthings without trying to determine their quiddity.
For Cartesians such as Bayle a proposition may be true simply because it is logical, not
because it is founded on facts or experimental measurement.
208 BA YLE'S YOUTH

perfection prOyeS reason's reliability. Whether aware of the eirele or

not, Bayle elearly regards revelation as the ultimate source of truth,
and is willing to teach that "evidenee" has to be rejected in cases
where revelation runs counter to it. The example he cites is the dogma
of the Trinity, which contradicts the basic self-evident truth that things
that are the same as a third thing are the same thing. God's nature
involves mysteries that transcend human comprehension or logieal
"evidenee."
Bayle nonetheless affirms that His existence can be established by
solid proofs. These proofs are of some interest if only because it is
rarely that Bayle writes directly to the question of the rational demon-
stration of the existence of God. He first lists the five Thomist proofs,
pointing out that each turns on the rejection of the possibility of an
infinite regress. The argument that Bayle proffers as grounds for
rejecting an infinite regress is not very strong. He says in effect that
the causality of an infinite collection must either be mutual (i.e.,
circular in some form), which seems impossible, or else have a terminus
somewhere. This terminus would be an unproduced principle, a
Being in itself. "Or si vous l'admettez, pourquoi ne pas avoüer qu'il
est Dieu?" (OD IV, 525.) Obviously this is not a completely satisfying
proof.
A somewhat better argument, and one that is suggested in his later
works, !ies in the refutation of any theory denying creation. The
alternative to a created universe is the eternality of a world made up
of unproduced matter. But should such matter, endowed as it is with
two perfections, not be endowed with others, such as intelligence?
In that case, matter becomes God. Now since the world shows signs
of being ordered according to a simple plan of a general nature, it
would seem better to speak of one simple, intelligent, eternal immuta-
ble creator, than of a mass of eternal, separate pieees of matter. Bayle's
argument here amounts to the fact that the universe, created or
unereated, shows signs of an intelligent design. And once the principle
of an organizing intelligence is admitted, the hypothesis of God is
more acceptable than the hypothesis of matter alone. The demon-
stration is indirect, to say the least; for it depends on the unaccepta-
bility or the unlikelihood of any alternative to the Christian doctrine
of creation.
A second kind of argument offered by Bayle follows the ontological
form. An atheist will admit that anything not self-contradictory is
possible. God then is at least possible, for there is nothing self-contra-
 BAYLE'S YOUTH 20 9

dictory in the idea of a Being of infinite perfections. Once an atheist

adrnits the possibility of an all-perfect God, it is easy to prove that
He exists because existence is one of His petfeetions, As Bayle states his
proof, it relies on the assumption that an atheist will admit the premiss
that an all-perfect Being does not involve a contradiction. The proof
is cautiously formulated and hypothetical.l
Next, Bayle analyzes the Cartesian form of the ontologieal argument,
concluding that its weak point lies in the assumption that the only
possible souree for the idea of a perfect Being is such a Being. Consider-
ed from a different angle, in the manner proposed by Malebranche
(whom Bayle does not name), there may be so me validity in Des-
cartes's argument. Malebranehe's proof was that when a man is
pricked by a pin, neither the pin nor his soul can be the eause of his
sensation. The sensation must then have been produeed by a power
of universal dimensions whieh so orders things that every time :t man
is pricked by a pin he feels the sensation of pain. That universal
power, whieh orders all our sensations and thoughts (including the
idea of a perfect Being on which Descartes bases his argument) is
God. Bayle follows Malebranehe's demonstration even to the point
of repeating his illustration, the pin-priek (OD IV, 522-523).2
What then is the status of rationalism in the young philosopher's
course? In philosophy, the Cartesian prineiple of "evidenee" is
accepted as antecedent to all eriteria of truth, including the syllogism.
It provides an adequate refutation of the Pyrrhonists and indicates that
the Srmest truths do not rely on the senses. vVhat is clear and distinet
is true eve n though it may be incomprehensible and lead to absurd
consequences. The foundation of the validity of "evidenee" is the
trustworthiness of God. Therefore, it is not illogical that in some cases
His revelations will have to take preeedenee over an evident propo-
sition whieh they contradiet. In theology, Cartesian principles are
helpful because th ey provide arguments for the immortality of the
soul and the existence of God. But a eareful reading of Bayle's proofs
shows that they are expressed in a eonditional way.
Sometime in the beginning of I679, Bayle eoöperated with a
Protestant minister of Sedan by the name of Saerelaire in the com-
position of a shOl't philosophical work later published as the Ob-

1 There is good reason to believe that Bayle realized that it was not absolutely irrefutable,
for in alllikelihood he had al ready collaborated on a work, the Objec/ions to Poiret, that alluded
to ~ome of the difficulties involved in the problem of evi!.
2 The same argument is cited with approval in the Objections (OD IV, 150 r).
210 BA YLE'S YOUTH

jeetiones in libros quatuor de deo, anima et malo. David Ancillon, minister

in Metz, had sent a copy of Pierre Poiret's Cogitationum rationalium de
deo, anima et malo to Sedan, asking for critical comments on it. The
point-by-point critique following the order of the original came to
sixteen folio pages of Latin (OD IV, 146-161). It is, unfortunately,
impossible to tell which passages come from Bayle's pen and which
from his partner's; so this work must be used with caution. Poiret
published it along with his answers, inept ones Bayle thought, in the
second edition of his book in Amsterdam, 1685. The Objeetions are a
piecemeal colloquy between Cartesians who are often in agreement,
though his critics present a mo re Malebranchian point of view than
Poiret does. The comments frequently reject arguments as incon-
clusive or inappropriate even though the authors agree with the thesis
being defended. For example, one of Poiret's proofs of the unity of
God is objected to while others are approved of.1 Similarly, the authors
refute some of the arguments intended to demonstrate that a thinking
thing cannot be extended (OD IV, 147) and yet praise Poiret later
for having succeeded so well along such lines of !lrgument. 2
Among the points made in the Objections are a few that could be
allied to a form of skepticism. On the soul, we find, "No indications
whatsoever of the preservation of the soul are left after death. And
although this does not prove demonstrative ly that it is annihilated, it
does provide just occasion for doubting its preservation and for ac-
cusing those who hold to the affirmative of temerity. And we have
need of many more arguments in defense of the preservation of the
soul than for the attack against it." 3 Discussing the complicated
question of God's knowledge of possible things, Bayle concludes
Pyrrhonistically, "Otherwise, I do not deny that the author proyes
with very valid arguments in chap. X that truths depend on the divine
free will. But his opponents also have their reasons, and they are
valid; so that the verdict may be - not proven." 4 Finally, a rather
large portion of remarks border on the question of evil. Cartesians
1 OD IV, 154 r. "Ali<e probationes pro Unitate Dei solidissim<e sum profeeto, & in paucis
acut<e." The procedure here is similar to one that has caused considerable accusations of
insincerity against Bayle. In later years he not infrequently devoted his attention to disproving
the validity of achain of reasoning all the while clairning to accept the conclusion on other
grounds. The function of his analysis was criticalonly. This was exactly what Poiret had
requested and it corresponded to Bayle's inclinations.
2 "Bene meretur Auctor de Philosophia Cartesiana qui tam solide probaverit Cap. V.
spatium non eonvenire spiritibus, nee ab ipsa substantia eorporea esse distinguendum"
(p. 148 i).
3 P. 159 i. All quotations from the Objeetions are in my translation.
4 "ut proinde pronunciare <equum sit, NON LIQUET" (p. 155 i).
 BA YLE'S YOUTH 211

tend to reduce man to an entirely passive agent with no will of his

own and no ability to produce his own thoughts (p. 153 r). Uthis were
true, God would be the author of all thoughts, therefore of evil.
"Throughout almost the entire length of his book the learned author
has stated that a creature commits no acts, and that God is the cause
of all reality.... What is the reason for which our author now tells
us that he does not know in what way the sin of Adam was beheld by
God? Uhe philosophizes consistently, he will say that God had previ-
ously made a decree to produce in the mind of Adam the will to eat
of the forbidden fruit, and this will is Adam's sin." 1 The dosing words
of the ObJections confess reason's incapacity to disentangle this question.
"In the meanwhile I admit with the learned writer at the end of
paragraph 8, page 729, that nothing is more incomprehensible than
man's free will, in other words, that there should be creatures whom
God allows to do as th ey please, even things disagreeable to Him. But
then, who would believe that God is not a law unto Himself?" 2 Thus
at the outset of his career we find Bayle taking part in the critical
examination of arguments offered by the philosophical school that
seemed to him to make the most sense. The general tenor of the
ObJections would indicate that philosophy encountered insoluble
problems in both metaphysics and philosophy.
In the fall of the following year, 1680, Bayle composed a series of
theses that his students were to defend and a Dissertation arguing for
the Cartesian definition of matter. 3 Both these opuscules he published
anunymously four years later in Amsterdam in a Recueil de quelques
Pieces curieuses concernant la Philosophie de M. Descartes. The occasion of
the collection and of the works was an attack against Cartesianism
made by the Jesuits in France, particularly in a work by Pere de Valois
under the pseudonym Louis de la Ville. TheJesuits accused Descartes's
philosophy of being incompatible with the dogma of transubstanti-
ation, a view with which Pierre Bayle was in complete accord. 4

1 Pp. 160-161.
2 P. 161 r.
3 Delvolvi, Religion, critique et philosophie ... , p. ga, mistakenly identifies these theses with
the ones Bayle had defended five years earlier in the competitian for the chair at Sedan. In a
letter to his father (OD IB, 1241,28 October 1680), Bayle writes, "J'ai fait soutenir quelques
Theses, ausquelles j'ai joint une Dissertation ... "
4 In the introduction to the Recueil, Bayle's expressed intentian is to prove that the
Cartesian theory of extension is eorreet. "Done il est clair que le Coneile de Trente a decide
une faussete quand il a parle de la presenee du Corps de notre Seigneur sur les Autels"
(OD IV, 137 r). He elaims to hope that this will persuade the Catholic Chureh to abandon
its dogma, in whieh ease Cartesianism might weil be the common ground for a possible
rapproehement of the ehurehes. It seems impossible to take his suggestion seriously (as does
2[2 BA YLE'S YOUTH

In the DisseTtation onlyone sentence particularly applies to the role

ofreason in theology: " ... comme il est vrai que l'etendue n'est point
l'essence de la matiere s'il repugne ala foi qu'elle le soit, & que tout
principe Philosophique contraire ala revelation est faux, on peut dire
aussi que si l'etendue est l'essence de la matiere, il est certain qu'aucune
revelation ne peut detruire cette verite, & que to ut dogme Theologique
qui y seroit contraire est faux" (OD IV, 130 l - with the orginal
Latin in column facing). The truths established by reason or by reve-
lation cannot be in conflict, and a philosophical proof is sufficient
grounds for changing a (Catholic) doctrine. If this is not a position
adopted simply for his polemic purposes, Bayle is here making a state-
ment that he was very often to dcny in later years when his offieial
published position was always the primacy of revelation over reason
(as is even the case in the COUTS). I find it hard to take his words at
face value. It was less than a year later that he wrote his brother
that all philosophical systems were merely conjectures. 1 Bayle's intent
is to put Pere de Valois in a difficult position, for the father can answer
only by disproving the Cartesian theory of extension or by denying
the primacy of reason in theology, a denial which would undercut his
whole attack on the new philosophy.
The Theses are more interesting. Numbers five and six declare that
the natures of movement, location, and time are completely inex-
plicable philosophically, as Bernier and Saint Augustine admit.
Corollary IX reads "Criterium veritatis non est evidentia sensuum,
ut volebat Epicurus, sed potius evidentia intelleetus" (OD IV, 145 l).
Thesis twelve discusses proofs of the existence of God repeating much
of what appears in the COUTS. Descartes's ontological proof, while
"optimum quidem" and "verum," is incapable of convincing vulgar
mind s which do not see how a finite soul can form the idea of a Being
of infinite perfeetions. Until th ey have been instructed in the doctrine
of ideas, other very solid reasons from metaphysics will have to be
used. Besides, the union of the body with the soul can be easily under-
stood on the grounds of Malebranche's theory of occasional causes,

Delvolve). All the prefaces of Bayle's works (excepting the Dictionnaire) are fictions. Further-
more, two of the pieces are de'fenses by Bemier and Malebranche of the orthodoxy of their
philosophy on the matter of the Eucharist, hardly the proper arguments to persuade the
church to renounce its doctrine. Considerations of chronology also make Delvolves opinion
unlikely. He believes that Bayle's early hopes ofreconciliation were soon abandoned in favor
of public toleration of different sects. But the Recueil was published after the Critique generale
de l'Histoire du calvinisme de M. Maimbourg, a work that by Delvolves thesis should have
followed the Recueil's preface.
1 Supra, p. 204.
 BA YLE'S YOUTH 21 3

whieh therefore is a kind of indireet proof of God's existenee. The most

interesting seetion of thesis twelve is its beginning,

Il Y a de l'imprudenee, pour ne rien dire de pIus, il temoigner ave e

eertaines personnes qu'on ne eroiroit point qu'il y a un Dieu si on ne l'avoit
appris de l'Eeriture Sainte. Car si nous ajolitons [oi il l'Eeriture Sainte, e'est
paree que nous eroions qu'elle est la parole de Dieu. Or avant de eroire
qu'une ehose est la parole de Dieu, il [aut eroire qu'il y a un Dieu puis qu'il
est evident que ee qui n'existe point ne parle point. La eonnoissanee de
l'existenee divine preeede done la eonnoissanee de eette revelation, & est
supposee par elle, d'ou il s'ensuit qu'elle vient de la lumiere naturelle
(OD IV, I43).

Bayle's remarks eome very elose to the later Catholie eoneepts of the
preambles of faith. The logieal prineiples on whieh the authority of
revelation is based are the existenee of God, the faet that He has
revealed Himself, and the faet that He eannot deeeive. In so far as
Bayle's writings deny any of these, he may be elassified as a fideist.
In so far as th ey leave these points intaet, he is not a thorough Pyr-
rhonist in matters of faith and lays sufReient grounds for a rational
defense of the authority of revelation. Although the term was not to
be defined until after his death, Bayle is aware of the importanee of
the preambles of faith. They are the touehstones by whieh the fideism
of his ofRcial published beliefs ean be measured and will oeeupy our
attention alongside of the analysis of his philosophie Pyrrhonism. In
the first years we find Bayle a Cartesian in philosophy, but thoroughly
eonscious of many weaknesses in the system he espouses. He gives
revelation preeedenee over reason in partieular questions of theology,
but at the same time reeognizes that the preambles of faith must be
demonstrated rationaUy. And the demonstrations he suggests are
often similar to Deseartes's. For the time being, no attempt will be
made in our analysis to read between the lines for any hidden intentions
or unexpressed eonsequenees to be drawn from Bayle's deelarations.
Re would have wished it so.
 CHAPTER X

THE WORKS OF THE r680'S

Bayle's entrance into the republic of letters came in March r682

with the publication in Rotterdam by Reinier Leers of the Lettre li
M. L. A. D. C., docteur de Sorbonne, ou il est prouve, par plusieurs raisons
tirees de la philosophie et de la thiologie, que les cometes ne sont point le prisage
d' aucun malheur; avec plusieurs rijlexions morales et politiques, et plusieurs
observations historiques, et la rifutation de quelques erreurs populaires. His
name did not appear as the author of the Lettre sur les cometes, which
bore the fictitious notation that it had been printed in Cologne by
Pierre Marteau, the kind of literary deception that was absolutely
normal prodecure during the time. Having originally hoped to dis-
seminate his work in France, Bayle had adopted the guise of a Catholic
author; but the attitudes taken in the work hardly concealed its
Protestant source.! He evidently sincerely intended to maintain his
anonymity and did not teIl even his elosest friends of his authorship.2
His publisher, however, informed Adrian Paets, Bayle's patron in
Rotterdam, of the identity of the author; and the fact was soon common
knowledge among men of letters. 3 The book was weIl received, and
the following year a second edition considerably enlarged appeared

1 See Walter Rex, Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1965).
2 Jurieu was offended to learn at second hand that Bayle was the author of the Lettre
sur ies cometes (OD II, 719 i). He may have had some reservations about the work, but
nonetheless he did recommend it to a friend as worth reading (OD II, 146 r).
a It would be false to suppose that Bayle wished to keep his authorship secret for fear
that his work might be judged harmful to the interests of religion; for he sent copies of it to
both his brothers, revealing that it was his work. In October 1682 he wrote Joseph teHing
him "sub sigillo confessionis" that the Lettre sur ies cometes was his (OD I B, 143 I). Far from
hurting his reputation in Protestant cirdes, the work seerns to have made it. Largely on the
basis of this book and the Critique generaie de i' Histoire du calvinisme de }vIaimbourg, he was
offered a position as professor of philosophy in the University of Franeker. See Elisabeth
Labrousse's "Docurnents relatifs li l'offre d'une chaire de philosophie li Bayle li l'universite
de Franeker au printemps de 1684," in Pierre Bayie, ie philosophe de Rotterdam.
 THE WORK S OF THE 1680'S 21 5

under the title Pensees diverses, ecrites rl un docteur de Sorbonne, il l' occasion
de la comete qui parut au mois de decembre 1680.
The Pensees diverses lives up to its title. The comet is merely a pretext
for an immensely varied series of reftections on all sorts of topics. Most
of the major themes that preoccupied Bayle in his later writings appear
or are alluded to in passing in the work. It has deservedly remained
one of the most admired of his books, and is the onlyone to have been
reprinted in the twentieth century.1lts two cardinal points, the attack
on superstition and the principle that morality should take precedence
over matters of dogma, were to become major themes of the eighteenth-
century philosophic movement. In Bayle's day they already repre-
sented the general thinking of the more advanced scholars. 2
Venturing little into the domain of scientific accounts of the nature
of comets, Bayle restricts himself to philosophic and theological
considerations. His originality, he clairns, lies in the theological argu-
ment, "que si les Cometes etoient un presage de malheur, Dieu auroit
fait des miracles pour confirmer l'idolätrie dans la monde" (OD III,
40 l; AP I, 154).3 Discussion of this position takes up almost three
quarters of the entire work and leads to many long digressions, the
most important of which deals with the comparison of atheists and
idolaters. 4 No matter how startling the conelusions he reaches, the
arguments Bayle uses, both philosophical and theological, are entirely
rationalistic in nature and scrupulously orthodox, though somewhat
more Protestant than Catholic. In this, his first published work,
Ba/le did not display either the skepticism or the fideism that he
confessed to J aco b in his priva te correspondence two da ys after sending
the first manuscript of the Lettre sur les cometes to Donneau de Vise,
editor of the Mercure galant. 5
1 Edited with an introduction and notes by A. Prat for the series of the Societe des Textes
Fran<;ais Modernes, 2 vols. (Paris: Droz, 1939). As far as I know, Beuchot's edition of the
Dictionnaire is the only nineteenth-century publication of a wOIk of Bayle's.
2 In his review of the contemporary treatises devoted to the question of comets A. Prat
finds that almost all of them had demonstrated that comets were subject to natural laws,
Pensies diverses, p. xiii. Comelia Serrurier, in Pierre Bayle en Hollande, pp. 47-51, discusses the
works of Grrevius and Balthasar Bekker on the same subject.
3 All quotations from the Pensies diverses are taken from OD III; corresponding pagination
in Prat's modern edition are introduced by the letters AP.
4 In the "Avis au Leeteur" of the uUre sur les corne/es, Bayle makes it clear that these
digressions may be the part ofhis work that will be most admired (OD III, 4 r; AP I, 7).
5 The letter to his brother has already been cited, ;upra p. 204. Desmaizeaux gives May 27,
1681 as the date of the letter to Vise: Vie de Bayle, DHC, XVI, 63 I. Comelia Serrurier comes
to the same conclusion about the absence of skepticism in the Pensees diverses. See her Pierre
Bayle en Hollande, pp. 66-67. She destroys Albert Cazes's opinion to the contrary by citing
Cazes's own sentenee, "Il ne veut reeonnaitre eomme vrai que ee qui est evident, et ehaeune
de ses negations affirme, la toute-puissanee ou la competenee unique de la raison," in his
Pierre Bayle, sa vie, son influence, son lEI/vre (Paris: Dujarie, 1905). Cazes's concept of skeptieism
is strikinglv originai.
216 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

The Pensees diverses opens with a deelaration that the popular belief
that comets are a sign of future ills must be examined in the light of
reason alone without deference to the authority of tradition or the
evidence adduced by historians. Bayle presents SL" elosely re3-soned
philosophical objections to the superstition. It is incompatible with
modern science (Cartesian science) that comets can have any inf1u-
ence, malevolent or otherwise, on the earth. 1 Astrology, which is
usually cited in conjunction with predictions of disaster founded on the
appearance of a comet, is "la chose du monde la pIus ridicule"
(OD III, 17 l; AP I, 56).2 Even if comets were always followed by
misfortunes, it cannot be proven that th ey are a sign or a cause of the
misfortunes (the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc).3 But Bayle will not
eve n grant that experience supports the contention that comets in
fact are followed by unhappy events. A long historical investigation
coneludes "qu'il est des malheurs sans Cometes et des Cometes sans
malheurs" (OD III, 32 r; AP I, I25). Finally the fact that everyone
believes in a superstition does not give that superstition any authority
at all. Men like to be deceived and they often find causes for events
that have not occurred. 4
The longest and most famous section of the book deals witp the
comparison of atheists to idolaters. Although the subject matter is
r..ot directly connected with questions of Pyrrhonism, some of the
outstanding conelusions may be mentioned. The principal one is
that the religious faith a man professes does not inf1uence his moral
cond'.lct. In terms of Christian doctrine this is not really extraordinary,
for it foIlows from original sin that man cannot be good without
God's grace; or in Protestant terminology, faith alone justifies.
"Considerez encore que la Theologie nous enseigne formeIlement
que l'homme ne se peut convertir a Dieu, ni se defaire de la corruption

1 Towards the end of the book (OD III, 143 r; AP II, 248-249) Bayle resumes this
thought in a manner reminiseent of Montaigne. He imagines a eomet about to eause the
Trojan War dispensing certain atoms with the mission to make Helen adulterous, others
to make Menelaus jealous and warlike, and so forth. This reminds me somewhat of Mon-
taigne's comments on a drug destined to heat the kidneys (see supra, p. 131.)
2 One of Bayle's piquant examples runs as follows. How ean it make a differenee if a
comet appears in the sign of the virgin? The constellation Virgo hardly looks like a human.
Even if it is a human being, there is no way to say whether a man or a woman, young or old;
and no telescope could possibly penetrate far enough to decide on the virginity of the lady in
question.
3 Bayle acutely points out the one sense in which a superstition may have some validity:
people may conduet themselves as if the superstition were true and thereby make it eome
true. Timoleon's confidenee that his birthday was a lucky day for him inspired his army to
victory when it fought on that day.
4 Bayle eit es Montaigne's chapter "Des boyteux" (III: xi) here (4 in Appendix II).
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S 21 7

de sa concupiscence sans etre assiste de la grace du St. Esprit; & que

cette grace ne consiste pas simplement a croire qu'il y a un Dieu &
que les Mysteres qu'il nous a revelez sont veritables; mais qu'elle
consiste dans la charite qui nous fait aimer Dieu & qui nous attache
a lui comme a nõtre souverain bien" (OD III, 94 r; AP II, 38).1
Since grace alone can reform a man, it must be true that an atheist
is capable of all the virtues found in any other human being without
grace. "Mais d'ou vient donc, me dira-t-on, que tout le monde se
figure les Athees comme les pIus grands scelerats de l'Univers, qui
tu ent, qui violent, qui ravissent tout ee qu'ils peuvent? C'est qu'on
s'imagine faussement qu'un homme agit toujours selon ses principes
c'est a dire selon ee qu'il croit en matiere de Religion" (OD III, 113
r; AP II, 120). Bayle does not rely on purely theological considerations
to carry his point. Re turns to historyand experience.
Car si on me dit que les aneiens Idolätres avoient eertaines notions de
leurs dieux qui leur aprenoient qu'ils reeompensoient la vertu & qu'ils
punissoient le viee, je demande d'ou vient done que les Idolätres etoient
si mechans? Et si on me dit qu'ils etoient mechans paree que leur detestable
Theologie leur representoit Ies Dieux eomme eoupables de mille crimes, je
demande d'ou vient done qu'il y a eu tant d'honnetes gens parmi les Pakns,
& qu'il y a tant de seelerats parmi les Chretiens ou eette raison n'a point de
lieu? Jamais on ne me repondra qu'en reeonnoissant que le veritable mobile
des actions de l'homme est fort different de sa Religion (OD III, 116 r;
AP II, 132).

To prove his point Bayle cites examples of atheists who have lived
virtuously such as Epicurus, Spinoza, and Vanini (a particularly
unfortunate example). In fact, a society of atheists could formulate
laws of honor and good conduct. 2 In general, "il n'est pas pIus e-
trange qu'un Athee vive vertueusement qu'il est etrange qu'un Chre-

1 Cf. the Belgic Confession, the artides of faith of the Walloon Church, Artide XXIV,
"Nous croyons que cette vraye foy estant engendree en I'homme par I'oule de la parole de
Dieu et par l'operation du S. Esprit, le regenere et fait nouvel homme, le faisant vivre d'une
nouvelle vie, I'affranchissant de la servitude du peche ... " Bayle said that he never wrote
anything that did not conform to this Confession.
2 The same opinion had been expressed by Bossuet in the Defensia deelaratianis cleri
gallicani, Part I, Book I, Section II, Chapter V. "Perfectum regirnen, quod attinet ad ordinern
etjura societatis humanre, sine vero saceldotio, ac sine vera religione esse potest." Note that
Bayle indudes both Spinoza and Epicurus among the atheists although he knew full weil
that each had a God in his philosophical system. (See their artides in the DHC.) Their
cardinal error was to deny God's Providenee, or His action in the affairs of this world. To
Bayle and many writers of his century this appeared to be one of the most frightful forrns of
atheism (see OD III, 925""""933 for severa! citations). In general it was far more dangerous
than an atheism which denied God's existence because the second brand was so unnatura!
that few men, if any at all, held it (OD III, 170 1 and section CVI of the Pensees diverses).
218 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

tien se porte a toute sorte de crimes" (OD III, I ro r; AP II, r07).1

The theory of human behavior that accompanies these arguments
is here, as everywhere in BayIe, profoundly pessimistic (Christian, he
would say).

L'homme ne se determine pas a une certaine action plutot qu'a une

autre par les connoissances generales qu'il a de ee qu'il doit faire, mais par
le jugement particulier qu'il port e de chaque chose lors qu'il est sur le point
d'agir. Or ee jugement particulier peut bien etre conforme aux idees gene-
rales que I'on a de ee qu'on doit faire, mais le pIus som"ent il ne l'est pas.
Il s'accommode presque toujours a la passion dominante du ca:ur, a la
pente du temperament, a la force des habitudes contractees, & au gout ou
a la sensibilite que l'on a pour certains objects (OD III, 87 l; AP II,
9- 10).

The motivations that ruIe mankind, then, are passion, habit, temper-
ament, or taste, but decidedIy not principles. This implies that reason
is generaIly ineffectual in morality, a conclusion that Bayle does not
[ail to draw (OD III, 87 r; AP Il, r r). On the other hand, the example
of Epicurus indicates that reason may occasionaIly be an effective
moral foree .

. .. la raison sans la connoissance de Dieu peut quelquefois persuader a

l'homme qu'il y a des choses honnetes qu'il est beau & loüable de faire, non
pas a cause de l'utilite qui en revient, mais parce que eela est conforme a
la Raison.. " " Car il faut savoir qu'encore que Dieu ne se revele pas pleine-
ment a un Athee, il ne laisse pas d'agir sur son esprit et de lui conserver
cette Raison & cette intelligence par laquelle tous les hommes comprennent
la verite des premiers Principes de Metaphysique et de Morale (OD
III, 114 r; AP II, 125).2

1 Montaigne's remarks on the conduct ofChristians in the opening pages of the "Apologie"
(supra, pp. 111-112) and his general opinion that religion cannot be relied on to produce
moral conduct (supra, p. 154) are essentially the same idea that Bayle expresses here. Bayle
quotes the "Apologie" on howeasy it is to have faith that is only !ip-service (5). Here is
another sentence that corresponds to Montaigne's remarks in the "Apologie" on Christian
conduct, "J'avoue que si on donnoit li deviner les moeurs des Chretiens a des gens d'un autre
monde li qui I'on diroit simplement que les Chretiens sont des cn'atures douees de Raison &
de bon sens, avides de la felicite, persuadees qu'il y a un Paradis pour ceux qui obelssent a la
loy de Dieu & un Enfer pour ceux qui n'y obeissent pas; ees gens d'un autre monde ne
manqueroient pas d'asseurer que les Chretiens font li qui mieux mieux pour observer les
preceptes de l'Evangile ... " (OD III, 871; AP II, 8) Ofcourse, these ideas are all eommon-
places of Christian sermons.
2 The difference between Montaigne and Bayle here is a matter of degree. Montaigne
(apart from the "Apologie") tends to see reason as efficacious in morality, even as the only
.reliable source of ethics. Bayle believes that it might determine the behavior of a very few
humans, just as religious eonviction might; but the general principle that man does not act
n aceordance with "Ies connoissances de l'ame" applies to reason as weil as to religion.
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S 2 19

All this discussion is conducted in a purely rationalist manner.

Many of Bayle's arguments tend to validate the daim of reason to
arbitrate in matters of theology, His repeated rejection of the
authority of tradition only reinforees reason's autonomy. If Bayle
repudiates the criterion ofuniversal consent (vox populi, vox dei), again
he is aeti ng in the interests of reason, whose right to examine super-
stition he seeks to establish. The criterion he rejeets was, however, one
that was dear to theologians who frequently invoked it as a proof of
God's existenee.l
In the eourse of his argument Bayle is required to establish some
rational standard by whieh it is possible to reeognize an aet of God,
either in the form of a mirade or of a sign offuture events. He reverts to
the ancient principle of both theology and philosophy that mirades
should not be multiplied unneeessarily. Most events must be eon-
sidered purely natural.
... en bonne Philosophie la Nature n'est autre chose que Dieu lui-meme
agissant, ou selon certaines loix qu'il a etablies tres-librement, ou par l'ap-
plication des creatures qu'il a faites & qu'il conserve. De sorte que les
ouvrages de la Nature ne sont pas moins l'effet de la puissance de Dieu que
les mirades, & supposent une aussi grande puissance que les mirades; car
il est tout aussi difficile de former un homme par la voye de la generation
que de ressusciter un mo rt. Toute la difference qu'il y a entre les mirades
et les ouvrages de la Nature, c'est que les mirades sont pIus propres a
no us faire connoitre que Dieu est l'autheur libre de tout ee que font les
corps & a nous desabuser de l'erreur ou nous pourrions etre la dessus
(O!) III, 60 r; AP I, 242).2

Only when no natural explanation of an event seems available, may

it be considered miraeulous; but it should be further possible to find
some reason for the mirade. The eriterion of the cui bono, the mirade's
utility for God's purposes, must be satisfied. Otherwise it is permissible
to adopt some other interpretation. 3 The rational eriterion of a mirade
then is that it must be preternatural and consonant with God's wisdom.
The theological criterion must always be revelation. "Les mirades

1 Bayle himselfhad referred without eomrnent to this usage in his COUTS (OD IV, 521).
Sextus Empiricus (Hypotyposes II: v) and Montaigne (II: xii, 545a and 563-564a) had both
argued against universal consent as a criterion of truth.
2 Montaigne too regarded the effects of nature as every bit as miraeulous in one sense as
any supematural oecurrenee. See supra, p. 145. In the Nouvelles de la republique des leltres,
October 1685, VI, Bayle repeats his remark on the miraculous nature of biological repro-
duction.
3 Bayle gives an interesting example. The Biblical verse "And God hardened Pharaoh's
heart" must be given an allegorical interpretation in order to avoid the eruelty implicit in its
literai meaning, which would make God the author of unnecessary human mi,eries.
220 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

doivent etre accompagnez de la parole, et la parole doit etre accom-

pagnee de mirades quand il s'agit de faire connoitre le vrai Dieu aux
Infideles ... " (OD III, I35 r; AP II, 2I3.) Bayle is speaking of a
special kind of mirade here, but the principle holds in a general way
for other cases.!
A few remarks in the Pensees diverses bear on the preambles of faith.
At one point Bayle admits that philosophy properly conceived leads
to the affirmation of the existence of a supreme Being. "J'avoüe que
si la consideration de la Comete portait un Idolätre a considerer les
reuvres de la creation, il arriveroit par cette vOl e a la connoissance
d'un Etre infiniment sage & infiniment puissant, pourvu qu'il fit
un usage legitime de sa science. Je suis persuade qu'il n'y a point
d'ignorance invincible d'une premiere cause qui gouverne le monde"
(OD III, I35 r; AP II, 2I4). Note that this statement contains several
restrictions; only legitimate use of reason will arrive at such a doctrine;
it conceives only an infinitely wise and powerful (not good) Being;
and this deistic God is emphatically not the God of revelation. "Faites
le raisonner tant qu'il vous plaira sur l'apparition d'une Comete;
promenez son esprit par toutes les reflexions qui peuvent vraisembla-
blement tomber dans son arne a la vue de cette etoile; je vous defie de
trouver une gradation de consequences qui le conduise jusques a
connoitre que le Dieu d'Israel, ou le Dieu des Chretiens est le vrai
Dieu ... " (ibid.) One of the preambles of faith is rationally demon-
strable, but requires the advent of revelation to complete it. 2
P}1ilosophy can also support the truths of revelation concerning the
immortality of the soul - provided that men will accept philosophy's
arguments. "La bonne Philosophie nous aprend aujourd'hui d'une
maniere tres-convaincante que nõtre arne est distincte du corps, & par
consequent qu'elle est immortelle. Mais combien y a-t-il de gens qui ne
comprennent pas la force de toutes ees demonstrations?" (OD III,
I20 r; AP II, I49-I50.)3 The Cartesian proafthat Bayle has in mind

1 Notice that Montaigne's standard is more fideist than Bayle's, for he would prefer only
revelation as proof of a miraele and does not approve of human conjecture in such matters.
Bayle is not far from his predecessor here, but he allows some validity to certain rational
standards that may apply in the absence of express revelation. Both, of course, combat the
superstitious desire to multiply mirades.
2 Belgic Confession, Artiele II, "~oU5 le cognoissons [God] par deux moyens. Prerniere-
ment par la creation, conservation, et gouvernement du monde universel, d'autant que c'est
devant nos yeux comme un beau Livre.... Secondement il se donne li se cognoitre li nous
manifestement par sa saincte et divine parole; voire autant pleinement qu'il nous est de
besoin en cette vie pour sa gloire et le salut des siens."
3 "La bonne philosophie" is a favorite expression ofBayle's (See the quotation on p. 219).
It often designates Cartesian thinking, as it does here.
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S 221

is as follows. The only form of destruction that is conceivable is the

separation of the parts of a unit, for any other form would be the
miracle of creation in reverse. The human soul is in no way an extended
substance. Since only an extended substance is divisible into parts, the
soul has no parts, hence cannot be destroyed.! Demonstrative as this
proof may be, the fact remains that many men do not accept it. Such is
human nature that reason, eve n at its most forceful, does not always
persuade. This is far from being an assertion that philosophy cannot
achieve the truth; it is simply a statement of the fact that reason
(Cartesian "evidenee") may not produce the certainty in others one
might expect of it. If it does not persuade men, the fault lies with men,
not with reason. This is not an unnatural conclusion for a work devoted
to the criticism of human superstition, a work that is pessimistic about
human nature and its would-be rationality, not skeptical about reason
itself.
Bayle's second work, the Critique generale de l' Histoire du calvinisme
de Mr. Maimbourg, appeared four months after the LeUre sur les Cometes.
Avolume of 339 duodecimo pages of small print, it had been written
during the first fifteen days of May r682. Only an accident revealed
its author's identity, which was guarded with the strictest secrecy.2
The immediate popularity of the work resulted in a second edition in
r682 and a third two years later, each corrected and somewhat
augmented.
The operative word in the title is generale. Bayle is not concemed with
a point-by-point denial of Maimbourg's history. Instead he quizzes
the ex-J esuit on his partisanship and choleric attitude, proclairning
that no man ofjudgment could possibly accept at face value any work
so clearly displaying its author's lack of objectivity. A short review of
Maimbourg's life and history, not exempt from some malice, gives
him due praise for his eloquence and lack of superstition, but casts
doubt on his erudition and his sincerity. Bayle recalls how the J anse-
nists had already exposed his ignorance of the church fathers, the
scholastic commentaries, and both ancient and modern translations of
the Bible. His good faith in the history of Calvinism is suspect because
his wish for vengeance and his desire to please the court at Versailles
are obvious on every page (Letter IV). This personal attack on the

1 This proof is given in the Cours de philosophie (OD IV, 416) and in DHC 2 Pomponace F.
In the Meditations Descartes himself admitted he had no proof of the soul's immortality be-
cause the souP s preservation was contingent on God's will.
2 See Elisabeth Labrousse, Inventaire critique de la correspondance de Pierre Bayle, p. 110.
222 THE WORK5 OF THE 1680'5

integrity of Maimbourg, all the more piercing for its persiflage, was
highly successful. It so nettled the historian that he made every effort
to have the Critique generaie condemned in France, succeeding only after
he had gone over the censor's head to the king.
Bayle does not attempt to demonstrate that the Calvinists had been
right at every juncture in their history; he is content to show that
Maimbourg's own account contains sufficient inconsistencies to indi-
cate to a perceptive reader that a case could be made out against both
sides. This entails a long section in which different Catholic accu-
sations against the Calvinists are subjected to close scrutiny. Take for
example the account Maimbourg gives of the Vaudois affair (Letter
XII). It would seem that several thousand French citizens in armed
op en rebellion against their sovereign were repressed only after the
most lenient measures had been given a trial. Maimbourg admits
that some of the king's orders were carried out with excessive harshness
which resulted in three thousand dead, nine hundred houses burned,
and eighty villages sacked. Bayle does not dwell on the atrocities
admitted in the Catholic historian's version. He is interested in ob-
serving that the ex-Jesuit's relation makes no sense, for it depicts
Franeis I as conseience-stricken by the memory of the ineident. What
king could possibly feel remorse at the suppression of an armed revolt
hy his subjects? The obvious conclusion is that the seditious acts
attributed to the Vaudois are a pure fiction. Faced with the extra-
vagant inconsistencies in Maimbourg's account an alert reader will at
least suspend his judgment and suspect that neither side is more guilty
than the other. 1
Furthermore, the accusations made against the Reform either are
baseless or else apply to the Catholics as weIl as to the Protestants.
It is maintained that the Calvinists rebelled against the sovereignty
oftheir king. Anyone consulting history will find that the Catholics are
at least as guilty - if not more so - of the same charge, witness the
Fronde or Maimbourg's own history of the Ligue. It is alleged that
many prelates converted to the Reformed religion in order to satisfY
their lusts in marriage. The history of the conduct of the religious orders
hardly makes it seem likely that there was any necessity to leave the
mother church. Women have always been partial to clerical lovers
for any number of reasons. Finally, ela les entendre parler, ceux qui
aecusent quelques-uns de nos premiers Reformateurs de s'etre mariez
1 BayIe's ruIes for "le pyrrhonisme historique" in the opening pages of the Critique
glniTale will be discussed later, itifra pp. 254-255.
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S 223

pour se delivrer du joug de la mortification ne savent ce qu'ils disent;

car quelle pIus grande Croix que le mariage?" (OD II, 40 t.) This
then is the spirit of the Critique generaIe, which can be called Pyr-
rhonist only in the sense that it tries to be objective by giving a pro
for every contra. Without whitewashing the Protestants Bayle redresses
the balance to the point where th ey are at least no more guilty than
their adversaries, and ridicules the partisan spirit of the French
historian.
In the final pages of the work Bayle raises the question of the cri-
terion offaith as he comments on the Catholic doctrine of infallibility.
The Protestant refugee, who had been converted himself because he
feIt the need of an infallible judge in matters of dogma, admits that it
would be "fort beau & fort commode" if such a tribunal existed; but
it does not (OD II, I43 r). The facts of ecclesiastical history support
his contention. Thomists and Scotists disagree on the Immaculate
Conception and the Assumption of Mary, both clairning that tradition
is on their side. Tradition is uncertain, it would appear; and an in-
fallible authority has not decided what tradition says (OD II, I16r).
It has not even been determined where the infallibility resides - with
the Pope or with the Councils. The Gallican church provides the
Protestants with a ready-made argument. "L'on peut dire que l'Eglise
Anglicane est aussi soumise au Pap e que la Gallicane" (OD II, I2Y).
Much other historical evidence could be presented that raises insur-
mountable difficulties about the practice of the doctrine of infallibility;
but Bayle is willing to concede, after listing this evidence, that it is
not conclusive and that the rational foundations of the dogma must be
examined if a decisive refutation is to be made.
Even if the Church were infallible, it could not convert a Huguenot
without first proving its infallibility to him. On this one point at
least authority must be subjected to examination. But it is no mean
question, and anyone capable of resolving this matter on the basis of
examination could solve any other point of controversy in the same
way. The Huguenot could not accept the Church's own word on its
authority, for that would be the most outrageous petitio principii. In fact,
the authority of the Church cannot be the criterion of faith since it
rests on another authority - God's.
Je demande a un Catholique Romain pourquoi il croit la Transub-
stantiation; il me repond, parce que l'Eglise en a fait un artide de Foi. Je
lui demande encore pourquoi il croit que les decisions de l'Eglise sont
veritables; il me repond, parce qu'il croit qu' elle est infaillible. J e continue
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

a lui demander pourquoi il eroit qu'eHe est infaillible; il me repond, paree

que Dieu l'a dit. Je pousse eneore pIus loin mes questions, & je lui demande
pourquoi il eroit que les choses revelees de Dieu so nt vrayes? Il doit me
repondre, paree qu'il eon<;:oit neeessairement Dieu eomme un Etre souve-
rainement parfait, & par eonsequent ineapable d'etre trompe et de tromper.
Je n'ai pIus rien a demander apres eela, ear on m'a dit la derniere raison
qui se puisse dire (OD II, 121 l).

But even more problems must be faced. Assuming that the H ugue-
not is converted and accepts the Church's infallibility, he must be
sure that the doctrines he is taught by his curate are the ones sanctioned
by this infallibility. This requires another round, or endless rounds,
of examination of the councils and the Papal bulls. How will he
decide between J esuits and Jansenists? between Gallicans and ultra-
montanes?
The doctrine of infaIlibility involves itself in certain self-contra-
dictions. For example, the Jansenists claim that the Papal infallibility
extends only to mattcrs of right and not to matters of fact in the inter-
pretation of a book (OD II, 138 I). But the only question of right in
the eas e of the Bible is whether or not it is divinely inspired, and
on this both parties agree. It is only on questions of fact that Calvi-
nists depart from Catholics. If the Pope cannot teIl what in fact a
cook by Jansenius teaches, how can he teU what the Bible teaches?
Such difficulties are perhaps not insurmountable, but it remains true
that the Catholic appeal to authority necessarily breaks down as a
criterion of faith since the authority itself must be founded on rational
examination. This orthodox Calvinist defense of individual exami-
nation is a position that Bayle maintains throughout his career. It is
hardly a skeptical or a fideist point of view. It is in opposition to the
spirit and the letter of Montaigne's "Apologie," in so far as Bayle
assumes that reason unaided by grace can succeed in its examination.
On that question he is silent in the Critique geniraIe.
The Nouvelles Lettres de i' auteur de la Critique generaie de i' Histoire du
calvinisme, composed in the fall of 1684, appeared in early 1685.
When one considers that throughout this period Bayle was also publish-
ing monthly the Nouvelles de la republique des lettres, averaging almost
twenty folio pages apiece, his literary productivity is staggering. As
Bayle foresaw, the Nouvelles Lettres did not enjoy the success of the
Critique generale; and he abandoned his intention of supplementing
them with parts II and III. The book is furiously digressive. Inventing
objections that could be formulated against the Critique generaie, Bayle
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S 225

uses them to a110w his pen free rein. The result is a potpourri of re-
fiections with only the barest semblance of unity.
In the final sections of the work, Bayle resumes the theme of the
Pensees diverses that man's conduct seldom results from reason's de-
liberations. This time he is not referring precisely to the effect 01
religious doctrines on behavior, but to the ineffectual role of the mentaf
faculties in general. It is not reason, but instinct, passion, and habit,
that motivate men .
. . . il y auroit Heu de se moquer des plaintes de ee Philosophe Payen qui
trouvoit que la Raison est un present ineommode que les Dieux nous ont
envoye pour notre ruine; ear c'etoit supposer que la Raison se meIe de nos
affaires, & il n'est pas vrai qu'elle y prenne part. Nous n'agissons que par
prejuge, que par instinet, que par amour propre, & que par les ressorts de
mille passions qui entrainent & qui tournent notre Raison, eomme bon
leur semble, de sorte qu'on pourroit tres justement definir le prineipe qui
nous regle & qui no us domine un amas de prijugez & de passions qui fait
tirer des consequences (OD II, 328 l).

What we ca11 reason is usua11y nothing more than the rationalization

of our emotional needs.
Nonetheless, the human passions serve man weIl; for without them
Bayle doubts that societies would ever be formed (OD II, 180-181).
Reason, for example, instructs us that interest in our reputation is an
unworthy motive; and yet without it social initiative would disappear.
Without the unreasoning attraction that draws men and women
together the reproduction of the race would not be assured. Were only
rational arguments considered, no woman would expose herself to
the rigors of childbirth. Once the child is born, its parents dote on it
because of a mechanieal instinct which regards the infant as an ex-
tension of themselves (OD II, 273).1 Even such ridiculous passions as
jealousy and the fear of cuckoldry serve to reinforce the institution of
monogarny. Since a purely rational attitude would lead men to
establish the community ofwives (OD II, 280 r), it can be said that the
natural instincts work, in this case at least, for the fulfi11ment of
Scripturallaws that reason would not accept of its own accord.
Bayle's conclusion is that man's irrationality is a sign of the wisdom

1 "Vhenever he speaks of sexual attraction or parental love, Bayle uses a mechanistic

terminology in order to explain these passions, a way of thought typical of Cartesians.
Although the Nouvelles uttTes is the work in which Bayle cites l'vIontaigne most frequently,
there is no reference to "De l'affection des peres aux enfans" (II: viii) despite numerous
opportunites, for Bayle makes the essayist's point that the natural affection for children
should be held in check by reason.
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

of God, who does not rely on so feeble a motivation as reason, but

accomplishes his plan by the shortcut of the passions and the in-
stincts.! Twice, once in italics and once in capital letters, Bayle
writes "Rien ne pouvoit etre mieux ordonne que l'amour d'instinct
qui attache les peres et les meres a leurs enfans" (OD II, 2771, 278/).
This kind of Leibnitzian metaphysical optimism is precisely the sort of
thinking one does not associate with Bayle, who later proved so ef-
fectively that reason cannot escape the conclusion that God is the
author of evi!. Nonetheless, he continued to maintain that passions,
which taken individually seemed harmful, could be useful in a few
instances, primarily in matters of politics. The utility of the passions is
only a minor movement in his thought, but it is a constant one.
Although it would be folly to make ofBayle a metaphysical optimist,
there are occasions when he sounds like one. vVhat is remarkable here
in the light of future developments in his thought is that he finds it
possible to admire the goodness of God's creation. The philosophy that
most appeals to Bayle in these years is lVIalebranche's system of oc-
casional causes. In more than one passage of the Pensees diverses he
had followed the Oratorian father, whom he called "un des pIus
grands Philosophes de ce siecle" (OD III, 130 r; AP II, 193). It is
obvious that the principal attraction of the system of the general will
of God (i.e., His way of working through universal laws) lay in its
ability to provide a partial explanation of evil without implicating
God's goodness.
S'il nous est permis de juger des actions de Dieu, nous pouvons dire qu'il
ne veut pas tous les evenemens partieuliers il. eause de la perfeetion qui s'y
trouve, mais seulement il. eause qu'ils sont liez aux lois general es qu'il a
ehoisies pour et re la regle de ses operations .... Rien n'est pIus propre
que eette supposition il. resoudre mille diffieultez que l'on fait eontre la
Providenee divine; e'est pourquoi on ne doit pas la eondamner sans l'avoir
examinee profondement. Or il s'ensuit de ee prineipe que Dieu n'a voulu
ehaque evenement partieulier que paree qu'il etoit enferme dans le plan
general qu'il avo it ehoisi; & par eonsequent, qu'il ne s'est point propose de
vue partieuliere lorsqu'il a desole les Idolatres par la peste ou par la famine
(OD III, 141 r; AP II, 240-241).
In the Nouvelles Lettres Bayle continues to find evidences of wisdom
in God's ordering of the world. If such marks of divine sagacity are

1 DeIvalve calls this "le providentialisme natureI," Religion, critique, et philosophie . .. , p. 104.
The expressian "la sagesse de Dieu," is a recurrent one in Bayle's thought. It appears
usually in the context of the problem of evi!. One could say that whenever he attempts to
account for the existence of evil, he has recourse to the vague concept of the wisdom of God.
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S 227

not immediately visible, the essential function of the philosopher is to

discover them.
Il faut s'attendre a voir l'instinct & le prejuge entrainer la plupart des
hommes maIgre les beaux discours des philosophes en faveur des idees
claires & distinctes de la Raison. Il est important neanmoins qu'il y ait
toujours quelqu'un qui combatte pour les interets de la Raison parce qu'on
prouve tres-solidement l'existence d'un Etre tout-puissant & tout sage en
faisant voir qu'il y a parmi les hommes un amour d'instinct, independant de
notre liberte & de notre Raison, qui est neanmoins dirige a une fin tr es-
necessaire pour la conservation des especes .... Je ne sais point si vous avez
medite sur eela; pour moi je l'ai fait pIus d'une fois, & je m'offre de vous
fournir quand il vous plaira, une demonstration solide de l'existence de
Dieu, en prouvant la consequence de eet Enthymeme:
Les hommes aiment leurs enfans d'un amour qui n'est point fonde sur
leur Raison. Donc il y a un Dieu (OD II, 274 r).l
Bayle obviously considered himself a member of this rational rem-
nant that strove to live above the passions; but his tough-minded, or
perhaps Calvinist, pessimism prevented him from expecting that
many men could join the fraternity of the reasonable.
For the three-year period from March I684 to February I687,
Bayle published monthly issues of the Nou~'elles de la republique des
lettres, a periodical devoted primarily to book reviews. Although many
of the articles are communications from his numerous literary corre-
spondents, the vast majority are his own work. In the earlier issues he
restrieted himself rather severely to impartial reviews of the eontents
of the books he was discussing, allowing himself only oecasional ex-
pressions of his own position. But as time went on, he spoke out more
openly, particularly on the injustices of Catholic perseeution of the
Huguenots in France. It was during the period of the Nouvelles de la
republique des lettres that the Edict of N antes was revoked.
It was also during this period that Bayle abandoned his allegiance
to Malebranche's theology. The journal, which probably was the
occasion for establishing a eorrespondenee between the two men who
never met, was instrumental in securing the international reputation
of the Catholie thinker. 2 No less than nin e of the works involved in the
1 Bayle never gives the full reasoning. It is obvious that, like the other proofs of an ornnipo-
tent Being that he alludes to, it depends on considerations of the signs visible in this world
that point to a general intelligence guiding it.
2 lVlalebranche's correspondance has been recently published in an excellent format by
Andre Robinet as volumes XVIII and XIX of the (Euvres eompUtes (Paris: Vrin, 1961).
The exchange of letters, which ceased with the termination of the journal, concerned entirely
literary matterso (Bayle recommended a Latin translatian of the Reeherehe de la viriii by his
friend Jacques Lenfant, and later undertook the disagreeable task of proofreading one of
Malebranche's replies to Arnauld.)
228 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

interminable dispute between Malebranche and Amauld were re-

viewed in the Nouvelles de la republique des lettres.! Bayle's unconcealed
partiality for the Oratorian eamed him the enmity of the easily
aroused J ansenist. 2
Many years later, in the Reponse aux questions d'un provineial (1705),
Bayle wrote of his rejection of the central thesis of Malebranche's
philosophy that God's wisdom required Him to work through universal
and simple laws.
Cette pensee a quelque chose d'ebloulssant: le Pere 1-Iallebranche l'a
mise dans le plus beau jour du monde, & il a persuade a quelques-uns de
ses Lecteurs qu'un systeme simple & tres-fecond est pIus convenable a la
sagesse de Dieu qu'un systeme pIus compose & moins fecond a proportion,
mais pIus capable de prevenir les irregularitez. M. Bayle a ete de ceux qui
crurent que le Pere Mallebranche donnoit par-Ia un merveilleux denoue-
ment, mais il est presque impossible de s'en payer apres avoir lIIles Livres
de :Mr. Amauld contre ee systeme, & apres avoir bien considere l'idee
vaste & immense de l'Etre souverainement parfait (OD III, 825 r).

Without going into the multiple complexities of the Arnauld-Male-

branche debate, it is possible to see the salient considerations that led
the philosopher of Rotterdam to change his position. 3 The comments
published in the Nouvelles de la republique des lettres only hint at what
their author actuaUy felt at the time. According to ~Ialebranche the
mirades of the Old Testament are the work of angels, whose "volontes
particulieres" are given effectiveness by God's general decree that

1 Five of Malebranche's books (ApriI1684, II; May 1684, IV; August 1684, III; May
1685, III; and April 1686, III) and four of Arnauld's (September 168+, II; March 1685, VI;
July 1685, VIII; and August 1685, III). In the catalogue oftheJlUle 1686 issue (OO I, 589 rl,
Bayle promised to discuss three more works of Arnauld's that he had received, induding the
second and third volume of the Rejlexions sur la Traite de la nature et de la grace. He never wrote
those reviews, perhaps because he did not wish to seem to turn against the philosopher
whose cause he had previously championed. In August 168+ (OO I, 10+ rl, he had called
Malebranche "le premier Philosophe de ee siede"; by March 1686, he referred to him and
his Jansenist adversary as "les deux premiers Philosophes du monde" (OD III, 570 I). The
interehange between Bayle, Malebranche, and Fontenelle, parts of which do not appear in
OO, has been published in the (Euvres comptetes de Malebranehe XVII, 567-594.
2 See OO I, 427-428 (December 1685, I), for Arnauld's ·'Avis" to Bayle and OO I,
444-461 for the journalist's answer, in which he argues very convincingly that Arnauld's
good faith is suspect in his treatment of Malebranche.
3 For asummary of the philosophical debate, see Ralph W. Church, A Study in the
Philosophy of Malehranehe (London: ABen & Unwin, 1931), especially chap. VI. For a summa-
ry of the theological debate, see Ginette Dreyfus' critical edition of Le Traite de la nature et de la
grace (Paris: Vrin, 1958), pp. 47-127. A large part of Malebranche's writings are concerned
with a detailed theory of sense perception. And yet Bayle hardly ever discusses it, so little
was he concerned with the kind of skepticism Montaigne had embraced. He called the
Catholic father's theory of ideas "des equivoques perpetuelles" in a letter to Desmaizeaux
(OO IV, 866 r, 16 October 1705).
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S 229

angels shall have their way. When the debate was stiIl new, this was
Bayle's re action to the angels' role in the miracIes: "Voila l'hypothese
du monde la pIus eommode pour expliquer les effets les pIus etranges
sans rien ehanger dans la eonduite universelle, immuable, simple &
uniforme de Dieu" (OD I, 50 I, May r684, IV). Ten months later, in
Mareh r685, he reeognized the advantages of Arnauld's position that
miracIes are the direet works of God. It eorresponded to the popular
idea of a miracIe; and its objeetions to Malebranehe's theory were
fo und ed on principles "qu'on n'oseroit nier publiquement, quand
meme on ne les eroiroit pas veritables" (OD I, 242 I). In the eourse
of the interehange of arguments and objeetions, Malebranehe was
foreed to admit more cIearly that there were genuine miracIes, such
as the creation, in whieh God did aet by a partieular will. His system,
therefore, eould aeeount for the miracIes of the Old Testament only
by reversing his fundamental premiss about God's action through a
general wilU
Later remarks make it cIear that Bayle also found the oeeasional
eauses a limitation on the omnipotenee of God beeause they bound
Him to His own "sagesse" to such an extent that His other attributes
lost their meaning. The theory exaggerated His wisdom at the expense
of His liberty and His goodness (OD III, 8r r-8r2). In effeet it said
that God wiIled the world to be eonstrueted and run with the
greatest eeonomy of means. And if the resultant world was a sorry
affair, He did not intervene beeause He preferred the eeonomy of its
funetioning to the alternative of working miracIes. But, as Bayle later
asked, if God ereated the world by a miraeulous aet, why did He not
prevent the fall of man by another far easier miracIe? (OD IV, 64 t.)
The system of oeeasional eauses, whieh Descartes introdueed in
1 The mirades ofJesus present no problem because He was God. In his review of Arnauld's
Rijlections, the book that eventually decided him against Malebranche (whether in thi3
volume or in the succeeding two is difficult to say), Bayle may be suggesting that Male-
branche's system requires "volontes particulieres." "Or si Dieu n'avoit qu'une volante
generale de mouvoir les corps sel on les Loix de la communication des mouvements, il ne
voudroit pas directement les effets qui se produisent dans le monde; il voudroit seulement de
cette maniere les voyes simples & general es d'agir, & par eonsequent il aimeroit moins
I'ouvrage meme qui resulte de la communication des mouvemens que la communication des
mouvemens, ee qui ne paroit eonforme ni a l'idee d'un Agent raisonnable, ni a ee que Dieu a
fait dans la creation du monde, puisqu'il est eertain qu'il y a neglige ees voyes simples &
general es & qu'il a mieux aime se serv ir de volontez partieulieres" (OD I, 347 r, August
1685, III). Bayle's remarks in the last piece of the series are extraordinarily eautious.
"Il y a des gens qui souhaiteroient que le P. Mallebranehe eut dit sans nulle exeeption que
I'ordre ne permet jamais que Dieu trouble la simplieite de ses voyes: ... Mais ees gens-Ia
n'examinent pas s'il est toujours en notre puissanee d'exclure toute exeeption. Ils eroyent
qu'on peut remedier a tout ineonvenient par la seule combination des eauses oeeasionnelles,
& peut-etre qu'ils se trompent" (OD I, 533 t, April 1686, III).
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

physies and Malebranehe extended to theology (OD I, 507 T, Mareh

1686, III - page misnumbered 570), did not sueeeed in explaining the
presenee of evil at all; it only tended to legislate God's Providenee
out of existenee by making Him asIave to His own laws. Reading
Arnauld's arguments made Bayle realize that there were breaehes in
Malebranehe's defense of God's honor. In a real sense the God of
oeeasional eauses was indifferent to the world He ereated. Both the
Jansenist Arnauld and the Protestant Bayle found it easier to believe
in a tyrannieal predestinator than in an indifferent meehanie. Henee-
forth, in Bayle's opinion no philosophy or theology would be eapable of
clarifying questions about the existenee of evil. Considering the e-
normous importanee this matter has in his later writings and the faet
that his declarations on it are the most persuasive pieee of evidenee in
the ease against his religious sineerity, one ean see how erueial this
esoterie debate was in his development. It would be a deeade before
he expressed fully his perplexities on the eauses of evil, but the whole
matter beeame immeasurably more diffieult for him when the bastion
of the oeeasional eause fell.
This eontroversy, although it was a theologieal matter, also eon-
tributed to Bayle's tendeneies toward skeptieism in philosophy. Of
the few remarks in the journal that bear on the uneertainty of know-
ledge, three of the most important are oeeasioned by the debate
between Arnauld and Malebranehe. It had opened with the J ansenist's
attack on his opponent's eomplieated theory of pereeption. Aeeording
to the Oratorian the pereeption of an idea is a modality of the soul,
while the idea itself is not, but belongs somehow to God's intelleet.
"Voila ee que peu de gens eomprennent. Mais on n'a pas raison pour
eela de le rejetter, puisque si l'on est eapable d'aprofondir les choses,
on voit aisement que eeux qui disent que no us voyons les eorps en
eux-memes & qu'ils so nt la veritable eause de l'idee que nous en avons
prononeent des termes dont le sens est aussi ineomprehensible qu'un
cerele quarre" (OD I, 283 l, May 1685, III). In one of his rare
comments about the senses, Bayle simply asserts that he does not
understand how they eould pereeive the corporeal world.
Sinee Bayle had never intended to found knowledge on the senses,
he direets his remarks to the general nature of abstraet reasoning.
What he has to say about philosophy in general and "evidenee" in
partieular resembles some of the eomments in his Cours de philosophie,
but he admits more frankly the uneertainty of philosophie al propo-
sitions. In the seventeenth eentury, philosophy, he admits, has made
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

more progress than in the past, but still has found almost nothing
certain (OD I, 185 T, December 1684, V). The disagreements between
Amauld and Malebranche have proven that our way of knowing
things cannot be explained; furthermore, when we do know something,
that something may be far from clear. For example, we know very
surely the existence and immateriality of the soul, but "nous n'en
avons point d'idee"(OD I, 26 r, April 1684, II). EIsewhere Bayle
writes that Cartesianism, though subject to immense difficulties, may
nevertheless be true; for the human mind sometimes finds itself faced
with insurmountable perplexities when it affirms a proposition and
equally insurmountable perplexities when it denies the proposition
(OD I, 157 l, October 1684, catalogue VII). Therefore, when a
principle is certain, it is best to hold on to it, eve n if it produces em-
barrassing consequences (OD I, 110 r, August 1684, VI). Statements
such as these are troublesome. vVhat does it me an to know something
certainly and yet have no idea of it? One can imagine such a feeling
about a religious mystery; but it seems most inappropriate in philoso-
phy, particularly Cartesian philosophy.! Bayle does not yet attack
the concept of certitude directly, but it is clear that he is aware that
the criterion of "evidenee" may have its shortcomings. Here, as in
the Cours and in later writings, he adopts the paradoxical position
that a proposition may be both self-evident and incomprehensible.
Only one e in the Nouvelles de la republique des lettres, in reference to a
work of Malebranche's, does he envisage the possibility that a propo-
sition may be both self-evident and false.

Il y a ici sans doute de quoi embarasser Ies pIus subtils Philosophes, &
demonter meme en quelque far;on toutes leurs maehines. Voici eomment.
Le but de la Philosophie doit etre de nous fournir un point fixe de certitude
qui no us sauve des attaques des Pyrrhoniens. Or eile ne peut nous en sauver
qu'en nous fournissant des idees claires & distinetes, eomme so nt eelles qui
prouvent que les eorps ne so nt point la eause de leurs mouvemens. Mais
eomme eette grande clarte n'empeehe pas que nous ne devions douter de
ees idees, puis que nous sommes obligez de tenir pour fausse une doetrine
toute fondee sur les memes raisonnemens, savoir, eelle qui nie que Ies esprits
creez se puissent donner de nouvelles modifications, il s'ensuit qu'une idee
claire & distinete est neanmoins ineertaine. Ou trouver done la eertitude

1 ef. Descartes in the answers to the Second Objections: "Et certes, il est manifeste qu'on
n'en peut avoir [a firm and unshakable conviction] des choses obscures et confuses, pour peu
d'obscurite ou confusion que nous y remarquions; car cette obscurite, quelle qu'elle soit,
est une cause assez suffisante pour nous faire douter de ees chases."
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

que la Philosophie se propose de nous procurer? (OD I, 335 l, July

1685, VII).l
Although the example Bayle gives (if bodies cannot move themselves,
spirits cannot give themselves ideas) is unconvincing, the form of his
argument is sound. A dear and distinet reasoning demonstrates one
undeniable condusion, but the same reasoning demonstrates another
that is questionable - in this case on religious grounds. How can one
choose which of the two demonstrated propositions is false if both of
them live up to the only philosophie al standard oftruth, self-evidence?
This is precisely the reasoning to be used later in the artide Pyrrlzon
of the Dictionnaire. Though implicit in a few comments made in the
journal, it appears explicitly only here.
:Many remarks bear on the relations between reason and faith. In
the initial artide of the first issue, a review of Van Dale's famous book
about orades that inspired FonteneUe, Bayle states one of his guiding
principles, namely that it is a service to religion to combat false
arguments that seem to favor it. They are unworthy of Christianity
and could be dangerous in a century as philosophieaUy demanding as
his. It is far better to separate the wheat from the chaff and ding to the
solid proofs of religion "que no us avons en abondance" (OD I, 4 r).
It is after all the mark of honesty in aChristian philosopher that he
will not accept unsound arguments. On such grounds, Bayle's relent-
less dialeetieal analysis of the unreliable demonstrations of rationalist
theologies may weIl be the sincere exercise of critical reason.
Two other subjects relative to fideism receive treatment in the
Nouvelles de la republique des lettres, the criterion of faith and the divinity
of Scripture. Bayle's policy in the controversy between authority and
individual examination is the same as the one outlined in the Critique
generaie. He delights in pointing out that there is no consistency in the
tradition that the Catholics vaunt so. If Catholics accuse the Reformed
churches of innovation in religion, their own so-called tradition con-
tains several innovations itself, for example the primacy of the Pope
and the dogma of transubstantiation (OD I, 700-703, December
1686, I). The latter dogma, a favorite whipping post of Protestants,
is grounds for introducing Pyrrhonism in religion. The mystery of the
Eucharist is so unfathomable that various hypotheses have been
advanced to explain it, each of whieh, in the hands of a dever apolo-
gist, works as weIl as any other (OD I, 745-747, February 1687, II).
1 A printer's error in OD reads "demontrer" in line 2. The second edition of the journal
(Amsterdam: Desbordes, 1686) provides the correet readingo
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S 233

Tillotson's Discourse against Transubstantiation turns the argument in

another way. If the bread is truly the body of Christ, then our senses
deceive us grossly, he maintains. If they deceive us in the Eucharist,
how can it be shown that th ey do not deceive just as mu ch when we
read "This is my body"? The dogma of the Council of Trent destroys
the foundations of knowledge (OD I, 581 l, June 1686, VII).l
Besides being untenable in fact, the principle of the authority of the
church is theoreticaHy inadequate because it requires reasoned
examination to establish it. Bayle devotes a long article to Nicole's
work Les Pritendus Riformes convainvus de schisme in order to give the
Protestant answer to Catholic apologists in terms similar to the ones
he had us ed in the Critique generale. Nicole claimed that a common
man was incapable of determining by rational inquiry what werc the
articles of faith contained in Holy Writ. Bayle grants that Nicole's
arguments are forceful, but they suffer from a grave defeet. They prove
too much, for th ey demonstrate just as conclusively that a simple man
cannot persuade himself that the church has any authority to interpret
Scripture. To be consistent, Nicole must claim to found that one
doctrine on the Bible. But he cannot because all his arguments have
gone to show how difficuIt it is for common men to know Biblical
exegesis. Bayle elaborates somewhat on his earlier position by ex-
plaining the standards that apply in the individual's examination of
doctrine. vVhere Nicole goes wrong is to expect that certitude of a
Cartesian sort is appropriate in matters of faith. Not eve n Descartes
himself would have insisted on that. "On ne peut pas faire un pIus
grand abus de la maxime de ee Philosophe que de la pousser jusques
aux matieres de conscience; et ee seroit meme aHer contre son esprit,
car il vouloit que dans les choses de pratique on se deterrninat sur la
pIus grande probabilite" (OD I, 161 l, November 1684, I). To expect
absolute certitude in a matter of conscience is to confuse one's stan-
dards. Self-evidence belongs to philosophy; to introduce it in religion
is to lead directly to Pyrrhonism. 2 This is a very dangerous practice,
and Catholics and Protestants alike are wrong to hope to achieve
certitude where faith is concerned. This is not to say that philosophical

1 La Plaeette uses the same argument in a treatise, known by Bayle, De insanabili romane
ecclesie scepticismo (DHC 1 Nicolle, n. (3). But Bayle in all his remarks about transubstantiation
never refers to the argument of the senses on his own count.
2 This distinetion is made severaI times in other articles de\"oted to the controversy raised
by Nicole's book (OD I, 5281, Apri11686, I; OD I, 590 r, June 1686, I). It also appears in
the closing pages of the Nouvelles lettres de l' auteur de la Critique generaie (OD II, 334 r) where
conseience and science are differentiated.
234 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

reasoning has no place in the defense of Christianity; it can be of help

when combatting the few freethinkers ("esprit forts") who are per-
su ad ed by debate; but th ey are rare, and the majority of mankind
will be more moved by appeals to eonseienee and sentiment.
The most extreme form of rationalism in religion, and one that
Bayle was to be especially eoneemed in refuting in later years, is
Soeinianism or Christian unitarianism, whieh unlike deism reeognizes
the authority of the Bible, but rejects all tenets that seem ineompatible
with reason. "Si la raison est entierement exclue de l'examen des
points de Theologie, l'on tombe dans des diffieultez inexplieables.
Si l'on soumet a l'examen de la raison tous les l\Iysteres que Dieu nous
a revelez, l'on court risque de les expliquer autrement que Dieu ne
veut. Il faut done s'eloigner de ees deux extremitez" (OD I, 132 t,
September 1684, IX). That defining the limits of reason and faith is
a knotty problem, Bayle admits. One thing at least is sure; reason
alone cannot be eounted on to provide a clear system of doctrine.
Wissowatius, Soeini's grandson, whose book is being reviewed, aecepts
the etemity of God on so-ealled rational grounds; but he is aetually
not relying on reason alone, for the doetrine he defends is an in-
eomprehensible one. "Puis que la raison nous prouve neeessairement
l'existenee d'une ehose ineomprehensible, il s'ensuit qu'il y a des
choses tres-vrayes & tres-reelles qui sont ineomprehensibles a la
raison, & des-la tous les argumens des Soeiniens, empruntez du lieu
eommun de l'ineomprehensibilite, n'ont aueune foree" (OD I, 133 T,
Sept~mber 1684, IX). Just as Bayle had found the infinite divisibility
of matter true but inexplieable, so he finds in religion similar verities.
To repudiate a demonstration simply beeause it leads to irresolvable
eomplexities, so Bayle is here arguing, is not being reasonable at all.
The same sort of attitude applies somewhat to Seripture.
C'est fort maI raisonner que de conclure ... que l'Ecriture n'est point
claire, de ce que les Protestans, qui s'en servent comme d'un principe
commun, disputent eterneIlement .... Une teIle consequence introduiroit
un Pyrrhonisme universel dans le monde, si une fois eIle etoit admise, parce
que l'on dispute tous les jours sur les choses les pIus claires. Qu'y a-t-il de
pIus clair que les principes mechaniques des nouveaux Philosophes?
Cependant on les nie presque par tout en faveur de je ne sais queIles forrnes
substantieIles & accidenteIles qui sant les pIus bizarres irnaginations du
rnonde (OD I, 333 t, July 1685, VII).

The standard Cartesian explanation for the eonfusion that exists over
clear truths is the foree of habit and prejudiee in human beings, who
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S 235

do not easily give up their deeply ingrained misconceptions. Likewise,

it could be maintained that people misread Scripture because of their
emotional biases. But Bayle does not seek refuge in human short-
comings; he admits frankly that the Bible is unelear, even self-contra-
dictory on oecasion. The Mosaic aec ou nt of the creation of the world
leayes a great many questions unanswered, ones that cause philosophy
considerable embarrassment. More than that, its narrative is in many
ways unsatisfactory. "Il faut avoüer que la narration de MOIse, quelque
parfaite qu' eIle soit par rapport au degre de connoissance que Dieu nous a
voulu donner, n'est pas exacte par rapport ala methode que nos Maitres
prescrivent a tout bon Historien" (OD I 428 I, December r685, II).
Genesis, he adds, takes fewer words to recount the creation of the
world than the novel Ctelie takes to describe a financier's vestibule.
Still, it is written in an astoundingly sublime style, in whieh one recog-
nizes the hand of God.
The story of the fall of man is no less perplexing. Considering a
book containing a collection of fantastic inanities that had been
conceived about original sin, Bayle writes.
. .. de la maniere que ~Iolse raeonte ee funeste evenement, ii paroit
hien que son intention n'a pas ete que nous s<;:ussions eomment l'affaire
s'etoit passe, & eela seul doit persuader a toute personne raisonnahle que
la plume de Motse a ete sous la direction partieuliere du S. Esprit. En effet
si Motse eut ete le maitre de ses expressions & de ses pensees, il n'auroit
jamais enveloppe d'une fa<;:on si etonnante le reeit d'une teIle action; ii en
auroit parle d'un stile un peu pIus humain & pIus propre a instruire la
posterite; mais une foree majeure, une sagesse infinie le dirigeoit de teIle
sorte qu'il eerivoit non pas selon ses vues, mais selon les desseins eaehez de
la Providenee (OD I, 592 l, June 1686, II).

The thought here is orthodox, as is the conclusion a few lines later that
the best thing is not to try to find allegorieal interpretations of the
literal word. Bayle's expression, however, seems obviously ironic.
That would be the natural conclusion of anyone accustomed to reading
eighteenth-century works.
And yet there are two pieces of strong evidence to suggest that
Bayle is speaking honesdy here despite his wry terrns. The first eon-
cerns his publication of a satirical tale by Fontenelle about the dispute
between two pretenders to a tribal throne in Borneo (OD I, 476-477,
January r686, X). The first, Mreo, established herself as queen and
introduced some unpopular innovations. During her reign the price
of bread rose extraordinarily, reputedly because some ofher magicians
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

made it disappear with words. She kept aroom of mummies in which

her former favorites were put on display with great ceremony, and
it was necessary to render respects to them before entering the queen's
chamber. Soon the other claimant, Eenegu by name, appeared, laid
siege to the throne, and did away with Mreo's innovations. The
people noticed that Eenegu resembled the old queen considerably
more than Mreo, presumptive evidence that she was the legitimate
heir. Still, she was finally defeated by the deceptive tactics of Mreo.
It should be obvious to any alert reader that the pretenders' names are
anagrams of Rome and Geneve, that the innovations are transub-
stantiation and hagiolatry, and that Mreo's victory is the revocation
of the Edict of Nantes. And yet Pierre Bayle, who we are to believe
is an arch-ironist himself, did not see through this transparent allegory!
Re published it, revealing its author, thereby endangering Fontenelle
in France.1 It is inconceivable that Bayle would have violated the
secrecy of a literary confidenee. EIsewhere in the journal he scrupu-
lously avoided any disclosure of authors' names (including his own).
If it is hard to believe that he is sincere in his remarks on Moses as a
historian, it is much harder to believe that Bayle did not penetrate
the meaning of Fontenelle's tale. And yet there is no denying that hc
was so nalve. 2 This incident gives one reas on to pause whenever
accusations of double meaning are level ed at Bayle. If he was capable
of them, he was not capable of recognizing them at the age of thirty-
eight.
The second incident involves his review of Le Clerc's anonymous
work Sentimens de quelques thiologiens de Hollande sur I' Histoire critique du
Vieux Testament (OD I, 33r-333, July r685, VII). The figure of Jean
Le Clerc makes an interesting foil for Bayle. Re was an Arminian
minister, a refugee in Amsterdam originally from Geneva. Bayle
regarded him and his sect as dangerous radicals in the fold of Protes-
tantism. The Arminians, whose unorthodox system of grace and the
free will had been the focus of debate in the Synod of Dort (French and
Dutch: Dordrecht), r6r8-rg, had been expelled from the Calvinist
Reformed Church by the synod. Later they were tol era te d by default
in Dutch cities. According to their beliefs, they were not so much a

1 In a letter to Desmaizeaux (OD IV, 584 I, 17 October 17°-1-), Bayle says that Jurieu
and his wife were also taken in. FonteneIIe remained on good terms with the refugeejoumal-
ist, evidentIy because he believed Bayle's cIaim not to have understood the meaning of the
tale.
2 There may be something to Bayle's assertions that we can know clearly something
that is incomprehensible.
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S 237

separate church as a separate community, whose principal doctrine

was universal grace and whose principal practice was toleranee.!
Although an admirer of their toleranee, Bayle always wrote against
their doctrines, associating them with the much reviled Socinians. He
had good grounds for this since the Arminian community was the
onlyone in Holland that allowed the Polish refugees to worship with
them. The two sects inevitably merged to a certain extent and were
regarded with suspicion, even horror, by old-line Calvinists. Bayle's
published declarations against Arminianism make him a member of
the conservative camp.
Relations between Le Clerc and Bayle were cordial at the time the
Sentimens de quelques theologiens de Hollande was published. Le Clere had
submitted articles to the journal and had seen previous works of his
receive generous reviews. \Vith typical consideration Bayle sent a
copy of his review of the Sentimens to Le Clerc for approval. The latter
took umbrage at so me of the comments about the inherent danger
in his theses, specifically in the sections that east doubts on the divine
inspiration of Scripture. He wrote back, in an obvious fiction that
would not deceive Bayle, that those sections were not his own work
and that he earnestly desired to see them refuted. Bayle revised his
review alo ng those lines. 2
Along with the letter enclosing the original review, a second letter,
this one from the journalist to Jacques Lenfant, a friend of both
Bayle's and Le Clerc's passed through the hands of the Arminian
minister. For one reason or another, Le Clerc opened it and did not
hesitate to read it. Here is part of what he read:
Mr. Le Clerc vient de faire un Livre contre M. Simon; il y a de bonn es
choses, mais trop hardies. Vous deviez l'avertir qu'au lieu de faire du bien
au Parti qu'il a embrasse, je veux dire aux Arminiens, il servira a les rendre
pIus odieux; car Il ne servira qu'a confirmer les gens dans la pensee ou l'on
est ici que tous les Arminiens savans so nt Sociniens, pour le moins. Ce paur
le mains n'est pas dit sans causeo Ces Messieurs n'ont point de politique;
car s'ils avoient temoigne moins d'entetement pour le Socinianisme, dont

1 See Annie Barnes, Jean Le Glerc (1657-I736) et la ripublique des lettres, chap. III.
2 See Annie Barnes, Jean Le Glerc, p. 1 13, and Elisabeth Labrousse, Inventaire critique de la
correspondance de Pierre Bayle, p. 142. Bayle had originally compared Le Clerc's Biblical
criticism to Spinoza's, an accurate remark but a great insult at the time. In his letter
enclosing the review, Bayle is even franker concerning his disapproval of the Sentimens.
Among other things, he writes: " ... tout votre Traitte sur l'inspiration des Prophetes et des
Apotres ne peut que jetter mille doutes et mille semences d'Atheisme dans les Esprits." The
letter is reprinted in Abraham des Amorie van der Hoeven, De Joanne Glerico et Philippo a
Limborch, dissertationes dUI2 (Amsterdam: Frederick Muller, 18+3), pp. 262-264.
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

ils empoisonnent avee affeetation tous leurs Livres, il eut ete aise de rae-
eommoder le Shisme (sie) du Synode de Dordreeht; mais [ranehement nos
Calvinistes se [ont un honneur & un merite de s'eIoigner d'une Secte qui
est l'egout de tous les Athees, derstes, et Sociniens de l'Europe (OD IV,
623 r, 6 July 1685).

Le Clerc did not feel edified, and relations between the two were cool
from then on. In later years, they engaged in a long and bitter quarrel
over several matters, with Le Clerc accusing the author of the Die-
tionnaire of impiety.
This collection of documents gives valuable insight into Bayle's
practice in writing reviews. In general, he goes out of his way to
praise most books, reducing his critical comments to a minimum out
of consideration for the sensitivity of their authors. Here, as in the case
of the dispute between Malebranche and Arnauld only the most careful
reading will enable one to see what Bayle's personal reaction is; for
it is usually only hinted at by a short, unobstrusive remark, carefully
phrased not to hurt any feelings. It is only by consulting his letters or
his later eomments that one ean aseertain exactly what he thought.
His taet and eircumspection when diseussing a book can easily mis-
lead even the most careful reader into a misunderstanding of the point
he is making.!
The important point is that Bayle was upset, more so than he showed
in print, by a work tending to reduee the divinity of the Bible. His
distress at the ideas contained in the Sentimens seems to be a genuine
expression ofhis respeet for the sanctity ofScripture. A year later, when
he writes flippantly about the account of the creation, it is wise to
take him at his word, namely that Moses is defeetive as a physicist
or a historian, but that he is inspired and succeeds in eonveying ad e-
quately the prineipal point that God ereated the world. Elsewhere in
the Nouvelles de la republique des lettres he defends the principle ofBiblieal
criticism by saying that Protestants do not believe that every chapter
and verse of the Bible is "la base et la regle de la Religion" (OD I,
211 I, January 1685, IX). He is no fundamentalist and willingly
concedes that Holy Writ contains grave diffieultie<;, but he draws the
line at the crueial question of its inspiration.
During the publication of the journal Louis XIV revoked the Edict

1 More facts demonstrating Bayle's real generosity as the editor of his journal can be
found in Mme Labrousse's artide in "Les Coulisses du Journai de Bayle" in Pierre Bayle, le
philosophe de Rotterdam. The ~-jdence shows that Bayle understates his critical comments
(except in Protestant-Catholic disputes), TUJt that he dissembles.
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S 239

of Nantes. In the journal and In hIs other writings both before and
after the revocation, Bayle worked tirelessly to establish religious
tolerance. The theme that predominates in the totality of his works is
the plea for tolerance of persons. In politics this means the recognition
of the rights of unorthodox sects; in the republic of letters this me am
the banishment of hatred and acrimony in book; of controversy.
Fanaticism of any sort always repelled him; and the injustices com-
mitted in the name of religion, whether Protestant or Catholic, never
failed to arouse his indignation. He heartily condemned either party
when it persecuted, remarking with bitterness that of all the sects of
Christianity only the Arminians and Socinians (including perhaps the
Anabaptists and Quakers) preached and practiced tolerance. This
seemed to hirn an abornination of the clear message of charity brought
to the world by the founder of Christianity.
Shortly after the revocation, BayIe abandoned all moderation in a
blistering denunciation of the Catholic pcrsecutions of the Huguenots
in a short work Ce que c' est que la France toute catholique sous le regne de
Louis le Grand. One of the most interesting features of this work is the
bitter use BayIe makes of Malebranche's theology, which he had given
up probably within months of writing La France toute catholique.

C'est la meilleure lec;on de Mallebranchisme qu'on sauroit donner; car

s'il etoit digne de Dieu d'agir souvent par des volontez particulieres & par
des mirades, auroit-il souffert qu'une Eglise aussi corrompue que la votre,
qu'une Eglise qui par l'enormite des ses maximes & la bassesse de quelques-
uns Je ses dogmes a merite l'horreur & le mepris de toute la terre, s'accrut
au point qu'elle a fait & opprimät par une longue suite de supercheries
grossieres entremelees de Dragons & de Soldats ... une Troupe d'innocens
qui servoient Dieu selon la purete de l'Evangile? Disons donc avec ee Pere
de l'Oratoire que Dieu, aimant mieux la Sagesse que toute autre chose, aime
mieux que sa conduite porte le caractere d'un Agent sage ... que de reme-
dier ... aux maux qui arrivent dans le monde (OD II, 347 l).

This acrimony disappears in the Commentaire philosophique sur ces

paroles de Jesus-Christ, Contrains-les d' entrer, ou l' on prouve par plusieurs
raisons demonstratives qu'il ny a rien de plus abominable que de faire des
conversions par la contrainte et ou l' on rifute tous les sophismes des convertis-
seurs a contrainte et l' apologie que St. Augustin a faite des persecutions. Pur-
portedly the translation of an English treatise, it was published in
October 1686, having been predicted in La France toute catholique
(OD II, 354 l). Bayle had finished part II before he fell ill in rnid-
February 1687, but withheId publication until July of that year,
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

perhaps in order to be able to reply very briefty to Jurieu's criticisms.

Early in r688 there appeared a SuppUment du Commentaire philoso-
phique. 1 Throughout his lifetime, both publicly and privately, Bayle
denied authorship of these works. 2 His caution was justified by events.
The national synod of the Walloon Church held in Amsterdam in
r690 condemned nine propositions, most of which reftected the spirit
of the Commentaire philosophique; and ten months later at Leyden the
synod suspended Gedeon Huet from his ministerial functions for a
year. A friend of Bayle's, and the future compiler of the index for the
Dictionnaire historique et critique, Huet had published two books in r690
defending Bayle's viewpoint, the Apologie pour les vrais tolirans and the
Apologie pour I' apologiste des toUrans. After condemning nine specific
propositions, the synod concluded: "le Sr Huet s'est montre dans ses
eerits approbateur du commentaire philosophique, et ee qu'il a dit
dans son apologiste n'a pas ete trouve une djection suffisante de tant
de mechantes et impies doctrines qui sont contenues dans ee livre." 3
The Commentaire philosophique is the first work of Bayle's in which his
skepticism occupies a considerable place in his argument. As has been
shown, there are many passages in the Nouvelles de la republique des
lettres which revealone facet or another of reason's incapacity. But
nowhere is there any sustained expression of their author's position;
for Bayle was concerned to remain objective in his book reviews,
which were too short anyway to give him the opportunity to develop
his ideas at great length. Even in the Commentaire philosophique he does
not base his reasoning on purely skeptical grounds. It is only as his
argument unfolds, and as he attempts to answer objections to it, that
he is required to assert that reason cannot be counted on to demonstrate
the truth of religious dogmas. Nor can this be considered the principal
significance of the work, the importance of which lies in its thesis that
every creed must be granted the privileges of religious toleration.
This at least is the conclusion his theory demands. In practice he

1 The reply to Jurieu oeeupies a large part of the prefaee. Bayle's sardonie method is to
compare passages from Le Vrai Systeme de l'eglise and the Traiii des droits des deux souverains,
both by Jurieu, but both offieially anonymous. The two works are in fundamental contra-
dietion, and Bayle hopes that the author of the one will refute the author of the other.
2 See OD IV 633 r (letter to Lenfant, 3 February 1687), OD IV, 830 r (letter to Des-
maizeaux, 17 October 1702), and OD IV, 104 i (in the Entretiens de "'"faxime et de Thimiste,
the work Bayle was writing when he died).
3 Livre synodal contmant les artides resolus dans les S)'nodes des Eglises wallonnes des Pays-bas public
par la Commission de l'Histoire des Egiises Wallonnes (The Hague: Martinus ~ijhoff, 19°4), II,
92, 104-1°5. Bayle received support from a surprising quarter. The rnagistrates of Amster-
dam, irked at the Synod's intrusion in matters of civil toleranee, threatened to send sur-
veillants to future Synods (OD IV, 652-653, 5 January 1691, to eonstant de Rebecque).
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

admits that it may be necessary to exelude Catholics and atheists from

citizenship or other political rights (OD II, 411-413,431).
According to its title, the Commentaire is to be philosophie, not
theological. It opens with the strongest statement to be found in
Bayle's works of the primacy of natural reason over faith. This is the
logical preliminary to the argument; for if Bayle intends to relyonly
on philosophical reasoning, he must first validate the rights of philoso-
phy. His specific intent is to refute the elaims of ecelesiastics that the
words of Jesus "Contrains-les d'entrer" (Luke xiv. 23) justify forceful
means of conversion. To do this he must provide a standard for
interpreting this passage from Scripture, and he chooses reason as
his criterion. His rule is that any literal reading requiring the com-
mission of a crime is unacceptable (OD II, 367 I). The natural light
of reason, he argues, indicates to all men what is criminal. Therefore,
in cases where Scripture is unelear, reason can bc called upon to
measure the Bible's intention, This is a valid procedure because there
is really no conflict, or hardly any, between reason and revelation in
matters of morality. Since the two agree, it is safe to rely on reason. l
In matters of dogma such is not the case, and Bayle informs his reader
at the very outset that he does not wish to be taken for a Socinian who
submits all questions of doctrine to reason's dictates.
At the same time, he notes that Catholic and Protestant theologians
alike often argue as if the mysteries of their faiths are not contrary to
self-evident propositions such as "The whole is greater than any of
its :parts." Although he does not say so, Bayle himself believes that
there is an irreconcilable conflict between mysteries such as the incar-
nation, the Trinity, and the creation, and the principles of reason.
Here he asserts that theologians of all sects (not himself) agree that
reason must not be violated by faith. If he can carry his point, he has
1 Note that this contradicts to a certain extent what Bayle had taught about the elarity
of moral principles in the Cours de philosophie (see supra, p. 207). Likewise, the whole thesis
of the Pensees diverses that man does not aet in aecord with his prineiples must mean that
Bayle cannot expeet his arguments to have too mueh effeet. These opening ehapters of the
Commentaire philosophique seem to me to be a position taken for purposes of debate, and not a
profound conviction of Bayle's. If he believed that morality could be founded in theory on
reason, he was weil aware that practice and theory often elashed. Moreover, if the general
outlines of ethics can be found by rational examination, the more speeifie rules belong to
revelation, for example the laws of monogamy. In my opinion Delvoh-e exaggerates the
importanee of these pages when he makes moral rationalism a fundamental assumption 0,
Bayle's thinking, Religion, critique et philosophie ... , pp. 99-11 I. Elisabeth Labrousse discusses
this matter in detail, Pierre Bayle: Hitirodoxie et rigorisme (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1964), ch ap. 9. She finds Bayle struggling to believe in an innate morality in the faee of
other stands of his. There may be a genuine parallei here between Bayle and Montaigne;
neither would abandon the belief that reason could guide man in ethics although his own
reasoning indieated otherwise.
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

established the basis for his argument.! "Il s'ensuit donc que no us ne
pouvons etre assurez qu'une chose est veritable qu'entant qu'elle se
trouve d'acord avec cette lumiere primitive & universelle que Dieu
repand dans l'ame de tous les hommes & qui entraine infalliblement
& invinciblement leur persuasion des qu'ils y sont bien attentifs ....
Je veux dire que sans exception il faut soumettre toutes les lois morales
a cette idee naturelle d'equite qui, aussi-bien que la lumiere Metaphi-
sique, illumine tout homme venant au monde" (OD II, 368 r).
By appealing to the principles of rationality, Bayle hopes to find
arguments against forceful methods of conversion that are convincing
to all men, regardless of religious affiliation. It must be remarked,
however, that his concept of a philosophical proof is sufficiently
broad to inelude considerations that would be elassified todayas
theological. In fact, his prineipal thesis rests totaUy on the Christian
concept of the conscience obedient to God; but he calls this concept
a philosophical one. His first premiss is that a man cannot violate his
conseience without sinning in God's eyes. Reason may prove that a
Being of sovereign perfection exists; but the essence of religion is the
individual's judgment of God and the respect, love, and fear that he
feels towards Him (OD II, 37I I). Now, to convert a man means to
change his judgment of his duties to God. This cannot be done by
force. Consider the case of a believer forced to change his religion;
the convert is actually being compelled to disobey his conscience;
and to disobey one's conscience is the sin of hypocrisy. A man who
in good faith conceives God in his own way cannot be denied the right
to worship; otherwise he would be damning himself by rejecting the
dictates of his conscienee. Therefore, a false doetrine sineerely believed
must be granted all the rights of the strietest orthodoxy; there is no
legitimate way to foree an erring eonseicnee. 2
Bayle had found a very elear illustration of his argument in the
Nouvelles Lettres de l' auteur de la Critique generaie de l' Histoire du calvinisme.
Imagine a porter who has been ordered by his master to guard the
house and to let only those bearing a certain token enter. His duty is to

1 Later in the Commentaire he wilI make admissions that seriously undermine the con-
tentions of the theolagians he is discussing here. For an interesting analysis of this shift see
Walter E. Rex's monograph, Essays on Pierre Bayie and Religious Controversy (The Hague,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), chap. V. Rex emphasizes the contradiction between the skepticism
of the fina I section and the rationalist arguments of the opening pages. The contradiction
does not appear so total to me. For Bayle the moral issues at stake are clear and incontro-
vertible, and his argument is based mainly on these issues.
2 Bayle had already expounded his views on the erring conscience in the Critique geniraie
(OD II, 85-88) and at great length in the Nouvelles Lettres (OD II, 2 I i-228).
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S 243

examine the token and to let anyone with it pass the gate (i. e., allow
a true dogma to enter his conscience). Should a counterfeit token
appcar, he must accept it if he cannot distinguish it from a genuine
one. To do otherwise would be to disobey his orders (OD II, 219-220).
To force the porter to accept a token he recognized as false would be
criminal. One can only exhort him to examine the token with the
utmost care. In other words, preaching, persuasion, and prayer are
the legitimate methods of converting the unorthodox. Note that Bayle
founds his lesson of toleranee on the only truly religious grounds possible,
the sanctity of conscience.
These are not the only reasons he advances for toleration. He demon-
strates at considerable length that any theory of persecution can be
turned against its partisans, for they cannot condemn others who
persecute. Protestants who re press Catholics in Switzerland cannot
plead for freedom in France. Catholics have no convincing grounds
on which to attack the English repression of the Roman Church. And
neither party has any answer to the Chinese who expel Christian
missionaries from the Orient. The emphasis on the reversibili.ty of any
theory of persecution, Bayle admits, is the kind of practical reasoning
that will persuade politicians; but the real foundation of toleranee
must lie in the rights of the erring conscience. l
An integral part of his position is the fact that a man may believe
in good faith that a false doctrine is true, i.e., he can mistake a counter-
feit token for the realone. This is the scandalous point for dogmatics,
for :3ayle must argue that the lights of reason are insufficiently sure in
matters of dogma. 2 It is at this point in his argument that skepticism
plays a role. In the Supptement du Commentaire philosophique he asks the
question whether the proofs of a true proposition are more solid than
the proofs of a false proposition. In absolute terms the answer must be
yes; but given the limitations of human nature, it is often the case
that the proofs of a falsity are every bit as convincing as the proofs of
the truth (OD II, 526 I). There are two sorts of truth, necessary and
contingent; and reason may find either obscure. Necessary truths are
universal truths, such as the propositions of mathematics or meta-
physics. Some of these (Bayle gives no examples) are so self-evident
that they are undeniable, and human intelligence accepts them im-

1 Cf. Belgic Confession, Artide XXXII, " ... nous rejettons toutes inventions humaines,
et toutes loix qu'on voudroit introduire pour servir Dieu, et par iceHes lier et estreindre les
consciences en quelque sorte que ce so it ... "
2 The validity of reason in morality, however, remains relatively unscathed.
244 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

mediately. However, other necessary truths cannot be demonstrated.

For example, one of the two following statements must be true: therc
is such a thing as space distinet from bodies; there is no such thing as
space distinet from bodies. Yet each is supported by eonvineingdemon-
strations, or more aecurately, eaeh is eombatted by eonvincing dis-
proofs. In absolute terms one only is true; on the human level, it is
impossible to determine.! The same applies to contingent truths, which
indude historical facts and the events dependent on the free will of
God. Some are incontrovertible; some are obscure. One could say
that either God desires the salvatian of all men and has given them
means sufficient to that end, or He has not. The arguments based on
theology, philosophy, and Scripture fall on both sides of the question;
and no definite solution is passible. Now, all revelatian falls into the
category of contingent truths sinee it depends on the free will of God.
To misunderstand revelation is to conceive an idea of what God could
have done in His liberty. One may candude that there is no crime
involved in a false theory of God's ways (OD II, 528 l).
The sources of human fallibility are two. The first is man's resistanee
to "evidenee." "Chacun sait, ou doit savair, que l'evidence est une
qualite relative; ... Cette evidenee que nous trouvons dans eer tai ns
objets peut venir ou du biais selon lequel nous les envisageons, ou
de la proportion qui se trouve entre nos organes & eux, ou de l'edu-
eation et de l'habitude, ou de quelques autres causes" (OD II, 396 r).2
This sort of error is quite compatible with dogmatic philosophy. Who
insisted mare on the errors arising from prejudice than the Cartesians?
If it is only misguided reasan that leads us astray, then aeeurate
reasoning ean find absolute truth. Furthermore, if aecurate reasoning
ean find the truth, heretics could eoneeivably be aecused of obstinacy
rather than honest error. They would be porters who gave the take ns
only a eursory inspeetian out of laziness or perversity. Against those
who would punish heretics for their obstinacy Bayle argues that only
God can know a man's heart weIl enough to judge whether or not he
aetualIy examines his beliefs in good faith.
But the truly clinehing argument for the rights of the erring
conscience must be that the truth cannot be surely reeognized. This

1 Bayle says that even the angels do not understand the mysteries ofnature (OD II, 514l).
2 In the Supptement Bayle writes: "Car le memeJuif qui est si opiniätre dans ses erreurs,
seroit un Chretien a briiler, si a l'äge de deux ans on l'eiit ote a son pere pour le faire elever
par de bons & zelez Chretiens" (OD II, 506l). The similarity to Montaigne is inescapable:
"Nous sommes Chretiens a mesme titre que nous sommes ou Perigordins ou Alemans"
(II: xii, 422b).
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

is the second source of error. To return to the illustration of the porter,

one could say that he is incurably myopic (i.e., reason is defective)
or that the token can be easily counterfeited (i.e., dogma is obscure).
Bayle chooses the second explanation, the difficulty of proving the
to ken is falseo Experienced controversialists, he says, should have
learned by now that reason cannot solve all their difficuIties; for
their own arguments can be turned against them. l The Calvinist who
accuses Catholics of believing in irrational mysteries has to defend
himself against Socinians who make the same eharge against him. The
Catholic who seeks to establish the need for an authority by destroying
the clarity of Scripture finds that in so doing he has undermined the
authority he was arguing for. "Concluons ... que les controverses
ne so nt pas seulement difficiles a cause des prejugez de ceux qui les
examinent, mais en elles-memes" (OD II, 503 r). The other possibility,
that the porter is myopie, would require a thoroughly Pyrrhonist proof
that reason must go astray. That proof was to come only with the
Dictionnaire historique et critique.
The reason for Bayle's refusal to give such a proof lies in his distrust
of the suspended judgment of a Pyrrhonist, which may resuIt in
indifference. A Pyrrhonist porter might abandon his post, leaving the
gate wide open because his eyesight was so bad that he could not tell
one token from another. Bayle believes that the human conscience
must make some decision despite the obscurity of things and that a
wrong decision is less bad than no decision at all (OD II, 427 r). He
rec0gnizes that in fact the classical Pyrrhonists never preached any
other doctrine in morality and consistently made deeisions on the
basis of appearances, whieh is to say on the basis of their conscienee.
Desorte qu'y ayant trois partis a prendre pour un homme qui est ferme-
ment persuade d'une Heresie; le premier, celui de suivre les fausses lumieres
de sa conscience; le second, celui de faire tout le contraire; & le troisieme,
celui de demeurer en suspens, il se trouve que le premier est le moins mau-
vai s de tous. Donc on est oblige de le prendre preferablement aux deux
autres; donc on a un droit legitime de le faire. Le mieux seroit ala verite
de prendre un quatrieme parti; savoir, de tenir pour suspecte sa persuasion,
mais il n'est pas donne a tout le monde d'etre soup«;onneux en ees sortes de
matieres. Il faut pour douter un certain degre d'esprit que tout le monde
n'a pas; rien n'est pIus malaise que de douter comme il faut; car ceux qui

1 Bayle's own demonstrations lead to some unfortunate results, as he is the first to admit.
By his own argument, one must tolerate those who believe in good faith that God requires
them to extirpate hereties by foree. There is no answer to this exeept to hope to persuade
them of their error (OD II, 403 rl.
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

ont assez d'esprit pour douter n'en ont pas toujours assez pour faire un choix
raisonnable; ils ne doutent que pour mieux s'ancrer ensuite dans l'erreur;
& d'autres s'etant mis une fois a douter, doutent toute leur vie (On II,
228 l).l

The correet form of doubting seerns to be to hold to an idea or a

system even while considering it suspect. This may have been Bayle's
policy during a considerable part of his life.
The remaining works of the 1680'S and the first years of the following
decade add nothing to our knowledge of Bayle's skepticism. 2 During
the latter part of this period he began working on the Dictionnaire,
but the publication of the Projet et fragmens d'un dictionaire critique was
delayed until the spring of 1692 by the demands of his quarrel with
J urieu. The history of this meiee has been recorded many times and
need not concern us. 3 For almost three full years Bayle's time was
occupied with accusations and counter-accusations, pamphleteering,
and defending himself before one body or another. Jurieu's charges
were on the whole ridiculous. The onlyone that might contain some
truth in it is his attribution of the Avis important aux rifugies to Bayle.
The most recent opinion regards Bayle as a collaborator on a work
originally by Daniel de Larroque. 4
If Jurieu's attacks were wildly irresponsible (he shifted grounds
more than onee), Bayle's conduct was not above reproach either.
Despite the advice offriends, he published an insulting personal attack
on his enemy in La Cabale chimerique, ou rifutation de l' histoire fabuleuse
qu' 01. vient de publier malicieusement touchant un eertain Projet de paix; dans
I' Examen d'un libetle, etc., intituU Avis important aux rifugies sur leur pro-

1 From the NO/UJelles LettTes. This resembles Malebranehe strikingly: Reeherche de la verite
Book I, Chap. XX.
2 There is one minor passage in La Cabale ehimeTique (OD II, 656 l) where Bayle daims
that exeept for the truths of religion, he regards all disputes as a "jeu d'esprit," in which he is
indifferent to the pros and eons of a question. Like a good Academie philosopher (he is
thinking of Carneades) hc accepts any opinion the moment it seems to have probability
on its side.
3 See Desmaizeaux's Vie de Bayle, the years 16g0-93. Dr. J. B. Kan published the aets of
the Consistory of the Walloon Chureh of Rotterdam eoneerning the affair in the Bulletin de la
Commission de l'HistoiTe des Eglises Wallones, IV (18go), 171-202. Delvolve, Serrurier, and
Robinson all review the dispute.
4 See Antoine Adam, HistoiTe de la litterature franfaise au XVIIerne sieele (Paris: Domat, 1956)
V, 236-238. Elisabeth Labrousse aeeepts this interpretation, Inuntaire, p. 373, and Pierre
Bayle, le philosophe de Rotterdam, p. 128. The important artides on this subjeet in the past are
Charles Bastide, "Bayle est-ill'auteur de l' Avis aux Tifugies?" Bulletin de la Societe de l' Histoirs
du Protestantisrne FTanfais, LVI (1907), 544-558, and Georges Aseoli, "Bayle et l'Avis aux
Tifugies d'apres des doeuments inedits," Revue d'Histoire Litterairs de la France, XX (lgI8),
517-545. Delvolve believes Bayle is the author of the Avis. Serrurier disagrees. Robinson also
rejeets Bayle's authorship.
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

ckain retour en France. The outcome of the debate involving a whole

series of pamphlets and books was Bayle's dismissal from his teaching
position on the second of November 1693 at the request of the Dutch
(not "Valloon) Reformed Church. Political reasons seem also to have
played a role in Bayle's dismissal.1 In his account to his cousin Jean
de N audis of these events, Bayle could not contain a certain amount of
his bitterness, "Vous serez cent fois meilleur reforme si vous ne voyez
notre religion qu'ou eHe est persecutee: vous seriez scandalise si vous la
voyiez ou eIle domine." (DHC Vie de Bayle XVI, 165 r, 28 December
1693. Same passage inaccurately reproduced in OD I B, 170 r.)
During the years from his arrival in Rotterdam to the day he was
dismissed from the Ecole Illustre, Bayle's life had not been an easy
one. The elosing of the Academy of Sedan had forced him to leave his
country and establish himself in a foreign city where his wages were
sufficient only to pay for the most modest lodgings and board. By
dint of tireless industry he turned out a voluminous literary production
which earned him an international reputation. But he knew severe
reverses outside the literary world while in Holland. The three living
members ofhis immediate family died within a period of a year and a
half, Joseph on the 9th of May, 1684, his father on the 31St of March,
1685, and Jacob on the 12th of November, 1685 in the Chateau
Trompette prison of Bordeaux. Bayle had reason to believe that
Jacob's incarceration had been caused in part by the French govern-
ment's annoyance at the publications of his illustrious brother in
RGtterdam. Repeated efforts on the part of Pierre Bayle for inter-
cession in Jacob's behalf in Paris resulted in an order liberating him,
but the order reached Bordeaux too late. Less than a month before
Jacob Bayle's death, Louis XIV signed the revocation of the Edict
of Nantes. Bayle's angry reaction is evident in La France toute catkolique.
Then in 1687 his constitutional frailty and the strain imposed on him
by his journal resuIted in a physical breakdown of the greatest gravity.
Not long after his recovery, he became the victim of the remorseless
attacks of a man who had been his patron and elosest friend at one
time, Jurieu, whom he had once called "le premier homme de notre
communion, soit pour le grand jugement, soit pour la delicatesse de

1 The affair did not die there, but was continued before the \\°alloon Consistory until
August 16950 Two years later the publication of the Dictionnaire saw Bayle called up once
again before the Consistoryo The inquiry continued for almost two years (16 June 1697 to
28 March 1699) ending with the condemnation of several articles and Bayle's promise to
revise his Dictionnaireo
 THE WORKS OF THE 1680'S

l'esprit "(OD I B, 73 I, 16 November 1676 to Jacob - misdated 16

December 1676 in OD).
The events of these years could only reinforce the philosopher of
Rotterdam' s sense of the adversi ties oflife and the iniq uities of human
nature. On political, religious, and personal planes he was faced with
soul-shaking misfortunes. Did th ey affect his personal faith? It is
conceivable that his disillusionments (if one can ever speak of Pierre
Bayle as the victim of illusions) contributed to an increasing inc re-
dulity. The Catholic persecutions in France moved him to write:
1-bis ne vous y trompez point; vos triomphes sont plutõt ceux du Deisme
que ceux de la vraie Foi. Je voudrois que vous entendissiez ceux qui n'ont
d'autre Religion que celle de l'equite naturelle. Ils regardent votre conduite
comme un argument irrefutable; & Iorsqu'ils remontent pIus haut & qu'ils
considerent les ravages & les violences sanguinaires que votre Religion
Catholique a commises pendant six ou sept ans par tout le monde, ils ne
peuvent s'empecher de dire que Dieu est trop bon essenciellement pour
etre l' Auteur d'une chose aussi pernicieuse que Ies Religions positives, qu'il
n'a revele a l'homme que le droit naturel; mais que des esprits ennemis de
notre repos sont venus de nuit semer la zizanie dans le champ de la Religion
naturelle par l'etablissement de certains cultes particuliers qu'ils savoient
bien qui seroient une semence eternelle de guerres, de carnages, & d'in-
justiees (OD II, 338 l).l

His own experience made Protestant persecutions seem even worse

than those of the Catholics. "Dieu nous garde de l'lnquisition Protes-
tante: eHe seroit dans dnq ou six ans si terrible que l'on soupireroit
apreJ la Romaine comme apres un bien" (OD IV, 671 r, 17 December
1691 to Pierre Sylvestre). When one remembers that the year that
saw the death of his father and elder brother and the revocation of
the Edict ofNantes was the year that marke d the termination ofBayle's
aHegiance to Malebranche's system of occasional causes, the hy-
pothesis that his faith underwent some transformation becomes
worthy of consideration. Re may have begun to have some doubts on
at least the benevolence of God. At the same time his skeptical tenden-
des become mu ch mo re marked in the Commentaire philosoplzique than
they had been in the works written before 1685. Both developments
were to reach fruition in the Dictionnaire.
The works of this decade show certain constants in Bayle's thought.
Re fought continuousIy against fanaticism, intolerance, and super-

1 In a similar vein Bayle eloses the preface to the Commentaire philosophique with an expres-
sion of his surprise that the violence committed in the name of religious zeal had not produced
more freethinkers (OD II, 367 r).
 THE WORKS OF THE 16Ro'S 249

stition. Everywhere he sought to persuade his readers of the primaey

of ethieal eonsiderations over matters of dogma. He defined God's
graee as a foree reforming moral eharaeter, not instiHing religious
doetrine. His strong re action against the vieiousness of religious
perseeution and intelleetuaI in-fighting was based largely on müraI
eonsiderations. In the third seetion of the Commentaire philosophique
he dared to eondemn the obloquy of Saint Augustine's theory of civil
repression of heresy, whereas other Protestants retained their respeet
for the saint, eontenting themselves with arguing that the Bishop of
Hippo's remarks did not apply to thern.! Always a dogma appeared
le ss important to Bayle thanjustice. An injury don e to God's nature by
a believer in good faith seemed far less serious than an injustice,
physieal or moral, perpetrated on a human being. The arguments he
used to support his position were a curious blend of Christian indig-
nation and semi-skeptical distrust of dogmatism.
At no time did he formulate any really Pyrrhonist theory. In
general he adhered rather strictly to a modified form of Cartesian
rationalism. From the beginning Bayle saw no difficulty in maintaining
the rather delicate position that man ean be certain of an incompre-
hensible thing. This is not an entirely untenable thesis - I would say
that it is the case of the present-day mathematies of infinity, to eite
onlyone example. But it is a thesis that can readily be converted into
absolute skeptieism. There are no signs that Bayle took such a step
in the r680's. A past master at dialeetieal argumentation, he was
eor.eerned to make clear the unsound reasoning of many traditional
stands, including those of his own religion. With the kind of honesty
that eould be self-destruetive he refused to be taken in by a faulty
reasoning. His abandonment of the system of oeeasional eauses in
theological questions when a quarrel between Cartesians proved its
inadequaey testifies to his intelleetual integrity. The destruetion of
this system was surely a major step, but onlyone, in his increasing
distrust of reason as he beearne more familiar with the endless eontro-
versies of his day.

1 See Walter H. Rex 3d, "Pierre Bayle, Louis Tronehin et la querelle des Donatistes: Etude
d'un doeurnent inedit du XVIIe siede," Bulletin de la Sociittf de tHistoire du Protestantisme
Franfais, CV (1959). 97-116.
 CHAPTER XI

THE DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE ET CRITIQUE

Appearing in four folio volumes in 1679 and five years later in a

second edition enlarged by almost fifty percent, the Dictionnaire
historique et critique contains approximately one half of Pierre Bayle's
total literary production. No work could have been more fitted to the
peculiarities of his temperament. The accumulation of notes from
his readings and his fund ofheterogeneous knowledge could be utilized
with the least effort since he was writing artieles, not books. In the
Projet et fragmens d'un dictionaire critique (1692), as yet undecided on how
to compose his artieles, Bayle had written uninterrupted narratives
divided rather arbitrarily into Roman numeral sections in which basic
iClformation and trivia followed up on each other without any differ-
entiation. Arid discussions of chronology and disentanglements of
mistaken identities occupied a considerable portion of his material,
especially in ancient history, where data were sparse and often con-
flicting. His original aim had been nothing less than to rid history of
its inaccuracies and to correet wherever possible the errors made in
other dictionaries or works of reference. Fortunately, he did not keep
to his plan; and following the advice ofhis friends and his publisher, he
expanded the scope of his remarks.
The format he selected after some experimentation with his artieles
allowed him the greatest freedom. To a concise historieal summary he
added notes that sometimes reached as much as twenty times the
length of the artiele itself. The flexibility of his footnote system
allowed him to digress without restraint into philosophical questions,
psychological analysis, or mo re diverting frivolities. Most important
was the consideration that he could restrict his comments to a carefully
limited subject without having to defend any general system of ideas.
Each artiele is in a sense a trial of his judgment and erudition, just
as each essay was a trial of Montaigne's judgment. There is, however,
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

a capital difference between the two. Montaigne meant to speak of

himself; Bayle sought the strictest objectivity. This did not predude
the expression of his opinions, but th ey were opinions purportedly
based on established fact or irrefutable logic.
It has often been assumed that Bayle intended his artides to be
anodyne summaries and reserved his more audacious ideas for the
notes.! Modern students of Bayle, such as Antoine Adam, Paul Dibon,
and Karl Sandberg, regard this as unfounded "legend." 2 It is unde-
niable that the succeeding century sought in the remarks facts and
reasoning that it could use in the philosophie crusade against political
and religious abuses. And Diderot and the editors of the Encyclopedie
feit that they were following Bayle's example when they concealed their
more revolutionary passages in apparently insignificant artides to
which they referred their readerso But there seems little reason to
suspect Bayle of any duplicity in his procedure. Some of his artides
are far from innocent. Antoinette Bourignon, the religious visionary,
is subjected to very subtle ironies in an artide that is one of Bayle's
finest pieces of satirical writing. A few of the remarks attached to the
artide (e.g., B, e, N, P) bear on the excesses of fanaticism or religious
zeal, but they do not always maintain the sardonic tone of the artide
itself. Likewise, the famous entry on David hardly conceals Bayle's
attitude concerning the Old Testament figure. Even in the revised
form of the artide, he writes of the prophet, "il a eu ses taches (G)."
What reader could be unaware of the content of the note? Bayle's
w0rds seem more like an invitation to read the note than an attempt
to hide the potentially dangerous ideas it might contain. It takes no
great perception on the part of a reader to pick out the remarks with
the richest subject matter, and the notes were always printed on the
same page as the text of the artide itself. What the notes supply is the
details of vast documentation and dose reasoning that corroborate
the judgment of the text. In them Bayle occasionally allows himself a
somewhat more personal tone than in the artides, which remain
objective on the whole.
The real difficulty with the Dictionnaire lies in finding which artide
handles a particular subject. Free will is discussed in Arminius, where
it is appropriate, and in the artide on Helen of Troy, where it is
1 See for example Horatio Smith, The Literary Criticism rif Pierre Bayle (Albany: Brandow,
19 12 ),p. 131.
~ Adam, Histoire de la literature franraise au XVIIime sieele, V, 242, n. 3; Dibon in Pierre
Bayle le philosophe de Rotterdam, p. xiii; and Sandberg, Faith and Reason in the Thought rif Pierre
Bayle 1670-- 1697, p. 35.
 THE DIeTIONNAIRE

surprising to say the least. However, the index prepared by Gedeon

Huet with some supervision by Bayle gives help tracking down such
subjects (23 entries under Arbitre). Furthermore, the major notes
themselves often refer to other important passages (Jvlarcionites, Mani-
cMens, and Pauliciens all refer to eaeh other). As a matter of fact, it is
highly likely, though not proven that groups of artieles treating a
partieular philosophie question were eomposed together with built-in
eross references.1 It seems safest to conelude that no intent to mislead
lies behind Bayle's choice of format. It simply eorresponds to the
needs of an abundantly furnished mind avid for detail and unwilling
and unable to eompose a earefully organized treatise.
A large portion of the Dictionnaire is devoted entirely to the investi-
gation and certifieation of facts. No effort seemed too great to Bayle
in his task of purifying history of miseoneeptions and misinformation.
For example, J urieu had written that Pope Sixtus IV had granted
permission to a cardinal and his family to practice sodomy during the
months of June, July, and August (Sixte IV 1 C). Bayle says that he
has heard that a Protestant gentleman (presumably himself), visiting
Jurieu to find the souree of this allegation, learned only that it was a
commonplace arno ng good authors though Jurieu eould not cite
anyone in partieular. He was not eontent with such an answer and
found that du Plessis-Mornay deserved credit for the story. Pushing his
researches further he asked where du Plessis-Mornay's souree, Wesselus
de Groningue, had gotten his information. U nable to find Wesselus'
work on indulgences, he decided to see what sort of refutations had
been written against du Plessis-Mornay. Coeffeteau, he found, assumed
that Wesselus did indude the story in a work, but rejeeted Wesselus'
eredibility on the grounds that he was a Protestant apologist. Gretser,
on the other hand, said that no such aeeusation ever appeared in
Wesselus' treatise; for it was not in Goldast's published edition of the
work; and Flaeius Illyricus, who borrowed enormously from Wesselus,
did not repeat the tale. Furthermore, the erudite Andre Rivet, finding
no grounds to refute Gretser, implied by his silenee that Gretser was
right. The only author Bayle found other than du Plessis-Mornay
who maintained that the ineident did appear in vVesselus' treatise
was Baleus. Now, du Plessis-Mornay wrote in an age where scholar-

1 For example, Piriira and Roranus are the only articles on the animal soul; they are in the
same part of the alphabet (earlier letters were already printed), and were composed in
1695-96. Nicolle and Pellisson, situated elose to each at her, treat the religaus controversies
over the criterian of faith.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE 253

ship was not demanding; and Baleus is frequently condemned as

unreliable. The conclusion drawn from this laborious searching through
du Plessis-Mornay, Gretser, Flacius Illyricus, Rivet, Goldast, Wes-
selus, and Baleus is that only a "miserable compilateur" would have
the temerity to include such a fantastic story in a serious work; for hc
lays himself open to charges of inaccuracy, against which he eould
only claim that Baleus had read a manuscript of \Vesselus that was
more eomplete than the one Goldast published. Even then, until he
produced the manuseript, his opponent could respond just as easily
that Baleus had found a manuscript that had been corrupted by a
slandering serivener. In short, Bayle wishes that writers were eircum-
speet in making aeeusations in print; only the most elaborate doeu-
mentation ean justify them. This is just one point in his uneeasing
eampaign against the injustiees perpetrated in literary eontroversies. 1
This remark on Sixtus IV exemplifies the extraordinary eare and
research that Bayle often demands of himself in the determination of
a faet. His articles become fragmented into a series of problems that
frequently require the greatest pains on the part of the seholar who
wishes to disentangle them. Not a few of them eannot be solved; in
the ease of Sixtus IV Bayle ean only show that the aeeusation against
the Pope is highly unlikely, so unlikely that no responsible author would
make it. So mueh attention is devoted to establishing these facts that the
forest seldom emerges from the trees, and the Dictionnaire articles
frequently remain disparate eompilations. 2
A historian eapable of eonsecrating such effort in order to prove a
simple assertion eould hardly be ealled a Pyrrhonist. The term "le
pyrrhonisme historique," whieh, as for as I ean determine, was first put
into vogue by Bayle himself, is deeeptive; for what Bayle practiees
is really "le doute methodique historique." 3 Nonetheless, he speaks
of himself as a historieal Pyrrhonist, meaning simply that in many
cases he is unable to decide on a matter, such as whether the Roman
Chureh approved of its laymen's reading the Bible in the vernaeular,

1 In the DHC as elsewhere, these controversies are a major theme of Bayle's. In volwne
three alone, the following articles contain significant reference to this one rnatter: Baius 1
C, Barclai 1 E, Basine 2 F, Baudoin I I, Beda 1 C, Bedell l E, Bellarmin 2 H, Bertelier l F, Bcze I V,
Blondel, David 1 I, K, and Bodin 2 N - and other less important ones could be cited.
2 There are a few major exceptions, especially in the second edition, where the series of
articles on the house ofNavarre makes a brilliant historical ensemble. On the whole, however,
Bayle's mind always resisted the task of making a synthesis of the diverse elements he reflected
upon in either history or philosophy.
3 Elisabeth Labrousse comes to the same conclusion in her article, "La Methode critique
de Pierre Bayle et l'histoire," Revue Internationale de Philosophie, XI (1957), 450-465.
254 THE DICTIONNAIRE

because there is evidence for both sides of the question (Arnauld,

Antoine 2 R). "En bien des rencontres les verites historiques ne sont
pas moins impenetrables que les verites physiques" (ConeiniI G, 275 i).
The fact that historieal research requires extreme prudence in no
way alters Bayle's conviction that absolute certainty is possible in
history. There is nothing probable or debatable about our knowledge
that Julius Cresar or the Roman Republic actually existed. ''Je
soutiens que les verites historiques peuvent etre poussees a un degre de
certitude pIus indubitable que ne l'est le degre de certitude a quoi l'on
fait parvenir les verites geometriques; bien entendu que l'on considere-
ra ees deux sortes de verites selon le genre de certitude qui leur est
propre" (Dissertation contenant le projetP XV, 24 I i). The species of certitude
that applies to history is an a posteriori certitude founded entirely on ap-
pearances. When two historians disagree on the nature of an event,
neither ofthem brings into question the fact that an event ofsome sort
did occur. To bring up the difficulties of the ten tropes of the Pyr-
rhonists is to shift grounds from a historical discussion to a philoso-
phical one. The historieal dispute rests entirely on what the testimony
of appearances is, not whether the testimony is a valid representation
of external reality. Within the domain of history thus understood,
man can achieve greater certainty than he can in mathematics. Since
g>':ometry is founded on imaginary entities such as dimensionless
points, its applicability to the real world is far more doubtful than
historieal facts, which are based, only on appearances. "Ainsi, il est
metaphysiquement pIus certain que Ciceron a existe hors de l'enten-
dement de tout autre homme, qu'il n'est certain que l'objet des
mathematiques existe hors de notre entendement" (Dissertation con-
tenant le projetP XV, 242 r). Later Bayle speaks of three kinds of certi-
tude, moral, physical, and metaphysical, and says that historieal facts
have at least physical certitude (Beaulieu 1 F). They are founded on a
genuine syllogism that runs, "It is impossible that all men at all times
should agree up on a falsity; all men at all times agree that Cresar
existed; therefore he did exist." The criterion of historieal truth
amounts to the fact that no historieal argument at all can be presented
to show that there never was aJulius Cresar.
The status ofhistorical truths then is clear in theory. Far from being
a skeptic, Bayle finds as much certainty in history as in other branches
of knowledge, or mare. But practice is not so easyas theory, and often
only the most general truths can be established. In the Critique geniraie
de I'Histoire du calvinisme de M. Maimbourg Bayle had defined his brand
of suspended judgment.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE 255

Je vous avoue que je ne lis presque jamais les Historiens dans la vue de
m'instruire des choses qui se sont passees, mais seulement pour savoir ee
que l'on dit dans ehaque Nation & dans ehaque parti sur les choses qui se
sont passees. Quand je lis les Histoires des Guerres eiviles du dernier siede
composees par nos Auteurs, je trouve que les Protestans de France n'etoient
jamais dans leur tort. Mais quand je lis les memes Guerres dans les Histo-
riens du parti eontraire, sur tout si ce so nt des Moines ou des Ecdesiastiques,
je me trouve transporte dans un autre paIs ou je ne me reconnois pIus ....
Sur ce pied-Ia, je ne crois en general autre chose sinon que les Protestants de
France ont ete armez quelquefois, qu'il y a eu une Bataille de Jarnae et de
Moneontour, & que certains autres choses reconnues de tout le monde se
firent en ee tems-Li (OD II, 10-1 I).

Only under certain circumstances can any particular detail of fact be

demonstrated.
On peut quelquefois pousser la certitude de I'Histoire jusques a quelque
detail. Par exemple, l'on peut etre persuade d'un fait, ou d'un dessein, ou
d'un motifparticulier lors que tous les partis en conviennent; lors qu'etant
infame a l'un des partis, il ne laisse pas d'etre avoue par ceux a qui il est
infame; ou bien lors qu'etant glorieux a l'un des partis, il n'est pas eonteste
par l'autre .... J'avoue encore qu'en examinant l'enehainure de plusieurs
faits, en eonsiderant le genie des Acteurs, en pesant toutes les eirconstanees,
en comparant ensemble ce qui a ete dit par les uns & par les autres, on
peut eelaircir bien des choses, decouvrir des impostures, refuter des ca-
lomnies. Mais en ces choses-Ia, Monsieur, soyez assure que l'Historien qui
a le pIus d'esprit est ordinairement celui dont la cause paroit la meilleure,
& qu'il est bien mal-aise de parvenir jusqu'a l'evidence (OD II, 11-12).

Certainty in details can be established when nobody disagrees about

the facts (the standard that applied to C<esar's existence) or when
there is an overwhelming probability in favor of one interpretation
(as in the example of Sistus IV). Analysis is usually more capable of
disproving a calumny or exposing a fraud than of establishing true
"evidence."
The major source of confusion in history is, of course, human parti-
sanship. "Si l'homme valait quelque chose, il y aurait entre les hommes
une entiere uniformite sur des faits ... eelatans" (Othan 1111 A, 280 r).
The true historian should be exempt from passions, without partiality
for his country, his religion, his political beliefs, or any other system
(Ussan 2 F). This is all but humanly impossible; eve n a pagan could
not be an impartial judge of the dispute between Catholics and
Protestants; for he would have prejudices that would attach him to one
party or the other, presumably the Catholics since their religion bears
more similarity to paganism (Remand 2 D). Moreover, an objective
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

historian is likely to be condemned by both sides because he is ob-

jective. The best one can do in order to write history with critical
accuracy is to follow rigorously certain rules of method. A historian
must always have a source for any statement (Guevara 1 D), preferably
a contemporary souree; for oral tradition is worthless (Esope 1 B).
Apologists, or any impassioned historian, are scarcely believable
(Brenzius 2 A; OD II, I Ir). Unfortunately, an incompetent historian
can make a true narrative seem improbable by his omissions or dis-
tortions (Grlgoire I 2 Q). A good historian, in short, must be ready to
distrust his authorities and examine eaeh fact anew (Goulu 2 F). No
one could be more aware than Bayle of the complexity involved in
such an investigation, for there is no kind of evidence that is not subject
to some doubt. Epitaphs, for example, may be untrustworthy (Herli-
cius 1 G). His own experience had taught the French refugee that
private letters often cannot be completely frank. Contemporary
reports of significant events can be egregiously wrong, espeeiallY in
political gazettes. Anyone reading the reports of the siege of Landau
five months after the event would find startling divergencies in the
accounts offered by the French alone, let alone between those by the
French and the Dutch (Landau 4 C). The tendency of historians to
repeat eaeh other uncritically perpetuates the grossest errors. More
than one non-existent sect of heretics can be found in ecdesiastical
catalogues (Bezanites 1, Westphale 1). Reams of paper had been dc-
voted to the totally fictitious Pope Joan (Papesse,4 Polonus 4 B). Bayle
eve!l finds one historian who denies that Jacques Clement assassi-
nated Henri III (Henri 111 2 R). Finally, a conscientious researcher
must be ready to abandon his own condusions if he is proven wrong
(Priolo 2 A). Bayle's own practice lives up to his precepts admirably
on all counts. His Dictionnaire was amodel of the critical method of
the scientific investigator who suspendsjudgment until factual evidence
thoroughly tested validates a conclusian which is considered sure only
so long as new factual evidence cannot be brought against it. Such a
method is historieal criticism, not historieal Pyrrhonism.
Bayle's application of his method to alleged supematural events
fumishes a good indication of the limits of his incredulity. The role of
historian requires him to repeat tal es of miraculous events even when
he disbelieves them (Achille P A) and to indicate in some way, if only
by an "on dit," that he personally does not subscribe to them (Gre-
goire 1 2 R). He seldom restricted himself to a mere "on dit," and
exposed as frauds or absurdities the great majority of mirades, visions,
 THE DICTIONNAIRE 257

and other legends that he recorded.1 The first thing to do when hand-
li ng a supernatural phenomenon is to verify the fact before attempting
to find an explanation for it. 2 Should a miracuIous event appear un-
deniable, it is best simply to admit that it surpasses human under-
standing. Speaking of a dream of Maldonado's that proved amazingly
prophetic, Bayle decides that the story is "tres probable." "De tels
faits, dont l'univers est tout plein, embarrassent pIus les esprits forts
qu'ils ne le temoignent" (Maldonat 1 G, 163 l). EIsewhere he makes
explicit his belief that wholesale denial of the supernatural flies in the
face of verified facts.
Je erois que l'on peut dire des songes la meme ehose a peu pres que des
sortileges; ils eontiennent infiniment moins de mysteres que le peuple ne
le eroit, et un peu pIus que ne le eroient les esprits forts. Les histoires de
tous les temps et de to us les lieux rapportent, et a l'egard des songes, et a
l'egard de la magie, tant de faits surprenans que eeux qui s'obstinent a
tout nier se rendent suspeets, ou de peu de sineerite, ou d'un defaut de
lumiere qui ne leur permet pas de bien diseerner la foree des preuves. Une
preoeeupation outree, ou un eertain tour d'esprit naturelleur bouehe l'en-
tendement, lorsqu'ils comparent les raisons du pour avee les raisons du
contre (.A1ajlls 1 D, I50 l).
Je souhaite aussi qu'on remarque que eeux qui soutiennent qu'il y a des
songes de divination n'ont besoin que d'enerver les objections de leurs
adversaires; ear ils ont pour eux une infinite de faits, tout de meme que
ceux qui soutiennent l'existenee de la magie. Or quand on en est la, il
suffit qu'on puisse repondre aux objeetions; c'est a eelui qui nie ees faits a
prouver qu'ils so nt impossibles; sans eela il ne gagne point sa eause (p.
I5 2 r).3

Although Bayle finds some truth in reports of prophetic dreams or

magic, occult practices such as sticking pins in wax figurines or casting
horoscopes seem utterly absurd for both theological and scientific
reasons. They impugn the wisdom of God; they imply man's inability
to exercise his [ree will to determine the contingent future; and th ey
cannot be explained on any scientific grounds whatsoever (Ruggeri 1

1 A few examples among many: Apulie 1 art., and L, Aristt!e le Proconnesien 2 passim,
Bennon 1 B, Bort!e 2 G, Cataldus 2 B,C, Constanee 4 B, Grandier 1 passim, and Radziwil 2 E.
\Vriting as a Protestant, Bayle was naturally free to debunk anl' Catholic or pagan legend.
2 Nigidius Figulus 2 E. In a footnote Bayle refers to the seetion of the Pensies diverses where
he had made the same point quoting Montaigne (4).
a A remarkable confirmation of Bayle's interest in the possibility of occult occurrences in
drearns exists in a letter to Jacob. "Apprenez-moi ... en quel etat etoit mon Pere la nuit du
21. au 22. de Juillet dernier, car je fis un songe eette nuit-la qui me fait souhaiter d'en etre
eclairei. J'ai mille fois eprouve que mes songes n'ont aueun rapport avee les choses qui en
sont le sujet & je suis hors de toute superstition a eet egard la autant que qui que ee soit;
eependant apprenez-moi si cette nuit-la mon Pere souffrit du mai ou non" (OD I B, 128 I,
13 September 1681).
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

D, Nigidius Figulus 2 E). In all cases where men try to make a science
out of the supematural, Bayle ridicules their efforts. The interpretation
of dreams is pure Rummery (Majus 1 D). Would-be prophets, among
them Jurieu, are mocked mercilessly on every occasion.!
But this is not to deny the existence of the supematural, and the
philosopher of Rotterdam is interested in finding an explanation for
such phenomena, one that rejects their miraculous nature while
retaining their supematural causation by good or evil spirits (Majus 1
D, Emma 1 D). As far as he can see, orthodox Christianity is compatible
with the belief in such spirits. In a very complicated remark (Rug-
giri 1 D), Bayle asks himself whether there is any necessary relation
between a belief in God and a belief in magic. According to his
analysis the only possible mechanism by which magical practices can
be explained is the operation of spirits; the question, therefore, revolves
itself into the connection between spirits and God. In actual fact no
one (except the Chinese) has ever credited the existence of good or
evil demons without also believing in God, but Bayle can see no logical
necessity joining the two in theory. From a philosophie al point of
view the existence of a supremely good being makes the simul-
taneous existence of evil angels very difficult to explain. Scripture,
however, seems clear on this point; and it would be rash to deny the
devil's sway over mankind. 2 But an atheist, who is not required to
believe in the goodness of God, has no valid reason to deny the existence
of evil spirits. He knows that there are beings with an evil spiritual
nature (namely men); so he cannot deny that there may be others of
a less corporeal composition. A magician then must believe in spirits,
need not in theory believe in God; but in fact all magicians do as far
as Bayle knows.
In regard to the supematural Bayle attempts to avoid the Scylla
ofgullibility and the Charybdis of disbelief, either one ofwhich appears
to him to be the resuIt of uncritical reasoning; for among the facts he

1 Braunbom 4 C, Comenius 1 art., E, I, Dijolarus 1 I, Drabicius 1 passim, KotteTUS 1 passim,

Mahomet 1 art., GG, Marets 1 I, Piricles 1 A (a precise summary of the argument against
natural phenomena as presages that Bayle had given in the Pensies diverses), Savonarola 4 D,
and T orquato 1 A; this list is partial.
2 Bayle refers to the devil several times in his writings, Abe/ l H, Xinophanes 1 E, OD II,
144 I (Pensies diverses), OD I, 730 r, (in the journal), OD 111,416 r (Continuation des Pensies
diverses), OD III, 946 r (in Riponse aux questions d'un provindal, Part III), OD IV, 669 r (letter
to Minutoli, 3 December 1691), and OD IV, 673 r (letter to Constant de Rebecque, 18
February 1692). In the last two he is condemning Balthasar Bekker's book Le Monde mehante
because it denies that there are any devils who have power over the earth. The reason he
gives for his disapproval is that Bekker's arguments indude some very dangerous interpre-
tations of Scripture.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE 259

finds grounds for a cautious belief in spirits. A too facile credence of

mirades may lead sooner or later, he says, to a complete disbelief
(Achillia PH). He personally is extremely suspicious of most stories,
but he is equally suspicious on both historieal and religious grounds
of the mentality of the incredulous who flatly deny the supernaturaU
Only a small part of his work is devoted to the history of skeptical
schools of philosophy. Five artides (Arcesilas, 1 Pyrrhon, 1 Carneade, 2 Lacyde, 2
and Mitrodore 2 - none on Sextus Empiricus) are devoted to the dassical
skeptics. With the exception of remarks B and C of Pyrrhon, these
artides are primarily historieal, weighing the testimony of Cicero,
Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, and their modern commentators,
notably La Mothe le Vayer and Foucher. 2 Bayle exonerates the
philosophers from accusations of moral iniquity, citing their virtuous
conduct, in which he sees an anticipation of the precepts of Gospel, as
further evidence for his oft-repeated idea that men do not live by their
principles (Arcesilas 1 G, K, Carneade 2 B, I, K, Lacyde 2 C). With a
certain satisfaction in his objectivity Bayle also indicates that Carne-
ades, though capable of great generosity, had no control over his
libidinous desires (Carneade 2 L). About the philosophy of the skeptics
he has little to say, never summarizing their arguments, merely
commenting that their goal of preventing men from opining about
undear subjects is a task greater than all the labors of Hercules
(Carneade 2 B) or that the refutation of all the sciences is "l'entreprise
... la pIus hardie qu'on puisse former dans la n~publique des lettres"
(Ardsilas 1 G, 250 1). The objectivity of the skeptics obviously makes
Bayle think of his own role as historian and the censures it brought
down on him:
Notez que l'antiquite avait deux sorte s de philosophes; les uns ressem-
blaient aux avoeats et les autres aux rapporteurs, d'un proces. Ceux-la,
en prouvant leurs opinions, eaehaient autant qu'ils pouvaient l'endroit
faible de leur eause et l'endroit fort de leurs adversaires. Ceux-ei, savoir les
seeptiques ou les aeademiciens, representaient fidelement, et sans nulle
partialite, le fort et le faible des deux partis opposes. Cette distinetion a
ete vue fort peu parmi les ehretiens dans les eeoles de philosophie, et eneore

1 See his judgment of Naude, supra p. 203. Bayle is less distrustful of the supernatural
than Montaigne, who wanted to accept only Scriptural miracles and was wiUing to "cut the
Gordian !mot" and refuse to credit as factual any reports ofsorcery (see supra, pp. 144-145).
Their ideas resemble each other, but Montaigne's were founded on a Pyrrhonist tempera-
ment. Bayle is more concemed with second causes, the theology of magic and astrology,
orthodoxy, and such theoretical considerations.
2 The articles on the moderns Patin 1, La l\llothe le Vayer 1, and Charron 2, never mention
Pyrrhonism significantly.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

moins dans les eeoles de theologie. La religion ne souffre pas I'esprit aea-
demieien; eIle veut qu'on nie ou que I'on affirme. On n'y trouve point de
juges qui ne soient parties en meme temps; on y trouve une infinite d'auteurs
qui plaident la eause selon la maxime de Chrysippe, je veux dire qui se
tiennent dans la simple fonetion d'avoeat; mais on n'y trouve presque point
de rapporteurs; ear si quelqu'un represente de bonne foi, et sans nul
deguisement, toute la foree du parti eontraire, il se rend odieux et suspeet,
et il eourt risque d'etre traite eomme un infame prevarieateur (Chrysippe 2
G, 167 l).
Pyrrhon B had made the same point that theologians deplore the
Pyrrhonist spirit. This important remark begins with the assertion
that Pyrrhonism cannot be harmful to the physieal or social sciences.
Most physicists, Bayle clairns, willingly admit that nature is an
impenetrable abyss that can be known only by conjectures of greater
or less probability.l Likewise, politicians and magistrates cannot
object to skeptical suspension of judgment as long as Pyrrhonists
accept the cliStoms and laws of their society. It is only religious au-
thorities that demand certainty in their dogmas. Intellectually
Pyrrhonism represents a threat to them. However, it is decidedly not
apraetieal threat to the survival of religion, for human nature is
inimieal to skeptical teachings. "La grace de Dieu dans les fideles, la
force de l'education dans les autres hommes, et si vous voulez meme,
l'ignorance et le penchant naturel a decider, sont un bouclier im-
penetrable aux traits des pyrrhoniens" (Pyrrhon 1 B, 10 I r). Bayle's
purpose is to excuse his Pyrrhonist arguments by saying that they are
not the sort that will make any inroads on the convictions of Christians.
Where grace does not act as the defender of the faith, other forees
such as ignorance, prejudice, and the pure stubbornness of human
beings will serve the cause of a religion, whether true or falseo No
Christian thinker could deny the accuracy of Bayle's words, but he
might wish that the encyclopedist deplored the depredations grace
suffers in the hands of human depravity. Instead, Baylejoins the sacred
and the profane sources of faith with an obvious, some would say
malicious, pleasure.
There follows the famous conversation between two abbots,
commonly designated the Abbe pyrrhonien and the Abbe catholique,
in which the first, whom Bayle calls a "bon philosophe," maintains
that both Christianity and the new Cartesian philosophy furnish
Pyrrhonists with weapons that make their attack on knowledge mu ch
more devastating. The ten modes of Sextus Empiricus had been almost
1 See supra pp. 204~05.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

unknown in scholastic philosophy according to the Abbe pyrrhonien;

but the moderns, specifically Gassendi, had published the classical
tropes and accepted their conclusions. In giving credit to Gassendi
for the promulgation of Sextus Empiricus' arguments, Bayle makes a
chronological error, neglecting the sixteenth-century translations of
Estienne and Hervet and the enormous influence of the "Apologie de
Raimond Sebond." No better cvidence could be presented to demon-
strate how little Montaigne is the fountainhead from which Bayle's
skepticism is drawn. It did not occur to him that the arguments of
Sextus Empiricus were in the public domain before Gassendi's De
fine logicae (in part I of the Syntagma).
It was the Cartesians, however, who completed the work of establish-
ing the classical tropes. "Personne, parmi les bons philosophes, ne
doute pIus que les sceptiques n'aient raison de soutenir que les qualites
des corps, qui frappent nos sens, ne sont que des apparenees. Chacun
de nous peut bien dire 'J e sens de la chaleur a la pres ene e du feu;'
mais non pas, 'Je sais que le feu est tel en lui-meme qu'il me parait' "
(p. 192 1).1 Furthermore, Abbe Foucher had shown that the argu-
ments undermining sense impressions of odor, color, and the like apply
with equal force to extension and movement, which cannot be demon-
strated to exist on the basis of information derived from the senses.
Malebranche had concluded that only faith in a God who would not
deceive man can be us ed as a foundation for the existence of bodies.
But, Bayle says, the Oratorian's argument proves too much; for God
has deceived man into believing that odors and colors do exist in the
external world. Cartesians claim that all mankind is mistaken in its
feeling that odors and colors are physical properties accurately report-
ed by the senses. In fact, th ey say, th ey are only modifications of the
soul whieh cannot be produced by any form of matter. Now if God
has allowed man to go so grossly astray in regard to sensations of color
and odor, why is it not likely that He has done the same with regard
to extension and movement?2 Malebranche's position makes b"d
1 In Dimocrite 1 P, Bayle makes his only major comment on sense perception. Like Male-
branche, he considers Cod the one possible source of vision. "Il faut etre je ne sais quoi pour
se pouvoir persuader qu'un arbre produit son image dans toutes les parties de l'air a la ronde,
jusques au cerveau d'une infinite de speetateurs. La cause qui produit toutes ees images est
bien autre ehose qu'un arbre. Cherehez-la tant qu'il vous plaira, si vous la trouvez au-dec;:a
de l'Etre infini, c'est signe que vous n'entendez pas bien cette matiere" (p. 473 rl. Bayle was
far from being in the scientific vanguard of his day.
2 In the second edition of the Dictionnaire Bayle repeats his argument in greater detail
(Zinon d'Elie 2 H). Popkin (in his article in Pierre Bayle, le philosophe de Rotterdam, p. 16, n. g)
claims that this refutation of Descartes is not valid because Descartes founds his concept of
extension entirely on abstract considerations, not on any sense evinence. A proper criticism
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

use of a very important prineiple, that God does not deeeive man in
His revelation. Bayle does not intend to deny this preamble of faith;
he merely excludes it from discussion of sensation.
The Abbe pyrrhonien turns next to the subject of the eriterion,
which in philosophy can only be self-evidence. But, he says, if "1' evi-
denee" is the criterion, he can show that it leads to results that are
patently falseo Herein lies the originality of Bayle's argument. Pyr-
rhon B is his clearest statement that a self-evident proposition may be
falseo Where other philosophers like Gassendi and Huet had argued
that many so-called self-evident propositions were debatable or that
it was difficult to be sure that a proposition was in fact self-evident,
Bayle went to the heart of the matter and declared that some clear
and distinet statements simply were not always true. Under such
circumstances self-evidence could not be called a valid criterion of
the truth. Some way would be needed to determine when an "evi-
denee" was falseo
The illustrations given in Pyrrhon B are all taken from theology.
First, the doctrine of the Trinity destroys the axiom that things that
are the same as a third thing are the same. This is by no means in
insignificant axiom. "C'est la base de tous nos raisonnemens, c'est
sur eela que nous fondons nos syllogismes" (p. 103 l).1 Secondly, the
same mystery teaches that persons can be multiplied in one individual
with one nature - a complete reversal of the self-evident concepts of
person, nature, and individual. Thirdly, our definition of a person is
also contradicted by the incarnation; for the mere juncture of a body
and a rational soul did not constitute the person of Jesus. Therefore,
it is possible that human beings are not persons even though they are
the union of a bodyand a reasonable soul. Fourth, it is evident that a
human body cannot be in several places at onee and that it cannot
be reduced in its entirety to an indivisible point in space; and yet
such is the doctrine of transubstantiation (the Abbes are both Catho-

of Cartesian extension would have to indude the statement that our idea of space is not
innate and in fact depends on empiricaI data. With a certain amount of trepidatian, I
must disagree with Popkin on his point. BayIe showed in 1703 (OD IV, 835/, 20 JuIy, to
Pierre Coste) that he understood exactly the Cartesian theory of extension, and he impIied
that he did on many oecasions in the opuscuIes of the 1670's. He was too good a Cartesian
to ga wrong on such a basic point. He knew perfectly well that no sense evidence couId be
used as the basis for a proof that extension exists. As he says here, the Cartesians thernselves
reaIized it, witness MaIebranche. BayIe is not discussing the Cartesian theory of the nature
of extension and movement as Popkin seerns to think; he is anaIyzing certain arguments
about their existence,
1 Carniade 2 C confirrns the crucial nature of this propositian. See supra p. 208, where
BayIe had taught the inconsistency of the Trinity with this axiom in his Cours rk philosophie.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

lie). This dogma destroys all concept of number; for if one body can be
in many places at once, who is to say that Peter and Paul are not the
same body reproduced in different places? The whole universe might
be one single creature of diverse manifestations. l\Ioreover, if a body
(the bread) is penetrable by another body, extension is not the defining
attribute of a body. How then can body be distinguished from spirit?l
Fifthly, transubstantiation also annihilates any valid distinction be-
tween accident and substance because according to the Roman
dogma the accidents of the bread remain although its substance has
been taken away completely.
Christian doctrine contradicts self-evident moral prineiples as weIl
as the axioms of logic and physics. First, it is clear that one should
prevent an evil if one can; and yet God permits the existence of
moral disorders in the world without betraying His perfections. The
second and third examples are brief to the point of obscurity. "2°.
Il est evident qu'une creature qui n'existe point ne saurait etre com-
plice d'une action mauvaiseo 3°. Et qu'il est injuste de la punir eomme
complice de cette action. Neanmoins notre doctrine du peche originel
nous montre la faussete de ees evidenees" (p. 104 l).2 Fourth, it is
clear that the good should be preferred to the useful. God, however,
preferred a world dominated by sin because it served the purposes of
His glory. Theologians argue that it is wrong to measure God by
human standards; but when they do so, they are only supporting the
Pyrrhonists' contention that there are no absolute standards of truth.
"S'il y avait une marque alaquelle on put connaitre certainement la
verite, ee serait l'evidence: or l'evidence n'est pas une teIle marque,
puisqu'elle convient a des faussetes; done" (p. 105 l).
Phyrrhon B gives a good representative sample of several of the
approaches the philosopher of Rotterdam utilizes in his repudiation
of the reigning criterion, self-evidence. In keeping with his preference
for piecemeal analysis he presents a carefully limited argument which
must be supplemented by other declarations elsevvhere in the Diction-
naire if one is to arrivc at a comprehensive statement of his skeptical
position. This is not to say that he is concealing his real meaning by
presenting only small segments ofhi~ thought at a time; on the contrary,
his sincerest beliefis that the truth is too complex to he contained in

1 This is Bayle's familiar gambit that transubstantiation is incompatible with Cartesian

principles.
2 The non-existent creature that gets punished is the unbom (predestined) man who was
not himself guilty of Adam's sin.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

any general theory. Therefore, he avoids general discussions. If the

hallmark of good philosophy is to recognize its own limitations, it is
only natural that Bayle would not transgress his own conviction by
undertaking to clarify in a comprehensive fashion something that is
unclear by its nature.1 Though dispersed, his statements on the cri-
terion of truth, when taken together, illuminate various facets of a
many-sided thought. His writings are like a handful of unassembled
tesserre, which, upon being reassembled, can produce only an in-
complete mosaic. And like all mosaics it is necessarily a rough and
uneven approximation of the sinuosities of reality. The task of the
literary scholar is made even more difficult by the encyclopedist's
self-effacement and his admissions of indecision on many matterso It
would be presumptuous on the part of the restorer to add tesserre
of his own. Bearing this in mind, the techniques Bayle uses in his
subversion of Descartes's criterion can be outlined.
The examples he chooses in his critique of "l'evidence," the Trini-
ty, the incarnation, transubstantiation, and the goodness of God,
are generally classified as mysteries. The last of these is particularly
important because it applies to the Socinians, who claimed to reject
all dogmas that could not be rationally demonstrated. They did,
however, believe in God's goodness. When Bayle maintains that it too
h amystery, he is forcing the Socinians to join those who must re-
nounce reason. Naturally, the mystery that receives the longest treat-
ment, the mystery that is the least logical, is transubstantiation, which
Bayle carefully shows contradicting both Cartesian and Peripatetic
metaphysics (and agreeing with Spinozist principles). It is significant
that nothing in remark B can be called fideist, for the preambles of
faith are not questioned - nor are they even considered in the critique
of self-evidence. Theologically the argument is very conservative.
Philosophically, it is radical because it attacks the sole remaining
bastion of certitude in the new philosophy.
As his development is presented, it does no more than demonstrate
-the absolute incompatibility of reason and revelation. It is possible
for a rationalist reader to discount the pious conclusion of remark B
and to claim that Bayle is really intent on the destruction of revelation,
not the destruction of reason. In order to save self-evidence one could

1 One of the favorite occupations of many Bayle scholars is drawing conclusions or

implications that he himself explicidy denied or refused to draw. This resuits in a fundamen-
tal misunderstanding ofhis profound awareness of the complexity of the truth, which should
be contemplated fragmentarily in philosophy as in history.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

simply discard the mysteries which are in conflict with it. Such an
interpretation of Bayle's intention can be legitimate only if some proof
can be brought forth to show that he actually regards reason as a
reliable instrument. Analysis of other artieles in the Dictionnaire will
make it elear that this is not the case. It would be far safer to say that
Bayle's intention is to persuade his readers that dogmas are not matters
of incontrovertible certainty. If he can succeed in this endeavor, he
may be able to reduce somewhat the intolerant dogmatism ofreligious
controversy. Re is warning the theologian that he cannot claim self-
evidence as a standard and at the same time warning the rationalist
that he cannot hope to rely exelusively on reason without violating
revelation.
Part of Descartes's attempt to avoid the confrontation of self-
evidence and revealed religion was his elaim that the naturallight of
reason was one form of revelation coming from a God who could not
deceive. Bayle does not contest the idea that whatever God has revealed
is true. Re does, however, repudiate the contention that "la lumiere
naturelle" actually belongs to revelation. Re agrees with the Cartesians
that in philosophy the best one can do is to rely on self-evidence as the
criterion. Re also agrees with their principle that God cannot deceive.
But he does not equate the two propositions. In Pyrrhon B he is forcing
the Cartesians to choose between revelation and self-evidence. First,
as he later shows, self-evident principles often prove too much and
lead to untenable consequences. The situation is made mo re difficult
by the fact that in many matters God has not revealed the solution
to questions philosophy has failed to answer. In other cases, reve-
lation is only too elear on certain subjects and raises embarrassments
that philosophy cannot handle.
It must be noted that Bayle's criticism of the eri te rio n is based on
an appeal to considerations external to a strict system of self-evidence.
As long as it is revelation, and not reason itself, that confounds reason,
a confirmed rationalist can always retort, "You are trying to prove to
me that revelation controverts my self-evident propositions; but I
assert that since revelation is unelear, no argument based on it can
have the strength of a logically evident proof. You have not refuted my
criterion; you have turned to another."
Not all the Abbe's arguments are an appeal to revelation. When he
states that the existence of evil in this world is incompatible with the
goodness of God, he is opposing a moral "evidenee" to experience,
an a priori deduction to an a posteriori knowledge. Each seems incontro-
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

vertible. As a matter of fact, according to Bayle, God's goodness can

be founded both on self-evident deduction and on revelation. None-
theless, the strength of the testimony of experience is sufficient to prove
that His goodness is incomprehensible. Bayle is not denying that God
is good, only that we can understand His goodness. If, then, he is
speaking absolutely sincerely in this remark, we find that he mentions
three standards against which the truth can be measured: revelation,
experience, and self-evidence. He makes it clear that either of the
first two can outweigh the third. He does not explain why one has
precedence over another, but he makes apparent what the order of
precedence is.
A thoroughly logical disproof of Descartes's criterion would require
Bayle to show that one proposition founded on "l'evidence" is in
conflict with another of the same nature. This is not an easy thing to do,
for Cartesian self-evidence is an extraordinarily complex concept. In
one sense it is an irrefutable criterion. Certain propositions, such as
"two pIus two makes four" and (perhaps) "the whole is greater than
any of its parts," are tautologies, and as such unassailable. As long as
such statements remain purely a priori analytical abstractions, they
retain their validity. We now know that even the simplest mathematical
functions are based on complex assumptions. The nature of these
assumptions is that they cannot be refuted, though they may be re-
jected in favor of other assumptions in different logical systems. l The
amazing thing about axiom systems is that deductive logic can produce
very subtle instruments of analysis starting from a limited set of as-
sumptions. As the founder of a mathematical system, Descartes was
aware of this and hoped to endow his whole philosophy with a similar
solidity. The purpose of the method of systematic doubt was to find a
statement or set of statements that could not conceivably be doubted.
By definition they would be true. Bayle never annihilates the criterion
of self-evidenee in this sense; nor, if I am eOITeet, eould he possibly.
There is one critical assessment of self-evident propositions that he
does not make, namely that they can never have any application to a
being existing outside the mind. 2 The reason Bayle does not use this
argument is quite simple; he does not believe it. Twiee in the Diction-
naire he refers to the cogito, ergo sum as an irrefutable argument against
1 Non-Eudidean geometry is the dassical example of this. If one axiom is rejected, a new
system can be built by the consistent use of a second set ofaxiorns. Descartes defined matter
in a certain way and built his system accordingly. With another definition, another theory
could be evolved, no less consistent.
2 As we shall see, he does say this about certain mathematical coneepts, in/ra pp. 1169-270.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

radical Pyrrhonism.l So long as he believes that the existence of at

least one thing can be proven, Bayle cannot make any general state-
ment about the entirely abstract nature of self-evident propositions.
Nonetheless, the final section of Pyrrhon B gives an argument that
severely limits the scope of the cogito itself. The Abbe pyrrhonien refers
to the Christian doetrine that the miracle of creation is continuously
maintained by a subsequent miracle of preservation. In effeet, God
does not guarantee that the Abbe catholique is the same person who
several years earlier had reeeived a benefice from the ehureh, for Re
could have created a new soul for the Abbe at any time. Bayle's words
could be extended to mean that while cogito, ergo sum is valid, memini,
ergo eram need not be. 2
For Descartes, "l'evidenee" serves the double funetion of under-
writing both the fundamental prineiples of his system and the process
of logical deduction which permits him to draw conclusions from his
prineiples. Certain self-evident propositions, the most important of
whieh is that "things equal to a third thing are equal to eaeh other,"
have the partieular quality of establishing the rules of deduction.
Descartes is internally consistent when he claims that his one standard
validates both his method and his eonclusions. Ir, however, it can be
shown that completely consistent applieation of the laws of deduction
to self-evident principles leads to contradictions, then self-evident logic
would destroy self-evident principles; and the criterion would be an
invalid one on entirely internaI grounds. One half of the system
(dtduetion) would destroy the other half (first prineiples) ; it would be
Penelope unweaving at night what she had woven in the daytime.
Bayle frequently argu es in this manner, showing that the logical
eonsequenees of one clear proposition eome into conflict with other
clear propositions. Take for example the case of free will. Man either
has or does not have free will. No matter what subtleties theology
seeks to establish in defining different degrees of grace, it must eon-
elude either one or the other; no third possibility exists. But either

1 Zenon d'Elee 2 art., 3 I, "Je ne saurais eroire qu'il ait soutenu qu'il n'y a rien dans
l'univers; ear eomrnent eut-il pu dire que lui, qui soutenait un tel dogme, n'existait pas?"
and Mitrodore 2 A, 420 r, "Sextus Empiricus le range parmi ceux qui n'ont point admis le
criteriwn, ou regle de la verite. Je ne comprends point que ni Demoerite, ni Metrodore, ni
aueun autre, aient jamais pu extravaguer jusques au point de soutenir qu'ils ne savaient pas
s'il y avait quelque chose; car ils ne pouvaient point douter qu'ils ne doutassent, ni s'imaginer
que ee qui doute n'est rien, ou n'existe pas." ..
2 In the following paragraph a third speaker (Bayle himself) finds the guarantee of the
eontinuity of self in the "sagesse" of God, who would not go around substituting souls all
the time.
268 THE DICTIONNAIRE

hypothesis entails difficulties. If man has free will, God's power is not
unlimited. If man does not have free will, God is guilty ofmorally repre-
hensible conduct when He punishes man for something that is not his
fault. Neither logically consistent position is tenable because it contra-
dicts a self-evident proposition about God's nature. At the same time,
if neither is true, the laws of logieal contradiction are falseo One way
or another some self-evident proposition must be sacrificed. Bayle
assumes that the propositions about God are true; therefore, he
concludes that for Christians free will is an ineomprehensible matter
and that self-evidence, the only possible philosophieal criterion of
truth, cannot reach any answer concerning it. A reader wishing to
refute his proof of the unreliability of "l'evidence" must do one of
two things. An atheist, or a rationalist, might reject God's goodness or
His omnipotence in order to retain the validity of reason. A man who
wishes to be both a rationalist and a believer would have to maintain
that logic is a valid instrument, but that Bayle has misused it. He
must prove that the contradictions Bayle makes so clear do not actually
exist, that the self-evident prineiples can be brought into harmony.
Woe unto such a reader, for he will become involved in a discussion
he is bound to lose.
To invalidate "l'evidence" on purely deductive grounds is perhaps
impossible, for that would amount to proving by logie that no system
made up of exclusively self-evident propositions could avoid leading
to contradictions. Furthermore, Bayle perhaps does not wish to in-
validate the criterion completely, but only to show that its authority
is subject to restrictions. He accomplishes this inductively by proving
that eaeh set of first prineiples proposed by philosophers entails
obnoxious consequences. This is not a direet attack on self-evidenee.
Whatever partieular system Bayle destroys, his opponent can always
answer him, "Your demonstration is exact, but it only proyes that one
of my first prineiples is not as clear as I thought it was. I reject it. I
remain loyal to self-evidence." However, in most cases, his opponent
thinks his first principle is self-evident; and Bayle is placing him in
the position where he must reject self-evidence itself or a seemingly
self-evident proposition. If Bayle is suecessful in enough arguments,
he will gradually eliminate from the realm of self-evidence almost all
first principles. Bit by bit, the subject matter of one area after another
will be shown to be incomprehensible by the use of allegedly self-
evident propositions. Whenever he can formulate a dilemma (either
the universe was created or it was not) and show that each alternative
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

entails irresolvable antinomies, he can elaim that no amount ofreason-

ing will produce an acceptable hypothesis. This is denying that the
criterion can function in a meaningful way because it cannot be
applied to any appreciable extent. The Dictionnaire is the ideal vehiele
for such a diversified undertaking, and Bayle elearly has in mind the
attempt to cover every conceivable system. For example, he ineluded
the artiele Sommona-Codom because he had found an Oriental philoso-
phy that appeared to maintain both that no God existed and that a
providential system of the punishment and reward of virtue still
functioned. To Bayle's way of thinking this was the most patent of
absurdities, but it was important as one of the possible metaphysical
systems and as such had to be convicted of inadequacy.
The major part of the case against "evidenee" is a survey of the
failures of philosophy to account for the complexities of reality. Even
in the science most universally recognized as sound, mathematics,
Bayle finds insurmountable difficulties. "Les mathematiques so nt ce
qu'il y a de pIus certain dans les connaissances humaines, et neanmoins
elles ont trouve des contredisans" (Zenon, philosophe epicurien 2 D, 62 r).
The mere fact that there are disputes among practicing mathema-
ticians is presumptive evidence that there is something unsound in
their branch ofknowledge. And yet the subject matter in mathematics
is not obscure as it is in all other sciences.1 vVhen great minds such as
Pascal's and Ruet's can be quoted on the faults of mathematics,
Bayle, himself quite unlearned in this field, relies on their authority.
Re mentions two insoluble difficulties: first, since geometry is based
upon non-existent entities such as dimensionless points, it is completely
valid only in the realm of abstraction; second, the study of infinity
results in paradoxes such as that an infinite thing can be equal to a
finite one or that there are elosed infinite systems. "S'ils [les mathe-
maticiens] trouvent de l'evidenee dans ees sortes de demonstrations, ne
leur doit-elle pas etre suspecte, puisque, apres tout, eHe ne surpasse
pas l'evidenee avee quoi le sens commun nous apprend que le fini ne
saurait jamais etre egal il. l'infini; et que l'infini, en tant qu'infini, ne
peut avoir de bornes?" (p. 63 r.) This is the nearest Bayle ean come to

1 Goedel's proof that no logical system that is consistent can give a complete foundation
for all mathematical sciences has shown that Bayle is wrong to say that there are no obscurities
in the subject matter ofmathematics. Bertrand Russell's reduction ofmathematics to formal
logic led him to pronounce the epigram that pure mathematics is the subject in which we do
not know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true. See Ernest
Nagel andjames R. Newman, "Goedel's Proof" in The World of ,Hathematics, ed. James R.
Newman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), III, 1668--1695.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

a proof in which two indisputable self-evidences come into conflict,

but he realizes that it is mathematical self-evidence and "l'evidence
du sens commun" that clash. Only the first of these is a pure Cartesian
"evidence." Therefore, the contradictory testimony of common sense
can only make mathematics "suspect." The extraordinary accuracy
Bayle shows in his formulation ofhis argument deserves our respect and
demonstrates how clearly he understood these complex matterso He
does not try to prov e too much. The one slight inexactitude he permits
himself is to apply the word "evidence' to the propositions of common
sense. However, he makes clear what he is doing; and he is following
the practice ofmost philosophers ofhis century. Mter all, ifhis purpose
is to reveal the deficiencies of the concept of self-evidence, he has the
right to use it as its proponents did.
It is a truism that modem science is founded in some way on the
mathematical measurement of external reality. But it was not a
truism in Bayle's day, and he categorically placed himselfin the camp
of those who denied that mathematics could achieve any significant
comprehension of nature. "Je n'ai guere vu d'auteur qui s'emporte
contre Kepler autant que Schoockius, comme si ce grand mathe-
maticien s'etait rendu le pIus ridicule de tous les hommes, en tachant
d'accommoder a l'explication de la physique les speculations de
mathematiques. Je ne pense pas que ce dessein puisse jamais reussir:
car l'objet des mathematiques et l'objet de la physique sont des choses
inalliables; l'un est une quantite qui ne subsiste qu'idealement, et qui
ne peut exister d'une autre maniere; l'autre existe hors de notre esprit,
et ne peut etre reellement dans notre esprit" (Kepler 1 C, 55 2 l).
Bayle's evaluation stems in the last analysis from his Cartesian concept
of the absolute separation of extension and thought. No more precise
theoretical rejection of modem science could be formulated. l
Physics, then, seemed to Bayle to be a matter of natural philosophy.
Despite his general preference for Cartesian principles (because they
gave the best definition ofspace), he had always been aware how much
of physics was incomprehensible. For example, Zeno's paradoxes on
the incomprehensibility of motion seem to him to be irrefutable
1 Note that it is an e'xtension of his argument about the unreality of geometric points.
Bayle's mind was seldom preoccupied with scientific matterso Nonetheless, as editor of the
Nouvelles de la republique des lettru he devoted slightly more than one fifth of his articles to
scientific matterso This astonishingly high proportion can be explained by his concern to
write a diversified journal. If he tried to keep abreast of scientific developments, they never
seemed as important to him as philosophical and theological matters. Had he not fallen iil
in early 1687, he might have reviewed Newton'g Principja, which was published in the game
year.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE 27 1

(Zenon d'Etee F, G). He puts them in modem form by shifting the

1
question to the nature of extension. If extension cannot be explained,
then motion cannot. Only three theories of extension are possible;
but each of them can be shown to be absurd; therefore, extension
makes no sense. According to the first theory it is made up of mathe-
matieal points. Since each point is dimensionless, it is utterly impossible
to conceive how a collection of points could have any dimension, much
less constitute all space. An infinity of nothings is stilI nothing. The
second theory would have recourse to an atomic structure of space.
Each atom, Bayle says, would have a left and a right side; hence it
would be divisible; hence it .vould not be an atom. Aristotle's theory,
the third and most widely held, composes space of infinitely divisible
parts. Against it, the Dictionnaire formuIates many unanswerable
paradoxes. For example, two concentric cireles can be proven to be
of the same size. For every point on the circumference of the larger
cirele aradius can be drawn passing through a corresponding point on
the smaller cirele. The two circumferences therefore have the same
number of points. They must be the same size, for it would be absurd
to imagine that infinitely divisible parts are expandable and con-
tractible. In the same way the diagonal of a square can be proven to
be as long as the side of the square. Another argument shows that it
would be impossible for two bodies to come into contact under such
a system, for the points that met would each be infinitely divisible at
the point of contact. Reversing his argument, Bayle can prove that if
contact is possible, it could only be defined in such a way that it
would be indistinguishable from interpenetration, a quality that is
denied to extension by most philosophers. Perplexities of a similar
nature can be raised against any theory of motion, a phenomenon
which Aristotle, Descartes, RohauIt, Regis, and other physicists have
failed miserably to define.l These and the other arguments Bayle lists
in support of Zeno would be sophistic quibbles if the philosopher's
point were that extension does not exist. As long as he is merely intent
on demonstrating that reason cannot give any adequate definition of
extension, he has a right to put forth such subtleties. 2 He can even
1 Newtonian caleulus provides an answer of so rts to the antinomies of the infinitely small.
Bayle's critique of mathematics (Zenon, philosophe epicurim D) refers to the caleulus, I believe,
when it mentions the incomprehensible concept that an infinite quantity can equal a finite
one.
2 One must make a distinction here. Zeno's mouthpiece does argw" that extension does
not exist. Bayle confines hirnself to the conclusion that it cannot be understood. Berkeley
tried to evade Bayle's reasoning by accepting the conclusion that extension does not in fact
exist. See Popkin's "The New Realism of Bishop Berkeley," in George Berkeley, University of
California Publications in Philosophy, XXIX (1957), 1-19.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

claim, as he does, that they may serve the cause of religion by hu-
miliating reason (~lnon d' Eliel G).
Remark I of Zenon d' EUe, added to the second edition of the Die-
tionnaire, finds more grounds for skepticism in the Newtonian mathe-
matieal proofs that the void must exist if motion is to be possible.
Nous voila bien redevabIes aux mathematiques; elIes demontrent l'ex-
istenee d'une chose qui est eontraire aux notions les pIus evidentes que nous
avons dans l'entendement; ear s'il y a quelque nature dont nous eonnaissions
avee evidenee les proprietes essentieHes c'est l'etendue; nous en avons une
idee claire et distinete, qui nous fait eonnahre que l'essenee de l'etendue
eonsiste dans les trois dimensions, et que les proprietes ou les attributs
inseparables de l'etendue sont la divisibilite, la mobilite, l'impenetrabilitl.
Si ees idees sont fausses, trompeuses, ehimeriques et iHusoires, y a-t-il dans
notre esprit quelque notion que l'on ne doive pas prendre pour un vai n
fantome? ou pour un sujet de defianee?l (Zenon d'EUe 2 I, 53 T.)

The difficulties attendant on the void are so great that Locke defended
.his belief in it by challenging his opponents to find a clearer theory.
"If any one ask me what this space I speak of is, I will teH him when
he tells me what his extension is.... If it be demanded (as usuaHy it is)
whether this space, void of body, be substance or accident, I shaH
readily answer I know not; nor sh all be ashamed to own my ignorance,
tm they that ask show me a clear distinct idea of substance." 2 Locke
and the new mathematicians, having to choose between two incompre-
hensibilities, seleet the less improbable. Bayle disagrees with their
choice and prefers to believe that both theories are merely intellectual
constructions having little or nothing to do with reality (p. 56 I).
That he should find so much obscurity in mathematics and physics is
particularly important for a proper appreciation of his skepticism
because neither branch ofknowledge involves him directly in religious
matters. 3 Had his critical faculties been oriented solely against theo-
logy, it is likely that he would have sought certitude somewhere else,
presumably in some form of rationalism or semi-scientific naturalism.
1 The same subject matter is in Leucippe 2 G. Bayle repeats his reasoning and his con-
elusion that "l'evidence" can deceive. "Il n'y a donc pIus d'idee elaire et distincte sur quoi
notre esprit puisse faire fond, puis qu'il se trouve que celle de l'etendue nous a trompes
miserablement" (p. 2061).
2 An Essay COn&eming Human Understanding, II~ xiii, 15, 17, quoted in French by Bayle
(p. 55 rl·
3 This is largely true. Bayle does, however, mention (I) that God's veracity does not
guarantee our idea of extension <Zenon d'Eli, G 1, H 2), (2) that God's immensity cannot be
the same as physical extension (Zenon d'Elis 2 I), and (3) that these difficulties are not
injurious to religion (Zenon d'Elie 1 G). Even so, he is under no compulsion to accept or
reject any major position because of its theologieal consequences.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

He has no such refuge; his case against reason extends well beyond the
mere condemnation of superstition or theology and embraces every
domain of knowledge.
In the biological sciences two questions interest him: the animaI
souI and the growth and reproduction of living beings. In remarks
E and F of Rorarius, Bayle reasons in agreement with the Cartesians
that it is in the interests of theology to believe that animals are un-
feeling autornats. Otherwise, if they are capable of sensation, it could
be shown that they are equally capable ofthought. 1fther are capable
of the most rudimentary thought, there is no way of distinguishing
their soul from an infant's. As soon as philosophers attribute some form
ofsoul, even a sentient one, to animaIs, they are in trouble theologically
if they reason consistently. Remark G then turns on the Cartesians
and shows that their arguments demonstrating that animaIs are
autornats could be used to prove that all men other than oneself are
also autornats. Furthermore, experience makes their system seem
quite implausible (Rorarius art., B). In short, the beast-machine theory
has theology for it and experience against it. Its reasons prove too
much because they apply to men as well as to animals. On the other
hand, the more common point of view has theology against it and
experience for it. Its reasoning proyes too little because it fails to find
a distinctive difference between the souls of animaIs and men. Phi-
losophy again finds itself between the devil and the deep blue sea.
One of the most perplexing questions about the human body is how
it g!"ows. To take refuge in the position that it is God's work seems pOOl'
philosophy to Bayle, for it avoids the question. In the same sense, one
would have to say that a building is God's work in so far as He created
and preserved the men who designed and constructed it. The crucial
point in the organization of the body is to find the second causes that
contribute to its formation and development. Daniel Sennert, a six-
teenth-century doctor, believed that semen contained a soul capable
of organizing matter into aliving body. However, Bayle continues,
microscopic investigations since his death (1637) had revealed the
presence of already formed organisms in semen. This obviates the
the embarrassments caused by having to explain how the soul is able
to construct a bodyout of formless matter. However, Bayle finds it
just as difficult to imagine any way in which the soul knows how to
make this organism grow. The formation of the body required marvel-
ous intelligence, but it takes very little less intelligence to accomplish
its growth. Bayle refuses to believe that the mere laws of mechanics
274 THE DICTIONNAIRE

could possibly suffice to account for such a feat. "Mais j'avoue ma

faiblesse; je ne saurais bien comprendre cela. Il me semble qu'afin
qu'un petit atome organise devienne un poulet, un chien, un veau,
etc., il est necessaire qu'une cause intelligente dirige le mouvement de
la matiere qui le fait croitre; une cause, dis-je, qui ait l'idee de cette
petite machine et des moyens de l'etcndre et de l'agrandir selon ses
justes proportions" (Sennert, Daniel e, 237 I). Since man has no idea at
all of how he grows, Bayle would prefer to attribute his growth to the
functioning of "un autre esprit." Followers of Avicenna would believe
that a created intelligence (i.e., a spirit or an angel, not God) presides
over the composition of animaIs and works with the help of "une
infinite d'ouvriers" to accomplish their growth. It is exceedingly
rare that Bayle hazards an opinion on a subject that he considers as
obscure as this one. The suggestion that he offers is a surprising onc.
The universe is filled with unseen intelligent spirits constantly at
work. l
Such scientific matters occupy only a very small part of the Diction-
naire. Metaphysical systems, however, offer Bayle myriad oppor-
tunities to show reason's follies and inadequacies. The longest artide
in the Dictionary is Spinoza's.2 Few philosophies aroused as much
contempt or as mu ch ire in Bayle as the Jewish lens-grinder's. "e'cst
la pius monstrueuse hypothese qui se puisse imaginer, la pIus absurd e,
et la pius diametralement opposee aux notions les pius evidentes de
notre esprit (Spinoza I art., 418 I). Re called Spinoza "un athee de
systeme," "le premier qui ait reduit en systeme l'atheisme" (Al,
421 l). The very heart of Spinozism, its integral monism, is the aspect
that most disturbs Bayle (Remarks Nl, pl, ee 2, DD2). If the entire
universe is one single substance, how can it have parts? Spinoza re-
gards the world as a plenum of one substance with infinite attributes
and modifications; but this multifold substance is always a single
entity, no part of which can be conceived truly separate from all the
other parts. Bayle has no sympathy whatsoever for this almost mystical

1 The same conelusion, based on the same reasoning, appears in Cainites 1 D. This should
lay in its grave DeIvolves far-fetched theory that Bayle's mentality has a basicaIIy positivist
east. DeIvolve is forced to plead that Bayle is attempting to establish a scientific theory on
the basis of the available evidenee, Religion, critique, et philosophie ... , pp. 370-376. As a
matter offact, in every major case where Bayle chooses between two theories, one ofwhich
has since become a basic part of modem science, he chooses the other.
2 It contains 52 pages in the Beuchot edition. Only two others, ~[ahomet (49 pp.) and
Luther (41 pp.), are more than forty pages long. Fourteen are between thirty and forty pages,
among them Anaxagoras, Beze, Calvin, EpicuTe, Ovid, Pauliciens, Rorarius, and Zenon d'Elie.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE 275

vision; for it breaks down all distinetions between form and substanee,
part and whole, one and manyJ
Supposons pour un moment qu'une masse d'or ait la force de se convertir
en assiettes, en plats, en chandeliers, en ecuelles, etc., eIle ne sera point
distinete de ces assiettes et de ces plats; et si l'on ajoute qu'eIle est une
masse simple, et non composee de parties, il sera certain qu'eIle est toute
dans chaque chandelier; car si eIle n'y etait point toute, eIle serait donc
composee de parties; ce qui est contre la supposition. Alors ces propositions
reciproques ou convertibles seraient veritables, "Le chandelier est la mass e
d'or; la masse d'or est le chandelier," "Le chandelier est toute la masse
d'or; toute la masse d'or est le chandelier." Voila l'image du dieu de Spi-
noza; il a la force de se ehanger ou de se modifier de terre, en lune, en mer,
en arbre, etc., et il est absolument un et sans nuIle composition de parties;
il est donc vrai gu'on peut assurer que la terre est Dieu, que la lune est
Dieu, que la terre est Dieu tout entier, que la lune l'est aussi, que Dieu tout
entier est la terre, que Dieu tout entier est la lune (DD2, 466 l).

Such utter eonfusions are monstrosities and do not deserve the name
of philosophy. Moreover, Spinozists have no right to deny any of the
Christian mirades, such as the inearnation, the Trinity, or even the
most illogieal one, transubstantiation, beeause every reversal of logie
entailed in the explanation of these mirades oecurs in Spinozism
(Remarks Nl III and DD2).2
These absurdities resuIt merely from the Spinozist doetrine of
extension. The vision ofGod is even more offensive; for He is extended;
His unity is made into a eomposite of parts; His liberty is destroyed;
His immutability beeomes the infinite ehangeability of the universe;
His ineorruptibility beeomes subjeet to eorruption (Nl II). As the
subject of all the modifications of thought, the lens-grinder's God
defies comprehension. It is bad enough to make thought and extension
identical in one substance (rather than miraeulously juxtaposed as
in orthodox philosophy); it is even more detestable to make every
thought a modifieation of God; for then God hates and loves, wills
and denies at the same time. What sense does it make to put all human
thoughts in one divine head? Morally considered, this monism beeomes
totally execrable.
1 See the somewhat confusing article by Leszek Kolakowsky, "Pierre Bayle, critique de la
metaphysique spinoziste de la substance" in Pierre Bayle, le philosophe de Rotterdam, pp. 66-80.
Kolakowsky would tax the encyclopedist with unfairness because he did not appreciate the
mystical qualities ofSpinoza's metaphysics. That is somewhat like blaming a mathematician
for using numbers. Bayle's rationalism recoiled from the philosophy of the Ethics precisely
because it made a mockery of all rational distinctions.
2 On Spinozism and the Trinity, see the Nouvelles de la ripublique des lettres, July 1685, III
(OD I, 3241).
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

Quoi donc! l'Etre infini, l'Etre necessaire, l'Etre souverainement parfait

ne sera point ferme, constant, et immuable? Que dis-je immuable? il ne
sera pas un moment le meme ... Cette mobilite continueHe gardera beau-
coup d'uniformite en ee sens que toujours pour une bonne pensee l'Etre
infini en aura mille de sottes, d'extravagantes, d'impures, d'abominables;
il produira en lui-meme toutes les folies, toutes les reveries, toutes les
saletes, toutes les iniquites du genre humain; il en sera non-seulement la
cause efficiente, mais aussi le sujet passif, le subjectum inhsiteonis; il se joindra
avec elles par l'union la pIus intime qui se puisse concevoir; car c'est une
union penetrative, ou plutöt c'est une vraie identiU ... Ainsi, dans le sys-
teme de Spinoza, tous ceux qui disent "Les Allemands ont tue dix mille
Turcs," parlent maI et faussement il. moins qu'ils n'entendent, "Dieu modi-
fie en Allemands a tue Dieu modifie en dix mille Turcs;" et ainsi toutes les
phrases par lesquelles on exprime ee que font les hommes les uns contre
les autres n'ont point d'autre sens veritable que celui-ci, "Dieu se hait.
lui-meme; il se demande des gräces il. lui-meme, et se les refuse; il se per-
secute, il se tue, il se mange, il se calomnie, il s'envoie sur l'echafaud, etc."
Cela serait moins inconcevable si Spinoza s'etait represente Dieu comme
un assemblage de plusieurs parties distinetes, mais il l'a reduit il. la pIus
parfaite simplicite, il. l'unite de substance, il. l'indivisibilite (Nl IV, 443-
444)·
Any form of monism runs into some of the diffieulties of Spinozism,
and Bayle finds similar philosophies in all eenturies (Plotin I D) and
all areas (Japon 2 D). Followers of Aristotle have eonverted his phi-
losophy into the logie of a universal world spirit (Cesalpin I D, Auer-
roes I E). Diogenes and Thales seem to have held a materialist monism
(Diogene, natif d'Apollonie 2 B, Thales 2 D), and Xenophanes eoneeived
the universe as a mystie oneness. l Even philosophers of the Christian
era such as the Scotists and Giordano Bruno, are basieally Spinozist
in their outlook (Abetard I C, Brunus, Jordanus 2 D). Not all ofthem fall
into every error of the J ewish philosopher's beeause he alone is utterly
systematic in his denial of all divisions and distinetions. The funda-
mental diffieulty of all such systems is that they eannot explain ehange,
motion, or variety (Xenophanes 2 B, Thales 2 D). In order for a single
Being to modify itself into different parts, there must be an aetive and
a passive principle which interaet. Bayle suspeets that one of the reasons
monists rejeet any dualism is their inability to understand how some-
thing ean be ereated from nothing; they prefer the eternity of infinite

1 He maintains this oneness by rejecting as illusory all mutability and change that
experience makes so obvious. This avoids Spinoza's inconsistencies, but it is the purest
kind of Pyrrhonism according to which everything is incomprehensible. Bayle admires the
integrity of the position, but finds the Christian doctrine of the creation better a~le to
account for the variety of facts to be explained. (Xinophanes 1 L - one of the most interesting
remarks in the DHC).
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

matter or spmt to the obscurities involved in creation. But by es-

caping one set of difficulties th ey fall into another (Spinoza 1 0,
Xenophanes n. 35).
At the other extreme of philosophical theories lies the hypothesis
of the atomic structure of matter. It has the great advantage over
Spinozism of explaining the multiplicity of phenomena. Gassendi
had taught the seventeenth century, and with it Bayle, that atoms
provided the best system for understanding corporeal reality (Leucippe 1
D); but the ancient atomic theories suffered severely from their
incapacity to explain sentienee. For the philosopher of Rotterdam
it is utterly inconceivable that a eertain disposition of inanimate
atoms could produce thought (Dicearque e 1, L2, Lellcippe 2 E, Epicllre 1
F). This is tantamount to saying that by moving matter in a eertain
way one can create conseiousness, an idea that no philosopher Bayle
knows of has held. Re uses the illustration of the mechanism of a
watch. The proper positioning of hands and springs and flywheels can
produce a machine of marvelous accuracy. But it is capable only of
motion; and each of its parts, being extended, was always eapable of
motion. A watch eould not be manufactured out of non-extended
parts. The same is true if a thinking being. No assembly of inanimate
parts could produce the capacity to think unIess eaeh part had
that eapacity (Dicearque 2 L). Only the hypothesis that atoms
are animate can save the atomists from serious objections. But
it is an assumption that is exposed to real difficulties, particularly
because thought, as an indivi5ible being, does not suffer parts (Leu-
cippe 2 E). How it can exist in a composite being Bayle eannot see.
"Rien ne me parait fonde sur des idees pIus claires et pIus distinctes
que l'immaterialite de tout ee qui pense" (Jupiter 2 G, 537 r).1 Even
Locke, who belieyes that matter does in fact think, admits that he
cannot understand howand can defend his theory only by saying
that nothing is impossible for God. That may be aceeptable the-
ology, but it is not a philosophical defense at all, and it only gocs
to establish Bayle's point that these matters are ineomprehensible
(Dicearque 2 M).
The ancient atomists did not always make the assumption that
atoms were sentient. They did, however, make two vital assumptions,
that atoms were eternal (Le., uncreated) and endowed with motion.
Although Bayle finds both these assumptions impossible to accept, he
1 Diciarque 2 L gives another clear statement of Bayle's that thought must be distinet
from body.
 THE DICT/ONNAIRE

admits that they are sufficient to explain in a partial way the existence
of the world and of men (if the soul is material) (Jupiter 2 G).

Il n'est pas jusqu'a la folle et extravagante hypothese des epicuriens, qui

n'ait de quoi fabriquer un certain monde. Passez-Ieur une fois les diffe-
rentes figures des atomes avec la force inalienable de se mouvoir selon les
lois de la pesanteur, et de se reprimer les uns les autres, et de reftechir ...
selon qu'ils se choquent ... vous ne sauriez pIus nier que la rencontre
ortuite de ees corpuscules ne puisse former des masses ou il y aura des corps
durs et des corps ftuides ... Tout ee qu'on peut leur nier est que le hasard
puisse produire un assemblage de corps tel que notre monde ou il y ait ta nt de
choses qui perseverent si longtemps dans leur regularite et ta nt de machines
d'animaux mille fois pIus industrieuses que celles de l'art humain, qui
demandent necessairement une direction intelligente (Ovide 2 G III, 2g8 r).

Even given its assumptions, any mechanistic philosophy, such as

Epicurus', still fails in that it does not recognize that the world shows
signs of an order that can only be the resuIt of a functioning intelli-
gence. "Les epithetes de fou, de reveur, de visionnaire, sont dues el
quiconque veut que la rencontre fortuite d'une infinite de corpuscules
ait produit le monde et soit la cause continuelle des generations"
(Leucippe 1 D, Ig8 I). "Absolument parlant, il est tres-vrai que tout
philosophe qui veut donner de bonnes raisons de l'arrangement que
l'on voit dans les parties de l'univers, a besoin de supposer une intelli-
gence qui ait produit ee bel ordre" (Anaxagoras 2 G VIII, 44 I).
Baylc does not name this intelligence God, but it is obvious that he
is thinking of a philosophie concept that is related to the Christian
God, and his intent is to show that any theory of the universe that
leayes out some such intelligent principle is inadequate. The pagan
theories of the demiurge, a God who fashioned the world out of an
already existing eternal matter, seem to him to be a compromise of
the most senseless sort (Epicure 2 S). If the pre-existing matter (or
chaos) was already endowed with motion and with a variety of forms,
then the demiurge is a totally unnecessary being who performs a job
that the matter was capable of un assisted (Ovide 2 G III and Epicure 2
S II). Furthermore, the demiurge is called upon to accomplish the
lesser mirade of shaping matter, when the major questions of how the
matter got there, how it was set in motion, and how it received its
internalorganization have been left unexplained (Anaxagoras 2 G VI).
All in all, it would be more logical if such systems did not
introduce unnecessary elements such as derniurges and relied entirely
 THE DICTIONN AIRE 279

on aset of assumptions about the eternity of matter and motion'!

The result of his survey of unorthodox philosophies is that Bayle
finds them all seriously wanting. Spinozism is utter confusion. Ma-
terialism i'l frequently inconsistent, and always incapable of explaining
the phenomenon of thought, even if it makes the incomprehensible
assumption of animated atoms. It avoids the difficulties inherent in
the mirade of the creation, but only by the gratuitous hypotheses of
the eternity of matter and motion, neither of which is without diffi-
culties. Finally, no matter how complex the primal atoms may have
been, the intricate organisms of the world seem totally inexplicable
without reference to some ordering intelligence. In this regard Bayle
takes particular delight in proving that the most thoroughly materialist
systems have no right to deny the existenee of invisible spirits, both
evi I and good. "Des qu'on nie que l'ame de l'homme soit une
substance distinete de la matiere, on raisonne puerilement si l'on ne
suppose pas que tout l'univers est anime, et qu'il y a partout des
etres particuliers qui pensent, et que comme il y en a qui n'egalent
point les hommes, il y en a aussi qui les surpassent" (Lucrece 1 F, 514l).
As a matter of fact, such spirits are more compatible with an atheistie
philosophy, such as Spinoza's, than with the Christian system because
th ey often appear to be malicious (Spinoza 1 T, Gainites 1 D, Ricius 2 G).
Even Lucretius had to admit that it seemed as if some hidden force
directed human life (Lucrece 1 F).2 Bayle was evidently extremely
attracted to the idea that some form of lower angelie order ("les in-
telligences moyennes") was responsible for mu ch of the functioning
of the universe, perhaps along lines similar to Cartesian oeeasional
causes. 3 This would aeeount for his eoncern to show that any theory,
materialist or dualist, permitted or even required their existence.
Je ne sais ee qui en arrivera; mais il me semble que töt ou tard on sera
contraint d'abandonner les principes mecaniques si on ne leur associe les

1 The whole question of the origin ofmotion is thorny. Bayle sees nothing in the concept
of matter or of an atom that indudes the necessity of motion. Therefore, atomists are forced
to multiply their gratuitous assumptions by incIuding the principle of eternal motion.
Aristotelians are not better off, for they have recourse to the preposterous idea of a substantial
form. According to their theory each soul is the unmoved mover of its body; therefore, there
is no reason why the same could not be true of the souls of the stars and heavens. Cartesian
physics, which Bayle finds sounder on this point, makes God the only source of all movement
<Zabarella, Jacques 2 G).
2 Bayle seems to me to be rnistaken here. If I read Lucretius correctly, the verses Bayle
cites (Book V, 1225-34) are thoughts the Roman poet is imputing to others, but denying
himself.
3 Cf. Belgic Confession, Artide XII, "Et sur ceci nous detestons l'erreur des Sadduciens,
qui nient qu'il y ait des Esprits et des Anges, ... "
280 THE DICTIONNAIRE

volontes de quelques intelligences; et franchement il n'y a point d'hypothese

pIus capable de donner raison des evenemens qu'on appeHe casuels, fortune,
bonheur, malheur; toutes choses qui ont sans doute leurs causes reglees
et determinees par des lois generales que nous ne connaissons pas, mais qui
assez vraisemblablement ne so nt que des causes occasionnelles, semblables
a celles qui font agir notre ame sur notre corps (Plolin 1 G, 175 r).

If the theories of the unorthodox are faced by complexities and

uncertainties, Bayle readily admits that those of the orthodox are no
less incomprehensible. One of the major deficiencies of the mechanistic
systems was their denial of the creation, which involved them in
unwieldy assumptions and inadequate versions of reality. But tbe
creation itself is philosophicaUy as obscure as its alternatives. How
something could be created out of nothing cannot be understood.
How an immaterial Being created matter and was capable of inHuencing
it is no me an riddle (Simonide 2 F). Mechanistic theories have trouble
explaining how thought can exist in material beings. But orthodox
systems have every bit as great difficulty explaining how an immaterial
soul can inHuence a material body. The Peripatetic solution of sub-
stantial forms is mere folderol, making no sense whatsoever. The
Cartesians cannot explain how thought can be located in an extended
body, mu ch less act upon it or be acted upon by it. 1
Philosophy is again at bay concerning two problems of particular
importance for theology: human free will and the immortality of the
soul. On the matter offree will, considered from a purely philosophical
poin~ of view, Bayle has little to say. He implies that a superficial
philosopher would conelude from introspection that man is free; more
profound analysis, however, shows how often the passions enslave
human reason and compel man to act against his convictions and his
interests (Helene 2 V). It was such considerations that made the pagans
regard their deities as aforee majeure that possessed man and overthrew
his liberty. In general, human experience supports the view that man
is enslaved to his passions, that is to say to the machine of his body.
On the other hand, a purely deterministic theory tends to embarrass
its proponents; Spinozists are distressed to have to admit that fatality
required rigidly that Spinoza die in the Hague and not at Leyden
(Chrysippe 2 S). Bayle refuses to accept the famous medieval argument

1 Note that only when criticizing Cartesian theories or mathematics is Bayle directly
attacking the concept of "evidenee." To no other philosophy would he grant that its
principles were self-evident. The Reponse aux questions d'un provincial Part II gives a good list
of the difficulties inherent in orthodox Cartesian philosophy, OD III, 94<>--941.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

ofBuridan's ass, which was supposed to die ofhunger because it could

not choose between two equally inviting bushels of oats (Buridan 1 C).
What little he says shows him of two minds about the proofs ofphiloso-
phy. Revelation, however, has made clear the existence of the free will
despite the dominance of sin (Helene 2 Y).1
On the immortality of the soul, Bayle has more to say. It is a con-
soling doctrine, more capabIe than any other of instilling moraI
behavior in men (Epieure 2 R, Pomponaee 2 H).~ AbsoIutely speaking,
there is no irrefutable philosophie proof of the soul's immortality
(Charron 2 0). Even the existence of spirits co mi ng back from the de ad
would not be a demonstrative proof, for they might have a limited
mortality as spirits (Bonjadius 2 E). Of all the philosophers, only the
Cartesians have a good demonstration; but Gassendi's arguments
against them have shown that to so me people at least the theorems of
the new philosophy are not self-evident (Pomponaee 2 F). Bayle person-
ally is completely persuaded by the Cartesian arguments.. "Pretendre
que puisque l'ame de l'homme pense, eIle est immaterielle, c'est a
mon avis bien raisonner, et c'est d'ailleurs etabIir un fondement tres-
solide de l'immortalite de notre arne, dogme qui doit etre considere
comme l'un des pIus importans articles de la bonn e philosophie"
(Dicearque 2 M, 5I5 r). But he has to admit that the validity of this
pro of is undermined by the other considertaions that make Cartesian
dualism incomprehensible.
In Pyrrhon B Bayle had demonstrated that the articles of faith
suLverted the criterion of self-evidence. A suryey of his philosophie al
discussions shows how he attempts to prove that the principles of
self-evidence break down in mathematical and metaphysical questions
because of the innate obscurity of things. In fact, there is no absurdity
that man has not believed (Cainites 1 art.). Reason may have been given
to guide man on the right path; "mais c'est un instrument vague,
voltigeant, souple, et qu'on tourne de toutes manieres comme une
girouette" (Hipparehia 1 D, I43 l). The example of Uriel Acosta, seven-
teenth-century lawyer, is informative. Born a Catholic in a family
formerly Jewish, his studies led him to abandon the Roman Church
for Judaism, which he deemed more in conformity with reaSOll.
Further reflection resuIted in the dismissal of J ewish dogmas, such
1 In the Nouvelles de la republique des lettres Bayle had found in revelation "la seule bonne
preuve de notre liberte" (OD I, 437 r, Deeember 1685, VIII). See also OD III, 782.
2 Of eourse, the bad eonduet of Christians, who profess to believe in the immortal saul,
and the good eonduet of the Saddueees, who did not belie\'e in it, indieate that like all
persuasions it ean have only the slightest effeet on morals (Sadlldens 2 E).
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

as the immortality of the soul, until he became an advocate of natural

religion. Had he lived a few more years, Bayle comments, he would
probably have renounced eve n natural religion in the name of reason.
His mistake was to take reason as his guide. "L'on peut comparer la
philosophie a des poudres si corrosives, qu'apres avoir consume les
chairs baveuses d'une plaie, ell es rongeraient la chair vive, et carier-
aient les os, et perceraient jusqu'aux moeHes. La philosophie refute
d'abord les erreurs; mais si on ne l'arrete point la, eHe attaque les
verites; et quand on la laisse faire a sa fantaisie, eHe va si loin qu' eHe
ne sait pIus ou eHe est, ni ne trouve pIus ou ~'asseoir" (Acosta 2 E,
19l 1).1 The peculiar quality of reason is that it destroys whatever it
creates, especiaHy when a proposition is foHowed to its logical co ns e-
quences. Even morality, which Bayle had elaimed was universaHy
evident in the Commentaire philosophique, cannot withstand the corrosive
effects of reas on (Hipparehia 1 D). Otherwise, how could one account
for the horrors of casuistry? (Loyola 1 T.) Reason's force is invincible
when it forms objections, like the warrior who can ravage his enemy's
land, but is incapable of defending his own (Arriaga 2 B). "L'esprit de
l'homme est encore pIus fecond en objections qu'en solutions" (Lu-
ereee F, 513 r). "Il semble que Dieu qui en est le distributeur [des
connaissances humaines], agisse en pere commun de toutes les sectes,
c'est-a-dire qu'il ne veuille point souffrir qu'une secte puisse pleinement
triompher des autres, et les abimer sans ressource" (Rorarius 1 G,
605 r). Since reason can establish no certitude that it cannot under-
mint, one must conelude that Bayle's theory approaches complete
Academic skepticism in regard to reason. He preaches the Academic's
akatalepsia, or the incomprehensibility of things, on many occasions.
His attitude toward the Pyrrhonist epocM, or suspension of judgment,
is not so sympathetic.
After demonstrating in Pyrrhon B that Christianity has strengthened
the arguments of the Pyrrhonist~, Bayle evaluates the uses of Pyr-
rhonism in remark C. He begins with a quotation from La Mothe le
Vayer on the beneficial effects of humiliating reason as a preparation
for receiving the word of God. A thorough understanding of the logic
of Sextus Empiricus, "le pIus grand effort de subtilite que l'esprit
humain ait pu faire" (p. 106 I), results not only in doubt, but in
doubting eve n the reasons for doubting.

1 Bayle was fond of this image and used it again in almost exactly the same words in
Euclide 2 E, 318 l.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

Quel ehaos! et quelle gene pour l' esprit! Il semble done que ee malheureux
etat est le pIus propre de tous a nous eonvainere que notre raison est une
voie d'egarement, puisque 10rsqu'eHe se deploie avee le pIus de subtilite
elle no us jette dans un tel abime. La suite naturelle de eela doit etre de
renoneer a ee guide, et d'en demander un meilleur a la cause de toutes
choses. e'est un grand pas vers la religion ehretienne ... Si un homme s'est
convaineu qu'il n'a rien de bon a se promettre de ses discussions philo-
sophiques, il se sentira pIus dispose a prier Dieu, pour lui demander la
persuasion des verites que ron doit croire . .. (p. 106 I).
As great thinkers as Pascal and Calvin have refused to found their
faith on reason in any way. However, Bayle continues, other authori-
ties, such as Vossius and La Placette, consider Pyrrhonism the most
dangerous state of mind. The remark ends with La Mothe le Vayer's
opinion that the Pyrrhonists were not saved because their suspension
of judgment extinguished in them the slightest spark of natural faith.
Although the general theme of the remark is that Pyrrhonism need
not be harmful to religion, Bayle presents both sides of the case.
Significantly, he presents the case against Pyrrhonism last. "Vhenever
Bayle expresses his personal opinion in the Dictionnaire it is usually at
the end of aremark. A particularly illuminating example of this
practice occurs in the preceding remark, Pyrrhon B, where the dis-
cussion concludes with the comments of a "savant theologien." In
a later work Bayle implied clearly that this theologian was his mouth-
piece. 1 The theologian's final thought is interesting, for it presents
one of Bayle's few lapses. "Il conclut qu'il ne fallait point s'amuser a
la Jispute avec des pyrrhoniens, ni s'imaginer que leurs sophismes
puissent etre commodement eludes par les seules forees de la raison,
qu'il faIlait avant toutes choses leur faire sentir l'infirmite de la raison
afin que ee sentiment les porte a recourir a un meilleur guide qui est
la foi" (p. roS r). What does Bayle mean when he says that one must
make Pyrrhonists feel the infirmity of reason? That is certainly
carrying philosophical coals to Newcastle. As has been shown,2 there
are two facets of Pyrrhonism, one that Bayle admires, one that he
rejects. As long as skeptidsm is the critique of natural reason, he agrees
heartily. If, however, it results in complete paralysis of judgment, he
finds it pernidous. This is borne out by the hundreds of times that he
accuses a doctrine of resulting in disastrous Pyrrhonism. 3

1 In the Entretiens de Maxime et de Thimiste (OD IV, 102 I).

2 Supra, pp. 245-246.
3 See Blondel, David 1 0, Hoffman 1 e, Luther 1 ee, Nicolle 1 e, Socin, Fausle 1 I, and supra
pp. 23 2, 233, 234·
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

The antidote to the dangerous form of Pyrrhonism, of course, is

faith in revelation. However much philosophy and theology may
dispute over precedence, final authority must always lie with the
second (Aristate 1 X). For Bayle the doctrine of the "double truth,"
that a proposition can be false in philosophy but true in theology, is an
infraction of the privileges of theology; once something is true in divine
science, it must be true in philosophy (Haffman 1 C, Luther 2 KK).
Nonetheless, a thinker has the right to prov e an artide of faith, such
as the creation, impossible according to the lights of reason as long as
he accepts fully the authority of revelation (AuTtalus 2 C). In a sense
it may be doing religion a service to remove the untrustworthy support
of falladous reasoning. Not to present accurately all the objections ...
reason can propose against a dogma is "une fraude pieuse dont la
verite ne doit pas avoir besoin" (W!clzeI 2 B, 529 r).l

Il ne faut pas que je finisse cette remarque sans observer l'injustice de

certaines gens qui croient que lorsqu'on rejette les raisons qu'ils donnent
d'un dogme, on rejette le dogme meme. Il y a une difference capitale entre
ees deux choses; ceux qui ont de l'equite et un bon esprit ne manquent pas
de les distinguer, et souffrent patiemment, et sans nul mauvais soup<;on,
que l'on combatte la temerite des orthodoxes a l'egard des argumer.s
faibles dont on se sert trop souvent pour soutenir la verite. Ce n'est pas
qu'il ne se puisse commettre bien des abus la-dedans; car, par exemple,
les pyrrhoniens, so us le pretexte de ne combattre que les raisons des dog-
matiques a l'egard de l'existence de Dieu, sapaient effectivement le dogme
meme (Rufin 1 C, 66r l ).

Because the consistory of the Walloon Church of Rotterdam censured

Bayle's remarks on Pyrrhonism, he promised to revise or darifY them
in the second edition. The third of four Eclaircissemens gives his ex-
planation ofhis views. It begins with a dear definition of the preambles
of faith. First, inasmuch as Christianity belongs to the supematural
order based on the authority of God, no Christian may dispute the
right of God's authority or the duty to believe what He ordains.
Two questions of fact are open to dispute: whether Scripture is a
work inspired by God's word and whcther it contains such and such a
dogma. Ifthe debaters cannot agree on the first point, the debate must
cease; for there is no common ground of agreement. There is no argu-
ing with Pyrrhonists who suspend their judgment on all matterso If
they restricted themselves to the ten tropes and to questions of physics,
1 See supTa p. 232 for the same idea in the journal. Chapter XXXIII of the Continuation
des Pensees dit'eTses (1704) gives this idea its longest aed fullest treatment.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

it would be possible to de al with them; but th ey go mu ch further, and

in their discussion of the criterion reject totally the possibility of es-
tablishing any truth. Theologians should not enter such discussions.
Bayle, however, will not admit that he was wrong to deelare that
the Pyrrhonists found new arguments for their doctrine in Christian
mysteries. J esus did not come to the world to favor one sect of philoso-
phers in its disputes. "Son dessein a ete plutat de confondre toute la
philosophie, et d'en faire voir la vanite" (XV, 3r 1 r). "Il avoulu que
comme son Evangile paraissait une folie aux philosophes, la science
de ceux-ci parut a son tour une folie aux chretiens" (XV, 312 l).l
Then follows a string of thirteen quotations from the Bible against
the vanities of knowledge. Faith, the primary theological virtue, must
be distinguished from the other acts of the intelleet.

Son essenee co ns is te a no us attaeher par une forte persuasion aux verites

revelees, et a nous y attacher par le seul motif de l'autorite de Dieu. Ceux
qui eroient par des raisons philosophiques l'immortalite de l'ame sont
orthodoxes, mais jusque-Ia ils n'ont null e part il. la foi dont nous parlons.
11s n'y ont part qu'en tant qu'ils eroient ee dogme il. eause que Dieu nous
l'a revele, et qu'ils soumettent humblement il. la voix de Dieu tout ee que la
philosophie leur presente de pIus plausible pour leur persuader la mortalite
de l'ame. Ainsi le merite de la [oi devient pIus grand a proportion que la
verite revelee qui en est l'objet surpasse toutes les forees de notre esprit
(XV, 318, l).2

The Eclaircissement eloses with supporting opinions from the works of

laymen, ineluding Sir Thomas Browne's Religio Aledici and Saint-
Evremond's Conversation du mareehal d' Hocquincourt avec le pere Canaye,
neither of which, Bayle admits, has seemed devout to all its readerso
Notwithstanding this final sardonic touch, the Eclaircissement is a
totally orthodox description of the qualities of faith and a elear state-
ment of the logical foundations on which it is based.
1 Belgic Confession, Artide XIV, "Qui parlera de sa cognoissance; voyant, que I'homme
sensuel ne comprend point les choses qui sont de l'Esprit de Dieu? Bref, qui mettra en avant
une seule pensee? veu qu'il entend que nous ne sommes pas suffisans de penser que1que chose
de nous mesmes, mais que nostrc sulEsance est de Dieu." .-\Iso from the Synod of Dort,
"Jugemens sur la corruption de I'homme" IV reads "Il est vray qu'apres la cheute est
dcmeure de reste en l'homme quelque lumiere de nature, par le benef1ce de laquelle il
retient encore quelque cognoissance de Dieu et des choses naturelles; il discerne entre ce qui
est honneste et deshonneste, et monstre avoir quelque estude et so in de vertu, et de discipline
exterieure. ~1ais tant s'en faut que par ceste lumiere de nature il puisse parvenir a la
cognoissance salutaire de Dieu et se convertir a luy, que mesmes il n'en use pas droictement
es choses naturelles et civiles ... "
2 Bayle choses the immortality of the soul because it is a dogma common to all Christian
sects and because it is one that could conceivably be demonstrated rationally. Note that his
last remark proyes too much, for it is the best defense possible for transubstantiation.
286 THE DICTIONNAIRE

What of these foundations, the preambles of faith? How do they

fare in the Dictionnaire? As ever with Bayle, the answer is not a simple
one. Among Christians, God's existenee, the first of the preambles,
must be a first prineiple of argument, therefore beyond the range of
discussion. It must be remembered that eve n if philosophy can give
good proofs of the existenee of an infinitely perfect Being, that Being
is not the Christian God, who is known completely only through
revelation. However, as metaphysicians, Christians have the right to
subjeet their first prineiples to examination by the intelleet (Maldo-
nat 1 L). Nowhere does Bayle argue directly that the existence of
God can be absolutely demonstrated. This prudence on his part is in
keeping with the fact that reason by its nature is better ..able to
furnish objeetions to proofs than prove a thesis. The best it can
do is to establish the presumption that a Being similar in many ways
to the revealed God does actually exist. Therefore the encyclopedist
devotes so mueh attention to the inconsistencies and inadequacies of
alternate theories. The sort of consideration that he finds most eon-
vincing for the proof of God, namely the visible signs that an ordered
intelleet runs the universe, has already been mentioned. The intrica-
cies of animal organisms may be best explained by the operation
of unseen intelligences (Archelaus, philosophe grec 1 B). The complex
structure of the universe seems inexplicable through the agency of
merely mechanieal laws (Anaxagoras 2 G VIII, Ovide 2 G III).l
This is all Bayle says about the existence of God. It is decidedly
little, conceivably because he feIt that nothing was to be gained by an
examination of all the difficulties involved in this first principle. He
does not hesitate, however, to discuss at great length the inherent
obscurities in the nature of God. The distinetion between the nature
of God and His existence is a subtle one that may seem sophistic to
many readers, but it is clearly made (Simonide 2, n. 39).2 Remark F of
the artide Simonide repeats the familiar story of the Greek philosopher
who was asked by Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse, to define God. Simonides
asked for a day to think over the matter, then for two days more, and

1 See E. D. James, "Scepticism and Fideism in Bayle's Dictionnaire," French Studies, XVI
(1962), 307-323. This is the most reeent, and in some ways the best, artide on Bayle's
fideism. James feels that the two artides cited above are Bayle's proof of God's existence.
He makes them demonstratc more than Bayle himself does. They are strong presumptions,
not incontrovertible proofs; and what they demonstrate is a supreme Being, not the Christian
God.
2 Bayle's treatment ofmotion is somewhat similar. One cannot define its nature though its
existence is hardly in doubt.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

so forth as he found the answer more and more difficult to give,l The
remark continues with a long summary of the problems that might have
occurred to Simonides. If God is not corporeal, then matter is either
an eternal substance or His creation. If it iii eternal, how does an imma-
terial God exercise control over it? If it is created, no one can have a
clear idea of how such a creation was possible. Granted that God is
an immaterial, unextended, infinitely powerful spirit, is He free or
necessarily determined by His will? Are men free or puppets in His
hands? These are minor difficulties compared to those arising if one
adds that He is good; for if He is, His creation seems deplorably full
of evil and misery. Now, Bayle adds, the humblest Christian artisan
could give Simonides an adequate definition of God by repeating his
catechism; but Simonides would not find the definition clearly
comprehensible. The accident of history has given the artisan an
orthodox faith, perhaps even a sanctifying grace, that makes him
infinitely wiser than the most enlightened pagan philosopher.

Ajoutez meme que Simonide, eonsultant et examinant l'Eeriture sans

l'effieaee ou de l'edueation ou de la graee, ne sortirait pas de son labyrinthe
ni de son silenee. La raison lui defendrait de nier les faits eontenus dans
l'Eeriture, et de ne voir pas quelque ehose de surnaturel dans l'enehaine-
ment de ees faits; mais eela ne suffirait pas a le faire deeider. Les forees de
la raison et de l'examen philosophique ne vont qu'a nous tenir en balanee
et dans la erainte d'erreur, soit que no us affirmions, soit que no us niions.
Il faut, ou que la graee de Dieu, ou que l'edueation de l'enfanee, soient de
la partie. Et prenez garde qu'il n'y a aueune hypothese eontre la quelle la
raison foumisse pIus d'objeetions que eontre eelle de l'Evangile. Le mystere
de la trinite, l'inearnation du verbe, sa mort pour l'expiation de nos peehes,
la propagation du peehe d' Adam, la predestination etemeHe d'un petit
nombre de gens au bonheur du Paradis, l'adjudieation etemeHe de presque
tous les homme s aux suppliees de l'enfer, qui ne finiront jamais, l'extinetion
du frane-arbitre depuis le peehe d'Adam, etc., sont des choses qui eussent
jete Simonide dans de pIus grands doutes que tout ee que son imagination
lui suggera (pp. 295-296).

The remark continues with the fact that no theologian, traditional or

Cartesian, could explain away the difficulties inherent in orthodoxy.
Having started with the obscurities entailed by the philosophie concept
of God, Bayle ends with the single most complete list to be [ound in
the Dictionnaire of the inexplicable articles offaith. At the same time, it
must be admitted that he carefully words his remark in such a way

1 Busson refers to the libertines' eonstant repetition of this aneedote. See Le Rationalisme
dans la littirature de la Renaissance franraise, p. 34.
288 THE DICTIONNAIRE

that the preambles of faith are left intact. God's existence is never
questioned, only the possibility of understanding His nature; and
the divine inspiration of Scripture, Bayle clairns, would be immedi-
ately recognized by Simonides' reason. The remaining questions can
be called incomprehensible mysteries, as the major theologians have
always admitted.
But the illogicalities are so great, so clearly delineated, so persistently
exposed that it has often seemed to the readers of the Dictionnaire that
its author could not possibly have believed in the mysteries. The most
upsetting of all Bayle's analyses is his critique of the problem of evil.
With unflinching clarity he showed how completely unfathomable
God's ways are when measured by the standards of morality and
justice. As he realized himself, this was far more prejudicial to religion
than any demonstration of the complexities of other mysteries because
the principles of morality are obvious to any man (Eclaircissement sur
les manicMens, XV, 293 r). That God's trinitarian nature should violate
the rules of logic is not likely to disturb most people. Ir, however, He
conducts Himself in a way that seems vicious and vengeful, human
faith in Him may well be shaken. There can be no doubt that this
is precisely the effect that certain articles in the Dictionnaire had on
some readerso It is a strong faith that can withstand the arguments of
Pauliciens E; and Bayle's frankness, if not malicious, is at least im-
prudent.
Bayle could, and did, maintain that nothing he wrote was against
Calvinist faith and that most of what he said was orthodox for any
Christian sect. Saint Paul, Saint Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and
myriads of other theologians had seen that God's justice is a mystery.l
Calvinists in particular were constantly accused of making God the
author of sin. In so me of his works, Jurieu is no less clear than Bayle
on the impossibility of explaining the existence of evil. 2
There is no need to review in its entirety Bayle's commentary on
this matter. 3 The Dictionnaire does not advocate :Nfanichrean dualism,
1 Luther had written, "Now the highest degree of faith is to believe that He is mereiful,
though He saves so few and damns so many; to believe that He is just, though of His own
will He makes us perforee proper subjects for damnation, and seems (in Erasmus' words)
'to delight in the torments ofpoor wretches and to be a fitter object for hate than for love.'
If I could by any means understand how this same God, who makes such a show of wrath
and unrighteousness, can yet be mereiful andjust, there would be no need for faith. But as it is,
the impossibility of understanding makes room for the exercise of faith," On the Bondage of the
Will, trans.J. I. Packer and O. R.Johnston (Westwood, l'\ew Jersey: Fleming H. Revell Co.,
1957), p. 102.
2 Bayle refers to this in Pauliciens 1 F.
3 Adequate accounts can be found in Delvolve and Robinson. Interestingly enough,
 THE DICTIONNAIRE 28 9

which Bayle finds full of inadequacies. For example, its admission of

more than one God is no different in essence from the atomic theory
of an infinity of independent Beings, and is therefore subject to all
the difficulties ofatomism (Ecclaircissement sur les manichiens, XV, 305 rl.
Contrary to any dualist system, a priori reasoning based on the idea
of order favors the prineiple of one God (1vlanichiens 1 D). Moreover,
the theory of occasional causes supplies an adequate explanation of
all physical phenomena, apart from man. 1 It is human experience that
raises difficulties, for it testifies only too undeniably to the existence of
evil. In fact, eviIs, both physicaI and moraI, predominate over good
in this life (Xenophanes 1 E, F). That an infinitely powerfuI Being could
all ow them to exist does not seem compatible with His goodness.
"L'auteur de notre etre, s'iI est infiniment bienfaisant, se doit faire
un plaisir continuel de nous rendre heureux et de prevenir tout ce
qui pourrait troubler ou diminuer notre joie" (Pauliciens 1 E, 481 rl.
Manichiens D makes it quite clear that a sound theory must be able
to satisfy the tests of both reason and experience (p. 195 r). And in an
imaginary debate Bayle has Zoroaster claim that the principal quality
of a good system is its interpretation of experience. The encyclopedist
himself admits no more than that the orthodox position has the upper
hand where pure reason is concerned, but loses whcre experience is
concerned.
Looking at the matter from a different standpoint, he says that
Christians have an explanation for the existence of evil. Revelation
teac!1es them that physical and moral ills are God's punishment for
the fall of man; therefore, no theologian need be embarrassed by their
existence (Lucrece Fl, H2, Chrysippe 2 T). "Le dogme que les mani-
cheens attaquent doit etre considere par les orthodoxes comme une
verite de fait revelee clairement" (Pauliciens 2 M, 508 l). But what
reason can never make clear to Christians is the origin of evil. According
to the Dictionnaire, God's actions in the drama of the Garden of Eden
appear totally indefensible when measured by any rational moral
standards; and any philosophical school attempting to exculpate Him
from the accusation that He is the author of evil is bound to fail.
Bayle was to devote many pages to proving this thesis; and in his last

Robinson places this subject in a chapter entitled "Scepticism," which he seems to confuse
with lack of piety. Bayle himself gives one of the best summaries in chapter CXLIV of the
Riponse aux questions d'un provineial, where he lists seven theolagieal truths and nineteen
philosophical propositions that conflict with them.
1 Note that this is Descartes's usage of occasional causes in nature, not Malebranche's
doctrine of grace.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

work, the Entretiens de Maxime et Thimiste, he admits that as far as he

knows, his analysis of the fall of man was an original one without
precedent (OD IV, 51 l).
Theologians have offered many theories to account for original sin,
each of which Bayle rejects. Some say that God permitted sin to exist
in order to manifest His wisdom or His mercy. His conduct then
resembles that of a father who breaks his child's leg in order to show
how well he can set it. Others contend that the gift of free will would
have been meaningless if man could not have used it badly. But God
could have given man a free willIike the angels' which does not sin.
A faulty gift is no gift at all.
Il n'y a point de bonne mere qui, ayant permis a ses filles d'aller au bal,
ne revoquat cette permission si elle etait assuree qu'elles y succomberaient
a la fIeurette et qu'elles y laisseraient leur virginite; et toute mere qui,
sachant certainement que eela ne manquerait point d'arriver, les laisserait
aller au bal, apres s'etre contentee de les exhorter a la sagesse et de les
menacer de sa disgrace si elles revenaient femmes, s'attirerait pour le moins
le juste blame de n'avoir aime ni ses filIes, ni la chastete. Elle aurait beau
dire pour sa justification qu'elle n'avoit point voulu donner quelque atteinte
a la liberte de ses filles, ni leur temoigner de la defiance; on lui repondrait
que ee grand menagement etait fort maI entendu et sentait plutöt une
maratre irritee qu'une mere (Pauliciens 1 E, 485 r).

Furthermore, it is generally agreed by theologians that man's will is

not entirely free, and that God in fact willed that man sin. The So-
cinians argue that God did not know infallibly that man would sin.
The example of the young girl at the ball would have to be slightly
altered.
Une mere qui laisserait aller ses filles au bal, lorsqu'elle saurait tres-cer-
tainement qu'elles y courraient un grand risque par rapport a leur honneur,
temoignerait qu'elle n'aime ni ses filles, ni la chastete; et si l'on suppose
qu'elle a un preservatif infaillible contre toutes les tentations et qu'elle ne
le donne point a ses filles en les envoyant au bal, on connait avec la derniere
evidence qu'elle est coupable, et qu'elle se soucie peu que ses filles gardent
leur virginite. Poussons la comparison un peu pIus loin. Si cette mere allait
a ee bal, et si par une fenetre eIle voyait et eHe entendait l'une de ses filles
se defendant faiblement dans le coin d'un cabinet contre les demandes d'un
jeune galant, si lors meme qu'eHe verrait que sa fiHe n'aurait pIus qu'un
pas a faire pour acquiescer aux desirs du tentateur, eHe n'allait pas la
secourir et la delivrer du piege, ne dirait-on pas avec raison qu'eHe agirait
comme une crueIle maratre ... ? (pp. 487-488.)
Let the Socinians learn from this not to reason about the incompre-
hensible. "Il vaut mieux croire et se taire" (p. 485 r). Bayle does not
 THE DICTIONNAIRE 29 I

add in this artide that the mother who allows her daughter to sin the n
punishes her with a lifetime of misery and perhaps also with etemal
damnation. In the artide Origene, replying to Le Clerc's attempts to
answer the reasoning of the first edition of the Dictionnaire, he shows
with characteristic force howetemal damnation is irreconcilable with
our ideas of justice.
The worst solution reduces God's goodness, as Jurieu does by
implication (Pauliciens 1 I) ; for if there is any quality that a sovereignly
perfect Being dearly has it is goodness. Bayle's constant theme,
directed particularly against the Socinians, is that Christianity sur-
passes any rational understanding. The best answer is Saint Paul's.

Ce grand apotre, inspif(~ de Dieu et immediatement dirige par le Saint-

Esprit dans tout ee qu'il eerivait, se proposa l'objeetion que les lumieres
naturelles peuvent former eontre la doetrine de la predestination absolue;
il eomprit toute la foree de l'objeetion; il la rapporta sans l'affaiblir le moins
du monde. "Dieu a eompassion de eelui qu'il veut, et il endureit eelui qu'il
veut." Voila le dogme de saint Paul, et voiei la diffieulte qu'il se proposa.
"Or tu me diras, pourquoi se plaint-il en co re ; ear qui est eelui qui peut
resister a sa volonte?" On ne saurait pousser pIus loin eette objeetion; vingt
pages entieres des pIus subtils molinistes n'en diraient pas davantage. Que
pourraient-elles conclure, sinon que, dans l'hypothese de Calvin, Dieu veut
que les hommes peehent? Or e'est justement ee que saint Paul a reeonnu
qu'on lui pouvait objeeter. Mais que repond-il? Cherehe-t-il des distinetions
et des adoueissements? nie-t-il le fait? ... Rien de tout eela, il n'emploie
que la souveraine puissanee de Dieu, et le droit supreme qu'a le Createur
de disposer de ses Creatures eomme bon lui semble. ... Il reeonnai! la
une ineomprehensibilite qui doit arreter toutes les disputes et imposer un
profond silenee a notre raison (Arminius 1 E, 387 I).

God's judgment of mankind depends on the account of the first sin

in Scripture. What does Bayle say about the veracity and authority of the
Bible? The cardinal principle that God cannot deceive, which seemed
inviolable to Descartes, had come under some criticism. Remark B of
the artide Rimini points out the disagreement between the Cartesian
position and the one maintained centuries earlier by Gregory of
Rirnini. Rimini, who is mentioned in the Second Objections to the
Meditations, had cited the unfulfilled prophecy that Nineveh would
perish in forty days and the fact that God hardened Pharaoh's heart
as examples in Scripture of deceptions on the part of the divine Being.!

1 For Bayle's earlier mention of the Pharaoh incident, see supra, p. 2 I9, note 3, Remember
also that in Pyrrhon B he excludes God's veracityas aguarantee of any knowledge based on
the senses.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

Descartes responded that God could utter untruths without malice as

a doctor or father may be forced to deceive for the good of his patient
or child. This contention, according to Bayle, does not resolve the
difficulty and permits a skeptic to claim that any statement in the
Bible could be a well-intentioned deception. Had Descartes only been
more familiar with Biblical interpretation, he would not have retreated
so quickly before his opponent's attack. l He would have insisted more
on the fact that the prophets had to speak humanly if they were to
make the sublimities of divine truth accessible to the popular mind.
When the Bible says that God repents, is angry, desires to find out if
something has happened, and the like, it is descending to the level
where common men can understand it. "Il fallait dire constamment et
invariablement que les passages de l'Ecriture qui affirment que Dieu
trompe quelquefois ne doivent jamais etre entendus litteralement, et
qu'ils doivent etre expliques comme ceux qui lui attribuent le repentir
ou quelque autre qualite humaine" (Rimini 2 B, 535 r). Bayle does not
push his discussion further in order to show on precisely what basis one
determines which passages are anthropomorphisms and which are
genuine, literal truths, but gives a hint of his thought. "Souvenons-
nous que si l'Ecriture represente Dieu tres-souvent sous des idees
populaires, et par consequent tres-fausses, afin de s'accommoder a
la portee des esprits a qui Dieu a destine la revelation, eIle nous fournit
ailleurs le correctif dont on peut avoir besoin, je veux dire la descrip-
tion de l'Etre infini dans sa majeste immuable et infiniment parfaite"
(p. 536 I). Scripture itself provides the criterion for the rejection of
certain literal interpretations of the Bible. 2 The concurrence of reason
is onlyone consideration that gives preference to the more exalted
passages. This is not to say that reason takes precedence over the
Bible, but that it resolves apparent inconsistencies in the text. 3
The Dictionnaire devotes only a few articles to Biblical figures. The
1 Bayle implies that it is the philosophical approach to Scripture that is the root of
Deseartes's diffieulties. "Disons aussi en passant qu'il y a eertains faits et eertaines phrases
qui d6nonteront toujours les machines des pIus grands metaphysiciens" (Rimini 2 B, 535 I).
2 For the same idea in the Critique geniraie, see OD II, 71 I.
3 Samblan;ai, Guillaume 1 B eonsiders the very speeial case where the precepts of Seripture
and its historieal examples seem to lead to two different conclusjons. It is a matter of the
legitimate obedience owed to sovereign powers, on which Bayle had previously written that
Seripture eould appear unclear (OD I, 86 r,july 1684, III). "Quand on emploie l'eeriture
a soutenir le pour et le eontre, le vrai moyen de se tirer des embarras ou notre raisan se confond,
e'est d'implorer humblement les lumieres du Saint-Esprit" (p. 71 l - italies mine). When
both reason and Seripture are at aloss, prayer is the only resort; but Bayle sees the danger
of this, for eaeh man will say that he has eonsulted the Holy Ghost and then eome to the
eonclusion that his interest dictates. The history of the religious wars bears out only too
clearly the truth of this.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE 293

publication in 1693 of the Dictionnaire de la Bible by Herve(?) Richard

Simon (not the Jesuit ex~gete) and the announcement of other works
of a similar nature made Bayle abandon his original project of com-
posing an artide on each of the major figures of Scripture. But he had
already prepared several groups of artides centered around the first
family (Abel, Adam, Gain, Eve, Lamech) and the patriarch Abraham
(Abimelech, Abraham, Agar - Hagar -, and Sara), many of which be-
longed to the first part of the alphabet.! They were composed when
Bayle stilI intended to confine his Dictionnaire largely to a list of errors
committed in other works, hence the number of fantastic, eve n scurril-
ous, rabbinical traditions recounted in the notes. 2 They have often
been criticized for the lack of respect they show to the figures of the
Hebraic religion. Here are the opening words of the artide Gain:

CAIN, fils aine d'Adam et d'Eve, fut laboureur. Il offrit a Dieu les fruits
de la terre; pendant que son frere Abel, qui etait berger, lui offrit des
premiers-nes de sa bergerie. Dieu agrea les offrandes d' Abel et ne fit nul eas
de celles de Cain; de quo i eelui-ei fut si outre que, sans avoir egard a la
remonstranee que Dieu lui fit, il tua son frere. L'arret que Dieu prononc;:a
contre lui le eondamna au banissement, et a une vie vagabonde, ee qui lui
fit avoir peur que quiconque le trouverait ne le tu at. Mais, pour calmer
cette crainte, Dieu eut la bonte de lui donner une marque qui devait
empeeher que ceux qui le trouveraient ne le tuassent. Cain se retira au pays
de Nod vers l'orient d'Eden et batit une ville a laqueIle il fit porter le nom
de son fils Henoe. Voila tout ee que l'on peut dir e de eertain sur son chapitre,
n'y ayant que eela pour lui dans le livre de la Genese.

The objectivity, appropriate in a historical works, seems scandalous to

manyears.
In the remarks on these words Bayle makes the most of the exe-
getical principle that the Holy Spirit speaks in terms understandable to
humans. He raises the perplexing question who Gain was afraid would
kill him. Not members of his family, because families do not behave
that way. Besides, Gain says he fears "whoever finds me," thereby
indicating that he belieyes that the rest of the world was inhabited.
Did he forget what his father had tol d him about the creation of
mankind? Surely the earth had not been populated so rapidly, eve n
if Gain was older than the thirty-four some commentaries give him at

1 There are not very many other Biblical artieles: among the more interesting are Cham,
David, Saint Jean (the Evangelist), Job, Jonas, Judith, and Marie (Miriam the prophetess).
2 See the elose of the artiele Abel. Abraham and its remarks conforms dosely to this pattemo
On the other hand, the notorious artide David does not belong to this category.
294 THE DICTlONNAIRE

the time. Further, the Lord does not teil Gain that he need have
no fear of foreigners because non e exist; instead he gives Gain a mark
that will proteet him. He remedies Gain's fear without disabusing him
of his ignorance. But then the Lord adapted Himselfto the weaknesses
of men in those days, so much so that it seems as if they regarded Him
as simply another human. What Bayle says is all based on the as-
sumption of the literal truth of the words of Genesis, and nothing he
says is contrary to the spirit of many Biblical commentators. The
difficulties of the narratives of both Testaments had been exposed and
discussed time and again. He nowhere states that the text of Genesis is
untrue, only that it is obscure. 1 But the obscuritics he exposes are
striking.
Other artieles contain comments that bear more directly on the
unreliability of detail in Old Testament texts. Akiba B mentions the
well-known fact that the chronologies of the Septuagint and the
Masoretic texts differ considerably. Lamech G deals with a particularly
obscure verse which is translated in the future tense by the Geneva
Bible, in the past tense by the Vulgate, and in the conditional by some
scholars. What is worse is that even if the correet tense could be
determined, the meaning of the passage remains undecipherable.
Agar H takes up the question of Ishmael's age when he and Hagar
were driven out of Abraham's home. She carried him on her shoulders,
but it seems elear from other details that he was at the very least sixteen
years old. Bayle suggests that perhaps children grew up more slowly in
tho~e days when they lived so long and when Isaac was not weaned
until he was five. Since it was accepted that not every word ofScripture
was exact and that copyists' errors had crept in, these facts, while
troublesome, were not as scandalous as the more audacious criticisms
of a Jean Le Glere, who doubted the literal accuracy of the tradition
that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch.
What upset Bayle's coreligionists most was his criticism of the mo rai
conduct of the heroes of the Old Testament, particularly David (who,
it must be remembered, was regarded as the author of the Psalms,
hence as inspired by the divine spirit). When he rewrote the artiele
on David, the onlyone he reformed, he felt free to leave the following
remark, "Si une narration comme celle-ci se trouvait dans Thucydide
ou dans Tite-Live, tous les critiques coneluraient unanimement que
les copistes auraient transpose les pages, oublie quelque chose en un

1 Gf. Bayle's comments on the brevity of Mosaic history, supra p. 235.

 THE DICTIONNAIRE 295

lieu, repete quelque ehose dans un autre, ou insere des moreeaux

postiches dans l'ouvrage de l'auteur. Mais il faut bien se garder de
pareils soup<;ons lorsqu'il s'agit de la Bible" (David Cl, D2, 404 r).
On the other hand, he did remove these sentenees from the body
(not the remarks) of the original artiele:
Il y a une autre ehose qui n' est pas moins admirable dans sa eonduite:
e'est de voir qu'il ait su mettre si heureusement d'aeeord ta nt de pit~te avee
les maximes rebkhees de l'art de regner. On eroit ordinairement que son
adulre:re avee Betsabee, le meurtre d'Urie, le denombrement du peuple,
sont les seules fautes qu'on puisse lui reproeher; e'est un grand abus; il y a
bien d'autres choses a reprendre dans sa vie ... il n'est pas jusqu'a ses
dernieres paroles ou l'on ne trouve les obliquites de la POLlTIQUE. L'Eeriture
Sainte ne les rapporte qu'historiquement; e'est pourquoi il est permis a
ehaeun d' en juger (p. 409 l).1

In keeping with his general proelivity to place moral values before

other religious eonsiderations, Bayle protested that Christians must
proteet themselves from the aeeusation that their faith eondones
injustiees by its exeessive respeet for Old Testament figures. 2
In addition to his refleetions on the aeeuraey or eompleteness of
Seriptural texts and his eommentary on the morality of the Rebraie
heroes, Bayle makes a few remarks on the miraeles reeounted in the
Bible. Re seems eoneerned with the dangers of disputing over them.
Saint Augustine, he notes, had argu ed wisely that a Christian must
accept all God's miraeles or none, that to believe in the resurreetion,
but not in the reseue of Jonah, is illogieal beeause th ey are both
founded on the veracity of revelation. When pagans argue against
Christians, or Protestants against Catholies, in order to east aspersions
on aeeounts of miraeles, their partisan prejudiees drive them to
exeesses. They put themselves in an awkward position; for when th ey
eome to defend the miraeles they do believe in, their own arguments
ean be turned against them. Bayle coneludes, "Si l'on ne pouvait
eviter eela qu'en se depouillant de prejuges, le remede serait peut-
etre pire que le maI" (Jonas 2 B, 389 r), meaning that total ineredulity
would be worse than partisan faith, perhaps.
1 By one of those reversals in historieal perspective, these passages, so shocking in their
own day, do not disturb moderns. "Valter E. Rex gives a provocative interpretation of this
famous artide in "Pierre Bayle: The Theology and Politics of the Artide on David,"
Bibliotheque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, XXIV (1962), 168-189, XXV (1963), 366-4°3. He
notes that David was both a prophesier and a theocrat, two of the roles Bayle most frequently
condemned in Jurieu.
2 Sara D aeeuses Abraham oflying. (The whole artide is one of the least respeetful of all
the Biblieal artides.)
296 THE DICTIONNAIRE

Remark B of Phaselis compares the mirade of the crossing of the

Red Sea with a similar inddent told about Alexander, Bayle establishes
first that the story of the Greek conqueror is apocryphal, and second,
thatif it were true, it could be explained by natural causes. Ad-
monishing Josephus for comparing the two events, he points out that
the Mosaic narrative contains purely miraculous elements - that
Moses raised his hand to command the sea to separate and that it
divided leaving a wall of water on both sides of the host of Israel.
Thus, while professing to revere Old Testament mirades, he allows
himself to compare them in detail with the legends of the pagans.
It must be noted that on the whole Bayle is quite cautious in what
he has to say about the Bible. There is almost nothing at all about the
New Testament.! This reticenee is somewhat surprising when one
remembers that he had not hesitated to speak of exegetical snares in
his letters to his family and in his journal. His stand in the Dictionnaire
is that the Bible's accuracy, except in minute details, cannot be chal-
lenged. He deplores any diminution of its literal truth beyond the
admission that some phrases are figurative. He quotes with approval
the Protestant minister Saurin and Jansenist authorities, who had
condemned a thesis advanced by both Jurieu and the Jesuit father
Jean Adam (Adam, Jean 1 E). They held that sometimes canonical
a.uthors expressed themselves in hyperboles that derived from their
human shortcomings, and not from divine inspiration. This, according
to Bayle, is the kind of idea that appeals to people "d' une imagination
si ardente qu'ils ne rapportentjamais sans l'outrer ee qu'on leur a dit"
(p. 213 r), that is, theJurieus of this world. 2 On the whole, Bayle seems
to feel that it is safer to attempt to make sense out of Holy Writ than
to doubt the inspiration of anything it says. When considering the
1 AlabasteT 1 A summanzes a dispute between Catholics on how to reconcile Matthew's
statement that Christ remained in Hell three days and nights with the chronology of the
resurrection. Roy 2 C mentions that the apostles had been inaccurate in their expectation
that the second coming was iuuninent. Reihing 1 D discusses a passage of Saint Paul's in
which the dear meaning of the apostle could be misread by a grammatical purist. And that
is all. The articles on the evangelist John and on Joachim (the reputed father of Mary)
have no bearing on matters of faith. I cannot agree with Robinson that the artides on
Apollonius of Tyana and Apuleius constitute in any way an indirect disparagement of
Christ's miracles: Bayle the Sceptic, pp. 173-174.
2 Robinson quotes this passage, implying that Bayle actually means it to apply to
Scriptural authors: Bayle the Sceptic, p. 161. This is a gross misreadingo He goes on to say,
"Bayle so carefully guarded the assumption that Scriptural authors are like other authors
that his own position could only be inferred. Yet the inference was not hard to draw." (Note
the tacit adrnission that nothing in DHC directly challenges the divinity of Scripture.) I
leave it to Robinson to draw inferences. No matter what his own personal faith may have
been, I cannot conceive Bayle suggesting that the authors of canon resembled Jurieu. That is
the lowest insuIt in his vocabulary.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE 297

Bible, he holds in abeyanee his fully developed technique of historieal

eritieism; his moral judgment, however, remains independent and is
allowed to eensure Biblieal eharaeters, but then only when Seripture
itself is silent. Bayle's insistenee on the most literal aeceptance of sacred
text exposed him to many difficulties, ones that he did not hide; but
he probably thought that any other stand was far more dangerous.
The erucial question is the divine inspiration of Seripture and
whether it ean be proven by reason. In remark F of Beaulieu Bayle
clarifies the Protestant position with which he seems to side. Beaulieu,
his disciple J urieu, and Saurin appear on the surfaee to disagree;
but Bayle argu es that in faet they all espouse the same doctrine, thou gh
in somewhat different words. This doetrine is that there are different
sorts of certitude: mathematical self-evidenee, that is to say proofs
that exclude the possibility that the opposite could be true, and moral
eertitude, "une demonstration morale eontre laquelle il n'y ait que la
ehair et le sang qui puissent former des objeetions" (Beaulieu 2 F,
226 r).l The divinity of the Bible can be demonstrated only by amoraI
eertitude, that is to say, one that leayes open the possibility that the
opposite could be true. An illustration of such eertainty would be the
confidenee with which a traveler eats a me al in a tavern. Although it is
possible that the me al has been poisoned, the traveler's assuranee that
it has not is complete. "Il ne faut donc pas critiquer un theologien qui
assur e que nous sommes parfaitement eonvaineus de la veri te des
doetrines que nos pasteurs nous annoneent, quoique les raisons sur
quui ils l'appuient ne no us fassent pas eonnaitre qu'il est impossible
que la chose soit autrement" (p. 226 r). These moral eertainties know
degrees of firmness "depuis une grande probabilite jusques a une tres-
grande probabilite (p. 227 r). Reason, then when unhampered by
passion or prejudice, ean demonstrate truths that are so probable
(though not self-evident) that they eonfer amoraI eertainty.2 In the
final paragraph of the remark Bayle asks why Porphyry's attack on
Christianity did not deny the facts alleged by the apostles in the New
Testament. Wasn't it because reasons stronger than any objeetions he
eould raise eonvineed him ofScripture's authority? "Je ne decide rien;
il me suffira de dir e que la chair et le sang rendent quelquefois les

1 As he makes clear later in the remark, by flesh and blood Bayle means passion and
prejudice.
2 It is in this note that Bayle argues that obvious historical facts enjoy the greater degree
of "evidence" conveyed by at least physical, perhaps metaphysical, demonstrations. The
point is not that historical truths are more certain than the divinity of the Bible, simply that
different branches ofknowledge have different kinds of certainty.
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

armes et se soumettent a une clarte qui ne leur plait point" (p. 228 r).
Porphyry's silence seems to me an that the certitude conferred by the
Bible belongs to the ranks of the very highest probability. Bayle and
the leading Protestants of his day defended the inspiration of Holy
Writ by rational arguments; but they did not claim to be able to
prove their points on self-evident principles. In matters of conscience
they relied on moral certitude, a middle way which provided as-
surance without "evidence."
The drawback of moral certitude is that it can be undermined by
"la chair et le sang," hence all the disputes about what Scripture
actually says. "Il serait a souhaiter que nous eussions une regle gene-
raIe pour discerner les objections qui ne procedent que de la chair
et du sang; car chaque secte chretienne attribue a ce principe les
objections que lui font les autres" (p. 228 l).l Each side is persuaded
that its own positions are reasonable and that its opponents are blinded
by passions and prejudices. How decide such controversies? Bayle has
no answer to this question. His repeated declarations elsewhere in
his works clearly indicate two things. First, no Christian, not even a
Socinian, can legitimately claim that his dogmas are capable of a
purely rational demonstration. Secondly, given this restriction, it is
still true, as Protestants maintain, that the only possible foundation of
orthodoxy is the rational examination of Scripture by each individual
conscience - unIess, of course, one has grace.
On the question of the criterion offaith, Bayle repeats substantially
what he had written in earlier works. 2 In his opinion it would have
been better if the whole matter had not been brought out into the open
by the controversies between Nicole and Pellisson on the Catholic side,
and J urieu, Claude, and others on the reformed side. The Protestant
answers to Nicole's works had shown that "la voie de l'autorite ...
est le grand chemin du pyrrhonisme" (Nicolle 1 C, 142 r). On the
other hand, Pellisson and Papin (both former Protestants) and the
author of the Commentaire philosophique had composed books showing
the "difficultes insurmontables de la voie d'examen" (p. 143 l).

1 Saduciens 2 G (p. 26 l) gives a very interesting example of the sort of truth made clear by
Scripture, yet denied by some Christians. "Chose pIus surprenante: beaucoup de chretiens
sans cesser de reconnaitre la divinite de l'Ecriture se moquent de la magie, et soutiennent
que les demons n'ont aucun pouvoir."
2 See supra pp. 223-224, 232-234. Amauld, Antoine 2 R argues that authority is divided on
major issues; Hemmingius 2 C, that Papal bulls require interpretation so that every curate
must be infallible; Launoi, Jean de 2 Q, that many ceremonies accepted on tradition are
unchristian.
 THE DICTlONNAIRE 299

Many have claimed that these disputes do great harm to religion,

for the proofs on both sides are so eonvincing that neither reason nor
authority seems to be a sound criterion offaith. "Il est a craindre qu'il
ne s'eleve un tiers parti, qui enseignera que les hommes ne sont
conduits a la vraie religion ni par la voie de l'autorite ni par la voie
de l'examen, mais les uns par l'edueation et les autres par la grace.
L'education, sans la grace et sans l'examen, persuade simplement.
La gräce avec l'edueation, et quelquefois sans l'education et sans
examen, ou avee un examen supemeiel, persuade salutairement....
Que l'examen soit facile, ou du moins possible, qu'il soit malaise ou
meme impossible, une chose est tres-eertaine, c'est que personne ne
s'en sert" (Pellisson 1 D, 527-528). Bayle specifically disavows this
position in a footnote; nonetheless, it comes very close to his own
belief. Re had always supported the legitimacy of the "voie d'ex-
amen"; at the same time, he was convinced that passions die ta te d a
large part of theological controversies. If he does not believe that no
one practices a scrupulously honest examination of the articles offaith,
he certainly believes that almost no one does. 1
In summary then, the debates concerning the criterion offaith lead
to the conclusion that orthodoxy is very difficult to attain. Reason is
not totally reliable in matters of moral certitude, for passion or
prejudice may blind it. And grace, which is reliable, is impossible to
identitY surely. Finallyone must not forget that the rest of Bayle's
works make it overwhelmingly clear that both reason and grace are
ral'ely to be found among men. Therefore, in a discussion with an
unorthodox believer, all that one can do is pray for him and try to
persuade him "par les voies d'une instruction moderee" that his
opinion has le ss probability than one's own.
The crucial word her e is probability. Bayle never really analyzes
what are the criteria of probability, but it is a concept that recurs
whenever he discusses the "voie d'examen." It is also central to the
idea of moral certitude, on which he bases the divinity of Scripture.
In fact, the little he says unequivocally about each of the preambles of
faith amounts to stating that very good reasons ean be found to support
them even if others, less valid, have been presented against them. They

1 In the artide itself Bayle had written, "je dirai par oecasion qu'il y a des gens qui
trouvent fort vraisemblable que presque personne ne se sert jamais de la voie de l'examen
proprement dit, quoiqu'on en parle beaueoup.Je ne sais si l'on ne pourrait pas assurer que
les obstades d'un bon examen ne viennent pas tant de ee que I'esprit est vide de seienee que
de ee qu'il est plein de prejuges" (p. 524 r).
300 THE DIGTIONNAIRE

are very highly probable. l Bayle cannot therefore be properly called

a fideist. The technical term for his position is semi-fideism.
A case can even be made out that he is not a skeptic. Antoine
Adam concludes flatly, "Il n'etait pas sceptique." 2 Paul Hazard,
likewise, refuses to call Bayle a pure skeptic on the grounds that his
hatred of error and injustice surpassed his doubts. "Allait-il jusqu'au
scepticisme absolu? Il y serait alle, s'il avait cede a la pente naturelle
de son esprit '" Mais il a resiste." 3 To assert that the Protestant
refugee in Holland became totally Pyrrhonist as his thought evolved
would be to distort the complexity of his ideas, but it would be no less
a distortion to deny him the name of skeptic. He is not the first
skeptic who has sought refuge in the idea of probability (e.g.,
Carneades), and it would be wrong not to give him credit for the
originality and profundity of his analysis of self-evidence in the Die-
tionnaire. A philosopher who works to destroy the predominant cri-
terion of truth must be called a skeptic.
Skeptics are in a touchy situation when th ey defend probabilities.
Mter devoting so much effort to showing that the truth cannot be
recognized, they then say that it can be approximated in some way
or other. But if an absolute standard is lacking, how can a relative
one be available? 4 Bayle's answer would seem to be that one must first
determine which arguments are appropriate to prove a point, then
evaluate them with the utmost caution and awareness of their conse-
quences. When all the evidence leads to one conclusion, it is virtually
a certitude. When the great majority is on one side, one mayaccept
that side as probable, provided that one's persuasion is subject to
change. In philosophy, reason's destructive force is so great that Bayle
would seem to believe that one is always forced to choose the lesser
of two improbabilities. Note that his most frequent argument is that
things become incomprehensible beyond a certain point. The fault

1 Even more so, specific dogmas can be only probable. "Car apres tout, dans les
matieres contestees entre les Chretiens, personne ne fait monter ses preuves jusqu'a l'evidence
Metaphisique ou Geometrique; elles demeurent donc toujours dans le rang des propositions
probabIes" (OD II, 522 r - Suppiirnent du Gommentaire philosophique).
2 Histoire de la littlraturejranfaise au XVI/ime sieele, V, 248. Not all of Adam's evidence in
support of his statement proyes his point. Bayle places the demands of conscience above
those of reason. True, but not necessarily incompatible with skepticism, depending on one's
definition of conscience. And above the rights of conscience Bayle places the rights of the
state. Again true, but skeptics up until Bayle's time had been politically conservative almost
to a man.
a La Gme de la conscience europlenne (1680-1715), p. II5.
4 Montaigne rejected the "vraisemblable" because the "vrai" could not be known (II: xii,
544'1)·
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

lies in part with reason, but in part with the nature of things. This
leayes open the possibility that some things are relatively clearo Bayle
himself uses various techniques to weaken the position of absolute
skepticism. In philosophy itself, the cogito is stronger than any Pyr-
rhonist argument. Furthermore, by erecting different standard s of
exactitude for different branches of knowledge Bayle seeks to avoid
many Pyrrhonist objections. There are first of all the self-evident
propositions of abstract reasoning. These can grant the greatest degree
of certainty; and yet, paradoxically, it is here that the Pyrrhonists are
often at their strongest. Even in its home grounds, mathematics, self-
evidence produces some strange contradictions. Still there are ways of
ranking self-evidence according to probability.

Il faut savoir que toutes les propositions qu'on nomme prineipes, ne sont
pas egalement evidentes. Il y en a qu'on ne prouve point, paree qu'elles
sont, ou aussi claires, ou pIus claires que to us les moyens dont on se voudrait
servir pour les prouver. Telle est, par exemple, eette proposition: "Le
tout est pIus grand que sa partie," "Si de deux quantites egales, vous õtez des
portions egales, les restes seront egaux." "Deux et deux font quatre."
ees axiomes ont eet avantage que non-seulement ils sont tres-clairs dans
les idees de notre esprit, mais qu'ils tombent aussi sous les sens. Les ex-
perienees journalieres les confirment; ainsi la preuve en serait tres-inutile.
Il n'en va pas de meme a l'egard des propositions qui ne tombent pas sous
les sens ou qui peuvent etre eombattues par d'autres maximes; elles ont
besoin d'etre diseutees et prouvees (Maldanat 1 L, r681).

When both reason and experience agree, a self-evident proposltlon

can be accepted as fully valid. Secondly, there are physical certitudes
(Beaulieu F). What Bayle me ans by them is never made entirely clearo
The statement "Paris is north of Lyons" would probably belong to this
category. Historieal truths may weIl also come under physical cer-
tainties. Their realm - the realm of appearances - avoids the arguments
of the ten tropes by assuming that experience has at least some
validity. As in other fields of knowledge, when reason and experience
are so in ac cord that no argument appropriate to physical matters can
be raised against them, a physical certitude is established. And once
a fact has been dearly determined, no amount of reasoning can undo
it. Finally, there are moral certitudes, in which class belong religious
faith and the fundamentals of ethics. Passions or prejudices may combat
them, but they are legitimate self-evidences of a sort. The most im-
portant of the mora! certitudes is the divinity of Scripture, first
because it enjoys a particularly strong degree of certainty, and secondly
30 2 THE DICTIONNAIRE

because it provides a series of facts, which as facts command that

reason yield to them.
There is perhaps some confusion in Bayle's thought on revelation.
First, he says that it is a fact; therefore, it is invulnerable to reason's
objections. On the other hand, it is founded on a moraI certitude (or
faith); therefore, it is weaker than self-evidence. Finally, reason
demonstrates that any revelation is more certain than any other
proposition of any nature whatsoever because revelation is God's
truth, and God cannot deceive. All this means that the strongest
certitude is founded on a probability or a faith. In order to convince
die-hard rationaIists of this, Bayle us es every device in his power to
show that the so-called certitudes of reason are in fact weaker than th ey
at first appear. This is the role of skepticism in his thought.
Two things must be kept in mind. First, the fact that the content of
revelation may not be elear - or even definable - has no bearing on
the rights that revelation has over reason. Like all Protestants BayIe
would argu e that the necessary artieles of faith are elear enough in
Scripture, but as a philosopher he leaves that to the theologians. It is
en ou gh for him that he can show that the elaims of revelation come
first. Secondly, if his purpose is to establish revelation by confounding
philosophy, his argument is circular whenever it is revelation that
shows where reason goes astray (as in Pyrrhon B). The participant in a
wrestling match must not be a judge at the same time. It is this
circularity that has allowed so many of Bayle's readers to believe that
reason throws faith to the ground, when in fact faith is showing that it
is more solidIy founded than reason. When one is wrestling with
Antreus, the point is not to pin him, but to keep him off his feet.
This analysis of probability and certitude in the Dictionnaire is in
part conjectural. It deals with matters Bayle did not care to discuss at
length. On many questions he feIt unable to decide at what point
uncertainty or incomprehensibility began, contenting himself with
showing that difficulties lay in the way of certainty. Perhaps nowhere
is this so true as in the matter of setting the limits of probability. Two
things he constantly taught. First, that each kind of truth has its own
standards. To confuse them, for example to demand of religion the
kind of demonstration that belongs only to mathematics, is a serious
error, perhaps the most dangerous (Nihusiusl, n. 35). Secondly, one
must not forget that every field is filled with insoluble uncertainties.
All in all, the truth is a complicated thing; there are many avenues
that lead toward it; but they do not all attain it, and the wisest
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

procedure is to avoid dogmatism. "Il y a des gens qui conservent la

verite comme un vase de porcelaine, qui semble etre convaincus que
'comme eIle a l'eclat du verre, eIle en a la fragilite'" (Lubienietzki 1
E, 480 r).1
The ideas in the Dictionnaire do not at all present a great departure
from those formulated in the earlier writings. A mind as cautious as
Bayle's, a mind as carefully trained in objectivity, a mind so aware of
the consequences of every thesis it supports, a mind so determined
not to be deceived by partisanship, such a mind does not swing easily
from one persuasion to another; it weighs carefully whatever it
propounds; it is not likely to change significantly. The two most
original elements in the Dictionnaire are the extensive skeptical analysis
of Cartesian reason and the discussions of the problem of evil. The
first had been outlined rather thoroughly, but fragmentarily, in
previous works. The second had only been hinted at. What the
Dictionnaire affords is a forcefully documented indictment of human
pettiness and irrationality and at the same time a tireless conviction
that objective, industrious search can illuminate at least so me areas
of human ignorance, in part by establishing diverse truths of fact, in
part by demolishing false theories. Either function will contribute
towards demonstrating the frailty of human nature and the weakness
of its reason, both in practice and in theory.
The avowed purpose of the Dictionnaire was to erect a series of
monuments to human ignorance and error. "Ces volumes peuvent
donc mortifier l'homme du cote de sa pIus grande vanite, c'est-a-
dir e du cote de la science" (Dissertation contenant le projet p XV, 243 l).
The first and major indictment of human knowledge is that it cava-
lierly neglects facts, above all embrarassing ones such as the virtues
of the atheists and the vituperations of Christians. Bayle is determined
to display the facts because no philosophy and no faith that overlooks
them can be firm. If reason is frequently opposed to faith in the pages
of the Dictionnaire, it is much more true that the theories of both faith
and reason are constantly being opposed to the touchstone of facto
The most enduring interest of the Dictionnaire for the student of the
history of ideas lies in the remarks dealing with the failures of philo-
sophical systems; but it must be remembered that important as these
commentaries were to Bayle, they are only a small part of his en-
cyclopedia. His case is against both human ignorance and human

1 Bayle does not identify his quotation.

 THE DICT/ONNAIRE

reason; he entitled his work both "historique" and "critique." This

word "critique," if properly understood, is the key to Bayle's theory
and practice concerning reason. Reason may not always command
the truth, but this does not mean that it has no genuine function at all.
"Une dispute bien n!gIee et bien limitee et ou l'on ne se propose
que d'eclaircir les matieres est la chose du monde la pIus utile dans
la recherche de la verite" (Euclide 2 E, 3!6 r). It can occasionally act
as a mediator in the decision which of two systems or two dogmas is
the less improbable (Vallde 1 A, 33! l). The best example we have of
Bayle's outright rejection of a theory is his treatment of Spinozism.
The considerations that led the J ewish philosopher to adopt his
system were presumably the difficulties he found in the three ideas of
creation from nothing, of an unproduced eternal matter, and of the
perfection of the Creator of such an imperfect world. Each of these,
Bayle agrees, leads to incomprehensible results. But Spinoza's alterna-
tive suffers from all their difficulties and then more. To refute his
system one is not required to prove the validity of one's own theory.
Il laisse des choses dont le pis que l'on puisse dire est que la faiblesse de
notre raison ne nous perrnet pas de connaitre clairement qu'elles soient
possibles; et il en embrasse d'autres dont l'impossibilite est manifeste. Il
y a bien de la difference entre ne comprendre pas la possibilite d'un objet
et en comprendre l'impossibilite .... Si les difficultes etaient egales de part
et d'autre, ce serait pour le systeme ordinaire qu'il faudrait prendre parti
puisque, outre le privilege de la possession, il aurait eneore l'avantage de
nous promettre de grands biens pour l'avenir, et de nous laisser mille
reSSO'.lrces eonsolantes dans les malheurs de eette vie. Quelle consolation
n'est-ce pas dans ses disgraees que de se Ratter que les prieres qu'on adresse
a Dieu seront exaucees et qu'en tout cas il nous tiendra eompte de notre
patience et no us fournira un magnifique dedommagement .... L'hypothese
ordinaire, comparee a celle des spinozistes en ee qu'eIles ont de clair,
nous montre pIus d'evidence; et quand eIle est comparee avec l'autre en ce
qu'elles ont d'obscur, eIle parait moins opposee aux lurnieres naturelles;
et d'ailleurs eIle nous prornet un bien infini apres eette vie et nous procure
mille eonsolations dans ceIle-ei, au lieu que l'autre ne no us prornet rien
hors de ce monde et no us prive de la confiance dans nos prieres et dans les
remords de notre prochain; l'hypothese ordinaire est donc preferable a
l'autre (Spinoza 10,447-448).

Reason, which is almost totally unable to establish any proposition

which cannot be denied in one way or another, still has its us es as a
preservative against falsities propounded by unwary philosophers.
Completely impossible hypotheses, like Spinoza's or transubstantiation,
can be show n to be incompatible with reason to such a great extent
 THE DICTIONNAIRE

that they undermine it totally. Even more, in some cases, when

carefully kept in rein, reason can endow an idea with a "certitude
legitime" (Pyrrhon B, 105 r). When it tries to do more than that, it can
furnish evidence against its own presumption. A truly reasonable
mind learns that the truth must remain largely unrevealed and that
reason's pronouncements must be measured against other clues to the
truth, especially experience and revelation. Such a mind has learned
how to doubt properly.
 CHAPTER XII

CONTROVERSIES

The works following the second edition of the Dictionnaire lack the
originality and creative vigor of Bayle's earlier publications. In the
final years he devoted most of his energy to defending and amplifying
ideas he had already made public. The most significant of his works,
the Continuation des Pensies diverses (1704), provided a long analysis of
the criterion of universal consent and further documentation for the
comparison of atheists and idolaters (not a word on comets), but
remained after all only an extension of his previous work, reaffirming
some of its theses. The majority of his output after 1702 appeared in
the four parts of the Riponse aux questions d'un provincial (Part I in 1703,
Part II in 1705, Part III in two volumes, 1706, and Part IV posthu-
mously in 1707). Under this nebulous tide Bayle permitted himself
to colleet helter-skelter a series of reflections on entirely unrelated
subjects, historieal, literary, and philosophie al. Part I, for example,
contained chapters on Plato's doctrine of the immortality of the soul,
on the debts contracted by the Duchess of Mazarin, on whether
Elizabeth I of England interrupted preachers, and on various aspects
of witchcraft. Although the remaining parts of the Riponse aux questions
d'un provincial continued to display this diversity, they were mostly
vehicles for the numerous philosophie al controversies Bayle had on his
hands. Much as he had written against paper wars, he was not
insensitive to the attacks made on his ideas and defended them tirelessly
and repetitiously. Although considerably more mod era te than his
adversaries, he was not entirely above returning charges of bad faith
and impiety in kind. In his debates he subscribed to the self-defeating
principle that the author of the last engagement of a literary batde
could presume to be the victor. Re died on the 28th of December,
1706 while completing the Entretiens de Maxime et Thimiste, a rebuttal
of the most recent attacks by Jean Le Clerc and Isaac Jaquelot. The
 CONTROVERSIES

quarrel did not end there; the following year j aquelot replied with his
Reponse aux Entretiens eomposes par M. Bayle; and in 1710 Leibnitz, who
had not taken part in the hassle during Bayle's life, published the
Essai de theodide, which aspired to be a refutation of the position Bayle
had taken on the problem of evil in the Dietionnaire and the Reponse
aux questions d'un provineiaf.1
The attacks that Bayle was subjected to are numerous. The last of
his adversaries was a familiar one, jurieu, whose Le Philosophe de
Rotterdam aeeusc, atteint, et convaineu (1706) Bayle did not even bother
to answer. The first was a certain Alexis Gaudin, whose short book
La Distinction et la nature du bien et du mal Bayle dismissed in Basnage
de Beauval's journal, Histoire des ouvrages des savans (August 1704). In
the same issue he attempted to clear up a misunderstanding that had
arisen over some remarks in the Continuation des Pensees diverses. Le
Clerc had assumed on the role of defender of the two English philosophers
Ralph Cudworth and joseph Grew, whose theory of the "plastic
medium" Bayle had found wanting. 2 The two journalists were already
involved in another disagreement which had been occasioned by the
Dictionnaire' s discussion of the problem of evil. Le Clerc had maintained
in his Parrhasiana (1699) that Origen's hypothesis of a limited dam-
nation in the afterlife could resolve the difficulties raised by a Mani-
chrean. He did not accept this theory, he said; but it was sufficient
for his purpose to show that eve n such a miserable hypothesis could
undo all the Manichrean arguments. Bayle's reply in the second
edition of the Dictionnaire (Origene E) resulted in a long interehange
that ended only with his death. 3
Other authors had com e forth to challenge Bayle on the question
of divine Providenee. The English cleric William King, bishop of
Londonderry, later archbishop of Dublin, published a De origine mali
in 1702. Unable to procure a copy of the book itself, Bayle based his
1 Delvolve, Religion, critique, et philosophie positive chez Pierre Bayle, pp. 324-335, shows
admirably how far Leibnitz came from succeeding. W. H. Barber devotes two very sound
chapters to Bayle in his Leibniz in France/rom Amauld to Voltaire: A Study in French Reaetions to
Leibnizianism, 167fJ-I760 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955)' - Given his tenacity, we can
imagine that had Bayle lived on, he would still be arguing with his opponents over the
mystery of God's goodness.
2 The pieces in this dispute are as follows: (I) Le Clerc, Bibliothlque choisie, vol. IV, (2)
Beauval'sjournal, August 1704, (3) Le Clerc'sjournal, vol. VII, (4) Reponse aux questions d'un
provincial, Part II, chaps. CLXXIX-CLXXXI, (5) Le Clerc's journal, vol. IX, and (6)
Reponse pour M. Bayle a M. Le Clerc, OD III, 989-1009. For convenience's sake the Riponse
aux questions d'un provincial will henceforth be abbreviated RQP in footnotes.
3 (I) Bibliothtque choisie, vol. VII, (2) RQP II, chaps. CLXXIl-CL'CXV, (3) Le Clerc's
journal, vol. IX, (4) Riponse pour M. Bayle a M. Le C/erc, (5) Le Clerc's journal, vol. X, (6)
Entretiens de Maxime et Thimiste.
30 8 CONTROVERSIES

refutation in the Reponse aux questions d'un provincial, Part II (chapters

LXXIV-XCII) on the lengthy summary given by Jacques Bernard,
the editor of the revived Nouvelles de la republique des lettres (Mayand
June 1703). In the same work Bayle devoted thirty-three chapters to
his debate with Isaac Jaquelot, a Protestant minister in the Hague. l
Finally, Bayle and Jacques Bernard were engaged in a controversy
somewhat less bitter than the others over the prineipal points of the
Continuation des Pensees diverses. 2 Not all of this is edifying reading; most
of it repeats substantially the reasoning of the Dictionnaire, occasionally
elarifying eer tai n details, but not modifying to any great extent their
their general significance.
It was only after publishing the second edition of the Dictionnaire
that Bayle had the time to make a serious study of a book he had
known for some time, John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing. Various bonds linke d the two philosophers without ever
establishing a elose relationship. Bayle had seen Locke during his
exile in Holland, probably at the house of their mutual friend Benjamin
Furly, where Locke stayed in 1687 (OD IV, 700 I, to Minutoli, 24
September 1693, misdated 14 September). The French philosopher
was later an intimate of Locke's pupil, the third earl of Shaftesbury.
Finally, he maintained a correspondence with Locke's secretary and
translator, Pierre Coste, who pressed him, perhaps at Locke's insti-
gation, for his opinion of the English philosopher's works.
It is obvious that Bayle feIt great respeet for the acuity and modesty
of Locke's mind and an equally great discomfort concerning both his
philosophy and his religion. Three remarks in the Dictionnaire refer
to perplexities that Locke could have resolved had he been able to
accept the Cartesian distinction between extension and thought. 3
1 The works involved in this dispute are (I) Jaquelot's Conformiii de lafoi QVec la raison
(1705), (2) RQP II,chaps. CXXVIII-CLXI, (3) Examen de la theologie de M. Bayle (1706),
(4) RQP IV, chaps. XVII-XIX, (5) Emretiens de Maxime et de Thimiste, and (6) Riponse aux
Entretiens composis par M. Bayle (1707). Besides the origin of evil, the subject of free will and
the relation between faith and reason were debated.
2 (I) Nouvelles de la republique des lettres, February and March 1705, (2) RQP II, chaps.
XCV-CXI, (3) RQP III, chaps. IX-XXIX, (4) Bernard's journal, January and February
1706, (5) RQP IV, chaps. XX-XXVI, and (6) Bernard's journal, July 1707. In the later
parts of the discussion the Manicha:an question was also raised.
3 Zinon d'Elie 2 I, where Locke advocates the void, admitting that it is incomprehensible,
Dicearque 2 M, where he takes the same position on the sentienee of matter, and Perrot,
Nicolas 2 K, where he confesses that he has no philosophical proof of the inlmortality of the
soul. In each case Bayle expresses his disapproval of Locke's conclusions, but his approval of
the empiricist's frank admission that his philosophy cannot give demonstrative proofs of
these opinions. Exactly the same kind of thinking occurs in a letter to Shaftesbury (OD IV,
789-790, 23 November 1699) in which Bayle writes that Locke would have no trouble
accounting for weight and solidity if he gave up his belief in the void. Bayle was able to
 CONTROVERSIES 30 9

In the Rlponse aux questions d'un provineial, Part III (OD III, 941-942)
Bayle makes his only direet published criticism of Locke, eommenting
that if the English philosopher is eorrect in defining substanee so
vaguely that either matter or thought may be its attribute, all the
confusions of Aristotelian metaphysics banished by Descartes would rise
up again to plague philosophy. This might be a help for Catholies
who have to defend transubstantiation, but it is a distinet disserviee
to the best proof of the immortality of the soul. If Locke's theory had
the advantage of elarity, philosophers might accept it patiently; but
by its author's own admission it is filled with obscurities.
On one point Bayle found Locke convineing, his critique of innate
ideas. Re reread this section of the Essay Coneerning Human Understanding
while composing the Continuation des Pensees diverses and made use of it
sever al times (OD IV, 838 r, 27 Deeember 1703, to Pierre Coste).1
In two letters to Pierre Coste, Bayle discusses Locke's Vindieation if
the Reasonableness ifChristianity, which Coste had translated into French.
In the non-committal style typical of the reviews in his journal, he
summarizes Locke's position aceurately.

Car autant que je l'ai eompris, eet Ouvrage tend a montrer "que pourvu
que l'on eroie que Jesus-Christ est le Messie & que l'on ait une intention
sineere d'obeir a ses Preeeptes & de deeouvrir les autres Verites eontenues
dans le nouveau Testament, on a toute l'essenee du Chretien:" de sorte
qu'en vivant selon l'Evangile autant que la fragilite humaine le peut
souffrir & en suppleant par la foi & par la repentanee ee qui manque aux
bor.nes reuvres, on est sauve aussi assurement que si l'on etoit eclaire sur
tous les Mysteres que l'Eglise Anglieane, par exemple, trouve dans les
Eerits des Apõtres .... on a donc lieu de eroire qu'il a pretendu faire voir
que l'esprit de la Religion Chretienne n'est pas d'exiger de l'homme, comme
une eondition neeessaire a etre sauve, que l'on croie ee grand nombre de
Dogmes ineomprehensibles & qui ehoquent la lumiere naturelle dont la
Confession des Protestans est ehargee: le Peehe Originel, la Trinite, l'Union
Hypostatique du Verbe, &e. (OD IV, 838 t, 27 Deeember 1703).

discuss Locke's philosophy on the basis of quotations he found in Le Clerc's Parrhasiana

or in Bernard's journal and from his own cursory reading of the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, which he quotes in Zenon d' EUe 2 I and Roranus 2 K. Re had still not read
the treatise carefully by mid-May 1702 (OO IV, 820 r, to Pierre Coste).
1 OO III, 196,207,214,221. P.J. S. Whitmore concludes very wrongly that Bayle was
forced to abandon Descartes for Locke's sensationalism, "Bayle's Criticism of Locke,"
Pierre Bayle, le philosophe de Rotterdam, p. 87. Locke's concept of an innate idea is a very limited
one and in no way excludes an innate faculty of reasoning capable of understanding external
reality to a certain extent. His point is that this faculty has no content prior to experience.
Accepting that one point does not necessarily entail a wholesale rejection of Cartesian
philosophy.
3 10 CONTROVERSIES

Locke had been accused of Socinian tendencies because of The Reason-

ableness of Christianity and had answered somewhat evasively without
deelaring forthrightly his belief in the Trinity. His intent seems to
have been to reduce the artieles of faith to their fundamentals, prima-
rily the belief that Christ was the Messiah, without inquiring too
exactly what precisely was entailed by His Messiahship. Locke's
major artiele of faith is a particularly fragile mainstay for Christianity
because Jesus consistently evaded a direct assertion that He was the
Messiah. The Englishman's book repeats all the pertinent incidents
from the New Testament and then argues that Jesus' parables elearly
imply his Messiahship. Bayle seems unsettled by this, " ... il a travaille
fortement a refuter les objections fondees sur la conduite du Messie,
je veux dire, sur la maniere de cacher, ou de deguiser sa Mission,
d'emploier des reponses ambigues quand il etoit interroge par les
Pharisiens &c. Choses que certains Juifs ont violemment critiquees,
& qui ont je ne sai quoi de choquant" (p. 838 r). Because he has no
proof, Bayle does not say that Locke is a Socinian, but he does add
that "je ne crois point qu'il y ait de Socinien qui ne souscrivit a son
Livre, generalement parlanti & il est certain que cette Secte a toiijours
suivi cette tablature pour rendre le Christianisme pIus conforme aux
lumieres de la Raison." Bayle is obviously disturbed by the tendencies
of Locke's book; and if he expresses himself mildly, it is probably
because he is writing to the Englishman's translator. (He says he
admires Coste's rendition.) Evidently, his correspondent shared some
of Bayle's hesitations, for in a subsequent letter, Bayle speaks more
frankly, saying that Locke should have asked himself whetber it is
possible to be saved without a distinct belief in the consubstantiality
of the word. Early Christians lived before the doctrine had been
elarified; since their time, however, "il faut opter ou la Negative ou
l'Affirmative" (OD IV, 845 I, 18 April 1704, misdated 8 April).l
The elear meaning of this private exchange ofletters is that Locke was
wrong to avoid an open declaration for the Trinity by seeking refuge
in an ambiguous formula. Bayle even implies in both letters that

1 In the same letter Bayle is perhaps hinting that Locke was also guilty of believing that
God is formally extended. He considers this an impiety, but recognizes that other authors
are unaware that it is. Whitmore does not mention this letter in his artic1e;Csee previous
footnote), and seems to me to misunderstand totally the whole tenor of Bayle's letterso
He helieves that Bayle approves of Locke's work. Leo Pierre Courtines, in his Bayle's
Relatrons with England and the English (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p.
117, discusses these letters objectively and more completely. He does not mention Bayle's
remarks linking Locke with Socinianism and draws no inferences concerning the Frenchman's
opinion of Locke's orthOOoxy.
 CONTROVERSIES 3 11

belief in this mystery may be necessary for salvation. His reaction to

the English author's ideas in both religion and philosophy was that
they were harmful to the cause ofChristianity. And he did not conceal
his reaction from Locke's own secreatry while the English philosopher
was still aliveo
Reflecting on Locke and other English authors gave rise in Bayle's
mind to the philosophie al problem that most perplexed him in the
last years: how to proteet orthodox philosophy from certain arguments
by determinists. In the Dietionnaire he had admitted that given the
hypothesis of an eternal matter endowed with motion one could con-
struct some kind of universe. In the Continuation des Pensees diverses
it is the figure of the little known Greek philosopher Strato who stands
for the thoroughly naturalist point of view. Cudworth had revived
Strato as the representative of atheism in his The T me IntelleetuaZ
System of the Universeo According to Bayle, Strato and Christians agree
that there is a Being that exists necessarily. For the orthodox, that
Being is God. For Strato it is nature. The assumption peculiar to the
Greek naturalist is that matter, without being conscious, is able to
follow certain laws blindly, but so effectively that it arranges itself into
an ordered world. For Bayle the assumption is patently absurd.
Si on lui accordoit son hypothese, il faudroit aussi lui accorder que le
desordre & la confusion ne peuvent jamais s'introduire dans la machine du
monde; mais cette hypothese est si et range & si incomprehensible que tout
homme qui la pourroit adopter seroit capable de consentir aux propositions
les pIus absurdes. N'est-ce pas de toutes les choses inconcevables la pIus
inconcevable que de dire qu'une Nature qui ne sent rien, qui ne connoit
rien, se conforme parfaitement aux loix etemelles, qu'elle a une activite qui
ne s'ecarte jamais des routes qu'il faut tenir ... ? Conc;:oit-on des loix qui
n'a'ient pas ete etablies par une cause intelligente? En conc;:oit-on qui
puissent etre executees regulierement par une cause qui ne les connoit
point, & qui ne sait pas meme qu'elle soit au monde? Vous avez la, meta-
physiquement parlant, l'endroit le pIus foible de l'Athe'isme.(OD III,
340 l).
Bayle is concerned by the fact that all ancient philosophers and all
Christian one s except certain Cartesians make the same assumptions
as Strato does when th ey try to explain the operation of naturallaws,
particularly in biological growth. As long as a philosopher admits that
inanimate creatures are the efficient cause of anything at all, even
motion, he is in no position to use Bayle's refutation of Strato.
Il est evident qu'il n'y a point d'autre difference entre cette Nature de
nos Philosophes & de nos Theologiens et la Nature de Straton, si ee n'est que
3 12 CONTROVERSIES

eelle-ci avoit d'eIle-meme ses faeultez & que eelle-Ia a re<;u les siennes de
Dieu. Cette diferenee est grande par raport a ee point-ei, e'est que Straton
etoit Athee & que les autres ne le so nt pas; mais eIle les laisse egalement &
lui & eux dans l'inevitable neeessite de reeonnoitre qu'il y a des choses
qui agissent regulierement & qui observent les loix les pIus admirables sans
savoir ee qu'elles font. '" S'il est difieile de eomprendre que des faeultez
inereees soient justes dans leurs operations sans se sentir, il ne l'est pas moins
par raport a des faeultez creees, & il semble meme qu'ille soit pIus, ear les
autres choses eta nt egales, ee qui est ineree doit surpasser ee qui est ere e
(OD III, 341 l).
Christians desirous of avoiding any taint of Stratonism in their
philosophy are in an awkward situation here unIess th ey adopt the
Cartesian stand that God is the unique and immediate cause of every-
thing in the universe.1 This is a very special and extreme position, one
that differs from the system of occasional causes that Bayle had more
or less espoused in his early works. As formulated by certain philo-
sophers, occasional causes allow matter some determining effect on
the workings of God's generallaws. The familiar example is the pear
tree. It is determined by a general law to produce a fruit, but it so
shapes the operation of that general law that the fruit produced is a
pear and not a peach. Bayle cannot allow even this much to be true if
he is to have an argument against Strato. 2
Re fully recognizes that there are upsetting consequences in his
stand. The first is that God becomes the cause of human desires and
sins; but that is a theological subject, somewhat extraneous to the
ques:ion, and one which causes difficulties in any Christian system,
especially Protestant ones. 3
The second is much more disturbing. Bayle has objected to Strato,
"Your ordered material world makes no sense unIess it is modeled on
some plan. Can you explain why nature is the way it is?" Christians
explain nature by saying that it has been modeled by God's intelli-
gence. But Strato can answer: "Your necessary Being, God, is no less
difficult to explain than my nature. You say that Re exists and that Re
is endowed with all perfections. Where did these perfections come
from? They must have been modeled on some plan. In that case, your
1 If this is true, He could arrest the operation of the universe at any moment. Bayle
admits that Strato's theory gives a better guarantee of the duration of the world (OD III,
338 rl·
2 In technical terms the tree is the material cause, not the efficient cause of the peach.
But Aristotle himself admitted that in cases of natural phenomena the material cause and
the efficient cause are likely to be the same thing. Bayle is interested in assuring that God alone
is the efficient cause.
3 OD III, 342 r, and later in RQP II, 892 r.
 CONTROVERSIES

necessary Being is not genuinely primary, but depends on an ante-

cedent plan, and so on ad infinitum. Can you explain why God is the
way Re is?" "Nous voila donc oblige aussi-bien que Straton a no us
arreter a la nature meme du premier etre sans pouvoir chercher la
raison de ses attributs dans un ordre ou dans un plan anterieur" (OD
III, 342 l). In other words, the God of the Cartesians is every bit as
subject to deterministic necessities as Strato's nature is'!
A few pages later, Bayle retums to the same problem in a different
context. Re mentions the commonplace of theology that God's
omnipotence is limited by certain truths. For example, Re cannot
change the essenee of things; Re cannot ehange the past; nor ean Re
ehange the etemal verities. A few hardy Cartesians have claimed that
Re can in faet change the essenee of things and produee a square
eircle if Re wills. Bayle himself eannot see his way to aceepting this,
though it would be tremendously helpful in answering Strato. 2 Re
does not say so, but it is likely that the reason he eannot accept such an
idea is that it would undermine eompletely all possible logie. That
circles might be square is more than Pyrrhonism; it is madness. The
outeome of this long and complex reasoning is that the argument from
the order of the universe no longer seems as strong to Bayle as it had
previously. This argument had been an important one for Bayle; it
was among the strongest he had against the classical atheists. Re does
not use it in the Continuation des pensees diverses. 3
There are further ramifieations of the Strato affair, espeeially
eor.eeming the unity of a God who is the eause of every individual
event (ef. OD III,286 l). In a letter to Desmaizeaux Bayle refers
obseurely to these eomplexities.
La difficulte que vous me proposez [concerning God's power over etemal
verities], Monsieur, me parolt tres-grande. Je la fis en gros a Mr. Poiret

1 This whole discussion particularly impressed David Hume, who mentions it more
than once in the notes he made preparatory to writing the Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion. He read Bayle in the edition of the (Euvres diverses and adapted his arguments
frequently. See Leo Pierre Courtine's "Bayle, Hume and Berkeley," Revue de Littirature
Comparte, XXI (1947),416-428.
2 Twenty-six years earlier, Bayle had argued against Poiret on this very point (OD IV,
155-156). In RQP III, 987 r, he again sees reasons for believing that God willed the essence
of things. Stiil he does not specifically endorse the idea.
3 These are among the most intricate pages that Bayle ever wrote, and al so the least clearo
I am gratified to read that the only other analysis of their content, Elisabeth Labrousse's,
seems to be quite in accord with the one given here (Hetirodoxie et rigorisme, pp. 167,214-2 I 7).
She finds Bayle's adherence to the Cartesian dualism of mind and extension becoming more
rigorous as he considers Strato. The net result is an extreme fonn of occasionalism in
physics (not theology).
 CONTROVERSIES

l'an 1679. Ill'a insen!e dans la second e Edition de ses Cogitationes rationales
de Deo, Anima & Malo avee sa Reponse qui ne vaut pas grand'ehose.
J'indique eela dans la Continuation des Pensees diverses, ou vous au rez pu voir
que je glisse eette diffieulte en quelques endroits. Les Stratonieiens, que je
sa ehe, ne s'en sont jamais servis. Je n'ai vD. aueun Auteur Orthodoxe qui
l'ait refutee; & ee n'est que depuis un an ou deux, e'est-a-dire, lorsque je
travaillois a la Continuation des Pensees diverses, que j'ai entrevD. quelque ehose
sur eela propose en forme d'objeetion par BERlGARD in Circulo Pisano. Je l'ai
eite. Je ne vois pas trop ee qu'on y pourroit repondre de fort. Ainsi je ne
voudrois pas entreprendre eette diseussion. EIle seroit maI rec;ue venant de
moi, & mes ennemis ne manqueroient pas de dire que la Reponse seroit
pIus foible que l'objection (OD IV, 859 r, 3 July 1705).1

I suspect that Bayle finaUy had to admit to himself that he could not
achieve his goal of forging an invulnerable Cartesian defense against
Strato. It is not that he has no arguments against Strato. It isjust that
he finds it very difficult to construct a system of his own that is not
subject to those arguments. In attempting to forge such a theory, he
has to abandon second causes and the old scholastic rule that it is bad
philosophy to have direet recourse to God as an explanation of events.
Locke and Strato, then, represent the two most important new philo-
sophical concerns of these years; and both ofthem led Bayle to an even
stronger entrenchment in Cartesian principles.
There is one other matter worth mention, his treatment of sorcery
in the Repome aux questions d'un provineial, Part 1. Although Bayle does
not place himself among those who deny the existence of sorcerers,
he remarks that such people have their us es as eheeks on human
credulity. His own attitude is more moderate. "Ne croire rien & croire
tout sont des qualitez extremes qui ne valent rien ni I'une ni l'autre"
(OD III, 579 r). Magic itself is probably an extension of pagan re-
ligions and usuaUy worthless. It is quite difficult to determine in
practice which are cases of real magic and which are not. Be that as it
may, in principle sorcerers are guilty and deserve punishment. A
genuine sorcerer's crime is deserting the true God and entering a
league with the deviI; a deluded magician is guilty of the same
intention whether he actuaUy succeeds in his project or not. Even
Spinozists and other freethinkers would not deny the criminality of
their intent. 2 The third dass of magicians, those who do not believe

1 The two referenees to the Continuation des Pensies diverses are OD III, 342, note ID, and
286, note r. Bayle is mistaken on the title of Poiret's hook, whieh should read Cogitationum
Tatjonalium.
2 Exeeption is made for lunaties who do not know what they are doing.
 CONTROVERSIES

in their mumbo-jumbo, but practice it in order to exert authority

over the gullible, deserves punishment in proportion to the injury they
profess to do to others. 1
So mu ch for theory; practice can be quite different. One may
legitimately ask whether it is worth while punishing alleged magicians.
Because of the obscurity of the whole matter, it is sure that many
inno ee nt victims have been executed. Furthermore, public trials for
witchcraft have the unfortunate effeet ofincreasing the credulity of the
people. The best way to do away with abuses seems to be the Dutch
solution. In Holland no one really believes in sorcery and no accu-
sations are made. In France, the Parlement of Paris had recognized
the uncertainty of sorcery trials by restricting them to instances of
poisoning. Whatever the case, it would be a good idea to reform the
legal procedure in order to reduce the frequency of such trials and to
eliminate injustices as much as possible. What Bayle has to say here is
neither surprising nor original and is in keeping with his moderate
belief is sorcery.
In his quarrels over the Dictionnaire most of Bayle's adversaries
belonged to the school of Protestant theologians known as "les ratio-
naux." 2 Socinians used reason to reject incomprehensible dogmas;
these ministers endeavored to establish a maximum of conformity
between reason and dogma without rejecting any doctrines. The
majority of Protestant theologians in Holland, and among them
Jurieu, proclaimed loudly that their program was an abomination of
true religion, which accepted mysteries on faith. Long and embittered
controversies (notably Jurieu against both Jaquelot and EHe Saurin)
resuIted in an ordinance by the Dutch Estates-General on the 18th
December, 1694 forbidding professors of theology to write or teach
that the mysteries could be explained according to philosophical
methods. 3 No book would be less likely to please the rationalists than
Bayle's Dictionnaire, and the disputes that arose over it gave him many
opportunities to proclaim his orthodox ideas concerning the relation
between reason and faith.
First of all, reason can prove the existence of God. In the Continuation
des Pensees diverses Bayle gives the proof that would persuade a pagan.
1 The exaet punishment Bayle has in mind for other magicians is not clear, but some of
the authors he quotes (e.g., Malebranche) reeommend death (OD III, 5641).
2 Le Clere was an Arminian, often aeeused of Soeinian tendeneies. Jaquelot beeame an
Arminian after he left Holland for Berlin. Bernard, a relative and protege of Le Clere's,
tended to rationalist beliefs. Crities unanimously eomment on the unusual allianee between
these men and Jurieu, the self-appointed scourge of rationalist theology.
3 The ordinanee is quoted in RQP II, OD III, 765 r.
 CONTROVERSIES

C'est de poser d'abord pour principe que rien d'imparfait ne peut

exister de soi-meme & de concIure de la que la matiere etant imparfaite
n'existe point necessairement, qu'eHe a donc ete produite de rien, qu'il y a
donc une puissance infinie, un esprit souverainement parfait qui l'a creee.
On arrive par la surement & promptement a la Religion. Mais n'aHez pas
vous imaginer que san s le secours d'enhaut, sans une grace de Dieu, sans les
lumieres de l'Ecriture, on puisse facilement s'apercevoir de ee chemin-la.
Si vous affirmez que l'esprit de l'homme est assez fort pour decouvrir cette
route a moins qu'une impiete volontaire, qu'un dessein formel de faire la
guerre a Dieu ne le jette dans l'egarement, vous serez oblige de le prouver
(OD III, 333 l).

As ever, Bayle's proof is founded on an assumption that is only pro ba-

ble, not self-evident, and one that reason is unlikely to find without
the guidance of revelation; for pagan philosophers, arguing that
nothing can be produced from nothing, would not necessarily agree
with this proof.
Bayle specifically and lengthily rejects another proof sometimes
advanced, the universal consent of mankind. First, it cannot be shown
that all men do agree on the existence of God. Admittedly, th ey do
accept the existence of a necessary Being. "Les Athees, sans en excepter
un seul, signeront sincerement ave e tous les Orthodoxes cette these-ei:
'Il y a une cause premiere, universeIle, eterneIle, qui existe nee es-
sairement, & qui doit etre apelee Dieu'" (OD III, 214 l).1 But that
is not saying much; for if you then add that God made the world,
the dassical atomists and many of the pre-Socratics will not agree.
Add further that God governs the world and the Epicureans will
disagree. Insist that there is onlyone God and all pagans will refuse
to sign the formulary. Make God totally distinct from extension and
many Christians even will not be able to accept your theory. Secondly,
eve n if some concept of God could be shown to exist in all men, it
would be very difficult to prove that it was implanted by nature and
not by education. Here Bayle makes use of Locke's arguments against
innate ideas. Thirdly, universal consent is no criterion of the truth.
Christians believe that the state of nature is radically depraved; it
would be more true to say that it has implanted ambition, avarice,
ignorance, and other such defects in man than to cite it as the foun-
dation of truth. In fact, most truths are first discovered by one man
only, and not revealed by natural instinct. The argument from uni-
versal consent then, must be rejected; others will do to establish

1 Note the use of the word "athee." See supra, p. 217 n. 2.

 CONTROVERSIES

God's existence, His immateriality, and the immortality of the soul

(OD III, 761 t, 795 t).
Where Bayle disagrees with the "rationaux" is over their contention
that certain dogma s can and should be explained in ways consistent
with philosophy. In his last works he makes very explicit the sort of
reasoning about the foundations of faith that had been present, but
unclarified, in the Dictionnaire. He believes that when reason under-
stands its own nature correctly, it disavows its primaey and yields
to the authority of faet, partieularly the facts of revelation. Christians
ean never question the authority of God's revelation. On the other
hand, in a debate with freethinkers, different eonditions apply; one
must first find out if they accept Seripture. "S'ils repondent qu'ils
l'admettent, il n'y a pIus de dispute ni sur l'unite de principe, ni sur
l'origine du maI, ni sur la eompatibilite entre tous les attributs de Dieu
& les malheurs & les erimes du genre humain. Ce sont des veritez de
fait, qui lors meme qu'elles semblent les pIus incomprehensibles, n'ont
aueun besoin de preuve a l'egard de eeux qui croient la Revelation
... " (OD III, 778t.) Iffreethinkers do not accept Scripture, one must
try to show that it is logical for reason to recognize God's veracity
as the one sure souree of knowledge. "La Philosophie doit plier so us
l'autorite de Dieu, & mettre pavillon bas a la vue de l'Eeriture. La
raison elle-meme nous eonduit a nous soumettre de la sorte" (OD
III, 265 r).1
But if reason ean defend its acceptance of the articles of faith, it is
far from eapable of understanding them. "Chaeun sait qu'il y a des
demonstrations qui no us eonvainquent sans no us eclairer" (OD III,
796 t, note a). For example, both reason and Scripture can persuade
a Christian that God is good (OD IV, 7 r). But human reason eannot
p~netrate so far that it understands how His goodness funetions. In

1 This passage from the Continuation des Pensees diverses was written before Bayle became
involved in controversics with J aquelot. Other passages with the same thought abound, for
example OD III, 761 r, 770 l, OD IV, 4.J. r. Popkin belieyes that this is not consistent with
the skepticism of the DHC. See "Pierre Bayle's Place in 17th century Scepticism," in Pierre
Bayle, le philosophe de Rotterdam, pp. 10-15. He says that having rejected self-evidence, Bayle
cannot logically expect reason to prove anything. How then could he say that reason bids one
accept revelation? I have tried to explain how Bayle would avoid this criticism. He would
say that he does not reject self-evidence totally. It is the best criterion available, but is not
always sufficient because many self-evident propositions can be disputed. The less disputable
a proposition the more likely it is to be true. This, perhaps, is just a modified way of accepting
"l'evidence" as criterion. If so, Popkin has a point, and Bayle is not entirely consistent in
everything he says. It is more important for our purposes to know what Bayle thought. As a
philosopher, Popkin is right to be concemed with questions of consistency. StiIl, it seems to
me that he misses some of the nuances of Bayle's thought - only some, for he is by far the
soundest writer on Bayle's skepticism.
 CONTROVERSIES

fact, it proposes objections to His goodness that it cannot possibly

refute. Even the rationalists Jaquelot and Saurin sometimes argue to
the same effeet.
Il n'est pas besoin que je develope ce passage pour vous faire voir claire-
ment qu'on y met de la distinction entre ces deux theses: l'une, "Tous les
dogmes du Christianisme s'accordent avec la Raison," l'autre, "La Raison
humaine connoit qu'ils s'aecordent avee la Raison." Mr. Saurin affirme la
premiere de ees deux theses, mais non pas la seeonde, & c'est justement la
doctrine de Mr. Bayle; car il n'a point mis en doute si nos Mysteres sont
conformes ala Raison supreme & universelle qui est dans l'entendement
divin, ou ala Raison en general; il a seulement soutenu qu'ils ne paroissent
point conformes a cette portion de Raison dont l'homme se sert pour juger
des ehoses (OD III, 833 1).1

Time and again Bayle repeats that disproofs of a proposlllon by

rational argument cannot be sufficient cause to abandon that propo-
sition. If one accepted as valid only ideas that reason could not argu e
against, one would have to be a Pyrrhonist (OD IV, 14 t). This is
true in physics where no concept of matter is exempt from insoluble
objections; why then should it appear shocking in religion? (OD III,
771 t, 1062 t, OD IV, 4 T, 15 T, 21 1.) "Il n'y a point de principe que
Mr. Bayle ait pIus souvent inculque dans les endroits ou il traitte de
ees matieres que celui-ci, 'L'incomprehensibilite d'un dogme &
l'insolubilite des objections qui le combatent n'est pas une raison
legitime de le rejetter'" (OD IV, 47 T).2 One wonders what would be
legitimate grounds for rejecting a dogma if incomprehensibility and
insoluble objections are not. They are exactly the kind of consider-
ations that Bayle had always proposed against transubstantiation.
About this Catholic dogma he is now forced to write that its principal
defeet does not lie in its incompatibility with reason, but in the mis-
taken belief that a literal reading of Scripture is preferable to a
1 Other passages: OD III, 795 r, I073l. On a minor point Bayle is not aiways consistent.
Are the mysteries above reason, or against it? They are certainIy above human reason,
and even against it. But if reason is taken to mean divine reason, they are neither above nor
against it (OD III, 833l). Earlier Bayle had been content with the Protpstant commonplace
that mysteries were above, but not contrary to, reason.
2 Leibnitz eites this passage (Theodieee, "Conformite de la foi avec la raison," 58), saying
that Bayle may have the right to accept something incomprehensible, but not something
against which insoluble objections can be made. This section of the Theodieee is as good a
review of Bayle's reasoning as can be found anywhere. Leibnitz's answers are far from
convincing, but he may have a point. Bayle himselfadmits that he has an argument against
these "insoluble" objections, namely that Cod is sovereignly perfect. For Leibnitz this one
argument undoes all the objections. Bayle seems to me more honest than Leibnitz because
he says that he can conquer his adversaries on a priori grounds, but that he is helpless in a
posteriori reasoning.
 CONTROVERSIES

figurative interpretation (OD III, 1075 r). In matters where reason

alone is concerned Bayle comes to the conelusion, horrifYing for an
uncompromising advocate of Cartesian self-evidence, that some propo-
sitions are more self-evident than others. "Au reste, je l'avertis [Jac-
ques Bernard] qu'on l'a trompe lorsqu'on lui a dit que 'Mr. Bayle
soutenoit que toutes les propositions evidentes etoient egalement
evidentes.' Je lui repons que cette these, 'Les corps sont incapables de
penser,' paroit assez evidente pour Mr. Bayle pour la juger certaine;
mais qu'il ne la croit pas aussi evidente que cette proposition, 'Deux
et deux font quatre'" (OD III, 1071 l). Reason is so weak that one
is sometimes forced to choose between two propositions each of which
can be disputed by self-evident arguments, or in other words one
must "preferer quelques-unes des maximes evidentes de la Raison a
quelques autres maximes evidentes de la Raison" (OD IV, 47 l).
The standards for ranking self-evidences must be those of probability,
particularly the weighing of all the arguments that can be presented
for and against an evident proposition; but Bayle is no mo re enlighten-
ing on howone determines probabilities than he had been in the
Dictionnaire. In the last works, he gives particular precedence to the
proposition "Le temoignage de Dieu est preferable a celui des hommes"
(OD III, 836 r) without explaining why he ranks it so high. One is
tempted to believe that he attributed great importance to the con-
siderations offered in Spinoza 0, namely that to abandon an established
faith one must have extraordinarily strong reasons, especially when
that faith affords the comolation of prayer.
A survey of Bayle's published works has shown a relatively continu-
ous and consistent point of view. The hints of his philosophie al
skepticism that appear in his letters and in scattered passages of his
earlier writings become articulated with increasing elarity in the
Commentaire philosophique and the Dictionnaire. With the significant
exception of the preambles of faith, his penetrating critique demon-
strates the self-destructive quality of all abstract argument. And even
the preambles are not entirely immune, for they enjoy a certitude
that is only highly probable. But Bayle always maintained that it
wouId be inaccurate to conelude that the human judgment should
remain suspended untiI it couId be persuaded with absolute certainty
of the truth of a matter. With very few exceptions every proposition
was subject to some doubt; reason's function, then, was to expose
these doubts systematically with the utmost elarity and opt for the
theory that seemed to come elosest to accounting for the facts, both
320 CONTROVERSIES

the facts of nature and the facts of revelation. PhilosophicaUy, his

position is at the borderline between rationalism and skepticism; and
it would be permissible to caU him either a skeptical Cartesian, or a
Cartesian skeptic, paradoxical as those terms may sound. In my 0-
pinion his significance in the context of his time lies in his reduction
of Cartesian dogmatism to a radical distrust of abstract reasoning
and his consequent emphasis on the solidity of historieal facts, among
whieh are revealed history.
It is also noteworthy, as Popkin points out, that Bayle is the first
Protestant skeptie.l The alliance of Pyrrhonism with Catholie apolo-
getics that had been so strong in the early seventeenth century was
gradually to diminish. The great debates over the criterion of faith
foreed many Protestants, including both Bayle and J urieu, to recog-
nize that the individual's examination of doetrine was an examination
of eonscienee, not of reason. Although he was not a theologian, Bayle's
devastating exposure of the incomprehensibility of the mysteries was
part of the movement within the Protestant world that led to the
reaffirmation of the primaey of faith and graee and to the doetrine of
eomplete religious toleration. In the modem world the great religious
skepties, such as Kierkegaard or Tillich, are Protestants. Pascal and
Pierre-Daniel Huet had represented the same forees at work within
the Catholie chureh, but the power of the Jesuits and of Thomism
excluded extreme Augustinian elements from the fold of orthodoxy
and resuIted eventually in the anathematizing of fideism in the
Vatkan Couneil of 1869-70.
Beeause he strove to be objective, because his remarks are often
maddeningly non-committal, because he buried his opinions under
mountainous seholastie dialectics that frequently obscured the general
outline and movement of his thought, finally beeause he was a skeptic
and his readers usually have not been, Bayle has been interpreted in a
muItitude of ways by commentators. Sandberg summarized the
results of two and a half eenturies of Bayle eritieism beautifully;
" . .. the Bayle who appears in the Dictionnaire is clearly a Protestant
fideist, even though he has been interpreted sinee his day variously as
a seeptic, a rationalist, a Soeinian, an atheist, a deist, a libertine, a
positivist, a moralist, a Catholie, a nominal fideist." 2

1 See his artide in Pierre Bayle, le philosophe de Rotterdam, p. 2.

2 Karl Christian Sandberg, Faith and Reason in the Thought of Pierre Ba)-le, p. 28. Sandberg's
rapid sumrnary is quite complete. See also Paul Dibon's article in Pierre Bayle le philosophe de
Rotterdam for the emergence of modem ideas about Bayle.
 CONTROVERSIES 321

That his official position is orthodox is recognized by most scholars,

but his sincerity is frequently impugned. With the single exception
of Elisabeth Labrousse's Pierre Bayle: Heterodoxie et rigorisme, every
major book by students attempting a general evaluation of his thought,
Charles Lenient's Etude de Bayle, Jean Delvolve's Religion, critique et
philosophie positive ehe;:: Pierre Bayle, and Howard Robinson's Bayle the
Sceptic, shares the conviction that the refugee scholar had lost any
meaningful faith. Lenient sees in Bayle a negating spirit, determined
to oppose any dogmatic pOInt of view in any area of thought. He
pictures Bayle as being carried away by his dialectics into positions
more extreme than his own personal views. "Est-il absolument
incredule? Non. Deiste? Non. Lutherien? calviniste? catholique?
Non. Qu'est-il donc? Rien de eela et tout eela a la fois" (p. 65).
Robinson calls Bayle "certainly a decided sceptic, though probably
not accepting the atheistic position that he seemed at times to defend"
(p. 243). By "sceptic" he appears to me an a man who doubts actively,
perhaps denies, and feels "disgust with Christianity" because it had
failed to reform mankind. After giving a relatively fair account of
most of Bayle's arguments and orthodox conclusions, Delvolve states
flatly, "Autant il se tient exactement a la lettre de ses dogmes, au-
tant il est certain qu'il en est aussi degage, et aussi ennerni qu'il
est possible de l'etre" (p. 336). This standard could lead to total
Pyrrhonism in literature; it systematically discounts every protesta-
tion of good faith. The reasoning behind this judgment is that since
mu sh of what he says disputes the mysteries instead of establishing
them, Bayle would have had to be mad to accept dogmas he knew to
be so very unreasonable. When one remembers how often he condemns
the behavoir of Christians, especially churchmen, how mu ch he writes
against superstition and gullibility, how carefully he defends atheism
as less pernicious than idolatry (which, after all, is a form of religion),
how untenable he makes most creeds about God, and especially how
often and how convincingly he makes the Christian God seem a
monster of moral cruelty, it seems natural to discount his orthodoxy as
an artifieial pose that could hardly deceive anyone. Having founded
all dogma on the authority of Scripture, he almost never quo te s
Scripture except on the weakness of reason. There are no impassioned
calls for true faith in his works; instead one finds proofs of faith's
irrationality and angry denunciation of religious partisanship or wry
reflections on human foibles. Where is the anguish of a mind like
Pascal's, whose theory resembles Bayle's in many ways, but whose
322 CONTROVERSIES

compelling religious fervor is lacking in the works of the Protestant

scholar?
Bayle's writings seem to be almost totally irreligiaus. Reading them
is bound to undermine the faith of any man who puts the least trust
in reason. This is especially true because the sort of reasan Bayle does
show partial confidenee in, Cartesian deductions like the proof of the
absolute perfectian of God, no longer seems acceptable. The few
arguments on the existence of God or the absolute immateriality of
the thought process that he gives serious credence to are the very
ones that are most repugnant to the experimental reasan that has
reigned since his time. Empiricists, impressed by his zealous concem
for historieal fact, easily overlook the validity he is willing to grant to
certain purely abstract coneepts.
It is ironic that Bayle, who worked tirelessly to proteet authors
from unfounded charges of bad faith, should be aecused of duplicity
in what he wrote. He serupulously accepted at face value a writer's
protestations. No assessment of Pomponazzi or La :Ylothe le Vayer
could be mare judieious than his own. His readers would do well to
learn from him. "Il faut donc, si l'on veut critiquer exactement et de
bonne foi, se prescrire cette regle: 'Aecusez les gens d'avoir dit pre-
cisement ee qu'ils ont dit; mais faites-vous une religion de n'en rien
õter et de n'y rien ajouter; marquez-leur les eonsequences qui en
naissent; mais n'assurez pas qu'ils aient vu ees consequenees et qu'ils
les aient admises; attendez ee qu'ils diront lorsqu'ils auront aUl dire
qu'elles sortent naturellement et necessairement de ee qu'ils ont dit'"
(DHC Barlette 1 B, 122 l). Until recently too few of the major studies
on Bayle have done him the courtesy of taking him at his word.
Now the only evidenee that ean be brought against Bayle is his
published work - and it is orthodox on the surface. Only a critic
unaware of the subtleties of his thought could hope to prove that the
unavowed consequences of his argument, resuIt in the undermining of
religion. It would be folly to accuse Bayle, of all people, of not realizing
the implieations of anything he said. The very least one can do, if
one is to be true to the spirit of Bayle himself, is to refrain from
judging.
Analysis of the rather scarce evidence available from his life and his
letters establishes a presumption in favor of his sincerity. First of all,
the liberty of the press in Holland would have allowed him to publish
mare radical ideas without being subject to civil punishment.
Scholars accustomed to the repressions of liberty in France are likely
 CONTROVERSIES

to be quite unaware of the freedom of thought in seventeenth-century

Holland.! There was no offieial censor who could decide against the
publication of a book. Privileges, granted merelyas copyrights for the
protection of printers, in no way entailed examination or approval of
the contents of a work (ef. OD II, 747 r). Occasionally a work already
published was condemned by the magistrates, usually at the request
of a foreign power objecting to its politieal doctrines, but sometimes
because of complaints from ecclesiastieal sources. During the twenty-
six years Bayle was in Holland, only twelve theological works were
banned. And in all cases the bans were issued against the publisher or
bookseller, never the author. There is no case of imprisonment of a
writer for the ide as contained in his works.
Furthermore, the political situation made the process of condemning
books cumbersome and ineffective. Holland was composed of seven
semi-autonomous states, whose central government was loath to
repress any book. U.mally petitions were referred to the eity in which
the work's publisher resided, for the Dutch cities were all but self-
ruled. Sometimes the condemnation of a book was limited to onlyone
city, hardly an effective way to prevent its dissemination. After four
years of indecision over Balthasar Bekker's treatise on witchcraft, the
Dutch magistrates finally abandoned the whole affair on the grounds
that the book was sufficiently widely distributed by that time to make
any suppression meaningless. The anomalous situation frequently
arose in which a work would be censured in one language and readily
available in another. As has been mentioned, government officials
were so sentitive about their policy of non-intervention that they
rebuked the Walloon Synod for its action against Bayle's Commentaire
philosophique. In general, what little censorship there was in Holland
had extraordinarily little effect. Neither church nor civil authorities
were able to prevent Bayle and Jurieu from continuing their exchange
of pamphlets.
Even the ecclesiastical bodies, especially the "Valloon Church, were
reluctant to proceed hastily in any condemnation and preferred to
exhort the parties concerned to reconciliation. Some writers, such as
Spinoza and Bayle, were deprived of privileges bestowed by their
religious affiliations. Bayle lost his teaching position, a job that he
had never enjoyed and never missed. Later he saw several articles of

1 See Sandberg, Faith and Reason, pp. 199-218 for an excellent swnmary of this matter.
This material has been published in "Pierre Bayle's Sincerity in His Views on Faith and
Reason," Studies in Philology, LXI (1964), 74-84.
 CONTROVERSIES

his Dictionnaire censured. It is rather remarkable that he bothered to

live up to the wishes of the consistory by reforming the artiele David
and adding the four Eclaircissemens to his second edition. Critics who
maintain that he concealed his true thought must explain why he
never took advantage of the liberties ofhis adopted country to separate
himself from the strictest orthodoxy. He could have published any
beliefs whatsoever had he been so inelined.
One must give due consideration to the Protestant ecelesiastical
background Bayle had been raised in. Throughout his life he always
remained elosely associated with the intellectual milieu of the church.
68% of his known correspondents were Protestants, of whom 42%
were ministers or had been postulants. 1 If one weighs these figures
according to the frequency with which he wrote his correspondents,
the predominance of Protestants becomes overwhelming. Moreover,
his elosest associates, Jurieu in Sedan and during the first years in
Rotterdam, the Basnage brothers, the publisher Reinier Leers, were
all intimately concerned with the church. In his struggles with Jurieu
he was never without the support of so me of the most influential
figures in the Walloon Church, ineluding Jacques Basnage (minister
and brother-in-Iaw ofJurieu) and Phineas Pielat, a pastor with whom
Bayle had traveled during his illness in 1687 and who was later
appointed one of the members of the commission examining the
Dictionnaire.
At every period of his life, some evidence can be shown to indicate
that Bayle was loyal to his church. His return to Calvinism in 1670
and the letters of his youth even into the 1680'S are replete with pious
expressions and frequently mention his habit of praying. At the same
time they indicate several mental attitudes that developed into the
objectivity of the mature Bayle, the objectivity that makes it so diffi-
cult to discover his personal opinions in what he writes. In 1685 he
showed privately his distaste for Jean Le Clerc's theses about the
divinity of Scripture. Less than a year later he betrayed astounding
naivete (and inaptitude for duplicity) by not recognizing the religious
meaning of Fontenelle's tale about Borneo.
Ifhe did lose his personal faith at some point, one would be tempted
to regard the years 1685 to r696 as the most likely period of internai
crisis. This decade witnessed the revocation of the Edict of Nantes,

1 The statistics of Bayle's eorrespondenee can be found in Elisabeth Labrousse's Irwentaire

p. 59. Among his Catholic eorrespondents, a slightly smaller pereentage (36%) belonged
to the ehureh.
 CONTROVERSIES

the cruel death of his brother, and the controversies over the cri-
terion of faith centered around Nicole's works. During these years
Bayle began to denounce the frightful spleen of Protestant theological
disputes; he abandoned the philosophy of Malebranche and admitted
his skeptical tendencies more frankly in print. Finally, he suffered
terribly at the hands of his own coreligionists.l
Nonetheless, in his debates with Jurieu he could write that he
communed four times a year (a requirement, I believe, of his position
as professor) and that he attended sermons and public prayers "assez
souvent" (OD II, 660 r). When Jurieu published that he had an a-
nonymous (fictitious?) supporter willing to pay a hundred pistoles to
anyone who could swear to a private act of piety on Bayle's part,
Bayle, assuming anonymity for the purposes of the debate, countered
immediately, "Or Mr. B. s'offre de foumir bien-t6t deux personnes
irreprochables, qui sont maintenant Diacres de l'Eglise Fran<;oise de
Rotterdam, qui jureront qu'ils ont fait souvent avec lui les devotions
domestiques de Dimanche apres souper, qui consistent a lire un
Chapitre de l'Ecriture, a chanter un Pseaume, & a reeiter une priere
qui est a la fin de chaque Pseaume" (OD II, 724l). Nobody collected
the money because none was ever offered. Still, it is hardly likely that
Bayle would have made such a claim without being able to produce
his witnesses if necessary. Re was always careful not to involve any
third party against his will in the dispute with J urieu. Previously he
had complied with the request of a friend who had asked to have his
name removed from the already printed galleys of La Cabale chimerique
(OD II, 618 r, 741-742). Re surely checked with his two companions
before stating that th ey would testify to his private Sundayevening
worship.
His works published after the battles with Jurieu are the ones that
seem the most dangerous to religion. For these years the available
e~ence from his biography is scanty. One can mention first his
cautious criticism of Locke's unwillingness to confess his belief in
the Trinity. Secondly there is a revealing statement in a letter by the
third earl of Shaftesbury, who had known Bayle weIl during his two
visits to Holland in 1698-1699 and 1703-170+ After the death of his
friend in Rotterdam, he wrote to Jacques Basnage,
... I am sure, no one in partieular owed more to him than I, or knew his
merit better. But that I should this have esteemed him is no wonder. The
1 During this period he was 37 to 48 years old, perhaps somewhat heyond the age when
most men are likely to give up their faith.
 CONTROVERSIES

prejudices raised against him on account of his sentiments in philosophy

could not be expected to raise scruples in those, who were no ways concerned
in retigious matters, but that the hard reproaches of the world against him
on this account should not have been able to lose him the friendship of so
great and worthy an actor in the cause of religion as yourself, this, I must
own, is highly generous and noble and to be acknowledged not only by all
lovers of Mons. Bayle but oftruth and philosophicalliberty ... I know very
well that it is in religion and philosophy, as in most things, that different
opinions usually create not only distike, but animosity and hatred. It was
far otherwise between Mons. Bayle and myself, for whilst we agreed in fun-
damental rules of moral practice and believed ourselyes true to these, the
continual differenees in opinions and the eonstant disputes that were be-
tween us, served to improve our friendship. I had the happiness to see that
they lost me nothing of his; and I know my own inereasing every day as my
advantages increased by his improving conversation. I may weIl say
improving in every respeet, even as to prineiples in whieh the enemies of
Mons. Bayle would least of all allow him the eharaeter of promoter. . ..
Whatever opinion ofmine stood not the test of his piereing reason, I learned
by degrees either to diseard as frivolous, or not to rely on with that boldness
as before; but that which bore the trial I prized as purest gold. And if that
philosophy, whatever it be, whieh, keeping in the bounds of decency,
examines things after this manner, be esteemed injurious to religion or
mankind, and be aeeordingly banished from the world, I ean foresee nothing
but darkness and ignoranee that must follow. 1

This preeious document is, as far as I know, the only testimony about
Bayle's diseussions with his friends; and it confirms, if only generally,
that he was far different from the representations of his opponents.
Both the literal meaning of his published works and the available
indications from his biography establish a real presumption that he
intended to remain within the bounds of orthodox Calvinism, what-
ever his inmost doubts may have been. His faith seems to have been
strong enough to withstand those doubts - and that means very strong
- but his highly intelleetual temperament did not express itself in
pious or mystic ways. His mind ehallenged everything it believed and
refused to find any sol ac e in weak arguments used in a good causeo
A truly modest mind in search for the truth has the politeness to
concede the weak points of its own beliefs and willingly exposes their

1 The Lift, Unpublished LetteTs, and Philosophieal &gimm of Antho1!Jl, Earl of Shaftesbury, ed.
Benjamin Rand (New York: Macmillan Co., 1900), pp. 373-374. Quoted by H. C.
Hazewinkel in Pierre Bayle, le philosophe rk RotteTtimn, pp. 41-42 and by Robinson in Bayu the
Sceptie, p. 245. Robinson c1aims in footnote 27 that "This letter appears to have eseaped the
attention of Bayle's Freneh biographers." Ifhe is presenting it as a discovery, one is all the
more disturbed by the faet that in citing it he omits the erucial sentenee in which Shaftesbury
asserts that Bayle's eonversation did not eorrespond to his enemies' ideas ofhim.
 CONTROVERSIES

Achilles' heel without, however, diminishing its conviction. It is this

sort of honesty in revealing the ineomprehensibilities of his creed that
aroused suspicion in others. The sanetimonious probity of the noble
lie or sincere self-deception repelled Bayle; and when he discovered in
the story of original sin newand insoluble objections to God's goodness
he made them public. When Cudworth evolved a theory of animaI
reproduction, Bayle saw immediately its implieations for theology
and judged the theory exclusively on that basis; for orthodoxy was
extremely important to him, mueh more so than philosophy. The
great intellectual drama for Bayle was the search for the truth, which
he found in facts and in faith. It was reason's role to help establish
both facts and faith, but always to submit to them.
 AFTERWORD

It should be manifest by now that the skeptieisms of Montaigne and

Bayle differ remarkably if one inquires into the details of their thought.
This is especially true because Bayle is a philosopher interested in the
technicalities of argument and proof as the essayist never had been.
Is it possible to imagine Montaigne breaking his head over substantial
forms? When he does allude to epistemology, he makes it quite cIear
that he is a Pyrrhonist and a fideist, regarding all purely human
knowledge as no stronger than the sense information on which it is
founded. The fecundity of the universe makes him particularly aware
of the immense variety of possibilities in a way not too dissimilar to the
fJhilosophy of Heraditus. The real interest of his skeptieism, however,
does not lie in his theory, but in the human reality of the observing mind
as it turns from intellection to self-awareness.
Bayle's philosophical point of view is mu ch more complex. His
skepticism concerned totally different questions from those that had
caused Montaigne's doubts, for he attacked the fortress of reason
itself rather than the reliability of the senses. He also daimed that he
was less a Pyrrhonist than Montaigne, and with good reason; in the
long run despite the strength of skeptical arguments, arguments that
he analyzed in much greater detail than the essayist, he never fully
acceded to the condusions of the Pyrrhonists, primarily because he
saw that other arguments, notably those of the Cartesians, seemed
every bit as convineing, even more so. He could not give his un-
qualified assent to any system ofphilosophy, even the Pyrrhonists', be-
cause he regarded the truth as something too varied and too diverse
to be contained by any theory. Quite frequently the objections he
raised against particular philosophies amounted to accusing them of
oversimplifying reality. Spinoza's attempt to unify the totality of
existence into one substance seemed to him the greatest error in
 AFTERWORD

philosophy, and one of the most common ones. The comments in

which we find him expressing his personal opinion usually reveal
him preferring the more complicated theory to the simpler one.
Substance must be divided into the uncreated and the created, and
the second must then be subdivided into the extended and the thinking,
for there are good enough reasons to establish each division. Bayle
recognized, of course, that with each complication he introduced he
exposed himself to weighty objections, and that the totality of those
objections was enormous. But he seldom concerned himself with
totalities. To him it seemed wiser to approach each matter individually
even though he knew full well that each separate conclusion suffered
from the objections that could be raised against it. He quickly con-
ceded that the truth was incomprehensible, but somehow or other
that did not me an that it was unattainable. Pyrrhonistic indecision
seemed more dangerous to him than an honest confession ofbaffiement.
Above all, he was determined to pursue his piecemeal inquiries with
the greatest diligence and the most careful, penetrating dialectic. It
is inconceivable that he could have written "0 que c'est un doux et
mol chevet, et sain, que l'ignorance et l'incuriosite, a reposer une
teste bien faicte" (III:xiii, I050-5Ic).
Both Montaigne and Bayle endorsed a form of religious fideism and
argued that skepticism prepared the mind to receive grace. But again
we find that Montaigne's fideism is complete, whereas Bayle's is most
properly termed semi-fideism. The Catholic and the Protestant agreed
that God was incomprehensible, as they agreed in accepting the
doctrines by which their respective churches interpreted him. But in
his later years the essayist arrived at a firm and confident faith in the
goodness of God, especially in His creation nature, which was a
beneficent guide for the man who knew how to follow its precepts.
All the vanity and pettiness of man could be compensated for if one
lea;ned to accept the gifts of life with due gratitude. They were great
gifts and could be the source of a truly harmonious and exalting
sense of being. Montaigne was far from sharing the Calvinist austerity
that was part of Bayle's upbringing. For the Protestant refugee the
world was a vale of tears and the watchword for enduring in it was
"Patience" (DHC 2 Vorstius, Conrad P, 481 r). God's goodness was an
article of faith, but of all the articles it was the one he found the least
passib le to comprehend or to experience.
In general there seems to be a connection between skepticism and a
pessimistic evaluation of human nature. The weakness apparent in
33° AFTERWORD

human reason extends further to the follies of human conduct. In

Montaigne this is true, almost without reservation, for the "Apologie de
Raimond Sebond," where his thought take s some very bitter turns.
However, in later years, without losing his firm awareness of the vanity
of human nature, he does become so reconciled to that vanity that he
can see beyond it and admire the moral grandeur of a Socrates or the
resilient fortitude of the ignorant. Examining himself and then the
people around him, he arrived at a peculiar brand of gay wisdom that
Bayle may never have known. For the latter the facts ofhistoryrevealed
only too clearly human superstition, iniquity, factiousness, folly,
depravity, and inconsistency. The weighty volumes of the Dictionnaire
constitute a documented indictment of the human race. Amid all
the diversity of languages, mores, and manners, Bayle found that one
thing made man everywhere recognizable; there are few good men
anywhere. The conclusions of the Dictionnaire can be summed up in
the sentence "Il y a de l'homme partout" (Innocent XII C, 369 I),
which means that passion and vanity reign supreme in history.
What better pro of can there be for human irrationality and immorality
than the record of obloquy man has written in history? Observing
himself, Montaigne found repeated evidence of human weakness and
instability; but he also found the human condition satisfying despite
its limitations; observing history, Bayle found almost exclusively signs
of depravity; his extreme pessimism knew no mitigation, exeept
perhaps the eonviction that God is good; and that convietion had to
be maintained in the face of the facts.
The differenees between the essayist and the seholar are great.
In philosophy their common allegiance to some form of skepticism
turns out on examination to be a quite superficial resemblanee. The
faet that they were both fideistic Christians eannot reduce the funda-
mental divergencies in the quality of their religions. Montaigne's
optimistic art of living finds no eounterpart in Bayle's works. There
are, however, certain similarities in their points of view that can be
traced to their skepticism. For both reas on was more likely to be able
to determine moral precepts than philosophical truths. The belief in
an inna te ethieal sense was not seriously threatened by the skeptieism
ofeither man. The naturalist morality ofBook III of the Essais and the
constantly recurring theme of the virtuous atheist in the Pensees
diverses and elsewhere show both thinkers deeply concerned with a
secular ethic. Where they parted company was that Bayle saw no
grounds to expect that reason could actually affect moral conduct
 AFTERWORD 33 1

to any appreeiable extent while Montaigne eould not forget the

example of Socrates, who may have been able to live aeeording to
the dietates of his rational eonscienee.
Another similarity between Montaigne and Bayle, and this is a
very deep-rooted one, is their abiding political conservatism. This
seems to be a eonstant in the skeptieal temperament, at least until the
eighteenth eentury; for all the dassical skepties from Pyrrho to Sextus
Empirieus were also loath to advoeate ehange or reform. As an em-
pirieal rule of eonduet they espoused the adherenee to the eustoms of
their eountries. For them the ethieal eode of a land might be inde-
fensible as a theory, but it was also a faet, and skepties have respeet for
the facts they live with. Montaigne and Bayle, eaeh in his way, put
great emphasis on experience and facts, against whieh they measured
the theories they so distrusted.
True skepticism as a philosophy is largely a thing of the past today,
for it would be foUy to deny the aehievements of seienee. Professional
philosophers and theologians may be eoneerned to point out the
limitations inherent in pragmatic empiricism, but hardly any would
eare to argue against its solidity. Skeptieism, however, still has a
meaning; for it is an attitude about the mind; and its greatest virtues
are intelleetual ones. Above all the doubting mind is a modest one.
Montaigne sought to learn for himself and from himself. Re feIt
keenly that the truths he diseovered were his own; and ifhe yearned to
share them with mankind, he did not presume to impose them on
others. Bayle, for whom doetrines of faith were very important, plaeed
the sanetity of eonseience above any belief and preaehed toleranee
above all. Both despised the assuranee and eruelty of dogmatie
arrogance. They were skepties, and as such, respeeters of men.
 APPENDIX 1

THE SENTENCES INSCRIBED ON THE CEILING

OF MONTAIGNE'S STUDY

These sayings have been reproduced in Galy and Lapeyre, Mon-

taigne ehe;;. lui (Perigueux: J. Bonnet, 1861), Paul Bonnefon (Revue
d'Histoire Littiraire de la France, II [1895], 320-327), Grace Norton,
Studies in Montaigne (New York: Macmillan, 1904), Pierre Villey's
1930 edition of the Essais, Maurice Rat's Classiques Garnier edition,
and Bulletin de la Sociil! des Amis de Montaigne, 3rd Series, number 17-18.
I. Extrema homini, scientia ut res sunt boni consulere, cretera
securum. Eccl.
(Montaigne's free version, II :xii, S63a: "Aceepte, dit l'Ecclesiaste, en
bonn e part les choses au visage et au goust qu'elles se presentent
a toy du jour a la journee; le demeurant est hors de ta connoissance."
Here as in other sentences attributed to Eccl. it is impossible to loeate
this phrase in either Ecclesiastes or Eeclesiastieus.)
2. Cognoscendi, studium homini dedit Deus ejus torquendi gratia.
Eccl., I.
(God gave man the desire to know to torment him. ef. II: xvii, 716a.)
3. T OU~ [LEV xevou~ &O'Xou~ 't'O 7tVeü[L1X a~[(j't'"Y)(n, 't'ou~ aE &',o~'t'ou~ &v&pw-
7tOU~ 't'O ot 7J [.LIX.
(The wind swells empty wineskins; pride swells foolish men.)
4. Omnium quae sub sole sunt fortuna et lex par est. Eccl., IX.
("Tout ee qui est sous le soleil court une loy et fortune pareille,"
II :xxxvi, 262a, and II :xii, 506a.)
5. 'Ev 't'c}l cppoveiv y~p [L7Jaev, ~a~(j't'o~ ~~6~. (Sophocles, Ajax.)
(Not knowing anything is the sweetest life. This sentence was covered
over by number 4.)
6. Ou [LIiAAo', o(hw~ ~xe~ ~ hdvw:; ~ ouae't'epw~. (Sextus Empiricus,
Hypotyposes, I :xix.)
("Il n'est non pIus ainsi qu'ainsin, ou que ny l'un ny l'autre" II :xii,
s61a.)
 APPENDIX I 333

7. Orbis magna! vd parva! earum rerum quas Deus tam mult as

fecit notitia in nobis est. Eccl.
(Knowledge is in us of the great and the small world of the things
God made in such great number.)
8. 'Opw ya:p ~[Lii~ ouo~v i:lV-rIX~ &.MO 7tA~V
E~OWA' ocromep ~w[Lev ~ xouCP1)V crxLlXv. (Sophocles, Ajax.)
(For I see that in this life of ours we are nothing more than phantoms
and vai n shadows.)
9. 0 miseras hominum mentes! 0 pectora ca!ca!
Qualibus in tenebris vita! quantisque periclis
Degitur hoc a!vi quodcumque est!
(Lucretius, De rerum natura, II, 14-16.)
(Oh wretched minds of men! Oh blind hearts! In what darkness, in
how many mortal dangers this brief span of time is passed!)
10. KpLveL -rL~ IXO-rOV 7tC.07t0-r' &.v&pW7tOV [LeylXv õv e;a:AdcpeL 7tPOCPIXcrL~ ~
't\)xou~' OAOV. (Euripides.)
(Whoever thinks himself a great man the merest chanee occurrence
will blot out completely.)
1 I. Omnia cum ca!lo terraque marique
Sunt nihil ad summam summai totius.
(Lucretius, De rerum natura, VI, 678-679.)
(All things with the sky, the earth, and the sea are nothing to the whole
of the universe. Montaigne quotes this, II :xii, 585a.)
12. Vidisti hominem sapientem sibi videri? Magis iHo spem habebit
insipiens. Prov., 26.
(Have you seen a man wise in his own eyes? There is more hope for a
fool than for him.)
13. Quare ignoras quomodo anima conjungitur corpori, nescies
opera Dei. Eccl., II.
(Since you do not know how the soul is joined to the body, you do not
know God's works. This sentence has been restored by conjecture
a.nd departs considerably from the test of Ecclesiastes xi. 5.)
14. 'Evoexe-rIXL xa:t oux e'loexe-rIXL. (Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes, I :xxi.)
(That may be and that may not be.)
15. 'AylX&Ov &YIXcr-rov. (Plato, Cratylus.)
(The good is admirable.)
16. KeplX[Lo~ &.v&pW7tO~.
(Man is clay.)
334 APPENDIX I

17. Nolite esse prudentes apud vosmetipsos. Ad Rom. XII.

(Be not wise in your own eyes.)
18. 'H aeLcnaeL[LOv[1X xlX&,x1tep r:1X'tpt 'tiJ> 'tUcpcp r:d&e-:-:;u. (Stobceus.)
("La superstition suit l'orgueil et luy obeit eomme a son pere," II :xii,
553a. Montaigne eites and translates this sentenee, whieh is deei-
pherable under number 17.)
19. Ou y.xp &~ cppoveeLv 0 &eo~ [LZYIX a/J...ov ~ ecuu'tov. (Herodotus, VII, 10.)
(God allows no one to be proud but himself. Cited, II :xii, 493a.)
20. Summum nee metuas diem nee optes. (Martial, Epigrams, X, 47.)
(Neither fear nor hope for your last day. This sentenee, covered by
number 19, is quoted in II :xxxvii, 850a.)
21. Nescis homo, hoe an iHud magis expediat, an ceque utrumque.
Eeel., II.
(You do not know, oh man, whether this thing or that is proper to
you, or whether both are equally. This differs eonsiderably from the
text of Eeclesiastes xi. 6.)
22. Homo sum, humani a me nihiI aIienum puto. (Terenee, Heauton-
timoroumenos, I, 1.)
(I am a man; I think nothing human foreign to me. Montaigne eites
this text in a slightly altered form which gives it an unsual signifi-
eanee, II :ii, 383a.)
23. Ne pIus sapias quam necesse est, ne obstupeseas. Ecel., 7.
(Do not be unneeessarily wise lest you be a fool.)
24. Si quis existimat se aIiquid seire, nondum cognovit quomodo
oportet illud seire. eor. VIII.
("L'homme qui presume de son sc;avoir, ne sc;ait pas eneore que e'est
que sc;avoir," II :xii, 494a.)
25. Si quis existimat se aIiquid esse, eum nihiI sit, ipse se seducit.
Ad Galat., VI.
("L'homme qui n'est rien, s'il pense estre quelque ehose, se seduit
soy mesmes et se trompe," II :xii, 494a.)
26. Ne pIus sapite quam oportet, sed sapite ad sobrietatem. Rom. XII.
("Ne soyez pas pIus sages qu'il ne faut, mais soyez sobrement sages,"
I :xxx, 234a.)
27. KlXt 'to [Lev o0v (jlXcpe~ ou 'tL~ eXv"Y)P raev ouaz 'tL~ ~(j-:-IXL daw~.
(Xenophanes, in Sextus Empiricus.)
(And indeed no man has known anything surely, and no one ever will.)
 APPENDIX I 335

28. TLe; a' ot(~€V d ~~v 't"0\3-&' Ö xexA"Y)'t"IXL -&IXV€~V,

To ~~v ae -&V~crx€LV ecr't"L; (Euripides, cited by Stobreus.)

(Who knows if what we call dying is not living and !iving, dying?
Montaigne cites this, n :xii, 588a.)
29. Res omnes sunt difficiliores quam ut eas possit homo eonsequi.
Ecel., 1.
(All things are too difficult for man to comprehend them. The quotation
is a corruption of Ecclesiastes I, 8.)
30. 'Enewv ae: noMe; v0fJ.0e; ev3-1X XIXl. ev3-lX. (Homer, Iliad, XX, 249.)
("Il y a prou loy de parler par tout, et pour et contre." I :xlvii, 3 I 7a,
also translated somewhat differently in n :xii, 562a.)
31. Humanum genus est avidum nimis auricuIarum. (Lucretius,
De rerum natura, IV, 598.)
(Mankind is too greedy for fabulous tales.)
32. Quantum est in rebus inane. (Persius.)
(How much inanity the re is in things!)
33. Per omnia vanitas. Eecl., 1.
(All is vanity.)
34. . .. Servare modum finemque tenere
Naturamque sequi. (Lucan.)
(To observe moderation, to keep within bounds, and to follow nature.
As only the first word is legible, this restoration is highly conjectural.
These !ines of Lucan are quoted in nl :xii, I I 63b.)
35. Quid superbis, terra et einis? (Ecclesiasticus, X, 9.)
("Bourbe et cendre, qu'as tu a te glorifier?" n :xii, 554a.)
36. Vre qui sapientes estis in oculis vestris. Isa. V.
(Woe to you who are wis e in your own eyes.)
37. Fruere jucunde prresentibus, cretera extra te.
(Enjoy the present with good humor; the rest is beyond your control.)
38. IIocv't"L A6y~ A6yoe; tcroe; &v't"LX€L't"IXL. (Sextus Empirieus, Hypotyposes, I:
xxvii.)
r'Il n'y a raison qui n'en aye une contraire," II :xv, 6goa.)
39. Nostra vagatur
In tenebris nee ereca potest mens eernere verum.
(Michel de I'Hospital.)
(Our mind wanders in darkness and, being blind, cannot discern the
truth.)
 APPENDIX I

40. Fecit Deus hominem similer umbrre de qua post solis occasum
quis judicabit? Eccl., 7.
("Dieu a fait l'homme semblable a l'ombre; de laqueHe qui jugera,
quand, par l'esloignement de la lumiere, eHe sera esvanouye?"
II :xii, 554a.)
41. Solum certum nihil esse certi homine nihil miserius aut superbius.
(Pliny, Natural History, II: vii.)
("Il n'est rien certain que l'incertitude et rien pIus miserable et pIus
fier que l'homme," II :xv, 6goa, replaced in editions after 1588 by
the Latin original.)
42. Ex tot Dei operibus nihilum magis cuiquam homini incognitum
quam venti vestigium. Eccl., XI.
(Out of all the works of God not one is any better known to any man
than the tracks of the wind. No such text can be found in Ecclesi-
astes or Ecclesiasticus.)
43. "AMwnv &Moc, &E6JV 1'Z xav&pw1t'WV fLeAE~. (Euripides, Hippolytus,
104.)
(Everyone, men and gods, has his preferences.)
44. 'Erp' <!)?POVE~C, fLey~O'1'ov, a1t'OAE~ 1'ou1'o O'E, 1'0 30xz~v 'm' dv~~. (Men-
ander, in Stobreus.)
(Your belief that you are some one will undo you because you think
arrogant thoughts.)
45. T~p&O'O'z~ 1'ouc; av&pw1t'ouc, ou 1'0: 7tP&YfL~1'~, aMO: 1'0: T:Zpt 1'6JV 7tP~YfL&-
1'wv lloYfLx1'X. (Epictetus, Enchiridion X, in Stobreus.)
("Les hommes sont tourmentes par l'opinion qu'ils ont des choses,
non par les choses memes," I :xiv, 6ga.)
46. K~AOV ?POVE~V 1'OV &v'YJ1'ov av&pw7to~c: rO'~. (Euripides, in Stobreus.)
(It is right for a mortal to think humbly human thoughts.)
47. Quid retemis minorem
Consiliis animum fatigas?
(Horace, Odes, II, xi, ii.)
(Why do you tire your lowly mind with eternal designs?)
48. Judicia Dominia abyssus multa. Psalm., 35.
(The judgments of the Lord are a great abyss.)
49. OUIle:V op[~w. (Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes, I :xxiii.)
("Je n'etablis rien," II:xii, 56Ia.)
50. Ou XIX1'XAlXfL~&vw. (Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes. I :xxvi.)
("Je ne le comprends point." II:xii, s6Ia.)
 APPENDIX I 337

51. 'E7tEZW. (Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes, I :xxii.)

("Je soutiens, je ne bouge," II :xii, 562a.)
52. ~XE7t1"O[LIXL.
(I observe.)
53. More duce et sensu.
(With eustom and the senses as my guide.)
54. Judicio alternante.
(With hesitant judgment.)
55. 'AxlX1"IXA1J7t1"w. (Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes, I :xxvi.)
(I do not understand.)
56. (Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes, I :xix.)
OU~E:V [LiiAAov.
(No more this way than that way.)
57. ' APPE7tW~.
(Without inclining in either direction.)
 APPENDIX II

REFERENCES TO MONTAlGNE
IN BA YLE'S WORKS

The references listed below are divided into five groups:

I. Quotations from the Essais
II. Passages of the Essais referred to (usuaUy in a footnote), but not cited.
III. Remarks made by Bayle mentioning Montaigne as an author.
IV. References to Montaigne as a historieal figure, not considering his
quality as an author.
V. References to Montaigne in passages not written by Bayle, but quoted
in his works
For the Dictionnaire, the name of the artide and the letter of its note will
usuaUy suffice. In cases where Bayle does not quo te the Essais, the Roman
I~umeral footnote or the Roman letter footnote in the Dictionnaire is given.
An asterisk by an entry indicates that the entry is not referred to in the
Index to the Dictionnaire or the Oeuvres diverses.
The entries are made in chronological order.
One minor matter. The edition of the Essais used by Bayle foIlows the
order in Book I established by the 1595 edition. This order differs from the
modem one in that I :xiv becomes I :xl. Therefore, any reference of Bayle's
to an essay between number fourteen and number forty of Book I will be
one figure lower than the modern numeration. Bayle makes no use of I :xiv;
so that potential source of confusion is avoided. This appendix foUows
modern numeration.

I. Quotations from the Essais.

1.* OD IV, 537 r : II:xvii, 629a. In a letter to Basnage, 28 December
16 72 •
2. OD IV, 543 r : ?l In a letter to Minutoli, 31 January 1673.
3. OD IV, 548l : I :xxxvii, 226b. In a letter to Minutoli, 8 March 1674.

1 OD gives "le defaut de Montagne (sie) qui est de sauair quelqllefais ee queje dis, mais non
jamais ee queje vais dire." The italies are meant to indieate that Bayle is quoting. I have not
located this passage in the Essais. It may be an unaeeurate eitation from memory.
 APPE:'.iDIX II 339

I. Quotations from the Essais (cont.).

In the Pensies diverses (1683).
4. OD III, 36 r : III:xi, 1003-1004b, c.
5. OD III, Il8 r : II:xii, 419c.
In the Nouvelles Lettres de l' auteur de la Critique geniraie de l' Histoire du
calvinisme (1685).
6. OD II, 169 r : II :xii, 549b.!
7.* OD II, 191 r: III:vii, 894b.
8. OD II, 289 r : III :v, 847b.
9. OD II, 290 r : III :v, 875b, c.
10. * OD II, 293 i : III :v, 834b.
I I. * OD II, 308 r : II :ii, 329a.
12. OD II, 318 r : 1:1, 29Ia. (See 76.)
13. OD II, 33 I i : II :xxxvii, 737-738 a, c.
14. OD II, 33 Ir: I :xxxvii, 225a, c.
In the Commentaire philosophique (1686).
15. OD II, 400 r : II :v, 348 a, b, c. (See 80.)
In the Nouvelles de la ripublique des leUres.
16.* OD I, 687 r, November 1686, IV : III:x, looob. (See 77 and 92.)
In the Dictionnaire historique et critique.
17. DHCp Achille E, 159 i : I:xxvi, 162a. (See 73.)
18. DHCp Hotman I, 280 r : II:xii, 420C.2
19. DHCl Aritin, Pierre B, 297 r : I :1i, 295a.
20. DHCl du Bellai, Guillaume E, 257-258 : II :x, 399-400a.
2 I. DHCl Brossier B, 161 i : III :xi, Io04b.
22. DHCl Dioscoride B, 545 i : I :1vi, 307-308c.
23. * DHCl Flora art., 494 r : III :iii, 804b. (See 105')
24. DHCl Fontevraud M, 5 I 2 r : III :v, 833b.
25. * DHCl Gournai A, 185 r : II :xvii, 64S-646c.
26. DHCl Guarini, Baptiste D, 306 i : III :v, 834-835b, c.
27. DHCl Guicciardin E, 331 i : II:x, 399a.
28. * DHCl Hilene G, 532 i : III :v, 841-842b.
29. * DHCl Herlicius H, 99 r : III :v, 827b.
30. DHCl Junon I, 505-506 : I :xx.x, 197c.
31.* DHCl Lorraine D, 366 r : I:xvii, 71-72a.
32. * DHCl Lorraine K, 369 i : II :xx.xii, 699c.
33. * DHCl Luther Q, 563 r : III :v, 832-833b.
34. * DHCl Napies, Jeanne /ere C, 8 r : III :v, 864b, c.
35. * DHCl Putianus I, 372 i : III :v, 859-860b.
36. * DHCl Sebonde art., 2 I7 i : II :xii, 41 7a.
37.* DHCl Sebonde C, 218l : II:xii, 4IS-416a.

1 The footnote in OD rnistakenly refers to II: ii.

2 In the Project etfragmens d'un dictionnaire critique there was no artide on Hotman. Note I
was then Note A of the artide Brutus, Etienne Junius.
 APPENDIX II

I. Quotations from the Essais (cont.).

38.* DHCl Sebonde C, 218i : II:xii, 416a.
39.* DHCl Sebonde D, 218 r : II:xii, 416-417a.
40.* DHCl Sebonde D, 21g i : II:xii, 417a.
41.* DHCl Sebonde D, 21g l : II:xii, 425-426a.
42.* DHCl Sebonde D, 21g l : II:xii, 417a.
43. * DHCl Sebonde D, 2 I gr: II :xii, 425a.
44. * DHCl Thesmophories C, 121 r : III :v, 836b.
45. * DHCl Xenophanes E, 607 r : III :v, 83gc.
46. DHC2 Acarnanie B, 108 r : II :xxxvi, 732a.
47.* DHC2 Accius L, 121 r : I:x, 40a, b.
48. DHC2 Castallion K, 539 i : I :xxv, 220-221 a.
4g. * DHC2 Charron I, g8 l : II :xi, 408a.
50.* DHC2 Democrite T, 476 r : II:xii, 4gO-4gla. (See go.)
51. DHC2 Edouard IV C, gl r : III:viii, gl8--glg b, c.
52. DHC2 Ermite H, 260 r : II :ii, 325C.
53. DHC2 Euclide E, 318 l : III:viii, 904b, c.
54. * DHC2 Fontevraud 0, 515 l : II :xi, 409a.
55. * DHC2 Fontevraud 0, 5 I 5 l : II :ii, 326c.
56. DHC2 Franfois d' Assise D, 547 l : II :xi, 408-409a.
57. * DHC2 Hospital 0, 266 r : II :xvii, 62ga.
58.* DHC2 Marie l'Egyptienne D, 284 r : I:xxvi, 171a.
59. * DHC2 Petit B, 670 i : III :x, 9goc.
60. * DHC2 Porcius H, 278 r : II :xxxvii, 745a.
61. DHC2 Surena A, 568 l : III :xiii, 1088b, c.
62. DHC2 TimoUon I, 188, l : III:viii, gl1-g12b.
63. DHC4 Guevara H, 326 r : I :xlviii, 28 I a.
64. DHC4 Papesse G, 374 l : II :xii, 548, 566-567a. (See 121.)
In Reponse aux questions d'un provincial - Pt I (17°3).
65. * OD III, 501-502 : III :ix, 974'.
In Continuation des Pensees diverses (1704).
66. OD III, Ig3 i : III:viii, g21--g22b.
In Reponse aux questions d' un provinciai - Pt II (I 7°5) .
67. OD III, 660 r, n. (z) : III :v, 854-855b.
68. * OD III, 778 l, n. (s) : II :x, 388c.
In Reponse aux questions d'un provincial - Pt III (1706).
69. OD III, 951 i, n. (a) : III :vii, 8g8b.

II. Passages of the Essais referred to, but not cited.

In the Pensees diverses (1683).
70. * OD III, 36 i : II :xii, 4go-4gla. (See go.)
71. * OD III, 48 I : I :xxix, Iggb.
72.* OD III, 96 I : I:lvi, 31Oa.
 APPENDIX II 341

II. Passages referred to, but not cited (cont.).

In the Nouvelles de la ripublique des lettres.
73. * OD I, 143 I, October 1684, IV : I :xxvi, 162a. 1
In the Nouvelles Lettres de i' auteur de ia Critique generaie de i' Histoire du
caivinisme (1685).
74.* OD II, 313 i, n. (E) : II:xxix, 684a.
In the Nouvelles de ia republique des ieUres.
75. * OD I, 490 i, February 1686, III: II :xvii, 629a.2
In the Dictionnaire historique et critique.
76.* DHCl Democrite N, 472 i : 1:1, 291a.3
77.* DHCl Loyer C (8), 304 I : III:x, IOoob. 4
78. * DHCl Pirieles G (54), 598 i : I :ii, 15a.
79.* DHC2 Chelonis art. (b), 129i : III:xiii, I079-80b.
80. * DHC2 Grevius C (5), 260 i : II :v, 348a, b, c. 5
81.* DHC2 Priolo K (42), 334, i : II:xvii, 630a.
82.* DHC2 Ruffi A (5), 650 r : III:xiii, I047b.
83. * DHC2 Saint-Cyre B (15), 44 r : III :v, 847b.
84.* DHC2 Sforce, Franfois F (37), 268 I : III:v, 837b.
85.* DHC4 Juies III E, 456 r : III:viii, 9I4b. 6
In Reponse aux questions d'un provincial - Pt I (17°3).
86. * OD III, 507 I : III :ix, 950b.
87. * OD III, 523 r : ?7
88. * OD III, 542 i : III :v, 837b, e.
89. * OD III, 578 I : III :xi, IOIOb.
In the Continuation des Pensees diverses (17°4).
90. * OD III, 532 r : II :xii, 490-49Ia.8
91. * OD III, 276 I : II :xi, 414a, e, and II :xii, 429-465.

1 Bayle here paraphrases the passage he will quote in DHCP Achille (17).
2 Bayle refers to a passage he willlater eite (S7).
3 Bayle refers to the essay and to 12.
4 Bayle refers to the essay and to 16.
5 Note (4) of Grivius refers to Bayle's previous citation of this passage (IS).
6 The footnote erroneously refers to III: vi.
7 This referenee is doubtful. Bayle explains the meaning of the words "cheval du regne,"
purportedly found in the Essais though he admits he does not know where. Sinee the usage
is not liSled in the lexicon in Volume V of the Municipal Edition, I suspect that Bayle's
memory (or his souree) has misled him. It is perhaps while searching for the term in "Des
destriers" (I: xlviii) that he eame aeross Montaigne's remark on Guevara (63) and inserted
it in the Dictionnaire.
8 This partieular passage is referred to three times in Bayle; onee in the Pensees diverses (70),
onee in the Dictionnaire (So), and here. Bayle was impressed by the story of Demoeritus and
the figs (See supra p. 87) as he had read it in Montaigne. \"nen he repeated it in his
works he was disturbed that he eould not find any souree for the aneedote more ancient
than the essayist. Twenty years after first using the incident, he found Montaigne's souree,
Plutareh's Symposium; but he found it several days after the compietian of the second edition
of the Dictionnaire and eould only make a note of it for inclusion in later (posthumous)
editions.
342 APPENDIX II

II. Passages referred to, but not cited (cont.).

In Reponse aux questions d'un provincial Pt II (1705).

92. * OD III, 659 r : III :x, 1000b. 1

III. Remarks made by Bayle mentioning Montaigne as an author.

93.* OD IV, 54r i. In a letter to Minutoli, 3r January r673. (M. op en ly

professes Pyrrhonism.)
94.* OD IB, 52 i. In a letter to Jacob Bayle, r3 July r675. (Bayle and
M. do not speak much because they lack a good memory.)

In the Nouvelles Lettres de i' auteur de la Critique generaie de l' Histoire du

calvinisme (r 685).
95. * OD II, 291 r. (M. and Brantõme must be censored before quoting
thern.)
96.* OD II, 318 i. (M. and Boileau defend animals.)
97. * OD II, 329 i. (Seneca more tranquil than M., who ridicules mankind
alo ng with Democritus.)
In the Dictionnaire historique et critique.
98. * DHCI Hobbes E, r 64 i. (M's judgment of Guicciardini.) 2
99. * DHCI Rorarius D, 598 r. (M. a modem defending animals.)
roo.* DHCI Preface (vol. XVI) 9 r (M. and Brantöme risque.)
I0r.* OD I B, r8r r. In letter to Naudis, 30 August r697. (Renaudot
criticizes quotes from M. and Brantõme.)
102. DHC vol. XV, 248 r. (M. risque - in Reflexions sur le pretendujugement
du publique.)
r03. DHC2 Charron B, 9r r. (Charron takes ideas from Essais.)
104'* DHC2 Charron 0, r02 r. (M., as a layman, mayexpress himselfmore
audaciously than Charron may.)
105. * DHC2 Flora D, 498 i. (Guevara is M's source for 23.)
106. * DHC2 Ossat E, 277 i. (M. should not be put in modem French.)
107. * DHC2 Philistus E, 28 t. (Essais' lack of order one of their charms.)
108. DHC2 Eclaircissemens (vol. XV), 27r t. (M.'s freedom as layman
compared with Charron's.)
r09. * DHC2 Eclaircissemens (vol. XV), 334 i. (Bayle cites M. and Brantõme
with prudence.)
I roo * DHC2 Eclaircissemens (vol. XV), 357 r. (M. and Brantöme may be
quoted legitimately in a dictionary.)

1 Bayle refers to his earlier quotation of this story (16). See al so 77.
2 Note (16) of this article refers to 27.
 APPEl\"DIX II 343

IV. Referenees to Montaigne as a historieal figure, not considering his

quality as an author, all ofwhieh are in the Dictionnaire.
I I I.* DHCl Andre, Jean E, 85 i. (NIlle de Gournai, M.'s "fille d'allianee.")
1 12.* DHCl Ferrier, Arnaud A, 455 r. (M. regrets Ferrier's eonversion to
Protestantism. )
113. * DHC2 Charron art., 89 r. (Their friendship.)
114. * DHC2 Furius C, 628 i. (M.'s age at death.)
II 5. * DHC2 Navarre, Marguerite de Valois, reine de L, 93 r. (A letter to M.
from du Plessis Mornay cited.)

V. Referenees to Montaigne in passages not written by Bayle, but quoted

in his works.
In the Dictionnaire historique et critique.
1 16. * DHCl Bose, Pierre du I, 7 r. (Menage: M. dislikes square hats of
priests.)
II7.* DHCl Epieure E, 175 r. (Naude: M. is a eompiler often read.)
118.* DHCl Goulart C, 174 r. (Sealiger: Goulart was right to "ehatrer"
Essais.)
119.* DHC2 Charron 0, 102 l. (Sorel: Charron eopies :\1.)
120.* DHC2 Perrot, Nieolas F, 641 r. (Patru: Perrat eompared to M.)
In Reponse aux questions d'un provineial - Pt I (1703).
12 I. * OD III, 598 n. (i). (Bouehet: mentions II :xii, 566-S67a, "question
pour l'amy." Bayle quotes same passage in 64.)
In Continuation des Pensees diverses (1704).
122. * OD III, 209 r. (Rapin: M. read by libertines.)
In Reponse aux questions d'un provineial - Pt III (1706).
123.* OD III, 933 n. (0). (Bernard: eites M. in Lettres historiques.)
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. PIERRE BAYLE

BAYLE, PIERRE. Oeuvres diverses de l'.Ir. Pierre Bayle, professeur en philosophie et en histoire, a
Rotterdam: contenant tout ce que cet auteur a puhli! sur des matieres de tMologie, de philosophie, de
critique, d'histoire, et de litterature excepte son Dictionnaire historique et critique. 2nd ed. 4 vols.
The Hague (Trevoux): Compagnie des Libraires, 1737.
Dictionaire historique et critique par 1'.'1. Bayle. 4 vols. Rotterdam: Leers, 1697.
Dictionaire historique et critique par Monsieur Bayle. Seconde edition. Revue, corrigee &
augmentee par l'autheur. 3 vols. Rotterdam: Leers, 1702.
Dictionaire historique et critique par Mr. Pierre Bayle. Troisieme edition, revue corrigee, et
augmentee par l'autheur. 4 vols. Rotterdam: Michel Bohm, 1720.
- Dictionaire historique et critique par Mr. Pierre Bayle. Quatrieme edition, revue, corrigee, et
augmentee avec la vie de l'auteur par Mr. Des Maizeaux. 4 vols. Amsterdam: P.
Brunei, R.J. Westem, G. Smith, H. Waesberge; P. Humbert; F. Honore; Z. Chatelain;
P. Mortier, and Lcyden: Samuel Luchtmans, 1730.
Dictionnaire historique et critique. Nouvelle edition augmentee de notes extraites de Chaufe-
pie, Joly, La Monnoie, Leduchat, L-J Le Clerc, Prosper Marchand etc., etc. ed. A.
J. Q.Beuchot. 16 vols. Paris: Desoer, 1820.
- Pens!es diverses sur la comete, ed. A. Prat. Societe des Textes Frant;ais Modemes. 2 vols.
Paris: Droz, 1939.
- Projet etfragmens d'un dictionaire critique. Rotterdam: Leers, 1692.
- ed. Recueil de quelque pieces curieuses concemant la philosophie de ,Uonsieur Descartes. Amster-
dam: Henri Desoordes, 1684.
Letters:
Bayle'scorrespondance, in part unedited,has bcen published fragmentarily in many journals.
An extremely valuable guide to the letters can be found in Elisabeth Labrousse's
Inventaire critique de la co"espondance de Pierre Bayle (q.v.), especially pp. 50-53. Below are
listed some of the most important collections.
Manuscript sources consulted.
Bibliotheque Nationale, F.F. 9359.
British Museum, Desmaizeaux Collection, Add. 4226.
Columbia University, Autograph Letters of Pierre Bayle written between 1670 and
1706, Special Colleetions X843 B34.
Printed letters.
Brown, Harcourt."Pierre Bayle and Natural Science," Romanic Redew, XXV (1934),
361-367.
Courtines, Leo Pierre. "Bayle and his English Correspondents: Four Unpublished
Letters," Romanic Review, XXVII (1936), 104-109.
Denis, Dom Paul. "Lettres inedites de Pierre BayJe," Ret'ue d'Histoire Litteraire de la
France, XIX-XX (1912-13),422-453,916-938,430-449.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 345
Gerig, John L. and G. L. van Roosbroeck. "Unpublished Letters of Pierre Bayle,"
Romanic Review, XXII (1931),210-217; XXIII (1932),21-23,117-128,206-224,
312-320; XXIV (1933), 17-20,210-222,303-314; XXV (1934), 15-24, 341-360.
Haase, Erich. "Quelques pages inedites de la correspondance de Bayle," Bulletin d,
la Societe de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Franfais, CIII (1957),267-288.
Hawkins, Richmond Laurin. "Two Unpublished Freneh Letters," Romanie Review,
XXIII (1932), 14-19.
Hoeven, Abraham des Amorie van der. De Joanne Clerico et Philippo a Limborch Disser-
tationes dUd!. Amsterdam: Frederiek Muller, 1843, pp. 262-26+.

B. MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE
MONTAlGNE, MICHEL DE. Oeuvres completes de Michel de Montaigne, ed. Dr. Arthur Armaingaud.
12 vols. Paris: Conard, 1924-41.
Oeuvres completes. Textes etablis par Albert Thibaudet et Maurice Rat. Introduction et
notes par Maurice Rat. Bibliotheque de la Pleiade. Paris: Gallimard, 1962.
The Complete Works rif Montaigne, tr. Donald M. Frame. Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1957.
- L'Apologie de Raymond Sebond, ed. Paul Porteau. Paris: F. Aubier, 1937.
- Les Essais de !viiehei de Montaigne. Nouvelle Edition Enrichie et Augmentee aux marges
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SHAFTESBURY, ANTHONY, 3rd earl of. The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen
of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, ed. Benjamin Rand. l'\ew York: Macmillan and London:
Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Lim., 1900.
SPINK, J. S. French Free- Thought from Gassendi to Voltaire. London: Athlone Press, 1960.
STÄUDUN, CARL FRIEDRICH. Geschichte und Geist des Skepticismus. 2 vols. Leipzig: Curusius,
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STROWSKI, FORTUNAT. Montaigne. 2nd ed. Paris: Alcan, 193!.
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TAVERA, FRAN<;:OIS. L'ldee d'humanili dans Montaigne. Paris: Champion, 1932.
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 INDEX

Academic skepticism: 4-5, 7,103,142,176-177,2°3, 2+6n, 282.

Acosta, Uriel: 281-282.
Adam, Antoine: 246n, 251, 300.
Adam,Jean: 296 .
..Enesidemus: 8, 10, II.
Agrippa (Greek philosopher): 8, 12.
Agrippa, Cornelius (von Nettesheim): 2S-27, 30, 33n, +8-49, 8+, 18S.
akatalepsia: 7, 164, 282.
Alexander the Great: 296.
Amyot,Jacques: 8In.
Amyrault, Moses: 198, 199.
Ancillon, David: 210.
angeis: see "spirits."
animais: 10, 14,28,3°, 78-82, 132,273.
"Apologie de Raimond Sebond": 62-120,13,27,3°, 5S-56n, 121, 12 3, 126, 135, 141, 142,
146,15°,151,152,157,182,183,187-188,2°3, 218n, 261, 330.
Aquinas, Saint Thomas: 66, 175,208.
Arcesilas: 6, 7.
Aristotle: 28, 30, 33, 83, 87,125,16+, 170n, 175, 177,2°4, 20S, 27 1, 276, 277n, 280, 309.
Arm;nians: 236-238, 239.
Arnauld, Antoine: 171, 190,228-231,238.
astrology (and astronomy): 77-78,95-96,1°+,177,216,257.
ataraxia: 9, 87, 107.
atheism: 68, 216-218, 237n, 238, 258, 27+, 311-313, 316.
atomism: 277-279.
Augustine, Saint: 20, 143, 175,212,249,288,295.
authority (for establishment of dogma): 194, 223, 232-233, 298.
d' Autrecourt, Nicolas: 21.
Avicenna: 274.
Bacon, Sir Francis: 147.
Baleus: 252-253.
Balzac, Guez de: 161n, 165, 179.
Barber, W.J.: 195n, 307n.
Barnes, Annie: 198n, 237nn.
Basnage,Jacques: 180,324,325.
Basnage de Beauval, Henri: 307.
Bayle,Jacob: 195, 196, 197,202,2°4, 214n, 215, 247, 2+8, 257n.
Bayle,Jean: 197, 198,201,21 In, 247.
Bayle,Joseph: 192, 196, 198,205, 214ll, 2+7·
Bayle, Pierre:
his skepticism: 189-191,2°3-205,215,221,23°-232,24°,243-246, 249, 259-282, 300 -
3°2,3°3,319-320,328-331.
his personal faith: 194-198,248-249,251,320-327.
 INDEX 353

his temperament: 184, 191-192,235-236,248-249,251.

his objectivity: 191,202,2°3-2°4,238,251,259-260,3°9,322.
puts morals over dogma: 215, 248-249, 295, 297.
his anonymity: 192n, 214, 221, 240.
pronunciation of his name: 195.
his correspondence: 196-197n, 256.
and Montaigne: 179-193, 1-2,73,93,166, 17on, 172, 174,328-331.
and Descartes: 178, 314. (See "Descartes.")
and Carneades: 8.
works by:
Avis important aux rifugiis: 246.
Cabale chimerique: 246, 325.
Ce que c'est que la France toute catholique: 239, 247.
Commentaire philosophique: 239-245, 248, 249, 298, 319, 323.
Continuation des Pensees diverses: 258n, 306, 307, 308, 3°9, 311, 31.!> 315, 317n.
Cours de philosophie: 205-209, 212, 219n, 221n, 230, 231, 24,1, 262.
Critique generaie du Calvinisme de Maimbourg: 221-224, 212n, 21-J,ll, 232, 254, 292n.
Dictionnaire historique et critique: 251-305, 6n, 19n, 26n, 164" 174, 176, 180n, 18m, 182,
188, 189, 19m, 201n, 202, 215n, 218n, 222n, 232, 233n, 245, 247n, 248, 307, 308,
311,317,319,320, 322, 3~4, 329, 330. (Composition ofDHC: 182n, 182-183, 184,
192n, 240, 246, 250--252, 293.)
Dissertation: 211-212.
Entretiens de Maxime et de Thimiste: 283n, 290, 307.
Nouvelles de la republique des let/res: 227-238, 20m, 219n, 224" 240, 258n, 275n, 28m,
284n, 292n, 296. (Under Bernard: 308.)
Nouvelles Let/res sur la Critique geniraie: 224-227, 181, 186, 242, 246n.
Objections to Poiret: 2°9-2 I I, 3 I 3n, 313-314.
Pensees diverses: 214-221, 189, 198n, 206n, 226, 24m, 257n, 258nn, 330.
Projet d'un dictionaire: 246, 250.
Recueil de quelques pieces curieuses: 2 I I.
Riponses aux questions d'unprovincial: 306-308. (I: 188, 312n, 3q; II: 228, 315n; III:
258n, 280, 309, 313n.)
Suppliment au Commentaire philosophique: 243, 244n, 300n, 303n.
Theses: 211, 212-213.
Bekker, Balthasar: 215n, 258n, 233.
Belgic Confession: 217n, 220n, 243n, 279n, 285n.
Belbrmine, Cardinal: 161.
Berigard, Claude: 314.
Berkeley, George: 27m, 313n.
Bernard,Jacques: 308, 309n, 315n, 319.
Bernier, Fran<;ois: 212.
Beza, Theodore: 202.
Bible: 40, 84, 88, 9 1, 124,253,317.
divine!y inspired: 64-65, 110, I I m, 119, 162-163, 173-174,235,237,238,284,287,291-
29 8 ,3° 1 •
textual criticism: 164,201,202,224,234-235,241-242.
as proof of sorcerers' existence: 14,3, 258.
Bodin,Jean: 143.
body: 97, 150,273.
Boileau: 181.
Bossuet: 173, 179, 2 I 7n.
Browne, Sir Thomas: 285.
Brues, Guy de: 26, 28-30.
Bruno, Giordano: 276.
Bune!, Pierre: 27, 62, 101.
Cain: 293-294.
calendar: 142.
Calvin, Jean: 283, 288.
Calvinism (Calvinists): 178, 198,222,236-237,288,291,315.
Campanella, Tomasso: 165.
354 INDEX
Camus,Jean-Pierre: 161.
Cameades: 6, 7-8, 34, 142, 189, 246n, 259, 300.
Catherine de Bourbon: 75.
Catholicism: 170,253,255.
and skepticism: 18-19,23,24, 162-163,320.
and Montaigne: 38,42,92, 93n, 95, I I In, 115, 130.
Cato ofUtica: 57, 91, 97.
Caussin, Nicolas: 16!.
censorship, French: 161,222.
Dutch: 322-324.
Chanet, Pierre: 165.
Charron, Pierre: 160-161, 164ll, 187, 259n.
Cherbury, Herbert: 164n, 166.
Chillingworth, William: 166.
Chouet,Jean-Robert: 20!.
Christ: 113-114, 229n, 241, 285, 296n, 309, 310.
church fathers: 163.
Cicero: 6, 27, 28, 46n, 83, 89, 141, 18a, 184ll, 203, 259.
Claude, Jean: 298.
Coeffeteau, Nicolas: 252-253.
Commines, Philippe de: 183.
conscience: 154, 155, 233, 234, 242-243, 245·
conservatism: 47, 51-52, 90, 104-105, 117, 129-130, 33!.
Constant de Rebecque, David: 240n, 258n.
controversy (books of): 199-200, 205n, 239, 245, 253, 265, 306-308.
Copemicus: 1°4, I 16, 206.
Coppin, Joseph: 38n, 63n , 64n, 67, 69nn, 72n, 73n, 75, 94ll·
Coste, Pierre: 179, 262n, 308-31I.
Cotin, Charles: 165.
councils: 163, 223.
Counter Reformation: 95, 160, 161-163.
creation (creator): 92,93,94,208,229,235,241,276-277,280.
criterion:
in matters offaith: 23-24, 148n, 163,194,2°7,223-224,232-233,298-3°2.
in philosophy: 15-17,44, 9g-IOI, 106, 108, 177, 19°,212,219,316.
self-evidence (revidence): 168, 170-171, 178,206-2°7,231-232, 244, 255, 262-270, 272,
297-298,3°0-3°2,317-319,
moral certitude (see also "probability"): 17°,2°7,233,254-255,297-298,299-3°2.
critical reason: 145n, 2 I I n, 232, 255, 284, 304.
Cudworth, Ralph: 307, 31 1,327.
curiosity: 82-83, 84, 90.
custom: 51-52, 131, 138, 143.
Daille,Jean: 162, 165.
death: 54-55,57,58-59, 5g-60, 84, 92.
deism: 95, 220, 234, 238, 248.
Delvolve,Jean: 2, 195n, 21 In, 212n, 226n, 241n, 246nn, 274n, 2BBn, 307n, 32 1.
demiurge: 27B.
Democritus: 87, 105, 146, 184, I 88n.
demon hypothesis: 167, 168, 170.
Descartes, Rene: 147n, 164, 165, 166, 167-172, 174-175, 177, 178, 182, 19°,2°4, 2I1, 220n,
221n, 225n, 229, 231n, 260, 264, 265, 266, 271, 273, 289n, 291-292, 322.
cagita: 166, 167-169, 174-175, 178,206,207,266-267.
Cartesian metaphysics: 169,201,2°4-2°5,272, 279n, 280, 281, 301, 308, 3°9, 311-312.
proofof God's existence: 169,2°9,212.
theory oftruth: 167-168,206-2°7,230-231,265.
moral certitude: 169-17°,233.
Deschamps, Arsene: I.
Desmaizeaux, Pierre: [80,228,236,313.
Vie de Bayle: 194n, 195n, [98n, 2[5n, 240n, 246n, 247.
devil: 258, 298n, 31!.
 INDEX 355

Dibon, Paul: 25 I, 320.

Diderot, Denys: 257.
Diogenes: 276.
Diogenes Laertius: 6, 8, 14n, 27, 8gn, 164n, 259.
discussion: 146- I 47.
diversity:
in men: 46, 56-58, 79, 103-1°4.
ofopinions: 51, 98--99,103,133-134.
of possibilities: 46, 49.
ofcustoms and laws: 51,105.
makes generalizations impossible: 139, 148.
divination: 7,41,48.
Dohna, Count of: 180.
Dolet. Etienne: 2 I.
Dort (Dordrecht), Synod of: 236, 238.
double truth: 21-22, 284.
Doumic, Rene: 2.
dreams: 257-258.
Dreano, Mathurin: I, 31n, 38nn, 75n, 101, 113, 139n, 140n, 179n, 189n.
Duns Scotus: 20.
Ecclesiastes: 78, I 19.
Edict of Nantes: 227, 236, 239, 247, 248, 324.
education: 132-133, 137,218,244,287,299.
Elizabeth I: 306.
Emerson, Ralph "Valdo: 37n, 157.
Epicurus: 88, 91, 93n, 165,2°4,212,217,218,278.
epochi: 7n, 9, 88.
Erasmus: 25,84,202, 288n.
essay form: 136-137.
Estienne, Henri: 17,3°-31,76,88,261.
l'Estoile, Pierre de: 161.
ethics: see "reason, practical."
Euripides: 92, 119.
evidenee: see "criterion."
evil, problem of: gl, 93, 97, 209n, 210-211, 219n, 226-230, 239, 288-29 1, 303, 307-308.
examination by individual conscience: 161, 223-224, 232-233, 298-299, 320.
experience (see also "fact"): 59, 105, 107, 147-149,217,266,273,289,3°1.
extension: 261-262, 271-272, 275.
facts: 104, 106, LH, 157,317-320,331.
require demonstration before being explained: 144-145, 189,216,257.
in DHC: 252-253, 273, 287, 297n, 301, 303.
faith: 45,111-113,2°7,285,287,3°2.
fall of man: 65, 84, 2 I I, 229, 235.
du Ferron, Arnould: 27.
Ferry, Paul: 162, 165.
fideism: 18-19,44-46,69,91-95,98, 111-116, Ilg, 139-140, 141-142, 161, 179n, 213, 215,
264, 29 1-300, 320, 329.
Flacius Illyricus: 252-253.
Fludd, Robert: I 64n.
Fontenelle, Bernard de: 228n, 232, 235-236, 324.
fortune: 50, 102n.
Foucher, Abbe Simon: 176-177,259,261.
Frame, Donald M.: 37, 38n, 40n, 54n, 70n, 73n, 74n, 76nn, 8In, 94/l, 113n, 136n, 150n.
free will: 132,211,236,257,267-268,280-281,290, 308n.
Freud, Sigmund: 122.
Friedrich, Hugo: 35, 37n, 46n, 52n, 67n.
Furly, Benjamin: 308.
Gaillard, Jacques: 204.
Galileo: 165.
gallicanism: 223.
 INDEX

Garasse, Pierre: 161, 165.

Gassendi, Pierre: 163, 164-165, 166, 170, 171, 178, 189,2°5,261,262,277,281.
Gaudin, Dom Alexis: 1,307.
geometry: see "mathematies."
God: 46, 84, 109, I 13.
existenee of: 169,173,206,208-2°9,212-213, 217n, 219, 220, 227, 284, 286, 3 11 , 3 15-
3 1 7.
nature of: 91-92, 94, 98, 110, 208, 220, 234, 266, 28~291, 312-314, 3 16.
and nature: 46, 49, 63, 114, 132-133, 155-156,311-312.
veracity of: 169, 171,2°7-208,224,262,265,284,291-292,3°2,317.
benevolenee of: 199-200,248,258,289-291,317-318.
wisdom of: 225, 226n, 22~227, 228, 229, 239, 267n.
alone ean know: 145, 146, 149.
Goldast: 252-253.
Gontery, Father: 161.
Goumay, Jeanne de: 18ID.
graee: 170, 198-199, 21~217, 236, 287, 298, 299.
Gra:vius: 2 I 5n.
Gretser: 252-253.
Grew,Joseph: 307.
Guieeiardini, Franeeseo: 186.
habit: 44, 54, 2 18, 225, 244.
Hazard, Paul: 163n, 300.
Henri III: 256.
Heraclitus: 11-12,46, 105, 108,328.
Herodotus: 76n, 92.
Hervet, Gentian: 28, 30, 32, 261.
historiography: 184-185,221-222,235,253-256.
Holland: 191,315,322-324.
Homer: 50, 119·
honesty: 126-127, 144.
de I'Hospital, Michel: 119.
Huet, Gedeon: 240, 252.
Huet, Pierre-Daniel: 173-176, 177, 18ID, 262, 269, 320.
Hume, David: 32, 313n.
idolatry: 195, 196,216.
ignoraaee:
as good as, or better than, philosophy: 54, 57, 83-85, 145·
inevitable: 87, 91--92, 126, 130,2°4,231,303.
immortality of the soul: 19n, 93n, 97, 98, 206, 209, 210, 220-221, 281, 282, 3°6, 308n, 309,
3 1 7.
ineamation: 65, 241, 262, 275.
ineomprehensibility (see also "akatalipsia"): 208, 2 I I, 23 I, 234, 266, 268, 270-272, 276,
277,291,3°0-3°2,318.
ineonstaney: see "diversity."
independence (of innerlife): 52, 54, 129-130, 150- I 5 I, 159·
index (of a book): 18ID.
Index of Prohibited Books: 26n, 38, 39n, 95, I 13n, 16o, 16 I n, 179·
instinet: 81, 225, 226, 227.
Jansenism (Jansenists): 178,221,224,296.
Janssen, Herman: 19n, 69n, 112n, 113, 142n.
Jaquelot, Isaac: 306,308, 315n, 317n, 318.
Jerome, Saint: 181.
J esuits: 178, 205n, 2 I I, 296.
Jonah: 295.
J osephus: 296.
Journal de voyage: 139-141.
judgment: 44, 102-105, 106, 107, 127-13°, 132-134, 147, 151, 152.
Jurieu, Pierre: 181, 199, 206n, 236n, 240, 24~247, 252, 258, 288, 291, 295n, 296, 297, 298,
3°7, 3 15, 320, 323, 324, 325.
 INDEX 357
King, William: 307-308.
Kirkegaard, Soren: 320.
La Boetie, Etienne de: 3m, 39, 42, 42n, 53, 60, 1I8, 18m.
Labrousse, Elisabeth: 3, 180n, 195n, 197n, 198n, 20m, 214n, 22m, 237n, 238n, 246n, 253n,
3 13n, 321, 324n .
La Croix du Maine: 182.
La !'vlothe le Vayer, Fran<;ois de: 163, 164, 181, 188, 189,2°3-2°4,259,282,283,322.
Lanson, Gustave: 40n, 75n, 90n, 95, 147n.
La Placette,Josue: 233n, 283.
Larroque, Daniel de: 246.
laws:
ofnature: 46, 92,132,148,151,156,311-313.
positive laws: 105, 143, 148n, 150-151.
Le Clerc,Jean: 236-238, 291, 294, 3°7, 308, 309n, 315n, 324.
Leers, Reinier: 214, 324.
Leibnitz, Gottfried: 307, 318n.
Lenfant,Jacques: 198n, 227n, 237, 240n.
Lenient, Charles: I, 195n, 321.
libertins erudits: see "nouveaux pyrrhoniens."
Locke,John: 165, 178,272,277,3°8-311,314,316,325,
logic: 134,2°5,206,2°7,313.
Logique of Port-Roy al (L'Arl de penser): 179, 189n.
Lorraine, Cardinal of: 28, 31, 32, 185.
Louis XIV: 222, 238.
LucretiliS: 279.
Luther: 22-24, 288.
magic: see "sorcery."
Maimbourg, Louis: 22 I.
Maldonado,Juan: 161,257.
Malebranche, Nieolas de: 176, 178, 179, 190, 2°9, 212, 212n, 226, 227-231, 238, 239, 248,
261, 289n, 315n, 325.
Maniehrean theory: 288-29 I.
Marguerite de Navarre: 187.
Marguerite de Valois: 74-76, 101.
Mariejol,Jean-Hippolyte: 76n, 102.
Marot, Clement: 182.
marriage: 223, 225.
Mary (Virgin): 94.
mathematies: 96, 99-100,167,168,173,206,243,254,266, 26g-270, 27m.
matter: 207,211,234,244,277, 308n, 311-312, 318.
meehanistie philosophy: 278, 311-313.
medallion (Montaigne's): 88.
medeeine: 97, 130-131, 140"
memory: 127-128.
Mersenne, Father: 165, 171.
Mesmes, Henri de: 31, 39.
mieroseope: 177, 273.
Minutoli, Vineent: 180, 182n, 188,203, 2s8n, 308.
miraeulous (mirades): 41, 43, 44, 47, 92, 140-141, 143-145, 219-220, 228-229, 256-259,
295- 2 97.
monism: 276.
Montaigne, Michel de: 6n, 7n, 160, 164n, 166, 167,179,19°,2°3,216, 218nn, 2lgnn, 220n,
225n , 228n, 244n, 250-251, 257n, 259n, 300n.
his skeptieism: 4,10-11,13-17,3°,26-27,33-34,37,39-4°,44-49, 9G-gI, 98-101,105-
107, 115- 120, 130- 135, 138- 139, 142-149, 157-158, 188-189,328-331.
his religion: 42, 45-46, 71-73,93-95, 110-116, 119, 139-145, 154, 156, 187, 189n, 190.
theology: 69, 98, 109, 110, 140.
evolution of his ideas: 35-37,121-122,135,137, 138n.
moralist: 40, 43, 98, 1I7, 136, 185.
read by Bayle: 17g-193.
 INDEX

Montaigne, Pierre Eyquem de: 49, 62, 66-67, 118.

morality (opposed to dogmas): 215, 216-218.
Moreri, Louis: 181, 182, 183.
Morus, Alexander: 199.
Moses: 203, 235, 236, 238, 294, 296.
motion: 270-272, 276, 279n, 286n.
du Moulin, Pierre: 199.
mysteries (ofreligion): 19,65,69,201,202,241,264,275,287, 3og, 318n.
nature:
in general: 78-79, 148, 2 19.
human nature: 57-58, 124, 138, 153.
an individual's nature: 131-132, 138-139.
and God: 46, 49, 63, 114, 132-133, 155-156,311-312.
Naude, Gabriel: 163, 164, 184, 189,2°3-2°4, 259n.
de Naudis, Charles Bruguiere: 18r.
de Naudis,Jean: 182n, 247.
Newton, Sir Isaac: 270n, 271n, 272.
Nicole, Pierre: 163, 233, 298, 325.
nominalism: 20.
Norton, Grace: 40n, 75n.
nouveauxdocteurs: 10r.
nouveaux, pyrrhoniens: 22, 161, 163.
obscenity: 184.
occasionalism: 2°9, 212, 226, 229-23°, 279, 28g, 312-313.
Ochino, Bernardino: 160.
Ockham, William of: 20.
Ogier, Father: 161.
ontological argument: 168,208-2°9,212.
optimism: 134, 155-156, 225-226.
Paduans: 21-22.
pain: 54-56,86.
Papin, Isaac: 298.
Pascal, Blaise: 63, 166, 172-173, 177, 179,269,283,320, 32r.
Pasquier, Etienne: 161n.
passion: 104, 132-133, 153,218,225,226,280.
Patin, Guy: 163, 164, 259n.
Paul, Saint: 19-20, 68n, 84, 91, 92, 113n, 119, 288, 291, 296.
Peletier du Mans,Jacques: loon.
Pellisson, Paul: 298.
du Perron, Cardinal: 16r.
persecution (of French Protestants): 227, 239, 243, 247, 248.
pessimism (rbout man's worth): 85-86, 118-120, 121, 157, 185-187,218,3°3,329-33°.
philosophes: 190.
philosophy: 82-86, 134, 138,2°4,2°9,220,227,230-232,234, 241-!242, 265, 274-282, 284,
285, 3°0-3°1.
Pico della Mirandola, Gian Franceseo: 24-25, 30.
Pielat, Phineas: 324.
Pinsson de RioHes: 195n.
plastic medium: 307.
Plato: 88,91,97,129,134,175,177,182,3°6.
Pleiade: 28.
du Plessis-Mornay, Philippe: 252-253.
Pliny: 78, 92, 119, 182.
Plutarch: 80-81, 1°9, 120, 135, 180.
Pomponazzi, Pietro: 322.
pope: 223, 224, 232.
Popkin, Richard H.: I9n, 22n, 23n, 24IUl, 25, 27n, 30n, 32n, 3~, 160n, 16m, 164, 169,
17m, I76n, 189n, 26I-262n, 271, 317n, 320.
Porphyry: 297-298.
Porteau, Paul: 40n, 45n, 76n.
 INDEX 359

Posidonius: 55, 83·

possibilities: 46, 49, 92, 157·
preambles offaith: 19,213,220-221,262,284,286,291-300.
presumption: 43, 78,80,81,83, 110, 119.
probability: 8, 97, 99, 103, 106, 14:6,204-205,233, 246n, 255, 257, 297-298, 299-302.
Protestantism: 23, 24, 42, 101-102, l~n, 154,215, 217n, 224, 247, 25711, 320.
providenee: 2 I 7n, 230.
Ptolemy: 104.
Pyrrho: 6-7, 14ll, 55, 83, 87, 89, 189,259,331.
Pyrrhonist skepticism: 4-5, 87, 8g-g1, 106-107, 145n, 172, 177,206,233,234,245-246,
260-262, 267, 276n, 282-285, 298, 300, 318, 328-329.
Rabelais: 182, 184.
rafters (inscriptions on): 13, 14, 78nn, 88-89, 92n, 119-120.
Ramus, Petrus: 27.
reason:
combats its own elaims to know the truth: 43, 96, 99-100, 205, 281-282.
practical reason: 50-61, 9o-g1, 131-134, 149-156, 17°,2°7,218,225,241-243,282.
pliability: 51, 96, 97, 101, 104, 106, 129, 144,281.
at a loss in religion: 91-94, 98,170,208,212,234,241,243-246,264-266,288,298,299,
308n, 317-318.
its uses: III, 148,219,227,234,241-242,304-3°5,315-316.
and judgment: 128.
Montaigne's usages of the word: 150-151, 156.
Regis, Pierre-Sylvain: 271.
repentance: 151-153.
reproduction: 97, 273·
revelation (see also "Bible"): 97, 110, 2°7-208, 219-220, 24m, 244, 264-266, 281, 289,
3° 1-3° 2, 3 17.
Rex:, Walter: 198n, 200, 201n, 214n, 242n, 249n, 295n.
Richelieu: 18m, 189.
Rimini, Gregory of: 291.
Rivet, Andre: 252-253.
Robinson, Howard: 246nn, 288-289n, 296nn, 321, 326.
Rohault,Jacques: 271.
Ronsard, Pierre: 28-29, 182.
Rou,Jean, 183n.
Sacrelaire: 209.
Saint-Cyran (Jean Duvergier de Hauranne): 162.
Sainte-Beuve, Charles-Augustin: I, 73, 93, 113.
Saint-Evremond, Charles de: 285.
saints: 66, 94, 236.
de Sales, Saint Francis, 161.
Sanchez, Francisco: 32-34.
Sandberg, Karl C.: 195n, 251, 320, 323n.
Saurnaise, Claude: 201.
Saurin, Elie: 296, 297, 315, 318.
science (scientific method): 9, 34, 41, 106, 147, 164, 177,206, 207n, 258, 260, 26m, 270-274.
Scudery, Mlle de: 16m.
Sebond, Raymond:
Theologia naturalis: g8, 62-66, 155.
Montaigne's translation: 38, 66-67.
Montaigne disagrees with: 40, 45, 71-73, 76,92-93.
Montaigne's assessment of: 66-73.
Bayle's artiele on: 182, 188.
Sedan: 204, 205, 209, 2II.
self-evidence: see "criterion."
self-knowledge: 122-129, 137-139, 149, 155, 156.
Seneca: 53, 58, 83, 109, 127, 135, 182, 183-184ll, 187.
Sennert, Daniel: 273.
senses (perception): 14, 100, 108, 157, 168, 189-190,206,212, 228n, 230, 233n, 261n, gOI.
360 INDEX

Septuagint: 294.
Serrurier, Comelia: 185n, 191, 215nn, 246nn.
Sextus Empiricus: 4, 6, 8--17, 24, 29, 30-32,'83n, 88-89, 89n, 91,108,117-118,163,164,
165, 166, 219n, 259, 260-261, 267n, 282, 331.
Shaftesbury, Anthony, 3rd earl of: 308.
Silhon, Jean de: 166.
Simon, Herve (?) Richard: 293.
Simon, Richard: 163,237.
Simonides: 286.
Sixtus IV: 252.
Socinianism: 234, 237-238, 239, 241, 264, 290, 29 1, 310, 315.
Socrates: 87, 9 1, 94, 97,122,125,131,132,153,154,182,191,330,331.
sorcery: 41-42,49, 143-146, 188,203-204,257, 298n, 3 14-3 15.
Sorel, Charles: 165'
souI: 95, 97, 150. (See aIso "immortality.")
Spanheim, Frederic: 199.
Spinoza,Benedictde: 178,217, 237n, 264, 274-277, 280, 304, 314, 323, 328.
spirits (and angels): 244n, 258--259, 274, 279-280, 290.
stoicism: 54-60, 82, 85, "5-"7, "7n, 120, 131, 133, 153·
Strato: 311-314.
style: 183-184.
Suarez, Fransisco: I 75.
substantiaI forms: 234.
suicide: see "death."
supematuraI: 49, 145-146,257-259.
superstition: 44-45,102,147,215,216, 257n.
syllogism: 33, 164, 168,2°9,262.
Sylvestre, Pierre: 248.
Tacitus: l44n, 185.
temperament: 53, 57, 131-132, 138--139, 152-153,218.
Terence: 119-120.
Thales: 276.
Theophrastus: 102.
de Thou, Jacques-Auguste, 18In, 182.
Tillich, Paul: 320.
Tillotson,John: 233.
tolera'lce (religious): 22, 237, 239, 240-245.
torture: 185.
tradition:
source ofCatholie dogma: 23n, 162-163,219,223-224,232.
foundation of just laws: 104-105.
transubstantiation: 65, 66, 92, 195, 196, 200-201, 211, 2I1-212n, 223-224, 23 2- 233, 236,
262-263,275,3°9,318.
Trent, Council of: 23n, 26n, 21 In.
trinity: 63, 65, 208, 241, 262, 275, 288, 310.
Tronehin, Louis: 200.
tropes:
ten: 10-12, 164, 168,254,260,284,3°1.
five: 12.
Tumebus, Adrian: 42, 66, 67, 71.
universaI consent: 216, 219, 316.
universalism: 198--200.
Valois, Father: 211,212.
van Dale, Anton: 232.
Vanini, Lucilio: 217.
van Paets, Adrian: 2 14.
Varilias, Antoine: 181.
Vergil: ,81.
Veron, Fran<;ois: ,6" ,62.
de la Ville, Louis: see "Valois, Father."
 INDEX ~l

Villey, Pierre: 13, 17, 24nn, 25nn, 27n, 30, 33, 35-36, 40n, 46n, 48n, 76n, 8on, 81ll, 136n,
141ll, 142, 147n, 179n.
virgin birth: 65, 94.
virtue: 56-58, 84, 85, 131-133, 134, 147n, 152.
Vise, Donneau de: 215.
vaid: 244, 272, 308n.
Vossius, Gerard: 283.
Vulgate: 163, 294.
Walloon Church: 240, 247, 284, 323.
Wesselus de Groningue: 252-253.
wisdom: 156.
Wissowatius, Andrea: 234.
witches: see "sorcery."
Yves de Paris: 165.
Zeitlin,Jacob: 43n, 48,74, 76n, 84n, 93n, 97n, 99, 142.
Zeno: 189,271-272.