6 International Broadcasting Public Diplomacy as a Game in a Marketplace of Loyalties Phillip Arceneaux and Shawn Powers Introduction Public diplomacy consists of behavior wherein a political actor engages in strategie communici- tion with foreign audiences in an image and reputation management capacity to further its for eign policy and security interests. Where many public diplomacy efforts take place in interpersonal capacities, such as cultural exchanges, embassy reading rooms, and language programs,’ the large majority of people globally will never interact with a foreign government through such means.” To that end, states have tured to intemational broadcasting as mechanism to engage in mass communication, or public diplomacy efforts that are mediated through information communication technologies (ICTs). International broadcasting consists of, the use of electronic media by one society to shape the opinion of the people and leaders of another.”* Further, international broadcasters are “tools of Public diplomacy, in the sense that they are entrusted by an executive or legislative authority with the responsibility for developing a program for foreign countrics.’* This includes networks such as the US Voice of America (VOA), the UK's BBC World News Service, Germany's Deutsche Welle, and Qatar’s Al Jazeera, while excluding privately owned networks such a CNN, Sky News, Phoenix Television, or Al Arabiya. Where the scope of international broad- casting is typically linked with images of news services using the electromagnetic spectrum, ic radio or television, the modem reality of international broadcasting is as much digital broadcast ing as it is taditional broadcasting.* In order to remain competitive, international broadcastes have adapted to modern media ecosystems, including extensive use of social media, citizen jour- nalism, and netizen engagement. Much the same way that the Internet was viewed at the end of the ‘twenticth century, in a light of techno-utopianism, public diplomacy tends to be viewed in an overly idealistic light. That i, many scholars view public diplomacy, or new public diplomacy, as a shift away from the harsh reales of intemational relations, to a space where states can engage foreign audiences in mutually beneficial dialogic communication where meaningful relationships are cultivated and developed.’ To the con- Sary, Youmans and Powers suggest that, while dialogic communication is nece-cary to undertand the nature of contemporary international broade: e 'g idealistic and utopian perspectives must be 50ee ee ee ee) ey International Broadcasting abandoned to recognize the reality of informational and ideational bargaining that takes place during the process of mediated dialogic transnational communications.” ‘The remainder of this chapter expands on Youmans and Powers’s call for a perspective of international broadcasting grounded in empirical assumptions similar to those embedded in theor- ies of international negotiation and bargaining.” That is, the chapter explores Putnam's two-level game theory and Price’s marketplace of loyalties as theoretical lenses through which international broadcasting can be understood and modeled.” Two case studies are offered as contextual test beds for the application of game theory and consumer loyalty to intemational broadcasting, the role of the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM) in North Korea and the China Global Tele- vision Network (CGTN) in sub-Saharan Africa. International Broadcasting and Game Theory Intemational broadcasting constitutes a behavior of information intervention, ie., “how strategic actors engage and compete for ideational influence in the intemational system.”"" As a function of international affairs, international broadcasting is a field of study rife for scholarly work informed by game theory, or the study “of how decision makers interact in decision making to take into account reactions and choices of the other decision makers.”"? Applied to public diplomacy, game theory offers a means to map the variety of ways in which states support the use of influence tools that accounts for a multitude of domestic and intemational variables and, with proper empirical inputs, can provide prediive analysis regarding the success or failure of these programs. While game theory has an established presence in the literature surrounding broadcasting, little research diverges from an operational, or science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) based analysis of broadcasting infrastructure to conceive of the larger geopolitical context of inter~ national broadcasting, namely the respective social and policy forces that impact decision making."® Youmans and Powers are among the first to analogize international broadcasting as a simultaneous process of dialogic negotiation and bargaining between communicative parties.'* AAs they suggest, the dialogic nature of international broadcasting constitutes an ideological nego- tiation between parties, with one actor attempting to diffuse an informational strategic narrative that supports the objectives of the sending nation, ideally nudging the receiving audience to a worldview (or deepening commitment to a pre-existing worldview or narrative) that more greatly harmonizes with the foreign policy interests of the sending government. Simplified perspectives of international broadcasting are usually taken from the US-Soviet model of the Cold War, with VOA and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty triumphantly battling Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress. Since the fill of the Soviet Union, howev great powers with established broadcasting networks like the United States and the United King- dom have increasingly had to share these broadcasting spaces with a growing number of state- sponsored or supported international broadcasters, forming what Chong and Druckman refer to as “competitive elite environments.”"> Indeed, the past two decades have seen the substantial growth of networks such as Qatar’s ‘Al Jazeera, Russia’s Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, Japan’s NHK, Isracl’s Kol Yisrael, India’s New Delhi Television (NDTV), Singapore’s Channel News Asia, and China's Global Television Network (CGTN)." Even middle-sized states, what McPhail would refer to as semi-periphery countries, are now established investors in international broadcasting, as evi denced by the role Poland’s Telewizja Polska has played in overseeing the targeted broadcast- ng of Belsat TV to Belarus.'? The presence of such new semi-periphery, periphery, and non-state actors in the realm of international broadcasting constitutes what Price refers to as asymmetric entrants."® 31 eR A RA ABS Pe pees a) LePhillip Arceneaux and Shawn Powers Two-Level Game Theory: Balancing International and Domestic Forces Contemporary social and information ecologies, however, are significantly more complex with muliple state and non-state, international and domestic stakeholders, as well as public and private interest pressures, each capable of influencing the decision-making process. While many theories of public diplomacy tend to center on the relevance of programs on foreign publics, the forces that determine the effectiveness of a public diplomacy are significantly more diverse and deserving of such recognition in the scholarly community. Indeed, foreign target audiences and their respective governments alone do not stand as the only forces vying for influence over the programming of public diplomacy and intemational broadcasting. As an institutional endeavor with a price ag reaching into the hundreds of millions, if nor billions, international broadcasting requires significant financial support ftom government appropriations bodies, requiring varying levels of public accountability for governmental spending. Thus, the domestic political culture of a nation-state plays a structuring role on the nature of a sponsoring government’s decision making as it pertains to international broadcasting. Putnam’s two-level game theory adds precisely such a level of consider- ation in the scope of international conflict, accounting for the impact a state’s domestic politics has on the ability of the government to successfully bargain with actors abroad." Robert Putnam’s two-level game model offers a theory of international negotiations based on interacting, strategic games that occur when states attempt to reach negotiated compacts. Moving away from the realist paradigm of international relations, Putnam’s model secks to explain when and how domestic politics impacts international bargaining between states. Putman’s model pro- poses a primary dynamic between two interactive, reflexive (“linked”) levels. The first level is between a state's representatives at the international level, and the second level is between these negotiators and their respective domestic publics and/or political institutions. The goal of the first-level game is to strike an agreement that will find ratification or agree the second-level game. Borrowing the language of game theory, the range of concession-benefits trade-offs the domestic public is ultimately willing to accept is called the “win-set.” If the inter- national negotiators formulate an agreement that falls within the domestic win-sets, they will suc- ceed (Figure 6.1), International broadcasting works in a similar fashion, though the participants in the first-level game are (a) state actors and (b) foreign publics, as governments support programs aiming to engage with and influence foreign publics in ways that are mutually beneficial. After all, if the engagement is not mutually beneficial, then forcign publics can simply walk away from the nego- tiation, especially in the modern media environment. In this context, the second-level game has two dimensions: (a) is there sufficient support for the negotiated content from the sending state's public (or key stakeholders) to sustainably fund the initiative, and (b) is the content at least not so objectionable to the receiving government that it doesn’t actively aim to prevent dissemination through legal, quasi-legal, or violent means? yent at the end of Negotiative Communication a Marketplace of Loyalties Not only must governments work to appease the political interests of the state’s own domestic audience, they must equally work to appease the interests of the forcign audience they are seek ing to reach. In Putnam’s two-level game theory, the context is sct in the field of international relations where stares in competition seek to negotiate some kind of agreement. In this scenario, the negotiators representing each state have vested interests in staying at the bargaining uble. To the contrary, foreign audiences have no such invested interests in engaging with content provided by foreign broadcasters; this places the burden of appeasement on the broadcasters to develop convent that capeures the interests of the foreign audience. There is very little preventing a media 52International Broadcasting Intemational Negotiator Intemational Negotiator coearyN county acing i pal ae ‘Spece ce ‘Space abe Sue Festina posfionng Gouikiy A DomCHGPRREION YC oamty 8 Domestic Publi Level2 van ser Figure 6.1 Putnam’s two-level game model Source: Supplied by authors. consumer from changing the channel, or the mobile application, or otherwise shifting their atten tion elsewhere, ic., che equivalent of walking away from a negotiation Similar to the approach of private international broadcasters like CNN International or Al Arabiya, state-sponsored international broadcasters adopt economic business models for reaching information seckers abroad, primarily informed by predictive behavioral economic theories.” Attempting to build consumer trust and allegiance among foreign information and entertainment seekers in competitive clite environments is a model akin to what Price refers to as the market for loyalties: ‘The sellers in this market are all those for whom myths and dreams and history can some- how be converted into power and wealth. The “buyers” are the citizens, subjects, nationals, consumers recipients of the packages of information, propaganda, advertisements, drama, and news propounded by the media, The consumer “pays” for one set of identities or another in several ways that, together, we call “loyalty” or “citizenship.”?" International broadcasters are thus sellers, while foreign audiences are buyers. The former replaces the sale of consumer goods with strategic information packages that push the geopolitical and/or cultural interests of the sending government while the latter barters, using their currency of atten- tion, and potentially “purchase” the message through some sort of ideological commitment, cither to retum for more content, to share the program with friends or family, or to even change ‘one’s mind or behavior”? The more the buyer willfully returns to purchase content from the buyer, the more loyal the buyer is. Today, this organic market exists within nearly every 53 eee Ee eee ee lePhilip Arceneaux and Shawn Powers informational environment as state broadcasters engage in competitive framing with cach other and local and private-sector media for the attention of audienccs.”” Entertainment-based content is a significant factor in appealing to foreign audiences and developing their sense of loyalty.”* An example of such entertainment programming was the VOA’s use of jazz during the Cold War. Launched in 1955 and hosted by Willis Conover, the VOA held a nightly “Jazz Hour,” which aired the classic American rhythms of artists such as Louis Armstrong, Duke Ellington, Benny Goodman, Dizzy Gillespie, and Ella Fitzgerald. The fluid and funky nature of jazz-based improvisation was viewed by many in the Soviet Union, and other countries behind the Iron ‘Curtain, as a literal metaphor for the kinds of freedom enjoyed in the United States.”* Jazz Hour was also unique in that it provided public opportunities for prominent African Americans to express their thoughts on the racial and civil rights issues taking place at the time, an element that further illustrated the US credible commitment to freedom of expression.” While VOA's Jazz Hour was supplemented in the 1950s and 1960s by State Department-based cultural exchange programming, such as the Jazz Ambassadors program, the nightly broadcasts of Ameri- can jazz heard around the globe were emblematic of the US success in bartering audience loyalty with highly desirable entertainment-based content (Figure 6.2). As state-funded organizations, however, international broadcasters often have to account for the success of their efforts, something achieved through extensive research and evaluation.” In attempting to balance the needs of the buyers with the demands of the sellers, content must blend the informational goals of the sponsoring government with the entertainment-based desires ‘of the audience, producing a hybrid form of infotainment.”* Too much political information risks alienating the foreign consumer, or buyer, while too much entertainment reduces the effect iveness of the desired outcome sought by the sponsoring government, or the seller’s cartel. While some suggest that content is king, another could argue that balance of content is king.”” ‘The simultaneous pressures placed on international broadcasters by the needs of foreign audiences and the demands of domestic audiences increasingly complicates the ability of the international Commerce Ideas Citizens, subjects, nationals, Who: | Individuals, businesses Pa eats g ‘Attention, identity loyalty, $ agency iS E c Why: | Basic needs, shared identity | Connect with others, make sense of lived experience Who: | Producers, distributors Governments, businesses, _ fle, cartels) interest groups (ie, cartels) S| what Ee Information, propaganda ) ews, entertainment Meet needs, further cartel | Meet needs, further cartel % | interests ees ee Figure 6.2 Negotiative communication in the marketplace ‘Source: Supplied by authors 4ee er a ree ie hs Sin: erry OM) gry International Broadcasting broadcasting arm of public diplomacy to aid the process of traditional diplomacy, i.e., government-to- government communication, Using a theoretical model informed by two-level game theory and the market for loyalties offers what the study of international broadcasting has been lacking, predictive power. Without a driving theoretical lens, international broadcasting scholarship to date has largely ‘been observational, publishing in the form of case studies, surveys, or interviews.” The application of deductive theories offers the field of scholarship a new perspective for moving research forward, one who's predictive power holds merit for both academic scholarship as well as policy formation and adjustment. Case Studies US Agency for Global Media’s Korean Media Services ‘The US Agency for Global Media (USAGM) is an independent federal agency tasked by the US ‘Congress to oversee five publicly funded international news networks: VOA, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia (RFA), Middle East Broadcasting Networks Inc., and Radio and ‘TV Marti. Its mission is to “to inform, engage, and connect people around the world in support of freedom and democracy,” and the networks target markets where robust and independent free press are unavailable, either due to political restrictions, economic conditions, or a combination of the two.”! As freedom of the press continues to be threatened around the world, the USAGM’s network operations have expanded, as has its budget. In Fiscal Year 2019, Congress allocated {$808 million to support 61 different language services, which collectively support over 3,000 jour~ nalists disseminating news in over 100 countries. Collectively, in 2018 the five networks had a weekly reach of 345 million adults, a figure derived from over 100 surveys.*” Media environments with poor access to outside and accurate information are a major priority for USAGM. Thus, North Korea—one of the most closed information ecosystems in the world—is near the top of this list. A 2019 survey of North Korean defectors found that a potent combination of technical and human enforcement mechanisms had retarded previously observed expansion in the depth and breadth of foreign media access.*® Crucially, access to the global Intemnct is limited to a small group of trusted insiders, and as North Korea transitions to a domestic digital television trans- mission infrastructure, information controls are easier to put in place, adapt, and centrally control Radio remains the best way to ty and inform North Koreans of current events outside of the gov- ‘emment’s robust system of information controls.** According to the study, foreign radio listeners overwhelmingly (84 percent) suggest that punishments for listening to foreign broadcasts are more severe under Kim Jong-un than under his father, Kim Jong-il. Thus, with the exception of VOA and RFA radio programs, access to other forms of foreign media access are either flat or flagging when ‘compared to the results of previous defector studies.°° Combined, VOA and RFA broadcast 13 hours of radio programming daily on high-quality short-wave (SW) and medium-wave (MW) transmission capabilities that blanket every square inch of North Korea. Crucially, the transmitters are based in locations around the region, but not inside of North Korea, thus limiting the government's capacity to shut them down. Broadcasts ‘occur in the night-time, when listeners find themselves less likely to be caught by the authorities or professional colleagues. Defector studies have consistently shown that getting informa relating to defection, business, or the economy are the primary reasons listeners tuned in. Learn- ing about the outside world also was a key driver. Consistent with previous iterations of this study, the most-lstened-to foreign broadcasters are USAGM’s RFA and VOA, along with South Korean state broadcaster, KBS Minjok Broadcasting. These three stations account for a larger share of audience attention than do all other measured for- cign broadcasters combined. In one study, ten respondents said they listened to RFA at least weekly 55 ath jee eee eS eePhillip Arceneaux and Shawn Powers while in North Korea, 8.0 percent said they were weekly VOA listeners, and 7.2 percent reported listening to KBS Minjok broadcasts weekly. In addition, for the first time, the sample included cight respondents who reported listening to VOA in English. Considering the technical limitations to reaching North Koreans with foreign broadcasting, and the risks audiences must take to seek out and tune into VOA and RFA, these figures indicate that the broadcasts reflect at least a partially successfil negotiation between a sending government and the receiving public. The US government has increased funding for broadcasts into North Korea over the last several years, and, according to defector studies, the number of North Koreans likely accessing VOA and RFA content continues to climb too. One could argue that this case study is an outlier, as North Koreans are more inclined to seck ‘out foreign content given the lacking state of the domestic media. While this may be the case, the fact that accessing foreign media is a major crime, in certain cases punishable by public exe- cution, signals that VOA and RFA programs provide information that is at least meaningful enough to take such a great risk. And the risk is a real one. More than six in ten respondents (65 percent) said they had personally experienced an inspection by Group 109, which oversees teams charged with confiscating ideologically illegal materials and transmitters, including media How does the second-level game play out in the case of VOA and RFA broadcasting to North Korea? Given growing concems about the threat North Korea places to US and allied national securities, as well as consistent concern regarding the state’s deplorable human rights record, funding has increased for Korcan-language broadcasting, signaling domestic support for the effort." The broadcasting, however, is an overt intervention into North Korea's sovereign media space, clearly violating domestic laws regarding the dissemination of news. In most con texts, this would likely trigger a robust effort to limit transmission mechanisms, revoke licenses, levy fines, intimidate journalists, and make direct appeals to the sending government to stop such illegal activity. But as this is North Korea, and due to its isolation, the government is limited in what it can do. With no journalists operating inside the country, there is no one to target. And as the transmitters are abroad, the government cannot use standard regulatory measures to limit distribution. Jamming of signals—the standard practice in such a situation—is also limited due to the energy needed (energy is a valuable commodity in North Korea) to target the MW and SW signals, not to mention the technical proficiency required for effectiveness. Thus, at the second level of the game, the agreed-upon negotiations between the VOA and RFA and North Korean audiences appear to be workable, at least for the time being. In summary, USAGM's information intervention into North Korea represents a compelling case for intemational broadcasting, providing timely and relevant news to audiences in one of the ‘most isolated information environments in the world. Our proposed game-theory model helps to explain this success, identifying a shared objective between the sending government and the receiving audience—news and information about the outside world, the global economy, and life after defection—while avoiding the pitfalls of cither domestic political lobbying or the risks of foreign government regulation due to the appropriate mix of distribution platforms and geopolit- ical alliances. To be clear, most efforts are far more complicate i : are far more complicated, introducing gray zones into the Proposed model. But for the purposes of demonstrating the utility of a game-theory approach, this case study helps to illuminate how each level of the game gets played out, the variables involved, and some situational concerns that can shape the outcome?” China Global Television Network and Sub-Saharan Africa Airing its first broadcast in 1958, China Central Television (CCT “V) was China's leading state broad- caster. While originally broadcast exclusively in China, following reforms under Deng Xiaoping, the network began to explore options for an English service in the late 1970s. It wasn’t until 2000 that 56(ee eee International Broadcasting the network launched CCTV-9, also CCTV International, a 24/7 all-English news channel broadcast specifically outside of China, In 2016, the network was rebranded as the China Global Television Network (CGTN). First established under CCTV-9 and continuing operation today under CGTN, CGTN Africa, based in Nairobi, is the network's production hub on the African continent.** While the Chinese state and CCTV do not make public the funding of such media networks, there is potential for partial fiscal insight. CGTN America was forced to register as a foreign agent under the US Forcign Agent Registration Act, through which the network was compelled to file its annual budget, an approximate sum of $8 million dollars (¥53,692,800).°” Where Sino-Affican relations extend back thousands of years, the modem revitalization of this partnership took place in the 1990s with the beginning of China’s economic growth, and has con- tinued to grow where today China is the single largest trading parmer on the continent.*” Notwith- standing the multi-year development of China's Belt and Road Initiative (RBI, which includes ports jn 14 Affica countries with railway access to another 8 Affican countries, CGTN Affica has served 2 public diplomacy function." This has been achieved by broadcasting news and information content that frames China as a peaceful actor in the region interested in mutual benefit and growth with a multitude of partners on the continent. The primary venue for cukivating not only Sino-African development initiatives, but both the private and governmental merger between Chinese and Aftica media markets, has been through the Forum on China~Affica Cooperation (FOCAC).? While Chinese international broadcasting has been particularly salient in countries that are most aligned with Chinese economic interests, including Angola, Kenya, and South Affica, CGTN Africa reaches a wide range of viewers across the sub-Saharan continent."* The Foreign Audience GTN Affica has served as an outlet on the continent for not only promoting a Chinese perspective of news, but equally in promoting a worldview that exists outside of the traditionally Wesiem pe spectives offered by outlets such as the BBC World News or the VOA;"* this is what Cull refers to 25 a counter-hegemonie broadcasting strategy." Interestingly, rather than attacking or undermining Western coverage as biased, Marsh suggests that CGT'N Africa has diversified issues covered in the ‘news as a function of diversifying the geographical dispersion of news coverage."° That is, the net- work has divided sub-Saharan Africa into smaller markets than its Western counterparts, allowing for more local or geographically relevant content to be distributed across each market. Further, CGTN Aftica has diverged from traditional Western news coverage by emphasizing a markedly positive editorial policy across news issues and content programming.*” That is, CGTN Africa con- tent is intentionally driven to be positively framed in nature. CGTN Africa's primary source of news content is Africa Live, a one-hour program broadcast daily and anchored primarily by Kenyan Beatrice Marshall. Other news shows include Global Business and Talle Africa, Entertainment-based content in the areas of sports and society are pri- marily broadcast via Match Point and Faces of Africa. Where international broadcasters always strive to balance information with entertainment in their content, CGTN Africa has struggled to find 2 consistent formula for balancing infotainment. A Kenyan studying in China found the net- ‘work's content to be starkly dull, and overall, boring, You never hear people saying | saw this on CGTN ... When not showing footage of middle-aged Chinese men in suits talking in a room in Beijing, CGTN has middle-aged African men in suits talking in a studio in Nairobi.® Indeed, research suggests that comparatively few in Attica willingly choose to consume infor- mation Chinese news outlets.” This limitation of CGTN Africa “does not appear to be 37eT EE Tete yl kee ee ol hs ccc Phillip Arceneaux and Shawn Powers a problem of access or availability, but one related to the association of China to negative stereo- types. We found deep-rooted negative biases against C! media ... which are hampering soft power acquisition.” What's more, as an extension of CCTV, CGTN and its regional networks fall under the cen- sorship of the Chinese state, an element of news coverage in Africa that has been noticed. In 2014, Kenya signed a parmership with a Chinese firm for the construction of a railroad between Nairobi and Mombasa. The cost of the project was nearly five times greater than the other bids, and led to significant controversy among Kenyans. Though the issue gripped the country, ic received little coverage on CGTN Africa, and when covered was presented in a favorable light for the development of stronger ties between China and Kenya. Overall, the issue of Chinese censorship has been a recurring problem for CGTN Affica and Chinese soft power in the region.*! “African journalists ... claimed that censorship is considered the biggest challenge to the actual performance of journalism within Chinese media organizations in Africa.” Based on the extent to which Chinese international broadcasting has tended to stress issues that empower a positive image of China in the region, other newsworthy issues that sug- gest China’s presence on the continent has been anything short of beneficial are largely ignored or misrepresented. Many across sub-Saharan Africa have begun to view the broadcaster as a source of Chinese propaganda engaging in a direct advocacy broadcasting model.®* “The data indicate a content strategy designed to prioritize the e agenda in Aftica, rather than to promote an *Affica rising’ narrative.” Rather than engaging in mutually beneficial communication indicative of new public diplomacy,”* Chinese international broadcasting has engaged in a largely “uni-beneficial” role of promoting Chinese news, interests, and foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa. This has alo come often over the objections of African journalists working for CGTN Africa. Former Tan- zania president, Julius Nyerere, who ruled from 1964-1985, referred to “China~Affica rela- tions as the ‘most unequal’ of ‘equal relationships” as they existed in the mid-twentieth century.°® Zeleza asserts this already unequal relationship was only exasperated by the ¢co- nomie advantage China developed over Tanzania moving into the beginning of the twenty first century.°” Such one-way organizational behavior on the part of China's international broadcaster in Aftica, it would seem, has only served to stoke twentieth-century suspicions of China as a new imperial power on the continent, thus damaging Chinese soft-power promo- tion efforts.** This damage to Chinese soft power also extends to Price's notion of the marketplace of loyalties. “Although forcign interest in China and its culture has grown recently, it has yet to translate into a loyal audience base.”*” Via its current business model and content strategy, it would appear that CGTN Africa has failed thus far to develop a base of consumer loyalty base among a variety of nationals on the African continent. Further, the network has failed to establish steady working relationships with many of the states in which the network oper- ations. In June 2018, CGTIN Africa's broadcast headquarters in Nairobi was the target of an immigration raid by Kenyan police in which numerous Chinese journalists were arrested and detained. While the raid was covered in Africa media outlets, such as the Congo's Africanews," no sources could be located to verify that CGTN Africa addressed the raid in its news coverage. The Domestic Audience In Tine with Putnam’s two-level gume theory, states must not only through international broadcasting, but they must balance tic front. In the engage with foreign audiences such efforts with forces on the domes- framework of transnational involvement in sub-Saharan Aftica, China is n0 58Intemational Broadcasting exception. The Chinese state uses its domestic media outlets to try and sell the win-set to China’s citizenry, Addressing domestic concerns is particularly relevant in the Chinese case; while CCTV does not publicize viewership or others form of engagement tracking, it is believed that less than one-third of traffic to CTGN’s website comes from outside of continental China. This means that the majority of content consumers are located inside China; namely Chinese nationals inter- ested in learning English.°' Data such as this suggests that CTGN’s greatest impact comes from China's domestic populace, not foreign audiences in sub-Saharan Affica. Addressing concerns that a growing number of Chinese citizens view China's financial involvement in Affica to be a dangerous waste of money, but also one that obligates countries to the Chinese state, state news outlets such as the People’s Daily have been running content designed to alleviate such concerns. Sheng Chuyi, for example, addresses the fear of the Belt and Road Initiative (RBI) as a debt trap, explaining how both governmental and private Chinese investments in transportation infrastructure in Tanzania facilities a functioning piece of the RBI, which in tum facilitates a process whereby Chinese imports and exports have more fluid access globally, cutting the costs to Chinese consumers and improving China's economy. Developmental aid in Tanzania, however, is not the only issue in which Chinese domestic media are trying to sell the Affican win-set. Pushing the potential role of CGTN Africa, the People’s Daily published a speech by Sierra Leonean journalist Joseph Margai at the seventh ‘China~Affica Think Tanks Forum. In the speech, Margai states the critical need for more and bexter public communication to facilitate a stronger and more positive process of image building the relationship between China and Africa.°* It is through broadcasters like CTGN Africa that precisely such improved public communication and image building can be achieved. Other efforts have made overt claims as to the growth and success of both CGTN and CGTN Africa in not only promoting Chinese interests abroad, but also painting China as a cooperative leader on the global stage alongside other leading actors such as Germany, France, and India. Ocher cffors: have echoed similar sentiment regarding Chinese media growth and development more broadly.** For all of its efforts, however, the Chinese domestic public is not completely sold on its cou try’s investments on the African continent. Xu Zhangrun, a professor of law at Tsinghua Univ sity, said, “Why is China, a country with over 100 million people who are still living below the poverty line, playing at being the flashy big-spender? How can such wanton generosity be allowed?" For a country that exercises censorship, there is little to no formal dissent of Chinese foreign and broadcast policy in Affica. Yet, in conversations with Chinese nationals, both in China and abroad, there is a moderate sense of disapproval toward Chinese image building on the Affican continent, particularly when all Chinese nationals do not enjoy the same quality of life. Where public sentiment may not be fully behind China’s public diplomacy efforts in sub- Saharan Africa, for the time being it appears that such discontent does not supersede general acceptance of China’s win-set on the African continent. Conclusion While public diplomacy scholarship has evolved significantly since the dawn of the twenty-first century, there are still yet many areas in need of fundamental research. This chapter argues that existing literature on the international broadcasting function of public diplomacy is one of the areas in most need attention. Scholarship on international broadcasting is substantially lacking in theoretical rigor, opting largely rather for inductive observation. In light of such weaknesses, this chapter pulls deductive frameworks from the fields of international relations and macroeconomics to contribute improved theoretical rigor to research in this area. Adopting Putnam’s two-level 59 MME a eeee a EM EEE el hat oe Poet) oye if. ccc Phillip Arceneaux and Shawn Powers game theory and Price's marketplace of loyalties model brings substantial explanatory and predict. ive power to the field of international broadcasting research. What does this potentially offer to the fast-growing number of international broadcasters? Applying two-level game theory elucidates the domestic context, or pressures, that often influence international broadcasting policy, a perspective that is often absent in public dip- lomacy scholarship more broadly. Further, it situates international broadcasting in a framework of international conflict resolution, i.e., negotiations, where the mindset is on finding and expanding common ground, rather than the more traditional and realist model of international relations that rests in the notion of zero-sum competition. Lastly, two-level game theory brings theoretical rigor and empirical accuracy to the study of international broadcasting, offering tangible, grounded insights to policy makers, bureaucrats, and scholars alike. ‘Applying the marketplace of loyalties model brings an industry perspective to broadcat policy that is under the purview of governmental oversight. With nearly seven and a half billion people on the planet, the large majority of them consume media content from at least one source; in more developed states this often includes at least one private broadcaster. Viewing international broadcasting through a media business lens brings a fundamental sense of audi- ence engagement, or consumer-relationship management practices, whereby brand loyalty and affinity can be bought and sold, or bartered. Placing consumer attention, i.e., loyalty, at the heart of policy governing international broadcasting places the foreign consumers as equals to state-sponsored networks; that is, international broadcasters must work, via content, to buy the loyalty of the information consumer and they must do it on the platforms the consumers are on. This contradicts the information dissemination model of international broadeasting that stems from the Cold War, which views foreign audiences as beneath states in a power hier- archy, who should want a foreign state’s content and should migrate to whatever platforms that state is on, The reality of today’s information ecology is one of clite competition becween a host of both public and private networks, where the only currency is consistent reach and viewership. “Informational needs drive demand, and successfial international broadcasters focus ‘on meeting unmet demand.”°” While this chapter maps Putnam and Price’s work onto the cases of USAGM in North Korea and CGTN in sub-Saharan Africa for illustrative purposes, future research should begin to apply these models for the purpose of analysis and policy planning. Both the scholarly and applied ficlds of international broadcasting, will be best served with the adoption of such frameworks informed by negotiation and conflict resolution as well as macroeconomics. Such work will hold meaningful contributions for the realm of international broadcasting policy formation and refinement. Notes 1 Nichokss J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories,” Annals of the American Academy of Polit- ical and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 31-54, : 2 Guy J. Golan, “An Integrated Approach to Public Diplomacy,’ Diplomacy: Communication and Engagement, ed. G,J. Gol (New York: Peter Lang, 2014), 417-440. 3 Monroe Price, Susan Haas, and Drew Margolin, “New Technologies and Intemational Broadcasting. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 150-172. 4 Anke Fiedler and Marie-Soleil Frére, “‘Radio France Internationale” phone Africa: Intemational Broadcasters in a ‘Time of Chang tno. 1 (March 2016): 68-85 at 70, Intemational Public Relations and Public Sung-Un Yang, and Dennis F. Kinsey and ‘Deutsche Welle” in Franco- ” Communication, Culture and Critique 9,EE International Broadcasting 5 Kenneth L. Hacker and Vanessa R. Mendez, “Toward a Model of Strategic Influence, Intemational Broadcasting, and Global Engagement,” Media and Communication 4, no. 2 (2016): 69-91. 6S. Ros, “Whatever Happened to the Internet’s Promise?” Techonomy, March 1, 2017, https://techon ‘omy.com/2017/03/whatever-happened-to-the-internets-promisc. 7 Jan Melisen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in The New Public Diplo- ‘macy: Soft Power in Intemational Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 3-27; Kathy Fitzpatrick, U.S. Public Diplomacy in & Post-9/11 Werld: From Messaging to Mutualty (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, 2011); Philip Seib, Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Socal Media Era (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); R.S. Zaharna, Batles to Bridges: U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy After 9/11 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 8 William Lafi Youmans and Shawn Powers, “Remote Negotiations: Intemational Broadcasting as Bar ‘ining in the Information Age,” Intemational Jounal of Communication 6 (2012): 2149-2172 9 Ibid. 10 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” Intemational Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427-460; Monroe E. Price, “The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and the Global Competition for Allegiances,” Yale Law Jounal 104, no. 3 (1994): 667-670. 11 Shawn M. Powers and Tal Samuel-Azran, “Conceptualizing International Broadcasting as Information Intervention,” in Golan et al., fntemational Public Relations and Public Diplomacy, 246. 12 Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Game Theory and Interstate Conflict,” Oxford Bibliographies, 2017, www. ‘oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0071 xml. 13 Alexander Kuehne, Hong Quy Le, Mahdi. Mousavi, and Anja Klein, “Power Control in Wireless Broadcast Networks Using Game Theory,” paper presented at SCC 2015-10th International ITG Con- ference on Systems, Communications and Coding, Hamburg, Germany, www-vde-verlag.de/proceed n/453659036,html; Vikraant Pai, Ameya Prabhu, and Aditya Menon, “Game Theoretic Optimiza- tion of Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio,” paper presented at IEEE 2016 International Confer ence on Computing Control and Automation (CCUBEA), Pune, India, https://iecexplore ieee.org/ document/7860023. 14 Youmans and Powers, “Remote Negotiations. 15 Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, “A ‘Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments,” Jourtal of Communication 57, no. 1 (2007): 99-118, Gury D. Rawnsley, “To Know Us Is to Love Us: Public Diplomacy and Intemational Broadcasting in Contemporary Russia and China,” Polites 35, no. 2 (2015): 273-286. 17 Thomas L. McPhail, Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders and Trends, 4th ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014); Beata Ociepka, “International Broadcasting by a Middle-Size Country: The Case of Belsat TV from Poland to Belarus,” Global Media and Communication 12, no. 2 (2016): 111-126. 18 Monroe E. Price, “Information Asymmetries and Their Challenge to Intemational Broadcasting,” Media and Communication 4, no. 2 (2016): 46-54 19 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Polities.” 20 Peter Diamond and Hannu Vartiainen, Behavioral Economics and its Applications (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), Price, “The Market for Loyalties,” 669 Paul D. Callister, “Identity and Market for Loyalties Theories: ‘The Case for Free Information Flow in Insurgent Iraq,” Saint Louis University Public Law Review 25 (2006): 123-153. 23 Porismita Borah, “Conceptual Issues in Framing Theory: A Systematic Examination of a Deca ture,” Journal of Communication 61, no. 2 (2011): 246-263, 24 Shawn M. Powers, “Conceptualizing Radicalization in a Market for Loyalties,” Media, War & Confit 7, no, 2 (2014): 233-249. 25 Miriami Khatiashvili, “Jazz Ambassadors: An Instrument of Public Diplomacy,” USC Center for Public Diplomacy, May 2, 2019, www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/jazz-ambassadors-instrument-public-diplo macy. ong/blog/jazz-ambassadors-instrument-public-diplomacy. 2% Line Bavenon, Jace Diploma: Posing At he Coll War of Mississippi, 2008). 27 Price, “Information Asymmetries.” 28 McCormick Tribune Foundation, Understanding the Mission of U.S. Intemational Broadcasting (Chicago, WL McCormick Tribune Foundation, 2007); Brian Rotheray, Good Neus from a Far Country? Changs in Inir- national Broadast News Supply in Affca and South Asia (Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Joumaism, 2010); Daya K. Thussu, News as Enertainment: The Rise of Global Infotainment (London: Sage, 2007). 29 Powers and Samuel-Azran, “Conceptualizing, International Broadcasting,” 16 ’s Litera- (ackson, MS: University Press 61 BAM a eePea ASRR oe) AN ENY RRR RC TEN ge easter A) a ccc Philip Arceneaux and Shawn Powers 30 Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 274-290; Youmans and Powers, “Remote Negotiations.” 31 US Agency for Global Media, F¥2018 Peyfanmance and Accountability Report (Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, 2018), www.usagm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/USAGM-FY-2018- PAR-FINAL pat 32 Shawn M. Powers, “USAGM's Reach: More ‘Than Meets the Eye,” USC Center on Public Diplomacy, April 3, 2019, www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/usagm%E2%80%99-global-reach-more-meets-eye. 33 It is impossible to conduct research on media inside North Korea. ‘This study’s findings are based on face- to-face interviews conducted among 350 North Koreans who left North Korea primarily in 2017 and 2018. Although the sample includes former residents of all North Korean provinces, it contains 4 proportionally high number from the northeastern provinces of Hamkyongbukdo and Yanggangdo. This study is not nationally representative of North Koreans, as the data come from a convenience sample of travelers and refugees. Although they represent the best source of current information about conditions inside North Korea, refugees and defectors are not perfect proxies for those still in North Korea. 34 Smuggled (illegal) pre-programmed USB drives and DVDs are another way North Koreans acces foreign information, although they typically are loaded with soap operas and movies from South Korea and China Illegal Chinese mobile phones are also a key conduit for North Koreans to reach friends and family inthe ‘outside world, but are used typically for making business or defection arrangements and not a reliable con- duit of current news. 35. US Agency for Global Media, North Korea Defector, Refugee & Traveler Survey Report (Washington, DC Intermedia, 2018), 36 Broadcasting Board of Governors FY 2018 budget, www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2017/05/ FY2018Budget_CBJ_05-23-17.pdf. 37 ‘The second-level game—that is, what domestic political calculations are alo shaping the negotiations—is 4 crucial one, especially for language services that overlap with activated domestic publies (eg, Cuban ‘Americans, for example). Activated domestic publics can become vocal critics or fierce advocates for a particular public diplomacy program, especially among communities who recently immigrated and are + to see dramatic change in their homeland. For the purposes of this chapter, the Korean American community as a whole does not play an active role in lobbying for (or against) broadcasting to North Korea, chough this ge over time. The domestic, political component of public diplomacy, and how it shapes the actual contours and content of programs, is an area worthy of additional academic rescarch (especially comparative/international perspectives) 38 Fei Jiang, Shubo Li, Helge Ronning, and Elling Tjonneland, ““The Voice of China in Africa: Med ‘munication Technologies and Image-Building,” Chinese Joumal of Communication 9, no, 1 (2016): 1= 39 Bill Allison, “Chinese Network's Washington Bureau Registers as Foreign Agent,” Bloomberg, February 6 2019, www bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-07 /chinese-network-s-washington-bureat-registen- as-foreign-agent. 40 Jean-Christophe Servant, ‘Trade Safari in Affica,” Le Monde Diplomatique, May 11, 2005, hesps://mon deciplo.com/ 2005/05/11 chinaffica; Peter Wonacost, “In Africa, U.S. Watches China's Rise,” Wall Stet Jour nal, September 2, 2011, worw.ws}.com/articles/SB 100014240531 11 9033929045765 1027 1838147248. 41 ‘Thomas S. Eder, “Mapping the Belt and Road Initiative: This Is Where We Stand," July 6, 2018, Mena: ‘or Insitute for China Studies, www.merics.org/en/bri-tracker/ 42 Michael Leslie, “The Dragon Shapes Its Image: A Study of Chinese Media Influence Strategies i» Africa,” Affican Studies Quarterly 16, no. 3 2016): 161-174, 43. Lauren Gorfinkel, Sandy Joffe, Cobus Van Stad ing the Audiences of China's ‘New Voice’ Jiang, et al., “The Voice of China in Africa 44 Jiang, et al, “The Voice of China in Africa 46 Nichohs tg l, Public Diplomacy: Foundations for Global Engagement in the Digital Age (Cambridge: Polity Vivien Marsh, “Mixed Messages, Partial Pictures? 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