CHAPTER 8 PEOPLE IN GROUPS > What is a group? Group ‘The social group occupies much of our day-to-day life. We work in groups, we ‘Two armore people socialise in groups, we play in groups, and we represent our views and attitudes who share common through groups. Groups also largely determine the people we are and the sorts of, definition and lives we live. Selection panels, juries, committees and government bodies influence ‘evaluation of what we do, where we live and how we live. The groups to which we belong deter- Pee ever” mine what language we speak, what accent we have, what attitudes we hold, what such a definition. ‘cultural practices we adopt, what education we receive, what level of prosperity we enjoy and ultimately who we are. Even the groups to which we do not belong, either by choice or by exclusion, have a profound impact on our lives. In this overwhelming ‘matrix of group influences, the domain of the autonomous, independent, unique self may indeed be limited. ‘Groups differ in all sorts of respects (Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Ethier, 1995). Some have a large number of members (e.g. a nation, a sex), and others are small (a com- mittee, a family); some are relatively short-lived (a group of friends, a jury), and some ‘endure for thousands of years (an ethnic group, a religion); some are concentrated (a flight crew, a sclection committee), others dispersed (academics, computer-mediated communication groups); some are highly structured and organised (an army, an ambulance team), and others are more informally organised (a supporters’ club, a community action group); some have highly specific purposes (an assembly line, an environmental protest group), and others are more general (a tribal group, a teenage ‘gang’); some are relatively autocratic (an army, a police force), others relatively dem- cocratic (a university department, a commune); and so on. ‘Any social group can thus be described by an array of features that highlight simi larities to, and differences from, other groups. These can be very general features, such as membership size (e.g. a religion versus a committee), but they can also be very specific features, such as group practices and beliefs (e.g. Catholics versus ‘Muslims, liberals versus conservatives, Masai versus Kikuyu). This enormous variety ‘of groups could be reduced by limiting the number of significant dimensions to pro- duce a restricted taxonomy of groups. Social psychologists have tended to focus ‘more on group size, group ‘atmosphere’, task structure and leadership structure than other dimensions. Groups as categories (One general distinction is between similarity-based or categorical groups, and inter- action-based or dynamic groups (Arrow, McGrath, & Berdabl, 2000; Wilder & Simon, 1998). This distinction comes in different forms. For example, Prentice, Miller and Lightdale (1994) distinguish between common-bond groups (groups based upon attachment among members) and common-identity groups (groups based on direct attachment to the group). We can go even further back to an impor- tant distinction in the social sciences originally made in 1857 by Tonnies (1955) between Gemeinschaft (i.e. community) and Gesellschaft (ic. association), that is, social organisation based on close interpersonal bonds and social organisation based ‘on more formalised and impersonal associations. ‘The property ofa group Nevertheless, human groups are quite clearly categories - some people are in the ‘that makes tseom ike grOUp and some people are not. As such human groups should differ in ways that all cok unitary entity, nt, distinct and categories differ. One of the key ways in which categories differ is in terms of entite tivity (Campbell, 1958). Entitativity is the property of a group that makes it appearwaar s a croup? [277 | to be a distinct, coherent and bounded entity. High-entitativity groups have clear boundaries, and are internally well structured and relatively homogeneous. Groups certainly differ in terms of entitativity (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996, Lickel, Hamilton, Wieczorkowska, Lewis, & Sherman, 2000). Groups and aggregates Not all collections of people can be considered groups in a psychological sense. For example, people with green eyes, strangers in a dentist's waiting room, people on a beach, children waiting for a bus ~ ate these groups? Perhaps not. More likely these are merely social aggregates, collections of unrelated individuals — not groups at all. ‘The important social psychological question is what distinguishes groups from aggregates; itis by no means an easy question to answer. Social psychologists differ in their views on this issue. These differences are, to some extent, influenced by whether the researcher favours an individualistic or a collectivstic perspective on groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner & Oakes, 1989). Individualists believe that people in groups behave in much the same way as they do in pairs or by themselves, and that group processes are really nothing more than interpersonal processes between a number of people (c.g. Allport, 1924; Latané, 1981). Collectivists believe that the behaviour of people in groups is influenced by unique social processes and cognitive representations that can only occur in and emerge from groups (e.g. Abrams & Hogg, 1988; McDougall, 1920; Sherif, 1936; ‘Tajfel & Turner, 1979), Defi ns Although there are almost as many definitions of the social group as there are social Psychologists who research social groups, Johnson and Johnson (1987) have identi- fied seven major emphases. The group is: 1 a collection of individuals who are interacting with one another; 2 a social unit consisting of two or more individuals who perceive themselves as belonging to a group; 3 a collection of individuals who are interdependent; 4 acollection’of individuals who join together to achieve a goal; 5 acollection of individuals who are trying to satisfy a need through their joint association; 6 a collection of individuals whose interactions are structured by a set of roles. and norms; 7. acollection of individuals who influence each other. ‘Their definition incorporates all these emphases: A group is two or more individuals in face-to-face interaction, each aware of his or her membership in the group, each aware of the others who belong to the group, and cach aware of their positive interdependence as they strive to achieve mutual goals. (ohnson & Johnson, 1987: p. 8) You will notice that this definition, and many of the emphases in the previous Paragraph, cannot encompass large groups andor do not distinguish between inter- personal and group relationships. This is a relatively accurate portrayal of the social[278] cHaprer & PEOPLE IN GROUPS ‘Social facilitation ‘An improverentin the performance of well: leamed/easy tasks and «a deterioration in the performance of poorly Searned/ificut tasks in the mere presence of members of the same species. ‘More presence Refers to an ently passive and ‘unresponsive audience ‘thatis only physically present. play bettrif there wore" ‘an audionce? psychology of group processes, which is generally restricted, explicitly or implicitly, to small, face-to-face, short-lived, interactive, task-oriented groups (but see Brown, 2000; Hogg & Tindale, 2001). In addition, ‘group processes’ generally do not mean ‘group processes but interpersonal processes between more than two people. The effect of the group on individual performance Mere presence and audience effects: social facilitation Perhaps the most basic and elementary social psychological question concerns the effect of the presence of other people on someone’s behaviour: ‘What changes in an individual’s normal solitary performance occur when other people are present?” (Allport, 1954a: p. 46). You are playing a musical instrument, fixing the car, reciting a poem or exercising in the gym, and someone comes to watch; what happens to ‘your performance? Does it improve or deteriorate? ‘This question intrigued Norman Thiplett (1898), credited by some as having con- ducted the first social psychology experiment, although there has been controversy about this (see Chapter 1). From observing that people cycled faster when paced than when alone, and faster when in competition than when paced, Triplett hypothe- sised that competition between people energised and improved performance on motor tasks. To test this idea, he had young children reeling a continuous loop of line on a ‘competition machine’; and he confirmed his hypothesis: more children reeled the line more quickly when racing against each other in pairs than when per- forming alone. Floyd Allport (1920) termed this phenomenon social facilitation but felt that ‘Triplett’s narrowing of the effect to competition could be widened to allow for a more general principle: that an improvement in performance could be due to the mere presence of conspecifics (i.e. members of the same species) as coactors (doing the same thing but not interacting) or as a passive audience (passively watching). '‘There are other circumstances when people may work harder in groups than when alone (e.g. Guzzo & Dickson, 1996). One is when People place greater value Social one nn individuals: that is, they have a collectivst rather thes individualist itfer con Sttation (Hofstede, 1980). Western and Eastern caters cnt significantly Qterent in social orientation (M. Bond & Smith, 1996, Seite & Bond, 1998, see Chapter 16), s0 it comes as no surprise to discover ther People can work harder in Karpaian alone in, for example, China (Earley, 1989, 1994) sad Japan (Matsui, Kakuyama, & Onglatco, 1987). Another circumstance wheee People may be moti- cepa sherk harder in groups is when groups and their neenpeae believe and i ee chit the group will be effective in achieving important goals (Guzz0, Jost, Campbell, & Shea, 1993; Sheppard, 1993), i Recent years have witnessed a revival in int Group cohesiveness © One ofthe most basic properties of a group is its cohesiveness (solidarity, esprit de Cohesivoness tained sary uit morale) ~ the way it hangs together as a tightly knit, self-con- The propery ofa group (Rined entity characterised by uniformity of conduct and monet Support between _thataffectively binds (ower and across time. Groups with extremely low levels of cohesiveness appear wanes Group 2s a whole, giving the group a sense of solidarity and oneness. aroee. Con eeychological process that transforms an aggregate of individuals into a sroub. Cohesiveness is thus a descriptive term, used to decenibe ¢ Property of the Shological prt itis aso a psychological term to deseribe the inierchar py- saased atthe beginning of this chapter. But, importantly, i iccles Psychological ‘erm to describe the individual psychological process underlying the cohesiveness ofGroup cohesiveness Isthis team cohesive or iit perhaps. rot team atl? groups. Herein lies a problem: it makes sense to say that a group is cohesive, but not that an individual is cohesive. ‘After almost a decade of informal usage, cohesiveness was formally defined by Festinger, Schachter and Back (1950). They believed that a field of forces, deriving from the attractiveness of the group and its members and the degree to which the group satisfies individual goals, acts upon the individual. The resultant valence of these forces of attraction produces cohesiveness, which is responsible for group membership continuity and adherence to group standards (see Figure 8.10). ‘Because concepts such as ‘field of forces’ are difficult to operationalise, and also because the theory was not precise about exactly how to define cohesiveness oper- | ationally (ce. in terms of specific measures or experimental manipulations), social psychologists almost immediately simplified their conception of cohesiveness. For {nstance, in their own research into the cohesiveness of post-war student housing projects at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Festinger, Schachter and Back i Simply asked students: ‘What three people . . .do you see most of socially?” (1950: p. 37; sce Chapter 13 for details of this study) ‘Major reviews (e.g. Cartwright, 1968; Hogg, 1992; Lott & Lott, 1965) indicate that the bulk of rescarch conceptualises cohesiveness as attraction to the group or i interpersonal attraction, derives the cohesiveness of the group as a whole from sum- | ‘ming (or some other arithmetical procedure), and operationalises cohesiveness | accordingly. Not suzprisingly, this research reveals that factors that increase inter- f personal attraction (e.g. similarity, cooperation, interpersonal acceptance, shared i threat; see Chapter 13) generally elevate cohesiveness, and elevated cohesiveness i produces, for example, conformity to group standards, accentuated similarity, improved intragroup communication and enhanced liking.‘Behaviour TT Cohasveness | + + Membessip continuity « + Adherence to group Standards Figure 8.11 (eneral framework ofthe socal cohesionVinterpersonal ‘Bistence of individual goals that cannot be interdependence model ‘sotsfiedindependenty Scurce: based on Hogg (1992) ‘Aastegation of unréated individuals alee "Mutual interdependence and cooperative Interaction | | ‘Mutual goat satisfaction | Individuals perceive one another as sources of reward: thus imbued with postive valance Interpersonal attraction = cohesweness294 | CHAPTER 8 PEOPLE IN GROUPS Personal attraction {king for someone ‘based on idiosyncratic preferences and interpersonal latonships. Social attraction Liking for someone based on comman group membership and determined by the person's prototypicaity ofthe group. researchers tend to differ only in which components of the model they emphasise. Because social psychologists have not really resolved the problem of knowing unam- biguously how to operationalise cohesiveness (Evans & Jarvis, 1980; Mudrack, 1989), more recent research has tended to be in applied areas (Levine & Moreland, 1990). In sports psychology, in particular, some quite rigorous scales have been devised: for example, Widmeyer, Brawley and Carron’s (1985) cighteen-item group environment questionnaire to measure the cohesiveness of sports teams. ‘A fundamental question that has been raised by social identity researchers (Hogg, 1987, 1992; Tumer, 1984, 1985; see also Chapter 11) asks to what extent an analysis of group cohesiveness in terms of aggregation (or some other arithmetic integration) of interpersonal attraction really captures a group process at all. To all intents and purposes, the group has disappeared entirely from the analysis and we are left simply with interpersonal attraction, about which we already know a great deal (Berscheid & Reis, 1998; see Chapter 13). Hogg (1993) suggests that a distinction should be made between personal attraction (true interpersonal attraction based ‘on close relationships and idiosyncratic preferences) and social attraction (inter- individual liking based on perceptions of self and others in terms not of individuality but of group norms or prototypicality). Personal attraction is nothing to do with ‘groups, while social attraction is the ‘liking’ component of group membership. Social attraction is merely onc of a constellation of effects (ethnocentrism, conformity, intergroup differentiation, stereotyping, ingroup solidarity) produced by the process of self-categorisation specified in self-categorisation theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell 1987; see Chapter 11). “This analysis has at least two major advantages over the tradi 1 It does not reduce group solidarity and cohesiveness to interpersonal attraction, 2 Itis as applicable to small interactive groups (the only valid focus of traditional models) as to large-scale social categories, such as an ethnic group ‘or a nation (people can feel attracted to one another on the basis of common ‘ethnic or national group membership). ‘This perspective is quite promising. For example, Hogg and Turner (1985) aggre- gated people with others whom they ostensibly would like or dislike (the fact that the others were people they would like or dislike was irrelevant to the existence of the group), or explicitly categorised them as a group on the basis of the criterion that they would like, or dislike, one another. They found that interpersonal attrac- tion was not automatically associated with greater solidarity (sce Figure 8.12). Rather, where interpersonal liking was neither the implicit nor explicit basis for the group (ie. in the random categorisation condition), group solidarity was unaffected by interpersonal attraction. In another study, Hogg and Hardie (1991) gave a questionnaire to a football team in Australia. Perceptions of team prototypicality and of norms were significantly related to measures of group-based social attraction but were not related to meas- ures of interpersonal attraction. This differential effect was strongest among ‘members who themselves identified most strongly with the team. Similar findings have been obtained from studies of women’s netball teams playing in an amatcur league (Hlogg & Hains, 1996), and of organisational subgroups and quasi-naturalistic discussion groups (Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, & Holzworth, 1993). nal model:Figure 8.12 Ingroup solidarity as a function of Interpersonal attraction: interpersonal attraction and social 5 Disteabe —Litesble categorsation Studer who were expt categorised as a | ‘F0up on the basis of interpersonal king or Who were merely aggregated showed greater Solidarity wit iceable groups, while participants who were randomly categorised showed equal Solidarity, inespectve of how ikeable the group 2 was 1 Source: Hogg & Tune (865) oer Random Biplet Soca categorisation Group socialisation € An obvious feature of many of the groups with which we are familar is that new mrombcrs Join, old members leave, members are socialised by the group, and the Struc, imprinted with the contribution of individuals. Groups at dynamic prompulgs that change continuously over time; however, this dynamic aspect of Sroubs.Js often neglected in social psychology: social psychologists hase tended tenants @ rather static analysis that excludes time. Maly social Psychologists feel that this considerably weakens the explanatory power of coca Psychological theo- Macc SOUP Processes and intergroup behaviour (Condor 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Tuckman, 1965; Worchel, 1996), Role transition Graduation isa ritualsed publ ‘ceremony that marks an important role transition ina students fe300 | CHAPTER 8 PEOPLE IN GROUPS = Norms ‘Aritudinal and bbohavioural uniformities that define group ‘mambership and difereotiate between sroups. Stereotype Widely shared and simplified evaluative image ofa social group and its members. Ethnomethodology ‘Method devised by Garfinke, involving the violation of hidden norms to reveal their presence. ‘Aronson and Mills’s study. Participants, who audited and rated a boring discussion they were about to join, were given mild or severe electric shocks either explicitly as an initiation or under some other pretext completely unrelated to the ensuing dis- ‘cussion. As predicted from cognitive dissonance theory, the painful experience enhanced evaluation of the group only when it was perceived to be an initiation (see Figure 8.14). (Now answer the second focus question.) Norms Norms are shared beliefs about what is the appropriate conduct for a group member: they are both descriptive (‘s’ statements) and prescriptive ‘ought’ state- ‘ments). As such, norms describe the uniformities of behaviour that characterise groups, while normative discontinuities provide the contours of different social groups. For example, the behaviour of students and lecturers in a university is gov- cerned by very different norms: knowing whether someone is a student or a lecturer establishes clear expectations of appropriate normative bebaviour. Norms and stereotypes are closely related — the terms ‘normative behaviour’ and ‘stereotypical behaviour’ mean virtually the same thing. However, research tradi- tions have generally separated the two areas: norms referring to behaviour that is shared in a group, and stereotypes (see Chapters 2, 10 and 11) to shared generalis- ations about other groups. Self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, ‘Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; see Chapter 11) has tried to bridge this rather artificial distinction. Let us return to norms. Norms can take the form of explicit rules that are enforced by legislation and sanctions (¢-g. societal norms to do with private property, pollution and aggression), or they can be the implicit, unobserved, taken-for-granted back- ‘ground to everyday life (Garfinkel, 1967). Garfinkel believed that thesc latter norms are hidden because they are so integral to everyday life, and that they account for much behaviour that is often labelled native, instinctive and innate. Garfinkel devised a particular methodology, called ethnomethodology, to detect these background norms. One method involved the violation of norms in order to attract people's attention to them. For example, Garfinkel had students act at home for fifteen minutes as if they were boarders: that is, be polite, speak formally and ‘only speak when spoken to. Their families reacted with astonishment, bewilderment, shock, embarrassment and anger, backed up with charges of selfishness, nastiness, rudeness and lack of consideration! An implicit norm for familial interaction was revealed, and its violation provoked a strong reaction. Group norms can have a powerful effect on people. For example, Newcomb (1965) conducted a classic study of norms in the 1930s at a small American college called Bennington. The college had progressive and liberal norms but drew its stu- dents from conservative, upper middle-class families. The 1936 American presidential clection allowed Newcomb to conduct a confidential ballot, First-year students strongly favoured the conservative candidate, while third- and fourth-year students had shifted their voting preference towards the liberal and communist/ socialist candidates (see Figure 8.15). Presumably, prolonged exposure to liberal norms had produced the change in political preference. Siegel and Sicgel (1957) conducted a slightly better-controlled study, in which they took advantage of the random assignment of new students at a private ‘American college to different types of student accommodation ~ called sororities and dormitories. At this particular college, sororities had a conservative ethos andCandidate: Wi Conservate Liberal Communisvsodaist 70) Percentage vote ‘styear——~=~=~S«rcland ath year Year of enrolment Ethnomethodology Non-normative behaviour (playing with a yo-yo) draws attention to the implicit norm of ' being serious when meeting an | important ctont Figure 8.15 Newcomb's 1965 Bennington study: voting Preference for 1936 presidential candidates as a function of exposure to liberal norms. Fistyear students at Bennington colege in the USA showed a tradtonaly conservative votng pate luring the 1936 presidental election, wie thd and fourth-year Students, who had been exposed for longer tothe coleg’ liberal norms, showed a signifcatty more Roel voting pattem Source: sd n ta fom Newco (965302_| CHAPTER 8 PEOPLE IN GROUPS Figure 8.16 Conservatism as a function of conservative or liberal norms of student residence Students ata private American college were randomly assigned to more consenative sorry type accommodation or more liberal dormitory style 109 accommodation, After a year of exposure to these different norms the dormitory group became signficanty less consenative in its atiudes Source: based on daa fom Sigel & Sige (1957) Frame of reference Complete range of subjectively conceivable positions ‘that relevant people can occupy in that context ‘on some attudinal or behavioural dimension. No} Sorority (conservative) Dormitory tibera) Conservatism 8 70! the dormitories had more progressive liberal norms. Siegel and Siege! measured the students’ degree of conservatism at the beginning and end of the year. Figure 8.16 clearly shows how exposure to liberal norms reduced conservatism. "Norms serve a function for the individual. They specify a limited range of behav- iour that is acceptable in a certain context and thus they reduce uncertainty and facilitate confident choice of the ‘correct’ course of action. Norms provide a frame of reference within which to locate our own behaviour. You will recall that this idea ‘was explored by Sherif (1936) in his classic experiments dealing with norm formation (see Box 7.1 in Chapter 7 for details). Sherif showed that when people made percep- tual judgements alone, they relied on their own estimates as a reference frame; however, when they were in a group, they used the group's range of judgements to converge quickly on the group mean. Sherif believed that people were using other members’ estimates as a social frame of reference to guide them: he felt that he had produced a primitive group norm experimentally. The norm was an emergent property of interaction between group ‘members, but once created it acquired a life of its own. Members were later tested alone and still conformed to the norm. ‘This same point was strikingly demonstrated in a couple of related autokinetic studies (Jacobs & Campbell, 1961; MacNeil & Sherif, 1976). In a group comprising three confederates, who gave extreme estimates, and one true participant, a rela- tively extreme norm emerged. The group went through a number of ‘generations’ in which a confederate would leave and another true participant would join, until the membership of the group contained none of the original members. The original extreme norm still powerfully influenced the participants’ estimates. This isa very elegant demonstration that a norm is a true group phenomenon: it can emerge only from a group, yet it can influence the behaviour of the individual in the physical absence of the group (Turner, 1991). It is as ifthe group is carried in the head of the individual in the form of a norm.Grour structure [ 303 Norms also serve functions for the group in so far as they coordinate the actions ‘of members towards the fulfilment of group goals. In an early study of factory pro- duction norms, Coch and French (1948) describe a group that set itself a standard of fifty units per hour as the minimum level to secure job tenure. New members quickly adopted this norm. Those who did not were strongly sanctioned by ostracism and in some cases had their work sabotaged. Generally speaking, there is good evidence from the study of goal setting in organisational work teams that where group norms embody clear group goals for performance and production, group members work harder and are more satisfied (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Weldon & Weingart, 1993). Norms are inherently resistant to change ~ after all, their function is to provide stability and predictability. However, norms initially arise to deal with specific cir- cumstances. They endure as long as those’circumstances prevail but ultimately change with changing circumstances. Norms vary in their ‘latitude of acceptable behaviour’: some are narrow and restrictive (e.g. military dress codes) and others wider and less restrictive (e.g. dress codes for British university lecturers). In gen- eral, norms that relate to group loyalty and to central aspects of group life have a narrow latitude of acceptable behaviour, while norms relating to more peripheral features of the group are less restrictive. Finally, certain group members are allowed a greater latitude of acceptable behaviour than others: higher-status members (e, Jeaders) can get away with more than lower-status members and followers (this ph ‘nomenon is discussed in Chapter 9 when we talk about leadership). ‘There is evidence for the patterning and structure of different types of norm from Sherif and Sherif’s (1964) pioneering study of adolescent gangs in American cities. Participant observers infiltrated these gangs and studied them over several months. ‘The gangs had given themselves names, had adopted various insignia and had strict codes about how gang members should dress. Dress codes were important, as it was largely through dress that the gangs differentiated themselves from one another. ‘The gangs also had strict norms concerning sexual mores and how to deal with out siders (¢-g. parents, police); however, leaders were allowed some latitude in their adherence to these and other norms. Norms are the yardstick of group conduct, and it is through norms that groups influence the behaviour of their members. The exact processes responsible are the subject of much of Chapter 7, which deals with social influence. Group structure Cohesiveness, socialisation and norms refer mainly to uniformities in groups. ‘However, we have just seen how there can also be a degree of patterning and differ. Group structure entiation of norms within groups. Here we develop this theme. In few groups indeed Division of a group into does it happen that all members are equal, perform identical activities or communi- ferent oes that often cate freely with one another. Group structure is clearly reflected in roles, status iforwith respect to relations and communication networks. Groups are also structured in terms of sub- 2t® and presige groups and in terms of the central or marginal group membership credentials of Roles specific members. Pattoms of behaviour that distinguish between diferent Roles ‘activities within the 7 o aroup, and that Roles are much like norms in so.far as they describe and prescribe behaviour. rrrveate tw one However, while norms apply o the group as a whole, roles apply to a subgroup of arate forte poster people within the group, Furthermore, while norms may distinguish between groups, good ofthe gospCHAPTER & PEOPLE IN GROUPS they are generally not intentionally derived to benefit the framework of groups in a society. In contrast, roles are specifically designed to differentiate between people in : the group for the greater good of the group as a whole. . Roles are not people but behavioural prescriptions that are assigned to people. ‘They can be informal and implicit (e.g. in groups of friends) or formal and explicit, (eg. in aircraft flight crews). One quite general role differentiation in small groups is between task specialists (the ‘ideas’ people, who get things done) and . socio-emotional specialists (the people everyone likes because they address rela- tionships in the group) (e.g, Slater, 1955). Roles may emerge in a group for a number of reasons: ‘© They represent a division of labour in the group; only in the simplest groups is there no division of labour. ‘+ ‘They furnish clear-cut social expectations within the group and provide . information about how members relate to one another. : © They furnish members with a self-definition and a place within the group. . Clearly, roles emerge to facilitate group functioning. However, there is evidence : that inflexible role differentiation can sometimes be detrimental to the group. . Gersick and Hackman (1990) found that rigid role differentiation relating to pre- flight checks by the flight crew of a passenger airliner caused the crew to fail to engage a de-icing device, with the tragic consequence that the plane crashed shortly . after take-off. : Roles can sometimes also be associated with larger category memberships (¢.g. professional groups) outside the specific task-oriented groups, in which case the task-oriented group can become a context for role conflict that is actually a manifes- tation of wider intergroup conflict. A good example of this might be intergroup : conflict between doctors and nurses. : Although we tend to adopt a dramaturgical perspective when we speak of people ‘acting’ or ‘assuming’ roles, we are probably only partly correct. We may assume roles ‘much like actors taking different parts, but many people see us only in particular Zimbardo had planned to observe the role-playing eertise ove a period of two weeks. However, he had to stop the study after six days. Athough the students were psychologically stable and those assigned to the guard or ‘rsoner roles had no prior dispastional ferences, things jl Cee cee iy Pili Zimbardo was interested in investigating the way, in wich people can adopt and intemalse roles to guide behaviour He was also interested to estabish that itis largely the presciption ofthe role rather than the per- sonality of the role occupant that govems in-role bbehaviou: In a famous role-playing exercise, wventy-four psychologically stable male Stanford University student volunteers were randomly assigned the roles of prison ers or guards. The prisoners were arrested at their homes and initly processed by the police, then hhanded over to the guards in a simulated prison con- structed inthe basement of the Psychology Department ‘at Stanford Univers ‘got completely. out of hand. The guards continually harassed, humiliated and intimidated the prisoners, and they used psychological techniques to undesine soidarty ‘and sow the seeds of dstnst among them, Some guards inceasingly behaved ina brutal and sadistic manner. ‘The prisoner initaly revolted but gradually became ‘passive and doce 2s they showed symptoms of individ- tual and group disintegration and an acute loss oF contact ‘with realty, Some prisoners had to be released from the study because they showed symptoms of severe emo- tional disturbance (disorganised thinking, uncontrolable “eying and searing); and in one case, a prisoner devel: ‘oped a psychosomatic rash al over his body.Group structure [ 305] | roles and so infer that that i how we really are; professional actors are easily typecast in exactly the same way. This tendency to attribute roles internally to dispositions of {he role player may be an example ofthe fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977; Fundamental see Chapter 3). attribution error One practical implication of this is that you should avoid low-status roles in Bat in atrbutng 7 sroups, or you will subsequently find it difficult to escape their legacy. Perhaps the anothers bhavour . ost powerful and well-known social psychological illustration of the power of roles _™0®tintemal than to to modify behaviour is Zimbardo’s (1971; Banuazizi & Movahedi, 1975) simulated _*i@tional causes. prison experiment (see Box 8.2). : {Ultimately roles can actualy influence who we are ~ our identity and concept of self. This idea has been extensively elaborated by sociologists to explain how social interaction and wider societal expectations about behaviour can create enduring and real identities for people ~ role identity theory (e.g. McCall & Simmons, 1978; ‘Stryker & Statham, 1986; see Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995), Status All roles are not equal: some are consensually more valued and respected and thus confer greater status on the role occupant. The highest-status role in most groups is Stas the role of leader (see Chapter 9) In general, higher-status roles or their oocupants Consensual evaluation : tend to have two properties: Ofte presi of roe roe oceupantin a 1 consensual prestige; reup, oof the prestige 2 a tendency to initiate ideas and activites that are adopted by the group. of a group and ts members 3s 8 whol. For example, from his participant observation study of gangs in an Italian American wie : immigrant community, Whyte (1943) reported that even the relatively inarticulate ‘Doc’, who described his assumption of leadership of the thirteen-member Norton gang in terms of who he had ‘walloped’, found that the consensual prestige that such Wallopings earned him was insufficient alone to ensure his high-status position. He admitted that his status also derived from the fact that he was the one who always : thought of things for the group to do. : Status hierarchies in groups are not fixed: they can vary over time, and also from situation to situation. Take an orchestra: the lead violinist may have the highest. status role at a concert, while the union representative has the highest-status role in ; ‘negotiations with management. One explanation of why status hierarchies emerge so . readily in groups is in terms of social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954, Suls & Miller, 1977) ~ status hierarchies are the expression and reflection of intragroup Social comparisons. Groups furnish a pool of relevant others with whom we can ‘make social comparisons in order to assess the validity of our opinions and abilities, Certain roles in the group have more power and influence and, because they are therefore more attractive and desirable, have many more ‘applicants’ than ean be accommodated. Fierce social comparisons on behavioural dimensions relevant to i these roles inevitably mean that the majority of group members, who are unsuccessful in securing the role, must conclude that they are less able than those who are success {ul. Thus arises a shared view that those occupying the attractive role are superior to the rest consensual prestige and high status (sce the third focus question) Status hicrarchies often become institutionalised, so that individual members do i not engage in ongoing systematic social comparisons. Rather, they simply assume that particular roles or role occupants are of higher status than their own role or themselves. Research into the formation of status hicrarchies in newly created ‘2r0ups tends to support this view. Strodtbeck, James and Hawkins (1957) assembled