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Aristotle's Four Causes illustrated for a table: material (wood), formal (design), efficient (carpentry), final
(dining).
Contents
1Meaning of "cause"
o 1.1Matter
o 1.2Form
o 1.3Agent
o 1.4End
2In modern science
o 2.1Biology
3Heidegger on technology
4Tinbergen's four questions
5See also
6Notes
7References
8External links
Meaning of "cause"[edit]
In his philosophical writings, Aristotle used the Greek word αἴτιον, aition, a neuter singular form of an
adjective. The Greek word had meant, perhaps originally in a "legal" context, what or who is
"responsible", mostly but not always in a bad sense of "guilt" or "blame"; alternatively it could mean
"to the credit of" someone or something. The appropriation of this word by Aristotle and other
philosophers reflects how the Greek experience of legal practice influenced the concern in Greek
thought to determine what is responsible.[8] The word developed other meanings, including its use in
philosophy in a more abstract sense.[9][10] About a century before Aristotle, the anonymous author of
the Hippocratic text On Ancient Medicine had described the essential characteristics of a cause: "We
must, therefore, consider the causes of each [medical] condition to be those things which are such
that, when they are present, the condition necessarily occurs, but when they change to another
combination, it ceases."[11] In the present context, Aristotle used the four causes to provide different
answers to the question, "because of what?" The four answers to this question illuminate different
aspects of how a thing comes into being or of how an event takes place. [12]
Matter[edit]
Aristotle considers the material "cause" (hyle)[13] of an object as equivalent to the nature of the raw
material out of which the object is composed. (The word "nature" for Aristotle applies to both its
potential in the raw material and its ultimate finished form. In a sense this form already existed in the
material: see potentiality and actuality.)
Whereas modern physics looks to simple bodies, Aristotle's physics instead treated living things as
exemplary. However, he felt that simple natural bodies such as earth, fire, air, and water also
showed signs of having their own innate sources of motion, change, and rest. Fire, for example,
carries things upwards, unless stopped from doing so. Things like beds and cloaks, formed by
human artifice, have no innate tendency to become beds or cloaks.[14]
In traditional Aristotelian philosophical terminology, material is not the same as substance. Matter
has parallels with substance in so far as primary matter serves as the substratum for simple bodies
which are not substance: sand and rock (mostly earth), rivers and seas (mostly water), atmosphere
and wind (mostly air and then mostly fire below the moon). In this traditional terminology, 'substance'
is a term of ontology, referring to really existing things; only individuals are said to be substance
(subjects) in the primary sense. Secondary substance, in a different sense, also applies to man-
made artifacts.
Form[edit]
Further information: Platonic realism
Aristotle considers the formal "cause" (eidos)[13] as describing the pattern or form which when
present makes matter into a particular type of thing, which we recognize as being of that particular
type.
By Aristotle's own account, this is a difficult and controversial concept.[citation needed] It links with theories of
forms such as those of Aristotle's teacher, Plato, but in Aristotle's own account (see
his Metaphysics), he takes into account many previous writers who had expressed opinions about
forms and ideas, but he shows how his own views differ from them. [15]
Agent[edit]
Aristotle defines the agent or efficient "cause" (kinoun)[13] of an object as that which causes change
and drives transient motion (such as a painter painting a house) (see Aristotle, Physics II 3, 194b29).
In many cases, this is simply the thing that brings something about. For example, in the case of a
statue, it is the person chiseling away which transforms a block of marble into a statue. Only this one
of the four causes is like what an ordinary English-speaker would regard as a cause. [16]
End[edit]
Main article: Teleology
Aristotle defines the end, purpose, or final "cause" (telos)[13] as that for the sake of which a thing is
done.[17] Like the form, this is a controversial type of explanation in science; some have argued for its
survival in evolutionary biology,[18] while Ernst Mayr denied that it continued to play a role.[19] It is
commonly recognised[20] that Aristotle's conception of nature is teleological in the sense
that Nature exhibits functionality in a more general sense than is exemplified in the purposes that
humans have. As discussed further below, Aristotle observed that a telos does not necessarily
involve deliberation, intention, consciousness, or intelligence. An example of a relevant passage
occurs in Physics II.8, where he writes:
This is most obvious in the animals other than man: they make things neither by art nor after inquiry
or deliberation. That is why people wonder whether it is by intelligence or by some other faculty that
these creatures work, – spiders, ants, and the like... It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not
present because we do not observe the agent deliberating. Art does not deliberate. If the ship-
building art were in the wood, it would produce the same results by nature. If, therefore, purpose is
present in art, it is present also in nature. [21]
For example, according to Aristotle, a seed has the eventual adult plant as its end (i.e., as its telos) if
and only if the seed would become the adult plant under normal circumstances. [22] In Physics II.9,
Aristotle hazards a few arguments that a determination of the end (cause) of a phenomenon is more
important than the others. He argues that the end is that which brings it about, so for example "if one
defines the operation of sawing as being a certain kind of dividing, then this cannot come about
unless the saw has teeth of a certain kind; and these cannot be unless it is of iron." [23] According to
Aristotle, once a final "cause" is in place, the material, efficient and formal "causes" follow by
necessity. However, he recommends that the student of nature determine the other "causes" as well,
[24]
and notes that not all phenomena have an end, e.g., chance events. [25]
Aristotle saw that his biological investigations provided insights into the causes of things, especially
into the final cause.
We should approach the investigation of every kind of animal without being ashamed, since in each
one of them there is something natural and something beautiful. The absence of chance and the
serving of ends are found in the works of nature especially. And the end, for the sake of which a
thing has been constructed or has come to be, belongs to what is beautiful.
In modern science[edit]
See also: Teleology § Teleology and science
Francis Bacon wrote in his Advancement of Learning (1605) that natural science "doth make inquiry,
and take consideration of the same natures : but how? Only as to the material and efficient causes
of them, and not as to the forms." Using the terminology of Aristotle, Bacon demanded that, apart
from the "laws of nature" themselves, the causes relevant to natural science are only efficient
causes and material causes, or, to use the formulation which became famous later, natural
phenomena require scientific explanation in terms of matter and motion. In The New Organon,
Bacon divided knowledge into physics and metaphysics.
From the two kinds of axioms which have been spoken of arises a just division of philosophy and the
sciences, taking the received terms (which come nearest to express the thing) in a sense agreeable
to my own views. Thus, let the investigation of forms, which are (in the eye of reason at least, and in
their essential law) eternal and immutable, constitute Metaphysics; and let the investigation of the
efficient cause, and of matter, and of the latent process, and the latent configuration (all of which
have reference to the common and ordinary course of nature, not to her eternal and fundamental
laws) constitute Physics. And to these let there be subordinate two practical divisions: to Physics,
Mechanics; to Metaphysics, what (in a purer sense of the word) I call Magic, on account of the
broadness of the ways it moves in, and its greater command over nature. Francis Bacon The New
Organon, Book II, Aphorism 9, 1620
Bacon's position, excluding teleology, is sometimes naïvely regarded as all-sufficient and exhaustive
in modern science, though one may properly bear in mind that it was reached before the theory of
evolution recognised the survival value inherent in biological functionality.
Biology[edit]
Further information: Tinbergen's four questions
Explanations in terms of final causes remain common in evolutionary biology.[18][31] Francisco J.
Ayala has claimed that teleology is indispensable to biology since the concept of adaptation is
inherently teleological.[31] In an appreciation of Charles Darwin published in Nature in 1874, Asa
Gray noted "Darwin's great service to Natural Science" lies in bringing back Teleology "so that,
instead of Morphology versus Teleology, we shall have Morphology wedded to Teleology". Darwin
quickly responded, "What you say about Teleology pleases me especially and I do not think anyone
else has ever noticed the point."[18] Francis Darwin and T. H. Huxley reiterate this sentiment. The
latter wrote that "..the most remarkable service to the philosophy of Biology rendered by Mr. Darwin
is the reconciliation of Teleology and Morphology, and the explanation of the facts of both, which his
view offers."[18] James G. Lennox states that Darwin uses the term 'Final Cause' consistently in
his Species Notebook, Origin of Species and after.[18]
Contrary to the position described by Francisco J. Ayala, Ernst Mayr states that "adaptedness... is a
posteriori result rather than an a priori goal-seeking." [32] Various commentators view the teleological
phrases used in modern evolutionary biology as a type of shorthand. For example, S. H. P. Madrell
writes that "the proper but cumbersome way of describing change by evolutionary adaptation [may
be] substituted by shorter overtly teleological statements" for the sake of saving space, but that this
"should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by anything other than from mutations arising
by chance, with those that impart an advantage being retained by natural selection." [33] However,
Lennox states that in evolution as conceived by Darwin, it is true both that evolution is the result of
mutations arising by chance and that evolution is teleological in nature. [18]
Statements that a species does something "in order to" achieve survival are teleological. The validity
or invalidity of such statements depends on the species and the intention of the writer as to the
meaning of the phrase "in order to". Sometimes it is possible or useful to rewrite such sentences so
as to avoid teleology.[34] Some biology courses have incorporated exercises requiring students to
rephrase such sentences so that they do not read teleologically. Nevertheless, biologists still
frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even if that is not the intention.
Heidegger on technology[edit]
In The Question Concerning Technology, Martin Heidegger describes the four causes as follows:
See also[edit]
Anthropic principle
Biosemiotics
Causality
Convergent evolution
Four discourses, by Jacques Lacan
Proximate and ultimate causation
Socrates
Teleology
The purpose of a system is what it does , Anthony Stafford Beer's
POSIWID principle
Notes[edit]
1. ^ Aristotle, Physics 194 b17–20; see also: Posterior Analytics 71 b9–
11; 94 a20.
2. ^ Jump up to: "[F]or a full range of cases, an explanation which fails to
a b c
References[edit]
Cohen, Marc S. "The Four Causes" (Lecture Notes) Accessed
March 14, 2006.
Falcon, Andrea. Aristotle on Causality (link to section labeled "Four
Causes"). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2008.
Heidegger, Martin (1977). Krell, D. F. (ed.). The Question
Concerning Technology. Basic Writings. Harper & Row.
Hennig, Boris. "The Four Causes." Journal of Philosophy 106(3),
2009, 137–60.
Leroi, Armand Marie (2015). The Lagoon: How Aristotle Invented
Science. Bloomsbury. ISBN 978-1408836224.
Moravcsik, J.M. "Aitia as generative factor in Aristotle's philosophy."
Dialogue, 14 : pp 622–638, 1975.
Reece, Bryan C. (2019). "Aristotle's Four Causes of
Action". Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 97 (2): 213–
227. doi:10.1080/00048402.2018.1482932.
English translation of Study on Phideas, by Pía Figueroa written
with theme of Final Cause as per Aristotle.
External links[edit]
The Consequences of Ideas: Understanding the Concepts that
Shaped Our World, By R. C. Sproul
Aristotle on definition. By Marguerite Deslauriers, page 81
Philosophy in the ancient world: an introduction. By James A. Arieti.
p. 201.
Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. By Joseph Owens
and Etienne Gilson.
Aitia as generative factor in Aristotle's philosophy*
A Compass for the Imagination, by Harold C. Morris. Philosophy
thesis elaborates on Aristotle's Theory of the Four Causes.
Washington State University, 1981.
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