Case 1:21-cv-00205 Document 1 Filed 04/02/21 Page 1 of 16 PageID #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT BLUEFIELD

DALLAS CONLEY,

Plaintiff,

vs. Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-00205

G.C. PAITSEL, individually,

A.S. PRIMMER, individually,
BENJAMIN R. WOOD, individually,
JOHN DOE NO. 1, individually,
JOHN DOE NO. 2, individually,
JOHN DOE NO. 3, individually,
JOHN DOE NO. 4, individually,
JOHN DOE NO. 5, individually,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT

This complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the Fourth Amendment to

the United States Constitution, arises out of the Defendants’ use of excessive force and

unreasonable search and seizure on the Plaintiff on or about April 3, 2019 and again on April 5,

2019 in Mercer County, West Virginia, within the Southern District of West Virginia.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343.

PARTIES

1. The Plaintiff, Dallas Conley, was at all times relevant hereto a resident of Mercer

County, West Virginia.

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2. Defendant G.C. Paitsel was at all times relevant hereto a police officer with the

Mercer County Sheriff’s Office and was at all times relevant hereto acting under the color of law.

He is named in his individual capacity.

3. Defendant A.S. Primmer was at all times relevant hereto a police officer with the

Mercer County Sheriff’s Office and was at all times relevant hereto acting under the color of law.

He is named in his individual capacity.

4. Defendant John Doe No. 1 was at all times relevant hereto a police officer with

the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office and was at all times relevant hereto acting under the color of

law. He is named in his individual capacity.

5. Defendant John Doe No. 2 was at all times relevant hereto a police officer with

the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office and was at all times relevant hereto acting under the color of

law. He is named in his individual capacity.

6. Defendant John Doe No. 3 was at all times relevant hereto a police officer with

the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office and was at all times relevant hereto acting under the color of

law. He is named in his individual capacity.

7. Defendant John Doe No. 4 was at all times relevant hereto a police officer with

the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office and was at all times relevant hereto acting under the color of

law. He is named in his individual capacity.

8. Defendant John Doe No. 5 was at all times relevant hereto a police officer with

the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office and was at all times relevant hereto acting under the color of

law. He is named in his individual capacity.

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FACTS

9. On April 2, 2019, the Plaintiff’s wife obtained an emergency temporary domestic

violence protective order against him, following a verbal argument.

10. Following the argument, the Plaintiff left the and drove around for a while,

returning home shortly thereafter.

11. Unbeknownst to the Plaintiff, his wife had left the home while he was absent and

obtained a temporary emergency domestic violence protective order against the Plaintiff, based

on the verbal altercation which took place. She was driven to the marital home by two police

officers.

12. The police cruiser was driven by Defendants Paitsel and Primmer, while

Plaintiff’s wife was located in the rear seat.

13. After parking in the driveway, Defendants Paitsel and Primmer exited the cruiser

and walked unannounced into the Plaintiff’s home through the closed, but unlocked, front door.

They did not knock and announce their presence. Plaintiff was surprised to see two police

officers inside his home.

14. Plaintiff was unaware that his wife was outside in the police cruiser in the

driveway. He was also unaware that the officers were there to serve protective order paperwork

on him. The defendant officers did not communicate their purpose for being in the home, but

rather began to approach the Plaintiff, shining their flashlights in his face.

15. Plaintiff did not recognize the two officers. Although the two men were dressed in

police uniforms, they did not appear to be acting like police officers. They did not identify

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themselves, nor the reason they had entered the Plaintiff’s home. They continued to approach the

Plaintiff with an aggressive and threatening demeanor. Plaintiff became fearful for his physical

safety. He again asked them to leave. The officers did not serve, nor attempt to serve, the

protective order paperwork.

16. Plaintiff continued to feel threatened by the two men aggressively approaching

him. He started backing up, raising his hands so that they were visible, demonstrating that he was

not a threat to their physical safety. The area of the home where the officers encountered the

Plaintiff was dark. Defendant Paitsel was holding a heavy “mag-lite” style flashlight and shining

it on the Plaintiff’s face, blinding him and also further escalating his fear that he was in imminent

danger.

17. Suddenly, without warning and without provocation, Defendant Paitsel violently

struck Plaintiff in the face with the heavy “mag-lite” flashlight, striking Plaintiff near his eye and

causing immediate severe damage to Plaintiff’s face, as well as excruciating sharp pain.

18. Prior to the violent strike to the head by Paitsel, Plaintiff had not threatened the

officers. Plaintiff had not attempted to flee from the officers - he had merely asked them to leave

his residence. Nor had Plaintiff engaged in physical actions that would objectively indicate he

posed a threat to the officers’ physical safety.

19. Immediately following Paitsel’s flashlight strike to the Plaintiff’s head, Defendant

Primmer joined in and also began to attempt to violently attack the Plaintiff.

20. Plaintiff was immediately placed in a reasonable apprehension of serious bodily

injury or death. He had already been struck in the head, unprovoked and unnecessarily, with a

flashlight being utilized as a blunt weapon, used with intention to cause great bodily harm or

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death. Plaintiff’s first instincts were to attempt to flee the violence. He ran into the hallway of his

house, trying to avoid another strike to the head by the officers.

21. The officers pursued Plaintiff into the hallway and continued to attack him.

Defendant Primmer struck Plaintiff in the head with a closed fist. Defendant Paitsel began

attempting to strike Plaintiff in the head again with his flashlight. Acting in self defense, Plaintiff

wrestled the flashlight away from Paitsel and used it to hit both Paitsel and Primmer as they were

violently attacking him in the hallway. Plaintiff utilized only that force which he reasonably

believed necessary to extricate himself from the danger, which he believed would cause him

great bodily harm or death.

22. After breaking free from the officers, Plaintiff dropped the flashlight on the floor

and ran out of his home, fleeing into the nearby woods. Plaintiff was in continued fear for his

life, should Paitsel and Primmer catch him. Plaintiff was still unaware of the existence of the

protective order. Plaintiff wouldn’t find out about its existence until his preliminary hearing -

days later. At the time, he just thought that the police were attempting to injure or kill him.

23. Thereafter, Plaintiff became fearful that he would be seriously injured or killed if

Paitsel, Primmer, or any other police officers, captured him. He tried to arrange to turn himself in

to his parole officer, whom he trusted. His parole officer told him to wait until Monday morning

to turn himself in, since it was a Friday. Plaintiff’s mother was able to get in contact with a U.S.

Marshall who worked with the parole officer. The U.S. Marshall arranged for the Plaintiff to turn

himself in at the federal courthouse in Beckley, West Virginia. Authorities were notified and were

waiting for the Plaintiff to arrive at the courthouse.

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24. Plaintiff retrieved his pickup truck. The tires were flat - apparently flattened by

law enforcement. He drove the truck to a gas station and filled the tires with air. He called his

mother and let her know that he was on his way to the courthouse to turn himself in. Plaintiff’s

mother then called authorities and reported that Plaintiff was en route to the courthouse.

Plaintiff’s wife was going to also meet the Plaintiff at the courthouse, in order to drive the truck

home.

25. While on his way to the federal courthouse to turn himself in on April 5, 2019,

several police cruisers pulled in behind him and began to follow him. Plaintiff immediately

realized that someone had notified local law enforcement of the fact that he was en route to the

federal courthouse in Beckley. Plaintiff panicked, believing that Defendants Paitsel and Primmer

were still trying to kill him - and now were attempting to prevent him from turning himself in to

federal authorities.

26. Still fearing for his life, Plaintiff fled from the police car, eventually crashing his

vehicle, at a location still within Mercer County, West Virginia. According to eyewitness

testimony from the preliminary hearing, Plaintiff never made it out of his truck. Defendant John

Does 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, who were deputies with the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office, pulled the

Plaintiff out of his truck and began to beat viciously beat him. Plaintiff did not strike, nor did he

attempt to strike, any of the officers. Plaintiff was unarmed. He was beaten unconscious by the

officers.

27. Eventually, Plaintiff was taken to Princeton Community Hospital to the

emergency room, escorted by law enforcement. There he was diagnosed with severe trauma to

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his head and face, including a fractured nose, multiple fractures of his orbital socket, lacerations,

missing teeth, and severe swelling of the face, including his eyes swollen shut.

28. Plaintiff underwent a long process of recovery, including dental surgery to repair

multiple missing teeth, knocked out by the officers during the April 5 beating. For a period of

time, Plaintiff completely lost vision in one of his eyes and he suffered from migraine headaches

and severe jaw pain and eye pain. Plaintiff continues to suffer from his injuries.

29. Defendant Primmer testified at the Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing in the criminal

charges which ensued. Upon information and belief, Defendant Primmer was later terminated

from the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office for making unrelated false statements while serving as a

police officer.

30. West Virginia State Trooper J. VanMeter also testified at the Plaintiff’s

preliminary hearing and stated that he observed members of the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office,

believed to be John Does 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, striking the Plaintiff after taking him into custody on

April 5, 2019.

31. Plaintiff was subsequently indicted on multiple charges related to both April 3,

2019 and April 5, 2019, with said charges still pending as of the date of this filing - almost two

years later. Plaintiff was initially placed on home confinement and was later released from home

confinement. He has been fully employed since and has abided by all terms and conditions

placed upon him by home confinement, as well as by the Circuit Court of Mercer County.

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COUNT ONE - USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN VIOLATION

OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT UNDER 42 U.S.C. 1983
(APRIL 3, 2019)

32. The previous paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully

restated herein.

33. On April 3, 2019, Defendants Paitsel and Primmer suddenly and without warning

or provocation, attacked the Plaintiff inside his own home on April 3, 2019, thereby using

excessive and extreme violent physical force, striking Plaintiff in the head with a heavy

flashlight, as described above in further detail. Defendant Paitsel struck the Plaintiff first with his

flashlight, with no verbal warning from either officer. Defendant Primmer immediately also

attacked the Plaintiff, striking and attempting to strike him, as well as attempting to control the

Plaintiff so as to allow Defendant Paitsel to again strike Plaintiff’s head. Defendant Primmer

struck the Plaintiff in the head with a closed fist at least one time.

34. At the time this violent use of physical force was performed, no objectively

reasonable police officer could have perceived the Plaintiff as posting an immediate threat to the

safety of himself, or any other individual. Plaintiff was unarmed, his hands were in the air and he

had not failed to obey any lawful order. He had asked the officers to leave his residence, which

he reasonably believed he was entitled to do. The officers did not identify themselves. The

officers did not explain the purpose for their presence in Plaintiff’s home. The officers did not

serve, nor attempt to serve, the protective order paperwork on the Plaintiff prior to using violent

physical force against him.

35. Plaintiff only began to engage in what he reasonably believed was necessary self

defense, after being violently struck in the head and attacked by the officers. Prior to the attack

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by defendant officers Paitsel and Primmer, there were no facts which objectively indicated that

Plaintiff posed a threat to the officers or anyone else who was present. To the contrary, he asked

them to leave. Nor did the officers inquire at any time about the location or safety of the

Plaintiff’s son, who was safely in bed in a bedroom of the home. Upon information and belief,

there was no protective order issued on behalf of the Plaintiff’s son - only Plaintiff’s wife.

36. At the time force was used against the Plaintiff, he was not charged with having

committed any crime. Nor did the officers have probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had

committed a crime for which he could be arrested in his home. While Plaintiff was alleged by his

wife to have been in an altercation earlier that evening, the altercation was a verbal argument and

did not involve physical contact.

37. The defendant officers did not obtain, nor did they seek, a warrant to enter the

Plaintiff’s home following his asking them to leave his home on April 3, 2019. Instead, they

ignored the Plaintiff and continued to aggressively approach him.

38. Defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable, unlawful, unwarranted, and

taken in violation of the Plaintiff’s clearly established procedural and substantive rights,

including the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to be free from having an excessive

amount of physical force used against him; namely being beaten unnecessarily.

39. Defendants’ actions were willful, wanton, intentional, malicious, and done with a

callous and reckless disregard for the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free from

excessive force.

40. The defendant officers utilized violent physical force to effectuate a seizure of the

Plaintiff in his home. At the time that Plaintiff was first struck in the head by Defendant Paitsel’s

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flashlight, his hands were up; he was not actively resisting; the officers had given no commands

which Plaintiff had failed to obey. The excessive and unjustifiable inception of violent physical

force against the Plaintiff, in what should have been a routine service of protective order

paperwork, escalated the situation to an unnecessary violent struggle which violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights and placed him in risk of severe injury or death.

41. As of the date of the subject use of force, on April 3, 2019, it was clearly

established that Fourth Amendment bars police officers from using excessive force to effectuate

a seizure. Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir.2003) ; see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). It was further clearly established on the said

date that a reasonable jury could find that an officer committed a constitutional violation when

the officer deployed physical force immediately upon arrival and without warning. Yates v. Terry,

817 F.3d 877 (4th Cir. 2016); citing Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th

Cir. 2007).

42. As of April 3, 2019, it was also clearly established that a police officer was not

entitled to use unnecessary, gratuitous or disproportionate force against a nonviolent

misdemeanant (or in this case, the subject of civil process who was not a misdemeanant) who

presented no threat to the safety of the officer or the public and who was compliant and not

actively resisting arrest or fleeing. Yates v. Terry, 817 F.3d 877 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing prior

cases). Even assuming that officers Paitsel and Primmer were entitled to be inside the Plaintiff’s

home and to seize him therein, “[e]ven noncompliance with police directives and nonviolent

physical resistance do not necessarily create ‘a continuing threat to the officers’ safety.’” Estate

of Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 902 (4th Cir. 2016);citing Meyers v. Balt. Cnty.,

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713 F.3d 723, 733 (4th Cir. 2013); Rambo v. Daley, 68 F.3d 203, 207 (7th Cir.1995) (Refusing to

enter an out-of-state officer's police car until a local officer is summoned is not a sufficient threat

to the arresting officer to justify physically striking the arrestee.); Goodson v. City of Corpus

Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 733, 740 (5th Cir.2000) (An arrestee "yank[ing] his arm away" from a

police officer, similarly, does not justify "being tackled.”). An objectively reasonable police

officer would have known that it would have been a constitutional violation to enter the

Plaintiff’s home, refuse to leave after being asked to do so by the Plaintiff, and then to strike him

in the head with a flashlight, even if Plaintiff failed to obey their directives through non-violent

means.

43. As of April 3, 2019, it was clearly established that where a police officer engages

in an excessive and unjustifiable inception of physical force against a subject, which

unnecessarily escalates tension, during an otherwise routine encounter, the officer’s violent

response subjects the civilian subject to an obvious risk of immediate injury and also creates the

very real possibility that the attack would continue to meet with frightened resistance, leading to

an even further escalation of the violence. Yates v. Terry, 817 F.3d 877 (4th Cir. 2016); citing

Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 103 (4th Cir. 2015) ("Not only did [the officer's] violent response

subject [the arrestee] to an obvious risk of immediate injury, it also created the very real

possibility that ... the attack would continue to meet with frightened resistance, leading to an

even further escalation of the violence."); id. at 104 ("[O]ur determination ... in Rowland ... was

based on the simple fact that the officer took a situation where there obviously was no need for

the use of any significant force and yet took an unreasonably aggressive tack that quickly

escalated it to a violent exchange when the suspect instinctively attempted to defend himself.”);

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See Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174 (“Rowland maintains that he resisted only to the extent

of instinctively trying to protect himself from the defendant's onslaught.”).

44. The severe nature of the Plaintiff’s injuries indicates the unnecessary level of

force used against him. Plaintiff suffered fractures of his orbital floor and orbital wall, which

resulted in a loss of vision for a period of time, as well as severe pain, were the direct result of

being struck in the eye with Defendant Paitsel’s flashlight. The said injuries indicate the

unreasonableness of the level of force used by Defendant Paitsel to effectuate a seizure of the

Plaintiff. The extent of Plaintiff’s injuries are a relevant consideration when measuring the

reasonableness of the amount of force employed by police officers in effecting a seizure. Turmon

v. Jordan, 405 F.3d 202 (4th Cir. 2005); citing Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir.

2003).

45. Plaintiff suffered harm, including personal injury, extreme emotional distress,

severe pain, and is entitled to recover damages for the same.

COUNT TWO - USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN VIOLATION

OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT UNDER 42 U.S.C. 1983
(APRIL 5, 2019)

46. The previous paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully

restated herein.

47. On April 5, 2019, John Does 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 encountered Plaintiff while he was

still in his pickup truck, shortly after Plaintiff crashed following the pursuit from law

enforcement as described above in greater detail. The said defendants had knowledge that

Plaintiff had struck two of their colleagues - Paitsel and Primmer - two days earlier and sought to

retaliate against the Plaintiff by beating him unnecessarily and unjustifiably.

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48. The defendant John Does, who were police officers employed and on duty with

the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office, pulled the Plaintiff out of his pickup truck and began to use

force on the Plaintiff, repeatedly striking and beating him in retaliation for what they believed he

had done two days earlier, rather than based on any active resistance or immediate threat posed

by the Plaintiff following the crash of his truck on April 5, 2019.

49. At the time this violent use of physical force was performed by John Does 1, 2, 3,

5 and 5 on April 5, 2019, at the time Plaintiff was taken into custody, no objectively reasonable

police officer could have perceived the Plaintiff as posing an immediate threat to the safety of

himself, or any other individual. Plaintiff was in custody, unarmed and not resisting at the time

force was being used against him. Plaintiff was secured the custody of the defendant police

officers and was not actively resisting. However, John Does 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 were savagely

beating the Plaintiff unjustifiably. When the officers later transported the Plaintiff to the hospital

emergency room, they falsely told the medical staff that Plaintiff attempted to get out of his truck

and hit his face on a guardrail.

50. Defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable, unlawful, unwarranted, and

taken in violation of the Plaintiff’s clearly established procedural and substantive rights,

including the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to be free from having an excessive

amount of physical force used against him; namely being beaten unnecessarily.

51. As of the date of the subject use of force, on April 5, 2019, it was clearly

established that Fourth Amendment bars police officers from using excessive force to effectuate

a seizure. Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2003) ; see Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Moreover, the law was also clearly

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established that it was a constitutional violation to subject arrestees to unnecessary and gratuitous

acts of violent retaliation. Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that it was

a clearly established excessive force violation to subject pretrial detainees to “rough rides”

during transport). It’s further well established that a police officer cannot defeat an excessive

force claim by alleging a plaintiff simply failed to submit to his unexplained and violent assault

to justify his escalation of the violence. See Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174 (“Rowland

maintains that he resisted only to the extent of instinctively trying to protect himself from the

defendant's onslaught.”).

52. As of April 5, 2019, it was clearly established that it was a constitutional violation

to punch an arrestee who had already been secured, or who was in the process of being secured,

and who is either not resisting, or is engaging in minimal non-violent resistance. See Estate of

Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892 (4th Cir. 2016). Moreover, it has been well

established that it is an excessive and unreasonable use of force for a police officer to repeat

53. Defendants’ actions were willful, wanton, intentional, malicious, and performed

with a callous and reckless disregard for the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free from

excessive force.

54. Plaintiff suffered harm, including personal injury, extreme emotional distress,

severe pain, and is entitled to recover damages for the same.

COUNT THREE - BYSTANDER LIABILITY

(April 5, 2019)

55. The previous paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully

restated herein.

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56. Plaintiff pleads in the alternative, that to the extent that either of John Does 1, 2 or

3 witnessed the beating of the Plaintiff, as described in Count Two above, but did not in-fact

physically participate in the same, the Plaintiff nevertheless asserts a constitutional violation

against any such police officer who was present during said beating, but who took no actions to

stop it.

57. It would be readily apparent to any objectively reasonable officer that the beating

and physical abuse perpetrated against the Plaintiff, as alleged herein in detail, would violate the

Fourth Amendment rights of that individual, the Plaintiff, to be free from the infliction of

excessive force - and in particular to be subjected to violent physical force for the sole purpose of

inflicting vengeance or retaliation for the perceived actions of the Plaintiff in allegedly attacking

defendants Paitsel and Primmer.

58. The defendants’ actions as alleged herein were under color of law, objectively

unreasonable, willful, wanton, intentional and done with a callous and reckless disregard for the

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free from excessive force.

59. The Plaintiff suffered harm and is entitled to recover damages for the same.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, based on the above stated facts, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that

this Honorable Court award:

1. Damages against the defendants in an amount to be determined at trial which will

fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiffs for all compensatory damages to be proven at

trial;

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2. Punitive damages against the individual defendants in an amount to be determined

at trial; and

3. Reasonable attorney fees and costs.

PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY

DALLAS CONLEY,
By Counsel

/s John H. Bryan
John H. Bryan (WV Bar No. 10259)
JOHN H. BRYAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW
411 Main Street
P.O. Box 366
Union, WV 24983
(304) 772-4999
Fax: (304) 772-4998
jhb@johnbryanlaw.com
for the Plaintiff

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JS ( ev. 06/ 7) CIVIL COVER
Case 1:21-cv-00205 Document 1-1 FiledSHEET
04/02/21 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 17
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as
provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the
purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

DALLAS CONLEY, G.C. PAITSEL, individually,
A.S. PRIMMER, individually, BENJAMIN R. WOOD, individually,
JOHN DOE NO. 1, individually, JOHN DOE NO. 2, individually, JOHN
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Mercer County of Residence of First Listed Defendant
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Attorneys (If Known)
John H. Bryan (WV Bar No. 10259) JOHN H. BRYAN, ATTORNEY AT
LAW 411 Main Street, P.O. Box 366, Union, WV 24983
(304) 772-4999
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an “X” in One Box Only) III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an “X” in One Box for Plaintif
(For Diversity Cases Only) and One Box for Defendant)
1 U.S. Government 3 Federal Question PTF DEF PTF DEF
Plaintiff (U.S. Government Not a Party) Citizen of This State 1 1 Incorporated or Principal Place 4 4
of Business In This State

2 U.S. Government 4 Diversity Citizen of Another State 2 2 Incorporated and Principal Place 5 5
Defendant (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III) of Business In Another State

Citizen or Subject of a 3 3 Foreign Nation 6 6

Foreign Country
IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an “X” in One Box Only) Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.
CONTRACT TORTS FORFEITURE/PENALTY BANKRUPTCY OTHER STATUTES
110 Insurance PERSONAL INJURY PERSONAL INJURY 625 Drug Related Seizure 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 375 False Claims Act
120 Marine 310 Airplane 365 Personal Injury - of Property 21 USC 881 423 Withdrawal 376 Qui Tam (31 USC
130 Miller Act 315 Airplane Product Product Liability 690 Other 28 USC 157 3729(a))
140 Negotiable Instrument Liability 367 Health Care/ 400 State Reapportionment
150 Recovery of Overpayment 320 Assault, Libel & Pharmaceutical PROPERTY RIGHTS 410 Antitrust
& Enforcement of Judgment Slander Personal Injury 820 Copyrights 430 Banks and Banking
151 Medicare Act 330 Federal Employers’ Product Liability 830 Patent 450 Commerce
152 Recovery of Defaulted Liability 368 Asbestos Personal 835 Patent - Abbreviated 460 Deportation
Student Loans 340 Marine Injury Product New Drug Application 470 Racketeer Influenced and
(Excludes Veterans) 345 Marine Product Liability 840 Trademark Corrupt Organizations
153 Recovery of Overpayment Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY LABOR SOCIAL SECURITY 480 Consumer Credit
of Veteran’s Benefits 350 Motor Vehicle 370 Other Fraud 710 Fair Labor Standards 861 HIA (1395ff) 490 Cable/Sat TV
160 Stockholders’ Suits 355 Motor Vehicle 371 Truth in Lending Act 862 Black Lung (923) 850 Securities/Commodities/
190 Other Contract Product Liability 380 Other Personal 720 Labor/Management 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) Exchange
195 Contract Product Liability 360 Other Personal Property Damage Relations 864 SSID Title XVI 890 Other Statutory Actions
196 Franchise Injury 385 Property Damage 740 Railway Labor Act 865 RSI (405(g)) 891 Agricultural Acts
362 Personal Injury - Product Liability 751 Family and Medical 893 Environmental Matters
Medical Malpractice Leave Act 895 Freedom of Information
REAL PROPERTY CIVIL RIGHTS PRISONER PETITIONS 790 Other Labor Litigation FEDERAL TAX SUITS Act
210 Land Condemnation 440 Other Civil Rights Habeas Corpus: 791 Employee Retirement 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff 896 Arbitration
220 Foreclosure 441 Voting 463 Alien Detainee Income Security Act or Defendant) 899 Administrative Procedure
230 Rent Lease & Ejectment 442 Employment 510 Motions to Vacate 871 IRS—Third Party Act/Review or Appeal of
240 Torts to Land 443 Housing/ Sentence 26 USC 7609 Agency Decision
245 Tort Product Liability Accommodations 530 General 950 Constitutionality of
290 All Other Real Property 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - 535 Death Penalty IMMIGRATION State Statutes
Employment Other: 462 Naturalization Application
446 Amer. w/Disabilities - 540 Mandamus & Other 465 Other Immigration
Other 550 Civil Rights Actions
448 Education 555 Prison Condition
560 Civil Detainee -
Conditions of
Confinement
V. ORIGIN (Place an “X” in One Box Only)
1 Original 2 Removed from 3 Remanded from 4 Reinstated or 5 Transferred from 6 Multidistrict 8 Multidistrict
Proceeding State Court Appellate Court Reopened Another District Litigation - Litigation -
(specify) Transfer Direct File
Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
42 USC 1983
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause:
Excessive Force
VII. REQUESTED IN CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION DEMAND $ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:
COMPLAINT: UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. JURY DEMAND: Yes No
VIII. RELATED CASE(S)
(See instructions):
IF ANY JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER
DATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
4/2/21 /s John H. Bryan
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG JUDGE