SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484               January 15, 2004

DORCAS G. PETALLAR, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JUANILLO M. PULLOS, MCTC, SAN FRANCISCO, SURIGAO DEL
NORTE, respondent.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

In a complaint-affidavit1 dated February 7, 2002, Judge Juanillo M. Pullos, former presiding

judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Surigao del Norte, stands charged
by complainant Dorcas G. Petallar of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.022 and Canon 3, Rule 3.053 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct; as well as Rule 140, Section 44 and Rule 70, Sections
105 and 116 of the Rules of Court; for undue delay in rendering a decision in Case No. 137
for Forcible Entry.

In charging respondent judge with having violated his duty to administer justice impartially and
without delay, Petallar averred that he was the plaintiff in said forcible entry case, adding (and
we quote his allegations):

"2. That I filed the complaint for Forcible Entry aforementioned in MCTC San Francisco
sometime on (sic) March, 1999, which court is presided by Judge Juanillo M. Pullos;

"3. That the Defendants filed their Answer on April 8, 1999;

"4. That after preliminary conference, we were ordered to submit our respective position
papers and evidences;

"5. That on February 02, 2000, I, the Plaintiff submitted our position paper and evidences
and the Defendants submitted also their position paper and evidences on the same
period;

"6. That after I submitted our position papers and evidences together with the
Defendants, I did not remember Judge Juanillo M. Pullos to have ordered us to submit
additional affidavits or other evidences to clarify certain material facts;
 "7. That after 30 days after the receipt of the affidavits and position papers and the
expiration of the period for filing at the MCTC-San Francisco, Surigao del Norte, Judge
Juanillo M. Pullos did not render judgment;

"8. That after two months from the submission of our position papers, I often went to the
court of Judge Pullos personally to verify if there is already a judgment;

"9. That I filed a manifestation through my lawyer on October 15, 2000, a copy is
attached as ANNEX-"A";

"10. That just to remind Judge Juanillo M. Pullos of his sworn duty, I nonetheless
compelled my lawyer on August 3, 2001 to file a Motion for Rendition of Judgment
before Judge Pullos which was duly received on August 6, 2001, a copy of said Motion
is attached as ANNEX "B";

"11. That I personally asked Judge Juanillo Pullos in his court when must be the
rendition of judgment of our case and personally answered me three times on those
three occasions, as follows:

1. ‘That he was still studying the case,’ and he promised this to me sometime on
September 2001;

2. ‘That he had already studied the case but the form shall still be reduced in
typewritten form’ and he said this to me sometime on the 1st week of October
2001;

3. ‘That the Decision shall be mailed’ and he said this on October 25, 2001;

"12. That as of the filing of this Complaint, December 27, 2001, I did not receive any
judgment in the above-entitled case;"7

For his part, respondent judge in his comment, by way of 2nd Indorsement8 dated August 6,
2002, stated that he handed down his decision in Case No. 137 on June 2, 2002. He pointed
out that said decision is, in fact, the subject of an appeal. Respondent submitted that the
charges against him had become moot.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), however, found no merit in respondent’s
contention that the administrative complaint against the latter had been mooted by the decision
he rendered in Case No. 137. The OCA observed that said decision was rendered out of time,
in breach of Rule 70, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that judgment must be
rendered within thirty (30) days after receipt of the affidavits and position papers or the
expiration of the period for filing the same. The OCA also found respondent omitted to come up
with a satisfactory explanation as to his failure to decide the case within the prescribed period.
Nor did he ask for an extension of time within which to decide the case. Thus, in its report dated
February 6, 2003, the OCA held respondent liable for undue delay in rendering judgment in
violation of the Rules of Court and recommended that he be fined the amount of ₱5,000.00. It
was further recommended that respondent judge be admonished to be more conscientious and
prompt in the performance of his duties.

On March 30, 2003, respondent retired from the judiciary.

After a careful perusal of the records of this administrative matter, we find no reason to disagree
with the findings of the OCA. Respondent indeed violated Rule 70, Section 11 of the Rules of
Court for undue delay in rendering judgment. The records show that the parties in Special Civil
Action Case No. 137 had filed their respective position papers as early as February 2, 2000.
Thus, respondent had until March 4, 2000 to render judgment. Had there been circumstances
which prevented him from handing down his decision within the prescribed period, respondent
should have at least requested from this Court for an extension of time within which to render
judgment. As respondent himself admitted, Case No. 137 was decided only on June 2, 2002 or
two (2) years and some three (3) months beyond the reglementary period. Moreover, he could
not even come up with an explanation for the delay.

We cannot overemphasize the Court’s policy on prompt resolution of disputes.1âwphi1 Justice

delayed is justice denied. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed
by law constitutes a serious violation of Article III, Section 169 of the Constitution.

The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by the fairness and
correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved.
Thus, judges must perform their official duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in the
judiciary is to be preserved. There is no excuse for mediocrity in the performance of judicial
functions. The position of judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the law and the
Constitution10 in the discharge of official duties.

Nevertheless, we are aware of the heavy case load of first level courts. Thus, we have, on
numerous occasions, allowed reasonable extensions of time within which to decide cases. But
such extensions must first be sought from this Court. A judge cannot by himself prolong the
period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. Without any order of extension granted
by this Court, failure to decide a case within the prescribed period constitutes gross inefficiency
that merits administrative sanction.11

The OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of ₱5,000.00 for his
failure to decide on time Case No. 137, with admonition to be more conscientious and prompt in
the performance of judicial duties. We agree that a fine must be imposed, but not in the amount
recommended by the OCA. Under Rule 140, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, undue
delay in rendering a decision in a case is a less serious charge that merits, under Section 10(B)
of the same Rule, either suspension from office or a fine beginning at ₱10,000.00 but below
₱20,000.00. This being his first administrative case brought to our attention and there being no
special circumstance to warrant the imposition of a higher penalty, we find it reasonable and
appropriate to impose upon respondent a fine of ₱10,000.00 only. Now, considering that he
already retired from the service, said amount ought to be deducted from his retirement pay and
benefits.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Juanillo M. Pullos, former presiding judge of the Municipal

Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Surigao del Norte, is found LIABLE for undue delay in
rendering a decision in Case No. 137, tantamount to GROSS INEFFICIENCY. He is hereby
ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱10,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement pay and benefits.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 
Rollo, pp. 1-3.

2 
Rule 1.02. – A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

3 
Rule 3.05. – A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.

4 
SEC. 4. Less Serious Charges. – Less serious charges include:

1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of

a case;

5 
SEC. 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers. – Within ten (10) days from
receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the
order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon
by them.

6 
SEC. 11. Period for rendition of judgment. – Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court
shall render judgment.

However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it
may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified,
and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters
within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within
fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the
period for filing the same.

The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the
rendition of the judgment.

7 
Rollo, pp. 1-2.

8 
Id. at 11.

9 
SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

10 
ART. VIII, SEC. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution
must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of
Court or by the court itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a
copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the
parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been
rendered or issued within said period.
 EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1691               January 16, 2004

THE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE IBP BAGUIO-BENGUET CHAPTER, CESAR G.

ORACION, PRESIDENT, Complainant,
vs.
FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch III, Baguio
City, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the Administrative Complaint filed by the officers and members1 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Baguio-Benguet Chapter against Judge Fernando Vil
Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Baguio City, for gross ignorance of
the law, gross violation of constitutional rights of the accused, arrogance, violations of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, oppression and graft and corruption.

In their Complaint, the complainants charge the respondent judge of gross ignorance of law
stating that:

1. His decision in Criminal Case No. 14054-R . . . and in Criminal Cases Nos. 15776-R,
15777-R, 15778-R, 15779-R and 15780-R . . . show his complete ignorance of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law;

2. He continues to violate the provision of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court by

immediately imposing a fine of ₱500.00 on any lawyer who does not answer the first call,
without giving the lawyer an opportunity to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt;

3. He fined Atty. Miguel B. Liceralde ₱500.00 for allegedly being absent during a hearing
when in fact he was present;

4. He dismisses cases if the counsel or a litigant does not appear even for the first time,
without giving the concerned party a chance to explain his absence;

5. He limits the period of appeal in criminal cases. In a case handled by Atty. George
Florendo, he rendered a decision convicting the accused. After the promulgation of the
decision, he told the accused that he was giving him three (3) days only within which to
 file his notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals or to file an application for probation. He
further declared that in case the accused files his notice of appeal, he will double his bail
bond and immediately order his arrest;

6. In the case of PEOPLE VS. ANGELINA MAMARIL, Criminal Case No. 16187-R for
THEFT of the amount of Fourteen Thousand One Hundred Pesos (₱14,100.00), the
accused, who was seventeen (17) years old, pleaded GUILTY to FRUSTRATED THEFT
with the consent of the Prosecution. In his decision, Judge Pamintuan imposed a penalty
one degree lower than that which is imposed for Consummated Theft and ordered the
accused to be recommitted to the DSWD Rehabilitation Center by virtue of her minority.
However, he failed to reduce the penalty imposed by another degree by reason of said
minority in accordance with the clear and explicit provision of Article 68 [2] of the
Revised Penal Code. . .;

7. In the case of PEOPLE VS. BENJIE GOSE, MARK JOSEPH OCHARAN, ET AL.,
Criminal Case No. 14935-R for Robbery, the respondent did the same thing.2

The complainants likewise charge the respondent judge of gross violation of the constitutional
rights of the accused alleging, as follows:

1. In PEOPLE VS. CEFERINO BANIQUED, Criminal Case No. 13949-R, for alleged
violation of Section 3 [e] of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) the
respondent has yet to act on a motion for the preventive suspension of the accused filed
way back in 1996 and which was reiterated after he took over the case in April 1998.
The said incident was deemed submitted for resolution by then Acting Presiding Judge
Joven F. Costales on December 2, 1997. When Judge Pamintuan took over, the
prosecution reiterated the motion which, on August 18, 1998, he ordered as deemed
submitted for the resolution of the court. For more than one (1) year, and as of date,
Judge Pamintuan has not resolved the motion;

2. In the case of SURLA VS. DIMLA, Civil Case No. 3322-R for Collection of Sum of
Money, Judge Pamintuan dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff-witness arrived
at about 8:32 in the morning or just two (2) minutes later, the counsel asked for
reconsideration of the dismissal, manifesting that the witness was ready to testify. In the
interest of justice and fair play, the adverse party even manifested his conformity to the
reconsideration of the order of dismissal. However, Judge Pamintuan did not rule on the
motion and simply considered the same submitted for resolution. For more than four (4)
months, the respondent did not resolve the motion;

3. He refused to furnish a copy of the decision to the accused, but when notice of appeal
was filed, he directed the counsel for the accused to amend the notice to reflect receipt
of the decision although no such decision was really received. This was done in, at least,
two (2) instances, particularly, in People vs. Remedios Malapit, et al. (Criminal Cases
Nos. 15320, 15323, 15327, 15570 and 15571) and in People vs. Alejandro Cas (Criminal
Case No. 15306-R).3

The complainants also claim that the respondent judge is arrogant in that:
 1. He waves at lawyers and tells them to approach his bench; if, by chance, a lawyer
touches a portion of his bench he shouts at him and berates him saying he has not given
him permission to touch his bench;

2. He tells lawyers appearing before him to give priority to his court at the expense of
their other court duties;

3. He insults lawyers by means of harsh and intemperate words in the presence of

litigants and the public;

4. He impresses to the lawyers and parties’ litigants that he is a convicting judge. He

boasts that since he sat as judge all his decisions in criminal cases except two (2) were
convictions;

5. He berates the lowly security guards in the Justice Hall of Baguio City every time they
fail to salute him;

6. He insults litigants who want to settle their cases for allegedly wasting his time;

7. He insults doctors and other expert witnesses who cannot appear because of
previous commitments;

8. In one occasion, he interrupted Atty. Federico J. Mandapat, Jr., in the course of his
cross-examination of a witness and told him: "that is not the way to cross-examine, ask
questions only that are answerable by yes or no." Atty. Mandapat explained that he was
laying the basis for his succeeding questions. The respondent curtly replied that he was
giving him only ten (10) minutes to conduct his cross-examination, to which Atty.
Mandapat countered by telling the respondent that it was tantamount to obstruction of
justice and violation of the right of the accused to cross-examine a witness being
presented against him.4

The respondent judge is also allegedly guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct, as
follows:

1. He is discourteous to lawyers, especially the new and inexperienced;

2. He tells the client in the presence of the lawyer to engage the services of another
lawyer because his lawyer does not know anything or he does not deserve to be paid
(Atty. Joris Karl Dacawi);

3. He verbally assaults lawyers;

4. He does not give even a little respect to old lawyers;

5. He insulted in open court retired Court of Appeals Justice Sixto Domondon because
he came to court late once. For such act, he was even admonished by the Honorable
Supreme Court for his unbecoming conduct towards a former Justice of the Court of
Appeals, yet, his arrogance continues unabated and is more manifest, apparently in
defiance to the admonition he received.5
The respondent judge is allegedly guilty of oppressive conduct committed as follows:

1. He unreasonably limits the presentation of evidence to the detriment of party-litigants;

2. He scolds and insults lawyers who stand up and walk while propounding questions to
witnesses. He pursues a strategy of assault and appeasement. He verbally assaults
lawyers, and if they re-act, he tries to appease some of them in an effort to get them to
his side;

3. He directed Atty. Reynaldo U. Agranzamendez (immediate past President of the IBP

Baguio-Benguet Chapter) to stand up, in lieu of the accused who jumped bail, during the
promulgation of the decision in absentia. Atty. Agranzamendez acting as de oficio
counsel requested that he be allowed to sit down because the people in court might
think that he was the accused but the judge in utter disregard of elementary courtesy
that befits a lawyer did not budge. Instead, he berated Atty. Agranzamendez and told
him to "shut up and don’t argue with the court". When Atty. Agranzamendez got tired
during the reading of the long decision, he slightly leaned to his side. When the Judge
noticed this, he shouted at him and told him to stand up properly. This he did in the
presence of lawyers and litigants who could only look at Atty. Agranzamendez with
sympathy and compassion;

4. He cited Atty. Nicasio M. Aliping, Jr., for contempt for not appearing as a witness in
one case before his sala. When Atty. Aliping learned about this, he explained to the
judge that he was not notified of the date of hearing and presented records clearly
showing that indeed he was not notified. Atty. Aliping prayed that the order be lifted and
set aside. The judge refused and told Atty. Aliping that it was a different matter. To this
day, the order citing him for contempt has not been lifted;

5. In one case where Atty. Cirilo Cawed is the private complainant, the latter executed
an affidavit of desistance praying, among others, for the dismissal of the case. The
respondent did not act on it and instead issued an order threatening his arrest if he will
not appear before him and explain.6

Finally, the respondent judge is allegedly guilty of corruption:

Respondent had a certain EUFEMIO M. GULA, his long-time "bodyguard", appointed as driver
assigned to his branch despite his knowledge that Mr. Gula has no driver’s license, and worse,
he does not know how to drive. This supposed driver draws his salary from the City of Baguio.
The driver fills up the required itinerary forms, which indicate that he supposedly drives for the
respondent from Baguio City to Manila and back, but the truth is that they commute by bus. It is
a certain WILLIAM DANNANG, personnel from the maintenance department of the Baguio City
Justice Hall, who actually drives for the respondent.7

In his Comment, the respondent judge vehemently denies the charges hurled against him.

On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, the respondent judge avers:

1. Criminal Cases Nos. 15776-R to 15780-R, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Danilo Dumez, et al." are now pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. . . Whether
or not the decision of the Respondent Judge in the aforecited cases is correct will be a
 matter only the appellate [court] can decide. The perceived errors in the imposition of the
penalty imposed should be addressed in the Accused-Appellants’ brief. Assuming
arguendo that the Respondent Judge erred in applying the [I]ndeterminate [S]entence
[L]aw, which of course he denies, the proper remedy would have been Appeal, and not
to file Administrative Case against the Judge;

2. In Criminal Case No. 14054-R entitled "People vs. Polic-ew," Respondent Judge
submits the same argument . . . ;

3. In Criminal Case No. 16187-R entitled "People vs. Mamaril" and Criminal Case No.
14935 entitled "People vs. Gose," the decisions of the Respondent Judge had become
final and executory without the Counsels appealing. Had the Counsels appealed their
cases, or at least Moved for Reconsideration, they could have properly raised the
mitigating circumstances, which they claim were not appreciated by the Respondent
Judge. Again the remedy is not the filing of administrative case against the Judge;

4. The Administrative Case against the Respondent Judge in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1483 was
resolved by the Supreme Court in a Decision dated September 17, 1999 and received
by the Respondent Judge on October 4, 1999. Respondent Judge has FIFTEEN (15)
DAYS to file a Motion for Reconsideration, which he will comply with. Suffice it to say
that in this case, the Respondent Judge believed, as he believes in good faith that he
had no cogent reason to inhibit himself from the case . . .;

5. The imposition of fines for tardiness or non-appearance in scheduled cases is

inherent upon any court as part of its disciplining authority. The remedy would have been
to seek reconsideration and not an Administrative Case. The Court has never collected
on the fine, provided the reasons cited in the reconsideration are meritorious. The
Complainants cite the case of Atty. Miguel Liceralde. Said lawyer was never fined by the
Respondent Judge. The fact is, as of date, the Respondent Judge never issued a writ of
execution for the collection of fines from lawyers. . . There were only four (4) instances
when fines were paid by lawyers who volunteered to pay the fine on their own without
filing a motion for reconsideration. . .;

5. The dismissal of the case for failure of the parties or counsel to appear in their
scheduled hearings is so provided by the Rules. Again the remedy is a motion for
reconsideration and not an administrative case on petty grounds. . .;

6. Atty. George Florendo who is not even a signatory to this Petition is mentioned,
albeitly [sic] without his consent regarding "People vs. Joseph Santos," Criminal Case
No. 15171-R for Illegal Possession of Marijuana where he appears for the accused.
Nowhere in the records does it show that he limited the fifteen (15) day period to
appeal.8

On his alleged violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, the respondent judge
counters:

1. In Criminal Case No. 13949-R, "People vs. Baniqued" for Violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019, which was inherited by the Respondent Judge, he submits that no violation
was ever made as the complainants would want to imply. Complainants wanted the
accused preventively suspended. The defense insisted that the entire prosecution
 evidence first be heard, as a pre-suspension hearing which was granted by the
respondent judge’s predecessor, Hon. Joven Costales, and by the respondent judge
himself. Thereafter, despite the opposition of the Accused to the preventive suspension,
an order was issued on September 2, 1999. The move for suspension was complicated
by the incomplete prosecution evidence as well as the constant absence of the Manila-
based private prosecutor. The Court has given wide latitude to the accused and he has
no cause to complain;

2. Civil Case No. 3322-R entitled "Surla vs. Dimla" for Sum of Money, is a continuing
attempt by the Complainants to mislead the Supreme Court. This case had been
dismissed and the dismissal has become final and executory. The case was earlier
dismissed for failure to prosecute on the part of the Plaintiff for failure to appear during
the scheduled hearings of the case, but a Motion for Reconsideration was filed and
granted by the Respondent Judge. Several postponements at the instance of the plaintiff
were tolerably allowed but then again the plaintiff failed to appear during the scheduled
hearing. The Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the same grounds. No motion
for reconsideration was filed and the decision became final. Clearly no fault can be
attributed to the Respondent Judge;

3. Respondent Judge denies refusing to furnish copies of the decision to the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 15321-R, 15323-R, 15327-R, 15770-R and 15771-R entitled
"People vs. Malapit, et al." as these are matters of public record available and accessible
to the public. He could not and never will prevent or obstruct any litigant, much more a
lawyer to access of records pertaining to a case;

4. Respondent Judge denies directing the defense counsel to amend his Notice of
Appeal to allegedly reflect receipt of the decision in Criminal Case No. 15306-R entitled
"People vs. Alejandro Cas," as such an action will gain him nothing. The Manifestation of
Apology by the concerned defense counsel says it all.9

Anent the charge that he is arrogant, the respondent judge declares:

1. The pettiness of the charges (3A to G) are completely wasteful of the Supreme
Court’s precious time as they are bereft of the specifics and are mere general
allegations;

2. As to 3H involving Atty. Federico Mandapat, said defense counsel together with Atty.
Juan Alberto and Prosecutor Raymond Tabangin were requested to approach the
bench. Atty. Mandapat was advised by the respondent judge to ask questions
answerable by yes or no as it was observed that he was repeating questions asked on
direct examination. Certainly, the court can advise counsel on how to conduct proper
cross-examination so as not to tax the time of both the court and the witnesses. When
the Respondent Judge said ten minutes, he was referring to the time left for him to
conduct the cross-examination on that trial day, as there were other ready cases. It was
not limiting his time to cross-examine the witness, as the records would show that the
next trial date, Atty. Mandapat was allowed to his heart’s content to continue the cross-
examination.10

On the charge of violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the respondent judge states:
 1. Respondent Judge denies 4A to D on his non-support for new lawyers. The fact is he
encourages old practitioners to help new lawyers and he announces this in open court
as a matter of policy. . . ;

2. Atty. Primitivo Jularbal, 72 years old, a former Professor in the College of Law of Saint
Louis University and a long time distinguished practitioner in the City of Baguio, and Atty.
Juan Valdez, 70 years old, former City Legal Officer of Mayors Luis L. Lardizabal and
Mauricio G. Domogan can affirm the respect, deference and dignified treatment he
habitually accord these senior lawyers;

3. As to the case of former Justice Sixto Domondon for which the Respondent Judge
was admonished by the Supreme Court, your Respondent Judge was barely one month
in office when he asked the former justice, whom he did not know at that time to come
on time for his hearings. Said justice was more than forty-five (45) minutes late for the
pre-trial conference and Respondent Judge applied the rule on him, like he did to all
lawyers.11

As to his alleged oppressive conduct, the respondent judge states as follows:

1. Respondent Judge denies 5A and B as they are mere general statements without
basis in fact and in law;

2. In the case of Atty. Reynaldo U. Agranzamendez, as defense counsel in Criminal

Case No. 7304-R, entitled "People vs. Liwayway Cruz," he required said counsel in the
absence of the accused to rise as a matter of procedure during the promulgation of
decisions. This is by way of proper decorum and discipline, which the Respondent Judge
submits as part of the inherent power of the court. The allegation that the Respondent
Judge berated Atty. Agranzamendez and told him to "shut up" is a patent lie. The
Respondent Judge recalls asking him politely not to argue with the Court, on matters like
standing up to show decorum and respect to the judicial processes . . .;

3. Atty. Nicasio Aliping was never cited for contempt, contrary to what the complainants
want to impress. No order was ever issued by the Court to the effect . . .;

4. Atty. Cirilo Cawed, who is not a signatory to the complaint, is the private complainant
in Criminal Cases No. 13535-R entitled "People vs. Licayayo" for Estafa. Despite several
orders for him to appear in the scheduled hearings, he refused, ignored and neglected
the same. He was warned that his continued defiance would constrain the court to order
his arrest. The Respondent Judge submits that it is the rule and practice and even the
responsibility, and duty of the court to summon the complaining witness who executed
an Affidavit of Desistance to determine the authenticity or genuineness of the affidavit.
The Respondent Judge should not be condemned for ensuring the integrity of affidavits
submitted in court.12

Regarding the charge of corruption against him, the respondent judge asserts that:

1. As a public officer, he is ready to face all kinds of charges as an inherent "risk" that
comes with the territory. It hurts him; however, to be accused of the baseless charge of
Graft and Corruption, for he values his honor and his name, presumably like the
Complainants themselves;
It is a matter of public and judicial knowledge that courts have no employment item for drivers.
On this point alone, how could Respondent Judge appoint a driver as alleged in the complaint?
Had the Complainants asked or in the least conducted a thorough investigation, they would
have discovered that in the RTC, Baguio City, Branch 3, there was a vacant item for City-paid
Utility Worker. In 1988, the RTC Clerk of Court, Atty. Delilah G. Muñoz, made a project proposal
to the City Government of Baguio for the revival of item. . .

Almost a year later, the City Government approved the request, and it was Mayor Mauricio G.
Domogan who appointed Mr. Eufemio Gula to the position and not the Respondent Judge. The
item approved was for a driver and not as Utility Worker. A correction was sought and again
Mayor Mauricio G. Domogan and the City Council of Baguio approved the amendment for the
appointment of Utility Worker and not as Driver. . . Mr. Eufemio Gula is not a Court-paid
Employee and performs his duty as a utility worker paid by the City Government of Baguio. He
has no driver’s license, as he did not apply as a driver. The respondent judge did not appoint
Gula and no judiciary funds were used for his pay. Neither did the respondent judge screen his
qualification as to whether or not it conforms to the minimum criteria set by the city for the item -
utility worker.13

The respondent judge prays that the administrative complaint against him be dismissed for lack
of merit.

In its Memorandum dated November 17, 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator revealed
that since his appointment to the judiciary on February 23, 1998, four (4) administrative cases
had been filed against the respondent judge:

1. RTJ-99-1450 "Justice Sixto Domondon vs. Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan" –

Respondent was REPRIMANDED by the Court on June 14, 1999;

2. RTJ-99-1483 "Lauro Gacayan vs. Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan" – Respondent

was FINED ₱10,000.00 and REPRIMANDED for Violation of Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which amount to
grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming an officer of the Judiciary and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and WARNED that a repetition of the
foregoing or similar transgressions shall be dealt with more severely;

3. OCA IPI No. 99-808-RTJ – The instant case under consideration;

4. OCA IPI No. 99-832-RTJ – "Mr. Galo R. Reyes vs. Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan" for
willful violation of the Rules of Court and incompetence. Awaiting comment of the
respondent judge.14

Considering the seriousness of the charges against the respondent judge, the OCA
recommended that an investigation be conducted thereon. In the Resolution of December 8,
1999, the Court referred the instant case, together with OCA IPI No. 99-832-RTJ (Mr. Galo R.
Reyes vs. Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan), to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for
immediate raffle among the incumbent appellate court justices.15

The cases were raffled to Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (Investigating Justice) who forthwith
set the cases for preliminary conference in accordance with Section 1, Rule 58 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Thereafter, hearings were held where the complainants and the respondent
judge were allowed to present their witnesses in support of their respective allegations.

The Evidence of the Complainants

The complainants presented Lauro Gacayan, Jurgenson Lagdao, Federico Mandapat, Jr.,
Reynaldo Agranzamendez, Reynaldo Cortes, Joris Karl Dacawi, Maria Ligaya Rivera, Rogelio
Daet and Edgardo Ancheta. Except for Ancheta, all the witnesses are lawyers and members of
the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter.

Gross Ignorance of the Law and

Violation of the Constitutional
Rights of the Accused

Attorneys Lauro Gacayan and Jurgenson Lagdao were presented to substantiate the charges of
gross ignorance of law and violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against the
respondent judge.

Atty. Gacayan executed the Affidavit dated March 15, 200016 and during his testimony affirmed
the truthfulness of its contents. Atty. Gacayan stated that he is a practicing lawyer based in
Baguio City. He was the counsel for the accused in "People vs. Ceferino Baniqued" (Criminal
Case No. 13949-R) for Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for the
defendant in "Albert Surla vs. Nelson Dimla" (Civil Case No. 3322-R) for collection of sum of
money. These two cases were pending before the RTC, Branch 3 of Baguio City, presided over
by the respondent judge.

According to Atty. Gacayan, in "People vs. Ceferino Baniqued," the prosecution filed a motion
for the preventive suspension of the accused. The latter duly opposed said motion. In his Order
dated August 18, 1998, the respondent judge submitted for resolution the aforesaid motion.
However, it was only on September 29, 1999, or more than one (1) year after it’s submission for
resolution, that Atty. Gacayan, as counsel for the accused, received an order resolving the
motion. Upon further verification, Atty. Gacayan discovered that the said order was received by
the RTC’s Office of the Clerk of Court only on September 23, 1999, after the instant
administrative complaint had already been filed against the respondent judge. Incidentally, the
respondent judge’s failure to act on the motion for preventive suspension in the Baniqued case
is one of the infractions raised in this administrative complaint.17

Further, during the hearing of Surla vs. Dimla on May 18, 1998, the respondent judge dismissed
the case on account of the fact that when the case was called at 8:30 in the morning, the
plaintiff’s first witness was not around. When the witness arrived at 8:32 a.m., or barely two (2)
minutes after, the plaintiff’s counsel manifested his readiness to present the witness. The
respondent judge denied the same. On even date, the plaintiff’s counsel moved for a
reconsideration of the said dismissal, which was not opposed by Atty. Gacayan as counsel for
the defendant. The motion for reconsideration was submitted for resolution at the hearing on
June 5, 1998. However, it took the respondent judge almost four (4) months to resolve this
simple and unopposed motion.18

Atty. Gacayan likewise narrated that he was in the sala of the respondent judge during the
promulgation of his decisions in People vs. Danilo Dumez et al (Criminal Cases Nos. 15776-R
up to 15780-R), People vs. Bernardo Polic-ew (Criminal Case No. 14054-R), People vs.
Angelina Mamaril (Criminal Case No. 16187-R), People vs. Benjie Gose et al. (Criminal Case
No. 14935-R). The last case particularly caught Atty. Gacayan’s attention because the penalty
imposed on the accused, who was then a minor, was the same as that of all the other accused
who were of legal age.

Atty. Lagdao, also one of the complainants in this case, executed an Affidavit dated August 27,
199919 and Reply-Affidavit dated March 17, 200020 and during his testimony, affirmed the
truthfulness of the contents thereof. Atty. Lagdao is connected with the Public Attorneys’ Office
(PAO) in Baguio City and handled People vs. Remedios Malapit (Criminal Cases Nos. 15321-R,
15323-R, 15327-R, 15770-R and 15771-R) and People vs. Alejandro Cas (Criminal Case No.
15306-R) pending before the sala of the respondent judge.

In these two cases, the respondent judge failed to immediately furnish the accused copies of the
decisions after their respective promulgation. In the Malapit case, a copy of the decision was
served on the accused seventeen (17) days after the judgment was promulgated; in the Cas
case, fifteen (15) days after promulgation of judgment. Moreover, in the latter case, one of the
court personnel approached Atty. Lagdao and told him that the respondent judge wanted the
tenor of the notice of appeal changed by deleting therein the phrase "copies of which [referring
to the decision] the Honorable Court has yet to release." In order not to prejudice the accused,
Atty. Lagdao did as instructed.

Atty. Lagdao admitted that, to support their charge of gross ignorance of law, he secured
certified true copies of the following decisions of the respondent judge where he misapplied the
Indeterminate Sentence Law:

Decision in Criminal Case No. 11363-R is marked as Exhibit "D";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 15108-R is marked as Exhibit "E";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 15544-R is marked as Exhibit "F";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 3200-R is marked as Exhibit "G";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 7703-R is marked as Exhibit "H";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 13646-R is marked as Exhibit "I";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 14054-R is marked as Exhibit "J";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 14524-R is marked as Exhibit "K";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 15600-R is marked as Exhibit "L";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 14776-R is marked as Exhibit "M";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 15932-R is marked as Exhibit "N";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 15653-R is marked as Exhibit "O";

 Decision in Criminal Case No. 13379-R is marked as Exhibit "P";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 13367-R is marked as Exhibit "Q";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 14929-R is marked as Exhibit "R";

Decision in Criminal Case No. 7304-R is marked as Exhibit "S"; and,

Decision in Criminal Case No. 14925-R is marked as Exhibit "T".21

Arrogance, Oppression
and Violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct

Atty. Federico Mandapat, Jr. was presented to support the complainants’ charges of arrogance
and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct against the respondent judge.

As one of the complainants in the instant case, Atty. Mandapat executed the Affidavit dated
December 14, 199922 and affirmed the truthfulness of its contents. Atty. Mandapat, a councilor of
Baguio City, is also engaged in the practice of law. He appears in various courts in Baguio City,
including that presided by the respondent judge.

He recalled that during the hearing of People vs. Andrade presided by the respondent judge, his
(Atty. Mandapat’s) cross-examination of the witness was interrupted by the respondent judge.
Atty. Mandapat, the other defense counsel and the prosecutor, were instructed to approach the
bench. In a loud voice, the respondent judge directed Atty. Mandapat to refrain from asking
questions that were already asked in the direct-examination. Atty. Mandapat explained that he
was just trying to test the credibility of the witness and in fact, the witness gave different
answers on cross-examination. The respondent judge then limited Atty. Mandapat’s time to
cross-examine the witness to ten (10) minutes. When Atty. Mandapat inquired from the
respondent judge whether he was limiting the right of the accused to cross-examine the witness,
the respondent judge replied that he did not want to argue.

Atty. Mandapat opined that in Baguio City, the respondent judge had the reputation of being
arrogant, and is known for treating litigants in an arrogant and rude manner.

To further substantiate the charges of violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and oppression
against the respondent judge, the complainants presented Atty. Reynaldo Agranzamendez. He
executed the Affidavit dated March 20, 200023 and during his testimony affirmed the truthfulness
of its contents.

Atty. Agranzamendez, also one of the complainants in this case, was the Past President of the
IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter. He narrated that he appeared as defense counsel for accused
Liwayway Cruz in an estafa case pending before the sala of the respondent judge. During the
promulgation of judgment on July 29, 1999, Atty. Agranzamendez manifested that the accused
was not in court. The respondent judge ordered Atty. Agranzamendez to stand up in place of
the accused during the reading of the decision. Atty. Agranzamendez requested that he be
allowed to sit down because if he stood up, it would seem that he was the accused. The
respondent judge curtly told him not to argue with the court.
During the reading of the decision, every time the clerk of court mentioned the word "estafa",
Atty. Agranzamendez would cringe in embarrassment. Since the decision was quite long, Atty.
Agranzamendez leaned on his side at one point. The respondent judge immediately banged his
gavel and sternly told Atty. Agranzamendez to stand up properly. Several lawyers witnessed the
incident. In fact, Atty. Jose Molintas playfully stood beside Atty. Agranzamendez and pretended
to be his counsel.

Atty. Agranzamendez felt so humiliated at the time. Even after the incident, several people,
including his students at the Baguio Colleges Foundation where he was Dean of the College of
Law, approached Atty. Agranzamendez and asked him why he was convicted for estafa.

Atty. Joris Karl Dacawi was likewise presented, also to substantiate the charge of violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct by the respondent judge. He executed the Affidavit dated March
23, 200024 and during his testimony, affirmed the truthfulness thereof. He worked as an
associate at the Sanidad and Villanueva Law Offices in Baguio City. One of the cases assigned
to him was Alejo Cabreros vs. Sussie Edralin which was pending before the sala of the
respondent judge. During one of the hearings of the said case, Atty. Dacawi manifested to the
respondent judge that although he was ready to present the plaintiff Mr. Cabreros as first
witness, the latter was not feeling well. Atty. Dacawi thus moved that the hearing be reset to
another day. The respondent judge angrily remarked that Atty. Dacawi was just not ready to
present his case and suggested that Mrs. Cabreros, who was also in the court, be presented as
witness instead. Atty. Dacawi explained that he could not do as suggested because it would
destroy his manner of presenting the evidence.

The respondent judge eventually cancelled the hearing that day but stated that the same be
deducted from the number of trial dates allotted for the plaintiff. The respondent judge further
ordered Mr. Cabreros to stand up and told the latter not to pay Atty. Dacawi as no service was
rendered by him as counsel that day; hence, did not deserve to be paid.

Violation of the Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act

The complainants likewise charge the respondent judge with graft and corruption. In support
thereof, they presented Atty. Reynaldo Cortes who executed the Affidavit dated July 14, 2000.25

Atty. Cortes is a practicing lawyer in Baguio City and also one of the complainants in this case.
He averred that on July 1, 1999, a certain Eufemio Dula was appointed as "driver" by the City
Government of Baguio City and was assigned to the respondent judge. According to Atty.
Cortes, he had observed that Dula accompanied the respondent judge everywhere he went.
Despite his designation as driver, Dula never drove the car of the respondent judge. Upon
verification by the complainants, it was discovered that Dula had no license to drive. In
September 1999, the RTC of Baguio City, through its clerk of court, requested that the item of
Dula be amended from "driver" to "utility worker".

Other Corroborative Evidence

Atty. Maria Ligaya Rivera, Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 3 of Baguio City, was also
presented as one of the witnesses of the complainants. She testified that she received the
notice of appeal filed in the case of People of the Philippines vs. Alejandro Cas and, following
the standard procedure, forwarded it to Edgardo Ancheta, the clerk-in-charge of the criminal
docket, for submission to the respondent judge for his action. However, the respondent judge
did not then act on the matter. Instead, he called Atty. Rivera to his chamber and instructed her
to tell Atty. Lagdao, the PAO lawyer handling the case, to change the notice of appeal;
otherwise, he would not act on it. Atty. Rivera took the notice of appeal and talked to Ancheta
regarding the respondent judge’s instructions.

Thereafter, Atty. Lagdao told Atty. Rivera that he could no longer change the notice of appeal as
the same already formed part of the records. The respondent judge insisted that the notice of
appeal be changed. Atty. Lagdao maintained that he could no longer do so because a later date
would be reflected as the date of its receipt. In such a case, it would appear as if the same was
filed out of time. Atty. Lagdao was eventually constrained to change the notice of appeal by
deleting the phrase "copies of which [referring to the decision] the Honorable Court has yet to
release." According to Atty. Rivera, the decision on People of the Philippines vs. Alejandro Cas
was released fifteen (15) days after its promulgation.

Atty. Rivera also confirmed that Dula was a part of the respondent judge’s staff. Dula’s
designation was originally as "driver" of the respondent judge but was later on changed to "utility
worker." Per the respondent judge’s instruction, Atty. Rivera signed Dula’s accomplishment
report. This report falsely stated that he drove for the respondent judge. Atty. Rivera admitted
that, by signing Dula’s accomplishment report, she was abetting the crime of falsification of
public document. However, she maintained that she could not go against the instruction of the
respondent judge on the matter.

Atty. Rivera was the one who read the decision in People v. Liwayway Cruz during its
promulgation. She corroborated Atty. Agranzamendez’ allegation that he was made to stand up
to take the place of the accused during the promulgation of the judgment. She confirmed that
Atty. Agranzamendez expressed his objection to this procedure but the respondent judge
merely told him to "shut up."

Atty. Rogelio Daet, the Regional Director of the Public Attorneys’ Office of the Cordillera
Administrative Region including Baguio City, was presented to corroborate the testimony of Atty.
Lagdao regarding the changing of the notice of appeal in People vs. Remedios Malapit.

Atty. Daet testified that as the immediate superior of Atty. Lagdao, he assigned the latter to
handle the PAO cases before the sala of the respondent judge. At one time, Atty. Lagdao
approached Atty. Daet to express his apprehension that they had not yet received the decision
in the Malapit case despite the fact that almost fifteen (15) days had already passed since its
promulgation. Atty. Lagdao informed Atty. Daet that he would file a notice of appeal even
without receiving a copy of the decision.1âwphi1 Atty. Lagdao showed to Atty. Daet the notice of
appeal and manifestation that were subsequently filed in connection with the Malapit case.

Some time in July 1999, the respondent judge called Atty. Daet to his chamber and informed the
latter that he disliked the tone of Atty. Lagdao’s notice of appeal and manifestation. The
respondent judge returned the said pleadings to Atty. Daet and instructed him to direct Atty.
Lagdao to change them. Atty. Daet did as he was told and later on learned that Atty. Lagdao
had complied with the respondent judge’s directive and deleted the phrase that he found
objectionable so as not to prejudice the accused.

Thereafter, upon the instance of the respondent judge, Atty. Daet transferred Atty. Lagdao to
another sala. Atty. Daet did not assign another lawyer to take Atty. Lagdao’s place because the
respondent judge insinuated that his approval should first be sought regarding the assignment
of the PAO lawyer to his sala. Atty. Daet felt that this was an encroachment on his prerogative
as regional director of the PAO.

Edgardo Ancheta, clerk-in-charge of the criminal docket in the sala of the respondent judge,
testified to corroborate Atty. Lagdao’s testimony. He recalled that at one time, Atty. Ma. Ligaya
Rivera, his immediate superior, directed him to talk to Atty. Lagdao regarding the notice of
appeal and manifestation that he filed in the Cas case. Atty. Rivera instructed Ancheta to tell
Atty. Lagdao to delete the phrase "copies of which the Honorable Court has yet to release" in
the notice of appeal in order that the respondent judge would act on it. Atty. Lagdao initially
refused to change the notice of appeal but when he was told that the respondent judge would
not act on the same unless the "objectionable" phrase was deleted, Atty. Lagdao was
constrained to obey the respondent judge’s directive.

In order that the second notice of appeal would not be considered as filed out of time, it was the
date of receipt of the first notice of appeal that was stamped on the second notice of appeal.
This was done presumably with the respondent judge’s knowledge and consent, since it was
him who ordered the alteration.

The Evidence of the Respondent Judge

On the other hand, to refute the charges against him, the respondent judge presented thirteen
(13) witnesses: Atty. Victoria C.M. Sturch, Atty. Primitivo C. Jularbal, Atty. Ma. Inglay Capuyon-
Fokno, Justice Sixto Domondon, Atty. Lourdes Maita Andres, Atty. Juan B. Valdez, Lina de
Guzman Dalusong, Prosecutor Lilian Dris S. Alejo, Sister Mercedes del Rosario Nicolas, Atty.
Johnico Alim, Prosecutor Raymond Tabangin, Ret. RTC Judge Concepcion B. Buencamino and
Atty. Lyssa G.S. Pagano-Calde.

Atty. Victoria C.M. Sturch, a member of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, executed the Affidavit
dated January 18, 2001.26 As a practicing lawyer, Atty. Sturch has appeared before the sala of
the respondent judge. She averred that the respondent consistently starts the hearings at
exactly 8:30 in the morning and that he is strict in the observance of decorum inside the
courtroom. She has not witnessed any instance when the respondent acted in an arrogant or
offensive manner. She was of the opinion that the respondent judge could not be influenced or
bribed by anyone.

Atty. Primitivo C. Jularbal also a member of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, executed an
Affidavit dated January 22, 2001.27 He is seventy-one (71) years old and has been in the
practice of law for over thirty-four (34) years and in the course thereof has appeared before the
respondent judge.

Atty. Jularbal revealed that he was asked to sign the complaint against the respondent judge but
that he declined. He believed that filing an administrative charge against a judge whenever he
committed an error would set a bad precedent. He dismissed the charge of gross ignorance of
the law against the respondent judge as very easy to make, but whether it can be proven is
another matter.

He knew of only one instance when the respondent judge imposed a fine of ₱500 on the
counsel for tardiness. But, according to Atty. Jularbal, the respondent judge did not make any
effort to enforce the payment of the fine. He has not witnessed any arrogant or oppressive
conduct by the respondent judge. Neither has he seen the respondent judge act discourteously
or disrespectfully towards senior lawyers like him (Atty. Jularbal).

Atty. Ma. Inglay Capuyan-Fokno another member of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, executed
the Affidavit dated January 22, 2001.28

Atty. Fokno admitted that in 1998, the respondent judge, when newly-appointed, intimidated the
lawyers who appeared before his sala, including herself. She noticed, however, that over the
lapse of time, the respondent judge had become more considerate towards the lawyers. Atty.
Fokno maintained that the respondent judge is diligent and serious in the performance of his job
as he starts the hearings at promptly 8:30 in the morning.

Retired Justice Sixto Domondon, a member of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, executed the
Affidavit dated May 24, 200029 in the respondent’s brief. Justice Domondon manifested that as a
practicing lawyer, he has three (3) civil cases pending before the sala of the respondent judge.
He confirmed that while he filed an administrative case against the respondent judge for which
the latter was sanctioned by this Court, he could vouch for the respondent’s integrity, capacity
and moral will to dispense justice fairly.

Atty. Lourdes Maita Andres executed her Affidavit in January 2001.30 As a practicing lawyer, she
has appeared several times before the respondent judge. Atty. Andres considered the
respondent judge to be fair and even-handed in dealing with the litigants. On one occasion, Atty.
Andres approached the respondent ex-parte to ask for a resetting of a case. The respondent
judge refused, explaining that the other party should be present "para walang masabi." Atty.
Andres realized that the respondent judge could not be easily approached for any favor.

Atty. Juan Valdez also a member of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, executed the Affidavit
dated January 11, 2001.31 Atty. Valdez has been in the practice of law for over thirty (30) years
and has appeared before the respondent judge. According to him, the respondent judge strictly
requires the observance of proper decorum inside the courtroom. For example, the lawyers are
enjoined to arrive at the hearings on time; otherwise, a fine is imposed on them for tardiness.
Upon proper motion and explanation, however, the respondent judge would lift the fine. Further,
the respondent judge requires that lawyers (1) wear the proper attire; and (2) refrain from
making unnecessary noises when the court is in session. In Atty. Valdez’ view, the strictness of
the respondent judge is necessary for orderly court proceedings.

Aside from handling cases, Atty. Valdez acted as the City Legal Officer of Baguio City from
1992 up to 1996. As such, he confirmed the practice of the local government of Baguio City of
hiring contractual employees and assigning them to the various courts in the city.

Lina de Guzman Dalusong was one of the parties in a civil case that was pending in the sala of
the respondent judge. She executed the Affidavit dated April 2, 2001.32 She testified that prior to
the respondent judge’s appointment to the court, the civil case where she was one of the parties
had been pending for almost twelve (12) years. When the respondent judge took over the said
sala, Dalusong noticed that he closely monitored the status of the cases pending therein. He
enforced a strict system where the litigants, as well as their counsel, were enjoined to come on
time. Consequently, the pending cases, including that of Dalusong, were resolved with dispatch.
Dalusong also attested to the respondent judge’s fairness in dealing with the parties and
deciding the cases assigned to him.
Lilian Doris Alejo is a State Prosecutor in the Department of Justice. She executed the Affidavit
dated February 23, 2001.33 She has appeared before the respondent judge and found him to be
accommodating. She noted that the respondent judge would see to it that both parties are
present before he talked to either of them. Since Alejo and her opposing counsel were based in
Manila, they often requested for cancellation of hearings and the respondent judge invariably
granted the same.

Sister Mercedes Nicolas is a nun belonging to the Franciscan Sisters, Immaculate Conception
Congregation and resides at the Little Flower Convent in Baguio City. She executed the Affidavit
dated February 26, 2001.34 Sister Nicolas knows the respondent judge because he used to visit
their convent to pray and attend their retreats. There was likewise an occasion when Sister
Nicolas appeared as witness in a case pending before the respondent judge. During the
hearing, Sister Nicolas saw that the respondent judge treated the people with patience and
kindness.

Atty. Johnico Alim, a member of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, executed the Affidavit dated
December 18, 2000.35 As a practicing lawyer, he has also appeared before the respondent
judge. Atty. Alim claimed that he has personally observed the respondent judge’s deportment in
and out of the courtroom, and that he could vouch for the latter’s neutrality, competence and
integrity.

Prosecutor Raymond Tabangin, a trial prosecutor assigned to the sala of the respondent judge,
executed the Affidavit dated October 15, 1999.36 Prosecutor Tabangin asserted that the
respondent judge is a strict and idealistic judge, who starts the hearings promptly at 8:30 in the
morning and ends them at 12:00. He requires the lawyers to be punctual and imposes a fine on
them if they are late. The orders and processes issued by the respondent judge are carried out
promptly. The respondent judge’s strictness has resulted in the unclogging of the court docket
as he reduced the same from over 300 cases to a manageable level. Civil cases that were
pending for several years had been disposed of and in criminal cases, the accused would opt to
enter into plea bargaining because the respondent judge has a reputation of being honest and
incorruptible. According to Prosecutor Tabangin, the respondent judge, for all his strictness, has
a soft spot for young lawyers as he patiently teaches them what to do. He takes great care not
to arouse suspicion of partiality and bias in dealing with the parties. He carefully uses his words
when admonishing lawyers and, contrary to the complainants’ allegation, telling a lawyer to
"shut up" is definitely not his style. Despite his stern and uncompromising countenance, the
respondent judge is a God-fearing and deeply religious man.

Retired Judge Concepcion Buencamino is eighty-three (83) years old and, upon her retirement
from the judiciary, has engaged in the practice of law, albeit on a limited basis. She executed
the Affidavit dated February 24, 2000.37 She averred that she has appeared before the
respondent judge in connection with a case involving a property dispute among siblings.
Through the efforts of the respondent judge, the parties reached an amicable settlement sparing
them from what could have been an expensive and long litigation.

Judge Buencamino stated that the respondent judge possesses a good knowledge of the
law.1âwphi1 She observed that the respondent judge is never arrogant or overbearing. He
listens to the witnesses and asks clarificatory questions in a polite manner. Judge Buencamino
confirmed that the respondent judge is strict about the attendance of the lawyers during
hearings.
Through Atty. Lyssa G.S. Pagano-Calde, the respondent judge presented several documentary
evidence38 to further refute the charges against him.

The Investigating Justice’s Report and Recommendation

Upon careful evaluation of the evidence presented by the complainants and the respondent
judge, the Investigating Justice found that the charges against the respondent judge for gross
ignorance of the law, violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, arrogance, oppression,
impropriety and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct are well-grounded, while the charge
of graft and corruption was unsubstantiated. The Investigating Justice made the following
recommendation:

On the basis of the foregoing evaluation on the evidence presented by both the complainants
and the respondent, undersigned Investigating Justice recommends, for Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Gross Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Accused, Arrogance, Oppressive
Conduct and Violations of the Canons of Judicial Ethics that respondent Judge Fernando Vil
Pamintuan be meted the severest of administrative penalties, that is, he should be stripped of
his robe.

IN VIEW THEREOF, recommendation is hereby made that respondent Judge Fernando Vil
Pamintuan be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges
with prejudice to reinstatement to re-employment in any branch of the government or its
corporation for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the
Accused, Arrogance, Oppressive Conduct, and Violations of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.39

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice well-taken.

On Gross Ignorance of the Law

The respondent judge’s ignorance of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is palpable. In People vs.
Dumez, et al. (Criminal Cases Nos. 15776-R up to 15779-R), the respondent judge sentenced
the accused who were found guilty of theft to suffer imprisonment "from seven (7) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years and eight (8) months as maximum of
prision mayor for each case." The penalty imposed by the respondent judge was contrary to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which prescribes that the minimum of the imposable penalty shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
Since the penalty for theft is prision mayor, the minimum of the penalty imposable on the
accused should have been within the range of prision correccional, the penalty next lower to
prision mayor.

A perusal of the other decisions rendered by the respondent judge shows that his erroneous
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing the penalties was committed in not
just one or two instances. Rather, as correctly raised by the complainants, the respondent judge
had repeatedly misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law in at least seventeen (17) other
cases, to wit:
1. People vs. Rose Dalmacio, et. al.
Crim. Case No. 11363-R, for
Theft (Exhibit "D")

The amount stolen was P10,000.00. Under Art. 309, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty imposable is prision correccional in its medium and maximum period. However, the
sentence imposed by Respondent Judge was from four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven
(11) days as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. Worse, he imposed subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency when no fine was imposed as penalty.

2. People vs. Joel Ramos, et al.

Crim. Case No. 15108-R,
for Robbery With Violence
(Exhibit "E")

As found by respondent, the provision applicable is Article 294, Par. 5 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides a penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its medium period. However, he imposed upon the accused imprisonment from six (6) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum. Again, he disregarded Article 39 of
the Revised Penal Code and imposed subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

3. People vs. Manuel Carino

Crim. Case No. 15544-R, for

Frustrated Homicide (Exhibit "F")

The accused pleaded guilty to Attempted Homicide and thus, the imposable penalty is prision
correccional (Art. 51 in rel. to Art. 249, RPC). Respondent, however, imposed the penalty of four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. Notably,
it was imposed in its maximum period without any finding of aggravating circumstance.

4. People vs. German Abarquez,

et al. Crim. Case No. 3200,
for Robbery (Exhibit "G")

As found by respondent, the penalty imposable is prision mayor. However, what he imposed
was imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as
maximum. Again, the penalty imposed is in its maximum period without any express finding of
aggravating circumstance.

5. People vs. Rolando Tawanna, et. al.

Crim. Case No. 7703-R, for Frustrated
Homicide (Exhibit "H")

The penalty imposed is prision correccional (Art. 50 in rel. to Art. 249, RPC) but respondent
sentenced all accused to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as
maximum, without any express finding of aggravating circumstance.
6. People vs. Jose Tamo, et. al.
Crim. Case No. 13646-R, for
Frustrated Murder (Exhibit "I")

The imposable penalty is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium period (Art. 50 in rel. to Art. 248, RPC) but the penalty imposed by respondent was
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months, as maximum.

7. People vs. Bernardo Polic-ew

Crim. Case No. 14054-R, for
Frustrated Murder (Exhibit "J")

The penalty imposable is prision mayor (Art. 50 in rel. to Art. 249, RPC) but respondent fixed the
sentence at eleven (11) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12)
years, as maximum. Note that the penalty is in the maximum period without any express finding
of aggravating circumstance.

8. People vs. Johnson Simsim

Crim. Case No. 14524-R, for
Attempted Rape (Exhibit "K")

It being in its attempted stage, the penalty imposable is prision mayor. However, the penalty
imposed by respondent was ten (10) years and one (1) (sic), as minimum, to twelve (12) years,
as maximum.

9. People vs. Moses Polic-ew

Crim. Case No. 15600-R, for
Malversation of Public
Property (Exhibit "L")

As found by respondent, accused violated Par. 2 of Art. 217, RPC, which provides a penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. However, what he imposed was seven (7)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum.

10. People vs. Renato Bernal

Crim. Case No. 14776-R, for
Homicide (Exhibit "M")

The imposable penalty for Homicide is reclusion temporal. Again, in complete disregard of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, respondent imposed fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum.

11. People vs. John Baliling

Crim. Case No. 15932-R,
for Frustrated Homicide
(Exhibit "N")

The offense charged is punishable by prision mayor. However, respondent imposed eight (8)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum.
12. People vs. Melchor Bawalan, et al.
Crim. Case No. 15653-R, for
Robbery with Violence (Exhibit "O")

The offense charged is punishable under Par. 5, Art. 294, RPC, which provides a penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. However,
respondent imposed eight (8) years and one (1) (sic) as minimum, to ten years, as maximum.

13. People vs. Paul Afiagan

Crim. Case No. 13379-R, for
Frustrated Homicide (Exhibit "P")

Accused pleaded guilty to Attempted Homicide punishable with imprisonment of prision

correccional, but respondent fixed the penalty at four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day,
as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum.

14. People vs. Edwin Longaquit, et. al.

Crim. Case No. 13367-R, for
Frustrated Homicide (Exhibit "Q")

The offense charged is punishable by imprisonment of prision mayor. Respondent imposed

eight (8) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to ten (10) years, maximum.

15. People vs. Joseph Samir Kairuz, et al.

Crim. Case No. 14929-R, for Estafa
(Exhibit "R")

The amount involved was P90,000.00. Under the first paragraph of Art. 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, the imposable penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, plus one year for every P10,000.00 since the amount involved
exceeds P22,000.00. The sentence imposed by respondent, however, is twelve (12) years,
eight (8) months, and twenty (21) days, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum. Note
that aside from not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty he
imposed is beyond the penalty imposable under the law.

16. People vs. Liwayway Cruz

Crim. Case No. 7304-R,
for Estafa (Exhibit "S")

The amount involved is P29,470.00. Hence, pursuant to Art. 315, Par. 1, Revised Penal Code,
the imposable penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period. The penalty imposed by respondent was six (6) years, eight (8) months and
twenty (21) days, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum.

17. People vs. Benjie Gose, et al.;

Crim. Case No. 149935-R, for
Robbery (Exhibit T")

The penalty imposable is prision mayor there being no evidence that accused carried arms
during the robbery (Art. 299, RPC). Respondent, however, imposed a sentence of six (6) years
and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum. Note, too, that he imposed the
same penalty upon accused Mark Joseph Ocharan despite his findings that he was a minor
during the commission of the crime. Minority is a privilege mitigating circumstance and thus,
accused Ocharan’s penalty should have been lowered by one degree.40

The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the imposition of penalties in crimes
punishable by the Revised Penal Code is a basic precept. The respondent judge’s repeated
misapplication thereof in quite a number of criminal cases he had rendered constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. As this Court has consistently ruled, "a judge is presumed to know the law
and when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law."41 Indeed, judges are duty bound to have more than a cursory acquaintance with laws and
jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law
from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.42

The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence."43 It bears stressing that –

. . . Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity
with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross
ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and
the court the duty to be proficient in the law.44

The respondent judge has utterly failed to live up to the standard of competence required of
him. His erroneous application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law committed not just once or
twice but in at least seventeen (17) instances is a compelling evidence of his gross ignorance of
the law.

On Gross Violation of
the Constitutional Rights
of the Accused

In People vs. Ceferino Baniqued (Criminal Case No. 13949-R) for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the prosecution filed a motion for preventive suspension and the accused
filed his opposition thereto. In his Order of August 18, 1998, the respondent judge submitted the
said motion for resolution. However, it took the respondent judge more than one (1) year to
resolve the same. As correctly found by the Investigating Justice, the delay in resolving this
motion constituted violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial.

In Surla vs. Dimla (Civil Case No. 3322-R), the respondent judge resolved an unopposed
motion for reconsideration after almost four (4) months. Again, this contravened the mandate of
the Constitution that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of cases."

Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide:

Rule 1.02. – A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

Rule 3.05. – A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.

SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 enjoins that:

3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of
the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in
their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve
months from dates of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower
courts are given a period of three months to do so . . .

Further, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88 reads:

6.1. All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory
matters pending before their courts . . .

Conformably with the foregoing mandate, this Court has pronounced –

The office of a judge exists for one solemn end – to promote the ends of justice by administering
it speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding over that court is the visible
representation of the law and justice. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the
period fixed by law constitutes violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy
disposition of their cases.45

The unreasonable delay of the respondent judge in resolving the motions submitted for his
resolution clearly constituted a violation of the parties’ constitutional right to a speedy disposition
of their cases.

On Arrogant, Oppressive
and Improper Conduct and
Violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct

As correctly enumerated by the Investigating Justice, the following incidents establish the
respondent judge’s arrogant and oppressive conduct:

a. Arrogance

When he tried to limit the cross examination by Atty. Fernando Manapat Jr., who was
representing the accused in People vs. Andrada, of the prosecution witness to ten (10) minutes
with an advice of not repeating questions that were already asked during the direct examination;

b. Arrogance and Oppression

Atty. J[o]ris Karl B. Dacaw[i], a young lawyer, who became the beneficiary of respondent’s
arrogance and oppressive conduct on 11 March 1999. On said date, Atty. Dacaw[i], as plaintiff’s
lawyer, moved for the cancellation of the hearing of the case entitled "Alejo Cabre[r]os vs. Susie
Edralin" alleging although his witness Alejo Cabre[r]os was present, said witness however was
not feeling well. This simple manifestation caught the ire of respondent judge who
instantaneously ordered Alejo Cabre[r]os to stand and told him not to pay his lawyer his
attorneys fees because he did not do anything for that day;

c. Oppression and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct

 1. Atty. Reynaldo U. Agranzamendez, while appearing as counsel de oficio for Liwayway
Cruz in Criminal Case No. 7304-R, for estafa last 29 July 1999, was extremely
embarrassed when he was ordered by respondent judge to stand in behalf of accused,
who was then absent despite due notice, and face the Clerk of Court during the reading
of the full text of the decision when said case was called for promulgation. Accordingly,
Atty. Agranzamendez asked respondent judge to allow him to take his seat as there
were several people inside the courtroom who, being unmindful of the rules might think
that he was the accused. But his pleas, however, got respondent mad, for instead of
allowing him to sit down, respondent instead banged his gavel and told Atty.
Agranzamendez not to argue with the court and to stand straight as he leaned over
avoid the glances of the Clerk of Court.

2. Evidence on hand also reveals respondent’s casual disregard of procedural rules, that
is, when he promulgated a decision that has yet to be released as shown in the case of
People vs. Malapit, et al., docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 15320-R, 15323-R, 15[327]-R
and 15571-R and in People vs. Cas, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15306-R.46

The behavior of the respondent judge towards Atty. Mandapat, i.e. berating the latter in his
cross-examination for repeating the questions already asked during the direct examination,
betrayed his impatience in the conduct of the hearing. A display of petulance and impatience in
the conduct of trial is a norm of behavior incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a
good judge.47

The respondent’s statement to the client that Atty. Dacawi did not deserve to be paid as
he did not do anything during the trial was uncalled for. Further, his act of requiring Atty.
Agranzamendez to take the place of the accused during the reading of the decision at the
promulgation thereof was improper. These actuations of the respondent judge cannot be
countenanced as they clearly violated Rule 3.04 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct:

Rule 3.04. – A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge
should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made
for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.

Apropos, this Court has held:

. . . A judge should be courteous both in his conduct and in his language especially to those
appearing before him. He can hold counsels to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court,
their clients, and the public without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing, or tyrannical. He should
refrain from conduct that demeans his office and remember always that courtesy begets
courtesy. Above all, he must conduct himself in such a manner that he gives no reason for
reproach.48

Clearly, the respondent judge has failed to observe courtesy and civility to the lawyers as well
as to the litigants who appeared before him.

Finally, the Court frowns upon the highly irregular practice of the respondent judge of
promulgating a decision, copies of which were not then ready for release to the parties.
Consequently, Atty. Lagdao of the PAO, who represented the accused, filed the notices of
appeal stating as follows:

In the Malapit case:

. . . hereby gives notice that she is appealing to the Supreme Court decision of the honorable
Court promulgated on 18 September 1999, copies of which the honorable Court has yet to
release despite the fact that the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or a
notice of appeal is about to expire. . .

In the Cas case:

. . . hereby gives notice that she is appealing to the court of appeals the decision of the
honorable Court promulgated on 22 June 1999, a copy of which the Honorable Court has yet to
release.. .49

What is even more reprehensible were the respondent judge’s directives to Atty. Lagdao to
delete the phrase "copies of which the Honorable Court has yet to release" from the notices of
appeal otherwise he (the respondent judge) would not act thereon. This conduct of the
respondent judge was utterly unbecoming a magistrate and violated the following canons of the
Code of Judicial Conduct:

CANON 1 - A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE

JUDICIARY

Rule 1.01. – A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.

CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND APPEARANCE OF

IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES

Rule 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

CANON 3 - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE

Rule 3.01. - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

On Graft and Corruption

While the Investigating Justice absolved, for insufficiency of evidence, the respondent
judge of the charge of graft and corruption in connection with the appointment of Mr.
Gula as driver, nonetheless, she found the respondent judge guilty of impropriety. As
found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent judge’s recommendation of Mr. Gula
to be his driver "despite the latter’s lack of driver’s license and inability to drive not only
casts doubt in his integrity but also his honesty as a judge."50 Indeed, the personal
behavior of the judge, not only while in the performance of his duties but also outside the
court must be beyond reproach for he is the visible representation of the law and of
justice.51
The Court also notes that this is not the respondent’s first administrative case. In Gacayan vs.
Pamintuan,52 the Court found him guilty of violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which amount to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming
an officer of the judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service. Despite the
fact that the accused already filed a Demurer to Evidence, the respondent, without resolving the
same and in blatant disregard for the rules of criminal procedure, still called witnesses who were
not listed in the information as well as those who had already testified to appear before him,
resulting in the re-opening of the case with respect to the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution. When the accused filed a motion for inhibition and a motion to suspend further
proceedings, the respondent judge denied the same. He was also seen conferring with the
witnesses for the prosecution, and later set the case for hearing without notice to the counsel of
the accused. The respondent was meted a fine of ₱10,000 and sternly warned that a repetition
of similar transgressions would be dealt with more severely.53

Considering all the foregoing, we find that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year
is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 3 of Baguio City, is SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year effective immediately. He
is sternly WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.

The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to the Court to
enable it to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1483 September 17, 1999

(OCA-IPI No. 98-578-RTJ)

ATTY. LAURO D. GACAYAN and NOEL SAROL, complainants,

vs.
Hon. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3, Baguio City, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In this administrative complaint, respondent stands charged with Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Incompetence, Partiality and Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.

The factual and procedural antecedents as summed by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) are as follows:

Complainant Noel Sarol is the accused in Criminal Case No. 14549-R, for
Homicide, which was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Baguio City, in an information dated September 26, 1996.

On October 14, 1996, complainant Sarol was allegedly arraigned and

thereafter, trial followed. The Honorable Joven Costales was then the
Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Baguio City.

After the prosecution rested its case, the then Presiding Judge Hon.
Joven Costales, directed the accused to present his evidence on March
2, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning. Complainant Sarol through counsel
instead of presenting his evidence filed a Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence with the Demurrer to Evidence already attached to
said Motion.

On March 2, 1998, the Demurrer to Evidence was scheduled for hearing.

The Trial Prosecutor, however, asked for ten (10) days within which to
submit his Opposition thereto. Thus, Judge Costales was constrained to
set the hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence on May 4, 1998 at 8:30 in
the morning.
 Meanwhile, the Honorable Fernando Vil Pamintuan took over as the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Baguio City. For
the first time he presided in the hearing of the case. He then inquired from
the Trial Prosecutor about his announced Opposition to the Demurrer to
Evidence and the latter manifested off-the-record that he is not submitting
anymore said Opposition. Thereafter respondent directed the trial
prosecutor and complainant Atty. Gacayan to see him in his chambers
where he reportedly said the following:

You see somebody died here and I can not just dismiss
this case as a result of insufficiency of evidence. I want to
talk to the mother of the deceased.

or words to that effect.

Consequently, he issued an order which directed the mother and the

brother of the deceased who were not listed as witnesses in the
information to appear in the "HEARING ON THE DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE" scheduled for May 25, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning. No other
persons were required to appear on May 25, 1998.

On May 25, 1998, complainants herein were surprised to see inside the
courtroom the witnesses who were already presented by the prosecution,
namely, Restituto Abuan and Alejandro Castaneda. The record of the
case shows that a subpoena was issued to all prosecution witnesses,
including the policemen who already testified to appear on said date
without any motion from the prosecution or from the accused requesting
for their appearance considering that the same was for the hearing on the
Demurrer to Evidence only. It was allegedly based purely on the initiative
of the respondent judge.

The mother and brother of the deceased as well as the other "witnesses"
subpoenaed by respondent Judge on his own discretion, were absent on
said day thus, he set the hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence on June
23, 1998 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning sharp. Thereafter, complainant
Atty. Gacayan made the observation that the proceedings then taking
place was unprocedural. He was warned that he would be cited for
contempt if he shall say that again.

Complainant Atty. Gacayan claims that at about 10:30 in the morning of

May 25, 1998 while he was about to leave the sala of RTC, Branch 4,
Baguio City, which is next to RTC, Branch 3, he observed that the
prosecution witnesses (Alejandro Castaneda and Restituto Abuan) who
allegedly testified for the prosecution were seen talking to the respondent
Judge. Thus, he (Atty. Gacayan) went near the door of the Session Hall
of RTC Branch 3 and when seen by respondent Judge, asked him to
approach the bench. Thereafter respondent Judge continued asking
questions to said witnesses on whether they saw complainant Sarol
stabbed (sic) the victim, which they answered "no".1âwphi1.nêt
Complainant contends that when said witnesses testified, they
categorically stated under oath that they did not witness the incident. It
was obvious that the Honorable Respondent Judge wanted the said
witnesses to admit that they saw the killing. Thereupon, he again
manifested his objections to the procedure being followed by the
Honorable Respondent judge considering that:

1] the prosecution had long rested its case;

2] the Court had long granted the accused's Motion

for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and that the
hearing being conducted is supposed to be a
hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence, not [the]
presentation of prosecution's evidence; and

3] the hearing for that day insofar as the Sarol case

had been adjourned and terminated.

On June 17, 1998, respondent Judge ordered the arrest of one Mirriam
Dominguez whom he described as an "eyewitness" to the incident. This
was done without any motion from the Prosecution and though there is no
record whatsoever supporting said conclusion that she is an eyewitness.
Thereafter respondent Judge talked alone to said witness in his
chambers.

In view of the unusual interest exhibited by the respondent Judge in favor

of the prosecution and the highly unusual procedure he was then
conducting the hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence, they filed a Motion
to Suspend further Proceedings on the Demurrer to Evidence until the
Motion for Inhibition is resolved by the Honorable Court.

Considering that there is no resolution yet on his Motion for Inhibition as

well as the pending Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings, complainant
Atty. Gacayan did not appear in the hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence.

The minutes of the hearing on June 23, 1998 shows that the respondent
Judge made the following orders:

a. DENYING the Motion for Inhibition;

b. DENYING the Motion to Suspend Further

Proceedings;

c. ORDERING the prosecution to present the

witness who was ordered arrested by the
Honorable Court though:

1. There was no valid motion complying with the

requisites of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, filed by
the prosecution praying that it be allowed to present
 further evidence — assuming such a procedure is
allowed considering that it had long rested its case
and there is a pending DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE;

2. There is no resolution yet on the demurrer to

evidence.

d. ORDERING the PAO lawyer who was then

present in court to act as counsel de officio without
giving said lawyer sufficient time to study the case.

e. ORDERING the continuation of hearing of said

case to June 24, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning and 2
o'clock in the afternoon.

In the morning of June 24, 1998 at 8:30, respondent Judge again called
the above case for hearing despite the fact that there was no notice sent
to complainant Atty. Gacayan. At 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of June 24,
1998, he appeared as counsel for the accused and right then and there,
he was ordered by the respondent Judge to conduct the cross-
examination of the witness he ordered arrested despite:

a. his vigorous objections to the unprocedural

manner in which the hearing on the Demurrer to
Evidence is being conducted by the respondent
judge;

b. his objection that there was no motion duly set

for hearing for the re-opening of the prosecution's
evidence;

c. the fact that he has not heard the testimony of

the witness presented by the prosecution who was
ordered arrested by the respondent Judge without
any motion from the prosecution;

d. the fact that there was no transcript of records of

the testimony of the witness ordered arrested by
the respondent Judge on his own without any
motion from the prosecution.

Consequently, respondent Judge agreed to the resetting of the cross-

examination of the witnesses but ordered the resumption of the hearing of said
case on July 1, 1998 at 2:00 p.m. despite his (Atty. Gacayan's) vigorous
objection considering his obvious partiality. This is so because as early as June
22, 1998, respondent informed the lawyers that the calendar of the court is
already full, yet he scheduled for June 24, 1998 at both 8:30 a.m. and 2:00 p.m.
the Sarol case when the testimony of the witness he ordered arrested was not
completed on June 23, 1998. Complainants contend that the act of respondent
Judge is highly unusual to say the least and a blatant violation of the unwritten
rule on how a judge shall conduct himself.

Complainants stressed that considering the patent disregard by the respondent

Judge of the basic rules governing the trial of the criminal case, they were left
with no other recourse but to bring the matter to the attention of this Honorable
Court in order for it to exercise its function as well as its disciplinary powers over
men in robes who are causing litigants to lose trust in our judicial system.

On August 7, 1996, Hon. Court Administrator Benipayo directed respondent

Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan to comment on the complaint of Atty. Lauro
Gacayan and Mr. Noel Sarol.

Respondent Judge in his comment alleged in sum that:

1. He was a newly-appointed Judge of barely a few

months when introduced to Criminal Case No.
14549-R, it was still on a hearing stage on
accused's Demurrer to Evidence;

2. On May 4, 1998, as the new Judge inquired into

the nature of the case and called for the Public
Prosecutor Benedicto T. Carantes and counsel for
the accused, Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan, in his
Chamber and informed them that he would need
time to examine the testimony of the witnesses and
other evidence already on record. Thus, the
hearing of the Demurrer to Evidence was reset on
May 25, 1998, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning with
the agreement of both Public Prosecutor and
counsel for the accused. However, he takes
exception to counsel for the accused's allegation
that he would not dismiss the case for insufficiency
of evidence. He simply said that he had to study the
record of this case and see the witnesses and the
private complainant/relatives of the victim in Court
so that he could be properly oriented as to the
evidence in this case;

3. On May 25, 1998, only two (2) prosecution's

witnesses appeared, Restituto Abuan and
Alejandro Castaneda, whose presence were (sic)
known to counsel for the accused, Atty. Lauro D.
Gacayan. These witnesses affirmed that they did
not see the killing of the victim. This was in the
presence of counsel for the accused, Atty. Lauro D.
Gacayan. Then, he issued an order requiring the
witnesses who failed to appear to show cause why
they should not be cited in contempt of court. The
hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence was reset to
June 23, 1998, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Again, said resetting was with the consent of the
Public Prosecutor and counsel for the accused.

4. For failure of the prosecution's witnesses Mirriam

Dominguez and Joseph Sarol to appear in Court,
despite notice, and again failure to show cause why
they should not be cited in contempt of court, the
Court issued a warrant for their arrest. Mirriam
Dominguez was arrested on June 16, 1998. Since
the next hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence was
still on June 23, 1998, Mirriam Dominguez could
have been detained at the Baguio City Jail until the
said next hearing. That was the reason why she
had to see him for her possible release before June
23, 1998. Had he not granted an audience to
prosecution witness Mirriam Dominguez, she could
have been detained at the Baguio City Jail from
June 17, 1998 to June 23, 1998. With the
commitment that she would appear on the June 23,
1998 hearing, and further commitment to bring
along [the] prosecution's eyewitness Neil Joseph
Sarol, she was released. This occasion was
transparent and properly recorded in the minutes of
the proceedings of June 17, 1998;

5. On June 23, 1998, [the] prosecution's

eyewitness Joseph Sarol appeared in Court and
upon motion of the Public Prosecutor that the
prosecutor is resting its case (sic) be set aside
given the appearance of an eyewitness to the crime
who could not be found before, the Court granted
the same in the interest of justice. His act in
allowing the prosecution to introduce an eyewitness
in a crime despite the fact that the prosecution had
already rested its case is supported by a legion of
cases in jurisprudence. 1

Also in the scheduled hearing, counsel for the

accused, Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan, failed to appear,
despite notice. Prompting him to appoint a
counsel de officio for the accused in the person of
Atty. Reynaldo Banta [the] detailed PAO lawyer in
court. Testimony of the eyewitness Neil Joseph
Sarol on direct and initial cross-examination was
completed.

6. On June 24, 1998 for the continuance of the

cross-examination of eyewitness Neil Joseph Sarol,
said eyewitness manifested that he had a class
examination at 11:00 o'clock in the morning and
understanding the plight of said eyewitness, he
reset the hearing for the afternoon of June 24,
1998;

On June 24, 1998, in the afternoon, the hearing

was cancelled on the ground that counsel for the
accused, Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan, had to study the
transcript of stenographic notes of the direct
testimony of eyewitness Neil Joseph Sarol and
moved for resetting of this case which the Court
granted. This case was reset to July 1, 1998, at
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

On July 1, 1998, at 2:00 in the afternoon, counsel

for the accused, Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan,
manifested that he did not have a copy of the
transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of
eyewitness Neil Joseph Sarol and he had to study
the same, and moved for the resetting of the
hearing which the Court granted, so that the cross-
examination was reset to September 9, 1998 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning SHARP.

7. On the matter of his inhibition, the same has

been denied and extensively discussed in the
Order dated June 23, 1998.

The pertinent portion reads as follows:

Also before this Court is the accused's motion for

inhibition of this Court from hearing this case the
same is denied for lack of factual and legal basis.
Furthermore, the counsel for the accused, Atty.
Lauro Gacayan who filed this motion for inhibition
failed to appear in today's hearing despite notice
and therefore failed to substantiate this motion in
open court. It must be stressed that this Court is not
only a Court of Law but also a Court of Justice. This
Presiding judge does not personally know neither
accused Noel Sarol [n]or the other people involved
in this case. The Presiding Judge does not come
from Baguio City and, therefore, does not have any
special interest as to any person from Baguio City.

The Presiding Judge is only interested that justice

shall be realized in the hearing of every case. It
does not personally matter to this Presiding Judge
if the accused will be convicted or acquitted on the
basis of the evidence and law. If the accused is to
be acquitted, so be it. If there is no evidence
against him to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, therefore, he should be acquitted. But the
Court cannot close its eyes to the fact that there is
still an eyewitness in this Homicide case, by the
name of Neil Joseph Sarol whose written affidavit is
even on record (p. 4, Record), and can possibly
shed light to the killing of the victim Cesar
Dominguez in this case. The Judge of this Court
does not sit in this chair as a mute witness of what
is going on in a case. It is the duty of this Judge to
see to it that justice is dispensed with. Whether or
not [the] accused Noel Sarol is convicted is none of
the personal concern of this Judge. Conversely,
whether or not the accused will be acquitted is
none of the personal concern of this Judge. Let the
accused be convicted or acquitted as the evidence
and the law warrant.

There lies a dead victim in my Court, so to

speak — a victim of the crime of Homicide. It is the
sacred duty of this Court to judicially determine the
truth regarding the death of this victim. If the
accused did not kill the victim, so be it. If according
to the evidence and law, the killing of this victim is
justified, so be it. If the killing of this victim falls
under an exempting circumstance favorable to the
accused, so be it. This court will have no choice but
to acquit the accused in this case under those
circumstances. But for as long as there is a vital
eyewitness whose written affidavit is on record and
who can tell the Court and the public as to what
really happened in this capital homicide case, this
Court which should be true to its duty, as a
dispenser of justice shall not rest finding out the
truth. Much more, this Court cannot be a party to
the suppression of an eyewitness to a homicide
case.

As the new Presiding Judge of this Court, of only a

few months, I cannot help but remember my
declared sworn solemn Covenant with God and the
people gathered in my oath-taking as a new judge
in the conference room of the Court of Appeals,
Manila last February 28, 1998. In my Covenant, I
vowed:

That I shall be an efficient, impartial

and honest judge;
 That I shall never compromise a
case for money or any other
considerations; and

That justice shall prevail in my Court

whatever it takes.

I have not forgotten said Covenant.

Thus finding no factual nor legal basis on this

motion for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge who
does not know any one of the parties in this case,
and whose conscience is clear on the matter, the
same motion is hereby denied . . .

8. Finally, he does not see any factual and legal

basis for the complainant's charge against him. He
has been simply doing his job as a dispenser of
justice in the best way he could.

From the foregoing factual findings, the OCA recommends that respondent Judge be severely
reprimanded for his obvious partiality with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
in the future will be dealt with more severely reasoning that —

The sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and
impartially without regard to persons or their circumstances or the opinion of one.
A judge thus should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial
and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision
and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from the suspicion as to its
fairness and as to its integrity." Hence, judges should not only be impartial but
should also appear impartial. While judges should possess proficiency in the law
or order that they can completely construe and enforce the law, it is more
important that they should act and behave in such a manner that the parties
before them should have confidence in their impartiality. 2

The issue before us is whether or not a Judge can motu proprio order the case to
be re-opened without being perceived as partial in favor of the prosecution.

The re-opening of the case by a court on its own motion was largely a matter in
its discretion and for the orderly administration of justice, and there is no merit in
the first assignment of error. 3

There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court governing motion[s] to re-

open a case for the reception of evidence after a case has been submitted for
decision but before judgment. This is a judicial action which is controlled only by
the paramount interest of justice and rest[s] entirely on the sound discretion of
the trial court. This [is] supported by existing jurisprudence on the matter, to wit:
 . . . it is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit
further evidence after the party offering the evidence has rested,
and the discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly
been abused. 4 More, it is within the sound discretion of the court
whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened for the further
introduction of the evidence after a motion or request for a non-
suit, or a demurrer to the evidence; and the case may be
reopened after the court has announced its intention as to its
ruling on the request, motion or demurrer, or has granted it or has
denied the same, or after the motion has been granted, if the
order had not been written, or entered upon the minutes or
signed. 5

In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties
have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to
offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for
good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to
offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be
disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion
appears. 6 So, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is
newly discovered or where it has been omitted through
inadvertence or mistake or where the purpose of the evidence is
to correct evidence previously offered. 7

In the light of the foregoing jurisprudence, it is thus necessary to determine

whether respondent judge acted within the bounds of his authority.

There is no doubt as borne by the previous resolutions of this Honorable Court

thru (sic) respondent Judge may in his own initiative order the reopening of a
case or upon motion of one of the parties for the orderly administration of justice.
It must not, however, be done whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably.

The records show that the subject case was filed on September 27, 1996. It took
the prosecution no less than one (1) year and four (4) months to adduce
evidence against the accused, and when the defense filed a Demurrer to
Evidence due to an apparent failure of the prosecution to prove its case,
respondent all of a sudden reopened the case. He subpoenaed witnesses to
appear before him and directed them to testify on what they know about the
case. This he made because of the fact that there lies a dead victim and he is to
determine who is responsible thereof. Thus, in so doing his actuation was viewed
as partial by the complainants. He acted as though he was actively prosecuting
the case at the expense of the accused.

Moreover, there was no "paramount interest of justice" to speak of in this case

which would have justified the actuations of respondent in reopening the case.
The prosecution was given all the opportunity to present its evidence and to
order anew the presentation of additional evidence is but a superfluity, especially
so that the same will not materially affect the position of the prosecution.
 Hence, the complainants have all the reasons to doubt the impartiality of
respondent Judge.

It is, thus well to remind the members of the Judiciary:

. . . to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and

suspicion and be free from any appearance of impropriety in their
personal behavior not only in the discharge of their official duties
but also in their everyday life, for as we have earlier stressed "no
position exacts a greater demand on [the] moral righteousness
and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary so
that (a) magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in
such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the
most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the
epitome of integrity and justice. 8

We agree with the factual findings of the OCA. However, the penalty recommended, i.e.,
reprimand, is too light given the facts of the case.

Apropos the charge of partiality, the Court pointed out in Dawa v. De Asa 9 that the [p]eople's
confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and
the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and
moral uprightness they are expected to possess. 10 It is towards this sacrosanct goal of ensuring
the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates
the following:

CANON 2 — A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE

APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.

RULE 2.01 — A judge should so behave at all times to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

CANON 3 — A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY,

AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.

RULE 3.01 — A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence.

RULE 3.02 — In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the
facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or
fear of criticism.

The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides that: "[A] judge's official conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in
the performance of judicial duties, but also his everyday life should be beyond reproach." Thus,
the Court in taking the respondent to task in Sarah B. Vedana v. Judge Eudarlo B.
Valencia, 11 minced no words when it said:

. . . his being a public official, holding a position in the Judiciary and specifically
entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice, breached Canon 2 of the
 Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which
mandate respectively, that "a judge should avoid impropriety in all activities", and
that "a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety,
and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of
judicial duties, but also in everyday life, should be beyond reproach." These most
exacting standards of decorum are demanded from magistrates if only, in the
language of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to "promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."

The spirit and philosophy underlying these Canons is best expressed in Castillo
v. Calanog 12 thus:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of
a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There
is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals.
The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times.
As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life can not simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely

and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed
as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.1âwphi1.nêt

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest

public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion. 13

Verily, no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and

uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench. Within the hierarchy of
courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol of government,
especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial judges are those
directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities which the
Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the
administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed
upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such manner that
his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the
public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. 14 In insulating
the Bench from the unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our democratic way of
life, it is essential that judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion.

A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must appear to be

impartial. 15 Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. 16 It was, thus, held that
it is improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused without the presence of the
complainant. 17 Talking privately alone to an alleged eyewitness to the incident in the
seclusion of his chambers, as what transpired in this case, likewise taints this image
much more so considering the circumstances surrounding the production of said
witness.
Verily, "[n]o position exacts a greater demand on [the] moral righteousness and uprightness of
an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all
times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise can bear the most searching
scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as an epitome of integrity and justice." 18 Indeed, more
than simply projecting an image of probity, a judge must not only appear to be a "good judge";
he must also appear to be a "good person". 19

As has been stated by this Court in Ruperto v. Banquerigo 20 "[T]he office of a judge exists for
one solemn end — to promote the ends of justice by administering it speedily and impartially.
The judge as the person presiding over that court, is the visible representation of the law and
justice. These are self-evident dogmas which do not even have to be emphasized, but to which
we are wont to advert when some members of the judiciary commit legal missteps or stray from
the axioms of judicial ethics . . ."

The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court, which states:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any

case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor, or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition
and leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based on just and valid
reasons. 21 The import of the rule on voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on
whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the trial judge based on
his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before
him. It points out to members of the bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or
previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that
could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition for, indeed, the factors
that lead to preferences and predilections are many and varied. 22

Considering the high-handed manner in which the respondent resolved the motion seeking his
inhibition vis-a-vis his manifest partiality in favor of the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 14549-
R, his attention is called to the pronouncement of the Court in Pimentel v. Salanga 23 reiterated
in Gutang v. Court of Appeals. 24

All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw
attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity
to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of
challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from
sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be
 induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant
arising out of circumstance[s] reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind,
he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion
in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary
norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the
back of his mind the thought that the judge unmeritoriously tilted the scales of
justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated
because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel,
if not altogether remote. He is a man subject to the frailties of other men. He
should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to
act or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in
good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and
where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to the others involved
therein. On the result of his decision to sit or not to sit may depend on a great
extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after
reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his
motives and fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted
as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule
137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.

A presiding judge, to be sure, must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-
litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of
faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative
but to inhibit himself from the case. 25 He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge under
such circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood, his
reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial
administration of justice is lived up to. 26

Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law, it needs be stressed that to be able to render
substantial justice and to maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges are expected to
keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, 27 consistent with the standard that
magistrates must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. 28

As aptly stated in Borromeo v. Mariano 29 "[O]ur conception of good judges has been, and is, of
men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with
law . . ." Thus, it has been held that when the judge's inefficiency springs from a failure to
consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a
judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too
vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial authority. 30

Indeed, everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. When, as in this case, the
law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 31 Judges are
expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.
They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence
requires no less. 32 It is imperative that a judge be conversant with basic legal principles and that
he be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. 33 He should strive for excellence exceeded
only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the rule of
law. 34
Needless to state, respondent was in this instance wanting in the desired level of mastery of a
fundamental rule on criminal procedure.

In Cortes v. Judge Catral, 35 this Court found respondent judge therein guilty of gross ignorance
of the law for granting bail to the accused without the requisite hearing. The respondent judge
was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future would be dealt with more severely. In Mamolo, Sr. v. Narisma, 36 the Court
held respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and penalized him with a fine of
P20,000.00. The same penalty was imposed by this Court on respondent judge in Buzon, Jr. v.
Velasco, 37 who was found to have fallen short of the standard set forth in Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, thereby eroding the litigant's confidence in his competence and
knowledge.

Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, We find the recommended penalty of reprimand not
commensurate with the misdeed committed. A fine of P10,000.00 and reprimand, with a
warning that a commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely is a
more appropriate penalty.

Furthermore, in view of the prevailing circumstances in this case, the Court deems it the better
course for respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further hearing Criminal Case No. 14549-R.
In that way, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is
preserved. Most important of all, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to. 38

WHEREFORE, for violations of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Ethics which amount to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of an officer of
the Judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service, respondent Judge
FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Baguio City, is
hereby FINED the amount of P10,000.00. He is likewise REPRIMANDED and sternly WARNED
that a repetition of the foregoing or similar transgressions shall be dealt with more severely.
Finally, he is ORDERED to inhibit himself from further hearing Criminal Case No. 14549-R. The
Executive Judge is ordered to re-raffle the case with dispatch to another sala.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1753. February 5, 2004]

CAPISTRANO OBEDENCIO, JR., Complainant, v. JUDGE JOAQUIN M. MURILLO,

PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 26, MEDINA, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

In a letter-complaint,1 complainant Capistrano Obedencio, Jr., charged respondent Judge

Joaquin M. Murillo, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Medina, Misamis Oriental,
Branch 26, of unjustly dismissing Criminal Case No. 1401-M (2000) for rape, entitled People v.
Dexter Z. Acenas.

Complainant averred that on May 3, 2000, he and his wife assisted their 14-year-old daughter,
Licel Acenas Obedencio, in filing with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Hall of Justice in
Cagayan de Oro City, a criminal complaint for rape allegedly committed upon her when she was
11 years old by her uncle, Dexter Z. Acenas. After the preliminary investigation, which the
accused did not attend, the case was filed in respondent judges sala.2 ςrνll

On May 25, 2001, following Licels abduction from their house,3 complainant sought to secure
from the court a copy of the warrant of arrest issued against the accused. To his great surprise,
respondent judge told him that the case had been dismissed three days earlier on May 22,
2001.4 According to respondent judge, Licel Obedencio had come to court, accompanied by her
maternal grandparents and Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel Hallazgo. There she was
presented to affirm her affidavit of desistance.5 ςrνll

Complainant claims that the dismissal was marred by serious irregularities. He specifically
lamented the absence of any subpoena or notice of hearing from the court to him, his wife, or
their counsel. He believes that since Prosecutor Hallazgo, Licels maternal grandparents, and
the accused are relatives, this fact contributed to the unjust dismissal of the case.6 ςrνll

In his comment,7 respondent judge stated that he heard Criminal Case No. 1401-M (2000) on
May 22, 2001, upon the request of Prosecutor Hallazgo who was prosecuting the case. During
the hearing, Prosecutor Hallazgo presented an affidavit of desistance executed by Licel. Then,
Licel took the witness stand and was asked on matters contained in her affidavit. She recanted
the allegations in her affidavit-complaint and denied having been molested by her uncle, Dexter.
She explained that her mother forced her to file the rape charge because of family inheritance
problems. Respondent judge asserts that, with the filing of the affidavit of desistance, the court
had no other recourse but to dismiss the case.8 ςrνll

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O.
Lock, found respondent judge liable for ignorance of the law for unjustly dismissing Criminal
Case No. 1401-M (2000). OCA recommended that respondent judge be reprimanded with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.9 ςrνll

This Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, but not with the recommended penalty.
Article 220(6) 10 of the Family Code gives to complainant and his wife the right and duty to
represent Licel in all matters affecting her interest. Thus, they were entitled to be notified and to
attend every hearing on the case. As a judge, respondent is duty-bound to acquaint himself with
the cases pending before him.11 He should have known that Licel filed the criminal complaint
with the assistance of her parents, who are her natural guardians.12 It was incumbent upon
respondent judge to inquire into the reason behind their nonappearance before the court instead
of simply relying on the bare explanation of the defense counsel that he and his client could not
find Licels parents.13 Respondent judge ought to remember that the accused, Dexter Acenas, is
the maternal uncle of the victim. That Licel came to court with her maternal grandparents, and
not her parents, on the day she was examined to affirm her affidavit of desistance, should have
alerted respondent judge to be more circumspect. Being still a minor, Licel cannot fully
comprehend for herself the impact and legal consequence of the affidavit of desistance. Given
her tender age, the probability is that Licel succumbed to illicit influence and undue pressure on
her to desist from pursuing her complaint.

Licel was only 14 years old, definitely a minor, on May 22, 2001, when she was presented
before respondents sala to affirm the execution of her affidavit of desistance. This being the
case, said affidavit should have been executed with the concurrence of her parents. Licel could
not validly give consent to an affidavit of desistance, for a minor is incompetent to execute such
an instrument. Yet, notwithstanding the absence of her parents conformity to the affidavit of
desistance and lack of notice to them or their lawyer of the scheduled hearing, respondent judge
dismissed the criminal case. Truly, he should have exercised more prudence and caution
instead of perfunctorily dismissing the case, considering the nature and gravity of the offense
charged.

At the very least, herein respondent should have appointed a guardian ad litem for Licel, to
protect her welfare and interest, instead of hastily dismissing the rape case. The Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness,14 which took effect on December 15, 2000, governs the
examination of child witnesses who are victims of, accused of, or witnesses to a crime. In the
absence or incapacity of the parents to be the guardian, Section 5 (a) 15 of said rule provides
that the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to promote the best interests of the child. This
rule was already in effect when respondent judge dismissed the rape case on May 22, 2001.

Respondent is reminded that a judge is the visible representation of the law and, more
important, of justice.16 A judge owes it to the public to be knowledgeable, for ignorance of the
law is the mainspring of injustice.17 A judge must know the laws and apply them properly in all
good faith.18 Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be faithful
to the law and to maintain professional competence. He should conduct the functions and
perform the duties of his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of
law.19 Where the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.20 ςrνll

For respondent judges infraction, the penalty of reprimand, recommended by the OCA, is
inapplicable. It is too light and incommensurate to the gravity of the administrative offense
charged and proved. Instead, the penalty of fine is proper in this case, following Sandoval v.
Garin,21 in the amount of P10,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the respondent Judge Joaquin M. Murillo, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Medina, Misamis Oriental, Branch 26, is found LIABLEfor gross ignorance of the law in
connection with the unjust dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1401-M (2000). He is ORDEREDto
pay the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) and ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in
the performance of his judicial duties and functions. He is further warned sternly that a repetition
of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and TINGA, JJ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION

[A. M. No. RTJ-02-1682 - March 23, 2004]

ELIZA MINA and RAMIR MINA, Complainants, v. JUDGE BENJAMIN T.

VIANZON, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

The present administrative case against Regional Trial Court Judge Benjamin T. Vianzon1 of
Balanga, Bataan, Branch 1, stemmed from an affidavit-complaint executed by Eliza Mina and
her son Ramir Mina,2 charging respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law, gross
inexcusable negligence and manifest bias and partiality.

As an antecedent, a case for ejectment was filed by the spouses Reynaldo Paul and Ma. Clara
Chico, against the spouses Florencio and Eliza Mina, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Balanga Bataan, docketed as Civil Case No. 1752.

On July 7, 1998, the MTC, through Presiding Judge Rodolfo S. Gatdula, rendered a Decision in
favor of the spouses Chico, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as against the defendants
by ordering the defendants and all persons claiming right under them to surrender peacefully
Lot 774 to the plaintiff by demolishing their house thereon and vacating the said
land;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

To pay the amount of P10,000.00 as actual damage and a reasonable rent of P1,000.00 per
month from May 1981 up to the removal of their house in the subject
lot;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

To pay costs of suit.

No award for moral damages, there being no evidence introduced by the plaintiffs to that effect.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 1
thereof, presided over by Judge Vianzon.

On October 2, 1998, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.

On October 8, 1998, the spouses Chico filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution, pursuant to
Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allowing execution pending appeal.3 Respondent
judge did not act upon the motion for execution right away.

In the meantime, the spouses Mina appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. The
appeal was, however, dismissed in a Resolution dated September 22, 1999. No appeal was
taken therefrom. Hence, on October 16, 1999, the judgment against the spouses Mina became
final and executory.

On April 6, 2000, months after the judgment against the spouses Mina had become final,
counsel for the spouses Chico reiterated their Motion for Execution before the RTC, which
motion, up to that time, had not been acted upon by respondent judge.

Instead of remanding the case to the MTC, the latter being the court of origin, Judge Vianzon
granted the motion for execution on April 12, 2000 and, thereafter, ordered the issuance of a
writ of demolition on July 19, 2000.

On July 25, 2000, complainant Eliza Mina filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution and
Writ of Demolition, on the ground that the RTC had no authority to issue the writs. However,
Judge Vianzon merely noted the motion to quash.

Consequently, on July 28, 2000, the writs in question were enforced. The personal belongings
of the spouses Mina were removed and their house was demolished.

Hence, the present complaint.

Respondent judge in his Comment states:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

(1) That the spouses Mina are estopped from questioning the legality of the issuance of the
writs of execution and demolition because at the time the motions for this issuance were being
heard, their counsel did not manifest any objection to his authority to issue said writs. In fact,
complainants actively participated in the hearings thereon and it was only when he had issued
orders adverse to them that they questioned his authority;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(2) That if complainants truly believed that he committed an error in issuing the writs of
execution and demolition, the complainants should have brought the matter to his attention so
that he could have immediately remanded the records of the case to the
MTC;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(3) That although he could have readily acted on the Motion for Execution filed as early as
October 8, 1998, he in fact deferred ruling upon the same in consideration of the appeal taken
by the spouses Mina to the Court of Appeals. He waited until the Court of Appeals decision had
become final and executory, so that said appeal would not be rendered moot if he ordered
immediate execution pending appeal; and,

(4) That he denies the allegation that he gave undue benefit, advantage or preference to the
spouses Chico. He states that he does not even know them nor has he even met them. He
further avers that, if ever there was any bias, partiality or undue advantage and benefit, the
same was in favor of the spouses Mina who, "because of pity of the undersigned judge" were
able to stay for almost two more years after he had rendered his decision, and it was only after
counsel for the prevailing party reiterated their motion for execution, that he finally acted and
resolved the same.

Upon evaluation of the parties pleadings and the evidence on record, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) found the petition meritorious, stating that respondent judges actuation
showed a total disregard or ignorance of the elementary provisions of law involved in the case.
Thus, the OCA recommended that Judge Vianzon be fined in the amount of P2,000 and warned
that a repetition of the same act would be dealt with more severely.

The findings and recommendations of the OCA are well-taken, except with regard to the
penalty.

After a judgment has attained finality, as in this case, Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court4 applies, viz:

Sec. 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on
motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration
of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith
certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced
and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires,
direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. (Emphasis ours.)

Section 11, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court also provides:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Sec. 11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a
portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be
filed in the proper court after its entry.

It is, therefore, clear that in the execution of the judgment in ejectment cases, the issuance of a
demolition order is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court which rendered the
decision. The Regional Trial Court that affirms the decision of the Municipal Trial Court cannot
order execution of its judgment. The exception is when the Regional Trial Court grants
execution pending appeal.

In the present case, the execution ordered by the respondent judge was not one in a case
pending appeal. For the decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered on September 22, 1999
and the same became final and executory on October 16, 1999. The order granting the motion
for execution was issued on April 12, 2000. By the latter date, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals had already become final and executory, depriving the RTC of jurisdiction to issue the
order. It is of no moment that the motion for execution was filed on October 8, 1998.

Relevant herein is the ruling in City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 362, 369 (1991) :
The rule is that if the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court is appealed to the Regional Trial
Court and the decision of the latter is itself elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision
thereafter becomes final, the case should be remanded through the Regional Trial Court to the
Metropolitan Trial Court for execution. The only exception is the execution pending appeal,
which can be issued by the Regional Trial Court under Section 18 [now Section 21] of Rule 70
or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court under Section 10 [now Section 21] of the same
Rule.

It follows that respondent judges act of issuing the writs of execution and demolition was done
outside the scope of his authority.

Respondent judges explanations are unavailing.

It is undisputed that at the time the writs of execution and demolition were issued, the judgment
in question had already become final and executory. In fact, respondent judge himself asserts
that he waited for the said decision to become final and executory before acting on the
prevailing partys motion for execution.

Respondent, moreover, argues that it was the duty of herein complainants to call his attention to
his error, so that he could have immediately remanded the records of the case to the proper
MTC.

We give credence to complainants averment that while it is true that they participated in the
hearings on the motion for execution, they did so in the belief that respondent judge was acting
regularly and within the scope of his authority under the law. It was only later on, when the
irregularity of the judges action became apparent, that they brought the matter to his attention.
However, respondent judge merely ignored their objection and continued to preside over the
incident, notwithstanding the formal objection to his lack of authority. We agree with
complainants that even without their objection, Judge Vianzon should have known at the outset
that, at that point, he had no more authority to hear and try the incident on the writ of execution.

It must be stressed that occupying the exalted position of a judge entails a lot of responsibilities,
foremost of which is proficiency in the law. Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain professional competence. He is
mandated to be conversant with the law5 and to have more than a cursory acquaintance with
the rules and authoritative doctrines.6 ςrνll

When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance thereof. Judges
are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules.7 We explained, in the case of Guillen v. Judge Cañon,8 that:

Respondent's actions also visibly indicate his lack of sufficient grasp of the law. No less than the
Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain
professional competence (Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct). Indeed, competence
is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
erodes the public's confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the
law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the duty
to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic
rules must be at the palm of his hands. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and
precepts as well as with procedural rules (Jovenal Oporto, Jr. v. Judge Eddie P. Monserate,
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1109, April 16, 2001). Thus, this Court has consistently held that:

A judge is presumed to know the law and when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law (Agunday v. Tresvalles, 319 SCRA 134 [1999]).

Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes
gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge (De Austria v.
Beltran, 313 SCRA 443 [1999]).

As to the penalty, gross ignorance of the law is now punishable with severe sanctions under the
amendment of Rule 140,9 Rules of Court, by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC.10 Considering that the
offense herein was committed before the aforesaid amendment of the Rules, the imposable
penalty should be a fine as recommended by the OCA. Nevertheless, in view of the nature of
the offense, which goes against a basic rule of procedure, the Court increases the
recommended amount of the fine to P20,000.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Benjamin T. Vianzon of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga,

Bataan, Branch 1, is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby FINED in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely under the more stringent
provisions of the Rules as amended. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., on official leave.
 FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. NO. MTJ-04-1534 : September 7, 2004]

EMELIE TAGUBA LUCERO, Complainant, v. JUDGE FELINO U. BANGALAN,

Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Allacapan, Cagayan, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.1 As an

administrative officer of the court, a judge should organize and supervise the court
personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all
times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.2

On August 15, 2003, Emelie Taguba Lucero filed a verified complaint3 with the
Office of the Court Administrator charging Judge Felino U. Bangalan, the presiding
judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Allacapan, Cagayan, with Gross
Ignorance of the Law for Rendering an Unjust Judgment, Violation of Republic Act
No. 6713, Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Violation of
the Rule of Summary Procedure and Legal Ethics.

The present complaint originated from three (3) separate cases of Forcible Entry
filed against herein complainant by Wilfredo Garo in Civil Case 250-L;4 by Federico
Aguinaldo in Civil Case 248-L5 and by Rogelio Antonio in Civil Case 249-L.6 All these
cases were heard before the sala of the respondent judge.

In relation to the aforementioned civil cases, the office of the respondent judge
through his Clerk of Court II, Fredelito R. Baltazar, issued three separate
summonses7 all addressed to complainant, Emelie Lucero.

Contrary to the express provisions of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
that all cases of forcible entry, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid
rentals sought to be recovered, will be governed by the said Rule,8 the above
summonses failed to state that summary procedure shall apply to the three civil
cases of forcible entry.9 Each of the said summons also required Emelie Lucero to
file her answer to the complaint within 15 days upon her receipt of the summons.
Under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, defendants are required to file
their answers within 10 days from receipt of the summons.10
On November 13, 2002, Process Server Bernardo B. Tan served the summonses
together with copies of the complaints upon the person of Rendon Rivera, a
purported nephew of complainant Emilie Lucero.11 In her complaint, Emelie Lucero
stated that the deficiencies in the summons issued by the office of the respondent
judge confused and misled her.12 Notwithstanding the confusion, complainant filed
her answers to each of the complaint filed against her on November 26, 2002.

Thereafter, respondent judge set the three civil cases for preliminary conference on
January 15, 2003. However, the preliminary conference for Civil Case Nos. 250-L
and 249-L was reset to February 6, 2003. On the other hand, the preliminary
conference for Civil Case No. 248-L was reset to February 16, 2003,13 a Sunday.

On February 12, 2003, before the preliminary conference in Civil Case No. 248-L
was conducted, respondent judge rendered three separate decisions14 ordering
complainant to surrender the possession of the contested property. Respondent
judge grounded his decision upon the failure of the complainant or her counsel to
appear during the preliminary conference set on February 6, 2003.

Complainant appealed15 the three decisions of the respondent judge to the Regional

Trial Court of Ballesteros, Cagayan, Branch 33, which annulled, reversed and set
aside the same on the ground of violation of due process in depriving the
defendant, herein complainant, an opportunity to be heard. The Regional Trial Court
held:

The records of the case bears out that on January 16, 2003 or prior to the
scheduled preliminary conference, the defendant-appellant has submitted her pre-
trial brief, thru counsel, while the plaintiff-appellee did not, which is a procedural
requirement before the parties may go to the preliminary conference hearing.
Instead, the lower Court has favorably granted the moved (sic) of the counsel for
the plaintiff-appellee for judgment based on the allegations in the complaint.

It also shows that the notification for the pre-trial conference sent to the defendant-
appellant was February 16, 2003, however, the decision was rendered on February
12, 2003, hence there was miscommunication of the scheduled pre-trial conference
which the lower Court should have better look out (sic).16

When ordered to comment,17 respondent judge raised the defense that it was his
Clerk of Court II, Mr. Fredelito R. Baltazar, who erroneously indicated in the
summons that the reglementary period to file answers was fifteen days instead of
only ten days as provided for under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such
error notwithstanding, respondent judge claimed that when complainant filed her
answers to the three complaints on November 26, 2002, she effectively waived
whatever formal defects may be found in the summonses issued by his office.

In his Comment, respondent judge did not explain why the summonses issued in
the three civil cases of forcible entry filed against complainant failed to state that it
shall be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Neither did he explain why
the preliminary conference for Civil Case No. 248-L was calendared on a Sunday, a
non-working day.

On January 19, 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its report and
recommendation18 that respondent judge be penalized with a fine of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) for negligence, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

After a careful review of the records of this case, we agree with the findings of the
Court Administrator, except as to the amount of fine to be imposed on respondent
judge.

All the complaints filed with the lower court against the complainant clearly showed
that they were "For: FORCIBLE ENTRY." These words appearing on the captions
should have alerted the respondent judge that the Rule on Summary Procedure
should be applied to all the three cases. Respondent judge's apparent laxity in the
conduct of his official affairs paved the way for the issuance of three deficient
summonses which not only failed to state that the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure shall govern but also gave defendant fifteen days to answer the
complaints, instead of only ten days.

Courts exist to dispense and promote justice. The realization of this solemn purpose
depends to a great extent on the intellectual, moral and personal qualities of the
men and women who are called to serve as judges.19 A judge owes it to himself and
his office to know by heart basic legal principles and to harness his legal know how
correctly and justly. When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the law and
the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of the law
by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.20 Thus, to the end that they be
the personification of justice and rule of law, judges should strive for a level of
excellence exceeded only by their passion for truth. Anything less than this strict
standard would subject them to administrative sanction.21

Respondent judge's explanation that his staff was responsible for erroneously
stating in the summons that complainant has 15 days to file her answer instead of
the 10 day period prescribed under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
deserves no consideration. Time and again we have ruled that a judge cannot hide
behind the incompetence of his subordinates. He should be the master of his own
domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects.22 A judge should be
an effective manager of the court and its personnel.23 He is directly responsible for
the proper discharge of the official functions of his staff. The efficient administration
of justice cannot accept as an excuse the shifting of the blame from one court
personnel to another.24

The setting of the preliminary conference in Civil Case No. 248-L on a Sunday, a
non-working day, further underscores the negligence of the respondent judge. His
collective actions fell short of the competence and faithfulness to the law required
of judges.25
However, we find no basis to hold the respondent judge administratively liable for
Rendering an Unjust Judgment and violation of Republic Act No. 6713. In
administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations in his complaint with substantial evidence.26 In this case, the
complainant failed to substantiate her charges that respondent judge knowingly
rendered an unjust judgment and that he violated the provisions of Republic Act
No. 6713. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given
credence.27

In its report, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
judge be fined in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).28 We find the
recommended amount not commensurate to the professional infractions committed
by the respondent judge.

Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended,29 the violation of

Supreme Court Rules, directives and circulars is classified as a Less Serious Charge.

The prescribed penalty for a Less Serious Charge is any of the following sanctions:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we hold that a fine of Twelve
Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) is commensurate to respondent judge's infraction.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Judge Felino U. Bangalan of the Municipal

Circuit Trial Court of Allacapan, Cagayan, is found guilty of violation of the Revised
Rule of Summary Procedure for which he is FINED Twelve Thousand Pesos
(P12,000.00). Judge Bangalan is further sternly warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. NO. RTJ-06-1993 : April 26, 2006]

[OCA-IPI No. 05-2161-RTJ]

AUGUSTUS M. GONZALES, Complainant, v. JUDGE ANTONIO B. BANTOLO,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Culasi, Antique, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

A complaint was filed on December 20, 2004 by Augustus M. Gonzales against

Judge Antonio B. Bantolo of the Regional Trial Court of Culasi, Antique, Branch 13,
for gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and delay in the resolution of
the motion for reconsideration.

Gonzales alleged that on October 2, 2003, respondent Judge issued an

order1 relative to Civil Case No. C-135 entitled Francisco A. Rada, Jr. and Juliefra G.
Rada v. Augustus M. Gonzales, the dispositive portion of which reads:cra:nad

WHEREFORE, premises considered, upon motion of the petitioners without objection

on the part of the respondent, the respondent is hereby directed/ordered:

1. To return the remaining stocks now at the bodega of Pandan North Bay
Enterprises at Poblacion, Pandan, Antique, or its money equivalent in the sum of
Sixty Thousand Four Hundred Thirty One Pesos (P60,431.00) as well as empty
bottles and cases of SMC products kept thereat consisting of five (5) ten-wheeler
truck or its monetary value of Five Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand One Hundred
Eighty Three (P525,183.00) Pesos to SMC at its Numancia Sales Office, Numancia,
Aklan. (Annex "A" of the Omnibus Motion and Manifestation).

2. To return the sum of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00) which

respondent withdrawn (sic) from the joint account aforementioned which
constitutes the proceeds from the sale of SMC products by Pandan North Bay
Enterprises prior to December 13, 2002 by directly turning it over to the SMC at its
Sales Office at Numancia, Aklan. (Annex "B" Ibid)

3. To stop the respondent or any person acting in his behalf from collecting the
accounts (sic) receivables from customers and for him to account and turn over the
money already collected from the customers arising from the accounts (sic)
receivable of PNBE to SMC at its Sales Office at Numancia, Aklan.

4. Not to sell nor to dispose in whatever manner any and all vehicles, equipments
and other properties owned by PNBE either registered in his name or PNBE, and

5. To turn over and account the proceeds of the sale of the Toyota Hi-lux 4x4 pick
up to PNBE or to SMC at its Sales Office, Numancia, Aklan.

Furnish copy of this Order to the parties and their respective counsel.

SO ORDERED.2

On October 22, 2003, Gonzales filed a motion for reconsideration3 of the order. In
this complaint, Gonzales alleged that respondent Judge failed to resolve the motion
for reconsideration despite lapse of more than one year from the time it was filed or
submitted for resolution.

In his Comment,4 respondent Judge claimed that when the motion for

reconsideration was submitted for resolution on December 18, 2003,5 Gonzales filed
a Motion to Recuse6 on December 5, 2003, and a Motion to Defer Further
Proceedings7 on January 8, 2004, which directly caused his failure to resolve the
pending motion for reconsideration.8 He also alleged that the motion for
reconsideration is already moot and resolving the same would be futile because the
relief prayed in the motion for reconsideration has been abandoned with the filing of
the amended petition.9 cra

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the charge of gross
ignorance should be dismissed for failure to establish that respondent Judge was
motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty, in not resolving the motion for
reconsideration on time. At the same time, the OCA recommended that respondent
Judge be fined in the amount of P10,500.00 in lieu of suspension considering his
compulsory retirement from the service last January 6, 2006, for failure to resolve
the motion for reconsideration within the mandatory period which shall be deducted
from his retirement benefits.10 chanroblesvirtuallawlibary

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

Indeed, respondent Judge failed to resolve the motion for reconsideration within the
mandatory period of 30 days from the time it was submitted for resolution11 on
December 18, 2003. When respondent Judge compulsorily retired from the service
on January 6, 2006, or more than two years after the motion for reconsideration
was submitted for resolution, it remained unresolved. In addition, the reasons
adduced by respondent Judge for not resolving the motion for reconsideration lack
merit. Regardless of whether the grounds or reliefs prayed for in the motion for
reconsideration have become moot, respondent judge has the duty to resolve the
motion in the interest of orderly administration of justice and to properly inform the
parties of the outcome of the motion.
The Court has repeatedly warned judges to dispose of court business promptly,
resolve pending incidents and motions, and decide cases within the prescribed
periods for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our
people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Such
exhortation is enshrined in Section 15, par. (1), Article VIII of our Constitution, as
well as in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that
a magistrate should dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods. For violations thereof, we have invariably imposed
penalties ranging from fine to suspension depending on the circumstances of each
case.12 cra

Undue delay in rendering an order is a less serious charge13 punishable by

suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor
more than three months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.14 Considering that respondent Judge had compulsorily retired from the
service on January 6, 2006, we find the penalty of fine in the amount of P10,500.00
as recommended by the OCA to be in order.

WHEREFORE, for undue delay in resolving the motion for reconsideration in Civil
Case No. C-135 entitled Francisco A. Rada, Jr. and Juliefra G. Rada v. Augustus M.
Gonzales, respondent Judge Antonio B. Bantolo, then of the Regional Trial Court of
Culasi, Antique, Branch 13, is FINED Ten Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P10,500.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
 THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1639 : July 28, 2006]

(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 05-1803-MTJ)

BENITO MONCADA, Complainant, v. JUDGE ALDEN V. CERVANTES, MTC-

Cabuyao, Laguna, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The present administrative case against Judge Alden V. Cervantes (respondent

judge) stemmed from the undue delay in the resolution of a criminal case for
Usurpation of Real Property and Real Rights filed before his sala as Municipal Trial
Court judge of Cabuyao, Laguna. The complaint dated 22 November 2005 was filed
by the defendant in that case, Benito Moncada (Moncada), charging respondent
judge with violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01,1 Canon 3,2 and Canon 3, Rule 3.053 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Moncada alleges that on 23 December 1997, he and his wife entered into a contract
of lease4 with the spouses Jose Ebron and Librada Ebron (spouses Ebron) over a
parcel of land located at Barangay Pulo, Cabuyao, Laguna, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-404878. Under the terms of the contract, Moncada, as
lessee, was to pay a monthly rental of P4,000.00 and another P10,000.00
representing advances in rental fees for 2' months.

Immediately thereafter, Moncada opened a bakeshop in a two-story building which

he constructed after he sought permission from the spouses Ebron as stipulated in
the contract of lease. Moncada claims that he spent more than P400,000.00 for the
construction of the building.

Sometime in 2000, Moncada went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and
Assessor's Office of Cabuyao, Laguna, to verify the ownership of the land he leased.
He came upon Tax Declaration No. 05248, which indicated a different set of persons
other than the spouses Ebron as the owners of the property.5 Moncada confronted
the spouses Ebron about his discovery, but the latter got angry and instead asked
for double the amount of the then prevailing rent. Moncada did not agree to the
increase in rent. As a result, the spouses Ebron refused to accept Moncada's
payment for the leased premises.

On 15 December 2000, the spouses Ebron filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Cabuyao, Laguna, a civil case for Unlawful Detainer with Ejectment & Damages with
Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction6 and a criminal case for Usurpation of Real
Property and Real Rights7 against Moncada.

On 24 May 2001, Moncada pleaded not guilty upon arraignment in the criminal
case. Pre-trial was deferred on several occasions for failure of either the private or
the public prosecutor to appear in court, and for other reasons not explained in the
records. All told, the criminal case dragged on from 24 May 2001 to 16 January
2006.8

During that period, Moncada filed a Motion to Suspend Action for Usurpation on the
Ground of Prejudicial Question9 on 5 June 2002 which was promptly denied by
respondent judge on 29 July 2002.10 He also filed on 28 January 2004 a Motion to
Dismiss11 on the ground that the criminal case against him, having been pending
from the time the pre-trial conference on 29 July 2002 was terminated until the
time of the filing of the motion, violated the Rule on Summary Procedure (Rules)
specifically with regard to his right to speedy, impartial and public trial. On 16
February 2004, respondent judge issued an Order12 denying Moncada's Motion to
Dismiss.

Another Motion to Dismiss13 was filed by Moncada dated 30 June 2004. However, in

an Order dated 7 July 2004, respondent judge again denied the motion to dismiss,
characterizing the same as "misplaced."14

Aside from the slow pace of the criminal case, Moncada also avers that the
stenographic notes taken during the hearings of the case have not been transcribed
and that, as of the time of the filing of the instant complaint, no transcript of
stenographic notes (TSNs) were attached to the records of the case.

Meanwhile, respondent judge retired from the judiciary on 23 November 2005, a

day before the present complaint against him was filed.

Required to file a Comment, respondent judge instead filed a Manifestations and

Motion to Dismiss Administrative Complaint15 insisting on his honest belief that the
present administrative case filed by Moncada has no legal basis and is
unmeritorious. Respondent judge claims that he was not remiss in performing his
duties as a judge and that the denial of the motions to dismiss was in the exercise
of his sound discretion. Respondent judge also notes that the complaint was filed
after he retired on 23 November 2005.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Senior Deputy Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño and Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez,
filed with this Court its Evaluation, Report and Recommendation dated 6 April 2006,
recommending the imposition of a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 to be deducted
from respondent judge's retirement benefits.

The OCA found the charge of ignorance of the law for denying Moncada's motions to
dismiss bereft of merit. It concluded that respondent judge issued the assailed
orders in the exercise of his sound judicial discretion, and if any error was
committed, it was an error in judgment that can be corrected by a judicial remedy
set forth in the Rules of Court. However, as regards the delay in the disposition of
the criminal case before respondent judge's court, the OCA held that the latter was
evidently remiss in his duty to resolve the same on time. It declared:

His conduct blatantly manifests his incompetence and ineptitude in discharging his
functions. Not only did he violate the constitutional and statutory requirements that
cases be decided within the period fixed therefore, he likewise contravened Section
16, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "All persons shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies." The public trust's [sic] character of a judge's office imposes
upon him the highest degree of responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to
promptly administer justice (OCA v. Benedicto, 296 SCRA 62, [1998]). Needless to
say, any delay in the determination or resolution of a case, no matter how
insignificant the case may seem to a judge, is, at bottom, delay in the
administration of justice, in general. The suffering injured by just one person
whether plaintiff, defendant or accused while awaiting a judgment that may affect
his life, honor, liberty or property, taints the entire judiciary's performance in its
solemn task of administering justice. (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit, RTC
Branches 4 and 23, Manila and MeTC, Branch 14, Manila, 291 SCRA 10, [1998]).16

We are in accord with the OCA's findings and recommendation.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the nature of the criminal case against
Moncada is one that entails the disposition of the case under the Rules. Section 17
thereof provides that when the trial has been conducted, the Court shall promulgate
the judgment not later than thirty (30) days after the termination of trial.

It is obvious that expediency is the objective of the Rules. Certainly, leaving a case
undecided for more than five (5) years is not sanctioned by the Rules.

Delay in the disposition and resolution of cases constitutes a serious violation of the
parties' constitutional right to speedy disposition of their grievances in
court.17 In Office of the Court Administrator v. Avelino,18 the Court held that a delay
in the disposition of a criminal case for slight physical injuries for five (5) years is a
violation of Section 10 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which directs a
judge to decide the case within thirty (30) days from receipt of the last affidavits
and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same. It must be
stressed that the Revised Rule was enacted to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of the cases falling within its coverage. It is therefore not
encouraging when it is the judge himself who occasions the delay sought to be
prevented by the said Rule.19
In this case, the failure of respondent judge to decide the criminal case with
dispatch as mandated by the Rules speaks of his arrant negligence. Worse,
respondent judge did not even offer a plausible explanation why the criminal case
took so long to be resolved.20 His proffered excuse that he was merely an acting
presiding judge of the MTC, Cabuyao, Laguna is unacceptable. All judges are
required to ensure that the administration of justice is unhampered by delays that
deprive litigants of their right to speedy disposition of their cases.

The Court also deems it fit to discuss the absence of the TSNs of the criminal case
from the record even after the lapse of a considerable length of time. Although it is
the duty of the court stenographer to transcribe the stenographic notes, it is a
given fact that the judge exercises supervision over his court personnel. The Code
of Judicial Conduct requires judges to organize and supervise court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and to require the observance
of high standards of public service and fidelity at all times.21

It is of no moment that Moncada filed his complaint one (1) day after the
retirement of respondent judge. It should be stressed that the administrative case
Moncada filed against him was in relation to his duties as a judge. As such, even if
he has retired from the service, if found to be remiss in upholding his sworn
responsibility, he could still be penalized for the infractions he has committed.

However, since the retirement of respondent judge precludes the imposition of the
penalty of suspension,22 the Court now rules that it is but proper to impose upon
him the recommended fine of P20,000.00 to be deducted from whatever retirement
benefits he may receive.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent judge guilty of gross neglect of judicial duty and
indifference to his responsibility concerning speedy disposition of cases, Judge
Alden V. Cervantes is hereby FINED the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

 EN BANC

[A.M. NO. MTJ-07-1682 : June 19, 2008]

ESTER F. BARBERO, Complainant, v. JUDGE CESAR M. DUMLAO, Municipal

Trial Court, San Mateo, Isabela, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law filed by Ester F. Barbero
(Barbero) against Judge Cesar M. Dumlao (Judge Dumlao), Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Isabela.

Barbero filed a criminal case1 for estafa against a certain Herman A. Medina

(Medina). The case was raffled to Judge Anastacio D. Anghad (Judge Anghad),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region II, Branch 36,
Santiago City, Isabela. On 19 February 2003, Judge Anghad issued a warrant of
arrest2 commanding the proper officer to arrest Medina.

Medina was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest. However, Judge Dumlao
approved Medina's bail and, on 9 May 2003, issued an order3 commanding the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and the Philippine National Police to
release Medina. Barbero alleged that Judge Dumlao's approval of Medina's bail and
his order to release Medina were unlawful.

On 15 July 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an affidavit-
complaint4 from Barbero charging Judge Dumlao with gross ignorance of the law. In
its 1st Indorsement5 dated 7 August 2003, the OCA directed Judge Dumlao to
comment on the affidavit-complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the 1st Indorsement. In
its 1st Tracer6 dated 11 November 2003, the OCA directed Judge Dumlao to
comment on the affidavit-complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the 1st Tracer. In its
2nd Tracer7 dated 10 March 2004, the OCA directed Judge Dumlao to comment on
the affidavit-complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the 2nd Tracer. In a Resolution8 dated
6 April 2005, the Court directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-
complaint and to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for
ignoring the OCA's directives. Judge Dumlao ignored the 6 April 2005 Resolution.

In a Resolution9 dated 17 August 2005, the Court reiterated its 6 April 2005

Resolution. Judge Dumlao ignored the 17 August 2005 Resolution. In a Resolution
dated 6 February 2006, the Court fined Judge Dumlao P500 for ignoring its
directives and directed Judge Dumlao to comply with the 17 August 2005
Resolution. Judge Dumlao ignored the 6 February 2006 Resolution. In Resolutions
dated 18 September 2006 and 19 February 2007, the Court considered Judge
Dumlao to have waived his right to comment on the affidavit-complaint and
resolved to proceed with the administrative case based on the pleadings already
filed.

The Court finds Judge Dumlao liable for gross ignorance of the law and for violation
of Court directives.

Section 17(a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. - (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court
where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof,
with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending,
bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge
thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge therein.

In Cruz v. Judge Yaneza,10 the Court held that:

There are prerequisites to be complied with. First, the application for bail must be
filed in the court where the case is pending. In the absence or unavailability of
the judge thereof, the application for bail must be filed with another branch of
the same court within the province or city. Second, if the accused is arrested
in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be
filed with any regional trial court of the place. (Emphasis ours)

The criminal case Barbero filed against Medina was pending before
the RTC of Santiago City. Judge Anghad of the RTC issued the warrant of arrest,
and Medina was arrested by virtue of that warrant.

Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that no person under detention
by legal process shall be released except when he is admitted to bail. Section 19
provides that the accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the
judge with whom it was filed in accordance with Section 17. Section 17 provides
that the bail may be filed with the court where the case is pending, unless (1) the
judge in that court is absent or unavailable, or (2) the accused is arrested in a
province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending. If the judge is
absent or unavailable, the bail should be filed with another branch of the same
court. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than
where the case is pending, the bail should be filed with any RTC of the place.

In the present case, there was no showing that Judge Anghad was absent or
unavailable or that Medina was arrested outside Santiago City. Thus, Medina's bail
should have been filed with Judge Anghad. Even if Judge Anghad were absent or
unavailable or even if Medina were arrested in San Mateo, Judge Dumlao would still
be liable because the bail should have been filed with another branch of the RTC in
Santiago City or with the RTC of San Mateo, respectively.11
Since the criminal case was pending before the RTC of Santiago City and there was
no showing that Judge Anghad of the RTC was absent or unavailable, Judge Dumlao
lacked authority to approve the bail and order Medina's release.

Barbero alleged that Judge Dumlao's acts of approving Medina's bail and ordering
Medina's release were not in accordance with law:

[N]apag-alaman ko x x x na [si Medina] ay basta na lang pinakawalan ni x x x

Judge Cesar M. Dumlao ng Municipal Trial Court ng San Mateo, Isabela x x x;

[A]ng ginawa ni Judge Cesar M. Dumlao ay hindi naaayon sa batas sapagkat wala

siyang kapangyarihang pakawalan x x x [si Medina];

[N]apag-alaman ko rin na ang pagrerelease na ginawa ni Judge Dumlao ay base

sa [bail] na ipinakita sa kanya;

[S]a akin pong pagkakaalam, lahat po ng [bail] sa criminal cases ay dapat

aksyunan at aprubahan ng hukom o judge na siyang may hawak ng asunto;

xxx

[K]ung maaari po sana, dahil sa kawalang respeto [ni Judge] Cesar M. Dumlao sa

ating batas x x x, ipinakikiusap [ko] na sana ay imbestigahan ang nasabing
pagmamalabis at kawalan ng respeto[.]

The Court directed Judge Dumlao several times to comment on Barbero's

allegations. Judge Dumlao opted to ignore all of the Court's directives. By his
silence, Judge Dumlao admitted the truth of the allegations. In Palon, Jr. v.
Vallarta,12 the Court held that silence is admission of the truth of the charges:

Respondent judge failed to comment on the complaint or file any responsive

pleading or manifestation despite receipt of notice to do so. x x x The natural
instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend
himself. It is against human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the
face of false accusations. Hence, silence x x x is an admission of the truth of
the charges. Respondent judge is deemed to have admitted the charges
against him. (Emphasis ours)

This is the second time Judge Dumlao unlawfully approved the bail and ordered the
release of Medina. The instant case has exactly the same set of facts as Lim v.
Dumlao.13 In that case (1) complainant filed two criminal cases for carnapping and
theft against Medina; (2) the criminal cases were filed with the RTC, Judicial Region
II, Branch 35, Santiago City, Isabela; (3) Judge Fe Albano Madrid of the RTC issued
a warrant of arrest against Medina; (4) Medina was arrested by virtue of the
warrant of arrest; (5) Judge Dumlao approved the bail of Medina; and (6) Judge
Dumlao ordered the release of Medina.

In Lim,14 the Court held that:

It is not disputed that the criminal cases filed by complainant against Herman
Medina were pending before the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela,
Branch 35. In fact, the warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Fe Albano Madrid,
presiding judge of the said court. The order of release therefore, on account of the
posting of the bail, should have been issued by that court, or in the absence or
unavailability of Judge Madrid, by another branch of an RTC in Santiago City. In this
case, however, there is no proof that Judge Madrid was absent or unavailable at the
time of the posting of the bail bond. In fact, complainant Lim avers that on the day
[Judge Dumlao] ordered the release of Medina, Judge Madrid and all the judges of
the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela were at their respective posts.

It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has no authority to grant

bail to an accused arrested outside of his territorial jurisdiction. The
requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 x x x must be complied with before a
judge may grant bail. The Court recognizes that not every judicial error
bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does
not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the
parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where x x x the law is
straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one
does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

[Judge Dumlao] undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the

order of release. He is expected to know that certain requirements ought
to be complied with before he can approve Medina's bail and issue an order
for his release. The law involved is rudimentary that it leaves little room
for error. (Emphasis ours)

The acts of approving bail and ordering the release of accused whose cases are
pending before other courts constitute gross ignorance of the law.15 Gross ignorance
of the law is a serious offense16 punishable by (1) dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations; (2) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3)
a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.17 Aside from Lim, the Court
also found Judge Dumlao grossly ignorant of the law in Pascual v. Judge
Dumlao.18 In that case, Judge Dumlao (1) hastily ordered the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) without notice and hearing; (2) ordered the
issuance of the TRO even though there was no showing of any grave or irreparable
injury; (3) hastily granted a motion to deposit harvest without notice and hearing;
and (4) failed to order the sheriff to render an accounting of the harvest.

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides
that competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Judge
Dumlao lacks this prerequisite.

Judge Dumlao disrespected the Court by repeatedly refusing to comment on the

affidavit-complaint. In its 1st Indorsement dated 7 August 2003, 1st Tracer dated 11
November 2003, and 2nd Tracer dated 10 March 2004, the OCA directed Judge
Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-complaint. In its Resolutions dated 6 April
2005, 17 August 2005, and 6 February 2006, the Court fined Judge Dumlao P500,
directed him to comment on the affidavit-complaint, and directed him to show
cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for refusing to comment.
Judge Dumlao unjustifiably ignored all six directives.

Court resolutions directing judges to comment on administrative complaints are not

mere requests. Judges are duty-bound to obey them fully and promptly.19 In
refusing to comment on the affidavit-complaint for almost five years and despite
several directives from the Court, Judge Dumlao blatantly demonstrated gross
misconduct, outright disrespect, indifference, and a recalcitrant streak in his
character.20

This is the third time Judge Dumlao disrespected the Court. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Dumlao,21 the Court found him liable for ignoring its directives. In
that case, the Court held that:

It appears that Judge Dumlao ignored and continued to ignore this Court's
directive requiring him to file his comment on complainant Sinaon, Jr.'s
administrative complaint. He had been afforded more than ample time within which
to file the required pleading. x x x [S]everal Resolutions had been issued by the
OCA and this Court requiring Judge Dumlao to comment on the complaint against
him. The first Resolution was issued as early as 2 August 2002 and the last was
issued almost three years later, or 5 July 2005, by which time, the Court already
deemed waived Judge Dumlao's right to file his comment and considered the case
submitted for decision based on the pleadings filed. Subsequently, Judge Dumlao
again failed to comply with the order of this Court to file his manifestation in the re-
docketed administrative complaint (concerning his non-filing of the comment)
despite due notice.

Judge Dumlao had been given more than ample time to abide with the
orders of this Court, yet he persistently failed to do so. Judge Dumlao
neither offered any reason nor raised any defense for his failure to comply
with the mandates of this Court. Nothing was heard from Judge Dumlao as
to what had prevented him from complying with the Court's directives.
Such insolence should not go unpunished. (Emphasis ours)

In Lim,22 the Court also found Judge Dumlao liable for ignoring its directives. In that
case, the Court held that, "We agree with the OCA that [Judge Dumlao] must be
held administratively liable for his unjustified failure to comment on an
administrative complaint. This constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination."

Violation of Supreme Court directives is a less serious offense23 punishable by (1)

suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor
more than three months, or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.24
Aside from Lim, Pascual, and Office of the Court Administrator, Judge Dumlao has
another administrative case decided against him. In Morales, Sr. v. Judge
Dumlao,25 the Court found him liable for violating SC Administrative Circular No. 1-
90. In that case, the Court held that:

[Judge Dumlao's] claim that he did not know how he inadvertently signed the
notarized revocation of power of attorney in this case betrays a deficiency of that
degree of circumspection demanded of all those who don the judicial robe. It is, in
fact, an open admission of his negligence and lack of care in attending to the
incidents brought before him for adjudication. This kind of judicial carelessness runs
contrary to Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that:

A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.
[(Emphasis ours)]

While we do not expect judges to have an encyclopedic recollection of applicable

laws, jurisprudence or administrative circulars we issue periodically in the discharge
of their responsibilities, they nevertheless have the bounden duty to keep abreast
with the law and the changes therein as well as the decisions of this Court. As a
trial judge, [Judge Dumlao] is the visible representation of law and justice. Under
Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct he is expected to be "the embodiment
of competence, integrity and independence" to maintain public confidence in the
legal system.

Inefficient judges are equally impermissible in the judiciary as the incompetent and
dishonest ones. Any of them tarnishes the image of the judiciary and brings it to
public contempt, dishonor or disrespect and must then be administratively dealt
with and punished accordingly.

Judge Dumlao has amply demonstrated his incorrigibility and unfitness to be a

judge. He is undeterred by the several penalties and stern warnings the Court has
given him. The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty for it cannot
tolerate any conduct that diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system.26

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Cesar M. Dumlao, Municipal Trial Court, San
Mateo, Isabela, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and VIOLATION
OF SUPREME COURT DIRECTIVES. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES him from
the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.