“ A critical appraisal of Rajasthan State Electricity Board v.

Mohan Lal”

A PROJECT PROPOSAL SUBMITTED IN THE PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE

COURSE TITLED- “CONSTIUTIONAL LAW-I” FOR ATTAINING THE DEGREE OF B.A.,
LL.B.
(Hons.).

SUBMITTED TO:

Dr. Anirudh Prasad

FACULTY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

SUBMITTED BY:

Anurag Chauhan

ROLL NO. 1918

5th SEMESTER

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NYAYA NAGAR, MITHAPUR,

PATNA-800001
NOVEMBER, 2020
 DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the project entitled “A critical appraisal of Rajasthan State Electricity Board
v. Mohan Lal” submitted by me at CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY is a record
of bonafide project work carried out by me under the guidance of our mentor Prof. (Dr.)
ANIRUDH PRASAD. I further declare that the work reported in this project has not been
submitted and will not be submitted, either in part or in full, for the award of any other degree or
diploma in this university or in any other university.

ANURAG CHAUHAN

ROLL NO- 1918

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is a fact that any research work prepared, compiled, or formulated in isolation is inexplicable
to an extent. This research work, although prepared by me, is a culmination of the efforts of a lot
of people who remained in the veil, who gave their intense support and helped me in the
completion of this project.

Firstly, I am very grateful to my faculty Prof. (Dr.) Anirudh Prasad, without the kind support and
help of whom the completion of this project was a herculean task for me. He donated his
valuable time from his busy schedule to help me to complete this project. I would like to thank
him for his valuable suggestions towards the making of this project.

I am highly indebted to my parents and friends for their kind co-operation and encouragement
which helped me in the completion of this project. I am also thankful to the library staff of my
college which assisted me in acquiring the sources necessary for the compilation of my project.

Last but not the least, I would like to thank the Almighty who kept me mentally strong and in
good health to concentrate on my project and to complete it in time.

I thank all of them!

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................5

2. FACTS OF THE CASE....................................................................6

3. ISSUES RAISED...............................................................................8

4. JUDGEMENT...................................................................................8

5. PRESENT SCENARIO..................................................................14

6. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS........................................17

 1. INTRODUCTION
This case involved a promotion dispute between some workmen and the Rajasthan State
Electricity Board. Articles 14 and 16 claims were raised, and consequently, the preliminary
question that fell to be determined by the Court was whether the Board came within the purview
of Part III, by virtue of being “State” (other authority) under Article 12.

In 1958, the services of respondents I and 4 to 14, who were Permanent employees of the State
Government holding posts of foremen were provisionally placed at the disposal of the State
Electricity Board (appellant), constituted under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The
Electricity Board was directed to frame its own grades and service conditions, but this was never
done. In 1960, the first respondent was taken on deputation from the Board and posted to the
P.W.D. of the State Government retaining his lien in the Electricity Board. The first respondent
remained with the P.W.D. for about three years, and during that time the Electricity Board
promoted respondents 4 to 14 as Assistant Engineers under the Electricity Board. In 1963, the
State Government directed the reversion of the first respondent to his parent department, namely
the Electricity Board; and the later posted him as one of its foremen. The big request that he was
also entitled to be considered for promotion as Assistant Engineer was rejected, he moved the
High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution on the ground that there was a violation
of Arts. 14 and 16; and the High Court allowed the petition.

In appeal to this Court, the appellant-Board contended that:

1. The first respondent never became its permanent Servant and so could not claim to be
considered along with respondents 4 to 14 ; and
2. The appellant-Board could not be held to be "State" as defined in Art. 12 and
consequently no direction could be issued to it under Art.226 and 227.
Therefore, this project will make an analysis on the role of judiciary in the interpretation of

Scope of Study

The scope of this paper is to make a critical appraisal of the case Rajasthan State Electricity
Board v. Mohan Lal.

Objectives
 The main objective of this paper is to understand the interpretation of “Other authorities”
under the definition of State in Article 12.

Research Questions

1. What is Other authorities defined under Article 12?

2. Can appellant-Board be held as "State" as defined in Art. 12?
3. What is ejusdem generis rule?

Hypothesis

The judiciary has played a major role in the development of Article 12 of the Constitution

Research Methodology

 Doctrinal research is adopted.

Limitations

The proposed research is confined to a limit of one month and this research contains doctrinal
works, which are limited to online sources and empirical research.

2. FACTS OF THE CASE

Rajasthan Electricity Board was a body constituted under Electricity (supply) Act 1948 (No. 54
of 1948) on July 1st 1957. Before the Board got constituted the State got electricity directly by
Electrical and Mechanical Department of State. In this case, Respondent 1 (Mohan Lal) and
Respondents 4 to 14 were holding post of foreman and they were the permanent members of the
Department.

As per the constitution of the Rajasthan Electrical Board, the services of most of the employees
were provisionally placed at the disposal of the Board. The Government did this by releasing a
notification on 12th February by which it claimed to exercise its powers under section 78A of
Act 54 of 1948. In this notification there was a direction as per which the Board had to frame its
own new grades and service conditions under its regulations. The employees whose services
were transferred to the Board had these options :-

(i) To accept new grades and service conditions or

(ii) To continue in the existing grades and service conditions or
 (iii) To obtain relief from government service. That is, to claim gratuity or pension as
admissible according to Rajasthan Service Rules.

Till the time the present litigation arose, the Board did not frame any new grades and service
conditions.

After working for two years, Mohan Lal (Respondent 1) was deputed to the Public Works
Department of the Government by the State Government by its order dated January 27th, 1960.
An order was made by the State Government on 10th August 1960. The order was addressed to
the Secretary of the Board and it indicated that Mohan Law and Respondants 4 to 14 were
deputed to the Board.

When Mohan Law was working at PWD, his juniors Respondents 4 to 14 were promoted as
Assistant Engineers by the Board. A request was made by Mohan Lal to the State Govt and
Board to be entitled for the promotion as the Respondent 4 to 14 who were promoted were junior
to Mohan Lal (Respondent 1). The request was turned down. After this, Mohan Lal filed a
petition in the High Court of Rajasthan under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. He
claimed that he was entitled to equality of treatment with respect to the Respondents 4 to 14 and
that the Board by not considering him for the promotion had acted in violation of Article 14 and
Article 16 of the Constitution.

The Board contended before the High Court that Mohan Lal is not a permanent member of the
Board, so no substantive post is held by him and thus, he is not entitled to promotion.

The Board also contended that it could not be held as “State” under Section 12 of the
Constitution. Hence, no direction can be issued to the Board by the High Court under Article 226
for the violation of Fundamental Rights.

The High Court rejected both the grounds raised by Board and it accepted the pleas of Mohan
Lal (Respondent 1). The High Court quashed the order of promotions and it had issued Order to
the Board to consider fresh promotions taking into account the claim of Respondent 1.

Rajasthan Electricity Board has approached to the Supreme Court through special leave petition
against this order of the High Court.
 3. ISSUES RAISED

The principal contentions which were raised on behalf of the Electricity Board :

(a) The Respondent (Mohan Lal) ceased to be an employee of the Board the moment when he
was deputed to the Public Works Department as an Assistant Engineer and, thus, he had no right
for promotion to any of the vacant posts which were under the control of the Board.

(b) Even if the first contention is answered against the appellant Board, the petitioner's case
cannot attract the operation of Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution because that authority
does not fall within the ambit of the expression 'State' as used in those articles. Hence, the
petitioner would not be entitled to any relief from this Court in the exercise of its writ
jurisdiction.

4. JUDGEMENT

1st Issue or contention:-

On the first contention, the counsel from the appellant side drew attention of the court to a
notification dated 12 February 1958 as per which it was specifically mentioned that the services
of Mohan Lal and Respondents 4 to 14 were ‘provisionally’ at the disposal of the Board. The
appellant side contended that Counsel for Board contended that Mohan Lal was placed
provisionally and that he never became permanent servant of the Board as he was made
permanent with PWD. In the petition, Mohan Lal contended that he had no lien with the Govt. on
abolition of Govt Dept and his services were permanently transferred to the Board. Thus,
Respondent 1 contended that similar to other respondent 4 to 14 the same conditions are
applicable in his case.

The Supreme Court held that there was no proof to show that the provisional transfers were made
permanent. The court further found out that all the services which were placed at the disposal of
the PWD including Respondent 1, worked in identical way. Hence, the High Court did not
commit any error in holding that Mohan Lal was in the service of the Board in the same way as
the Respondents 4 to 14. Since, no new grades or new service conditions were framed by the
Board, it is clear that Mohan Lal and Respondent 4 to 14 continued to be governed by the old
service and grade conditions applicable to them when they were servants of the state of State
Government in
the Electrical and Mechanical Department where they were all serving as Foremen. Since all of
them (Respondent 1 and Respondents 4 to 14) are governed by the identical rules, it is clear that
Mohan Lal was entitled for promotion on the basis of equality with the Respondents 4 to 14.

2nd Issue or Contention:-

The Counsel for Board contended that it is prima facie that Board cannot be held to be covered
by these authorities - the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the
Legislature of each of the States and local authorities. The expression “other authorities” if read
ejusdem generis with those named cannot cover the Board because the Board is a corporate body
which has a separate existence and it has been constituted mainly for the purpose of carrying on
commercial activities.

The counsel for the Board relied on the decision in a case of Madras High Court - The University
of Madras v. Shantha Bai and Another1. In this case a question was raised before the Madras
High Court whether a University can be held to be other authority or local authority as defined
under Article 12. The court held that as per the Ejusdem Generis principle by ‘local or other
authority’ it meant the authorities which exercise governmental functions. These authorities
cannot include persons who cannot be regarded as instrumentalities of the Government. The
University does not execute any Government functions. The function of the university is mainly
to promote education. Therefore, it cannot be a ‘State’. There is a difference between ‘State-
aided’ and ‘State- maintained’ institutions. The university is state-aided and not maintained,
therefore it cannot be brought under the definition on that ground either.

The counsel for the Board also relied upon the case of B. W. Devadas v. The Selection
Committee for Admission of Students to the Karnataka Engineering College, and Others2.

In this case the High Court of Mysore held that “the term 'authority' in the ordinary dictionary
sense may comprise not merely a person or a group of persons exercising governmental power,
but also any person or group of persons who, by virtue of their position in relation to other
person or persons, may be able to impose their will upon that other person or persons. But
there is an

1
AIR 1954 Mad 67
2
A.I.R. 1964 Mys 6,
essential difference between a political association of persons called 'the State' giving rise to
political power connoted by the well-known expression 'imperative law' and a non-political
association of persons for other purposes by contract, consent or similar type of mutual
understanding related to the common object of persons so associating themselves together giving
rise to a power which operates not in the manner in which imperative law operates, but by virtue
of its acceptance by such associating persons based upon contract, consent or mutual
understanding.” The Court further held that "The term 'authorities' occurring in Art. 12 could
only mean a person or a group of persons who exercise the legislative or executive functions of a
State or through whom or through the instrumentality of whom the State exercises its legislative
or executive power. "

On the basis of these decisions, and the principles laid down therein, it was urged that an
examination of the provisions of the Electricity Supply Act will show that the Board is an
autonomous body which cannot be held to be functioning as an agent of the Executive
Government and, consequently, it should be held that it is not "State" within the meaning of Art.
12 of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court said that the High Courts fell into an error in applying the principle of
ejusdem generis when interpreting the expression "other authorities " in Art. 12 of the
Constitution, as they overlooked the basic principle of interpretation that, to invoke the
application of ejusdem generis rule, there must be a distinct genus or category running through
the bodies already named..

The court further relied upon the sayings of Craies on Statute Law. Craies on Statute Law
summarises the principle as follows:- "The ejusdem generis rule is one to be applied with caution
and not pushed too far... To invoke the application of the ejusdem generis rule there must be a
distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not to different objects of a widely
differing character but to something which can be called a class or kind of objects. Where this is
lacking, the rule cannot apply, but the mention of a single species does not constitute a genus."

The court quoted Maxwell. Maxwell in his book on 'Interpretation of Statutes' explained the
principle by saying: "But the general word which follows particular and specific words of the
same nature as itself takes its meaning from them, and is presumed to be restricted to the same
genus as
those words.... Unless there is a genus or category, there is no room for the application of the
ejusdem generis doctrine "

The Supreme Court relied upon the case of United Towns Electric Co., Ltd, v. Attorney-General
for Newfoundland3. In this case the Privy Council held that (in their opinion) there is no room for
the application of the principle of ejusdem generis in the absence of any mention of a genus,
since the mention of a single species. For example, water rats - does not constitute a genus.

The Supreme Court said that in Art, 12 of the Constitution, the bodies specifically named are the
Executive Governments of the Union and the States, the Legislature of the Union and the States,
and local authorities. The court was unable to find any common genus running through these
named bodies, nor can these bodies be placed in case single on any rational basis. The doctrine
of ejusdem generis could not therefore, be applied to the interpretation of the expression "other
authorities" in this article.

The court relied upon meaning of the word "authority" mentioned in Webster's Third New
International Dictionary as per which “authority” is "a public administrative agency or
corporation having quasi-governmental powers and authorised to administer a revenue-
producing public enterprise. " The court found out that the dictionary meaning of the word
"authority" is clearly wide enough to include all bodies created by a statute on which powers are
conferred to carry out governmental or quasi-governmental functions. The Supreme Court held
that the expression "other authorities" is wide enough to include in it every authority which is
created by a statute and is functioning within the territory of India, or under the control of the
Government of India. The Supreme Court did not find any reason to narrow down this meaning
in the context in which the words "other authorities" are used in Art. 12 of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court relied upon the case of Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh 4 for
understanding the interpretation of “other authorities” mentioned in Article 12. In this case
Justice Ayyangar has held that 'other authorities’ mentioned in Article 12 includes the authorities
within the territory of India which cannot obviously be read as ejusdem generis with either the
Government and the Legislatures or local authorities. He said that the words are of wide
amplitude

3
(1939) 1 All E.R. 423
4
[1963] 1 SCR 778
and they are capable of comprehending each and every authority which is created under a statute
and which functions within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.
He further pointed out that there is no characterisation of the nature of the 'authority' in this
residuary clause and it must include every type of authority which is set up under a statute for the
purpose of administering laws which are enacted by the State or the Parliament including those
vested with the duty to make decisions in order to implement those laws.

The Supreme Court also cited the case of K. S. Ramamurthi Reddiar v. The Chief
Commissioner, Pondicherry and Another5. In this case the Supreme Court while dealing with
Art. 12 has held that all other authorities or local authorities within the territory of India include
all authorities within the territory of India whether they are under the control of the Government
of India or under the control of the Governments of various States and even those autonomous
authorities which may not be under the control of the Government at all.

Justice Bhargava in the present case (Rajasthan Electricity Board case) said that the provisions
are present in the Electricity Supply Act which clearly reflect that the powers conferred on the
Board include power to give directions and the disobedience of such directions is punishable as a
criminal offence. Thus, he held that the Board was clearly an authority to which the provisions of
Part III of the Constitution were applicable.

Justice Shah in the present case said that the Board is an authority invested by statute with
certain sovereign powers of the State. He said that the Board had the power to promote
coordinated development, generation, supply and distribution of electricity and for that purpose it
had power to alter, amend and carry out schemes under Ch. V of the Electricity (Supply) Act,
1948, to engage in certain incidental undertakings; to organise and carry out power and hydraulic
surveys; to conduct investigation for the improvement of the methods of transmission; to close
down generating stations; to compulsorily purchase generating stations, undertakings, mains and
transmission lines; to place wires, poles, brackets, appliances, apparatus, etc; to fix grid tariff; to
issue directions for securing the maximum economy and efficiency in the operation of electricity
undertakings; to make rules and regulations for carrying out the purposes of the Act; and to issue
directions under certain provisions of the Act and to enforce compliance with those directions.
He

5
[1964] 1 SCR 656
further said that the Statute also gave extensive powers to the Board to control over electricity
undertakings. He pointed out that the power to make rules and regulations and to administer the
Act is in substance the sovereign power of the State delegated to the Board. Thus, he held that
the Board is "other authority" within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution.

The expression "State" is defined in Art. 12 for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution. Article
13 prohibits the State from making any legislative or executive direction which takes away or
abridges the rights conferred by Part III and declares any law or executive direction in
contravention of the injunction void to the extent of such contravention. In determining what the
expression "other authority" in Art. 12 connotes, regard must be had not only to the sweep of
fundamental rights over the power of the authority, but also to the restrictions which may be
imposed upon the exercise of certain fundamental rights (e.g., those declared by Art. 19) by the
authority. Fundamental rights within their allotted fields transcend the legislative and executive
power of the sovereign authority. But some of the important fundamental rights are liable to be
circumscribed by the imposition of reasonable restrictions by the State. The true content of the
expression "other authority" in Art. 12 must be determined in the light of this dual phase of
fundamental rights. In considering whether a statutory or constitutional body is an authority
within the meaning of Art. 12, it would be necessary to bear in mind not only whether against the
authority, fundamental rights in terms absolute are intended to be enforced, but also whether it
was intended by the Constitution-makers that the authority was invested with the sovereign
power to impose restrictions on very important and basic fundamental freedoms.

Thus, the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court.

 5. PRESENT SCENARIO

The decision in the present case overruled the earlier decisions which excluded the universities
from the definition of “State” under the ambit of Article 12.6 Thus, from this decision onwards
the universities have been held to be state.7

Later in the case of Sukihdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi 8 (Sukhdev Singh),
the question arose before the court that whether statutory corporations like ONGC, LIC and IFC
which are created respectively by Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act 1959, the Life Insurance
Act, 1956 and the Industrial Finance Act, 1948 come under the ambit of the definition of “the
State” as mentioned in Article 12. The court held that all the three corporations were “State” as
defined under Article 12. This judgement was given by a majority of 4 to 1. The majority led by
CJ Ray gave this judgement by following the judgement of the Rajasthan Electricity Board case.
CJ Ray held that all the statutory bodies are state, combination of state fund and furnishing
important public services will make them state. Since, ONGC was established under ONGC Act,
it is a state.

Justice KK Mathew in his concurring judgement pointed out that public corporations are
springing from the new social and economic functions of government. He pointed out that
instead of characterizing public corporations in old legal system, it should be adapted to the
changing needs. He said that the State being an abstract entity has to act through an agency or
instrumentality or a juristic person. He referred to Article 298 and pointed out that the
government has to do business through agencies. He pointed out that the criteria to determine
whether such agency is a state or not should not only be the binding orders nor it should be
solely on the baiss of the extent of financial support by the state. The combination of state aid
and furnishing an important public service may result in conclusion that the appointment agency
should be classified as state agency.

Justice Allagiriswamy gave his dissenting opinion. He pointed out that no distinction can be
drawn between the order made by ordinary company and statutory corporation because no
sovereign

6
University of Madras v Shantha Bai, AIR 1954 Mad 67; Krishan Gopal Ram Chand Sharma v. Punjab University, AIR
1966 Punj 34.
7
Umesh Chandra Sinha v V.N. Singh, AIR 1968 Pat 3.
8
(1975) 1 SCC 421; AIR 1975 SC 1331.
function is performed by either of them. He apprehended that if “other authorities” is given a
liberal interpretation then corporation employees will get more benefit than public servant and
courts will be flooded by petition relating to petty matters like seniority, pay scale, punishments.

Justice Mathew’s approach in the Sukhdev Singh case found favour in the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court applied the principle of instrumentality/agency in the case of Ramana Dayaram
Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India9(R.D. Shetty Case). In R.D. Shetty case, Justice
Bhagwati pointed out that the corporations acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the
government would be subject to the same limitations in the field of constitutional or
administrative law as the government itself. Ultimately, he laid down certain principles to
determine the character of corporation as a State. The principles of the R.D. Shetty Case were
accepted and more exhaustive principles were laid down in the case of Ajay Hasia v. Khalid
Mujib Sehravardi10, they are:-

1. If the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way
toward indicating assistance of the state is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the
corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government.

2. Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of
the corporation, it would afford some indication of corporation being impregnated with
governmental character.

3. Whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected.

4. Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is
a State agency or instrumentality.

5. If the functions of the corporation of public importance and closely related to governmental
functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying as an instrumentality or agency of
Government.

9
(1979)3 SCC 489; AIR 1979 SC 1628.
10
(1981) 1 SCC 722; AIR 1981 SC 487
6. If a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor
supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of
Government.

R.D. Shetty’s principles were further applied in the case of Som Prakash Reddv. Union of India 11
in which Bharat Petroleum Corporation was treated as state’s agency. Later it was transferred to
Central Government which took over it under Burmah Shell Act, 1976. It became statutory
corporation.

The next very important case is the case of “Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of
Chemical Biology12” it essentially overruled the Ajay Hasia case. The court ruled that there is no
hard and fast rule that registered societies having link with the government are always state.

“Zee Telefilms Ltd. V. Union of India 13”also followed the Pradeep Kumar Biswas decision and
ruled that the BCCI is not a state. The case was decided by a majority of 3 to 2. In this case, the
question was whether the Board of Control for Cricket in India was “State” within the meaning
of Article 12. The Board argued that its autonomous nature took it out of the ambit of Article 12,
per Pradeep Kumar Biswas. Zee Telefilms, on the other hand, pointed to the “governmental
functions exercised by the Board in the area of cricket.” The Court held in favour of the Board.
Following Pradeep Kumar Biswas, it noted that the Board was not created by statute, the
Government held no share capital, provided no financial assistance, conferred no monopoly,
exercised no pervasive control, and had not transferred a government-owned corporation.
Consequently, Article 12 was not applicable. Responding to the petitioners’ contentions, the
Court then stated: “Even assuming that there is some element of public duty involved in the
discharge of the Board’s functions even then as per the judgment of this Court in Pradeep Kumar
Biswas that by itself would not suffice for bringing the Board within the net of “other
authorities” for the purpose of Article 12″.14

The petitioners also argued a variant of the functional test – i.e., the power of the Board, by
virtue of its near-exclusive control over cricket in India, to impact an important fundamental
right on a national scale: the Article 19(1)(g) right to carry on a trade, business or profession –
brought it within the ambit of Article 12. Rejecting this contention, the Court held that “the pre-
requisite for

11
(1981) SCC 499, 471: AIR 1981 SC 212, 225.
12
(2002) 5 SCC 111
13
(2005)4 SCC 649
14
Paragraph 25.
invoking the enforcement of a fundamental right under Article 32 is that the violator of that right
should be a State first… [but] we have already held that the petitioner has failed to establish
that the Board is State within the meaning of Article 12. Therefore, assuming there is violation of
any fundamental right by the Board that will not make the Board a “State” for the purpose of
Article 12.”15

The Supreme Court conceded that the relief against the BCCI could be available in High Courts
under Article 226 but not in the Supreme Court under Article 32. Workload with the court was
one of the reasons for such a decision, but clearly Article 32 is available against the violation of
any fundamental right including the ones which are guaranteed against the non-state bodies or
private individuals. Minority in this case emphasized upon the functions test and even pleased
for the rejection of agency or instrumentality test. On the facts of the case majority can be
justified in its conclusion, but in line with the widening application of fundamental rights and the
need to protect human dignity from all invasions, functions and other suitable tests must be
evolved and applied.16 Even though exclusion of BCCI from the definition of “the State” has not
yet been disturbed by the court,17 following the functional test laid down in earlier cases starting
with Sukhdev Singh case the court without overruling Zee Telefilm case has emphasized on the
nature of duties and functions on which the minority relied in Zee Telefilm.18 Thus, any day in
future a larger Bench of the Court may overrule Zee Telefilm and bring BCCI within the
definition of “the State”.

6. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

“State” is defined in Article 12 which comes under Part III of the Constitution of India. Hence,
fundamental rights are enforceable against those bodies which are covered under the definition of
Article 12. In the present time, state cannot perform all the functions so its various functions are
performed through outsourcing by corporate agencies or bodies.

In the case of The University of Madras vs. Shanta Bai19, the High Court did not allow the
petition against university because the court applied the rule of “ejusdem generis” (of the same
kind). The

15
Paragraph 28.

17
A.C. Muthiah v. Board of Control for Cricket in India, (2011) 6 SCC 617.
18
BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar, (2015) 3 SCC 267, 281.
19
AIR 1954 Mad 67, (1953) IIMLJ 287
High Court pointed out that university is not of the same kind of institution which are
enumerated in Article 12. This view was reaffirmed in B.W. Devdas v. Karnataka Regional
Engineering College20 and again it was reiterated by the Punjab High Court in Krishna Gopal
Ramchandra Sharma v. Punjab University21.

In Rajasthan Electricity Board vs. Mohan Lal 22, the Supreme Court held that the term “other
authorities” under Article 12 should include all authorities created by the Constitution and other
statutes which are empowered by law. The statutory authority does not need to be engaged in
performing governmental or sovereign functions, the court also observed that the Rajasthan
Electricity Board, in the instant case had the power to give directions, the disobedience of which
was punishable as an offence. This case overruled the judgment given in the University of
Madras vs. Shanta Bai23 which excluded ‘Universities’ from the definition of state.

Later in the case of Sukihdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi (Sukhdev Singh) 24,
the question arose before the court that whether statutory corporations like ONGC, LIC and IFC
come under the ambit of the definition of “the State” as mentioned in Article 12. The court held
that all the three corporations were “State” as defined under Article 12. This judgement was
given by a majority of 4 to 1. The majority led by CJ Ray gave this judgement by following the
judgement of the Rajasthan Electricity Board case

After this the court in R.D. Shetty Case25 the court has laid down the test of instrumentality and a
more exhaustive test was laid down by the court in Ajay Hasia case26.

The case of “Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology 27” overruled the
Ajay Hasia case. The court held that there is no hard and fast rule that registered societies having
link with the government are always state.

20
AIR 1964 Kant 6, AIR 1964 Mys 6, (1963) 1 MysLJ
21
AIR 1966 P H 34
22
1967 AIR 1857, 1967 SCR (3) 377
23
AIR 1954 Mad 67, (1953) IIMLJ 287
24
(1975) 1 SCC 421; AIR 1975 SC 1331.
25
1979)3 SCC 489; AIR 1979 SC 1628.
26
(1981) 1 SCC 722; AIR 1981 SC 487
27
(2002) 5 SCC 111
In SRM university case28 it was held that imparting education in higher studies to students at
large was a public function, and since it was a deemed university and governed by the University
Grants Commission Act, 1956 alike other universities then it is an authority as provided in
Article 12 of the Constitution. This seems to be a good approach that the Court should look into
the kind of function which is in question and if the function can have an influence over effective
exercise of fundamental right by an individual then should be brought within the ambit of Article
12. This approach will also ensure horizontal application of fundamental right i.e., if a private
body is performing a function which could hamper or influence individual’s exercise of
fundamental right it could be brought within the purview of Article 12.

“Zee Telefilms Ltd. V. Union of India 29” followed the Pradeep Kumar Biswas decision and ruled
that the BCCI is not a state. Even though exclusion of BCCI from the definition of “the State”
has not yet been disturbed by the court,30 following the functional test laid down in earlier cases
starting with Sukhdev Singh case the court without overruling Zee Telefilm case has emphasized
on the nature of duties and functions on which the minority relied in Zee Telefilm.31 Thus, any
day in future a larger Bench of the Court may overrule Zee Telefilm and bring BCCI within the
definition of “the State”.

Therefore, the judiciary has played a major role in the development of Article 12 of the
Constitution.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 BOOKS

 M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, lexis Nexis , 8th Edition.

 V.N.Shukla's book-M.P.Singh(edn.) VN Shukla's Constitutional Law of India.

28
Dr. Janet Jeyapaul v SRM University Civil Appeal No. 14553 of 2015.
29
(2005)4 SCC 649
30
A.C. Muthiah v. Board of Control for Cricket in India, (2011) 6 SCC 617.
31
BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar, (2015) 3 SCC 267, 281.