A merica n

PH I L O S O PH E R S

AT WO R K
T h e P h i l o s o p h ic S c e n e
in the

U n it e d S t at e s

Edited b y

S ID NEY HOOK

IR I T E RI O N B O O KS N EW Y O RK

w m sm
e 5 5 5 1 3 52 39 5;
3 mm ;
 Contents

In tro d ucti o n

ONE . Lo gic and Sc ientific Method

f
jus ti ying I nd u c t i I f
n e re nc e

MBROSE
ve

AL I CE A

De fi nitio n, Pres upp os itio n a nd As s e rtio n

MAX B LACK

M e aning a nd S y no ny my in Na tu ral L ang uag es

D F CARNAP
RU OL

The R e v is io n f Philos op hy
G O MA N
o

NELSON O D

S o me S ugg es tio ns Co ncerning M e tap hys ics of L ogic

C C
LAREN E I LE S . WI
M e c hanis tic E xp l anatio n an d Org anis m ic B io l ogy
ERNES T N AGEL
L og ic al T ruth
WILLARD v .
QU I NE
6 C O N EN S
T T

I s T he re S y nthetic A Prio ri?

WILF ID SELLARS
a

Pers uas iv e D e fi nitio ns

C H A LES R L . S T EVEN SO N
T WO . si
Metap hy cs and Theo ry o f Know l edge
T he Natu re f M i d
BRAND B LAN S HARD
o n

Go d as a Fu nc tio n in M o dern S ys te ms f Philos op hy

o

j A ME S O L N S CLI
The M etho d of Kno w le dge in Phil os o p hy
C .
J D U CAS SE
.

S o me E mp ty Tho ug h I mp o rtant T ruths : A Pre f ac e

to M e tap hys ics

C H LE S HAR
AR T S HORN E
Na turalis m and F irs t Princip les
S ID NEY HOO K
Me tap hys ic al Me tho d
ST P E H EN PEPPE C . R

T o Be and No t to B e
HE BE W S C H N EIDER
R RT .

T ime and E ternity

T he Ne w Ou tlo o k

T he My th of Pass ag e
 C O N EN
T TS

Co nflic t
WILLIAM DEN N E R .
S

Mill s ’ “
Pro o f ”
f Utility
E ERE W H ALL
o

V TT .

Of H u manis tic S o u rces f D e mo cra cy

ACE M KALLE N
o

HOR .

O b s cenity E s the tic Catego ry

AB A HAM KAPLAN
as an

T he S c ie nce f M a nd Uni fidS i

C HA L S
o an e c e nce

R E

The Co m mo n G o o d
A H E M URP HY
RT UR .

E thic al R el ativ is m in the L ig ht o f R e c e n t L eg al S c ie nce

F . s . C. NORT HROP

The R atio nale f Po l itic al D is c uss io n

M PE RY
o

C H AR NE R . R

The Ab s ol u te Tru th f He do nis m

H S H ELDO N
o

WIL MO N .

Phil o s op hy a nd D e mo c racy
T . V . S MI H
T

B iograp hical N o tes

Ind ex
 I ntroduction

In his classic study of Am e ri can democracy Alexi de Toc queville

“
, s
observed that in no country of the civilized world is less atten
”
U
tion pai d to philosophy than in the nited S tates D e T o cqu e
’
.

ville s reference was to the formal philosophy of the schools and

w
to technical doctrines in hich visions of life and j udgment s
o f value are expressed bu t so obscurely that their vital beari ng
,

is missed . H
e went on however to pay a remarkably pe rceptive
, ,

and generous tribute to the philosophical attitu des which he found

embodied in A merican habits of understanding and conduct A t a .

U
time when the population of th e nited S tates as ethn ically mu h
“
w c
more homo geneous than i t is today de Tocqueville found com
,
”
mon to the whole people the following rules of philosophical
me thod :
To evade th e bondage of system and habit of family maxims ,
-
,

class opinions and in some de gree of national p reju dice s z to

-
, , ,
.

accept tradition only as a means of information and ex 1 s t1 ng ,

facts only as a less on used in doing otherw ise and doing better ;
s
,
’

to seek the reason of things for one self and one s self alone
’

to tend to results Wi tho u t being bo u nd to means and to arm ,

at the substan ce through the form—such are the princ pal char i
acteristics o f what I shall call th e philosop hi cal me thod of the
Am ericans But if I go further and if I se ek among thes e char
w
.
,

ac te ris ti cs that hich predo mi nates over and includes almost

all the rest I discover that in most of the operations of the m I nd
,

each American appeals to the individual exercise of his o wn .

understanding alone America is therefore o n e of the co u n trres l n

w
.

the world here philosophy is least studied and where the ,

precepts of D escartes are best applied .

9
10 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
O ne is tempted to observe that a people whose mode of thought
is so gifted so independent so sensiti v e to di fferences in person
, , ,

place and thing hardly needs a formal school philosophy to gi ve

,

direction to i ts thinking It is an interesting q u estion to specu late

.

upon whether if de T o cqueville ere to re isi t A merica tod ay he w v

would find his j u dgments abou t pop u lar j u dgment confirmed As in .

w
all other things he o u ld probably find less individu alism both in
,

thought and action And he o u ld disco er that it is not so m u ch

. w v
w
the precept s of D escartes hich are applied b u t rather the argu
M
”
ment from issou ri which stres ses not professions bu t acti o ns not ,

promises bu t con equences and fruits s .

i
W th respect to p hi losophy as a discipline and bod y of specialized
thought however there is little do u bt that de T o cq u ev il l e s j u dg
, ,
’

i ss
ment rema n ubstantially true The nited S tates is still a cou n . U
try in which philosophy is le ast st u died in which proportionately ,

fewer b o oks on philosophy are bought and read in which the ,

views of philosophers are considered less relevant to the concerns

of nonphilosophers even less ne s orthy than in most E uropean
, ww ,

countries Philos ophy creat e s a stir only where its implications

.

seem to impinge directly upo n matters of p u blic interest like edu

cation an d law The reasons for this are vario u sly interpreted It
. .

may testify to the fact that philosophy has come of age that i t ,

is no longer the queen of the sciences that it is no longer in pur ,

sui t o f wisdom or salvation or intell e ctual comfort b u t a spec alized

, i
science itself From this point of view philosophy should no more
.

be expected to provide intellectual leadership or a unifying point

of view for a culture than theoretical physics or comparative phil o
logy It may howev er al s o testify to the fact that philosophy is
.
, ,

forging the tool s and concepts hich are required to take a fresh w
g rip on perennial problems that have defied resol u tion —e en if v
the resolution consists in showing that perennial problems are
not genuine — and on new problems that are not perennial b u t
ge n u m e .

Whatever the reasons the existence of A merican civilization

, ,

roo ted in a E uropean heri tage but an outgr o th of a unique h is w

to ri c al experience calls for ome philosophical interpretation of
, s
s
it domi nant val u es and ide als Failing to find I t it is natu ral to .

l o ok at the char acter and contribu tions of p ro fe ssro n al philosophy

as a possible clue to styles of thought feeling and interest— the , ,

intellectual p a sions of an ages n numerous occasions especially . O ,

at trans oceanic meetings and conferences in which are fo u nd dif

 IN RODU C IO N
T T II
fe re n c e s in points of vie w val e and color
u , of thought far more
,

marked than differences in language or color or skin there is ,

v
in a riably manifested an intense curiosity about the nature of
the A merican scene especially of the current philosophic scene
, .

Whether out of fear or friendship the literate representatives of ,

w
nations ho see their destinies invol ed for goo d or e il in those v v
U
of the nited S tates are eager to fathom the depths or shallo s w
of A merican c u lture Impressionistic be liefs abroad abo u t American
.

c u lt u re indicate that by and large the ni ted S tates is still an U

v
u ndisco ered country The same may be said of impressionistic
.

beliefs abo u t American philosophy only more so , .

w
This volume has gro n out of an attemp t to meet the natu ral
and almos t u niversal curios ity abo u t what A merican philosophers
w
are doing abo u t hat lies at the center of their contemporary
,

intellect u al concern A n d i t sho u ld be as instructive to those who

.

v
li e in A merica as to tho se ho li e else here w v w .

Instead of offering a summary and interp retation of the doc trine ,

allegiances and classifications of A merican philosophers which i n ,

e v i tab l reflects an edi torial bias i t seems desirable and a welcome

y , ,

departure from previous acco u nts of American philosophy to ,

v
give representati e Ame ri can philosophers an opport u ni ty to
w
present their o n selections from their ritings to re eal them so w , v ,

w
to speak at ork The fact that i t sho s America n philosophers in
, . w
w ork clothes rather than holiday dress makes more a u thentic the
v w
e idence of hat they are thinking abo u t and ho w .

A ll important philosophical movements are represented in this

w
collection as ell as all the maj or re gions of the co u ntry but in ,

w
the nature of the case i t as impossible to incl u de all important
v
indi id u al thinkers Nothing is to be inferred abou t the philoso phic
.

distinction of any thinker from his absence in this book Whatever .

the philosophical stat u s of space and time no editor can abridge

w
their tyranny in the orld of everyday existence .

I permi t myself a fe w observations abo

t the character of Ameri u

can philosophy as evinced in these self selections obse rvations the -

, ,

validi ty of which the reader may j u dge in the light of his own
reading .

A merican philosophy is no p ar ochial a ff air but an integral part

of the Continental and especially the E nglish tradi tion in p hil o so
,

phy A merican philosophers are mu c h better informed of phil o

.

sophical movements in foreign countries the nature of th en ,

I2 A MERI C AN I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
problems and interest s than are their colleagues in foreign coun
i
tr es about A merican philosophy To this day W lliam James is . i
almost the only great Am erican figure known abroad and even
he is j udged in term s of antecedently held views abou t the nature
of pragm atism rather than in th e ligh t of a fresh and sympathetic
i
read ng o f his work .

A merican philosophers w th some notable exceptions no longer , i ,

i i
practice ph losophy n the gr and trad itio n e s aying whole ale , s s
w
vie s about th e nature of m an existence and eterni ty Inspired , , .

s
by the result won in the c ences they do not even practice si ,

philosophy in th e grand m anner bu t concentrate on the patient

analysis of specific problem a ming at results which although p ece s i i
meal are more likely to wi th tand ri ticism The natural co n se s c .

q u e n ce i an e s
s trangement from the interests of educated laymen

who feel that techn ical ph losophy is remote from their concerns i .

s
An d to be ure no longer can h e who runs read philosophy
, e . H
must study i t sometimes w th p e ncil and paper in hand
, n the i . O
s
other hand scienti ts who are not phil o sophi cally trained find
,

i i
little llum nation in the scientific analysis of philosopher whom s
they tend to regard a mere camp followers of s entifi progresss ci c .

This despi te the fact that in the absence of philosophical so p hi s ti

,

cation th e report th e c entist make s to the nonsc entist of the si i

s
strange new world di covered by modern cience i apt to generate s s
confusion and needle paradox ss .

R ecent ye ar s have witnessed an impressive sh ft of attention to i

theoretical proble ms of value and ethical theory But few p h i l o so .

p h e rs hav e attempted to come to grip wi th pec fic oc al prob s s i s i

si
lem nvolving conflict of spe fic set s of value n a philosoph cal
, s ci ,i i
s
way An d by a phil o ophical way I mean clarifying th e ssue n
. i si
dispute separating th e purely verbal from the factua l i sues ex
, s ,

s
plicating what i at stake th e degree of di fference what specific , ,

i s
cogn tive truth di fferences in specific valu e j udgments depe nd
c
upon and whi h of the proposals in sight i s more likely to lead to
,

s
a sati factory resolution of the di ffi culty There are many con rete . c
si
problem n law and morals in soc al political and ed ucati o nal , i ,

i s c c
ph lo ophy whi h ry ou t for the illumination a rigorou analysis s
can thr ow upon them In thi s way if philosophy leaves alvation . , s
i
to relig on and the accumulation of knowledge and the c o n s tru c
,

i si
t on o f be tter made c entific l anguages to the scienti t philosophy
-
s ,

on a modest scale can contribute to human isdom and take its w

i
r ghtful place in th e comm unity It will at lea t be li tened to .For . s s ,
 IN T RODU C ION
T I 3

i n the end professional phi losophers exist not for each other alone
but for tho e who are not professional phi lo ophers also
s s , .

Finally the trai t which de Tocqueville saw a s cha acteristic

, r

of philo s ophically innocent America s is conspic o s among the

n , u u

s ophisticated professional philosophers E ach is an indep endent

.

thinker even when he vol ntarily adheres to a school of thought

u ,

and most of them adhere to no schoo l There is no state phi losophy

.

in America and no auth ori ty is recognized except good argument

and cogent evidence The continuous disagreements among Ameri
.

s
can p hi lo ophers may show that p hi losophy is still far from being
c
a s ience or even scientific but i t also proves that American phi
,

l o so p h ers are free

. U
ltimately i t is more impo rtan t that they be
free than that they agree
IDNE H
.

S Y OO K
 A L I CE AM B R O SE

I nd uctine

i
I w sh to begin wi th a matter abou t which to quote R us ell none
, s ,

, ,
”
of us in fact feel the slightest do u bt 1 I then propose to d scu ss
. i
w
doubts of that c urious academic kind ith whi ch philosophers have
challenged common sense wi th a vie to seeing through them
, w
w
clearly eno u gh to find the ay back to the common sense non -
,

skeptical position It is not intellectually satisfactory to indu lge

.

in the ordinary man s reaction of bru shing as ide these doubts as

’

i
tr vial or unreal But it may be possible to cope i th them without
. w
having to relinquish the common sense position -
.

Consider the following quotation from R ussell Pro b le ms of ’

s
Phil os op hy

We are all convinced that the su n ill rise tomorrow Why ? w .

Is this belief a mere blind o u tcome of past exp erience or can

w
,

i t be j u sti fied as a reasonable belief? If e are a sked why

w “
we believe [ this] e shall naturally ans er B e c au se I t always w
,

has risen every day We have a firm bel ef that I t WI ll u se I n

.

2
i ,
O

the fu ture because i t has risen in the past

,
The problem .
I 8 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP H RS E AT WORK
we have to discuss is whether there s any i rea s on for believing
w
in hat is called the uniformity of nature 3 ”
D o any num .

ber of cases of a law being fulfilled in the p as t a fford evidence

w
that i t ill be fu lfilled in th e fu ture ?4 When t o things have w
been found to be often associated and no instance is kno n of w
w
,

the one occu rring ithout the other does the occurrence of one
w
,

of the t o in a fresh instance gi ve any go o d ground for expect

v
, ,

ing the other ? 5 If not i t becomes plain that w e ha e no

,

ground whatever for expecting the su n to rise tomorrow or for

w
,

expecting the bread e shall eat at our next meal not to poison
us 6 .

R ussell makes clear that in raising these quest on s he is not sug

“
i
g e s ti n g we seek for a proof that the s e expectations m us t be ful
filled b u t only for some reason in favour of the view that th ey are
,

”
l ik e ly to be fu lfil l e d 7 I n other ords he is asking for some justi
. w ,

fic atio n of the inference that th e sun is l ik e ly to rise tomorrow

from the fact that it has done o not of the s u n s being c erta in to s ,
’

rise The t ask of j ustifying an inference that something is likely is

.

a more modes t one than that of j ustifying the inference that it is

certain Bu t if both inferences are felt to be in gen u ine need of
.

j ustification then the doub t directed against the weaker inference

,

must b e more drastic than that directed against the stronger Ob .

v io u s l the do u b t whether the repetition of c o n oo m i tan c e s or se

y
u e n c e s of events makes a similar concomi tance or sequence ro b
q p
a b le is o f a more radical kind than the doub t he ther i t makes this w
certain . O
ne might feel hesitant for exam ple about claimi ng i t , ,

was certain that aspirin wou ld stop the present headache on the
w
grounds that i t had al ays provided relief and not feel at all h e i , s
tant about claiming that these gro u nds made it at leas t probable .

S uch assurance however does not for long preserve immuni ty

, ,

against th e progr essive infectiousness of doub t I t is par t of th e .

natu ral history of doub t to spread u me r ai sed doub ts concern . H

ing our certainty of any ind u ctive conclusion p These c an be and .
,
“
in fact have been extended to conclusions of th e form p is prob
,

”
able The same sort of considerations which historically gave
.

rise to the s u spicion that even our most ass u red ind u ctive conclu
si ons are uncertain give rise equally to uneasiness whether any evi
dence could even make them probable We se e this in the progr ess .

of philosophers to the more extreme doub t that brought against ,

“
the legitimacy in general of conclusions of the form p is prob
, ,

able In this paper I shall be concerned wi th doubts of thi s ki nd

. .
2 0 AM R E IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WORK
cient to infer a pr o bability But if after our first five fifty more
. ,

w
cases were so follo ed we should no t know exactly what to say
,

about our previous limited evidence And no matter what number .

we mentioned a question could b e raised to throw the inference in

,

“
. w
doubt Can e ever know that our evidence i ufficient to warrant
”
ss
i t is probable that p ?
One further uncertainty about th e con clusions of induct ve argu i
w
ments hich infects those of ordinary deduction as well I wi sh
, s ,

to mention briefly but Withou t elaboration s ince t can be inter , i

p re te d as an uncertainty abou t a pecial sort of inductive s
inference
and i ts special features are not relevant n this p aper This u m i .

certainty concerns o n the face of t not the validity of inferring

, i ,

a conclusion from premises bu t th e premises themselves A ccord

, .

ing to R eichenbach no premises abou t physical obj ects or events

,

could be certain an d hence nothing inferred from them could be

,
.

O nly propositions of logic or about one s immediate experience are ’

beyond doub t true It is n ever ab olutely certain for example

. s , ,

that there is a die be fore me when I s ee i t feel it be t upon i t 1 1

, , .

S ensory observations is subj ect to all sorts of error and for that ,

matter we may not even be sure that what our senses reve al is other
s
than the material of dream o r halluc nations E rror lies not in i .
,
’
i
any j udgm ent recording one s mm ediate experi e nce but in th e in ,

ference one makes from i t to th e existence of a counterpart in the

real world Thus the evidential premise of an ordinary induction
.

is in the position o f an inductive conclusion from immediate ex p eri

ence Any doub t about i t will therefore be bu t a special cas e of
.

doub t about inductive conclusions in general Clearly Bro ad s .

’

skeptical doub t could b e rephrased as follo s so as to ap p ly to , w ,

inferences from immediate experience : Can one immediate ex ’

s
p e ri e n c e s any
, number of them ever mak e an evidential
, premi e s
s
probable ? Thi question has speci al features which giv e i t an even
more academic character than the similar question about induc
tions made from premise s about physical obj ect and events In s .

fact o ne would not in ordinary circu mstances raise the q u estion

whether i t was ev e r cert ai n a d ie was befo re o n e let alone the que , s
tion whether this was probable The first kind of question I tried
.

to deal wi th in my paper in T he P h i lo s op hy of G E M o o re 1 2 treat . .

,

ing i t along lines develo p ed by Joh n Wisdom and orri s L az ero M

wi tz In this paper I shall ignore the special feat u res of skepticism
.

c s
wi th respe t to the enses an d confine consideration to th e general
ques tion : Given that w e k n o w premises which we take as evidence ,
 J U S IF Y I N G I N D U C I V E I N F E R E N C E
T T 2 1

can they or y i b l pre mi ses mak

an c o nce v a conclu s ion probable ?
e e o ur
“
This is bu t a va i ation on the old problem C
r inductive i , an n
ference be j u s tified ? It i s not ho w ever my intention her
”
, , e to
attempt a solution o f this problem in the form of a detailed philo
sophical theory to the effect that probable i n ference can or can ,

not b e j ustified The questions I hould like to ans er are quite

, . s w
s
different question which might properly b e characterized as
,
“
m e tap h il o so p h ic al s
Why i there the philosophical problem of
s
j ustifying uch inferences ? I there any genuine problem? The s
latter question is of fundam ental importance In practice the .

necessi ty of j ustifying every inference no matter how assured , ,

never presents i tse lf as a problem A ctuar e of ins u rance com . is

s
pani c s after settling the que tion whether the statistic al evidence
,

warrants their probability j udgment would be shocked at the ques ,

tion whether any statistical information could ever j u tify any s

s u ch j u dgm ent In calling attention to s uch a fact i t i
. not merely , s
that I wan t to suggest that inductive inference needs no ju s tifica
tion as I think i t does not—for thi s s simply to contradict those
, i
s
who feel i t doe —but that I want to se e if the philosophi cal prob
w
lem ill disappear when one see ho those who have attempted to s w
so lve it have conceived i t In what follows I shall take i t that at
.

tempted j ustifications o f inductive inference even though in fact ,

w
directed to ard securing that the inference of p b e legi timate are ,

s
equally relevan t to ecu ring the legitimacy of the inference is
probable I have already indicated how doubt about the one can
. s
v
be or ha e been extended to the o ther and I hall therefore treat , s
i
attempts made so far to elim nate these doub ts as d rected toward i
securing a probability rather than a certa nty i .

As one looks through vari ous attempts at j ustifying inductive

inference in general say tho se of ill R ussell Broad i t become
, M , , , s
w
clear hat i t is supposed j ustification would be like Thi s is that .

w
we should be able to kno that p i probable given that we know s ,

such facts as :
( )
1 that 4; and 4 have always been asso ciated
;

( 2 ) that qb an d i
have been assoc ated in a certain propo rtion of

c as e s .

Qu ite a number of differen t kinds of inference have premi se an s

s w erin
g to the s e t o general desc w
ri ptions From pre mi e of type . ss
( )
1 we infer such conclusion a : s s
2 2 AMER ICA N PH ILO S OP HERS AT WORK
It is probable that llnes always follows large quantities of i s
drink .

It is probable that illness will follow drink in the next instance .

An d from premises of type ( 2 ) such conclusions as

It is probable that continued thro s of a penny ill maintain w w
for heads the observed proportion
The probability of lipoid pneumonia being fatal in this par
tic u l ar case is

In connection wi th s u ch conclusions philosophers have admitted

the force of u me s criticism s H
But then being con inced that
’
.
, v
nevertheless they are sometimes j ustified in dra ing inferences o f w
this s ort they have gone on to seek the j ustification A ttempts they
, .

have made indicate that hat they see k is some means whereby in w
d u c tiv e inferences may be made l o gic a l ly v a lid in o rm such that
“
f ,

the premises e n tail the concl u sion p is probable Thi s wou ld .

satisfy the condi tion that the conclusion be known once the
premises are kno n w .

Mill R ussell and Broad have all ostensibly conceived their

, , , ,

task to be that of s u pplying to the inference a premise to be con

w
j oined ith the empirical facts about concomitances from which
the conclusion follo s ill for example wri tes : w M
every in
.
, ,

i
duction is a syllogism w th th e maj or premise u ppressed ; or ( as I s
prefer expressing it) every inductio n may be thro n into the form
”
w
of a syllogism by supplying a maj o r p rem ise l 3 What is to be .

“
supplied he says is an assumption involved in every case o f in
, ,
” “
duction and this is o u r warrant for all inferences from ex p e ri
,

ence 1
.
4 ” “
R u s sell holds that A ll ar guments hich on the basis of w ,

experience argu e as to the future or the unexperienced parts of

,

the past or present assume the inductive principle If the prin .

c i l e is unsound we have no reason to expect the sun to rise to

p ,

morrow to expect bread to be more nourishing than a s tone or to

, ,

w
expect that if we thro ou rselves o ff the roof we shall fall A l l o u r .

condu ct is based u pon associations hich hav e worked in the past w ,

w
and which e therefore regard as likely to work in the future ; and
this likelihood is dependent for its validity upon the indu ctive
”
principle 1 5 Broad al thou gh he is unable to say precisely hat
.
,
w
“
w
premise conj oined i th I have obse rved N qs s and 1 00% of them ’

are 4 ; w
ou ld j u stify him in conj ectu ri ng that of the ¢ s n ’
i
nature are 4A is in agreement that there must be ome premise s
which does this .
 J U S IF Y I N G I N D U C I V E I N F E R E N C E
T
3 T 2

The premise which R ussell adj oins to the observational evidence ,

“
and whi ch as regards unexamined cases he says alon can j stify e u

any inference from what has been examined to what has not yet
”
been examined 16 is as follows :
,

( )aThe gr eater the n u mber of cases in hich a thin g of the w

sort A h as been found assoc iated ith a thing of the sort B the w ,

more probable i t is ( if no cases of fail u re of association are

w
kno n ) that A is al ays associated ith B w w
U
.

b
( ) nder the same circ u mstan ces a s u ffi cient n u mber of cases

w
of the association of A i th B ill make i t nearly c ertain that A w
w
is al ays associated with B 1 7 .

T hi s is the s o called ind u ctive principle as i t applies to the ,

pro b ability of a general la w

A s I understand R ussell h e takes.
,

this principle to play the role of a premise in e ery ind u ction we v

v
make abou t uni ersal concomi tances In order to exhibi t this I set .

w
out the follo ing inference in which I make explici t e ery premise
, v
v
“
supposedly used in arri ing at the concl u sion p is probable For .
”

this purpose I need only part ( b ) of the indu cti e p rinciple and v ,

in particular a weakened form of i t hi ch I shall designate as (a ) w

( )
a U nder
similar circ u mstances a s u fficient n u mber of cases
w
of B accompanying A ill make it probable that B al ays ac w
companies A
U
.

nder similar circ u mstances a s u fli cie n t n u mber of cases

of dry leaves burning when li t ill make it probable that they w
w
al ays bu rn when lit
w v
.

(y ) In the past dry leaves hen li t ha e b u rned a hundred

times witho u t exception

w
.

( )
8 A hundred cases ith no exceptions are s u fficient to make

i t probable that dry lea es hen lit al ays burn v w w .

Therefore it is probable that dry leaves hen lit al ays b u rn

, w w .

In practice when we infer such a concl u sion as this we pass di

re c tl
y to i t from (y ) But i t ill be a d mi tted that w
( )
8 to the e f
f ect
that we have enough cases to render o u r concl u sion probable is ,

implicit in this passage R u ssell seemingly ants to hold that with

. w
’
w
out (fi) s being true e could not assert ( 8) That is u nless there ,

is such a thing as a number of similar cases being su ffi cient to make

i t probable that dry leaves burn no n u mber mentioned o u ld tend , w
in the slightest to do this ( a ) as e see is simply the o rm of this
. w , f
general premise ( B) an d we mu st have i t if e are e er to have a w v
g eneral prem i se for any other arg u ment than this one .
2 4 . A M ERI C A N P H I L O S O P H E S WO K R AT R

A this exampl i ndicates I have taken i t hat accord i ng

s e , t to
R ussell finding a j ustification for an i nductive inference consi s ts
in finding the premises necessa y to make i t logi cally valid that i s r , ,

in supplying enough premi s e s to throw i t into the form of a d d e uc

t i on Among these
. the i nduct i ve prin ci ple and its special
are ,

i nstance It w i ll be recalled that hose who s uppos inducti ve t e

i nference requires j ustification demand i t shall be such tha can t o ne

k now the conclusion p i s probable A simple ste p to se uring
“
. c

this i to exhibi t i t as h conclu si on of premise s which are such

s t e
that if hey are certain the conclusion is al s o A y deduction satis
t . n
fi esthi s condition But thi s i s not s u fficient If the conclusion is to
. .

be known then the premises must b also A d cu i o sly enough

, e . n , r u ,

t h i according to R ussell is pre ci sely what i s i mpossible The induc

s .

t i ve principle premi s e ( ) he s ay s i s i ncapable of being proved

, a
“

” “
by an appeal to experience we can never use experience to prove
the inductive principle wi thout beggi ng the question H ence we .
”
18

must simply accept it or forgo all j ustification of our expectation s

”
about the future N i t is clear that if a partic lar induc
.
19 ow u

tive co nclu s ion i s in doubt ly b i t is doubtful Whether any

on e c au s e

number of case s enders any proposition probable hen

r do s , t o ne e

not j ustify the conclusio by m i g th at they do N othing is

n as s u n .

gained by using a premis e w hat is in doub t For if one is to

as . es

tab l ish th e conclusion one must know the premises are true Ex .

pressing an inductive argu ment in the form o f a deductive one by

supplying the requisite premises thus provides a spurious kind of
comfort .

c
Further a loser exami nation of the sequence of proposition
, s ,

( ) (B) (y ) ( )
a 8 makes i t very puzzling what function R us ell
“
ex s
p e c te d
( ”)
a or (3 ) to serve in establishing the conclusion p is
s
probable For thi conclusion follows from ( y ) and (8) wi thout
.

th e help of anything further In addition ( a ) and its special case

.

( )
8 appear to be singularly empty tautologi e s ( fl) for example . ,

ci
states that a suffi ent number of case s of dry leaves burning when
i
lit w ll make i t probabl e they always do The natu ral question .

s“
i su fli cien t for what? and the natural answer i given in the s
following paraphra e of (B) s
If the number of cases of dry leaves burning when lit is s u ffi
cient to mak e it p ro b a b le that they always burn then i t is ,

probable th at they do .

( a) permi ts of a similar paraphra e It lear that th e add t on s . is c ii

s
of the e necessary proposition to ( y ) and ( 8) w ll in no way help s i
 J U S IF Y I N G I N D U C I V E I N F E R E N C E
T
5 T 2

to deduce the conclusion In fact as the u se f truth table show s

. o -
s ,

the conj nction of a necessary p p i i

u
p with any contingent re os t on

proposition q or set of su h w ill have no more deductive fertility

,
c
,

than the contingent proposition alone p q q S giving our i : . . . . o n

d i arg ment a ded ctive form can not in this ca e be de s cri bed
uct v e u u s

as consisting in the addition of premises ( ( ) and (m) without a

which the conclusion could not be inferred O n the b asis of thi s .

acco u nt the relevance le t alon e the importance of the inductive

, , ,

principle in a particular inference is very do u b tful .

I think some accoun t of this principle remains to be g ven 2 0 I i .

have pointed ou t that neither ( a ) nor (fl) is a proposition with the

w
help of hich the concl u sion is deduced That is their role is not .
,

like that of the general premise of a syllogism e g Al l men are , . .

,

mortal , w “ ”
itho u t which the conclusion S o crates i mortal can s ,

not be inferred S uppose no for purpose of comparison with our

. w s
inductive inference w
e conj oin to the fam iliar syllogism the
proposition
If all men are mortal and S ocrates is a man then S ocrate
(9) , s
is mortal
and that to th s we add i
( )
to If all a is b and x is a then x is b , .

The adj u nction of ( 9 ) and (w ) to the pre mi ses of the syllogism is

“ ”
of no help in deducing S ocrates is mortal ; the premises alone are
s
s u fficient for thi ( 9 ) and ( w ) are both necessary and hence could
.
,

not help establish an empirical concl u sion o ever the fact that
“ ”
. Hw ,

( )
0 is necess ary is the same as the fact that S ocrates is mortal
may be deduced from the t o given premise An d th e fact that w s .

( )a is necessary is hat is meant w

by saying this syllogistic argu
ment is valid in virtue of its form ( 6) and ( ) are not premises . to ,

bu t ru l es according to wh ch deduction are made ( ) being the i s , to

general rule of which ( 6) i the special instan ce s .

N o w there is some analogy between the role of ( w ) and the role

of ( a ) th e inductive principle If we put (a ) in the form .

If for some specified number N N cases of assoc iation of A and ,

B occur an d if these are s u fficient then it is probable that A and ,

B are always associated ,

it appears not as a pre mi se but as giving the orm of the inference

, , f
(y ) D r
y leaves when li t have burned one hundred times with
ou t exception
O
.

( )
8 ne hundred cases are sufficient .
2 6 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
Therefore i t is probable dry leaves al ays b u rn when lit
, w .

A w
similar thing as pointed out by Whiteley n hi s paper in Anal i
y s is 2
,
1 here hew maintained that the inductiv e principle expres ses

the form common to p ar ticular indu cti e arguments nless the v . U

form is valid the partic u lar inductive argument cannot be The
,
.

same of co u rse characterizes ( w ) the form of the syllogistic argu

, ,

ment cited The difference is that whereas everyone would grant

.

that ( w ) is the rule according to wh ch S ocrates i mortal s i s ”

i
v alidly ded u ced from i ts premises i t is not as clear and p h il o so , ,

h ers such as Broad are ready to challenge whether ( a ) is the rule

p ,

w
according to hich inductive conclusions are inferred For one .

thing the hypothesis of ( a ) I f for some number N N cases

, ,

are s u fficient implies the po ssibili ty o f s o m e number o f cases be ing

,

su fficient by i tself to render a propos t on probable An d th s

, , ii . i
is what Broad denies .

O f co u rse ( a ) as stated is undeniable : If ome number N o f , s

cases occu r and are su fficient to make p probable then p is prob ,

.
,
w
able I t can ho ever be restated so as to free i t of its trivial ap,

p e aran c e In the following

. form ( )
a do e s not look as certainly ,

nor as trivially tautologous ,

fii c ie n t n u m b e r
A su of cases of ass o c at on of i i A and B make t i
probable A and B are alway assoc ateds i .

A sufficient number seems to denote any of a sequence of num

bers having a lower limit o that ( a ) m ght b e re p lace d by , s i ‘

S om e n u m b er
of cases of association of A and B make i t prob s
abl e they are always ass ociated .

H ere we have the proposition which Broad clai ms is certainly false ,

since accordin g to him it is ins u fficient for making any proposi tion
probable m e re ly that there should be N cases of association without
Y
exception et one feels inclined to agree ith L e w y that in ao
. w
co rd an c e w “
ith the E nglish usage of the word probable thi s is a ”

necess ar y pro p osition so that to assert the observational premises

,

of certai n indu ctions and deny that the conclusions is probable

-
“
is a self contradiction 2 2 S ome number of ca es makes p probabl e
.

“
s
looks to be strictly anal o gous to the necessary proposi tion S ome ,

n u mber mu ltiplied by 2 eq u als 1 4 These two propositions c an be .

instructively compared The function on which the latter is con .

structed namely x X ,
“
is uch that i t h as a nece sarily
, s s
2 8 A M E R ICA N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
accepted view about what is gained by supplying a general pre mi se
about the constitution of nature Broad for example holds that n
“
. , ,
”
i
order to know a conclusion of the form p is probable i t is ne ce s
w
sary that e know some premi se of thi s sort In general hi s view .

is that indu ctive arguments al l involve a premise to the effect that

there is in nature constant causal determinati on and something like
“ ”
loading in favor of one alternative rather than another and that ,

in order for this to be th e c as e natur e mus t answer to the principle

of limi ted variety ” Ve ry roughly thi pr nciple s that nature i
. s i i s
not infinitely complex—that every obj ect an d event analyze into a s
i i
l m ted number of element and hence that a li mi ted amount o f v a s
rie t
y is possible from combinations of these elements A gain very .

roughly what would b e secured if the genera l empirical premise

,

were true is that nature obeys simple causal laws .

N o w my thesis i s that this concern that nature obey s mple i

casu al laws is a concern that i t b e poss ible for us to make inductive
inferences at all n o t that i t b e possibl e to k n o w once the condi
, ,

s
tion for making an inference are satisfied that any given probable ,

conclusion is validly inferred That is there are two questions .

, ,
“
What would j ustify us in making inductive inferences i e what , . .
,
”
would make it possible to do this ? and What would j us tify ,

‘ ’
in the sens e of validate the conclusion p is , Broad ‘

s
ha I think answered the first question while supposing him e lf
, , s
to have answered th e econd s
e makes a premise abou t nature . H
a requisite for dedu cing the conclusion whence we could not know ,
“ ”
p is probable wi thout knowing this p remise I want to con .

sider bri efly what the consequences are if the premise abou t n ature
is false I am not certain bu t I believe that if nature is not of uch
.
, s
and such a cons titution inductive inference would not be possible
-
.

An d in t hi s cas e we should have no problem of validating an in

d u c tiv e conclusion The problem as to what validates an inductive
.

i
conclusion can ar se only if i t is pos ible for inductive inferences s
to be made .

From a number of statements abou t nature which have been

cited as premises o f inductive inference I shall elect a few typical s
ones and see what their falsity entails sually to put i t vaguely . U , ,

it has been held that nature must be uniform that the law of uni
‘

ve rs al causation must operate No w it is not u ffi cient that the l aw .

, s
that every event has a cause an d similar cau e have similar effects
“
ss
hold As R uss ell said i t is not the reign of law bu t th e reign
.
,
”
of s im p le laws whi ch is required 2 4 But n o w for what is i t not .
 J U S IF Y I N G I N D U C I V E I N F E R E N C E
T 9T 2

suffici ent for w hat is the rei gn of imp l laws required? Both
, s e

Venn and Keynes have prov ided an answer whi ch supports my con
tention that the premise about nature which is being sought is one
which assures the p oss ib il ity o f making indu ctions Keynes says 2 5 .

that if every configuration of the universe were s u bject to a sepa

w
rate and independent la and if every di ff erence in b o dies led to
w
their obeying di ff erent la s — in other ords if i t ere false that w , w
w w
nature is u nder th e rei gn of simple la s —i t o u ld still be the c as e
that nature w as uniform and causation so ereign ; but prediction v
would be imp ossible I f inductions are to be made at all natu re
.
,

must not be like this No r must it be s u ch that though every event

.

is causally determined no causal la has more than one instance in w

v
the histo ry of the uni erse A s Venn points out 2 6 induction cou ld
.
,

not take place in s u ch a orld either w

ere the reason we should
. H
“
not be j u stified in inferring p is probable ould simply be that ”
w
we co u ld not start to make an y inference We should not have any .

v
obser ational premise abou t repeated concomitances .

The point is clearer if we consider the conseq u ences of falsi

fy ing the premise M
ill cited as being a arrant for every induction w .

A ccording to M
ill i t is a necessary condi tion for pro ing any indu c v
i
t ve concl u sion that nat u re be u niform By the u niformity of na .

ture he meant that there are in nature s u ch things as parallel ca ses

s w
—that i t is ometimes the case that hat is true of o n e instance of
qb is true of all instances In other words som e generalizations
.
,

hold in nature or there are uniform ities in nature L e t u s s u ppose

, .

there are no uniformities in nature simple or otherwise In thi , . s

i
event two s tuations are poss ible : ( I) that no characteristic o c
curs with any other in accordance wi th any law— that is that there ,

are no constant conj unction s

of any characteristic but that each s ,

occu rs w i th absolutely any other ; ( 2 ) that there are some repeated

s
concomi tance and s equences but that their repe tition is not uni
versal . s
In the fir t case we clearly have a suspensio n of the prin
ci l e of li mi ted vari ety
p In u c h a world
. the s
amount of possible
variety would be unli mi ted In fact there could not even be what
.

Broad has characterized as

“
—
natural kinds grou pings of char ”

c
Ic ters which consti tute su h recurrent enti ties as humans horses , ,

r ees etc Were a m al ignan t demon to

, . cramble up such a world s ,

t would be one in which no inductions could be made For one .

h ing there would not be human beings to make them In fact it .

s w
,

dou btful hether what is being described here is even a co n ceiv

Ible s
ituation As Isai
. ah Berlin points out 2 7 n th e extreme ca e , i s
3 0 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
where no character ever occurred more than once we should have ,

no general terms to refer to i t and such a chao could not even be , s

talked about le t alone nferred from i .

Hw o ever the case is different f there are ome repe t t on of

, i s ii s
sequences or characters even for relatively short per ods of time
, i .

S u ppose that for some centu ri e s there has been that constant
conj unction of ch aracter which constitutes man kind and that s ,

other conj u nctions of characters are repeated for a coup l e of gen

eratio n s I s inductive inference pos sible ? First of all
. if we ,

k ne w i t to be false that there were any universal conj unctions we

should of course never say t w as probable that qb and all were i
always associated H
owever f t were false that there were uni
.
, i i
fo rm i tie s but because there were some repetitions and recurrence
, s
i t was not k n o w n to be false we could and wo uld still make prob ,

able inferences We should have the s am e kind of evidence which

.

we now have the sort expre sed in premis e ( y ) namely in one

, s ,

hundred cases withou t exception dry leaves when li t have been

found to burn What we do n establishing the probabili ty of a
. i
i
spec al uniformity is to make an nf erence from observed repeti i
O
tions f cours e if our ancestors told us that things had been differ
.

ent in their day we should be uncertain hether i t was probable w

the next instance o f a s would be ll or that all future instances of !

gb would be An d if <1; and q; were never observed in c o nju n c tro n

w s
again e hould not say i t as probable 4; would be associated w
w ith i
in the next nstance In fact after a time we should mo s t .

likely say i t was improbable .

E xactly how much repetition there must be before we draw

probable inferences I do not know b u t certainly in a world where ,

w
there was very li ttle e cou l d not draw them For w e hould lack . s
s
the ob ervational pre mi se e g ne thousand cases have been
, . .
, O '

found withou t exception etc An d we hould need th for . s is

inference regardless of what other premise might be needed The .

point I am trying to make here is that the question as to hat na w

tu re must be like before we are j ustified in making any inductions
at all i e , . .
, w
hat i t must be l ike to have proper Observ ational prem
is e s is different from the question hether given th e observational
, w ,

premi ses we are j u stified in draw ing a conclusion from them

, .

I want to retu rn now to thi s latter que tion The fact that s .

philosophers feel that there s a problem here hows ome ort of i s s s

dissatisfaction To say what this di s satisfacti o n is when we in
. ,

fact do not for a moment feel uncert ai n that for exam ple the un , , s
 J U S I F YI N G I N D U C IVE I N F ERE N C E
T T
3 1

wi ll i se again and the springtime come is to answ er

r question , o ur

Why is there the philo s phi cal problem of ind ction ? I

,

o u t seems to
me this is a question which ought to b e asked For this need of .

j ustifying inductive conclusions ne er is felt in any ordinary cir v

cu ms tan ce s O
ur behavior shows this : We are willing to bet that l
.
,

2 3 or 4 will come up on a fai r die as agai nst 6 We ne er b e

, , , . v
come fe arful that the la s of nature ill be sus p ended so that e w w , w
hesitate to plan t a garden on the grounds that the su n may ne er v
shi ne again An d yet despi te this e feel challenged by th e ques
.
, , w
“
tion Are you warranted in supposing i t p robable the s u n ill
, w
”
shi ne again ? as we are by th e question Are you arranted in , w
supposing i t probable that viru s A is responsible for the illness of
s
all the e guinea pigs ? ”

Certain linguistic analogi es between questions and doubts phi

l o so p h ers express and questions and do u b ts of the scientist or ordi
,

nary man are I think responsible for o u r feeling the challenge

, , .

E ither the questions and doub ts give vent to some diss atisfaction or
they positively create i t It is clear that the req u est that a scientist .

j ustify a particular nducti e concl u sion and the req u est that i v
inductive conclusions in general b e j u stified bear at le as t a verbal
analo gy to each other A n d the do u b t expressed in S h e lo ed . v
you today and yesterday bu t ha e yo u any goo d reason to s u p p ose , v
that she will love you tomorro ? is analogo u s in the same ay to w ”
w
s
the eeming doub t expressed in “
esterday and for many ye ar s Y ,

before that things which were dropped fell ; b u t have yo u any good
,

s
reason to suppo e the law of gravitation ill contin u e to operate w
tomorro ? w
Further there is close enough analogy between inductive infer
,

e nc e s and deductive ones that q u estions hether an inference is w ar w

ranted se em to be s u ch as could be settled I n a dedu ction i t is al .

ways possible even though sometimes diffi c u l t to determine hether

, , w
a conclusion is validly dra n An d hen i t is it is a mi s u se of w . w ,

, . .
,
s
language i e elf contradictory to assert th e premises and deny
-
,

the conclusion The linguistic pattern of inducti e argu ments is

. v
very similar to that of deductive ones and there are some c ases ,

in which i t definitely see m s a mis u se of lan guage to assert that a

s
conj unction ha been repeatedly observed and then to deny the
probability of i ts oc cu rri ng in a fresh instance O ne ould feel
“
. w
that a pe rson who said I have known tho u sands of cases and no ,

exceptions of peo p le be ing burn t hen they touched a hot stove

,
w
but it is not probable that I shall be b u rnt th e next time I do it ,
3 2 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
or The penny has come up head a million times trai ght and s s ,

never tails bu t it is not prob able the penny s unfair was some
, i ,

how misusing lan gu age — that he didn t know the use of the word ’

“
probable and as saying something self contradictory
, w -
.

No w despi te all these analogies there are equally obviou lack s s

of analogy To ignore these is to fail to see that questions and
.

doubts which the skeptic has about induction are but pantomimes
of questions and doub ts which are genuine For example to ask of .
,

a scientist whether his evidence is su ffi cient to warrant a particular

inductive conclusion is to ask a u eful question to whi ch certain s
procedures he commonly engages n are relevan t by way of ans er i w .

S ho u ld he be made unsure by the question he will reconsider hi , s

evidence and if satisfied will reiterate his probabili ty j udgment
, , , ,

and if not will experiment further By fu rther tests he could

, , .
,

i
for e x am pl e ncreas e or de cre ase the probabili ty that a p articular
,

i
v rus induced illness in his guinea p ig s or he migh t eve n dises ,
'

tab l i sh th e probability j udgm ent previously arrived at But now .

“
the questi o n Are any empirical facts evidence for any conclu
,

sion p is ‘
is not one to which any tes ting procedure
is relevant No r is it useful to ask i t For i t does not create a
. .

doub t which in any way a ffects our behavior We don t becom e

2 8 .
’

uncertain in virtue of th is question of the conclusion of Whi h

, , c
w
we ere c ertarn .

H
owever the S keptic s comment , ou mus t admi t that th e fact ’

, Y
that a law has operated in the past is thin reas o n for expecting it
”
to conti nue manages somehow to b e convincing The main reason
, .
!

v
for this I belie e to be the follo ing : D espite the fact that some w
inductive arguments closely parallel deductive ones s o very many
’
,

do not The S keptic s emphasis on the lack of parallel makes us

.

intellectually uncomfortable even with regard to those inferences

w e previously felt sure of For example we all feel that there .
,
“
would be s omething peculiar in saying I have a million favorable
cases and no u nfavorabl e ones but still p is not probable Thi ,
‘

. s
seems to be a misuse of language Bu t even here w e are not as ure . s
there is an entailment relation be tween the observational premi s e
“ ”
and the conclusion p is probable as we are in the case of d e d u c
tions which are valid in virtue of th eir form This uncertainty I .

believe arises from the fact that we can think of innumerable cases
where one doesn t know hether to say the inductive c o nclusion ’
w “

s
follow or not S uppose that one hundred ca es o f my drinking
. s
coffee at night were followed by sleeplessne s and that this did en s ,
 J U S IF Y I N G I N D U C I V E I N F E R E N C E
T T
33
tail the probability of my spending a sleepless night next time
w w
,

o u ld fifty cases entail it or t enty fiv e or ten ? There is no way

,
-
,

w hatever of de ciding this An d the indecision abo u t the special

.

inference spreads to all inference de pite the obvious lack of , s

analogy already ci ted bet een the genuine q u estion
, ,
“
w
ave I suf H
w
,
”
fic ie n t evidence to arran t this inference ? and the q u estion
Hv w
,
“ ”
a e I ever su fficient evidence to arrant any inference ?
I t is one of the features of a philosophic problem that e feel w
p u zzlement and yet not o f a kind hich in any way alters our b e w
v
ha ior . H w
ere e have an instance In practice we do not do u bt .

w
that e are in general j u stified in making inductive inferences
w
though e all grant that sometimes we are not ; and yet certain cen
siderations pro d u ce an academic dissatisfaction with inductive
w
inference in general hich makes us try to j ustify it This ju s tifi .

cation is conceived as a matter of finding a mean whereby be ng s , i

certain of the observational premise e can be certain that p i , w s
probable I want to say that the remedy for th e dissatisfaction we
.

are made to feel about ind u ctive inference is misconceived If this .

w
can be sho n then i t will be clear why there is the philosophical
problem about inductive inference I shall begin by tracing the .

dissatisfaction and the attempt to allay i t 2 9 .

L e t us begin by comparing ourselves ith an maginary tribe of w i

w w
beings ho are un illing to call any proposition probable unless
s u pported by a million cases S uch being w ould doubtless com . s
v
plain o er seldom being able to establish any probability But .

w o u ld their situ ation be like o u r o n ? Consider the following in w

w
ference From this e shall see ho dissimilar our situation is and
. w ,

w hy the dissatisfaction which made Broad say no number of cases

,

by itself could make p probable :

Three cases of drinking co ffee at night ere followed by sleep w
lessness .

Therefore i t is probable that drinking co ffee at night is al

w
,

ays so accompanied .

No w w
s u ppose coffee as drunk at night fifty more times withou t any
w
un p leasant sequel This ould make us say that o u r first three
.

w
cases ere ins u fficient to establish the probability of co ffee s causing ’

sleeplessness that is that it is false that the observational premise

, ,

implies the conclusion It might then be argued that if three

.

w
cases o u ldn t necessitate p s probability would seven or eight
’ ’
, , ,

or ten ? Can one case ever make the difference between the imp l i
3 4 A M E ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S
R AT WORK
’
cation s being false and its being necessary ? And even though we
a gr eed with L ewy that some number of cases would make the im p l i
cation necess ary and even a greed on some particular numbers
,

which did this we should oon find ourselves in th e position of

, s
being unable to decide as we dimini hed the number of cases th e
, s ,

w
precise point at hich the implication became nonnecessary It is .

an impressive fact that on substituting consecutive values in the

“ ”
function x cases makes p probable we derive a numeri cally
ordered sequence of proposition with regard to which there is no s
reason for saying any one is necessary and it immediate predecessor s
s
i not A pparently Broad is so impressed by this fact that he is will
.

ing to deny that any of them i necessary which is to deny that any s ,

number of cases make p probable We are in a much wor e posi . s

tion seemingly than the people who must find a million support
, ,

ing cases before they can infer a probability We do not know .

exactly how many cases e need The skeptic makes us feel that w .

we should In these circumstances it is natural to conceive our task

.

fi
as n d ing either a premise to conj oin wi th the evidence from which
“
p is probable ”
would follow or a rule hich inductive inference , w
must conform to if valid I have tried to argue that hat i being . w s
sought is a rule or rule s s
ince a premi s e about nature secures
,

something else .

No w w
hat would such rules do ? Clearly what they do in de
d u c tio n s — provide criteria for determining whether th e arguments
are correct This means providing exact cri teria for the use of th e
.

w “
ord probable criteria x e d b y th e n u m b e r of cas es such that
,
“
fi ,

from a de finite number of c as es it can be known that p is prob

”
abl e follows If such were found we should kno w hich values of
“
.

”
w
x in x cases make p probable yielded some th ing necessary .

Whenever the premise involved one of these numeri cal values we

“
sho u ld know it ent ai led the conclusion j ust a we know that this is s
” “ ”
square entails this is four sided becau e we know all quares
”
-
s s
are four sided is necess ary
-
.

Finding such rules wo u ld cert ainly provide us criteria for cor

rect inference But now where should one loo k for them ? L e t us
.

consider what Aristotle did in formulating rules for valid d e d u c

tion . H
e examined arguments accepted a correct and derived the s
rules from them What is the case with inductive inference ? ere
. H ,

even in those in stances when no one doubts that the conclusion i s

warranted inspection doesn t yield the rule i t conforms to No w a
,
’
.

rule is merely the abstract form of a cla of inferences already ss

36 E IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S
AM R WORK AT

should be some s h p div i ding line between these state s

ar some point ,

at which i t is proper to apply the o ne term and not the other .

S imilarly with the term probable For a whole mi ddle range .

of val u es of x in If x ca e ss
occur then p s probable we”
, i
w w
do not kno whe ther i t follo s that p is probable or not To know .

this requires knowing which values when substituted in the func

tion yield something necessary and this has not been de c ded , i .

s
N evertheless i t seem that there should be some point at whi ch the
fu nction becomes neces ary before which i t is not s , .

—
There s h o u ld be such a point that expresses exactly the dis
satisfaction abou t inductive inference The compl ai nt that we do .

s
not in given cas e know whether we can validly infer that p i prob s
able appeared to be the complain t that we had o u nd no rules to f
which valid inductive inference conformed The remedy of this s itu .

atio n would be had when these were found But thi puts the phi . s
is
l os o p h er s d satisfaction in a mi leading way : as though i t were
’
s
over the inability to find rules rather than over the lack of them .

s
The fact is that nothing i hidden If to j ustify induction we must .

look for ru les according to which one correctly deduce p i prob “

s s
able we are looki ng for what doe not exist But if the feeling
, s .

that induction needs j ustifying is merely th e feeling that there

s h o u l d b e r u les of this sort then the means of remedying th e lack
,

“ ”
s
is not to be described a finding them but as m aking them To ask , .

that the criteria for the word probable be more exact than they
are that there be a sharp line between correct and incorrect in
,
s

s
d u c tio n s as there i amongst deductions —this is a way of urgi ng
that exact rules be made up in such a manner that in being cert ai n
“ ”
of th e observational statement we can be certain of probably p .

This is of course to urge a modification of our language An d to

, , .

do this is t o express a di ssatisfaction wi th it ere I think w e h ave . H

“
our answer to the question Why i there a problem of j ustifying, s
ind u ctive inference ?
I cannot here go int o whether this urge to mod i fy the language
w
so as to remedy hat appear to be its inadequacies is j ustified Bu t .

w w
I ill point out that if e try to eradicate the vagu eness of the
w “ ”
ord probable we should

w
ample e co u ld
,

b u rning hen Ifw

w
that t enty fiv e -

night made it p
 J U S IF Y I N G I N D U C I V E I N F E R E N C E 3 7 T T

should want a rule for each inference A d i n no case would there . n

seem to be any special reason for accepting th e rule Why should .

twenty four or forty nine cases be in su fficien t—why should an

- -

inference from these not be necessary while an inference from

w
t enty fiv e or fifty cases ould be ? ndoub tedly if su ch rules
-
w U
w ere accepted philosophers ould find them the source o f a new w
problem Their complaint would in these circumstances be against
.

“
the excessive sharpness of th e word probable instead of its ex
ce s s iv e vagueness The ne dissatisfaction would arise from the . w
arb itrarin es s of the r u les rather than the lack of them .

w “
It ould seem that the ord probable like the ord rich w , w ,

is for the purposes of ordinary life as sharply defined as e ant w w

i t ; and even philosophers have show n no real interest in sharpening
the cri teri a for i ts application else they would have tried to still
their dissatisfaction by the only means open to them namely by , ,

specifying such cri teria A ll this indicates that present usage is .

satisfactory othe r ise e should have what e do not no have

, w w w w ,

precise cri teria fixed by the number of c as es nce this is admitted . O ,

the need to j u stify probable inference disappears A t this point we .

v
ha e returned to the common sense position -
.

Th is p ap er ori ginally ap p eared in T he jo u rnal o f P hil o s op hy Vo l

M w
.
,

XL I V No 1 0 ( ay 8 1 9 4 7 ) an d is rep ri n ted i th p e rm is si o n
,
.
, .

v B e rtran d R u sse ll , ro b l e m s P o P
f hil os o p hy , p . 94 .

w R u ss e l l , o p c it , p p 9 4 —9 5
. . . .

I b id , p p 9 8—9 9
o
o . . .

R
- I b id , p 9 6 . . .

n
g I b id , p 1 01 . . .

I b id , p 9 6
s
c . . .

y I b id
v
.

o
p D a id Hu m e , S e l e c tio ns ( S c ri b n e r p 3 5 . .

I b id , p 4 3
P
o
c . . .

1 0 C D Bro ad , M e c h anic al an d T e l eo l o g ic al C au s atio n,

. . . ro c e e ding s o f
the A ris to te l ia n S o c ie ty , S u p p l e m e n t ary V o l X I V , p 8 9
1 1 H an s R e ic h e nb ac h , E x p e rie n c e a n d re dic tio n, p 3 3 1
.

P P . .

.
.

13
.

. J
1 2 T he L ib rary of L iv ing hil o s o p h e rs , V o l I V
o h n S tu art Mill , L o g ic , B k I I I , Ch ap

1 4 I b id , p 2 2 3
. . . .
3, p 2 24 . .
.

.
.

15 R u ss e l l , o p c it , p p 1 06—07
. . . . .

1 6 I b id , p 1 06
. . . .

1 7 I b id , p 1 04
. . . .

1 8 I b id , p 1 06
. . . .

1 9 I b id
. .

2 0 Wh at fo l lo w s b y w ay o f an al y s is
. of it I ow e in l arg e p art t o dis cu s s io ns
w ith M L az e ro w itz
. .
3 8 E I CAN
AM R I S
P H LO OP HERS AT WORK
2 1 . M . Whitel ey ,
On the J fi
u s ti c atio n of I n du c tio n, A naly s is , Vo l . 7
p
2 2 C L ew y ,
. .
69 .

T he
.

J fi
u s ti c atio n o f I n d u c tio n, A naly s is , Vo l 6 .

P P P
8 9 —9 0
pp . .

2 3 C D Bro ad, T h e rinc ip l e s o f rob l em atic I nd u c tio n,

. . . ro c e e dings o f

the A ris to te lia n S o c ie ty , Vo l 2 8 , p 4 5 . . .

2 4 B e rtran d R u ss e l l , A naly s is o f M a tte r, p 2 3 2

.

JV
o hn M ay n ard Ke y n es , A T re a tis e o n P . .

J
25 . ro b a b ility , p 249 . .

26 e nn , E mp iric al L o g ic , p p 96 97
P
-
. . . .

“
2 7 I s ai ah Be rlin, I n du c tio n and Hyp o th es is ,
. ro c e e d ing s of the A ris to te l ian

S o c ie ty , S u p p l e m e n tary V o l XV I , p 9 9
2 8 S e e M L az e row itz ,
. .
“
. .

P .

Mo ore s arado x , in T he hil o s op hy of G E

’

M o o re, fo r a dis cu ssio n o f th e ac ad em ic c h arac ter o f a s im il ar p hil o s o p hic al

P . .

do u b t ; al s o o h n J W
is d o m ,
“
P
hil o s o p hic al
to te l ia n S o c ie ty , Vo l XXX I I , p p 7 8—7 9V
erp l exi ty ,
”
P
ro c e e d ing s o f the A ris P
v
. . .

2 9 I n this I am in deb te d to dis c u s s io ns I h a e h ad w ith M L az erow itz

. . .
 MA X BL A C K

P res upp os ition a nd A ssertio n

i
Whenever I speak of defini tion in th s essay I hall mean an , s
w
explanation of the uses of some ord or expression In one case .

to be considered the definition is a way of teaching o mebod y

, s
w
ho to use the d efin ie nd u m ; in ano ther the intention is to give
an explici t description or analysis of the meaning of ome word s
w
or expression i th whose uses one is already fam liar i .

When logicians speak of the definition of a term they usu ,

v
ally ha e in mind analysis or des cri ption of that term s co n no ’

tatio n . A characteristic s
tatement is To define a term to is
state its connotation o r to enumerate the attr butes t impl e
, i i is .

Th u s we define a parallelo gram as a quadrilateral figure whose

”
sides are parallel 1 In this type of definition we are supposed
.
,

to s tate the connotation by successively dividing an incl u

v
si e genus into progressively narrower subspec es S uch a d e fi i .

n i tio n provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the a l i

pp
cation o f the term : th u s a thing is properly called a parallelogram
if and only if that thing is a q u adrilateral figure an d also h as
parallel sides Another way o f putting the matter 1 5 that the
.

3 9
 A M E R IC A N PH IL O S O P H E R S AT WORK
things to which the term applies i t extension) consti tute s
i
a sharply del neated class : everything that exists must be either
wholly inside the class of parallelograms or wholly outside it .

The necessary and sufficient cri terion for application o f the term
“ ”
parallelogram provides a conclusive tes t for membership in the
extension of that term i e for membership in the correspond
, . .
,

ing class .

It is no accident that favorite examples of this traditional type

of definition p e r ge n us e t d ifie re n tiam are dra n from mathe w
. s
m atics For in a calculu such definitions are often practicable
“
and useful Because th e terms of such a calculus are u n in ter
.

re te d the r u les connecting them can be as clear c u t as the r u les

p
-
,
“
s
of chess But as soon a we pass from pure to applied mathe
.
”

m atics i t is hard to find a single acc u rate and u sefu l definition

,

o f the traditional type The kind of definition that consists in

.

i
giv ng the connotation of a term in the form of a necessary and
su fficient condition determi ning a class far from being normal ,

or customary is something exceptional and remarkable

, .

s
Consider th e problem that arise in defining th e meaning o f
a name for some breed of animal S uppose we had to explain .

the meaning of the word dachshund to somebody not already

acq u ainted wi th those agreeable little beasts o r ith the name w
applied to them It is unlikely that a dictionary definition like
.

one of a German breed of small hou nds wi th a long body and

”
very short legs would be satisfactory For a man ho had mastered . w
this defini tion could hardly be expected to recognize a dachshund
w hen he met one A t first ight a basse t ho u nd may resemble a
. s “
,

dachshund and the diction ary definition of the former as a long

,

bodied short legged dog resembling a dachshund b u t larger and

-

heavier will not help us much in distinguis hi ng bet een an over w

sized dachshund and an unders zed bas se t i .

S omebody mi ght be inclined to say that the dictionary definitions

are simply poor as definitions and that su ffi cient ingenuity ou ld w
provide a satisfactory defini tion of the traditional type But if .

we really wanted to teach the use o f the word a more frui tful ,

w
proced u re ould surely be the e x hib itio n of sp e c im e ns this is ,

w
ho all of us in fact learn to use words like dachshund “
spaniel ,
”
,
”
or bulldog A s u ccessful explanation of this kind ill us u ally
. w
require the presentation of a wide range of variation in the s peci
mens in order to diminish the risk that adventitious common
,

features might be supposed significant n the other hand t . O , i

 DE FI N I I O N
T , PRE S U P P O S I ION
T A N D A S S E RT O N I
will be unwise to exhibi t abnormal or exceptional pecimen ; the s s
obj ect is to have an extensive ran ge of variation gr oup ed around
some c le ar c as es 2 .

The clear cases may themsel es sho considerable vari ation v w .

The learner may be shown a wire h ai red or a mooth dachshund -

s
or again dachsh u nds o f variou colors al l of them being pre
, ,
“
s ,

sented as equally good clear cases .

Part of s u ch a definition of the word dachshund might take

w
the follo ing form : This dog and that one an d that one are
c le ar cas e s of a dachshund This o ne is very nearly a clear c ase .
,

but has such and such a deviation This o ther one i sti ll further . s
removed from being a perfectly clear case An d thi one i a . s s
borderline specimen and could be called a da chshund or a ba e t ss
i ”
ndifferently The specimens by means of whi h the meaning of
. c
“
the labe l dachshund is explained are pre ented n an orde r ”
s i ,

determined by the degree of deviation from one or more specimens

that are introd uced a typical or clear cas e ”
s s .

S uch exhibi tion of specimen is usually intended to result n s i

w
the kno ledge of c riteria for application of the word da hshund c ,

s
for otherwi e the learner wi ll find i t hard to apply th e label to new
cases 3 . H
owever the demand for a n ecess ary and s ufii cie n t cri
,

te rio n is too exacting .

A l l kinds of features are relevant to the cla m that a particular i

dog is a dachshund its length weight the texture and color of its
-
, ,

coat the relative proportion of i ts leg to the rest of its body and
, s ,

so o n If all these features are with in certai n ranges of variation

.

“
,

we have a typical dachshund ( a clear if any of them are

outside the corresponding range of variation the animal falls ,

short in that respect of complete conform ty to the type No one

, , i .

of these criteria is by itself nece ary nor is any of them su fficient ss , ,

and the same is true of any simple conj unctive or d sjunct ive com i
“
bination of the cri teria The anim al s we cal l dachshund have ”
. s
“ ”
no common attribute an d there i s trictly speaking no class , s , ,

of dachshunds Instead of a harp boundary bet een dachshunds

. s w
and other animals we have what h as been called a borderl ne
,
“
i
region — a kind o f no man s land where dev ation from typical -
’
i
specimens of th e breed is so gr eat that the question whe ther given
animal s belong to the breed is no longer d ete rmi nate But there .

“ ”
w
is no sharp line bet een the borderli ne region and the field of
clear application .

It is customary to represent th e relation of a class of thin g s

4 2 A M E R I CA N P H I L O S O P H E S W O R K R AT

to the rest of the universe by a ci rcle or s ome other closed c ur e v .

Points inside the circle and on its circumference represent member s

of the class in question while points outside the ci rcle represent
,

things excluded from that clas s The fact hat every point in h. t t e
diagram is either inside outside the circle accurately reflect s
or

the concep tion of a class determined by a strict di chotomy

as .

For a spatial representation of the mutual relation s of the

“
things referred to by a word like dach hund we may think s ,

o f the way i n which a mountain range gradually merges i nto

the plains to which i t descends The s ummit s may be taken . to
corre s pond to the typical or clear cases while the region where
“ ”
,

the mountain eventually becomes indistinguish bl from h s ur a e t e

rounding plains represent s the borderline region The corre “
.
”

s
p d i
on
g geometrical
n diagram will be a f A m ong the many s u r ace .

forms which s ch a surface might t ke h ca s e of a tableland

u a , t e

or mesa w i h precipitou s boundi ng faces wi ll c respond to the

“ ”
t or

special c ase of a c lass te rm I propose to say that th e individual

.

dachshunds consti tute a range ra ther than a class of instances

, , .

It mi ght be thought that the rea on there is no necess ary and s

“
su fficient cri terion for the application of the word dachshund ”
is
i ts imprecise use by laymen who lack the specialized knowledge
needed for the substitution of a more prec se word But the more i .

detailed specifications formulated by breeder reveal e sentially s s

the same logical situation In place of my vagu e references to
.

, w
length eight an d so on (which betrayed my o w n i gnoran ce o f th e
,

breed in question) w
e find more detailed instructions concerning
the traits and features that must be displayed by a satisfactory
specimen of the breed These criteria however are till very
.
, , s
numerous admi t of vari ation in the degree to which they are met
, ,

and no simple conj u nctive or disj unctive combination4 of them

is both necess ar y and s u fli c ie n t No r is this due to ineptitude on the
.

part of breeders and dog fanciers The quest for a definition p er .

g e n us e t d ifiere n tiam o w
u ld be futile in view of the purposes

the definition has to serve The flexibility of even th e te chnical

.

use o f the breed name is demanded by the complexity and varia

b i l i ty of the phenomena to be descri bed A bsence of a n e ces .

sary and su ffi cient criterion is not a symptom of inadequacy of

the langu age b u t acc u rately reflects the complexity and continuous
,

v ariability of the s u bj ect matter to which th e language refers .

The nonexistence of ri gi dly demarcated classes is not a pe s

c i al and peculiar b y product of canine promis c uity If we ex
-
.
44 A M E I A N P HI L O O P H
R C S ERS AT WO RK

usually be possible to gi vevery exact nstructions for arranging i

instances in the order of their distance from the paradigm s In .

short the expression

,
”
range definition i i t elf a range term 5 s s .

I hope the example “

of the word dachshund w ll have s u ffi i
c ie n tl y ind cated what i I would accep t a a clear ca e of a range s s
definition .

Wh en we teach a man the meaning o f th e word dachshund ,

we take i t for granted that he ha a good deal o f elementary but s

relevant kn owledge about the behavior of dogs and other animals .

For exam ple we expect him to know that the trait of an animal
, s
—
vary continuously du ring i t lifet me that leopards do not changes i
s
their spot and lions never change into tigers S o far as I can ee
, . s ,

f
no re ere n c e to such approximate constancy of traits is p ar t of
“ ”
the meaning of the word da h shund or o ther breed names et c . Y
i
th s fact abou t the continuity of trai ts plays an importan t part in
i
determ ning the application of the range term dachshund a ”
, s
th e following considerations will show .

Consider what we should say if a dog that atisfied all the s

s
test for being a clear case o f a dachshund ere gradually to w
change until i t were indist ngui hable from a poo dle and then i s ,

back again until it looked exactly like a dachshund ! S ho u ld we

feel j ustified in continuing to call i t a dachshund? And should we
i
b e speaking correctly f we did ? If I am righ t in thinking that
reference to th e continuity and constancy of traits is not part of
”
the meaning of dachshund we can hardly regard this q u eer ,
“
kind of dog as a borderline case ur dachshund poodle or . O -

s
poodle dachshund till exemplifies in e mi nent degree all the c
-

s ti tu tiv e factor s
we have in mind in using the word dachsh u nd
”
and th e case is unlike that of a deformed puppy or sport deviat ,
”
ing so far from the clear cases as to fall w i th n the penumbra i
w
of vagueness If e forget its curiou history we have an animal
. s ,

that ought to ran k as an excellent specimen of the breed Never .

i
th e l e ss I th nk we should be right to refuse to apply the word
,
“ ”
dachshund in th s type of case 6
“
i .

The uses of th e word dachshund were taught to us on the

assumption that th e fantastic case I have j ust been descri bing
never happens And if such a case ere to happen the correct
. w ,

w
verdict o u ld be that no provision as made for it in the original w
 DE FI N I I O N T ,
PRE S U P P O S I ION
T A N D A S S E RT O N I 45

process of definition It wo u ld be w rong to say of such an .

extraordinary freak This is a dachs hund an d equ ally wrong to

, ,

say This is n o t a dachsh u nd — unless the negati e statement as

,
“ ”
v w
used to mean that the ord dachsh u nd had no application to w ”

. O “
the situation ( f course a man might say This is a dachshund , , ,

in an attemp t to enforce a change in the me aning of the word ,

but I am excluding thi s type of case ) .

The correct j u dgm ent wo u ld be that s u ch a freak not having ,

w
been considered hen the definition w as fr am ed falls on that ,

acco u nt o u ts ide th e ju ris d ic tio n of the definition The q u estion .

w hether or not such an extraordinary obj ect is a dachshund d o es

n o t aris e
“
because an ybody ho u ses the term dachshund ac
,
w
cording to the usual definition is committed to taking for granted
that s u ch extraordinary ca es do not occ u r ( I t ould be rath er s . w
odd to say that we normally b e l iev e in the absence of s u ch aberran t
, w v
cases since e e ry likely have not considered the q u estion B u t if .

w
the question ere p u t i t would be ans ered u nhesitatingly ) , w .

S u ppose I be t a dollar that a certain coin ill sho hea d s after w w

being flipped into the air i e promise to pay a dollar if it sho s , . .
,
w
tails in consideration of receiving a dollar if i t sho s heads We
, w .

can imagine that by some extraordin ar y chance th e coin in

, ,

q u estion lands and remains o n e dge I s ei ther par ty then obligated .

to pay any sum ? Clearly not This type of case as not considered . w
in the framing of the conditions regu lating the b e t The terms of .

th e w w
ager ere framed u pon the s u p p osition that the coin o u ld w
show ei ther heads or tails upo n landing If the coin lands on its .

, w w
edge or is s allo ed by some hungry bird or explodes in mi d air ,
-
,

or suffers one of the other fantastic and unlikely mischances that

were too abs u rd to ha e been di sc u ssed hen e made the bet v w w
w “
hy then the be t is off as e say The terms of the wager become ,
”
w .

null and void for f ai l u re of one of the s u p p ositions hose tru th

, w
had been taken for granted I t has long been recognized that be ts . ,

promises commands and other s u ch lingu istic acts may depend

, ,
“ ”
u p on s u p p ositions in the sense that they become n u ll and void
,

if those s u p p ositions pro e false I t has not been so clear ly recog v .

n i z e d that definitions also may become n u ll an d void for pre cisely

‘

similar reasons The exam p le I ha e gi en p ro ides a case o f this

. v v v
w
kind I believe in hich the form of ords Thi s is a dachshund
, , w ”

v
fails to ha e a good u se not beca u se i t contai ns a nonsense word ,
“ ”
like S nark and not on acco u nt of o ert o r concealed contra
, v
diction and not finally beca u se the instance in q u estion is a
, , ,
4 6 A MERICA N PH ILO S O P H ER S AT WORK
borderline specimen The expression Th . a dachshund fails is is
to have a predetermined use because the case in question violates
one of the conditions determining the kind o f case in which either
th at expression or its logical negation i properly applicable s .

The example I have been using was one in which the a sumption s
o r supposi tion upon which the defini tion was based took the form

of a claim about a certain regu lari ty of occurrence in the consti

tu tiv e factors ( the physical traits of a dachshund) The follo ing . w
example illustrates the case of a supposition concerning relation s
between two o r more of the constitutive factors .

In diagnosing a disease a physician will pay attention both

,

to the observable condition of the patient s body (hi tempera ’

s
ture p u lse rate and so o n ) and to the feelings o f pain or dis
, ,

comfort reported by the patient Features o f the conditions of the .

patient s body and features of his experience are con titutive fac
’

“ ”
s s
tors o f such a term as scarle t fever Consider now the predi ca .

w
ment of a physician ho finds a patient exhibiting all the o u t
w ard symptoms o f an acu te case of scarlet fever while ro fess rn
p g ,

to feel in perfect health The doctor might be inclined to cry out

.
,

incredulously This kind of thing j ust doesn t h ap p en l —as indeed

“
,
” ’

s
i t does not An d thi is o n e reason why i t is a case ou tside the
.

scope of the name scarlet fever It would be wrong t o say the .

patient had sc ar let fever and wrong to say he did not have scarle t
,

—
fever j ust as wrong as to ans er th e question
”
“
w
ave you s topped H
beating your mother ? either in the afli rm ativ e o r in the negative .

P art of the medical definition of scarlet fever migh t be put n i

“
the form : S carle t fever is shown by the presence o f uch and s
s
such feelings and uch and such bodily manifestation the tw o
, s ,

o c c u rring to ge th er
“
H
ere the word the two occurring together
. s
“ ”
express what I have been calling a suppo ition of the definition s
-
the assumption violated in the instance I have conj ured up .

Consider for a last example the case of a student of theology

, ,

w ho believes that there is a Being who is omnipotent b e c aus e

“ ”
he is o m n rscien t An d let us suppose that he gives the name God
.

to this Being so that the definition of that word as he uses i t i

, s
“
w
the Being ho is omnipotent because omniscient S uch a m an .

wo u ld believe I am supposing that omniscience necessarily con

, ,

fers omnipotence and that omnipotence is impo sible wi thout s

i
omnisc ence . H
e would therefore use omniscience or omnipotence
, ,

s “
indi fferently a crite ri a for application of the word G od No w .

s
let us uppose that fur ther studies led the theologian to revise hi s
 DEFINI ION T ,
PRE S UP P O S I ION
T AND AS SER ION T 47

ori ginal belief by substituting for i t the belief that there was a
w
Being who as omniscient but not ho ever omnipotent This , w , .

discovery might e as ily appear as a lo gi cal con tradiction Qua .

i w
omnisc ent the Being hose existence ha now been discovered
,
” “
s
should be called God but qua n o n o m nip o ten t he is not God
, .

H owever there is no contradiction The i tuation is that a up

,
”
. s s
position for the u se of the name God (v iz that a Being who is .
,

i w
omnisc ent ill necessari ly also be omnipotent) ha here been s
abandoned and the name no longer has its origi nal use When
, .

v
e er a s u pposi tion as to th e correlation o f constitutive factor i s s
falsified a self contradiction will seem to result This appearance
,
-
.

is produced by an e ffort to apply a ord in its ori gi nal me aning w

to a case o u tside the scope of that meaning .

“
N ormally the supposi tions involved in a range definition
,

are not explicitly stated When they are accepted by both parties
.
,

i t is u nnecessary to allude to them and only the ne stipulation , w s

needed for the definition are stated in so many words B u t if the .

w
suppositions ere explicitly fo rm u lated they o u ld naturally be , w
expressed in a kind of p ream b le S uch an explicit definition ould . w
v
then ha e the form : Whereas s u ch and s u ch is the case therefore ,

w
the ord W shall be applied in s u ch and s u ch ays ere the first w . H
“
cla u se ( Whereas such and such is the case ) is hat I have ”
w
called the preamble .

The proposi tion expressed by the preamble and any logical con
sequences o f that proposition I propose to call from now o n , ,

p res u
pp os itio n s of the ord in q w
u estion Thus it is a presupposition .

w “
of the ord dachshund that breed characters are approximately ”

”
constant ; i t is a presupposition of the name scarlet fever that
the condition of a patient s body is correlated ith that patient s
“
’
w ’

feelings ; it was a pres u pposition of th e term God in the use ,

described that any Being ho as omniscient ould be o m nip o

, w w w
tent I t will be noticed that according to the above definition a
.
, ,

w
pres u pposition of a ord is al ays a proposition i e something w , . .
,

that is true or false — and not itself a ord w .

O f course the relation expressed by the ords Whereas

, w
therefore is qui te different from the relations of material im
,

plication or entailment The words follo ing Whereas .

“
ie w , . .
,

the preamble express a practical consideration or rea so n for

,

framing th e definition as e do The definition doe s not o l l ow w . f

from the p res u p p ositions of the ord defined nor do th e p resup w ,

positions follo from the de finition w .

4 8 AMER ICA N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
Though I introduced the foregoing analysis by referring
a case in which a word dachshund was supposed to need e , ,

planation for the benefit of somebody unacquainted with its mea

ing I have gradually hif ted to talking about definitions de cr
,
“ “
s ”
s i
ing the meaning of a name such as scarlet fever or God who
s
u e is already known Indeed the distinction proposed will app .
, s
s
j ust a well to the latter type of case as to th e former In the ca .

of any range word whose use we know say the word happiness ,
“
we may ask such questions as : What would be paradigms ( or cle :
s ”
s
case ) of happines ? By what cri teri a do we j udge the re l ati r

s
degree of deviation from these paradigm ? ow are these cri ter s H ”

” “
related ? What are the presuppos tion of th e word happ iness i s .

s
“
In th e ca e of a word like happiness the ans ers to such q u t , w
s
tions a these might be said—at any rate by some philosopher —1 s
i s
const tute an analy is rather than a defin tion But thi di s tin c tic i . s
is unimportant for the present discussion .

s
Que tions may arise as to the meaning o f whole sentences ,

well as the words composing such sentences ; and some words a:

of such a character that their meaning can be explained only I
reference to the meaning of sentences in which tho e words c a s
occur O
ur account can be easily adapted to apply to sentences
.

s “
w
”
a well as to ords The ranges will now be ranges of situatio n
.

rather than things By the pres u ppositi ons of a sentence will I

.

“
meant a proposition expressed by the preamble of an ex p l an
i
t on of th e meaning of that sentence and all the logical cons
q u e n c e s of that proposition If a presup p osition of a ord W . w
, s
falsified it become impossible to say of the instance fal sifyir ,

it ei ther that i t is W or that i t is not W S imilarly if a p res u

, .
,

position of a sentence is falsified n a given situation i t become ir i , s

possible in that situation either to say that the sentence expres s
a true proposition or that i t does not ; the q u estion of truth
falsity simply fails to arise .

S ome o f the presuppositions of a sentence are sometimes sh o t

by explici t symbolic devices Thus among the pres u ppositions .

”
the sentence N apoleon me t the Czar of R ussia the pro]
“ ”
s i ti o n s th a t so m e b o dy ca lle d N ap o le o n o n ce e x is te d, th at th e
“ ”
is a c o u n try c a ll e d R us s ia, th a t R uss ia h ad o ne an d o n ly a

Cz and so on
ar, . O
f these presuppositions the last is ex p l ici ,

symbolized by the occurrence of a descriptive phrase of the fo

“ ”
the so and so 7 .

In criticizing a particular philosophical argument i t may ,

 DE FI N I I O N
T ,
P RE S U P P O S I ION
T A N D A S S E RT O N I 49

more important to examine the pres uppositions of the terms used

than to try to refute the considerations advanced in support of
the conclusion Indeed if the preferred term inology of the author
. ,

is accepted by the cri tic there may remain little scope for radical
,

disagreement abou t the position in question Consider for instance .

, ,

“ ”
w
the difference bet een arguing about logical to p ics ( a) in terms of
”
s s erti b ili ty
!
L tru th
-
b
( ) in
, terms of warra n ted a Can this be .

one reason why philosopher so often complain that their critics s

have failed to understand them ?8
In order to simplify the dis c ussion I have sometimes spoken as ,

if the words expressions and sentences used for illustration had the
, ,

same meaning for all their users so that e migh t properly speak , w
“ “ ”
of th e defini tion or th e analysis of th e meaning of the ords ”
w
in question . O
f course the true situation is usually more compli
,
“ ”
c a te d E ven a relatively unambiguous word like
. dachshund will
be used by different speakers at the same time or by the same ,

speaker at different times in di ergent senses , v .

When different users of the word succeed in defining a term

according to th e patte rn I have been describing any di ergences , v
w
in their u ses ill res u lt in di ergences bet een the arious d e fi v w v
n i tio n s These may take a number of alternative forms There may
. .

b e disagreement abo u t the choice of paradigm s or about the ,

v
nature of the rele ant constituti e factors or abo u t the r u les v ,

determining the contribution of the factors to the ordering of

w
specimens ith regard to the paradi gms or finally ith regard to , w
the choice of pres u ppositions of the ord or se ntence in question w .

In order to have a determinate ans er to the q u estion What is “

w
the definition of the word W? we must specify w h a t us age of the
”

w ord W we have in mind Conversely a range definition is a ay.

, w
of rendering more specific one u se among many of the ord in w
i
q u est on .

w
I want no to use the foregoing theory in trying to become
“ “
clearer abo u t the notion of as sertion T h e ord assertion and .
”
w ,

the related and equally tro u blesome ord proposition are con w ,
”

s tan tl
y used by philosopher bu t i t is not clear hat is s
meant, w ,

or intended to be meant by either word , .

“ ”
The technical term assert is connected wi th the more incl u sive
”
layman s word say To assert omething is to s ay something n
’
. s ,
i
5 0 IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S
AMER AT WORK
one use o f the elu si ve term say I propos e
therefore to be g n by .
, , i
s
making ome obvious distinctions in the meaning o f the latter
word .

When a man says that fish are mammals he may b e do ng o ne , i

of four things :
()i e may H s mply be u ttering a i
et of noi e wh ch we hould s ss i s
recognize as an instance of the entence F h are mammals “
s , is ,

wi thout necessarily even understand ng what he s aying In thi i i s . s

“ ”
,
“
sense of say a man might say Fi h are mammals ”
n hi sleep , s , i s ,

i
and a fore gner can ay that fish are mammals without know ng s i
the meaning of a single E nglish word A parrot m ght ay the ame . i s s
thing and perhaps even a phonograph ( For the ake o f simplicity
,
. s ,

I shall neglect througho u t this essay the case o f w ritte n di course )

, , s .

ii
( ) A man may pronounce the word “
Fish are mammals s , ,

as in ( i ) above and also understand what the word m ean s

mean something b y them) and ye t not be us ng the entence to i s
make an assertion If a student has said in c la s It is my opinion
.
, s ,

that fish are mammals th e lecturer may echo part o f his remark , ,

saying with the same intonation and expre ion Fi h are m am

, ss , s
mals L e t us consider this
.
”
nlike the student he s not c laim ing . U , i
that fish are mammals r a man may pract ce a peech he has . O i s
promised to make by saying aloud with the intonation and ex ,
“
pression appropriate to an assertion the words Al l men are ,
”
equal ! No t until he actually makes the speech will he c laim that
all men are equal A n actor in a play underst and what he ay
. s s s ,

b u t he is not taken by the audience to be cl ai ming that any thing s i

really the case (All examples n the following discussion will be
. i
d e c lara tiv e sentences but parallel dist nctions could be made for
, i
commands requests questions prayers and other form of speech
, , , , s .

A man can utter the words

“ ”
pen the door wi thou t giv ng a O i
“
command ; he may utter th e words Is P akistan a sovere gn state ? i
without asking a question ) .

( )
iii S ometime a man may utter th e s entence “
Fi h are m am s s
”
mals while disbelieving what he says in order to dece ve his , i
he ar ers . H
e is then making a truth claim though of course lying , .

I t is c u stomary to say of such a case as this that the speaker ass e rts
that fish are mammals whether he is lying or speaking truthfully , .

( )
iv Finally men often make statemen
, ts seriously in good faith , ,

knowing or believing what th ey say or at any rate not disb e liev , , ,

ing it In such a case as thi I shall ay the speaker h ones tly

. s , s
asserts that fish are mammals .
5 2 A M E R IC A N IO
P H L S O P H ER S AT WORK
Tom honestly asserted i t had begun to rain For example some . ,

people might say that the prior question addressed to the speaker
was merely a ca u se or reason for his assertion and no part of ,

w w
what e mean when e say that he made the assertion in question .

I am far from wanting to argue that an honest as ertion m u st s

w
al ays be preceded by a question to hich i t is an answer Bu t if w .

s u ch a question has been as ked i t is then relevant to our verdict

,

that a s u bsequent assertion has been made .

S uppose for example that after

, ary had asked
, ow is the M , H
“ ”
w
weather no ? Tom walking over to the window as before says
, , ,

Tomorrow is Tuesday The fact that what he said was n o t an

.

w
ans er to the preceding question would make t appear do u btful i
that he w as honestly asserting anything is hearer would naturally . H
suppose that he could not have heard th e question r ght or that i ,

he was j oking or indulging in a piece o f silly mys tific atio n r con . O

sider a case in which two men have been walking in the rain for a
good hour after the rain has started and one of them then turns ,

to the other saying It has begun to rain The hearer would not
, , .

w
kno what to make of this remark— its inappropriateness to the
general context would lead him to question whether any thing ‘

could have been honestly asserted e would fail to understand . H

what had been said in o n e important ense of understand
'
,
“
s ,

though in another sense of understand he would understand

perfectly well the meaning o f the word used s .

I hope enough has been said to indicate at lea t in outline how , s ,

w
I ould go about trying to show that a great many factors were
relevant to the claim that T o m had honestly asserted that it had
begun to rain .

S o far we have been talking about a ingle relatively determinate s , ,

s
si tuation and the feature of the ituation that are relevan t to th e s
claim that an honest assertion has been made If however we say . , , ,
“
Tom honestly asserted that it had b egun to rai n without speci ,

fy in g any particular context of utterance any one of a wide ran ge ,

o f situations would j ustify our claim Tom might not have u sed .

“
w
j u st those ords It has begun to rain but ome other sentence ;
, , s
“ ”
he might have used th e single word R ain ! and not a entence s
at all ; might have made the corresponding remark in French or
some other language ; or might imply have used some prearrangeds
signal or gesture No preceding question need have been asked ; th e
.

speaker might have made a mi stake in su p posing somebody was

present or that he could have been heard ; indeed nobody bu t the
 DEF I N I I O N I ION
T AS SER ION
, E
PR SUPPOS
5 3 T AND T

speaker need have been pre s ent The s peaker might not have i . n
tended to say anythi ng but found himself blurting the w ords
, out ;
might have b en telling the t th whi le knowi ng i t would i
e ru n
i b l y deceive his hearer and s o
e v ta through a whole gamut ; o n,

of variation s .

Th i s is how I would try to show that none of h relevant factor s t e

i
s n eces s ar
y for there to b a s ituat i on whi c h we should want to e

describe as one in which Tom hone s tly a ss erted that it had b gun e

to rai n H ow ever I do not wi sh to overempha ize the variety of

.
, s

these situations M y chief contention i s that these va i ou s yet

. r ,

related situations can be organized in te rm s of their deviation

,

from central cases or para di gms .

It may be obj ected that I have not p rov e d there i no neces sary s
and su fficient factor present in all cases of honest assertion that it
has begun to rain But if anybody think there is such an invari able
. s
index of honest assertion he may be hallenged to des cri be it , c .

There is of co u rse a cert ai n conventional way of pronouncing a

, ,

— a
“ ”
s
sentence n a sertive tone of voice as we mi ght say which we — ,

often use as a reliable ign that omething has been asserted But s s .

a man can assert that i t ha begun to rain w thou t using ords s i w

a t all and hence withou t u sing an assertive tone of voice
,

“
n the . O
other hand one may say The bo oj um is a snar
, in an as sertive
,

tone of voice and be making no as e rtion whatever s .

The attemp t to find a necessary and sufficient factor in a sup

posed characteristic atti t u de o u th e part of the speaker is equally
“
doo med to fail u re S uppose somebody said To assert that it ha
.
,
’
s
begun to rain is to pronounce the words It has begun to rain or ,
‘
,

some sign having the same meaning in an assertive tone of voice ,

and w ith in te n tio n The speaker has to intend or mean hat he

.
‘ ’
w
says To assert honestly is to assert while believi ng hat one is
. w
asserting The chief di ffi culty about th is obj ection to the vie
. w
“ ”
I am advocating is that intend ng like all o ther psychological i ,

words is i tself what I have previo u sly called a range ord The
, w .

w ord refers not to a class of cases having a common identifiable

character b u t to a whole spec trum o f instances related to one
,

another by gradually shifting cri ter a i .

“
A clear case o f intending to say It has begun to rain ould b e , , w
the follo ing w . O
ur old friends T o m and ary have quarreled , M ,

so violently that they ha e not s p o ken to one a noth er for severalv

w
days Now T o m ants to heal the brea ch and says to himself The “

M i
.

very first time ary asks a question I intend to answer t Then , .

54 A M E R ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WORK
M ary asks , H ow is the weather now? and
h action pro ceed s a s t e
before .

H ere is a clear case of intention a paradigm Tom has considered , .

the matter formulated a prior resolution and ha s carried that

, ,

resol tion into effect But no w suppose s omebody simply asks

u .

me in a more normal situation what the weather i s I would

, , .

“
probably reply It has begun to rain without taking any p
, , ar

i l
t c u ar thought and certainly wi thou t needing to s crew my resolu
tion to h sticking point H ere there i s noth i ng over and above
t e . ,

my honestly making the assertion that could properly be called ,

my i d i g to make the as s ertion I s imply said what I did and

n te n n .
,

the fact that I did say i t in the circumstances in que s tion i s a

proof that I in ended to s ay it in the peculiar sens of intended
“
t
”
, e
“

that is relevant We do not usually s ay that a child who alter s the

.

posit i on of a chess piece a chessboard but know s nothing about

on ,
“ ”
the purpose or the rules of the game of chess has really made ,

a move But when an experienced chess player is p l aying a game

.
,

his making ly h m m e x ac t a s the child count s as a

t e sa e an e uv er

move There is no reason to believ that each move in a g m f

. e a e o

chess is accompanied b y a specific att i tude i ntention the or on

part of the player who makes the move S imi larly gi ven certai .
, n
surrounding circumstances the proof that a man mad an as s ertion , e

may be that he simply pronounced certain words ; and whe ther

or not he had any concomitant mental attitude may be irrelevant .

w
I ant to consider now some of the presuppo itions governing s
“
the usage of the expression hone tly assert ”
E xamination o f s s .

the factors relevant to the correct application o f the sentence ,

“
To rn asserted that i t had begun to ra n would how that the e i , s s
factors could be roughly separated nto three groups In the first i .

w
gro u p e can pu t whatever the speaker finally d id i e in this case , . .
,

his prono u ncing the words in question in an a sertive tone of s

voice L e t us call this his p e r orman ce In the econd group let
. f . s
us put all factors which refer to the peaker s feelings memories s ’

, ,

intentions at the time of his performance insofar as they are

, ,

relevant L e t u s call these factors collect vely the speaker s m en tal

.
, i ,
’

s ta te .
( This is not a very happy term but I think it me an rng , s
w
here ill be su fli c ie n tl y underst o od ) Finally let us lump toge ther .
,

v
e erything else relevant to th e claim that Tom a erted i t had
, ss
begun to rain by ca l ling the remaining factor collectively the
, s , ,

c o n te x t The context o f our orig nal p aradi gm in luded e g

. i c , . .
,
 DEFINI IO N T , PRE S U P P O S I ION AND
T A S S E RT O N I 5 5

s ’
Tom having been a ked a que tion the fact that i t w as rai ni ng s s , ,

and o on s .

No w w s
hi le the peaker s performan e hi s mental tate and the ’
c , s ,

context are all relevant to the claim that he honestly made a

certain assertion I think we commonly expect there to be certain
,

s
causal connection be t een them We normally suppose that if a w .

man prono u nces the word “

It i r ai ning now in an assertive s , s ,

tone of voice and in the context previously descri b ed that is a

, ,

s u fficient sign that he is in the corr es ponding mental tate It s .

would seem pointless in this familiar type of ca e to require addi s

tio n al evidence that he ha th e beliefs intentions purpo e s and s , , s ,

so on which would be appropriate ; his performance in that con

,

text is excellent evidence that he i in the requisite mental state s .

O nly in abnormal ca es here th e performan ce is very remote s w

from our paradigms or the context is of a character with hi ch , w
w e are unfamiliar do e find t necessary to inquire into th e
, w i
speaker s mental state ’
nly in such atypical cases do w e find it . O
necessary to ask question like What was he trying to say ? What
“

“
” “
s ”
could he have had in mind ? What could he have supposed to
be the case ? What was his purpose ? — all directed to ard e l u ci
“ !
w
w
dating hat I have called the speaker s state of rriin d
“ ’
.

O “
ne general presupposition o f the term honestly assert accord
ingl y takes the form
“
Given such and such a context the pe ak , , s
’

w
er s performance ill signify that he is in s u ch and such a mental
”
state A ccordingly the cri teria e use in cen tral and typical cases
. w
have reference mainly to performance and context and not to the ,

mental state that is supposed to be correlated with them 9 .

“
S o far I have been discussing th e meani ng of th e term h o n es tly
,

assert I have chosen to do this ra ther than to begin by co n s id

.

“
ering the term assert because I think assertion can easily be ,

explained in terms of honest as ertion hile the reverse is not s , w

the case A speaker who asserts but does not honestly assert what
.
, ,

he says is lying , . H
e is p re te n d ing to make an honest assertion
w
in a cas e in hich he di sbelieves what he is saying If we under .

w
stand hat i t is to make an hone t as sertion and hat it is to s w
pretend to do some thing e can de ri ve a su ffi ciently clear notion , w
w
of hat i t is to make a show of honestly asserting that is to ay , s ,

w hat i t is to lie O “
n the other hand the expression honest asser
“
. ,

tion doe s s u ggest that honest as sertion st an ds for a subrange

“ ”
of a wider range of situations called assertion If thi s suggestion .
5 6 AMER WORK I CAN PH IL O S O P H E R S AT

were co ect i t ought to rr , to desc i be a range of be po s sib l e fi rs t r

situations hat are what we would w t to call as sertions (whether

t an

honest or di shone s t) and then to select f om the s e a s ubrange to r

which we give h name hone s t a s e ti on T his however s ee m s

t e
“
s r .
”
, ,

to me to be an inver s ion of the proper order of definition of the

two terms I cannot s ee how to de sc ibe what we mean when we
. r

talk abou t cases f lying except by s aying s omething like L ying

o ,
“

occurs when a man t i es to give the illusion that he is telling the r

truth i that he i s hone s tly asserting some hing If thi s i s cor

, . e .
, t .

rect we need to understand what i t is to speak truthfully before

,

we can understand what i t i s l i we mu s t define honestly assert to e;

“ ”

before we define a ss ert c an

“
.
”

We do i n fact le rn to under s ta d l nguage i n our infancy

, , a n a

because adults b gin by telling the truth to u s however much

e ,

they may afte wa d u s e language for decept i on A s oci e ty in which

r r .

parents constantly lied to thei ch i ldren from the out s et and r ,

in unpredictable ways would be i n which so far I could , o ne , as

see i t would be logi cally impos s ible for the next generation to
,

learn the la guage The connec i on between the words h

n . t , t e en

i
v ro nm and the norma l human purpo s es of the s peakers would
en t,

be destroyed and for tho s e new comer s to the s ociety who had no
,

previous memori es of t u htell i ng fall b ack upon the words r t to ,

they heard could have no mean i ng .

From M ax Black P b l m f A ly i ( I haca Cornell U ni versi y ,

ro e s o na s s t , t
Press 1 9 5 4 ) R ep i n ed wi th p ermi ssion of p blisher
,
r t u .

1
193 2
.
J)p 81
Creigh ton and H R S m art, A n I ntro du c to ry L o g ic ( New
. E
.
.

.
. . o rk , Y
” “
2 O c c asio n al ly it mi ght se em m o re natu ral to s p e ak o f no rm al,
. s tan d ard,
” “

fi
“ ”
c e ntral , p erfe c t, or i de al s p e c im e ns I s h al l n o t c o ns id er the d iffere nt .

“
v ari eties o f d e nitio n th at so m e o f th e se w o rds s u gg e s t I s h al l u s e ty p ic al .

” “ ”
c as e , th ro u gh o u t, as a sy no nym fo r c l e ar c as e .

q
”
3 By a c ri te rio n I m e an a tes t w hic h c an b e u se d in d e term ining w h e th er
v
.

th e w o rd in u e s tio n sh o u l d b e rig h tl y ap p l ie d to a g i e n s p e c im e n S u c h a t es t .

”
w il l n o rm al ly m en tio n so m e c h arac ter ( o r c o n s titu ti v e fac to r as w e s h all l ate r
c al l it ) th at th e S p e c im e n is re u ire d to h av e T h u s , o n e c r
“ ”
q
i te rio n for th e ap p li .

c atio n o f th e w o rd d ac hs hu n d is th at th e sp e c im e n b e w ithi n a giv e n s iz e

rang e I n th e c ase o f som e re l ativ el y s im p l e w o rds , h o w ev er, it w o u l d b e in ap
.

p ro p riate to sp e ak o f c ri teria I t s eems im p o s s ib l e to form u l ate any c ri terio n fo r

v
.

“ ”
th e u s e o f th e w o rd m au e o r o th er c o l or w o rd s .

q
4 I t m ay b e th at s o m e c o mp l e x tru th fu n c tio n o f th e d e s ire d c h arac te rs w ill
.

p rov e ro u g hl y ade u ate B u t su c h a c omb in atio n o f c h arac ters w il l h ardl y a nsw er

.

to th e d em an d s o f th e tra ditio n al c l as sific ato ry d e nitio n, n o r w ill i t i n c l u d e any fi

“ ”
in d ic atio n o f th e re l ativ e w eigh t o f th e fac to rs .
 DE FI N I I O N T ,
PRE S U P PO S I ION
T A N D A S S ERT O N I 5 7

v
5
p ro xi m a ting thi s ki n d o f d e nitio n is in fi
T h e o nl y p rev i o u s d is cu s sio n I h a e b e e n ab l e to fin d o f s o m e th in g ap
.

K eyn es s F o rm al L o g ic ( C am
’
Jv N
M e n fo rm c l as s e s o u t o f agu e l y re c o g niz e d res em b l an c e s l o n g
. .

fi
“
b rid g e ,
v
b efo re th ey ar e ab l e to g i e an in t e n s iv e d e nitio n o f th e c l as s n am e , an d in s u c h -

a c as e if th e y are as k e d to e x p l ain th e ir u s e o f th e n am e , th eir re p l y w il l b e to

fi
e n u m e ra te typ ic al e x am p l es o f th e c l ass T h i s w ou l d no d o u b t o rd in aril y b e d o n e

v fi
.

in an u ns c ie n ti c m ann e r, b u t i t w o u l d b e p o s sib l e to w ork it o u t s c i e n ti c al ly fi .

T h e e x te n s i e d e ni tio n o f a n am e w il l tak e th e fo rm : X is the na m e o f the c l as s

o f w hic h Q 1 , Q 2 , Q n are ty p ic al T his p rimi ti e form o f d e ni tio n m ay
a l s o b e c all e d d efinitio n b y ty p e L S S teb b ing o b e c ts to th is :
.

“
v
j fi
(p It
v
. . .

re g ard e d as a p ro c e s s o f d e nin g
”
fi
m ay , h o w e er, b e d o u b te d w h e th er th e g iv ing o f typ i c al ex am p l e s c an b e rig htl y
( A M o de rn I n tro du c tio n to L o g ic [ L o n d o n,
p .

Cf . al s o fo l lo w ing s tate m e nt :
th e
typ e o f a p artic u l ar s p e c ies d e p e n d s o n th e fu l llm e n t o f an in nity o f c o rre l ate d fi
T h e c o nf o rm i ty o f an indiv i d u al to th e
fi
p e c u liariti es , s tru c tu ral and fu n c tio n al , m any o f w hic h , so far as w e c an s e e ( lik e
k e e n ne ss o f s c e n t an d th e p ro p e rty o f p ers p iring th ro u gh th e to n gu e in d o gs ) ,
v
h a e n o c o nn e c tio n o n e w ith an o th e r T h e re m ay b e d e v i atio ns fro m th e typ e ,
.

t o a g re a ter o r l e ss d e gre e , in e n d l e ss d ire c tio n s ; an d w e c ann o t fix b y any h ard

v
an d fas t ru l e th e am o u nt o f d e i atio n c o n s is te n t w ith th e ir b e in g o f th at s p e c ie s ,
-

n o r c an w e e n u m erat e all th e
p o in t
e n te r in to th e d e term in atio n o f th in g s o f a k in d

v
s ,
o f fu n c ti o n o r s tru c tu re, th at in re ality

H e n c e fo r d e nitio n, s u c h as
fi
. fi
J
w e h a e it in g eo m e try , w e m u s t s u b s titu t e c l as s i c atio n ; an d fo r th e d e m o ns tra

tio n o f p ro p e rtie s , th e d is c o ery o f l aw s

”
( H v W B o s e p h ,
I n tro d u c tio n to
. . .

L o g ic [ 2 d c d ; O x fo rd , .
p .

6 B u t c o n tras t L o c k e s d is cu s s io n o f m o ns ters in Bk I I I , c h ap v i, s e c 2 7 , o f
’
. . . .

th e E s s ay Al s o L e ib ni z Ne w E s s ay s C o n c e rn in g the H u m an U n d e rs ta n d ing , B k
’
.
.

I I I , c h ap v i
7 Cf. F St a
. P
.

r.
p 3 4 4 o f th e O p e n C o u rt e d itio n )
w s o n
.
,
“
O n R e
.

ferr in g,
”
M in d , V o l 5 9 p p 3 2 0— 3 4 4
.

, . .

an d e s p e c ial l y p 3 3 0 . .

P
8 I t is ins tru c tiv e to read in this c o n n ec tio n R o y c e s arti c l e , O n D e ni tio ns
.

”
’

re p rin te d in R o y c e s
’
fi
an d D e b ate s in J o u rnal o f hil os o p hy , V o l 9
q
.

P
L o g ic al E s s ay s , e d D S R o b inso n ( D u b u u e , I ow a,
. . .
Th e Am erican
h il o s o p h ic al Asso c iatio n h ad s e t u p a d is tin gu is h e d C o mm itte e o n D e fini

j P fi
“
tio n s
”
to fix th e te rm s o f a g e n e ral d is cu ss io n , T h e R e l atio n o f C o ns c io u s n es s
an d Ob e c t in S e n s e erc e p tio n
”
R o y c e argu es , in p e rs u as i e an d s o m e tim e s
.

c o m p l ex o f
v
am u sin g d e tai l , th at th e d e niti o ns c h o s e n all p res u p p o s e th at a

p yh s ic a l u ali ti q
es
”
c o u l d b e g i e n i n v
so m e p a r t i c u l ar p erce p tio n
”
S in c e R o y ce , .

l ik e m any o th e r p h il o s o p h e rs , c ou l d n o t ac c e p t th is p res u p p o s itio n , i t b e c am e

im p o ss ib l e fo r h im to p art ic ip ate in th e d is c u s sio n
v
.

9 Wh e n th is p res u p p o s itio n is io l ate d w e g e t p arado xic al u tteran c es , as in

.

th e c as e o f a m an w h o s ay s s o m e th in g o f th e fo rm
“
p b u t I d o n t b e l ie e i t
”
,
’
v .
 RU D O L F CARNA P

Mea n ing a nd Sy no nymy

in Na tu ra L a nguages l

1 . M e an ing A n a lys is in P ragmatics an d S e m an tics

s
The analysis of meanings o f expression occur n two fu n d ame n si
tally different forms The first belongs to p ragm atics that i the
.
, s ,

empirical investigation o f historically given natu ral languages .

This kind of analysis has long been carried out by lingu ist and s
philosophers especially analytic philosopher The second form
, s .

w as developed only recently in the field of symbolic logic ; this

form belongs to s e man tics ( here understood in the ense of pure s
semantics while descri ptive semantics may be regarded as part of
,

pragm atics) that is the study of constructed language sys tems

,

given by their rules .

The theory of the relations between a language —ei ther a natural

u u —
lang age or a lang age system and what language is about may
w
be divided into t o parts which I call th e theory of extension
and the theory of intension respectively 1 The first deals wi th
, .

concepts like denoting naming extension truth and related

, , , ,

“ ”
,
“ ”
ones ( For example the word blau in Ge rman and like i e , ws
the predi cate B in a symbolic language system if a rule assi gns
to it the same meaning denote any obj ect that is blue ; i ts exten
,
“ ”
M
sion is the class of all blue obj ects ; der ond i a name of the s
60 A M E R ICA N P HI L O S O P H E R S AT WORK
which had been used for natural languages by philosophers or
linguists though usually without exact definitions Those eman
, . s
tical concepts were in a sense intended a ex p l ic ata for the corre
, , s
s o n d in
p g pragmatical concept s .

In the case of the semantical ntension concepts there is an i

additional motivation for studying the corresponding pragmatical
concepts The reason is that some of the obj ections raised against
.

these semantical concepts concern not so much any particular ,

proposed explication but the question of the very existence of

,

the alleged explicanda E specially Q u in e s criticism does not con

.
’

cern the formal correctness of the defini tions in pure semantics ;

w
rather he do u bts hether there are any clear and fruitful corre
,

s o n d in pragmatical concepts which co u ld serve as explicanda

p g .

That is the reason why he demands that these pragmatical con

c e ts be sho
p n w
to be scientifically legitimate by stating empirical ,

behavioristic criteria for them If I u nderstand him co rrectly he

.
,

v w
belie es that ithout this pragmatical substru ct u re the semantical
, ,

intension concepts even if formally correct are arb itrary and

, ,

witho u t p u rpose I do not think that a semantical concept in

. ,

order to be frui tfu l mus t necessarily possess a prior pragmatical

,

co u nterpart It is theoretically possible to demonstrate its fru i tful

.

ness thro u gh its ap p lication in the fu rther development of lan

u age systems B u t this is a slow process If fo r a given semantical
g . .

concept there is already a familiar though somewhat vague corre , ,

s o n di n pragmatical concept and if we are able to clarify the

p g
latter by describing an ope rational procedure for its application ,

the n thi s m ay in de e d b e a s imp l e r w ay fo r re fu tin g the ob je c tion s

and furnish a practical j u stification at once for both concepts .

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the nature of the prag

m a tic al concept of intension in natural languages and to outline
a behavioristic operational procedure for i t This will give a pra o
, .

ti c a l vin di c a tion for the s e man ti c a l inte nsion c on c e p t ; w a y for s s

defining them es p ecially analyticity I have sho n in a p revio u s
, , w
w
paper 2 By ay of introduction I shall first ( in § 2 ) discuss briefly
.

the pragmatical concepts of denotation and extension ; i t seems

to be generally agreed that they are scientifically le gi timate .

2 . T h e D e te rm inatio n o f E x te ns io ns

We take as example the German language We imagi ne that a .

w
lingu ist ho does not know anything abou t this language sets
s
out to stu dy i t by ob erving the linguistic behavior of German
 MEAN N I G AND S YN ONYMY IN NAT URAL LAN UA E S G G 61

speaking people M
ore specifically he studie th e German language
.
, s
as used by a given person Karl at a given time For simplicity . ,

we restrict the discu ssion in this paper mainly to predicates ap

plicable to observable things like blau and “ ”
und It is gen , H .

eral l a reed that on the basis of spontaneo s or elicited utterances

y g u ,

of a person the linguist can ascertain he ther or not the person

, w
w
is illing to apply a given predicate to a given thing in other ,

w w
ords hether the predicate denotes the given thing for the per
,

son By collecting results o f this kind the linguist can determine

.
,

first the extension of the predi cate

,
“
u nd within a gi ven region H
for Karl that is the class of the things to hich Karl is illing
, , w w
to apply the predicate second the extension of the contradictory , , ,

that is the class of those things for hich Karl denies the ap p lica
, w
tion of “
u nd H
and third the intermediate class of those things
, , ,

for which Karl is not willing ei ther to a ffirm or to deny the predi
cate The size of the third class indicates the degree of vagu eness
.

of the predicate “
H
und if e disregard for simp licity the effect , w
of Karl s ignorance abo u t relevant facts For certain predicates
’
.
,

e.
g .
“
, ensch M
this third class is relati
, ely very small ; the degree v
of their extensional vagueness is lo n the basis of the deter w O
.

mination of the three classes for the predicate “

u nd ithin the H ”
w
v
in estigated region the lingu ist may make a hypothesis concerning ,

the responses of Karl to things outside of that region and maybe ,

even a hypothesis concerning the total extension in the u niverse .

The latter hypothesis cannot of course b e completely verified b u t , , ,

every single instance of i t can in principle be tested O n the other .

hand i t is also generally agreed that this determination of exten

,

sion involves u ncertainty and possible error But since thi s holds .

for all concepts o f empirical science nobody regards this fact as a ,

s u ffi cient reason for rej ecting the concepts of the theory of exten
sion The sources of uncertainty are chiefly the following : first
. ,

the lingu ist s acceptance of the result that a given thing is denoted
’

by u nd H
for Karl may be erroneous e g d u e to a m isu n d er , . .
,

standing o r a factual error of Karl s ; and econd the generaliza ’

, s ,

w
tion to things hich he has not tested suffers of course from the , ,

uncertainty of all inductive inference .

3 . T h e D e term inatio n o f I n te ns io ns

The p rpose of this paper is to defend

u the thesis that the an al
y
sis o f intension for a natu ral langu age is a scientific proced u re ,

methodologically j ust as sound as th e analy is of extension T o s .

62 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
many lingu ists and philosophers thi thesi w ll appear a a truism s s i s .

Hw o ever some contemporary philosophers especially Quine 3 and

, ,

White believe that the pragm atical intention concepts are foggy
4
,

mysterio u s and not really understandable and that so far no

, ,

explications for them have been given They believe further that .
,

if an explication for one of these concepts is found i t will at be t , s

be in the form of a concept of degree They acknowledge the good .

scientific status of the pragmatical concepts of the theory o f exten

sion They emphasize that their obj ection against the intension
.

concepts is based on a point of principle and not on the generally

recognized facts of the technical difficulty of linguistic investiga
tions the indu ctive u ncertainty and the vagueness o f the word
, , s
of ordinary language I shall therefore leave aside n my dis cussion
. i
these di ffi c u lties especially the t o mentioned at the end of the
, w
last section Th u s the question is this : G ran te d that the l ingu is t
. ,

c an d e te rm in e th e e x te ns io n o f a g iv en
p re d ic ate , ho w can h e go
b ey o n d this an d d e te rm in e a ls o i ts in te ns io n?
“
The technical term intension wh ch I use here instead of the , i
“ ”
ambiguous word meaning is meant to apply only to th e og , c
n i tiv e or designative meaning component I shall not try to define .

w
this component It as mentioned earlier that determination of
.

truth presupposes knowledge of meaning ( in addition to knowl

edge o f facts) ; now cognitive meaning may be roughly charac
,

teriz e d as that meaning component which is relevant for the

determination of truth The noncogn itive meaning components al .
,

tho u gh irrelevant for questions of truth and logic may till be , s

very important for the psychological effect of a sentence on a
listener e g by emphasis emot onal association motivational
, . .
, , i s ,

effects .

I t m u st certainly be admitted that the pragm at cal determi na i

tion of intensions invol es a new step and therefore a ne meth v w
o d o l o ica l problem L e t us assume that two linguists investigating
g .
,

the langu age of Karl have reached complete agreement in the,

determination of the extension o f a given predicate in a given

region This means that they agree for every thing in thi regi on
. s ,

w hether or not the pre d icate in question de notes i t for Karl or

not As long as only these res u lt are gi en no matter ho large
. s v , w
the region is — you may take it fic ti tio u s ly as the whole orld if , , w ,

you like —i t is still possible for the linguists to ascribe to the predi
cate different intensions For there are more than one and possibly .

infinitely many properties whose extension wi thin th e given region

is j ust the extension determi ned for the predicate .
 MEAN N I G AND SYNO NYMY IN N AT U RA L L A N U A E S G G 63

H ere we come to the core of the controversy It concerns th e .

’
natu re of a linguist s as si gnment of one of these propertie to the s
predicate as i ts intension This assi gnment may be made explici t .

by an entry in the German E nglish dictionary conj oining the G e r -

,

w
man predicate ith an E nglish phrase The lingu ist declares hereby .

the German predicate to be synonymou s with the E nglish phrase .

The in te ns io n al is t th es is in pragmatics hich I am defending says , w ,

that the assignment of an intension is an empirical hypothesis

w hich like any other hypothesis in linguistics can be tested by
, ,

observations of langu age behavior n the other hand the e x . O ,

te ns io na l is t th es is asserts that the assignment of an intension on ,

the basis of the previously determined extension is not a question

of fact but merely a matter of choice The thesis holds that the .

lingu ist is free to choose any of those properties hich fit to the w

gi ven extension ; he may be guided in his choice by a considera
tion of simplici ty b u t there is no question of ri ght or wrong
, .

Quine seems to maintain this thesis ; he says : The finished lexicon

is a case evidently of e x p e d e H e rc u le m B u t there is a difference . .

H
In proj ecting ercules from the foot e risk error b u t we may de w
v
ri e comfort from the fact that there is something to be wrong
abo u t In the case of the lexicon p ending some definition of
.
,

, v
synonymy we ha e no stating of the problem ; we have nothing
”
for the lexicographer to be right or wrong abo u t 5 .

I shall no w
plead for the in te n sio n al is t thesis S uppose for . ,

example that one linguist after an investigation of Karl s peak

, ,
’
s
ing behavior wri tes into his dictionary the following
,

( )
1 P f erd, hor e s ,

while another linguist wri tes

( 2 ) P f erd, horse or unicorn .

S ince there are no unico rns the t o intensions ascribed to the , w

w “
w
ord Pferd by th e t o lingu ists although di fferent have the , ,

same extension If the ex te n s io n al is t thesis were right there would

.
,

w
be no ay for emp irically deciding bet een ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) S ince w
the extension is the same no response by Karl afli rm ativ e or nega
, ,

v w
ti e , ith respect to any actual thing can make a difference b e
w
t een ( l ) and ( 2 ) B u t what else is there to investigate for the
lin gu ist beyond Karl s responses conce rning the application of the
’

predicate to all the cases that can be fo u nd ? The ans er is he w ,

must take into acco u nt not only the actual cases b u t also possible ,

w
cases 6 The most direct ay of doing this would be for the linguist
.
64 AMER IC A N PH IL O S O P H E R S AT WORK
to use in the German questions directed to Karl modal expression
,

“ ”
,
s
corresponding to possible case o r the like To be s u re these .
,

expressions are usually rather ambiguous ; but this di fficulty can be

overcome by giving s u itable explanations and examples I do not .

think that there is any obj ection of principle against the use of
modal term s O
n th e other hand I think that their use is not
.
,

necessary The linguist could imply describe for Karl cases which
. s ,

w
he kno s to be possible and leave it open whether there is any ,

thing satisfying those de criptions o r not s

e may for example . H , ,

describe a unicorn ( in German ) by omething co rresponding to s

the E nglish formulation : a thing si mi lar to a horse but having ,

only o ne horn in the middle o f the forehead ”

r he may point . O
toward a thi ng and then de cribe the intended modification in
“
s
words e g : a thing like thi s one but having one horn in the
, . .

middle of the forehead . O

r finally h e m ght j ust point to a pic , , i
ture representing a unicorn Then he asks Karl whether he is ill .

”
w
ing to apply the word Pferd to a thi ng of this kind An affirm a .

tive or a negative answer will constitute a confirming instance for

( )
2 or
( )
1 respectively This shows that l
( ) . and ( )
2 are diff erent
empirical hyp otheses .

A l l l ogica l ly p os s ib le cases come into con ideration for the de s

termination o i intensions This includes also those cases that are .

causally impossible i e excluded by th e la, . .

,o f nature holding ws
in our universe and certainly those that are excluded by laws
,

s
whi ch Kar l believe to hold Th u if Karl believes that all P are . s ,

Q by a law o f n ature the linguist will,still induce him to consider

things that are P bu t not Q, and ask him whether or not he wo u ld
apply to them the predicate under investigation
The inadequacy o f the ex ten sio n al is t thesi is also sho n by the s w
following example Consider on the one hand these customary
.
, ,

entries in German E nglish d ctionaries -

i
( 3 ) E inh o rn, unicorn . K o b o l d, goblin ,

and on the other hand

, , th e following unusual entries

4
( ) E in h o rn, goblin Ko b o ld unicorn .
, .

No w w
the t o German wo rds ( and like ise the two E nglish ords ) w w
have the same extension viz the null class Therefore if the , .
, .
,

e x te n s io n al i s t thesis were co rrect there would be no essential em , ,

p iri c al l y testable difference between ( )

3 and The extension
alist is compelled to say that the fact that ( 3 ) is generally accepted
 MEAN N I G AND SYNONYMY IN N AT U RA L L A N U A E S G G 65

and (4 ) generally rej ected i merely due to a tradition created s

by the lexicographers and that there are no facts of German
,

v w
language beha ior hich could be regar ded as e idence in favor v
w
of ( 3 ) as against ( 4 ) I onder he ther any linguist ould be w w
w illing to accept (4 ) O
r to a oid the possibly misgu iding in fl u
, v
ence of the lexicographers tradition let u s p u t the q u estion this
’

w ay : Would a man on the stree t who has le arn ed bo th languages ,

by practi cal use wi thou t lessons or diction ari es accept as correct ,

a translation made according to

s
In general term the determination o f the ntension of a
, i
s
predicate may tart from some i ns tances denoted by the predicate .

s
The e sential task is then to find o u t what vari ations of a gi ven
s e crm e n I n variou
p respects s iz e shape color
) are admitted s , ,

wi thin the range of the predicate The intension o f a predicate .

may be defined as i ts range which comprehends those possible ,

s
ki nds of obj ect for which the predicate hol ds In this in estigation . v
of intension the linguist finds a new kind of vagueness
, hich , w
may be called in te ns io nal v agu e ness A s mentioned above the .
,

extensional vagueness of the word “

ensch is very small at least M ”
,

in the accessible region First the intermediate zone among ani

.
,

s
mal now living on earth is practically empty S econd if the an .
,

c e s to rs of man are considered i t is probably found that Karl ,

w
cannot easily dra a line ; thus there is an intermediate z one b u t ,

i t is relatively small H
owever when the linguist proceeds to the
.
,

de termination of th e in te ns io n of the word “

ensch th e situ a M ,

s
tion i quite di fferent .H
e has to test Karl s responses to d e s crip ’

tions of strange kinds of animals say intermedi ate bet een man , w
and dog man and lion man and hawk etc It may be that the
, , , .

linguist and Kar l know that these kinds of animals ha e ne er v v

lived on earth ; they do not know whe ther or not these ki nds ill w
ever occu r on earth or on any o ther plan et in any galaxy A t any .

rate this knowledge o r ignorance is irrelevant for the determina

,

.
’
s
tion of intension But Karl ignorance has th e psychological e ffect
that he has seldom if ever thought o f these kinds ( unless he hap
s s
pen to be a tudent of my thology or a science fic tio n fan ) an d -

therefore never felt an urge to make up hi s mind to which of

them to apply th e predicate ensch Con equently the linguist M . s ,

s s
finds in Karl re ponses a large intermediate zone for this predi
’

cate in o ther words a high intensional vagueness The fact that

, ,
.

Karl has not made such deci sions mean s that the intension o f th e
word “
M ”
ensch for him is not quite clear even to himself that ,

s
he doe not completely understand his o n word Thi s lack of w .
66 A M E R I CAN IL O S O P H E R S
PH WORK AT

clarity does not bother hi m mu ch b c use i t holds only for aspect s e a

which have very little practical import ance for him .

The ex te n sio n alis t will perhaps rej ect as impracticable the de

scribed procedure for determining intensions because he might ,

say the man on the stree t is unwi lling to ay anything about non
, s
s
existent obj ects I f Karl happen to be overreali tic in this way
. s ,

the linguist could still resort to a lie reporting say hi alleged , , , s

observations of unicorns But this is by no means nece sary The
. s .

tests concerning intensions are independent of questions of ex

s
i s te n c e The man on the stree t i very well able to understand and
i
.

w
to ans er quest ons about assumed ituations where i t is left open s ,

whether anything of the kind descr bed will ever actually occur i
or not and even about nonexisting situations This is sho w n in
, .

ordi nary conversations abou t alternative plans o f action about ,

the truth of reports about dreams legen ds and fairy tales

, , , .

A lthough I have given here only a rough in di cation of the

empirical procedure for determining intensions I believe that i t ,

is s u fficient to make clear that i t would be po si b le to write along s

the lines indicated a manual for dete rm ning intension or more i s ,

exactly for testing hypotheses concerning intensions The kind

, . s
of rules in such a manual would not be essentially different from
those c u stomari ly gi ven for proc edures in psychology lingui tics , s ,

and anthropology Therefore the rules could be understood and

.

carried out by any scientist ( provided he is not nfected by philo i

sophical prej udices) 7 .

4 . I n te ns io ns in th e L anguage o f S c ie nce

s s
The discussion in thi paper concern in general a simple pre ,

s cre n trfic language and the predicates con idered designate o b s erv
, s
s
able properties o f mate ri al bod ie L e t u now briefly tak e a look
. s _

at the langu age of s c ie nc e It is today still mainly a natural lan

.

guage ( except for its mathematical part) wi th only a few explic tly i
made conventions for some special words or ymbols It is a variant s .

of the p re s cien tific language caused by pecial professional need

, s s .

The degree of precision is here in general considerably higher

w
the de gree of vagueness is lo er) than n the everyday language i ,

and this degree is continually increasing It is important to note .

that this increase holds not only for extensional b u t also for in
tensional precision ; that is to say that not only the extensional
intermediate zones those o f actual occu rrences ) bu t also th e
intensional ones s
those o f pos ible occ urrences) are shrinking .
68 AMERWORK IC A N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT

intension of a predicate say Pferd for a speaker s ay Karl S ince , , , .

a p roce dur of his k in d i s ap p li ab l

e y hy p o h s is f i m n
t c e to an t e o te
sion h gen ra l on p f h in en ion f y p r di a in
t e e c ce
y t o t e t s o an e c te an

language for any person a t any time ha s a clear empiri cally test
,

able sense This general concept f intension may be characteri zed

. o

roughly as follows leaving s b tletie s aside the intension of a

, u :

predicate Q for a speaker X is the general condition w hich an

“ ”

obj ect y must fulfill in order for X to be willing to ascribe the

“ ”
predicate Q to y (We omi t for simplici ty the reference to a
.
, ,

time t ) 8 L e t u s try to make thi general characterization more

. s
explici t That X is able to use a lan guage L mean that X has a
.
/
s
certain system of interconnected d spos tion for certain linguistic i i s
“ ”
responses That a predicate Q n a language L ha the property
. i s
F as i ts intension for X means that among the disposi tions of X ,

constit uting the language L there the disposition of ascribing is

“ ”
the predicate Q to any obj ect y if and only if y ha the property s
F (F is here always assumed to be an observable property i e
. , . .

either directly observable or expl c tl y definable in terms of di ii

re c tl
y observable properties ) ( The g iven formulat on is over . i
simplified neglecting vaguene s In order to take vagueness into
, s .

account a pair o f intensions F1 F must be stated : X has the

, , 2
“ ”
disposi tion of ascribing afli rm ativ e ly the predicate Q to an o b
j y
ect if and only if y ha P I ; and the disposition of denying “
Q
”
s
for y if and only if y has F2 Thus if y has nei ther F nor F X .
, 1 2 ,

will give neither an affirmative n or a negative response ; the prop

e rt
y of having neither F1
nor F constitute the zone of vaguene ss
2
s ,

which may possibly be empty ) .

The concept of intension h as here been characterized only for

thing predicates The character zat on for expression of other
-
. i i s
types incl u ding sentence can be given in an an alogous ay The
, s , w .

other concepts of the theory of ntension can then be defined in i

th e usual way ; we
“
s
hall state only tho e for ynonymo u s and ”
s s
“
analytic in a simple form w thout claim to exactness i .

w
T o expressions are syn o nym o us in the l anguage L for X at
time t if they have the ame intension n L for X at t s i
A sentence is ana ly tic in L for X at t if i ts nten ion ( or range i s
or tru th condition) in L for X at t comprehends all pos sible cases
-
.

A langu age L was character zed above as a system of cert ai n i

disp ositions for the use of expressions I shall no w m ake some re .

marks o n the m e th o d o logy of d isp os itio nal co n c ep ts This wi l l help .

to a clearer u n dertand ing of the nature o f l ngui s tic concept in i s

 MEAN N I G AND SYNONYMY IN N AT URA L LA N U A E S G G 69

general and of the concep t of intension in particular L e t D be .

the di sposition o f X to react to a condi tion C by the characteristic

response R There are in princ ple although not al ays in p rac
. i , w
s
tice two way for as certaining hether a given thing or person
, w
X has the disposition D ( at a given time t) The first method may
be called b eh av io ris tic ( in a very wide sense ) ; it consists in pro
i
da c ng the condi tion C and then determining hether or not the w
response R occurs The second way may be called the m e th o d of
.

s tru c tu re ana l s is It consists in

y nvesti
.
g ating the state of X ( ati t)
s
in su fficient detail uch that i t is po s sible to derive from the o b
taine d des cript on of the state i ith the help of rele ant general w v
w s s
la s ( ay of phy ics physiology etc ) the responses hich X , , . w
would make to any spe fied circumstances in the en ironment ci v .

Then i t will be possible to predict in parti cular hether under , , w

the condition C X would make the response R or not ; if so X
, ,

has the disposition D othe rw ise not For example le t X be an , .

,

a u tomobile and D be the ability for a specified acceleration on a

horizontal road at a speed of 1 0 miles per ho u r The hyp othesis .

that the automobile has this ability D may be tested by either o f

w w
the follo ing t o procedures The behavioristic method consists .

in driving the car and observing its performance u nder the specified
conditions The second method consists in st u dying the internal
.

stru cture o f the cart espec ally the motor and cal c ulating i th the
, i , w
help of physica l laws the acceleration h ich wo u ld res u lt u nder the w
specified conditions With respect to a psychological disposi tion
.

and in particular a lingu i tic disposi tion of a person X there is

, , s ,

first the familiar behavioristic method and second at least theo ,

re tic all,y the method of a m i cro h

p y s i o l o
gi c al investigation of the
body of X especially the central nervo u s system A t the present
, .

state o f physiological knowledge of the human organism and espe

c i all the central nervous system the second method is f co u rse
y o , , ,

not practicable .

6 . T h e C o n cep t o f I n te ns io n for a R obot

In order to make the me thod of s truct u re analysis ap p licable le t ,

us now consider the pragmatical investigation o f the language o f

a robot ra ther than that of a human being In this case we may .

ass u me that we possess much more detai led kno ledge of th e i n w

ternal structure The logical nat u re of the pragm atical concepts
.

remains j u st the same S u ppose that we have a sufficiently detailed

.
7 0 A M E R I CA N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WORK
blueprint according to which the robot X and wa s constructed
that X has abilities of observation and of use of language L e t us .

assume that X has three inp u t organs A B and C and an output , , ,

organ A and B are used alternatively never simultaneously A i

.
, . s
an organ of vis u al observation o f obj ects presented B can receive .

a general description of a kind of obj ect ( a predicate expression)

in the langu age L of X which may consist o f ritten marks o r o f
, w
holes punched in a card C receives a predicate These inputs con
. .

s ti tu te the q u estion whether the obj ect presented at A o r any obj ect

satisfying the description presented at B is denoted in L for X by

the predicate presented at C The outpu t organ may then supply .

one of three responses of X for affirmation denial or ab tention ;

, , , s
the latter response wo u ld be given e g if the observation o f the , . .
,

obj ect at A or the description at B is n ot sufficient to determine a

s
definite answer Ju t as the linguist investigating Karl begins with
.

pointing to o b j ects bu t later after having determined the inter

, ,

re tati o n of some words asks questions formulated by these words

p , ,

the investigator of X s language L begins with presenting obj ect

’
s
at A but later on the basis of tentative results concerning the in
, ,

tensions o f some signs of L proceeds to present predicate expres

,

sions at B which use only those interpreted signs and not th e

predicate presented at C .

Instead of using this behavioristic method the investigator may ,

here use the method of structure analysis n the basis of the given . O
blueprint of X he may be able to calculate the respon es which X
, s
wo u ld make to vario u s possible inputs In particular he may be .
,

able to derive from the given bluep rint with the help of those laws ,

of physics which determine the fu nctioning of the organs of X ,

“ ”
the following result with respect to a given predicate Q of the
i
language L of X and spec fied propertie P an d F2 ( ob e rvable s I , s
“ ”
for X ) : I f the predicate Q is presented at C then X give an , s
affirmative response if and only f an obj ect having the property F 2 i
is presented at A and a negative response if and only if an obj ect
wi th F is presented at A This result nd cate that th e bo undary
1
. i i s
“ ”
of the intension of Q is some here b etween the boundary o f F1 w
and that of F For some predicate the zone o f indeterminateness
2
. s
between F and F may be fairly small and hence th s p reliminary
1 2
i
determination of the intension fairly preci e This might be th e s .

case for example for color predicates if the investigator has a uf

, , s
fic ie n t number of color specimens .

A fter this preliminary dete rmination o f the nten ion o f ome i s s s

 MEAN N I G AND SYNONYMY IN N AT U RA L LA N U A E S G G 7I
predicates constituting a restricted vocabul ary V by calculation s
concerning inpu t A th e inve tigator will proceed to making c al cu
, s
l atio n s concerning descriptions containing th e predicates of V to b e
presented at B . H
e may be able to de ri ve from the blueprint the
w “ ”
follo ing result : If the predicate P i presented at C and any s ,

description D in terms of the vocabul ary V is presented at B X ,

gives an affirm ative response if and only if D ( as interpreted by

the preliminary results ) l o gically implies G an d a negative re
s o n se if and only if D logically implies G This result indicate s
p ,
.

“ ”
that the bo u ndary of the intension of P is bet een the bo u ndary w
of G and that of G In this way more precise determinations for
1 2
.

v
a more comprehensi e par t of L and finally for the hole of L w
H
may be obtained ( ere again we assume that the predicates of L
.

designate obse rvable properties of things ) .

It is clear that the method of structure analysis if applicable , ,

is more powerful than the behavioristic meth o d because i t can ,

w
supply a general ans er and under favorable circu ms tan ces even , ,

a comple te answer to the question of the intension of a gi ven

predicate .

Note that the procedure des c ribed for inp u t A can nclude empty i
kinds of obj ects and the procedure for input B even causally im
possible kinds Thus for example though e cannot present a
.
, , w
unicorn at A we can nevertheless calc u late hich response X ould
, w w
w
make if a unicorn ere presented at A This calculation is obviously .

w
in no ay a ffected by any zoological fact concerni ng the exi stence or
nonexistence of u nicorns The situation is di fferent for a kind of .

obj ects excluded by a la of physics especially a la needed in w , , w

the calculations abo u t the robot Take the la 1 1 : Any iron bod y . w
at 6 0 F is solid The investigator needs this law in his calc u lation
°

of the functioning of X in order to ascertain that some iron cog,

w heels do not melt If no he ere to take as a premise for his

. w w
derivation the statement A liquid iron body having the tempera
° ”
ture of 6 0 F is presented at A then since the law 1 1 be longs al o , , s
w
to his premises he ould ob tain a contradiction ; hence every s tate
,

ment concerning X s response o u ld be de ri vable and th u s the

’
w ,

w w
me thod ould break do n B u t e en for this case the method still . v
w
works ith respe ct to B “
H
e may take as pre mi se T h e des cription
.

°
‘
liquid iron body wi th the temperat u re of 60 F ( that is the ’

translation of this into L ) is presented at B Then no co n trad ic .

tion arises ei ther in the derivation made by th e investigator o r in

that made by X T he d e riv atio n carrie d o u t b y th e inv es tiga tor
.
72 A M E R ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WO R K
s
contain the premise j ust mentioned which does not refer to an ,

iron body b u t to a description say a card punched in a certain ,

way ; thus there is no contradiction although the law 1 1 oc curs al o , s

as a premise O n the other hand in th e d e riv atio n mad e b y the
.
,

ro b o t X
, the card presented at B s u pplies as i t were a premise of , ,
“ ”
the form y is a liquid iron body at 6 0 F ; but here the law 1 1 °

s
does not occur as a premi e and thus no contradiction occurs X , .

makes merely logical deductions from the one premise stated and ,

“ ”
if the predicate R is presented at C tries to come either to the ,
“ ” “ ”
conclusion y is R or y is not R S uppose th e investigator cal .
’
s
s
culation leads to the re ult that X would derive the conclusion y
”
“

is R and hence that X would give an afli rm ativ e response This .

result would show that the ( ca u sally impossible ) kind of liquid

i
“
ron bodies at 6 0 F is included in the range of the intension o f
”
°

R for X .

i is
I have tried to show n th paper that in a pragmatical inve tiga s
i
t on of a natural language there is not only as generally agr eed , ,

an empirical method for ascertaining which obj ects are denoted by

s
a given predicate and thu for determining the extension o f the
predicate but also a method for testing a hypothesi concerning it
, s s
intension ( designative meaning) 9 The ntension of a predicate for . i
, s
a speaker X is roughly peaking the genera l condi tion which an ,

obj ect must fulfill for X to be willing to apply th e predicate to t i 9 .

For the determination o f intension not only actually given case , s

m u st be taken into consideration but also possible case i e kinds , s , . .
,

s
of obj ect which can be described without self contradiction i rre -
,

s e c tiv e o f the q u estion whether there are any obj ects of the kinds
p
described The intension o f a predicate can b e determined for a
.

w
robot j u st as ell as for a human speaker and even more com ,

p l e te l
y if the intern al structure o f th e robot is u fficiently kno n s w
w
to predict how i t ill function under various conditions n the . O
basis of th e concept o f intension other pragmatical concepts wi th ,

s
respect to natural language can be defined synonymy analytici ty , , ,

and the like The existence o f scientifically sound pragmatical con

.

ce ts of this kind provides a practical motivation and j ustification

p
for the introduction of corresponding concepts in p u re semantic s
s
with respect to con tructed language systems .

ii
This p ap er or g nally ap p eared in Philo s op hic al S tudies 19 5 5 and ,

w as rep rinted in R C am ap M eaning and Ne c es s ity 2 md enlarged ed

.
, ,
,

( Chica go ,
 MEAN N I G AND SYN ONYMY IN N AT URAL LA N U A E S G G 73
1T hi s dis ti n c tio n is c l o s e l y rel ate d to th at b e tw e e n radic al c o n c e ts an d
p
.

L c o nc e p ts w hic h I m ad e in I ntro d u c tio n to S e ma n tic s T h e c o ntras t b e tw e e n

-
.

ex te ns io n an d in te ns io n is th e b as is o f th e s e m an tic al m e th o d w h ic h I d e v e l o e d
p
in M e aning an d Ne c e s s ity Q ui ne c all s th e tw o th e o ri es th eo ry o f re fe re n c e
“

v
.

P P
”
and th e o ry o f m e aning, re s p e c ti e l y .

2 R C am ap , Me anin g o s tu l ate s ,
P
“
hil o s o p hic al S tu dies , —7 3
V
. .

3 . W Q u ine , F ro m a L o g ic al o in t of Vie w : Nin e L o g ic o Phil o s op h ic al

. . -

fi
Fo r h is c ritic is m o f in t e n s io n c o n c e p ts s e e e s p e c iall y E ss ay s I I
E ss ay s
“

U
”
( T w o D o gm as o“f Em p iri c ism , rs t p u b l is h e d in I I I , an d V I I
4 M White , T h e A n al y tic an d th e S y n th e ti c : An
.

3 1 6
.

— 3 0
.

S id ney H o o k , c d , J o hn D e w ey :
n te n ab l e D u alis m
hil o s o p he r of S c ie n c e an d F re e d o m, 1 9 5 0,
. P in

pp . .

fi
5 Q u ine , o p c it , p 6 3
v
. . . . .

6 S o m e p hil oso p h ers h a e in d e e d d e n e d th e in te n s io n o f a p re d ic a te ( o r a

j
.

fi
c o n c e p t c l o s e l y re l ate d to i t ) as th e c l as s o f th e
p o s sib l e o b e c ts fal lin g u n d e r it .

“
Fo r e x am p l e , C I L ew is d e n e s : T h e c o m p re h e ns io n o f a te rm is th e c l a ss i
. .

P P
fic atio n o f all c o ns is te n tl y th in k ab l e thin g s to w hi c h th e t erm w o u l d c o rre c tl y
( T h e Mo d es o f M e an ing ,
” “
ap p l y hil o s o p hy a n d he n o m e n o l o g ic a l R es e a rc h,
—5 0 I p re fer to ap p l y m o d alitie s l ik e p o ss ib il ity n o t to o b ec ts j
b u t o nl y to in te n s io ns , e s p e c ial ly to p ro p o s itio n s o r to p ro p e rties ( k in d s ) ( C o m .

p are M e an ing an d Ne c ess ity , p p 6 6 f ) T o s p e ak o f a p o s s ib l e c as e m e ans to

s p e ak o f a kin d o f o b ec ts w h ic h is
p o s s ib l y n o n e m p ty j . .

q
.

7 Afte r w ritin g th e p re s e nt p ap e r I h av e b e c o m e ac u ain t e d w ith a v e ry

.

inte re s ting n ew b o o k b y A rn e Nae ss , I n te rp re tatio n a n d re c is e n e s s : A C o n tri

b u tian to the T he o ry o f C o mm u nic a tio n ( S k rift e r No rs k e V id Ak ad e m i, O s l o ,
P
v
.

I I His t Fil o s Kl ass e , 1 9 5 3 , No

. .
-
. T h is b o o k d e s c rib e s in d e tail . ari o u s

th e h e l p o f
th e s e q v q
p ro c e d u re s fo r tes ting hyp o th e s e s c o n c e rn in g th e s y n o nym i ty o f e x p re s s i o n s w ith
v
u es tio nnaire s , an d g i e s e x am p l e s o f s t atis tic al res u l ts fo u n d w i th

u e s tio nnaire s T h e p rac tic al diffi c u l tie s a n d s o u rc es o f p o s s ib l e erro rs are

.

fi v j
c arefull y in e s ti g ate d T h e p ro c e d u res c o n c e rn th e re s p o n s e s o f th e t es t p e rs o ns ,
.

no t to o b s e r e d o b e c ts as in th e p re s e n t p ap e r, b u t t o p airs o f s e n te n c e s w i th in
s p e c i e d c o ntex ts T he re fo re th e q
u es tio n s a re fo rm u l a te d i n th e m e tal ang u ag e ,

v
.

e g ,
. . D o th e tw o gi e n s e n te n c e s in th e g iv e n c o n te x t e x p re s s th e s am e ass e rtio n
”
to y ou ? Al tho u gh th e re m ay b e diff e re n t O p in io n s c o n c e rni n g s o m e fe atu res o f
th e v
ario u s p ro c e d u res , it s e e m s to m e th a t th e b o o k m ark s a n im p o rtan t p ro g

q
ress in th e m e th o d o l o gy o f em p iri c al m e ani n g an al y s is fo r n atu ral l an gu ag e s

S o m e of the u es tio ns u s e d re fe r al s o to p o s s ib l e ki n d s o f c a s e s , e g , C an y o u
“
. .
.

o ne s e n ten c e an d re e c t th e o th e r, o r ic e ers a ? j
im agin e c irc um s tan c e s ( c o nd itio n s , s itu ati o n s ) in w hic h y o u w o u l d ac c e p t th e
”
(p
i ts m e th o do l o gic al d is c u s s io n s an d in its re p o rts o n e xp e rie n c es w ith th e u es
v v
T h e b o o k , b o th in .

q
tio nn aires , s eem s to m e to p ro i d e ab u n d ant e v id e n c e in s u p p o rt o f th e in t e n v
s io n alis t th e s is ( in th e s e n s e ex p l ai n e d in § 3 ab o e ) v .

8 No te T h e fo ll o w in g fo rm u l a tio n , s u g g e s te d b y Chis ho lm ,
adde d 195 6 :
q
.

fi
“
w o u l d b e m o re a d e u ate : T h e in te ns io n o f a p re d ic ate Q fo r a s p e ak er X is
‘ ’

th e g e n eral c o n diti o n w h ic h X m u s t b e lie e an o b e c t y to fu l l l in o rd e r fo r X v j

P
”
to b e w ill ing to as c rib e th e p re d ic at e Q to y S e e th e n o tes b y C his h o lm , p p
’ ‘
. .

8 7 —8 9 , and C am ap , p p 8 9 —9 1 , in h il o s op hic a l S tu d ies , 6

Y
.

“
9 B ar- Hill e l in a re c e n t p ap er ( L o g i c al S y ntax an d S e m antic s , L a n
. .

g u a g e 3 0: 2 3 0—3 7 d e fe n d s th e c o n c e p t o f m e aning ag ain s t th o s e c o n

te m p o rary l ing u is ts w h o w is h to b a n it fro m l ingu is ti c s H e e x p l ain s th is te n d .
74 A M E R ICAN ILO S OP HERS
PH AT WO K R

e nc y fi q
b y th e fac t that in th e rs t u arter o f th is c e n tu ry th e c o nc e p t o f m e aning
w as in d e e d in a b ad m e tho d o l o g ic al s tate ; th e u s u al ex p l an atio ns o f th e c o nc e p t
v
fiv
inv ol e d p sy c h o l o g is tic c o nno tatio ns , w h ic h w e re c o rre c tly c ritic iz e d b y Bl o o m
e l d an d o th e rs. B ar Hill e l p o in ts o u t th at th e s e m antic al th e o ry o f m e anin g
-

d e e lo p e d re c e ntl y b y l o gic ians is fre e o f th e se d raw b ac k s H e ap p e al s to th e

.

l ing u is ts to c o ns tru c t in an anal o g o u s w ay th e th e o ry o f m e aning n e e d e d in th e ir

em p iric al inv e s tig atio n s T h e p re s e n t p ap e r in d ic ate s th e p o s s ib ility o f s u c h a
v
.

c o n s tru c tio n Th e fac t th at th e c o nc ep t o f in te n s io n c an b e ap p l ie d e e n to a

v
.

ro b o t s h o w s th at it d oe s n o t h a e th e p s y c h o l o g is tic c h arac ter o f th e trad itio n al

c o nc ep t o f m e ani ng .
76 ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S
AMER WORK AT

a disc ssion of the s ignificance of Carnap s D L gi h A f b

u
’
er o sc e u au

der W l deal almost entirely with the more general question s

e t, 2
which must be answered before the sig i ficance f such a book n o

can be appraised Thus I am at h s ame time i mplici tly defending

. t e
the point of view of for example my book T h S , f , ow n e tru c tu re o

App —which i ncidentally contain s

e aran c e 3 expo si t i on and i i
, , an cr t

i m of a considerable part of h A f b
c s t e u au .

1 . E v il D ays for the AU F BA U

f
The A u b au is a crystallization of much that w dely regarded is i
as the worst in twentie th century philo ophy It an anathema s . is
to antiempirical metaphy ic ans and to alogical empir ci t to s i i ss ,

O
analytic xonians and to an tian aly tic Bergson an to thos e who i s ,

would exalt p hilosophy above th e s cience and to those who would s

abolish philosophy in favor o f the ence A goo d p art of current sci s .

polemical w riting in philosophical j ournal is directed against s

views found in virulent form in the A u b au The A u b au tands f . f s
pre eminent as a horrible examp l e
-
.

M y purpose here is to u rvey and appraise the charges against s

f
th e A u b a u and to et forth ome conviction concerning the sig
, s s s
n ific an ce of th e w
ork This virtually amounts to the unpromising .
,

bu t welcome task of defending the A u b au against almost every

, f
body incl u ding Carna p himself—indeed includ ng a uccession of
, , i s
w
Carnaps ho have belittled th early work for different reasons is
at different times in th e t enty e ght year since t was published w -
i s i .

i
But I am more nterested in the c urrent atmosphere o f opinion con
f
cerning the A u b au than in what particular people have said at
particular times ; and my adversary except where pe fically named , s ci ,

is a composite figur e encountered a often in conversation as s

in the j ournals .

2 . P h e no m e nal is m and th e AU F BA U

In place of the impres ions o r S mple ideas o f 1 8 th century

‘
s ’
i ’

i
Br tish philosophy Carna p based his system on total moments of
,

experience — the e lem e n tarerle b n isse —in order to begi n a nearly as s

possible with what he regards a unanalyzed and unproces ed ex s s
p e ri e n ce The system is plainly phenomenalist c and phenomenal
. i ,

ism has be en under heavy and ince ant attack ss .

T h e most popular obj ect ion is that p h e nomen al m i in c o m is s

 THE RE V S O N I I OF I
P H LO SOP HY 77
l e ta b l e No full and adequate account of the obj ective and inter
p .

subj ective world of the sciences can be given i t is contended u pon , ,

a pu ely phenomenalistic basis Carnap s o n first disa o al of

r .
4 ’
w vw
f
the A u b au expressed the conviction that a phenomenalistic system ,

unlike a physica l istic o ne could not be all embracing for science ;

,
-

and perhaps nothing else he has e er written has fo u nd s u ch wide v

spread agreement .

The arguments commonly adduced to s u pport the charge of the

incompletabili ty of phenomenalism cannot in the natu re of the ,

case be very cogent by themselves ; for the thesis they are designed
,

to prove is no t precise enough and there is available no develo p ed

,

b o dy of theory within whi ch a sound proof mi ght be gi en Proof v .

that a complete system cannot be constructed on any phenomenal

i s tic basis prerequires some precise delimitation of the class of
phenomenalistic b ases a full statement of admissible me thods of
,

constru ction and a clear conception of hat constitutes complete

, w
s
nes of the ki nd in q u estion ; and none o f these requirements is
easy to meet Thus for example the argument that phenomenalism
. , ,

is incompletable because the infinite orld of mathematics and the w

sciences cannot be acco u nted for upon a finite b as is has at first
sight the simple force of the statement that an infinite number o f
things cannot be made out of a finite number B u t if e under . w
stand that the question is rather hether e can interpret in terms w w
of statements about a finite number of entities all indispensable
s f
statement that p rim a ac ie refer to an infinite number of entities ,

the matter cannot be e ttled so ea ily s s .

O n th e o ther hand the thesi that phenomenalism is in co m

, s
p l e ta b l e hardly needs proof S urely no complete system
. will be
i
offered wi th n any foreseeable leng th of time ; and no other means
of proving the possibility o f completion is in prospect The tas k .

i
of cons truction is so form dable and the tendency to regar d i t as ,

hopeless is so strong that the presumption is all against the claim

,

that any phenomenalistic sys tem—or for that matter any system
w ith a very narrow b as is —is completable E ven wi thout proof o r .

s
clarification of the thesi that phenomenalism is incompletable one ,

is j ustified in accepting this thesis at least until the opposite is ren

dered more cre di ble .

— —
But if the thesis proven or unproven is accepted what conclu ,

s U
ion can be dr awn from it ? sually phenomenalism is taken to be
utterly discredited once i ts incompletability is ackno ledged It is w .

—
j ust this step in the argument a step commonly p as ed over as o h s
7 8 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
v io u s— w
that I ant to challenge I am ready to maintain that the .

val u e of e fforts to construct a system on a phenomenalistic or any

w
other narro basis is very little a ff ected by whether or not the
system can be completed E u clid s geometry is not robbed of value .
’

by the fact that the circle cannot be squared by E u clidean means .

Indeed acce p tance p rior to E u clid of the impossibility of squaring

,

the circle wi th compass and straightedge o u ld not in the least w

have diminished the importance of developing E u clidean geometry ;
w
and i t ould not I think have been gro u nd for turning attention
, ,

solely to the discussion of the adeq u acy of vario u s bases or to the

development of geometry on a basis broader than E u clid s ore ’
. M
over propositions affirming the E u clide an insol u bility of certain
,

problems could hardly ha e been p re c rse l y form u lated or have v

been capable of proof except aga nst the background of elaborated i ,

v
e en if incompletable mathematical systems B u t my point is not , .

w
j u st that it as psychologically necessary or helpfu l to ork in w
w
this ay What is accomplished in the incompletable system has
.

w
permanent val u e hen incorporated into a fu ller system Indeed .

after a system like E uclid s has been developed as far as possible ’

questions concerning hat can be accomplished ith even fe er w w w

means ( e g wi thou t a straightedge or withou t a given postulate)
. .

often still have interest .

The analogy I take i t is transparent Incompletability by itself

, , .

is no decisive obj ection against th e attempt to build a system on a

phenomenalistic basis nly by positive e fforts ith severely re
. O w
s tric te d means can w
e make any progress in constru ction ; only so '

can we discern the exact l im i tatio n s o f a basis and the exact sup
l e m e n tatio n needed A n d what we achieve may be retained in
p .

an exp anded system and ill help solve parallel problems in al, w
te rn ativ e systems Carnap s suggestion that his single chosen ri m r
’
.
p
tive might be eno u gh for a complete system as indeed rash and w
untenable B u t his mistake here as no worse than that of people
. w
who thought E uclid s basis eno u gh for a complete plane geometry
’
.

The incompletability of the system of the A u b au or of phe f

n o m e n alis m in general is not a very damaging charge .

Incompletability is not the only count urged agai nst phenomenal

ism S ometimes the obj ection is rather that a phenomenalistic sys
.

tem w
hether completable or not i s ep is tem o l o gic al ly false ; that
‘

i
, ,

I t m srepresents the cognitive process Phenomenal events or q u ali .

ties i t is held are not the original elements of kno ledge b u t are
, , w
products of an artificial and highly sophisticated analysis so that ,
 TH E I I
REV S O N O F P H LOSOPHY I 79
a phenomenalistic system gives a highly di torted picture o f actual s
cognition .

A ny such Vie w
rests o n the premise that the que tion What are s
the original elements in knowledge ? i a clear and an erable ”
s sw
one An d the ass u mption remai ns uncontested so long as we are
.

dominated by the tradi tion that there is a sharp dichotomy b e

w
t een the given and the interpretation pu t upon i t— so long as we
picture the knower as a machine that is fed experience in certain
l u mps and proceeds to grind these up and reuni te them in various
w ays B u t I do not think this View of the matter ill tand very
. w s
s .
“
close crutiny For the q u estion What are the units in which ex
” “
e ri e n c e is actually gi ven ? seems to amount to the qu e stion What
p
is the real organization of experience before any cognitive organiza
”
tion takes place ? and this in turn eems to ask for a des ript on , , s c i
of cognitively unorganized experience But any description itself .

e ffects so to speak a cognitive organization ; and apart from a

, ,

description it is hard to see hat organ ization can be The earch

, w . s
for the original given is sometimes envisaged as an interrogation
w w“
in hich I am first asked hat I j ust saw I reply I saw the worst .
,

cri minal alive today but my q u estioner complains that I am

,

making too many j udgments about hat I saw ; he ants me to w w

tell him exactly what I could see and nothing more A s he con .

ti n u e s to press me I reply
“
ucc essively ; I saw a man
,
” “
s
I saw a ,

h u man looking animal “ ”

I sa a mo ing obj ect I saw such and
, w v ,
” ‘
-

such a configu ration of color patches But if my questioner is .

consistent and persistent none of these replies —o r any other I

,

v w
can gi e him— ill satisfy him ; for all my ans ers describe my w
w
experience in ords and so impose on i t some organization or
interpretation What he is covertly demanding is that I describe
.

w hat I sa ww
i tho u t describing i t A l l my ans ers may be true . w
w w
descri p tions of hat I sa but no description can be a satisfactory
,

w w
ans er to the q u estion hat I m e re ly saw ;5 for the q u estion is a
bogus one .

B u t obviously I cannot discuss the whole question of e p is te

m o l o gic al priority very thoro u ghly here An d there is no need For . .

the val u e and validity of a constructional system do not depend

u pon the epistemological primacy of the elements it starts from ,

wv
ho e er one may concei e such p rimacy to be determined The v .

old idea that philosophy aims at writing the story of the cognitive
process had already been abandoned in the A u b au Carnap warned f .

that his constructions are intended to preserve only the logi cal ‘
80 A M E R IC A N PH ILO S O P H ER S AT WORK
’ ‘
value not the epistemological value of the term defined and ’
s ,

stated expressly that his ystem is not to be regarded as a portraya l s

of the process of acquiring knowledge Nevertheless he considered .
,

the system to be a rational reconstruction o f that process a dem

‘ ’

,
’
o n s tra tio n of how the ideas dealt with could have been derived ‘

from the original given ; and for that reason he base his system s
on elements that are a close a possible to what he regards as thes s
given But i t becomes almost immediately obvious that if we do
.

not care whether step in the system picture corresponding step s s

in cognition nei ther do we care whe ther the system starts from
,

what is originally given The function of the ystem is not to por . s

— —
tray the genesis either actual or hypothetical o f idea bu t to s ,

exhibit interconnections be tween them The consideration relevant .

s
in choo ing elements for a sys tem thus not pr ma y in th e cogu i is i c
i
tive process but serv ceability a a basi for an economical p ersp icu s s ,

ous and integrated sys tem

, .

s
I hall have more to say on the nature and purpose of c o n s tru c
tio n al systems as we proceed especially in the following ection ; , s
but the brief answer to the charge that phenomenalistic systems
s
are false as picture o f the cognitive process is s mply that such i
systems need not be true I n this way Carna p claims a diluted tr u th .

of this sort for his system as he tentatively claims co mp l e tab il ity ,

for i t ; but the system is not to be j udged in term of these need s

less and mis l eading claim s .

A third and more considered line o f attack upon phenomenalism

is directed toward showing not that phenomenalistic systems are
incompletable o r false but that they are disadvantageous —that the
,

important purposes at hand can be better served by st ar ting from

s
a physicalistic basi I t is pointed out that even the mos t common
.

place obj ects o f daily experience are extraordi narily di fficult to con
stru ct upon a phenomenalistic bas s ; that the e lem e n tarerle b n iss e i
or qualities or ap pearance events from which a phenomenal istic -

system proceeds are unfamiliar units of discourse elusive if not ,

ill u sive di ffi cult to catch and identify ; and that a system based
,

upon such elements is an ingro n development of technical phi w

l o so p h y remote from practical concerns o r scientific discours e In
, .

s
contra t it is held a physicalistic ystem begins with familiar and
, , s ‘

well understood elements is able to deal at once w i th th e world

-
,

of everyday experience and much more readily yield the obj ects , s
of the cience s s .

This argument with t appeal to the fami l ar the practica l

, is i , ,
 TH E I I
REV S O N OF P HILO S OP HY 81

and the scientific is so overwhelmi ng that those w h o sp en d time on

phenomenalistic constructions are regarded as stubborn and o l d
fashioned crackpots who shut their eyes to the facts o f life and
science Nevertheless let us look at th e argument more closely
. ,
.

In the first place one great advantage claimed for a physicalist

, ic
system is that i t does not face the difficult and perhaps insoluble
problem of constructing physical obj ects on the basi of phe s
n o m e n a This is qui te true L ikewise i t is true that if you simply
. . ,

use a double compass ( a compass wi th another mounted on o ne

leg) you can trisect any angle An d since a do u ble compass is easy .

to ob tain and since the goal is to ge t angles trisected isn t i t im

, ,
’

practical and quixotic to deny o u rselves use of this instrument ?

If physical obj ects are h ard to constru ct in terms o f phenomena ,

w hy not begin with physical obj ects ? L et s be clear though that ’

, ,

i w
n both cases e are not solving a problem but evading one The .

w
difference i t ill be claimed i that in the case of geometry the
, , s
w
choice is between t o equally simple and ordinary bases while ,

in the shift from a p henomenalistic to a physicalistic system we

are dropping an abstruse and el u sive basis in favor of a plainly
more comprehensible and familiar one Thus the argument for .

physicalism here cannot be that i t solves a problem that p h eno m e

malism does not bu t rather that it begins with a more accep table
,

basis and frees us of the need for bothering with a difficult and
unimportant problem before e come to grips wi th the realm of w
everyday life and of science .

The comfortable homey character of the physicalist s b asis last

,
’
s
only so long as he is argu ing for his basis rather than trying to
O
use it nce he makes any serio u s begi nning to ard systematic con
. w
s truction he q u ickly finds that ordinary things like tables
, desks , ,

and chai rs are much too gross complicated ill assorted and scat , ,
-
,

te re d to serve his purpose ; and hile e are looking the other w w

,
“
way he slips in substitutes In Testability and ”
eaning 6 for
. M ,

example Carnap at first speak of a thing langu age in which

, s ‘
-
’

atomic sentences consist of observable predicates applied to ordi

“
nary things 7 But a few pages later he is speaking of observable
.

predicates of the thing langu age attrib u ted to perceived things o f

-

”
any kind or to space time points 8 This last phrase makes a radical
-
.

addition Whether the space time points in question are those o f

.
-

physics or are mi nimal perceptible re gions they are by no mean , s

the familiar things o f everyday experience What the physicali t . s
and the phenomenalist both do is this : they begin i nformally with
82 AMER IC A N PH IL O S O P H E R S AT WORK
ordinary disco u rse and indicate in terms of i t a set o f entities that
are q u ite different from ordinary things but p o se a uniformi ty s ss ,

simplicity and j oint exha u stiveness that makes them serviceable

,

as elements for a system The physicalist does not any more than
.
,

the phenomenalist take the usual obj ects of daily life as the basic
,

elements of his s ystem .

M v
oreo er there is a good deal of eq u ivocation about th e s pace
,

time points taken as elements by the physicalist When he main .

tains that he is in a better position to construct the obj ects of

science the supposition is that his elements are the space time
,
-

points of mathematics and physics But this cannot be the ca e ; . s

for he retains observable predicates Carnap gives as examples
‘
.
’

“ ”
of admissible atomic statements : This space time point is warm -

“ ”
and at this space time point is a solid obj ect 9 bviou ly no
-
, . O s
mathematical space time point is warm and at no s uch point
-
,

is there any obj ect that is solid or red or that has any other o b
se rvable q u ality ; observable qualities belong to obj ects of p erce p ti
ble size But if the elements called space time points are p ercep ti
.
-

ble regions then we are faced with a good many of the problems
,

for example the explication of imperceptible differences — that the

,

physicalist so u ght to avoid An d his claim that his basis is adequate

.

for constru cti ng the obj ects of science no longer look o plausible ss .

The problem of deriving the obj ects of physics from such a basi s
is hardly less formidable than and is in many way s not very dif ,

fe re n t from the problem of constructing ordinary obj ects from a

,

strictly p henomenal basis ; and there is no p rima ac ie reason to f

suppose that the one is sol u ble if the other is not The physicalist .

“
o ff ers the argument that For every term in the physical language
p hysicists know how to use i t on the basis of their observations .

Thus every s uch term is reducible to observable predicates

b u t the p henomenalist h as characteristically argu ed in exactly par
“
allel fashion that for every term that is used at all competently ,

w
the user kno s how to use i t on the basis of what appears to him ,

and th u s every term is red u cible to phenomenal predicates If the .

former argu ment is goo d so is the latter ; if the latter is bad so is

the former The serviceability of ordinary thing langu age for con
.

s tru c ti n the realm o f physics remains a totally uns u pported cl ai m

g
i
.

I f the problem o f constructing the entit es of physics from o b

servable things is so tro u blesome one might expect the physicalist ,

to skip i t as inessential —as he has already kipped the problem of s

84 A M E R ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S WORK AT

( or
‘
reduct i oni s m a s i ts enemies call it )
’
of all varieties —not j ust
to a certai n choice f basi s but to the very program of a systematic
o

logical construction from any s et of primitives .

The root of such oppos ition is f course the anti intellectualism , o ,

-

that finds forthright expression in Bergson The complaint against .

all definition analys is and systematic description is that i t employs

, ,

static abstract and Procrustean concepts to construct a bloodless

, ,

caricature of the rich and pulsating world of experience C o nc e p .

tu al iz atio n abstraction symbolization are instruments of excision

, , ,

and dessication This appears to be an attack les against one kind

. s
of philosophy than upon philosophy in general as compared with
. O s
poetry r ince poetry uses words and symbols and selects as pects
, ,

perhaps the protest is rather against al l verbalization a contrasted s

with nonverbal living In thi extreme form the position need not . s ,

much concern us here ; for we are considering the A u b au as com f

pared to other philosophical effort no t a comp ared to a moon s , s
light walk o r a drunken brawl et the basic anti intellectualistic . Y -

complaint that philosophy doe not duplicate experience is worth s

noting ; for it underlies many another obj ection to attempts at pre
c is i o n and systematization in philosophy .

The function o f a constructional system not to recreate ex is

eri e n c e bu t rather to map i t Though a map is derived from o h
p .

serv atio n s of a territory th e map lacks the contours color s ound , , s , s ,

smells and life o f the territory and in size shape eight tempera
, , , , w ,

s
ture and mo t other respects may be about a much unlike what s
i s s
t map a can well be imagined It may even be very little like .

other equally good map o f the same territory A map is schematic s . ,

selective conventional condensed and uniform An d these char

, , , .

ac teris tic s are virtues r ather than defects The map not only sum .

m ariz e s clarifies and systematizes it often discloses facts we

, , ,

could hardly learn immediately from our explorations We may .

make larger and more complicated maps or even three di mensional -

s
model in order to record more inform ation ; but this is not al
s
way to the good For when our map becomes as large and in all
.

s s
other respect the ame a the territory mapped—and indeed long s
before this stage is
reached—the purposes of a map are no longer
served There is no such thing as a completely unabridged map ;
.

for abridgment i intrinsic to map m ak ing s .

s
Thi s I think uggests the ans er not only to rampant anti
, , w
intellectualism bu t to many another obj ection against the abstract
ness poverty artifici al i ty and general unfaithfulness of co ns tru c
, , ,
 TH E REV S O N I I OF I
P H LOS OP HY 85

tio n al systems no one complain that the turnpike s not red

. Let i
like the line on the map that the dotted state boundaries o n the
,

i
map are not v sible in the field o r that the city we arrive at is s ,

no t a round black dot L e t no o ne suppose that if a map made

.

according to one scheme of proj ection is accurate then maps made

according to alte rnative scheme are wrong An d let no one ac s .

cuse the c ar tographer of merc le reduction sm if his map fail i ss i s

to turn green in the spring .

The anti intellectualist confronts us with a spurious dilemma

-
.

The choice is not between m srepresentation an d meticulous re i

production The relevan t que tion abou t a system or a map is
. s
w i
hether i t is serv ceable and acc urate in the ay intended w .

M any contemporary philosopher are opposed not to analysi s s

as such but to the use of logic and artificial terminology and to

step b y step construction A system of formal definitions the o b jec

- -
.
,

tion runs raises irrelevant problems is too ri gid and precise and
, , ,

is too insensitive to the sub tle variations of ordinary use A philo .

sophic problem is considered to ar se from lack of care in the use i

of ordinary language and the recomm ended treatment consis t
, s
simply o f explaining in ordinary language the nature of the mi s
use or misunderstanding of use The analyses o ffered as examples .

of this method are often much needed and highly illuminating .

They are like directions that tell us ho to go from the post office w
to the park without taking a wrong t u rn at the red barn In gen .

w
eral e need ask such directions only hen e are lost o r puzzled
, w w ,

since we do most of o u r daily traveling q u ite e ffi ciently i thout w

them A nd good verbal direction as compared with a map have
. s , ,

obvio u s Virt u es : they are in th e vernacular mention recognizable ,

lan dmarks and tell u s w thout w as te j u t what we i m mediately

, i s
need to know .

B u t a map has its advantages too It s indeed in an art ficial , . i , , i

language and has to be read and related to th e terrai n ; bu t i t i
, s
consistent comprehensive and connected It may needlessly give
, , .

us a good deal of information we already have well in mind ; but i t

may also reveal unsuspected routes and lead us to rectify mi scon
c e ti o n s that mi ght o the rwise have gone unquestioned
p It give . s
an organized overall View that no set o f verbal direction and no s
experience in traveling can provide unaided Verbal direction may . s
often be u seful even when we have a map ; they may help us in
terp re t the map o r save us the trouble But they do no t upplant . s
86 ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S
AMER WORK AT

There are dangers in map s of course A map may be taken , . too

literally or otherw ise misread But the map is not at fault if the .

user supposes that the numbering of the lines of longitude reflect s

a scale of metaphysical pr i o i ty or if disputes arise over whether r ,

a marking ff by square mile s or by minute s is more i keeping

o n

wi th reality .

We are still admittedly in a rather pri mitive s tage f philo

, , o

sophical map making and no one is to b blamed for an inclina ; e

tion to trust skilled verbal direction s as against new and imperfect

maps N is the reputation of cartog aphy improved by elaborate
. or r

maps draw n too hastily on the basis of too little exploration Y et .

the opposition to the princip l es of i l i m by the p i co n s tru c t o n a s rac t

i of verbal analysi s has always s urprised me for I think

t o n e rs ;
there is no irreconcilable conflict of obj ectives o r even of meth
ods Verbal analysis is a necessary preliminary and accompaniment
.

to systematic construction and deals with th e same sphere of ,

problems For example the verbal analyst may well concern him
.
,

w
self ith explaining the vague locution we use w hen we say that
v
se eral things are all alike ; and he may well examine the dif
‘ ’

w
ference bet een saying that a color is at a given place at a given
time and saying that a color is at a given place and at a given
time The c o n s tru c tio n al is t dealing ith qualities and particular
. w s
w
will like ise have to be clear on these points The analyst treating .
,

these as separate problems may well miss the intriguing relation ,

w
ship bet een the two hile a systematic treatment shows them
, w
w
to be t o cases of a single logical problem 2 But verbal analysis
1

i
.

and logical construct on are complementary ra ther than in co m

patible The co n s tru c tio n alis t recognize the anti intellectualist as
. s -

an arch enemy but looks upon the verbal analyst a a valued and
, s
respected if inexp licably hostile ally
, , .

A part from entrenched philosophical posi tions the opposition ,

to co n s tru c tio n al ism degenerates into greeting each proposed d efi

n i ti o n of a so and s o as a such and such wi th the na i ve protest that
- - - -

a so— and so is No t erely a s u ch and—

-
M
such but S omething ore This -
M .

betrays a simple failure to grasp what the co n s tru c tio n al is t is doing .

I n defining a so and s o as a such and s u ch he is not declaring that

- - -
,

a so and s o is nothing b u t a such and such Carnap disclaimed any

-
.

s u ch idea by insisting tha t his d e fin ie n tia need have only the ame s
extension as his d e finien d a; and as my di scussion above uggest s s
i
,

= d i in a constructional definition s not to be read is nothi ng ‘ ‘

”
more than but rather in some su ch fashion a is here to be “
s
 TH E I I
REV S O N OF I
P H LOSOP HY 87

mapped as But the nature an d import o f a con tructional

. s d e fin i
w
tion no need to be examined more clo ely s .

4 . E x te ns io na l is m , D e fi n itio n, an d th e A U F BAU
S ome f
critics of the A u b au take iss u e primarily neither with its
w
phenomenalistic orientation nor ith co n s tru c tio n al ism in general
b ut w
ith the particular conception of constructional method that
f
the A u b au sets forth and exemplifies .

The first such obj ection is against the extensionalism of th e

f
A u b a u The only nonformal requirement there placed u pon a
.

constructional definition is that the d e fin ien d u m and the d e fin ien s

s
apply to exactly the ame thing so that replacement o f the one s ,

by th e o ther in admissible contexts pre erves truth val ue 3 A gainst

1 s .

this many cri tics — incl u di ng the Carnap of today—argue that since
,

such extensional identity does not guarantee ameness o f meaning s ,

some more stringent criterion mu t be adopted s .

L e t us grant the premise that extensional identity not a uf is s

fic ie n t condition for synonymy This alone d oe s not settle the .

w
main questi on For hat is at is ue here is not a theory of mean
. s
ing but a theory of constructional defini tion ; and acceptance of
a nonextensional cri terion for synonymy does not c arry with it
adoption of a nonextensional criterion for constructional definition .

w
From hat I have said in the preceding section it wi ll be clear
w hy I sharply disagree with contentions that a s tronger require
ment than extensional identity should be imposed on co ns tru c
tio n al defini tions This would mistake and defeat th e primary
.

s
function of a cons tructional ystem That fu nction as I see it is .
, ,

w
to exhibi t a net ork of relationship obtaining in th e subj ect s
w
mat ter ; and hat is wanted therefore is imply a certain structural s
w
correspondence be t een the world of the system and th e world of
presystematic language .

O w
nly in this ay as a structural description
,
1 4 ra ther than a ”
s
a book of synonym s or as a fu ll color portrait of reality can e -
, w
u nderstand a system like that of th e A u b au The extensional cri f .

te ri o n for cons tructional definition far from being too eak is , w ,

too strong To require that the d e finie n ti a be extensionally iden

.

w
tical ith the d e fin ie nd a is in effect to claim a literal and exclusive
tru th for th e chosen definitions ; for if a quality i in fact identical s
with a certain class of e le m e n tarerle b n iss e then i t is not identical ,

i
w th a cl as s of some other exper ential element that might be i s
88 A M E R I CAN P HI L O S O P H E R S WORK AT

cho s en basic for a di fferent sy s tem A y s uch claim of exclu sive

as . n
truth i s utterly foreign the spi i t d purpose of construction
to r an

al i m If we conscientiou s ly try to elici t the cri teria we actually

s .

employ in discussing and j udging the correctness of particular con

s tru c tio ns I think we find that the pertinent requirement is no t
,

that each d e fin ien s be extensionally identical wi th its d e fin ie n d u m

but rather that the entire system of d e finien tia be is o m o rp h ic in ,

a certain sp e ci fiab l e way 1 5 to the entire sy tem of d e finien d a Thi

, s . s
s
clears away extraneou and u n s atisfiab l e demands and leave s room ,

for many di fferent but equally valid alternati ve systems .

The second common obj ect on against the conception of method i

f
embodied in the A u b au is almost the opposite of the fir t Carnap s .

s
himself ha taken th e lead in maintaining that the restriction to
definition as the sole method of construction is much too confin ng i .

s
No t only have we mall h Op e of achieving full definition for all
the terms we want to introduce but there s —h e argue another , i s -

equally legitimate method of introducing new terms into a system .

H e claims indeed that the ntroduction o f term thro u gh what

, , i s
“ ”
he calls reduction sentences ha th e advantage of reflecting a s
common actual procedure o f the scientist .

The latter argu ment is quite beside th e point ; but the chief
trouble is that this supposedly new method of introducing terms
adds nothing to the means that ere already at our disposal R e d u c w .

tion sentences are merely postulates ; and term s introduced through

postulates are introduced simply as primitives The introduction .

of primitives requires no new method and there is some danger ,

in concealing it under a ne name For the suggestion that re w .

duction sentences are fundamentally comparable to definitions o b

sc u res the fact that each addition of a new and ineliminab le
w
primitive ( hether by reduction postulate or otherwise) consti
tu te s a sacrifice in the economy of basis and th e resultant integra
tion of our system The difference between frankly adopting a term
.

as primitive and introducing it by reduction sentences is the

euphemistic differences bet een a lo s of ground and a strategic w s
retreat .

We may indeed have to add new p ri mi tives from time to time

in building a system and we may want to use new yntactical or
, s
semantical techniques ; but the adoption of new primi tives in not .

w
a ne technique .

The standard criticisms of the A u b au s concept of constructional f ’

method then seems to me wrong in t o way First the exten

, , w s .
,
 TH E I I
REV S O N OF I
P H LO SOP HY 89

s io n al i
cri ter a for constructional definition needs weakening rather
than strengthening S econd the proposed supplementation of the
.
,

method definition by the so called method of reduction adds -

‘ ’

nothing hatever w .

5 . Fau l ts o f C o ns tru c tion

s
If we et aside all considerat on of general principle and ex i s
ami ne i n detail the actual constructions in the A u b au e find f , w
a great many faults 1 6 A number of these are pointed out in the
.

bo ok itself for Carn ap di d not profess to o ffer more than an im

,

perfect sketch o f a system Bu t there are other difficulties too ; and

.
,

the cumulative effect is that hardly any construction is free of

fault . M
oreover not all these defects are minor slips or mere mat
,

ters of detail still to be orked o u t S ome of them are so basic w .

and material that nothing short of rather drastic re ision of the v

w hole system is likely to correct them .

N o thing that can be said will explain a ay these faults or make w

th em less serious ; b u t they sho u ld be seen in perspective They are .

the faults of an honest and early ventu re in a ne direction S uch w .

w
troubles can al ays be avoided by attempting nothing or by keep
ing ca u tio u sly vagu e ; the likelihood of error increases ith the w
earnestness and origi nali ty of the effort to attain precision But the .

making of errors the discovery of faults is the first step toward

, ,

correcting them S omething has already been accomplished hen

. w
w hat is being done and what s being attempted ha e been clari i v
fie d far enough to make possible a ound accusation of error If s .

f
we compare the A u b a u not w th hat e hope for but ith what i w w w
w e had before w —
e may still not condone i ts errors but e can
, w
app reciate their s i gnificance .

Fu rthe rm ore some of the most important error in the A u b au

, s f
w ere not invented by Carnap They had been made repeatedly .

and uns u spectingly by generations of earlier philosophers and are ,

still made today If Carnap did not correct o r even notice them
.

all the rigorous logical ar tic u lation he demanded and began

,

brought them much nearer the s u rface and made their early dis
co v e r
y inevitable To take j ust .one example in discussions of ,

the status of qualities i t is often assumed that if e take likeness w

as the relation ob taining bet een any two things that have a com w
mon quality then we can define a class of thing having a com
, s
mon quality as a class o f thi ngs that are al l alike But if to s ay .
90 A M E R ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WO R K
that all are alike is to say merely that each two are al ke th i , is
does not gu arantee that there s a quality common to all ; and in i
fact no su fficient condi tion can be given solely in term o f th e s
dyadic likeness of things This difficulty is custom ari ly camouflaged
.

by the easy locution all alike E ven R ussell has fallen into a .

similar logical trap 1 7 But one can hardly study the A u b au in

. f
te n siv e l y wi thou t becoming ac u tely a are of this problem w .

What the opponen ts of the A u b au usually o ffer us i not some f s

, s s
thing to replace it but di cu sions of methods and programs argu ,

s i
ments for o ne basis a aga nst another debate over what can and , s
cannot be done A ltogether too much philosophy these days
. is
,

like the present article merely philosophy about philosophy ; the

,

characteristic contemporary philosophical refuge is n o t metaphy c si s

but me tap h il o s o p hy The admission that the A u b au
. full o f f is
faults has to be coupled with the observation that the player On
w
the field al ays gets caught in more mistakes than the player o n
the bench An d concerning many o f the constructional errors in the
.

f
A u b au we may perhaps say in ummary that they were e r ous , s , s i ,

unoriginal and orth while

, w -
.

6 . T h e S ign i fi can ce o f th e A UF BA U
s
I am by no mean s u ggesting however that the A u b au valu , , f is
able only o r primarily for its errors nce mi sconceptions an d . O
groundless obj ections have been cleared away the positive s igni ,

fic an ce of the work be comes very evident .

f
The A u b au brings to philosophy the powerful techniques o f
, w
modern logic along ith unprecedented standards of explicitness ,

coherence and rigor It applie to ba ic philosophical problems

, . s s
w
the ne methods and principles that only a few years before had
thrown fresh and brilliant light upon mathematics T h e potential .

importance to philosophy is comparable to the importance o f the

introd u ction of E uclidean deductive meth o d into geometry The .

f
A u b au for all its fragmentary character and for all its defects
, , ,

is still one of the fullest example we have of the logical treatment s

of problems in nonmathematical philosophy But its significance .

in the long run will be measured less by how far it goes than by
how far i t is s u perseded .

In stressing the novelty of ts contr b ution we must not be mis i i ,

f
led into regarding the A u b au as an aboriginal work unrelated to ,

the course of tho u ght preceding it It belong very much in the . s

92 A M E RI C A N PH ILO S OP HER S AT WORK
6 . R u d o l f C arn ap , T es tab ility an d M e anin g, in hil os op hy of S c ie nc e , Vo l
9 — 7 V V —
P .

III ( 1 3 6 ) pp 4
. 1 9 4 1 , an d o l I ( 1 9 3 7 ) pp 1 40
. . .

7 I b id , Vo l I I I , p 4 6 6
. . . . .

8 I b id , V o l I V, p 9
. . . . .

9 I b id
. .

1 0 I b id , Vo l I I I , p 4 6 7
. . . . .

1 1 T h e re c e n t d om inanc e o f this id e a s e e m s to m e to h av e b l o c k e d any

.

s ig h t . P
c l e ar u n d e rs tan d ing o f eith er p hil o s o p h y o r th e sc ie n c e s

v
B u t s o m e re lie f is in
s y c h o l o gis ts h a e l ate l y p ro d u c e d e x p erim e n tal e id e n c e th at m o nk e y s

w ill ex e rt m o re e ff ort o u t o f s h e er c u rio s ity th an fo r foo d S atis fac tio n o f c u ri

.

v
.

an d th e n w e s h al l n o l o ng er h a e to

al l y do fo r th e w h e at c ro p
j
o s ity m ay in tim e b eco m e alm o s t as re s p e c tab l e a g o al as sa tis fac tio n o f h u ng er ;

v
u s tify as tro p h y s ic s b y w h at i t m ay e v e ntu

1 2 Fo r fu rt h er e x p l an atio n, s e e S A, p p 1 6 1 —1 6 9
v
. . .

1 3 T h e a ow e d e x te n sio n al ism o f so o u ts tan d ing a m o n u m e nt o f p he nom e

.

n alism and c o ns tru c tio n alism as th e A ufb a u w o u l d s e e m to c o n fu te Q u in e s

’

rec e n t c h arg e ( M in d, V o l 62 p 4 3 4 ) th at th e n o tio n o f anal y ti c ity is

v
. .

“
a h o l do er o f p h e n o m e n al is tic re d u c tio nism .

1 4 C arnap s o w n term ( S tru k tu rb e s c hre ib u ng ) se e S e c tio n 1 2 o f th e A ufb au

’
. .

15 S e e S A, C h ap I
V
. . .

1 6 Fo r a d e tail e d ex p o sitio n of m any o f th e s e , s ee S A, Ch ap

. . .

1 7 T h e p as s ag e s o n c o m p re s e nc e an d c o m p l e x es in B ertran d R u ss e l l s An
’
.

I n q u iry into M ea ning an d T ru th ( No rto n , 1 9 4 0, p p 2 8 9 and H u ma n .

Kn o w l e d g e ( S im o n an d S c h u s te r 1 9 4 8 , p
c ati o n c o nc ernin g th e c o m p re s e n c e o f u al itie s q
s u ff e r fro m a p aral l e l e q u iv o
.

.
 CL A R ENCE I . LE WI S

S ome S uggestio ns Co ncern ing

Metaphys ics f
o L ogic

s s
The uggestion which I should like to present concern smal l
points each having a bearing o n a large topic But each of them
, .
,

though small is
too big to be covered adequately in a short com
,

s
pas : as here formulated they are put forward kno ing that you
, w
will supply the needed context and in the hope that they may
serve as a b asis for di cussion s .

The large question which my uggestions all concern is the

, s ,

relation between the conceptual and th e existential And the gen .

ss s
eral the i which these eem to me to support is that the co n cep
tual and the existential are irreducibly different categorie both s ,

i
requ red for an adequate th eo ry of logic ; but that within logic ,

s
i tself there are only such truth as are certifiab l e from conception
,

alone and are independent o f existential fact .

L ogic is the science w s

hich e rv es the purpose of finding out
what can be determi ned by thinking i thout looking and has no w ,

w
business ith any fact th e ass u rance of hich requires sense ex w
erie n ce A ll empirical facts belong in the domain of some o ther
p .

c
and natural science L ogi c is con erned with what is deducible
.
94 AMER ICA N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
w
from hat and hence ith the distinction between supposition
, w s
which are self consistent and those which are not since Q is deduc
-
, i
ble from P if and only if th e j oint statement hich asserts P and w
denies Q is self contradictory B u t it has no conce rn with the dis
-
.

tinction amongst statements hich are both consistently affirm ab l e

, w
and consistently deniable between those which are actually tru e ,

and those which in fact are false All that logic can determine . ,

in the case o f such continge nt statements is what is deducible ,

w
from them and hat premises are su fficient for them ; and the e s
logical relationships of them are unaffected by their truth or
falsity .

S o much is commonplace A ll statements belonging to logic and .

all statements c ertifiab l e by logi c are analytic and deducible from

any premise including the premise hich denies them An d from
, w .

premises of logic alone no contingent truth of existence o r non

,

i
ex stence is derivable : they have no conseq u ences save other state
w
ments hich are likewise analytic But that leaves it still desirable .

to identify something by reference to which logical truth expresses

a kind of fact and logical falsehood does violence to fact ; ome s
w
ground on which hat is logically true is distinguishable from the
logically false and is worth saying , .

I t is the prevailing practice at present to explain this character

of statements of logic by reference to language That procedure .

is both apt and economical B u t I thi nk that i t will prove i made .

quate for the theory of logic unless certain simple and obvious
s
fact abo u t langu age are recognized and the implications o f them
adhered to A first such fact is that linguistic entities are not
.

physical obj ects or events bu t abstract things of which physical

existents may be instances If there are no universals then there .
,

is no such thing as language A s a physical phenomenon language .

,

w
_

is identifiable ith s ounds and marks But a s ound or a mark is .

not langu age u nless there is a fixed meaning associated wi th and ,

exp ressed by i t Furthe rmore i t is not the pile of ink on the page
.
, ,

or the noi se occ u rring to hich is the linguistic entity The w .

w
same ord or other exp ression mu st be able to occu r at di fferent
times and places in order to be a linguistic entity ; even the physical
symbol is a unive rsa l identifiable wi th the recu rrent p a ttern o f
,

, w
marks or of noises of hich a single physical existent can be an “

I nstance .

S econd the mea ning associated with a symbol and essential to

,

i ts being a linguistic entity mus t be a psychological o r mental , .

 S OME SU GGES ION S C ON CERN I N G
T ME T APHYS S O IC F LOGIC 95
entity I sho u ld be glad to avoid the metaphysical question o f
.

mind ; and I have no full theory of the mental to offer But we .

shall all a gree that psychological happenings take place in those

individ u als called conscious and are not identifiable w th marks , i
w
on pages or i th noises a phonograph may e mi t at certain times
u nheard by anybody Whatever th e natu re of psychological phe
.

n o m e n a they are what is spoken of by common sense by referring

,

to minds L e t me use this common sense idiom so far as possible

.
- -

without metaphysical prej u dice A meaning is something which is .

mind dependent ; no mi nds no meanings We speak of meanings

-
, .

as entertained and the entertainmen t of a meaning is an occu r

,

w
rence ; an event hich is temporal if not spatial But j ust as i t i . s
essential to a linguistic symbol that i t be the ame from page to s
page and the pile of ink an instance of i t only so the meaning i t
, ,

conveys cannot be identified with the psychological occurrence

called the entertainment of i t : i t must be the ame meaning which s
is entertained when we read th e same expre sion at different times s ,

if the pile o f ink is to exercise the f u nction o f expressing the same

meaning on different occasions This meaning as characterizing .

di fferent psycholo gi cal events and the same for any o ccasion of i ts ,

entertainment is the concept A n d a meaning as relative to uch

, . s
entertainments I shall speak of as a conceptual meaning
, .

Third most meanings and correlatively most linguistic expres

, ,

sions have reference to external existents or states of affairs spoken

, ,

of as some thing meant In relation to such an obj ective actuality

.
,

the meaning entertained or linguistically expressed constitutes the

criterion which operates to de termi ne hich or what amongst w ,

actualities which may present themselves are those o meant An d , s .

i t so operates by determining some recognizable charac te r of actu

al i tie s as essential to their being accepted as hat is meant This w .

character even if there be no more than one actual entity in

,

s tan c in
g it never extends
, to the hole nature o f any individual w
thing but is again an abstract or u ni versal entity ; a property o r
, ,

attrib u te .

This last consideration will of course require some comment , , ,

lest i t sho u ld seem to imply that individuals cannot be conceived ,

and meant by language I defer such comment to a later point . .

O f these three abstract entities ; first the concept as psycho ,

logically instanced meaning second linguistic meaning a what , , s

patterns of so u nd or of marks convey and a th e meaning of uch , s s
expressions in terms of other expressions and third the character , ,
96 A M E R I CA N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WORK
or property of obj ective actualities which i essential to their satis s
i s
fyi ng th e condi t on e t by th e concep t and expre sed in language ; s
s
of the e three i t th e fir t w hi ch is
antecedent to the other two
, s is .

We do not first have mark and ounds and then nvent o r try s s i
to discover co ncepts for them to convey bu t devi e language to , s
convey what is conceptually entertained If there hould be any . s
who announce that there are no uch things a me an ng let u s s i s , s
reply that their announcement i meaningle s ss .

Given a meaning i t may be a ociated wi th a v ual pattern or, ss is

s
pattern o f ound by a ocial convent on o r by ndividual declara s i i
tion of intent And g ven a m ean ng repre ented by o ne symbolism
. i i s ,

another symbolism can be s tipu l ated to have the same meaning,

i
But convent ons and stipulation are o ible only with re pect s ss s
p
s
to the use o f ymbols Given two mean ng the relation of them . i s ,

can in no wise be affected by any convent on of language ean i . M

s
ing and the relation o f them are a they are and could not be s
“

s
otherwise ; and the upposi tion that meanings arise from o r can s
s
be altered by tipulation of language —if anybody hould hold that s s
s —
upposition would be ludi ro u c s .

I have no intention o f aying that con ept or that me an ng s c s i s

is
ex t ( That point we hall return to later ) Neverthele I would
. s . ss
s u ggest that they mus t be granted ome manner of being and that
“
s ,

if any logician were to say There are no such things as co n cep ,

”
tual meanings he would be us ing ccam razor to cu t his o w n
, O s ’

th oat
r E xistence
.
—I i —
take t refer to a relation be tween a con s
c e tu al meaning entertained and an actuali ty e mpi rically found
p ,

or evidenced whi h atisfies th e ntention o f that concep tual

, c s i
entertainment But in this connection i t . o f some importance is ,

to observe that no empirical presentment could determine that

“
S o an d o exists
”
s
if th e conception of so and so as a me aning
,
‘ ’

entertained did n o t function a a con di tion to be ati fied or not s s s

s atisfied by what may be empirically disclosed Thi is no more . s
than to say what is obv ou ; we mu t know what we mean by so
‘

i s s ‘

and so before we can determi ne the exi tence of so and o ince

’
s ‘
s s ,
’

o therwise we should lack any manner of determining what em

p iric al findings would be pertinent to th is ques tion o f existence .

The basic relation of empi r cal knowledge s

thi relat on between i is s ‘
i
a character mentally entertained as the concep t of so and so and a ,
’

pe rceptual finding of that which evidence thi character essential

‘
s s
to being so and so .
’

Incidentally perhaps thi resolves th e puzzle that existence is

, s ‘
 SOM E S UGGES I ON S C ON CERN IN G T IC F LOGIC 9 7
ME TAPHYS S O
not a predicate In the s tatement 8
.
’
, 0 and s o exi st his seeming s, t
predicate exists does not express any identifiable charac te r dis
‘ ’

ti ngu i s h i n g one thing from another : th e relevant character is

‘ ’
expressed by so and so ; and there is no difference of conceived
character between the silver dellar which I cannot find in my
pocket and the silver dollar that I do find else here S trange as
”
w .

i t may seem the s u bj ect of S o and so exists is the conceptually

,

delineated so and so not th e empirically discovered so and o ;

, s
if i t were the latter then the as ertion o f existence would be mean
, s
in gfu l only when i t is true and we should have the r diculous , i
conseq u ence that we could not think of or speak of anything
w hich does not exist What is p re d icate d o f this c onceptually meant
.

‘
so and so is a relation o f correspondence o f character between
’

it and something empirically find ab l e or evidenced by perception .

A n d again incidentally this show that for the being of a co ncep t

, s
or conceptu al meaning the ontological argument is perfectly good
,

whatever is mentionable mus t have thi s tatu a concep tual s s s ,

whether i t exists or not .

w
E mpirical kno ledge ha thu two condition : the condition of s s s
a conceptu ally entertained meaning and the condition of ome s
relevant perceptu al finding But knowledge the expres ion of .
, s
w
which o u ld be an analytic statement has only one condition : the ,

condition o f a factual relationship o f meanings a concep tually s

entertained And this relationship is determ ined by the e concepts
. s
themselves .

I have so far left the ense of meaning which s here in ques

, , s ‘ ’
i
tion und u ly vagu e and attempted to characterize i t principally
,

by reference to its epistemologi cal statu and function When we s .

t u rn from the epistemologi cal to the linguistic and seek to deline ,

ate that meaning o f the word meaning which s here in point ‘ ’

i
as a property of expressions i t becomes evident that conceptual ,

meaning is not denotation or extension but is identifiable with or

correlative to connotation or intension .

It is the intensional meaning o f an expression whi h i th e c s

criterion of classification and ets a condition to be atisfied ; the s s
denotation of the expression is the cla s of actualitie ati fying thi s ss s s
antecedent condition D u e to the logically accidental limitations
.

of what exists or is act u ally the case a conceptual and intensio nal ,

meaning is never determinable from though i t may be l mited by , i ,

the class denoted A n d for th e same reason the nten on al mean

. , i si
ing of an expression does not determi ne but o nly limi ts the d e , ,
9 8 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
notation or extension of i t D enotat on or extension i meaning a . i s s
a plication
p , coinciding with those actualities w hi ch in tance the s
i
intens on which operate a criter on o f their s election from s s i
s i
amongst thing observed o r things n general ; the inten ional s
meaning which so operate s is
i s
meaning as im plicat on ; a what
s
is entailed and required to be the ca e in o rder that th e expre s
s s “
sion hould apply Thu th e question What doe th e expression
. s
s ”
s
mean in the sen e of denotation ? i the que tion What thing s “

ss ”
or things does i t single out a poken o f? And the que t on What si
s s s
does the expres ion mean in the en e o f inten ion ? s the ques s i
”

“
i i
tion What is said about any thing o r mpl ed by the application , ,

or predication of thi expre sion ? s

”
s
s i s
S ince I have already done my be t w th re pect to thi topic s
of i ntensional and extensional meaning in ano ther place let me ,

merely summarize here .

L inguistically the intens on o f an expre

, i
on A can be iden ti ssi ,
‘

,
’

fie d by the dictum that any other expres ion B i ncluded in the s ,

‘

,
’
si
s
inten ion of A if and only if fro m the premi e that A applies
‘ ’
s ‘ ’

‘
to x i t is deducible that B applies to x Thu in linguistic terms ’
. s ,

the intension of A would be const tuted b y the and relation of

‘ ’
i -

all th e predicates entailed by the predication of A Intensional ‘ ’

.

equivalence — reciprocal entailment o f two expression —is th e rela s

tion of definition ( though there are further and psychologica l or
heuristic requ irements o f a practically s ati factory definition) It s .

sho u ld be noted that entailment i not here a truth value relation s -

,

since deducibility i not a truth value relation s -

.

Hw ,
‘
o ever linguistic inten ion as I here use that phrase fails s ,
’

to cover some thing essential to meaning as condition of the ap

p li c ab i l i t
y o f an expression because of the farfetched , consideration
that explicating one expression by mean s of o ther w ll never suc s i
c e e d of its intent unless s o m e words used are already understood

s
as rules of di crimination to be followed in applying them n . O
the side of that to which application is made what i essential to , s
such correct application is ome character This haracter or at s . c
s
tribute which mu t be dete rmined as present n determining cor i
re c tn e ss of the application of an expression I w ill speak of as the ,

g fi
s i n i c a tio n of th e expression Thus there are three thing here . s
which are correlative ; the concept which is the ri te r on or rule c i
in mind the character o r attribute signified which is n the thing
, , i ,

and the linguistic intension which is a function exerci ed by the , s

expression in relating the concept or rule o f dis ri mination to o h c
1 00 A M E R ICA N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
other time is not a proposi tion but a propos tional function Any
, i .

proposition which has temporal reference requ ires for the full ,

expression of i t that this te mporal reference be made explicit ;

,

and when that is done it must be a lw ays tru e or else al ays false
, w .

There are more considerations which cry out for attention than
i t is possible to discuss here ne of the most important is that . O
there must be a conceptual meaning o f the proposition which is ,

independent of i ts truth o r falsity because there must be a criterio n ,

of s u ch tru th or falsity— that s a criterion of applicability o f the i ,

proposition to what is actu al—ih order that uch actual truth or s

falsity may be determined This proposi tional concept i the same . s
whether the assertion of the proposi tion—the statement— i true or s
is false ; only o n that condi tion would any truth o r falsity be dis
cover able Co rrelatively the intensional meani ng of any expression
. ,

of the proposition al concept entertained and the signification o f ,

i t—the state of a ff airs s upp os e d — must remain the same whether ,

the proposition is actually true or actu ally false An d again cor .

relatively logic which certifies no actual existence and depends

, ,

s
on none ha nothing to do with the extensional relations of state
,

h i ll —
ments o f fact except h yp t e ca y o and this is the place to
i
o , t r

put the emphasis —so far a the extensional relation o f proposit onss s
are deducible from their relations o f intensional meaning The .

i
logic which construes ts basic categories a extensional and in s
terms o f truth values would seem to be strangely misconceiving
-
,

itself as one of the natural and empi ri cal sc ences L ogic can certify i .

no existential and empirical fact ; and no empir cal fact or set i

of such can certify any tru th of logic “That logic can certify is .

the relation of intensional meanings amongs t themsel es ; e g that v . .

,

w hatever satisfies one condition must also satisfy another condi tion ;
w
that hat satisfies o ne condition mu t fai l to sati fy another con s s
dition ; that what is requisite to atisfaction of o ne condition is the s
same as what is requisite to atisfaction o f another ; or that two con s
d i tio n s are mutually compatible bu t have non e of the previous
s
relation N one of these relationships can b e empir cally assured
. i ,

w ith the exception of cons ten y ; and consisten y is l ogically a is c c , ,

negative fact— the negative of a relation of deducibili ty .

s
I have o far spoken o f individual of character or at tributes s , s ,

of existence and of an ontol ogical tatus of conceptual meanings

, s
w s
hi ch i not that of exi tence w th no explanat on Adequacy ins , i i s .

an implied metaphysics would take a book ; o ne whi h I h al l not c s

i
attempt to w r te D ogm atically an d nadequately : only n d vi dual
. i i i s
 SOME S U GGES ION S C ON CERN IN G ME APHYS I
T T C S O F LOGIC I OI

exi st An d I am satisfied to conceive individuals a continuous and

. s
bounded parts o f the space time whole ( The pace time whole -
. s -

w
i tself is a Pick icki an individual not being bo u ndable ) ne , . O
v
indi idual may be wholly contained in another as the bottom ,

board is incl u ded in a box T o may o erlap as a dog and a hair . w v ,

v
that it sheds Indi iduals having neither of these two relationships
.

are distinct The space time attrib u tes of a thing may erve as the
.
-
s
‘
v
principle o f indi iduation but cannot be exhaustive o f its in ’

div id u ali ty ; and space time attributes themselves ar e sp e cifiab l e

-

only in relative te rm s ( In passing please note that a pile o f and

.
, s
is an individual only if the pieces of air between the grain are s
parts of this individu al pile : the s an d in the pile is not a continuous
boundable entity This apparently trivial consideration might turn
.

out to be important for clear distinction between in di vidu als and

characters ) .

w
A character is an enti ty hich can be instanced and is the same ,

in all its instances An instance of a character is an existent in

.

dividu al Characters themselves do not ex st bu t they are real or

. i ,

unreal A ch aracter is real if an instance of i t exists

. .

v
Correlati ely neither concepts nor intensional meanings ex st
, i .

But a concep t is real if there is a psychological instance of ts i

s
entertainment or i t i logically ( and consistently) con tructible
, s
from element concepts which are entertained ( The notion of a
-
.

concept never entertained may seem j ej une ; but e sho u ld remind w

ourselves that this is the only kind o f reality which any but an
infinitesimal fraction o f the natural numbers have I n this con .

n e c tio n also we sho u ld observe the necessity of distinguishing a

,

concept the expression of wh ich o u ld be of the form logi cally con w ‘

s tru c tib l e from element s

such and such by operations so and o s ’

from any concept so constructed ) S imilarly an intensional mean .

,

ing as a linguistic entity may have the kind of reality characteristic

of expressions ; that is i t is real if there is some pattern of sounds
,

or of marks having an instance— some noise on some occasion or a

w
pile of ink some here —which con eys this conceptu ally d e term i v
nate meaning ; or if i t is consistently constructible by the rule s
of language from elementary expressions which are instanced .

w
A s bet een the concept or the intensional meaning on the , ,

one side and the corresponding character in an obj ect or obj ects
, ,

on the other the reality of the concept or the meaning doe not
, s
entail the reality o f the character as instanced in ome exi stent s .

( Its i by this fact that we are able to thi nk of and peak of what , s ,
1 02 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
does not exist An d if we could not o think we could not act de
. s ,

lib erate l y since that requires us to choose amongst considered al

,

tern a tiv e s only one of which will ever be realized ) A lso the reality .
,

of the character as instanced in some individual does not entail

, ,

the reality of the concept or of the intensional meaning as a lin ,

u is ti c entity
g .

M eanings as concepts meanings as lingu istic intensions and , ,

characters as instanced in existents are all three o f them abstract ,

s —
entities o r universal Concepts and linguistic entities are I have
.

suggested— mind dependent Whether characters or attributes as

-
.
,

abstractable aspects of individual existents are mi nd dependent is ,

-
,

w
a final question hich lies between a metaphysic which is con s
sistent with nominalism and one consistent with conceptualism .

I shall attempt merely to indicate the locus of this somewhat

ten u ous issue The conceptualist repudiates nominalism for one
. ,

reason because i t reduces logic to a game played with fictions hav ,

ing a psychological explanation but no validi ty An d for another .

becau se i t redu ces the basis of the intelli gi bility of things to a

similar fiction B u t he refuses the Platonic re ific atio n of ab s trac
.

tions and he may also re p u diate the basic argument of absolute

,

idealism : to be real is to be intelligible and to b e intelligibl e is to ,

be mind related ; hence no obj ect ou t of relation to a s ubj ect

-
.

H e may consider the l o go cen tric predicament ( Professor S h e ffer s ’

phrase ) of a rationalizing mi nd which m u st think and speak in

terms of universals no be tter argument for absolute idealism than
,

the egocentric predicament is for personalistic idealism If so then .

,

he is left with a conception I can only suggest cru dely by saying

that the conception o f a orld of individual existent none of w s ,

th em conscious is a meaningful supposition ; but that in such a

, ,

world there would be no abstract entities ; there would be classi

,

s
fi ab l e thing b u t no classes ; there would be star in the heaven s s
but no constellations .

What suggests this manner of conception and is at once le s s ,

simple mi nded than my crudely put s u ggestion and more pertinent

-

to logic is the fact that nothing can be literally apprehended by

,

a m ind except some abstrac tions or u niversal Indi viduals can .

neither be thought o f nor identified except thro u gh their inherent

characters The nominalistic conception that individuals are the
.

first k n o w ab l es and the logically primitive entities and that in ,

d iv id u al s are pri mi tively determinable by ostensive reference i ,

s ,

I think epistemologi cally untenabl e It is plausible only when a

, .
I O4 A M E R I CA N PH ILO S O P HER S AT WORK
su m ab l yintends the further implication that a unique ndividual i
exists satisfying th e condition x is S ocrates A lthough we know ‘
.
’

from the meaning o f S ocrates that no nonhuman individual ‘ ’

s
satisfies thi condition we have ind u ctive assurance only o f the
,

existence and uniqueness o f an obj ect satisfying it ; and the state

“
ment S ocrates is a man is nonanalytic like every assertion o f ,

existence .

O i i
ne mportant po nt o f dist nction between individuals and i
characters must at least be mentioned since w thout t the di , i i , s
tinction itself could be u nclear Fo r every predicable relation of .

an individual to a character there is th e convers e relation o f that,

character to that individual Individuals instance j ust those char .

ac te rs which they do ; an d conversely ch ar acters are in tanced in , s

v
j u st those indi iduals in which they are The difference is that .

every character instanced by an indi idual is essential to that in v

d iv id u al s being j ust the indi vidual that i t is That is implied by
’
.

the infinite specificity of what is individual A character however .

, ,

is j ust that character which i t is regardless of what individuals

exist and are instances o f it In o ther words the relation bet een .
, w
an individual and a character i t instances is essential to the ind i
vidu al ; inessential to the character That i a basic di fference . s
w
bet een the t o categories w .

O ne corollary o f this is the fact that any attempt to identify

a universal or a character by reference to the class of in d ividual s
of which this character is predicable is doo med to failure An y , .

, s
given predicate taken a condition delimits uniqu ely a c l assi fic a ,

w
tion of existents ( hich may be null) ; but no class of existents
determines a unique predicate as that which all it members s
satisfy . Ow
ing to the logically accidental limi tations of what exists ,

as well as on ac count o f the infinite specificity of each and every

individual there are always for any given class of existents at least
, , ,

w w
t o predicates ( t o which are not eq u ivalent in intension) which
are common to all and only those individu als hich are members w
of this class The predicates h u man fea therless biped and ani
.
‘

,
’ ‘

,
’ ‘

mal that la u ghs constitu te a fam iliar though not too good examp l e
’
.

There are I think many other implications here involved the

, , ,

w
investigation of hich wo u ld be interesting and logi cally p ro fit
able But time does not permit even the suggestion of them In
.
.

concl u sion let me mention one such consideration only ; one with
,

respect to which you may well think I have a prepossession .

The denotation or extension o f any expression is always logi cally

 SOME S U GGES ION S C ON CERN I N G
T ME T AP HYS C S O I F LOGIC 1 05

accidental : logic can never certify what t denotes o r whether i t i

denotes anything except in those cases in whi ch i t is dete rminable
, ,

from its intensional meaning that i t has universal extension o r

,

that i ts extension is null The statements belonging to any correct

.

w
logic are those and those only hose tr u th is certifiab l e by refer
ence to the intensional meanings o f the logical constants o f th e
system ( including those conveyed by the syntactic i gnificance of s
the order of wri ting) A logic in which the constant are confined
. s
to extensional functions symbolize no element relation uch that s -
s
whenever i t ob tains i t is logi cally certifiab l e The exten ional logi . s c
of propositions for example instead of symbolizing and asserting
, ,

w
that relation hich ob tains between p and q when an d only when q
is dedu cible from p asserts a relation uch that if two s entences
, s
be chosen at random from the morni ng paper i t i cer tain in ad , s
s
vance that thi relation will hold between o ne o r other of them a s
ii
antecedent and th e rema n ng o n e as consequent But t as erts . i s
this relation o n ly in th os e ins tan ces in which the quite d i fferent
s s
relation which i the conver e o f i deducible from also ob tains ‘
s ’
.

It thus uses tacitly as criterion of assertion in logic a relation

, ,

which is not expressible in the vocabulary t provides ; and what t i i

asserts is logically certifiab l e for that reason only I thi nk i t i . s
c
desirable in logic that the logi cal ri ter a o f logi ca l certifiab ili ty i
should be expres ed s .

before th e mee ting of th e Association for S ym bolic

R ead L ogic on

D ecember 2 8 1 9 4 9 bu t not previou ly pub l ished

, , s .
 E R NES T N A G EL

Mecha n is tic E xp la nati n

o

a nd Orga n is m ic B i l gy
o o

Vi talism s
of the s u b tantival type sponsored by D riesch and other b i
ologists during th e preceding and early part of the present century
w
is no a dead issue in the philosophy of biology— ah issue that has
become q u iescent less perhaps beca u se of the methodological an d
, ,

philosophical criticism that has been leveled against the doctrine

s
than beca u se of the infertili ty of Vitali m as a gu ide in biolo gi c al
research and because of the superior heuristic val u e of alternative
approaches for the i nvestigation of biological phenomena N ever .

th e l e s s the historically infl u ential Cartesian conception of biology

,

as simply a chapter of physics continues to meet resistance ; and

w
outstanding biologists ho find no meri t in Vi talism believe there
are concl u sive reasons for maintaining the irredu cibility of biology
to physics and for asserting the intrinsic autonomy of biological
. w
method The standpoint from hich this thesis is currently ad
“
v an c e d commonly carries th e label of o rgan rsm rc biology and
i
tho u gh the label covers a variety o f spec al biological doctrines that
w
are not all mutu ally compatible those ho fall u nder it are uni ted
,

by the common conviction that biological phenomena canno t be

1 08 AMER WORKICA N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT

t i on of such regula i ties i n phy si cochemical term s i s available and

r ;
nei her the theory of evolution even in it s current form nor the
t ,

gene heory of hered i ty i s based

t any definite phy s icochemi cal on

assumptions concerning l i ving processes A ccordingly organis mi c . ,

biologists posses s at least some ground s for the i r s kepticism con

cerning the inevitability f the mechani s tic s tandpoint and j u s t o ;
as a physicist may be warranted in holding that some given branch
o f physics electromagnetic theory) i s not reducible to some
o her branch
t mechanics) so an organi smi c biologi st may be ,

warranted in holding an analogou s View with respect to the rela

tion f biology and physi cochemistry If here i s a genuine issue
o . t
between mechanist s and organi smic biologists it is not p im f i ,
r a ac e

a pseudo que s tion .

H owever organismic biologists are not content wi th making the

,

obviously j ustified observation that only a relatively small s ector

of biological phenomena has thus far been explained in physico
chemical terms ; they also maintain that in p rinc ip le the mode of
s s ci
analy is a so ated with mechanistic explanations is napplicable to i
some of the maj or problem of biology and that therefore mechan s ,

is tic biology cannot be adopted as the ultimate deal n biologi al i i c

s
re earch What ar e the grounds for this contention and how solid is
.

the support which organismic biologist claim for their th e s ? s si

The central theme of organismic biology is that l ving creatures i
are n o t assemblages of tissues and organs fun tioning ndependently c i
of one another but are integrated tructure of parts Accordingly
, s s .
,
“
s s
living organism mu t be studi ed as wholes and not as the mere ,
“
sums o f parts E ach part i t is maintained ha physicoc hem cal
.
, , s i
i
properties ; but the nterrelat on of the part involve a di t nct ve i s s si i
i
organizat on so that the study of the physicochem cal properties
, i
s
of the p ar ts taken in i olation of their membership in th e organized
w hole which is the l iving body fails to provide an adequate u m
d ers tan d ing o f th e facts of biology In con equence the continuous . s ,

adaptation of an organi m to its environment and of i ts parts s

s
to o ne another o as to maint ai n i ts character st c structure and i i
i
act vi ties cannot be described in terms of physical and chemical
,

i s
pr nciple Biology mu st employ categories and a vocabulary which
.

are foreign to the sciences of the inorganic and it must reco nize
g ,

s
modes and law of behavior which are inexplicable n physi o i c
chemi cal terms .

ci
To te bu t one brief quotation from the wri ting of organism c s i
 ME HAN S T C I IC I
EXPLANAT ON AND OR AN S M G I IC BIOLO GY 9 10

s
biologi st I offer the follow ng from
, i E S . . R us s ell as a typ i cal s tate
ment of this point o f View :
An y w
action of the hole organism o u ld appear to be s u sc e p ti w
ble of analysis to an indefinite de gree — and this is in general the
aim of the physiologist to analyze to decompose into their , ,

elementary processes the broad activities and fu nctions of the

i
organ sm .

But by s u ch a procedu re something is lost for the action

w
,

o f the whole has a certain u n ifie d n e ss and completeness hich is

left out of account in th e process of analysis I n o u r con
w
.

c e tio n o f the organism e must take into acco u nt the u n ifie d

p
w v v
.

ness and holeness o f its acti i ties [especially since] the acti ities
of the organism all have reference to one or other of th ree great
v
ends [de elopment maintenance and reprodu ction] and both
, , ,

the past and the fu ture enter into their determination

w w
.

It follo s that the activities of the organism as a hole

are to be regarded as of a di fferent order from physicochemi cal
relations both in themselves and for the p u rposes of our under
,

standing .

Biochemistry st u dies essentially the c o n d itio ns o f actions

of cells and organisms hile organismal biology attempts to w
w
,

study the act u al modes of action of hole organisms re garded ,

as conditioned by bu t irred u cible to the modes of action of

, ,

lo w er uni ties 1

A ccordingly while organismic biology rej ects every form of sub

,

s t an tiv al Vi talism i t also rej ects the possibility of physicoche mi cal

,

explanation of Vital phenomena But does it in point of fact pre .

, ,

sent a clear alternative to physicochemi cal theories of li ing proc v

, , , w
esses and if so hat typ es of explanatory theo ri es does i t reco m
w
mend as orth exploring in biology ?
( )
1 A t first bl u sh th e sole iss u e that seems
, to be raised by
organismic biology is that commonly discussed u nder the heading
“ ”
of emergence in oth er branches of science incl u ding the physical ,

sciences ; and altho u gh other q u estions are involved in the organ

,

i s m ic standp oint I shall be i n

g , ith this aspect of the question w .

The cr u x of the doctrine of emergence as I see it is the deter , ,

mination of th e conditions under hich one science can be reduced w

to some other one the form u lation o f the logi cal and e m p iri
w
cal conditions hich m u st be satisfied if the laws and other state
ments of one di sci p line can be s u bs u med under or explained by , ,

the theories and principles of a second discipline mitting details . O

1 10 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
and refinements the two conditions which seem to be necessary
,

and sufficient for such a reduction are briefly as follows L e t S 1 be .

some science o r group of sciences such as physic and chemistry

”
s ,

hereafter to be called the primary discipline to which a second ,

science S for example biology is to be reduced Then ( i ) every

, 2 , , .

”
term which occurs in the statements of S terms like cell 2 ,
“ ” “
m y to s is heredity etc ) m u st be ei ther explici tly definable with
, , .

the help of the vo c abulary specific to the primary discipline

i
w th the help of expressions like length
”
“ “
electric charge ” “
os ,
”
,

mosis ) or well established empirical laws must be available wi th

-

c
the help of whi h i t is possible to state the u fficient con di tions for s
the application of all expressions in 8 exclusively in terms of 2 ,

expressions occurring in the explanatory p ri nciples of 8 For ex 1

.

ample i t must be possible to state the truth conditions of a state

,
-

“
men t of the form x is a cell by mean of sentences constructed s
exclusively out of the voc ab u lary belonging to the physicochemi cal
sciences Though the label is not entirely appropriate this first
.
,

condi tion will be referred to a th e condition of d efin ab il i ty s .

ii E s
( ) very tatement in the econdary discipline 8 2 and e pecially s , , s
s s
those tatement which form u late the la s established in 8 2 must w ,

be derivable logically from some appropriate class o f s tatements

that can be established in the primary science S — such classes of ,
l

statements will include the fundamental theoretical as sumptions

of S This second condition will be referred to as the condition
I
.

of derivability .

s
It i evident that the econd conditio n cannot be fulfilled unless s
the first o n e is although the realization of the first condition does
,

s
not entail the atisfaction of the second one It is also q u ite beyond .

i
dispute that n the sen e of reduction specified by these conditions s
biology has thus far not been reduced to physics and chemistry ,

since not even the first tep in the process of reduction has been s
completed— for example we are not yet in the position to specify ,

i
exhaustively n physicochemical terms the co ndi tions for the
occurrence o f cell u lar division .

A ccordingly organismic biologists are on firm gro u nd if what

,

they maintain is that all biological phenomena are not explicable

i
thus far phys cochemically and that no physicochemi cal theory ,
‘

can possibly explain uch phenomena until the descriptive and s

s
theoretical term of biology meet the condition of d efin ab i l i ty n . O
the other hand nothing in the facts urveyed up to thi p oint
, s s
1 12 A M E R ICA N P HI L O S O P H E R S AT WORK
organism does not su fli ce as a premise for deducing anyth ng about
, i
w
the behavior of the hole organism in which the parts do stand
in certain specific and complex relation to o ne another s .

But do these admi tted facts establish the organismic thesi that s
mechanistic explanations are not adequate in biology ? This does
not appear to be the case and for everal reasons It shoul d be , s .

noted in the firs t place that various forms of hierarchical organi

, ,

z atio n are exhibited by the materials of physics and chemistry and ,

not only by those o f biology O

n the basis of current theories of
.

matter we are compelled to regard atom as tructures o f electric

, s s
charges molecules as organi z ation of atoms olid and liquids as
, s , s s
complex systems o f molecu les ; and we must also recognize that
the element occupying positions at di fferent levels of the indicated
hierarchy generally exhibit traits and modes of activ ty that their i
component parts do not possess Nonethele s this fact has not . s ,

stood in the way o f establishing comprehensive theories for the

more elementary physical particles in terms of which i t ha been , s
possible to explain some if not all of the physicochemical prop
, ,

e rti e s exhibited by things having a more complex organization .

We do not to be sure possess at the presen t time a comprehensive

, ,

w i
and unified theory hich s competent to explain the whole range
of physicochemical phenomena at all level of complex ty Whether s i .

w
such a theory ill ever be achieved s certainly an open question i .

B u t even if such an inclusive theory were never achi eved the ,

w
mere fact that e can now explain some feature s of relatively highly
organized bodies on the b asis o f theori e formulated in terms of s
w
relations bet een relatively more s imply structured elements — for
examp le the specific heats of solids in terms of quantum theory or
,

the changes in phas e of compounds in terms o f the thermodynami cs

of mixtures — should give us pause in accepting the conclusion that
the mere fact of the hierarchical organization of biological ma
te ri al s precludes the possibility of a mechanistic explanation .

This obse rv ation leads to a second point rganismic biologists . O

do not deny that biological organism are complex structures of s
physicoche mical p rocesses altho u gh like everyone else they do not
,

claim to know in min u te detail j ust what these processes are or

j u st how the various physicochemical elements ( assumed as the
ultimate parts of living creatures) are related to one another in a
v
li ing organism They do maintain however ( or appear to main
. ,

w
tain) that even if our kno ledge in this respect were ideally com
l e te i t would still be impossible to accoun t for the characteristic
p ,
 M EC HAN I S IC EXPLANA ION
T T AND OR AN S MG I IC BIOLOGY I I3
behavior of biological organisms — their ability to mainta n them i
selves to develop and to reprod u ce —in mechanistic te rm Thus t
, , s . , i
has been claimed that even if e were able to descr be in ful l w i
detail in physicochemical terms hat is taking place when a ferti w
l iz e d egg segments , w w
e ould nevertheless be unable to explain
, ,

mechanistically the fact of segmentation —in the language o f E S . .

R ussell w w
e o u ld then be able to state the physicochemical c o n
,

d itio ns for the occurrence o f segmentation but we ould still b e , w

unable to explain the c o u rs e which development takes Now thi . s
claim seems to me to rest on a mi sunderstanding if not on a con ,

fusion It is entirely correct to mai ntain that a kno ledge of the

. w
physicochemical composition o f a biological organism does not
suffice to explain mechanistically ts mode o f action any more — i
than an en u meration o f the parts of a clock and a kno ledge of w
their distrib u tion and arrangement suffices to explain and predict
v
the mode of beha ior of the timepiece To do the latter one must . ,

a ls o ass u me some theory or set of la s the theory of mechan w

w w i
ics ) hich form u lates the ay n which certain elementary obj ects
w
behave hen they occur in certain initial distributions and ar
w
rangements and i th the help of hich e can calculate and pre
, w w
dict the co u rse of s u bsequent development of the mechanism N o w .

it may indeed be the case that our information at a given time

may s u ffice to describe physicochemically the constit u tion of a bio
v
logical organism ; ne ertheless the established physicochemical ,

theories may not be adeq u ate e en hen combined ith a physic o

, v w w
chemical description of the initial state of the organi sm for d e ,

d u cing j ust w
hat the co u rse of the latter s de elopment will be T o ’
v .

put the point in terms of the distinction previously introd u ced ,

the condition of d e fin ab il i ty may be realized i thout the con di tion w

of derivabili ty being fulfilled B u t this fact must not be interpreted
.

to mean that i t is possible under any circu ms tances to give ex

plana tions wi thou t the use of some theoretical ass u mptions or that ,

because one bod y of physicochemical theory is not competent to

explain certain biological phenomena i t is in p rinc ip le imp os s ib le
to construct and establish mechanistic theories hich might do o w s .

( )
3 I must now exam ine the consideration w h ich appears to
constitute the main reason for the negative attitude of organismi c
w
biologists to ard mechanistic explanations rgan smic biologists
“
. O i
have placed great stress on what they call the u nified n ess the ,
“ “
unity th e completeness o r the wholenes
, ,
”
of organic b e s
v s
ha ior ; and ince they believe that biologi cal organi m are com
, s s
1 14 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S O P HER S AT WORK
plex systems of mutually dete rmining and interdependent processes
to which subordinate organs contribute in various ways they ,

have maintained that organic behavior cannot be analyzed into

a set of independently determinable component behaviors of the
parts of an organism “
w
hose sum may be equated to th e total
,

behavior of the organism n th e other hand they also maintain

“
. O ,

that mechanistic philosophies o f organic action are machine

” “
theories of th e organism which assume the addi tive point of ,
”
view with respect to biological phenomena What distinguishes .

mechanistic theories from organis mi c ones from this perspective , ,

w
is that the former do hile the latter do not regard an organism as
“
a machine “
w
hose parts are separable and can be studied in
,

isolation from their actual functioning in th e whole living organ

ism so that the latter may then be understood and explained a
, s
an aggregate of such independent parts A ccordingly the funda , ,

mental reason for the dissatisfaction which organismi c biologi sts

w
feel to ard mechanistic theories is the addi tive point of vie ”
w
that allegedly characteri z es the latter o ever whether this argu . Hw ,

ment has any me ri t can be decided only if the highly ambiguous

“ ”
and metaphorical notion of sum receives at least partial c l arific a
tion ; and it is to this phase of the question that I first b ri efly turn .

i
() A s is ell known the wordw “
sum ”
has a large ,variety of
di fferent uses a number of which bear to each other certain
,

formal analogies while others are so vague that nothing definite

is conveyed by the word There are well defined senses of the term
i
.

in var ou s domain s of p u re mathematics — e g arithmetical sum . .

, ,

algebraic s u m vector s u m and the like ; there are also definite

, ,

uses established for the word in the natural sciences — e g sum of . .

,

weights sum of forces s u m o f velo ci ties etc But i th notable

, , , . w
exceptions those who have employed i t to distinguish holes
, w
which are sums of their parts from holes which s u pposedly are w
not have not taken the tro u ble to indicate j ust hat wo u ld be
, w
the sum of parts of a whole which allegedly is not equal to that
whole .

I therefore wish to s u ggest a sense for the work su m which

seems to me relevan t to th e claim of organismic biolo gists that
the total behavior of an organism is not the s u m of the behavior
of its parts That is I wish to indicate more explicitly than
.
, ,

organismic biologists have done — thou gh I hasten to add that the

prop osed indication is only moderately more precise than is cus
to m ary —what it is they are asserting when they maintain, for
1 1 6 IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S
AMER WORK AT

solid rather than a ga s A ccordingly h therma l behav i or of s olids

.
, t e
is not the m f the behavior of i t s parts
su o .

Whe her the above proposal to interpret the distinction between

t
w holes which are and those w hich are not the sums of their parts
w ould be acceptable to organismic biologists I do not know But , . ,

w hile I am a w are that the suggestion requires much elaboration

and refinement to be an adequate tool of analysis in broad , out

line i represents what seems to me to be the sole i ntellect al con

t u

tent f what organismic biologis ts have had to say in this connec

o

tion H owever if the proposed i nterpretation of the distinction is

.
,

accepted as reasonable then one important conseq ence needs to, u

b noted For
e the above propo s al the distinction between
.
, on ,

wholes which are and those which are not sums of parts is clearly
re la tiv e to s o m e ass u m e d b o dy o f th e o ry T ; and accordingly , ,

though a given whole may not be th e sum of its parts relative to

one theory it may indeed be such a um relati e to another Thus
, s v . ,

though the therm al behavior o f solids is not the su m of the b e

havior o f i ts parts relative to the cla ical kinetic theory of matter ss ,

it is such a sum relative to modern q u ant u m mechanics To say . ,

therefore that the behavior of an organism is not the sum of the

,

b e havior of its parts and that its total behavior cannot be under
,

stoo d adequately in physicochemical term s even thou gh th e b e

havior of each of its parts is explicable mechanistically can only ,

mean that no body of general theory is now available from hich w

statements about the total behavior of the organism are derivable .

The assertion even if true doe n o t mean that i t is in p rinc ip le

, , s
impossible to explain such total behavior mechanistically and it ,

supplies no competent evidence for such a claim .

ii
( ) “ There is a second point related to the organismic emphasis
on the wholeness of organic action upon which I w sh to com i
ment briefly It is frequently overlooked even by those who really
. ,

know better that no theory whether in the physical sciences or

, ,

elsewhere can explain the operations of any concrete system

, ,

unless vari ous restrictive o r boundary conditions are placed on the

gene rality o f the theory and unless also specific initial conditions , , ,

relevantly formulated are upplied for the application of the , s

theory For example electrostatic theory is unable to specify the
. ,

distribution of electric charges on the surface of a given body

unless certain special information not deducible from the fu nda ,

i
mental equat on o f the theory (Poisson s equation ) is supplied ’

, .
 C A I IC
ME H N S T I
EXP LANAT ON AND OR AN S G I MIC BIOLOGY 1 1 7
s
This information must include tatement concern ng the hape s i s
and size o f the body whether i t is a conductor o r n o t the d is trib u
, ,

i
tion of o ther charges ( if any) n the environment of the bod y and ,

th e value of th e d i al e c tri c constant o f the medium in whi ch the

body is immersed .

B u t though this point is elementar y organism c biologi t , eem i sss

to me to neglect it qui te often They sometimes argue that though
.

mechanistic explanations can be gi ven for the behavior of certai n s

parts of organisms when these parts are tudied in ab traction or s s
isolation from the rest of th e organism s u ch explanation s are not
,

s
possible if those part are functioning conj ointly and in mutual
dependence as actual constituents of a livi ng organism This argu .

ment seems to me to have no force whatever What i t overloo ks .

is that the initial and bound ar y condi tion whi ch must be s u pplied s
in explaining physicochemically the behavior of an organic part
i
act ng in isolation are in general n o t s ufii c ie n t for expla ni ng
, , i
mechanistically the conj oint functioning of such p ar ts For when .

these parts ar e assumed to be acting in mutual dependence the ,

environment of each part no longer continue to be what it wa s s

w w
s u pposed to be hen i t as acting in solation A ccordingly a i . ,

necessary requirement for the mechanistic explanation of the

unified behavior of organisms is that boundary and initial con di
tions bearing on th e actual relations of parts as parts of living
organisms be stated in p hys ic o c he m ica l term nless therefore s U .
, ,

appropriate data concerning the physicochemi cal constitution and

arrangement of the vario u s parts of organisms are specified it is ,

not surprising that mechanistic explanations of the total behavior

of organisms cannot be given In point of fa t thi requirement
. c , s
has not ye t been fu lfilled even in th e case of the implest forms of s
vi
li ng organisms for o u r ignorance concerning the detailed physico
,

che mi cal constitution o f organic part is profound s

oreover even . M ,

w w
if e ere to succeed in completing our kno ledge n this respect w i
w
—this ould be equivalent to satisfying the con di tion of d e fin ab il
i ty stated ear lier—biological phenomena might still not be all
explicable mechan istically : for this fu rther step could be taken
v
only if a comprehensi e and independently warran ted physico
chemical theory were available from whi ch together with the ,

necessary boundary and initial con di tions the l aw and o ther tate , s s
i
ments of biology are der vable We have certa nl y fa led thu far
. i i s
i i i
n finding mechan stic explan at ons for the total ran ge o f biolog cal i
II8 AMER IC A N I
P H L O S O P H ER S AT WORK
phenomena and we may never succeed in doing so But though
,
.
,

w e contin u e to fail then if this paper i not completely in error

, s ,

the reasons for such failure are not the a p riori arguments advanced
by organis mi c biology .

4
( ) O
ne final critical comment must be added It mportant . is i
to distingu ish the q u estion whether mechanistic explanations of
biological phenomena are possible from the quite different though ,

related problem whether living organisms can be effect vely syn i

th e siz e d in a laboratory out of nonliving mate r al any b io l o i s M .

gists ap p arently deny the first possibility because o f their skepticism

w
concerning the second even hen their skeptic sm does not extend
, i
to the possibility of an artificial synthesi of every chemical com s
pou nd that is normally produced by biological organisms But the .

w
t o q u estions are not related in a manner so intimate ; and though
i t may never be possible to create living organisms by artificial
means i t do es not follow from this assumption that biological
,

phenomena are incapable of being explai ned mechanistically We .

do not possess the power to manufacture nebulae or solar ystems s ,

tho u gh we do have available phys cochemical theories in terms of i

which the behaviors of nebulae and olar systems are tolerably well s
understood ; and while modern physics and chemistry is beginning
to supply explanations for th e v ario u s p ro p ertie s of metals in
s
_

terms of the electronic tructure of their atoms there is no com ,

pelling reason to suppose that we shall one day be able to manu

facture gold by putting together ar tifi ially its subatomic co n s ti tu c
ents A n d yet the general tenor if not the explic t assertions of
.
, i ,

some of the literature of organismic biology is that the possibility

i
of mechanistic explanations n biology entails the possibility of
taking apart and p u tting together in overt fas hi on the various
i
parts of living organ sms to reconstitute them as unified creatu res .

B u t in point of fact the condition for achieving mechanistic e x

, ,

planations is q u ite different from that necessary for the artficial

v
manufactu re of li ing organisms The former involves th e con .

w
stru ction of fact u ally arranted theories of physicoche mi cal proc
esses ; the latter depends on the avai lability o f certain physico
chemical s u bstances and on the invention of e ffective techniques
of control It is no doub t unlikely that living organ isms ill e er
. w v
be synthesized in the laboratory except with the help of me chanistic
theories of organic p rocesses —in the absence of such theories the
i
,

v
artificial creat on of li ing things would at best be only a fortuna te
w s i s
.

accident B u t ho ever this may be the e con di t on are logi cally

. , ,
12 0 A M E R I CA N P HI L O S O P H E R S WO K AT R

b ehavi or of another pa t ( the chemic al a c t i on f the red b l ood

r o

cell s) O rganismic biologist s like eve yone else who contribute s

.
, r to
the advance of scien ce mu s t be s electi ve i n their procedure and
,

mu s t study the behav i or of livi ng organi sm under s pecialized and s

i solating conditions pain of making the f ee bu t unenlighten

— on r

ing use of expression s like wholenes s and ifi d

“
substitu te s ” “
un e nes s
”

for genuine knowledge .

R ep r inted with p ermission from Phil os o p hy and Phe no me no l ogic al

R es e arc h, 1 9 5 1 .

1 E S R u ss e ll , I nte rp re tatio n o f D e v e l op me nt a nd H ere dity pp 1 7 1 —2 ,

—
. . .
, .

1 87 8 .
 W I LL A R D V .
Q U I NE

What of the empiricist who would gr an t certainty to logic and ,

w w
to the hole of mathematics and yet ould make a clean s eep
, w
of other nonempirical theories under the name of metaphysics ?
s
The Viennese solution of thi nice problem as predi cated on w
language M
etaphysics was meaningless thro u gh mis u se of lan
.

guage ; logic was certain through ta u tologous u se of language .

w
A s an ans er to the question
“
H
ow is logical certainty possi
ble ? this linguistic doctrine o f logical tru th has its attractions .

For there can be no doub t that sheer verbal u sage is in general

a maj or determinant o f tru th Even so fact u al a sentence as
.

‘ ’
w
Bru t u s killed Caesar o es its truth not only to th e ki lling but
w
eq u ally to our using the component ords as e do Why then w .

s
sho u ld a logically true sentence on th e ame topic e g Brutu , . .
‘
s
killed Caesar or did not kill Caesar not be said to owe i t truth
,
’
s
p u re ly to the fact that we use our ords ( in w
this case or and ‘ ’

‘ ’
is
not ) as we do ?—for i t depends not at all for t tru th upon the
killing .
 I2 2 A M E R ICA NWORK PH IL O S O P H E R S AT

The suggestion is not f course that the logi cally true s entence , o ,

is a contingent truth b verbal u s age but rather that it is a

a out ;
s entence which gi the language automatically becomes true
, v en , ,

whereas Brutu s killed Cae s ar given the language become s t ue

‘

,
’

, r

only contingently on th e alleged killing .

Further plausibility accrues to the linguistic doctrine of logical

truth when we reflect on the question of alternative logics S uppose .

someone puts forward and uses a consistent logic the principles of

which are contrary to our own We are then clearly free to say .

‘ ’ ‘ ’
that he is merely using the familiar particles and all o r what , ,

ever ih other than the familiar senses and hence that no real
, ,

contrarie ty is present after all There may of course still be an .

, ,

important fail u re of i ntertran s l atab il i ty in that the behavior of ,

certain o f o u r logical particles is incapable of being duplicated by

s s
paraphrase in his sy tem or vice versa If translation in this sense .

, ss
is possible from hi ystem into ours then we are pretty sure ,

to protest that he was wantonly u ing the familiar particles and s ‘ ’

and all ( say) where he might u nm isl e ad ingl y have used such and
‘ ’

such other familiar phrasing This reflection goes to support the .

View that the truths of log c have no content over and above the i
s
meaning they confer on the logical vocabulary .

M uch the same point can be brought o u t by a caricature of a

doctri ne of L evy Bruhl according to which there are prelogical
-
,

peoples who accep t certa n imple elf contradiction as true i sver s -

s . O
simplifying no doub t let u uppose i t claimed that these natives
, , ss
accept as true a certain sentence of the form p and not p O r ‘
.
’

not to oversimplify too much—that they accept as true a certain

heathen sentence of the form q k a bu q the E nglish translation ‘ ’

of which has the form p and not p But now j ust ho good a ‘
.
’
w
translation is this and what may the lexicographer s method have
,
’

been ? If any evidence c an count against a lexicogr apher adopti on ’

s
‘ ’ ‘ ’
s
of and and not a translations of k a and bu certainly the ‘ ’ ‘

,
’

i
nat ves acceptance of q k a bu q as true counts overwhelmingly
’ ‘ ’
.

We are left with the meaningles ness of the doctrine of there being s
relogical peoples ; re l o i c al i t is a trait inj ected by bad trans
p p g y
s
lators Thi is o ne more illustration of the inseparabili ty of the
.

truths of logic from the m eani ngs of the logical vocabulary .

is
Where someone d agrees w th u as to the truth of a entence i s s ,

i t often happens that we can onvince him by getting the entence c s

12 4 A M E R ICAN P HI L O S O P H E R S WORK AT

A nother point in § 1 was that true s entence s generally

depend
for their tru th on the traits of their language in addition to the
trai ts of their s u bj ect matter ; and that logical truths then fi t neatly
in as the limiting case where the dependence on traits of the sub
‘
c t matter is nil Consider however the logical truth E verything
je .
, ,

is self identical or ( x ) ( x
-
,
’
We c an say that i t depends for
‘

s
its truth on trait o f the language ( specifically on the usage of
and not on traits of its subj ect matter ; bu t we can also say ,

altern atively that i t depends on an o b v io us trait v iz elf identity

, , . s -
,

of its subj ect matter v iz everything The tendency of o u r present

, . .

reflections is that there is no difference .

‘ ’
I have been using the vagu ely psycho l ogical word obvious non
technically assigning t no explanatory value
, i
y suggestion is . M
s
merely that the lingui tic doc trine of elementary l ogical tru th
w
like ise leaves expl anation unbegun I do not suggest that the .

i
linguistic doctr ne is false and some doctrine of ultimate and in
explicable insight into the obvio u s traits of reality is true b u t ,

i
only that there s no real di fference between these two pseudo
doctrines .

i
The l nguistic doctrine of logical truth is sometimes expressed
by saying that such truths are true by lingui tic convention No w s .

if this be so certainly the convention are not in general explici t

, s .

R elatively few persons before the time o f Carnap had ever seen
, ,

any convention that engendered truths o f elementary logic No r .

can this circumstance be as cribed merely to the slipshod ways of

our predecessors For i t is impossible in principle even in an ideal
.
,

state to get even the most elementary part of logic exclusively by

,

the expli c it application o f conv entions stated in advance The .

difficulty is the vicious re gress familiar from L ewi Carroll which , s , l

w
I have elaborated else here 2 Briefly the point is that th e logical .
,

tru ths being infinite in number must be give n by general con

, ,

v e n tio n s rather than singly ; and logic is needed then to begin

with in the metatheory in order to apply the general conventions

, ,

to individual cases .

“
In dropping the attribute o f deliberateness and expli tness s ci
from the notion of linguistic convention I went on to complain ,
“
in the aforementioned paper we ri k depr v ng the latter o f any , s ii
 L O GIC A L T RUT H 1 2 5

explanatory force and redu ng t to an idle l abe l It would ci i .

s eem that to call elementary logic true by convention is to add

nothing but a metaphor to the linguistic doctrine o f lo gica l tru th

whi ch as applied to element ary logic has tself come to seem
, , i
rather an empty figu re 3 .

The case of set theory however di ffers from that of elementary , ,

logic The tru ths of se t theory are not all deri able from obvio u s
. v
s
be gi nning by obvious steps ; and in fact convention in quite the
ordinary sense seems to be pre tty much hat goes on S e t theory w .

w as straining at the leash of intuition ever since Cantor discovered

the higher in fini te s ; and with the added impetus of the paradoxes
of set theo ry the leash was snapped What e do is develop one . w
or another set theory by ob ious reasoning or elementary logic v , ,

from unobvious firs t principles which are se t down hether for , w

good or for the time being by something very like convention ,
.

Conventionalism has a serious claim to attention in the p hil o so

phy of mathematics if only because of set theory , istorically . H ,

though conventionalism was enco u raged in the philosophy of

,

mathematics rather by the non E uclidean geometries and abstract -

, w
algebras ith little good reason We can contrib u te to subsequent .

p u rposes by su rveying this situation F u rther talk of se t theory i . s

deferred to § 4 .

In the beginning there was E uclidean geometry a compendium ,

of truths about form and void ; and its tru ths ere not bas ed on w
convention ( excep t as a conventional ist might begging the presen t ,

question apply this tag to everything mathematical) Its truths

, .

w ere in practice presented by deduction from so called postu lates -

( including axioms ; I shall not di stinguish ) ; and the selection of

truths for this role of postulate o u t of the totality of truths o f ,

E u clidean geometry was indeed a matter of convention But this

, .

is not tru th by convention The tru ths were there and what was .
,

conventional was merely th e separation of them into those to be

taken as a starting po int ( for purposes o f the expo i tion at hand) s
and those to be deduced from them .

The non E uclidean geometries came of artificial deviation from

-
s
’
s
E u clid postulates wi thout thought ( to begin with ) of true inter
,

p re tatio n These depar ture . were doubly conventional ; for E s

uclid s ’

w
postulates ere a conventional selection from among the tru ths
of geometry and then th e departu res were arbi tr ari ly or con
,

v e n tio n all
y devised in turn But still there a no truth by con . ws
v e n tio n because there was no truth
, .
 1 2 6 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
P laying w
ithin a non E uclidean geometry one might c o nv e n i
-
,

ently make believe that his theorems ere interpreted and tru e ; w
bu t even such conventional make believe is not truth by c o n v e n -

s
tion For i t i not really truth at all ; and what is conventionally
.

pretended is that the theorem are true by n o n co nv e n tio n s .

No n E uclidean geometries have in the fullness of time received

-
, ,

serio u s interpretations This mean that ways have been fo u nd of

. s
so constru ing the hitherto uncons trued terms as to identify the at
first conventionally chosen set of nonsentences wi th some genuine
tr u ths and tr u ths pres u mably not by convention The status of an
, .

interpreted non E uclidean geometry differs in no basic way from

-

the original status of E uclidean geometry noted above , .

U
ninterpreted systems became quite the fashion after the advent
of non E uclidean geometries This fashion helped to cause and
-
.
,

w as in t u rn encouraged by an in creasingly formal approach to ,

mathematics M
ethods had to become more formal to make up
.

v
for the una ailability in uninterpreted systems of intuition Con
, , .

v e rs e l
y d i s i n t
,e r
p re tatio n served as a rude but useful device ( u ntil c
Freg e s syntactical approach came to be appreciated) for ach iev
’

ing formal ri gor uncorr u pted by intuition .

The tendency to look upon non E uclidean geometries as true -

by convention applied to uninterpreted systems generally and then ,

carried over from these to ma thematical systems generally A .

t endency indeed developed to look upon all mathematical sys

tems as q ua mathematical uninterpreted This tendency can be
, , .

acco u nted for by the increase o f formality together w th the use , i

of disin terp re tatio n as a heuristic aid to formalization Finally .
,

in an effort to make some se nse o f ma thematics thus drained of

all interpretation recour e was had to th e shocking quibble of
, s
identifying mathematics merely w th th e elementary logic hich i w
leads from uninterpreted postulates to uninterpreted theorems 4 .

What is shocking about this is that it puts arithmetic q u a inter

re te d theory of number an analysis u a interpre ted theory of
p q ,

fu nctions and geometry qua interpreted theory of space outside

, ,

mathematic altoge ther s .

The s u bstantive reduction o f mathematics to logic by Frege ,

Whitehead and R ussell is of course quite another thing It is a

, .

reduction not to elementary logic but to set theo ry ; and I t 1 S a

redu ction of genuine interpreted mathematics from arithmetic ,

onward .
12 8 A M E R I CA N PH ILO S O P HERS AT WORK
‘
did Brutus killed Caesar ( cf They come into being through
’
.

a conventional adoption of a new si gn and they become true ,

through conventional definition of that sign toge th er w ith what

ever made the corresponding sentences in the old notation tru e .

D efinition in a properly narrow ense o f th e word is conve m

, s ,

tion in a properly narrow sense of the ord But the phrase true w .
‘

by definition m u st be taken cautiously ; in its strictest u age it

’
s
s
ref ers to a tran cription by the definition of a truth of elementary
, ,

l ogic Whether such a sentence is true by convention depends o n

.

w hether the logical tru ths themselves be reckoned a true by con s

v e n tio n E ven an o u tright equation or biconditional connecting
.

the d e fin ien s and th e d e finien d u m is a definitional transcri ption

o f a prior logical truth of the form x
‘ ’ ‘ ’
x or
p p .

D efinition commonly so called i not thus narrowly conceived

-
s ,

s
and must for pre ent purposes be divided as postulation was di ,

v id e d into legislative and discurs ve L e gi slative definition intro

, i .

duces a notation hitherto unused or used only at variance wi th ,

the practice proposed or used also at variance so that a co nv en

, ,

tion is wanted to settle the ambiguity D iscursive definition on . ,

the other hand sets forth a pre existing relation of inte rchange
,
-

ability or coextensiveness between notations in already familiar

usage A frequent purpose o f this act v ty i to show how some
. ii s
chosen part of language can be made to erve the purposes of a s
wider part An other frequent purpose is language in truction
. s .

It is only le gislative definition and not discursive definition nor,

discursive postu lation that makes a conventional contribu tion to

,

the tru th o f sentences L egislative postulation finally a ffords tru th

.
, ,

by convention unalloyed .

‘
Increasingly the word definition connote the formu la o f d efi ’
s s
n i tio n which appear in connection w th formal systems signaled i ,

by some ex trasys tem atic sign such as S uch definitions are

bes t looked upon as correlating t o sy tems two notations one of w s , ,

which is prized for its economical lexicon and the other for its
brevity or familiarity of expression 5 D efinitions so used can be .

either legislative or dis c ursive in their inception But this d is tinc .

tion is in practice left unindicated and wisely ; for it is a distinction ,

w
only bet een particu lar acts of definition and not germane to the ,

definition as an endu ring channel of in tertransl atio n .

The distinction between the legislative an d the discursive refers

thus to the act and not to its enduring consequence in the case
, ,
 L OGI C A L T RUT H 1 2 9

of postulation as in the case of definition This is becau se we ar e .

taking the notion of truth by convention fairly literally and simple

mindedly for lack of an intelligible alternative S o conceived con
, .
,

v e n tio n al i t
y i a p assing s
tra t significant at the moving ifront o f
,

science but useless in classifying th e sentences behind the lines It .

is a trait of even ts and not of sentences .

M ight we not still proj ect a derivative trait upon the sentences
themselves s
thu speaking of a sentence as forever true by con
,

v e n ti o n if i t s s
fir t adoption as true was a convention ? N o ; this ,

i s
f done eriously involves us in the most unre arding histori cal
, w
conj ecture L egislative postulation contrib u tes truths hich become
. w
integral to th e corpus o f truths ; the arti fici al i ty of their origin
s
does not linger a a localized quality b u t suffuse the corpus If , s .

a subsequent expositor single out those once legislatively postu s

s
lated tru ths again a po stulate that signifies no thing ; he s e n s , i
gaged only in di scursive postulation e co u ld as well choose hi s . H
postulates from elsewhere in the corpus and will if he thi nks thi s ,

s i
se rve h s expos tory ends i .

s
We have been at a lo s to gi ve substance to the lingu istic doc
trine particularly of elementary logical tru th or to the doctrine
, ,

that th e fami liar tru ths of logi c are true by conven tion We have .

s
found some ense in the notion of truth by convention bu t only ,

as attaching to a process of adoption v iz le gi slative postulation , .

,

i
and not as a si gni ficant linger ng trai t of the legislatively postulated
sentence S u rveying current events we note legislative postulation
.
,

in set theory and at a more element ary level in connec tion with
, ,

w
the la of the excluded middle .

An d do we no t find the same continually in the theoretic al

ss
hypothe e of natural science itself ? What seemed to smack o f
“
convention in se t theory at any rate was deliberate choice , ,

se t forth unaccompanied by any attempt at j u stification o ther

than in terms of elegan ce and convenience and to hat theo w
re ti cal hypo thesis o f natural science might not this same character

s
be attributed ? For urely th e ju tification o f an y theoretical hypo s
thesis c an at the time of hypothesis consis t in no more than the
, ,

elegance or convenience which the hypothesis brings to the con

taining body o f laws and data ow then are w e to deli mi t th e . H
13 0 A M E R I CA N PH ILO S OP H ER S AT WORK
category of legislative postulation short o f including under i t ,

every new act of cientific hypothesis ? s

The situation may seem to be aved for ordin ary hypotheses in s
natural science by there being some indirect but eventual con
fro n tatio n with empirical data o ever thi confrontation can . Hw , s
be remote and conversely some such remote confrontation ith
, , , w
experience may be claimed even for pure mathe matics and ele
ment ary logic The semblance of a di fference in thi s respect is
.

largely due to overemphasis of departmental boundar es For a i .

,

self contained theory which we can check with experience includes

-
,

in point of fact not only its var ous theoretical hypotheses o f so

, i
called natural science but also such portion of logic and mathe s
m atic s as i t makes use of ence I do not see how a line is to
. H
w
be dra n between hypotheses which confer truth by convention
s
and hypothese which do not short o f reckoning al l hypotheses ,

to the former category save perhap those actu ally derivable or s

refu table by element ary logic from what Carnap used to call pro
tocol sentences B u t this version besides depending to an u nw el
.
,

come degree o n the debatable notion of protoc ol sentences is far ,

too incl u sive to uit anyone s .

i i
The not on of log cal truth is now counted by Carnap as semantical .

This of course does not of itself mean that logical tru th is gr ounded
in language ; for note that the general notion of tru th is als o
semantical though truth in general i not grounded purely in
, s
langu age But the semantical attr bute of logical truth in par
. i ,

ti c u l ar is one which
, according to Carnap is grounded in lan
, ,

guage : in convention fiat meaning S uch support as he hints for

, , .

this doctri ne aside from ground covered in § § l 5 seems to depend

,
-
,

on an analogy with what goes o n in the propounding of artificial

languages ; and I shall now try to how why I think the analogy s
mistaken .

I may best schematize th e point by consider ng a case not di i ,

re c tl
y concerned with logical truth where one might typically ,

produ ce an artificial language as a step in an argu ment This is .

the imaginary case of a logi cal positivist say I x mann who is o u t , ,

to defend scientists against the demands of a metaphysician The .

metaphysician argues that science pre uppo es metaphysical princi s s

13 2 A M E R ICA N PH ILO S OP HERS AT WO KR

7
’
ii
Carnap s present pos t on 6 s that one ha specified a language i s
q u ite rigoro u sly only when he has fixed by dint of s o called mean ,
-

ing post u lates what sentences are to count a analytic The pro
, s .

ponent is s u pposed to distinguish between those of hi s declara

tions which count as meaning postulates and thus engender ana ,

l y tic i ty and those which do not This he doe presumably by at

, . s , ,

taching the label meaning postulate ‘

s .
’

Bu t the s ense of thi s label is far less clear to me than four

i
ca u ses of ts seeming to be clear Wh ch of these causes ha worked . i s
o n Carnap if any I cannot ay ; but I have no doub t that all
, , s
four have worked on his reader ne of these causes is misev al u a s O .

tion of the role o f conve ntion in connection with artificial lan

guage ; thus note the fallacy described n § 6 Another s mi sev al u a i . i
tion o f the conventionality of postulate : failure to appreciate that s
postulates though they are po tulate always by fiat are not th e re
, s s ,

f o re tr u e by fiat; cf 4 A third i overe t mation of the d is tin c

.
-
. s si
tive nature of postulates and of defini tions becaus e of c o n sp icu
, ,

ous and peculiar roles which postulate and definitions have played s
in sit u ations not really relevant to pre ent concern : postulates in s s
s
uninterpreted ystems (cf § 3 ) and defini t on in double yste ms
. i s s
of notation (cf § 4 ) A fourth i m sevaluation of legi lative pos tula
. s i s
tion and legislative definition them elves in two re p ects : fai lure s , s
to appreciate that this legislat ve tra t i a tra t of cientific hypo i i s i s
thesis very generally ( cf § 5 ) and failure to apprec ate that it
. i is
a trait o f the passing event ra ther than o f the truth which i s
thereby ins ti tuted ( cf end of § 4 ) .

S uppose a scientist introduces a new term for a certain ubstance s

or force . H
e introdu ces it by an act ei the r of legislat ve d e fini tiOn i
s
or of legislative po tulation Progre sing he evolve hypotheses . s , s
regarding fu rth er traits o f th e named ubstance or force S uppose s .

w
no that some s u ch event u al hypothesis ell attested identifie , w , s
this s u bstan ce o r force wi
th o ne named by a complex term built
up of other portions of his scientific vocabulary We all k no w th at
'

w w
this ne identity ill figure in th e ensu ing developments quite
w
on a p ar i th the identity whi h first came of the act of legislative c
definition if any or on a par with the law whi ch firs t came of
, ,

the act of legislative postulation R evision in the course of fur ther . s ,

progress can touch any of the e affirmation equally No w I urge

, s s .
 L OGI C A L T RUTH 1 3 3

i
that sc entists proceeding thus are not the reby lurring over any
, , s
meaningfu l distinction L egislative acts occur again and again ; on .

the other hand a dichotomy of the resulting truths themselves into

analytic and synthetic truths by meaning postulate and truths by ,

force of nature has been given no tolerably clear meaning even

,

as a methodological ideal .

O ne conspicuo u s consequence o f Carnap belief in this dicho ’

s
tomy may be seen in his attitude toward philosophical issues e g , . .

w
as to hat there is It i only by assu mi ng the cleavage between
. s
analytic and synthetic truths that he is able e g to declare the . .

problem of universals to be a matter not o f theory but of linguistic

decision 7 N o w I am as impressed a Carnap with the vastness of
. s
what language contributes to science and to one s w hole View of ’

w i
the orld ; and n particular I grant that one s hypothesis as to ’

what there is e g as to there be ing universals is at bottom j ust a

, . .
, s
arbitrary or pra gm atic a matter as one s adoption of a new brand ’

of set theory or even a new system of bookkeeping Carna p in .

turn recogn izes that such dec sions however conventional will “
i , ,

s s
nevertheles u ually be influenced by theoretical knowledge 8 But .
”

what impresses me more than i t doe Carnap i how well this s s

whole attitude is suited also to the theoretical hypotheses o f natural
science itself and how little basis there is for a distinction
, .

The lore o f o u r fathers is a fabric of sentences In our hand . s

i t develops and changes through more or less arbi trary and d e l ib ,

c rate revisions and additions of our own more or less directly ,

occasioned by the continuing stimulation of o u r sense organs It .

is a pale gray lore black wi th fact and hite with convention But
, , w .

I have found no substantial reasons for concluding that there are

any quite black thr ead in it nor any whi te ones s , .

i
Thi s essay s made u p of p ortions of my essay Carn ap and logical
tru th ”
w
hich is ap p earing in fu ll in T he Phil o s op hy o f R u d o l C arnap
,
f ,

Vo l 1 0 of the Library of Li ing Philosop hers ( New

. ork Tu dor v Y , ,

1 9 5 6 ) Thank s are du e the editor of that seri e s Profe ssor Pa u l Arthu r ,

S c hilp p for p ermission to m ake the p resent u se of the ma terial

,
.

Wh at T o rto is e S ai d to Ac hi ll e s , M in d, V o l 4
1
2
.

White he ad ( New o rk ,
th e
”
T ru th b y Co nv e n ti o n, in O H L e e , c d , h il os op hic al E ss ay s fo r A N
Y —
. .
p p 2 7 8 ff

1 2 4 R e p ri n te d in H Fe ig l an d W
. P . .

.
.

pp 9 0
P
S e ll ars , e d s , R ea dings in h il o s o p hic al A naly s is ( Ne w
.
.

ork , Ap p l e to n,
.

Y
. .

3 . Cf , § 2
. .

P
4 B ertrand R u s s el l , rinc ip l es of M athe m atics ( C amb ridg e , E ngl an d,
.
13 4 A M E R ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WORK
pp .
“
4 2 9 f ; He inri c h B ehm ann, S ind die m ath em atis c h e n U
rteil e an al y tis c h o d er

P
”
s y nthe tis c h ? E rk e nntnis , V o l 4 p p 8 ff ; an d o th e rs
v
. . .

5 S e e m y F ro m a L o g ic al
. o int o f Vie w ( C am b rid g e, Mas s , H ar ard ,
.

pp 2 6 f . .

6 S e e p articu l arl y R u do l f C arn ap ,

.

S tu d ie s , V o l 3 65 —73
Meani ng os tu l ates , P P
hil os op hical
.
pp . .

P
“
7 S ee C arnap , E m p iric ism , S e m an tic s , an d O n tol o gy , R e v u e I nte rnatio nal e
.

—4 0 e s e c ial l § 3 l o n g es t fo o tn o t e R e
de hil o s o p hie, Vo l 4 .
pp 2 0
p rin te d in L L ins k y , e d , S e man tics an d the
. .
, p y.

P
,

U
hil os op hy o f L ang u ag e ( rb an a,
.

8 . Op . c it.
, §2 ,
5 th p aragrap h .
13 6 A M E R I CAN P HI L O S O P H E R S WORK AT

te rms inv o lv e d These philosophers s eem for the most part

. to be , ,

under the impression that this sense o f analytic coincides wi th

“p ”
that defined above An d if . is logically true did entail and w ere
“p
entailed by is true by virtue of its terms little damage would ,

res u lt from this am b igu i ty g U

nfortunately this is not the case , ,

w s
as ill be argu ed in a later ection of th s paper Indeed the more i .
,

interesting examples gi ven by these philosopher of proposi tion s s

w s
hich are analytic in their sen e turn o u t o n examination n o t to
i
be logically true From which t follow that unless they are mis
. s
“ ”
i
taken in applying th eir own cr teria analytic in their sense can
“ ”
,

not be logically equivalent to analytic in the sense defined abov e .

That tru e b y v irtu e of th e m ean ings of the te rm s inv o lv e d is indeed

a broader sense of analytic than l ogica l ly tru e—broader in that
,
“ ”

it has a greater denotation —will be a central theme of this paper .

To avoid possible misunderstanding le t me make i t clear that ,

“ ”
I shall use the term analytic only in the first or n arrower of the
two senses distinguished above and that where I ant to refe r
, w
to the views of philosophers who use the term n the broader sense
“ ” “
i ,

I shall make the approp riate translation of analytic into true by

“ ”
virtue of the meanings involved Accordingly synthetic will .
,

be used to mean n e ith e r logica lly tru e n or logical ly als e and the f ,

question under dis c ussion becomes : Are there proposition hich sw

are a priori ye t not logically true ?
w
To ans er this q u estion even provisionally we must next de c de , i
“
on a meaning for a priori ”
H
ere the going s more difficult and
. i ,

w v
e shall ha e to be content wi th a rather schematic dis c ussion By .

and large philosophers have given ( or have believed themselves

,

to gi ve) four difl eren t bu t closely related senses to th is phrase .

In the first place we have Kan t s j oint cri teri a of universality and
’

necessity The propositions traditionally characterized as a pr ori

.

”
i ,

with the possible exception of the proposition God exists ( in

the context of the ontological argument) have been universal
— w
p ropositions a priori kno ledge about indiv duals presupposing a i
minor p remise of subs u mption No w when he explicates the cri
.

teri o n of universali ty Kant makes i t clear that it is intended to

,

exclude such universal j u dgments a are tru e merely as a matter s

, v
of fact so that uni ersali ty merges with th e criterion o f necessity .

w
If our kno ledge that all A is B is to be a priori i t must be cor
A
,
“
rect to say A l l m us t be B .

But while we should all agree that a person cannot properly be

said to know a priori that all is B unl e A
he can al o be s a d ss s i
 E E A S Y N H E IC A P R I O R I
Is T H R 3 7 T T ? 1

to know that all A i s ily B — that know ing that all A is

n e c ess ar so

nece s sarily B i s a d i i of k nowing a priori that all t

A i s B —i doe s not at le t at first sight seem to be a s fficient
y ne c ess ar co n on

t , as , u

condi tion There i s no immediate appea ance of contradiction in

the s tatement It is highly probable that all A is necessarily B
. r
“
, ,

so that there wo u ld seem to be no absurdity in speaking of know

ing a poste riori that all A
m us t be B though j u st what account ,

might be given of such kno ledge is another and extremely per w ,

p l exi n
g, matter to which we hall return at the conclusion of s
o u r argument .

s
This brings u to the econd of th e four interpretations of s
i i
apr or ty According to this approach we have a priori kno ledge
.
, w
s
that all A i B when we k n o w for ce rtain that all A is B If we
, .

s “ ”
ask what i meant by knowing for certain we are told that this ,

is not a mere matter o f feeling confident that all A is B It must .

“
s
be reas o nab le to a sert A ll A i B where thi reasonableness is s ”
s
not grounded o n knowledge that on such and such evidence e is
probable that all A is B nor on an argument of which one of the
,

premises is
o f thi
“
s
form Furthe rmore not only must i t be reason
.

”
,

able to assert Al l A is B bu t i t must in some sense be asserted

b e ca us e i t is reasonable In tra di tional terminology k n o w ing fo r
. ,

c e rtain i s
contrasted wi th both p ro b a b le op in io n an d tak ing for
ran te d .
g
ss
Thi econd approach leads smoothly and easily into the third
and fourth explications of apriori ty The third arises by scarcely .

more than a minor reform ulation of what we have j ust said For .

“
to say that the reasonableness of asserting A ll A is B does not
“
rest on knowledge of the form It is probable on e that all is X Y ”

s s
i t t a pedan tic way o f aying that the reasonableness of asserting
“
s ”
All A i B does no t rest on o r is independent of experience , .

An d according to the third approach our knowledge that all A ,

is B is a priori if it is in dep e n de n t of ex p erie n ce

, .

“
But if the reasonablene s of asserting Al l A is B doesn t rest s ’

on experience on what does i t rest? The answer to this question

,

s
bring us to the fourth approach Th s reasonableness we are told . i , ,

rests solely on a correct understanding o f th e meanings of the terms

. s
involved In hort a priori truth is truth e x v i te rm ino ru m
, .

Now in sketching these familiar explications of a priori kno l

, w
edge o f universal truths a kno ledge independent of experience
, s w ,

an d as knowledge e x v i term in o ru m —I have made it clear that to

my way o f thi nking there is a general confluence of these four

13 8 A M E R IC A N PH ILO S O P HER S AT WORK
cri teria such that each o n re fl ect on leads to the others
, , i
uch ,
. M
more would have to be done before we could claim to have dis
s
entangled the variou meaning wh ch have traditionally been given s i
to the term a priori and we hall have to return to this topic
, s
s
before this paper i complete Bu t chematic though the above dis . s
c u s s io n may be i t provides a u eful background for a provisional
, s
choice of a sense of this term for th e interpretation of th e question
I s there a synthetic a priori ? A ccordingly I shall select the fourth ,

of the above criteria as the defining property o f the a priori O u r .

“
q u estion th u s becomes Are there any universal propositions which
, ,

though they are not logically true are true by virtue o f the mean ,
”
ings of their terms ?
2. A D iv e rge n t Us age : C I L ew is It w ll prove useful to con
. . . i
trast our provisional explication of the ori gi nal question with
s s
what one get if one adopt the convention implicit in C I L ewis s . .
’

“ ”
use of the terms synthetic and a pr or S ince he appears to use i i .

“ ”
s
analytic a we are using a pr on and a priori to mean h o l d i
ing o f a ll p oss i b l e o b jec ts of ex p erie nce in hi hands the question , s
i i s
,

“ ” “
Is there a synthetic a pr or ? become Are there any universal
propositions which though they are no t true by virtue of the mean
,
”
ing of their terms hold o f all possible obj ects of experience ? To
,

th is question L ew s answers i ”
no That he is correct in doing so .

becomes clear once it is realized that L ewis picks hi meanings for

“ ”
s
b o th analytic and a priori from our lis t of four traditional
i
criteria of a prior knowledge In o ther words if we are j ustified . ,

in speaking of a confl u ence of these criteria and given L ewis inter ,

’

“ ” ”
re ta ti o n of the terms synthetic and a priori he is on solid
p ,

ground in cl ai ming that i t is logical ly imp oss ib le t hat there be any

propositions which are both syn thet and a pr ori ic i .

3. L ingu is tic R u les an d Ord inary Us age I shall open the next .

“
stage of my argument by pointing o u t that the phrase true by
virtue of the meaning of i ts terms can reasonably be aid to have ”
s
s “ ”
the same ense as true by defin t on Thi brings u face to face ii . s s
w ith a sticky issue H
uman knowledge is presumably the sort of
.

thing that finds its fitting expression in the ord inary us age of ex
pressions in natu ral langu ages ave we not therefore reached a
. H
point at which the horsehair couch is a more appropriate in s tru
ment of philosophical clarification than th e neat dichotomies and
tidy rule books o f the profess ional logicians ? I do not think so .

No t however because I frown on philos o p h ical therapeutic ( on

, , s
 140 AMER WORK
IC A N
IL O S O P H E R S PH AT

said to formulate analyt i c a priori knowledge Bu t a synthe ti c a .

priori proposition our account i s one that is both synthet ic

, on ,

and tr e u i mi
ex v m Can there be such a th i ng?
te r n o ru .

“
No w i t is at once clear that the definition if such it can b e ,

called by virtue of which a synthetic a priori proposition would

,

be tru e e x v i term in o ru m cannot be e xp l ic it definition ; for the a

priori truth to which these g ve rise is analytic If anything that i .

has been called definition can serve this purpose it is what follow , ,

ing S chlick we shall call i p

, m lic i t d e fin i ti o n — to an exami nation o f
which we now turn .

In ro u gh and ready terms a number of predicates w thou t ex , i

p l i ci t definition are said to be implici tly defined if they appear in

a set o f logically synthetic general proposi tion which are pecified s s

as axioms or pri mi tive sentences by the rule of the lan guage to s
which they belong To say that these p re p o sitio n s are axioms or
.

primitive sentences is to say that they are specified to be u n co n

d itio nally as s e rta b le by syntactical rules of the language Thi ac . s
count is deliberately skeletal and is intended to gain flesh from the
,

argument which follows shortly .

If we use the familiar ill u stration of a geometry the following ,

points may be noted : ( 1 ) N either the axiom nor the theorem are s s
logically analytic tho u gh the implicative proposition whose ante
,

cedent is the conj unction of the axioms and whose con equent i , s s
one of the theorems is log cally analytic ( 2 ) If the geometry
, i .

should be of the E uclidian type then th e theorem The area o f a ,

triangle is l/ z
b h hich ,is w
logically synthetic must not be confused ,
“
with the proposition T h e area of a E u c l idean triangle s l/ gb h i ,

i
which is ndeed an analytic proposition but one hich pre upposes
“ ”
, w s
both the theorem and an explici t defini tion of E uclidean triangle
,

w
in terms hich specify that an obj ect doesn t belong to this cate ’

gory unless the axioms and therefore all their logi cal consequences
“
hold of i t S i mi larly th e ax om A traight line is the shortest
.
1
, i s
w
di stance bet een two point
”
s
which is logically syn thetic m u t
, ,
s
“
not be confu sed with A E uc lid ean straight line is the hortest d is s
w
tance bet een two points whi h though analytic depends on an
, c , ,

i“
explicit definit on of E uclidean stra ght line ”
i .

( )
3 The nonlogical terms o f an uninterpre ted calcu l us should

not be interpreted as variables The interpretation of such a cal .

c u l u s by establishing translation rules co rrelating i ts nonlogical

terms wi th expressions in actual use must not be confused wi th

si
the as gning of values to variab l e (4 ) The po tulates o f a E u s . s
 IS TH R E E A S YNT ET H IC A P R I C RI ? 1 4 1

c l ide an geome try do n o t con t tute an mplic t defin tion of t si i i i is

s
nonlogi cal term unless they are specified as unconditionally as
s ert ab l e ( and hence as more than generalized ma terial implications ,

s
equivalence etc ) by th e yntactical rules of the calcu lu ( 5 ) A
, . s s .

deductive system can gain application either by ( a) translating its

nonlo gi cal terms into expression in actu al u se or (b) by building s ,

it onto language in actual u e by establishing ru les of inference s

s
to take o ne from entences in the calcul u s to sentences in actual
and vice versa o r by a combination of ( a ) and ( b )
u se
( )
w
Bu t hat o f expression which do not belong to a contrived s
s
calculus which ha gained a use by being co ordinated i th a pre -
w
exi sting language ? D oe th e notion of implici t definition have s
any application to them? Instead of dealing directly ith this w
question I shall wai t unt l o ther dimensions of the problem have
, i
been brought into view .

Perhaps the most common complaint against the idea of im

p l i ci t defi ni tion i
“
that a e t of terms s
may be implicitly s
defined ”

and ye t have no real o r extr alinguis tic meaning 2 Implici t d e fin i .

tion i t i argued
, s , is
a purely syntactical a ffai r and to expect i t to ,

g ive rise to extralinguistic meanings is a sensible as expec ting a s

number o f people to li ft each o ther by their boo ts traps .

That this obj ection calls attention to an essential featu re of

meaningful lan guage i doub tlessly true But its force as an argus .

ment against the definitional character of implici t definition is

s w
ome hat less keenly felt when one realizes that hen e x p lic i t w
definition is conceived in purely syntactical terms exactly the same ,

obj ection can be raised agai nst i t Both explici t and implici t d e fin i .

tion are matters of syntax The difference is that hereas in the . w

i
case of explic t definition the d e finie n d u m and the d efin ien ti a are
distinct and the gi ving extralinguistic mean ings — ho ever this
,
”
w
is done —to the d e finie n tia fixes the extralinguistic meaning of the
d e finie nd u m ; in the case o f implici t definition the extralingu istic
“
meaning must be given to all the predicates simultaneously ,

s
a they are all both d e finien d a and d e finien tia rolled into one .

A second obj ection point o u t that a set of pre di cates may be s

implici tly defined in terms of one another and yet admit a mul ,

tip lici ty of real meanings 3 But as before the same is true of an .

, ,

explicitly defined term and i t d e fin ien ti a To the set consisting

” “ ”
s .

of m an rational and animal could belong either the real

,
”

meanings m an ra tio na l and an im al or the real meanings b ro th e r

, , ,

m ale and s i b l ing It may be granted that to the extent that the
.
14 2 AMER IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S WORK AT

d e fin ie n ti a themselve s are explicitly defined in te m s of other predi r

cates and the d e finie n tia of these in turn and so on the alternative
, , ,

real meanings capable of belonging to the terms in the chain are

increasingly restricted But i t is by no means obvio u s that the terms
.

’
in however long a definition chain couldn t posse ss any one of a
number of sets of real meanings In any event to the fact that the . ,

syntactical stru cture o f a chain o f explicit definitions limits the

n u mber of alternative real meanings which can be possessed by
the predicates in the chain corresponds the fact that the number
,
“ ”
of possible interpretations o f a set of implicitly defined terms
can frequently be narrowed by adding a new axiom to the original
w
set In neither case ould the utility of the definition seem to
.

depend on its admitting only one et of real meanings The p u r s .

s
poses o f unambiguo u communication require only that where one
and the same abstract syntactical truct u re i associated with two
“
s s
different sets of extralinguistic meanings this structure be em ,

bodied in two sets of visually and audibly di fferent symbols .

B u t the above is but prel u de to the most searching of the o b je c

tions to the notion of implicit definition The obj ection i based . s
on broad philosophical considerations and takes us to the heart of ,

o u r problem I ts point of departure is the above familiar distinction

.

w ”
bet een the linguistic meanings of an implicitly defined et of
“
s
predicates and the real meanings the properties and relations
, , ,

w
which are correlated ith these predicates A s its firs t step i t re .

minds u s that what the implicit definition does is specify that cer
tain sentences containing these predicates are unconditionally as
se rt ab l e In other words that we are authori zed by the rules of
.
,

s
the language to assert the e sentence without either deriving them s
from other sentences or establishing probability relations between
,

th em an d observation sentences But the o b j ection continues even

.
, ,

though the implicit definition may permit u unconditionally to s

s
assert certain sentence involving the predicates A “ ” “
B “
C , ,
”
,

.
, w
etc the tru th of what e assert depends solely on the relation of
the re a l meanings o f these predicates to the world Thus e en .
, v
sho u ld there be a syntactical rule ( implici t definition) authorizing
“ ”
us to assert A ll A is B uncondi tionally ( and therefore to derive
“ ” “ ”
x is B from x is A ) migh t there not be an obj ect which con
“ ”
forms to the real meaning of A without conforming to the real
“ ”
meaning of B ? If this were the case then as far a its real , s
“
meaning was concerned A ll A i B ould be false even though
, s w ,
144 . AMER IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WO R K
i t must be l ogica l ly p oss ib le and hence p oss i b le and hence c on
“ ”
c e iv a b l e that something might exemplify the real meaning of A
”
witho u t exemplifying that of B .

I t is here that the defense clothed in the dignity O f p h i l os op h ia

,
“ ”

p e re n n is q u ietly adds that for

,
A l l A is B to be synthetic yet true
e x v i term in o ru m i t is not su fficient that
,
x is B be syntactically
derivable from x is A there must also be an e x tralingu is tic or
“

re a l c o n n e c tio n bet w “
een the real meaning O f A and the real ”

meaning o f B In other ords given real meanings for A

.
”
w ” “
, B
”
, ,

“
C etc an implici t definition of the e predicates in terms O f one
,
”
.
,
s
another will be adequate only if to the syntactical derivations au
th o riz e d by the definition there corres p ond sy n th e tic nec ess ary
,

c o nn e c tio ns bet w
een the properties which are the real meanings
of these predicates Indeed the defense continues i t will be ap
.
, ,

rO ri a te to gi ve an implicit definition o f these terms only to the

p p
extent that one app re he n ds these necessary connections For only .

“ ” “
w
to this extent could e exclude merely o n the basis Of what we ,

mean by say A and B the possibility that something might

, ,
“ ” “
conform to the real meaning of A but not to that Of B .

. fi
6 I m p l ic it D e n i tio n : T h e A ttac k C o n tin u e d The Opposition .

to im p licit definition now deve l ops the second prong Of its Offensive ,

foc u sing attention on the notion of real or syn thetic necessary ,

” ;
connection It reveals itself to be an empiricist Opposition claim
. ,

ing that this notion is incompatible w th the most element ar y i

princi p les O f the empiricist tradition .

H istorically the characteristic doctrines Of empiric sm have been

, i
gro u nded in a theory or better a type of theory O f concep t forma
, ,

tion Theories of this type form a spectrum wh ich at o n e end

.

to u ches and is easily confu sed with a radically different approach

to be developed at the close O f our argument which can also
( )
w “
ith some j u stice claim the title empiricism though i t is com ”

m i tte d to few if any of the dogmas associat ed with this term L e t .

us begin by reflecting o n the consequences for o u r probl em of a

w
characteristic ( if some hat oversimplified) form u lation Of what we
shall call c o n cep t e m p iric is m It goes as follows : Conce p ts O f q u ali
.

ties and relations are formed from particulars We can indeed have .
, ,

conce p ts of qualities and relations of which we have encountered

“
no instances ; but only if these concepts consist Of concepts which
v
ha e been formed from instances .

N o w from this theory together wi th certain appropr ate assum p

, , i
tions concerning the composition Of concep ts i t follows that w e ,
 Is T HERE A SYNT HET IC A PRI ORI ? 145

can have no concepts Of univer als which are n o t at fied by s s is

“ ” “
particulars S atisfied by particulars here means would be sati
. s
fie d by partic u lars if satisfied at all In thi sense the property . s
ss
Centaur i atisfied by particulars even though t actually ha no , i s
instances .

The implication Of concept empiricism ith respect to the con w

cept Of real connection is immediate and murderous There is no .

Y w
such concep t et here e must be careful It is sometime thought
. . s
w H
that hen ume and his followers are criticizing rationalistic di s
course about necessary connections their application Of concept ,

empiricism consists in pointing out that th ey find no instances of

necessary connection among sensibly experienced particular and s ,

predict that w e shall find none If this were the heart Of the matter
.
,
“
w
the Obvious comeback ould be Yo u are either looking in the
w rong place or are necessary connection blind The truth Of
,
- -
.
,

co u rse is that if there is s u ch a thing as necessary connection i t i

, , s
a relation satisfied by u n iv e rs als ( a relation whose terms are uni
versals ) and n o t by particulars Thus for the concept empirici t .
, s ,

v
our failure to ha e such a concept is not a mere matter O f failing
w
to find any p articulars hich exemplify it ; we co u l d n t find p articu ’

w
lars hich exemplify it .

It should be noted that unqualified concept empir cism equally i

w
entails that e have no concept of l ogical necessi ty not to mention ,

conj unction disj unction negation and class membership though

, ,
-
,

concept empiricists have not been quite as assiduou n pointing si

this out as they have been in sco ffing at real connection An d even .

sho u ld the concept empiricis t seek to define logical necessity in

psychological terms or perhaps give an em o tiv is t analys s Of uch
, , , i s
” ”
terms as necess ary and m u st denying them cognitive mean ng
“ ” “ ” “ ”
, i ,

he can scarcely treat s u ch useful terms as and or not and , , ,

“ ”
is a member Of in either Of these ays S ooner or later he s led w . i
w w
to distinguish bet een t o types o f cognitively meaningful expre s
“

”
w
sion : ( 1 ) those hich have extralinguistic meaning e g red “
, . .
,

and centaur ; and ( 2 ) those which while they do not have extra ,
”
lingu istic meaning have a le gi timate ( and indeed indispen able)
, s
syntactical fu nction in langu age .

B u t more O f this later For the moment t is suffic ent to n o te

. i i
that whatever else he may be committed to the concept empiri c st , i
w
can have no tru ck ith a relation Of real connection between extra
lingu istic o r real meanings A s a result if he ha any use at all for
. , s
th e phrase
”
i
implicit defini t on i t can mean nothing more to hi m
,
146 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP ERS H AT WORK
than the building of empirical generalizations of which we are
highly confident into the very syntactical stru ct u re O f our language .

The concept empiricist is th u s in a position to ret u rn to the first

prong O f the attack on the notion O f imp licit definition by insisting
once again this time on ex p lici t emp iricis t groun ds that even
, ,

“
should an implici t definition authori z e u s to deri e x is B “ ”
v
”
from x is A at the linguistic level it nevertheless cannot pre ent , v
us from conceiving of something which exemplifies the real mean
“ ” “ ”
ing of A without exemplifying that of B .

7 C o n cep t E mp iric is m : T h e C o ns erv a tiv e App ro ac h The moral

. .

of the argument to date is that only if concept empiricism is re

j e c te d is it possible to hold that there are nonlogically true proposi

tions which are true e x v i te rm in o rum .

w
There are many to hom this would be the end of the matter ,

as they find some version of concept empiricism to be beyond dis

pute Indeed there was a time not too long ago
.
, , hen I myself , w
was a convinced conce p t empiricist — though I was not as aware
O f i ts implications and pres u ppositions as I should have been For .

, wv
a number Of years ho e er I have been a renegade a n d in the , ,

w
follo ing pages I shall indicate some O f th e considerations hich w
led me to abandon concept empi ricism as well as the resulting ,

changes in my interpretation O f the synthetic a priori .

In the preceding section it s u fficed for our p u rposes to introdu ce

concept empiricism by means of a studio u sly vagu e fo rmu lation .

We must now call attention to the fact that the phrase denotes
w
t o radically different lines Of thought which agree ho ever in , w ,

concluding that the basic concepts in terms Of hich all gen u ine w
concepts are defined are concepts of qualities and relations ex em
“ ” “
p l i fie d by particulars in what is called the given or immediate
ex e rI e n c e
p .

In i ts more traditional and conse rvative form concept empiricism ,

w
distinguishes sharply bet een the intellect u al a ar eness O f quali w
ties and relations and the form u lation O f this a areness by the
, w
use of symbols In short it accepts without q u estion a venerable
.
,

but at present unfashionable distinction bet een tho u ght and its
, , w
expression in langu age ( or as it is sometimes p u t bet een real
” “
,
“
,
w
thinkin g and symbolic thinking Thus the conce p t empiricist
v“
of this brand concei es Of s u ch symbols as red and bet een “ ” ”
w
as acq u iring meaning by virtu e Of becoming associated with such
abstract entities as redness and between ness the association being -
,

w
mediated by o u r a areness of these entities is attention is thus . H
14 8 A M E R I CA N P H I L O S O P H E R S WO R K AT

as they were when i t wa s new d i t i s often comb i ned wi th , an

modes of theorizing with which i t is radically incompatible In .

view of the widespread acceptance of the thesi s i n question there ,

is li ttle need to construct one more argument in i ts defense In s tead . ,

I shall concern myself with certain o f its implications w hi ch bear

on the synthetic a p riori .

L e t us assume then that the situation which Obtain when t i

, s i s
true to say that jones I s aware of a quality o r relation o r possibility
o r even a particular can
, ,
( in pr nciple ) be exhaust
, vely de cribed i i s
i s
n term o f episodes and dispo itions relating to the use o f lin s
g u i s ti c symbols 4
( predicates sentence names de criptions ) In
, s , , s .

s
deed ince the tidy socially stabilized tructure we call languages
, , s s
are continuous wi th more rudimentary conceptual mechanisms let ,

us assume that the above Jo nese an si tuat on can ( n pr nciple) be i s i i

exhaustively described in terms of habits and d sposi tion relat ng i s i
to the use of symbols No w this a sumption ha an obviou implica
.
, s s s
i
tion o f great mportance for o u r problem If what occur when we . s
“
are aware of a universal ”
the use of a ymbol i t follow thatis s , s
s
learning to u e a symbol cannot be based on the awarenes of s
universals In other words we are committed to the abandonment
.
,

of what has happily been called the metaphor o f th e mental eye ,

which is so deeply rooted in the grand tradition of western p h il o so

phy ( and is o ne o f th e maj or points on which E ast eets West) M
that its influence crops u p where least expected .

w
If e put this implication in a slightly different way we im ,

mediately establish contact wi th a character stic contention of i

w
Professor L e is A ll classification of obj ects however confident
.
,

and pre emp tory is a vent u re a venture which at no point finds

-
, ,

its j ustification in a p re sym b o l ic vision of generic and specific heart s

on the sleeves of the obj ects o f experience Classification resembles .

the grasping tentacles of an octopus n o w tentative no confiden t , , w ,

rather than a salesman s selection of a suit for a customer after a

’

glance at his build I am afraid however that our agreement w th

.
, , i
w
L e is is more shadow than u bstance For hile he wri tes in this s . w
manner of the interpretation of the gi ven by means of concept s
whose implications transcend the given he al s o hol ds that the ,

s ensible appearances o f things d o wear their hearts on their sleeves ,

w
and that e do have a cognitive vision o f these hear ts which i s
direct u n l e am e d and incapable of error— though e may make a
, w
s lip in the expressive language by which these insights are properly
formulated In other words the assump tion to which we are com
.
,
 Is T HERE I I A SYNT HET
49 IC A PR OR ? 1

mi tte d requires u s to extend to all l ifi y con s c i ou s nes s what

c ass c ato r

ever , the stri ki ng language i which L ewis de s c ibes our c on s cious

h r ~

ness of obj ects .

8 . C o n c ep t E mp iric is m, S y n tac tics , S e m an tics an d P ragma tics .

We distinguished above between two radically different lines of

thought which lea d to the conclusions characteristic of concept
empi ri sm ci O
f these we have taken a brief look at the firs t o r
.

mental eye vari ant Before turning to the second let me point out
.
,

that although for analytical purposes e are dra ing a sharp di w w s

w
tinction bet een these two approache historically they have u u s
, s
ally been blended into one confused argument .

The concept empiri ci sm we are now defining arose p ari p as s u

w ith the development o f association theories O f lea rn ng in p sy i
ch o l o
gy and has felt
, as m u ch at home in more recent behaviori tic s
form u lations as in th e earlier ( mentalistic) varieties of this psycho
logical movement In its traditional form this second approach al
.
, ,

though i t agrees verbally with the more conservative form of con

“
cep t empiricism that uch words as red acquire meaning by s
becoming associated i th universals ( though i t tends to tres w s s
classes rather than q u alities and relations) insists that thi asso , s
ci atio n develops unmediated by aw ar eness of abstract entities by
, ,

the j oint oc currence of instances of the word and instances o f th e

characteristic in question In other words whi le it s redness that .
, i
“ ”
i
is associated w th red the mechanism whereby this association ,

is created does not involve awareness of redness bu t only the joint ,

occurrence in experience o f instances o f redness with token of

“
s
red In this respect it differs radically from the firs t approach
.

ci s
,

for which the formation of the asso ation involves awarenes o f

the uni versal In short the concep t empiricism which develop in
.
, s
thi s context if it does not entirely escape from the metaphor of
,

the mental eye at le as t does not include abs tract ent ties wi thi n
, i
its visu al field .

No w if we do not lim t our elves to the account thu crudely

, i s s
sketched bu t embrace in our v ew the more S ophis t cated theor es
, i i i
of this general type there i clearly s o m e th ing to them A p hil o so
, s .

pher who rej ects th e mental eye approa ch and all i t implication s s
is indeed commi tted to th e view that i t is by th e au al nterplay c s i
of th e individual and hi s physical and so al environment with ci ,

out ben efit o f a prehension of eternal obj ec ts whe ther in re or e x tra ,

re m that concepts mea ni ngful ymbol

, ar se owever wh le there
, s s i H
, .
,
i
is i ndeed s om e thing to th eor e of th e above type they are gu lty is , i
15 0 AMER ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WORK
of a radical confusion and are in large part responsible for the
,

more implausible feature of contemporary empiricism s .

O u r first comment on the theory sketched above is a restatement

and pressing of a point made earlier in thi paper I t is simply s .

that unqualified concept empiricism is patently incapable o f ac

counting for many of o u r most fami liar concepts among others ,

those of logic and mathematics To remedy this defect the theory .

,

is us u ally modified by introducing a radical dualism into its ac

count o f concepts and concep t formation T h e theory now recog .

mizes a second mode o f concept formation namely the le ar ning ,

to use symbols in accordance with rules o f logical syntax The .

concepts o f logic and mathematics are held to be symbols which

gain meaning in this second way ra ther than by association w th , i
empirical phenomena .

It is even more important to note that even those terms such ,

as red wh ich are supposed by the theory to ga n meaning by

, i
association share in the second mod e of concept formation for
, ,

only by being used in accordance wi th rules of logical syntax can

i
they perform the funct on s by virtue of which a concep t is a
concept .

Clearly then the learning to u se symbols in accordance with

, ,

s
ru le is a pervasive feature of concep t formation p until now . U
the ru les we have considered in thi paper have been s yn tac tical s
s
rule rules according to which a ssertable expressions are pu t to
,

ge ther and properly derived from one another

, owever some . H ,

proponents of the second approach to concept empiricism have

w
been so impressed ith the philo op hi cal power of the concep t of s
rule that they have applied i t to the as sociation of a te rm w th
, i
s
an extralinguistic clas o f obj ects which asso iation as w e have , c ,

seen is the core of their theory Thus we find them characterizing

, .

the learning to use a language or system of concepts as the learning

to u se symbols in accordance wi th two types of rule : ( a) r u les of
syntax relating symbols to other s ymbols ; ( b) emantical rules
, s ,

whereby basic fact u al terms acquire extralinguis tic m e an rn g It .

takes bu t a momen t however to show that this widespread manner

, ,

of speaking involves a radical m take A rule is always a ru le fo r is .

d o ing something in some circumstance A n d a r u le is the sort of .

f
thing that one o l lo w s But follow ng a rule entails recognizing
. i
i
that a c rcumstance is one to which the ru le applies I f there w e re .

s u ch a thing as a semantical ru le by the adoption of which a de

scriptive term acquires mean ng t would presumably be of th e i , i
15 2 A M E R I CAN P HI L O S O P H E R S WORK AT

a s we shall s ee to g nt the l atter poin is by no mea s

, ra concede t n to
h former
t e .

S entence s f the form means d have had no le s a ‘ ’

R o ot re s

hypnotic and disa s trou s e ffect on empiri ci st s engaged i n f m l or u at

i ng theorie s of concept formation than h mos t na ve ment l , on t e i a

oculists S uch s entence s whi ch appear to present meaning as a

.
,

tete a tete relation between a word and a universal have been

- -
,

misinterpreted a s en ta i ling hat might well be called a matri w

”
moni al theory of the meaning of primitive or undefined d ip es cr

ti ve predicate s according to whi ch the fa c t that the s e term s have

meaning is consti tuted by h fact that they are a s sociated with t e

( married to) cl s se s of obj ect s Y et that these

a sentence s i l no . e n ta

such consequence s becomes obvi ous once we reflect that it i s j ust ‘ ’

as legitimate and indeed true to y The German word , , d sa un

mean s d as i t i s to s ay T h Germ
an
”
word mean s d “
e an
‘
ro t
’
re

where i t i s clea that d ga i n s its mean i ng not by a proce ss f

r un
”
o

a ss ociation with conj unction a class f conj oined obj e c ts b or o , ut

rather by c om ing to be used wi h other s ymbol s in accordance t

wi th fami lia syntact i cal rule s r .

L et us exami ne h force f h form mean s

t e S uppo e o t e
“
C
s

S mi th say s When S chmidt s ay s Th is s tate

“
d i means
‘ ’
, d un t an .

ment clearly convey s the i nformation hat S chmidt ha s habit s wi th t

d whi ch parallel hi s
”
(
’
respect to un S mith ) wi th resp ct s ow n e
to and Y et i t mu s t not be a s umed hat i f i t i s h bu si ne ss f
“
. s t t e o

a statement to convey i nformation f a certain kind hi s informa o , t

tion mus t be asserted by the s tatement i h h d fi i n t e s e ns e t at a e n
t i o nal p k i g f
un h ac m ldn l i o Jone
t se s tate
g h en t w o u rev e a t
.
“
ou t
to do A convey s h i nformation hat Jon s
”
do A ye t i t is
t e t e can ;
a mis tak to s uppo s e hat a defini ti ona l unpacking of the former
e t
would reveal a s entenc serting h latter Thu s Smi th is not e as t e . ,

mentioning hi s hab i t or h habit s f E nglish s peaking peop l e s, t e o -

generally with re s pect , and H e menti ons h Ge m an vocable to .

”
t e r
“
und bu t
”
the E nglish vocabl
us es and H u s e s i t however e
“
.
”
e , ,

in a peculia way a way whi ch is chara c teris tic of m i l dis

r , se an t ca

course H e pre s ents

. with an i nstan c e f the word i t elfus a o s , no t
name of i t and making use f h fact that we belong to the s am e
, , o t e

language communi ty i ndicate s u s hat hav only to rehearse

, to t we e

h o her si de
“ ” “ ”
our use f and to appreciate h role f
o d t e o un on t e t
of the R hine .
9

N suppo s e S mi th to s ay When S chmi dt say s

ow i t mean s ,
“ ‘
ro t
’

re d . O nc ag i n hi s s tatement convey s h i f i i i in
”
e a t t e n o r n at o n , . e.
 Is I I
T HERE A 5 3 S YNT HET IC A PR OR ? 1

som sen s e implie s that S chmi dt ha s habits wi th re s pect to a Ger

e ,

man word which parallel hi s ( S mith s ) with respect to an ow n

’

E nglish word But whereas if one supposes that S mith s s tatement

’
.

m i habit s the fact that i t mention s

e n t o ns , but uses red is “
ro t
“ ”

naturally taken to imply that the habi t s in question are of the

word thing variety we now see that the statement has no such im
-
,

plication S mith s statement conveys the information that S chmi dt

.
’

s “ ”
ha word thing habit with respect to ro t only in the course of
-
s
conveying the glo b al information that in a ll relevant respects
“ ”
S ch mi dt s habi ts wi th respect to ro t parallel his own ( S mi th s)
’ ’

i
w th respect to red “ ”
.

Thus instead of leading u to adopt a matr monial th eory of

, s i
the meaning relation bet een ro t and re d the explication of w ‘ ’
,
‘
ro t means re d
’ ”
make i t clear that this entence is not a rela s s
tion sentence at all o r at least that i t is a relation sentence only
, , ,

in a purely gramm atical sense of this term For its business i not
“ ”
. s
to des cribe ro t and re d as standing in a relation but ra ther to ,

convey the information characterized above o . l

No w the moral of all this is that we need no longer be hyp no
,

tiz e d by the facile contrast bet een the

”
“ ”
linguistic meaning and
“ ”
w
th e real meaning of a word For to say that ro t has real mean .

i ng and indeed the real meaning re d is merely to convey the in

, , , ,

formation that ro t “ ”
is
the subj ect (beyond the R hine) of a full
blooded set of habits sufficient to consti tute i t a word in actual
, ,

“ ”
“
use and indeed a use which parallels our o n use of red C o n se
,
”
w .

quently to come to the point if o u r use of red involves extra

, ,
“ ” “
logical syntactical rules ( P rules ) as well as L rules i t follo - -
, ws
“ ” “
that ro t couldn t have th e real meaning i t does unles it too
’
s , ,

were s ubj ect to P rule“ “

and indeed P ru les whi ch parallel
-
s , ,
-
”

those obeyed by red .

s
I hall suppose then that the conceptu al tatus o f descriptive
, , s
predicates can correctly be attributed to the fact that they are
gove rned by r u les of usage These rules o f u age include extra . s
logical rules ( abou t which we shall say more in a moment) as
’
well as logical rules in the narrow sense ( Carnap s L ru les ) Those -

descriptive predicates hich are conditioned responses to situation w s

of the kind they are correctly said to mean are called o b s erv atio n ,

p re d ica tes If a language di d n o t contain observation predicates t

. i
would not be app l ie d D escri ptive predicate other than observa . s
tion predicates gain application through rule tying them to o b s
servation predicates o ever only if one uppose that for an
. Hw , s s
1 54 . AMER IC A N PH IL O S O P H E R S AT WORK
u ndefined descri ptive predicate to have de criptive meaning is for s
i
i t to be assoc iated w th an extralinguistic class of obj ects is one ,

forced to hold that all primitive descriptive predicates are o b

servation predicates . O
ne can indeed say that all the other de
“
, ,

scriptive predicates of langu age must be defined in terms of

s
observation predicate ; but i t would be a mistake to s u ppose that
in every case these defini tions will be e x p lic it definitions .

9 . fi
C o n c ep tu a l S ta tus an d I mp lic it D e n i tio n The above di al e c .

tical examination o f concept empir cism has been so designed as i

to bring me to the position I wish to defend a positi o n hich as , w ,

I see it represents a meeting of extremes a synthesis of insights

, ,
“
belonging to the two maj or traditions of Western philosophy R a ,
”
tio n al i sm and E mpiricism S tated summari ly it claims that con
.
,

c e tu al status the conc e ptual statu s of descriptive as ell as logical w

p
i
— not to ment on pres criptive — predicates is constit u ted c o m l e te l
p ,
y ,

cons ti tu ted by syntactical rules N otice that I am n o t saying that

, .

‘ ”
ro t means re d is true merely by virtu e of the intralinguistic
’

“ ”
moves proper to ro t ( in German ) For ro t means re d can be ‘ ’

tru e only if in addi tion to conforming to syntactical rules parallel

“ ”
ing the syntax of red i t is app l ie d by Germans to red obj ects that
, ,
“ ” “
is if i t has the same app l ica tio n as red Thu s the conceptual
, .
,

“
status of a predicate does not exhaust its meaning The rules .

w w
on hich I ish to focu s attention are rules of inference 1 1 f these . O
w “
there are t o kinds l ogica l and e x tra l ogica l ( or material ) I can ”

best indicate the di fference bet een the mby saying that a logical
,

w
ru le of inference is one which au thorizes a logically valid argu ment ,

that is to say an argument in which the set of descriptive terms

,

s
involved occu r vacuously ( to use Qu ine s happy phrase ) in o ther ’

w ords can be replaced by any other set of descripti e terms of

, v
appropriate type to ob tain another valid argument
, n the other . O
hand descriptive term s occ u r essentially in valid arguments au
,

th oriz e d by extralo i cal r u les

g .

L e t me now put my thesis by saying that the conceptual meaning

of a descriptive term is consti tuted by hat can be inferred from w
i t in accordance with the logical and extralogical ru les of inference
of the langu age ( conceptual frame ) to hich it belongs (A tech w .

n i c all
y more adeq u ate fo rm u lation would p u t this in ter m s of the
inferences that can be drawn from sentences in which the term
ap p ears ) .

Finally let me make the same claim in still another way by

,
“ ” “
pointing out that where x is B can be validly inferred from x
15 6 A M E R IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S WO R K AT

concepts we can never find an i nstance of A which fails to be B

,
.

But tho gh in this s ense

u knowledge that all A B is our
’
s are

independent f experience there i s another sen s e in w hich i t most

o ,

certainly does depend on experience A fter all the learning f a . ,

o

conceptual frame the lea ning to use symbols in accordance w ith

, r

certain logical and extralogical rules i s a psychological process es

i l elements
sen t a f which are sensory stimuli together with the
o

re w ards and punishments which the environment ( including the

social environment) brings to motivation s T h conceptual o ur . e

frame we have developed is only one o f a vast number of alterna

tive frames any one of which we might have been brought to
adopt by a more or less radical hift in the cours e of our environ s
ment The claim that our conceptu al frame
. only o n e among is
many possible conceptual frames and that o ur adoption of i t i , s
to be explained in terms of learning theory ra ther than of nsight i
into abstract entiti es is what led o u r true blue proponent of the
,
-

synthetic a priori to say that o u r ynthetic a priori is a peculiar s

kind of a posteriori .

N ext a closely related remark o n the second cri terion name l y

, ,

ce rta in t
y L e t. u s s
u ppose that a person has acquired a firmly em

bedded conceptual frame In employing this frame he w ll di .

, i s
tin gu ish between those propositions which are certa in and thos e ,

which are a t b es t m e re ly p ro b ab le on th e evidence The former .

i
will coincide w th propositions which in his frame are tru e ex v i , ,

te rm in o ru m N otice however that when th e learning process b e

.
, ,

i
g ns to bring about a modification o f his conceptual frame h e w ll , i
“
admit to being uncertain o f even those propositions which n , i
that frame are tru e e x v i term in o rum It is clear from this d e scrip
, .

tion that w e are d e aling w ith tw o d ifiere n t s e ns es o f th e co n tras t

b e tw e e n certain ty an d u n c e rtain ty The first may be called th e .

“
in trac o n c e p tu al the second the ex traco n cep tu al sense Thu
“
, . s ,

i t makes good sense to say I am uncertain about its being certain

that all A s are B ’
U
ncertainty n thi s e c o n d s ens e is not ome
“
. i s s
thing that can be remedied by paying closer attention to what
”
we mean It can be overcome ( should this be desirable) only by
.

more firmly learning to apply the conceptual system in question to

, w
experience itho u t hesitation o r unea siness .

B u t is this the goal of w

isdom ? No t if we are correct in maintain
ing that to all conceptual structures there are alternatives ; and that
“ ”
no conceptu al frame carries th e imprint sterling certifying i t to
be th e conceptual frame to which all others to the extent that ,
 IS IC A P R I O R I ?
T HERE 5 7 A S YNT HET 1

they are coherent approxi mat The e ss ence f s c i en ti fic w i sdom

, e. o

cons i st s in being uncertain abou t what is i in a readines s 2

c erta n
l ,

to move ( in circumstances the discussion o f which belongs rather

to a paper on Induction) from o ne concep tual frame to another .

For not only can we be caus e d to modify o u r lingu istic frame we ,

can deliberately modi fy i t— teach ourselves ne habits — and give w

reasons for doing so It is the idea that because ( in terms o f our
.

“ “ ”
present use o f A and B ) we have o u n d all observed A s to be
“ ”
”
f ’

B i t would be re as onable to adopt Al l A is B as an uncondition

,

ally assertible sentence “

hich finds expre sion n It is p ro b a b le
”
, w s i
that all A is necessarily B 1 3 No w the use of a conceptual fr am e .
,

s
is the awarenes of a system of logical and extralogical necessities .

The essence of scientific wisdom therefore lies in being tentative , ,

about what one takes to be ex tral o gi cal l y necessary .

In conclusion if one means by synthetic a priori kno ledge

, w ,

w
kno ledge which is logically synthetic ye t true e x v i term in o ru m , ,

then indeed there is synthetic a prio ri kno ledge If one means

, w .

s
by i t ynthetic kno ledge to which there i no significant alterna
, w s
i
t ve then syn thetic a priori kno ledge is a myth a snare and a
, w ,

i “
delus on The question Is there a synthetic a priori ? calls there
.
,

, i
fore for a dec sion before it calls for an ans er What the decision
, w .

should be that is which meaning ( if any) should be attached to

,

the term a priori i t is by no means easy to say any factors

, . M
are involved by no means the least o f hich is a sense of belon ging
, w
to one or other of th e t o maj or traditions of Western philosop hy w .

If one s overall loyalty is to S extu and to u me one ill be moved

’
s H , w
s
“ ”
to ay There is no yn the t c a priori an d hence to choose a s i , ,
“
sense of a priori ”
hich will make th s tatement tru e If one
“
w i s .
’
s
heart beats wi th the rationalists o ne will long to say There is a ,
”
syn thetic a priori and ill make the corresponding terminological
, w
si
deci on If one is tired o f philosophical shibbole ths and finds im
.
,

portant insights o n both sides of the fence one will content one ,

s i
elf w th pointing o u t that while every conceptual frame nvolves i
propositions which though syn thetic are true e x v i te rm ino ru m
, , ,

every conceptual frame i also bu t o ne am ong many whi h com s c

pete for adoption n th e marke t place o f exper en ce i i .

A
revi sion of a p ap er p ublished n the Phil os op hy of S c ie nc e 1 9 5 3 ; i ,

w
rep rin ted ith p ermi ssion o f Williams Wil kin s Publis hi ng Co .

( The p ap er has been fu rther rev sed for inclu sion n th e p resent i i
v olum e ) .
 15 8 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HERS AT WORK
1
c ip l e s
. U q
nl es s I am m u c h mi s tak e n, C 1 L e w is thi nk s o f h is c ate g o rial p rin
. .

as u n u e s tio n ab l y an al y tic , b e c au s e h e thin k s o f th em as an al o g o u s to

“ ”
T h e are a o f a E u c l id e an tri an gl e is V 2 bh Now , if h e in te n d s th is an al o gy ,
v
.

th en h is c a te g o rial p rin c ip l e s are in d e e d l o gic al l y tru e B u t th e n , if th e ab o e .

dis c u s s io n is s o u n d, m u s t th e re n o t b e a c o rre s p o n ding s e t o f p ro p o s itio n s w hic h

triang l e
”
fi
are n o t l o g ic all y tru e , an d w hic h c o n tain a s e t o f p re d i c ate s w h ic h are no t
e x p lic itl y d e n e d in te rm s o f th es e p ro p o s itio n s ? p re d ic ate s w h ic h c o rres p o n d to
“
as o cc u rring in E u c l i d e an axio m s , rath e r th an to E u c l id e an tri
”
angl e ?

2 L e t m e m ak e it c l e ar fro m th e b e g in nin g th at m y w illing n e ss to u s e th e

.

P
”
p h ras e re al or ex tral ingu is tic m e anin g i n b u il din g u p th e d ial e c tic al s tru c tu re
o f m y arg um e nt d oes n o t re fl ec t an ac c ep tanc e o n m y p art o f a l ato ni c or
Meino ngian m etap hy s ics o f m e aning My p u rp os e in this p ap e r is to ex p lo re th e
v v
.

c o ntro ersy o er th e s y n th e tic a p ri o ri s ym p ath e tic all y an d fro m w ith in, in th e

v
c o n ic tio n th at th e tru th o f th e m atte r lies s e p arate d fro m i ts e lf in th e o p p os ing

c am p s S o m e light w ill b e th ro w n o n th e s tatu s o f re al m e aning s b y th e dis

.

c u ssio n o f m e ans in s e c tio n 8 b el o w

v
.

3 S e e fo o tno te 2 ab o e
v
. .

4 I t s h o u l d n o t b e ass um e d th at in c alling an e e nt a s y m b o l w e are d escrib

v
.

ing th e e v e n t We are rath er ser in g no tic e th at o u r dis c u s sio n o f th e e v e nt

q
.

w ill b e in s em antic al te rm s ( Fo r a m o re ad e u ate fo rm u l atio n Of th e i de a th at

f
.

th o u g hts ar e ling u is tic e p is o d e s , an d are y e t d is ting u is ha b l e ro m an d e x p re ss e d

v
b y o e rt li n gu is tic e p iso de s , s e e m y ess ay
P
E m p iric is m an d th e
Min d, in M innes o ta S tu dies in the hil os op hy of S c ie nc e, V o l 1 , p u b lish e d b y
h il o s o p hy o f P
Uv P
”
.

th e ni e rs ity o f Minnes o ta res s ,

5 I l e av e Ou t o f ac c o u n t, as a to p ic to o l arg e to b e in tro d u c e d in to this

q
.

dis c u s sio n, tho u gh o f e u al im p o rtanc e fo r th e u n d ers tan ding o f th e n atu re o f

v
c o n c ep tu al s y s te m s , th e p re s c rip ti e o r c o n d u c t g u id in g as p e c t o f l ang u ag e B u t .

s ee fo o tn o te 7 b e l o w

v v
.

6 No te th at w hi l e th e ac ti atio n o f th e s e h ab its re su l ts in v erb al b eh a io r

f f
.

j
w hic h c o n o rms to s y n tac tic al ru l e s , it c an n o t b e th e o l l o w ing o f s y ntac ti c al

v
ru l e s u n l e ss th e s u b e c t h as l e arn e d th e p re s c rip ti e s y n tac tic al m e t al an g u ag e

w hic h p ermi ts th e fo rm u l atio n o f th es e ru l e s Fo r an e l ab o ratio n o f th is p o in t,

s e e m y p ap e r,
“
S o m e R e fl ec tio n s o n L angu ag e G am es ,
”
.

hil os op hy of S c ie nc e , P
195 4
7 .
.

Jj v
u s t a s an in tralingu is tic m o e is n o t in th e fu ll s e ns e an in ere n c e u nl es s f
v
c o n c e i e th e m to b e ru l e s j
th e s u b e c t n o t o n l y c o nfo rm s to , b u t fo l l o w s , s y n tac tic al ru l es ( th o u g h h e m ay
u s tify ing th e trans itio n n o t fro m o n e l ing u is tic ex p res

s io n to ano th er, b u t fro m o n e th o u g h t to ano th e r ) ; s o a l ang u ag e e ntry tran

j
s itio u is n o t in th e fu l l s e ns e an o b s e rv a tio n u nl es s th e su b e c t n o t o nl y ( in j
j
“
n orm al c irc u m s tanc e s ) to k e n s T h is o b e c t is g re e n if an d o nl y if a gre e n

g u ag e ) fro m J
o n e s u tte re d
‘ ’
j
O b e c t is p res e n t to hi s s e n se s , b u t i s ab l e to inf er ( in a p ragm atic m e tal an
“

JJ
‘
T his o b e c t is g re e n ( o r th e th o u g h t T h is o b e c t j
j
” “
is g re e n o cc u rre d to o ne s ) at tim e t in p l ac e s in c irc u m s tan c es 0 12 0 a g re e n
’

”
Fo r a m o re c om p l e te an al y sis o f
’
o b e c t w as p re s e nt to o ne s s e n s e s at t in s .

th e ro l e o f a c o n c e p tu al fram e w o rk in s e e ing th at p is th e c as e , an d o f th e
v
re l atio n b e tw ee n th o u g h ts an d o e rt l i ngu is ti c b e h av io r, s e e th e ess ay re ferre d

to in fo o tno t e 4
.
.

q
8 Th at th e ac u is itio n o f a c o n c ep tu al fram e al s o in o l v e s l a ng u ag e d ep ar
tu re trans itio ns , an d th at this no ti o n is th e k ey to the s tatu s o f p re s c rip tiv e
v
 C H A R LES L S T E V ENS O N .

P ers uas ive D efin itions

A
“
si i s
persua ve definit on i one which give a new concep tual s
i
meaning to a fam liar word wi thou t ubstantially ch angl ng I ts s
emotive meaning and which , is s
u ed with th e consc ou o r u n i s
s c i
consciou purpose o f hang ng by th means th e di rect on o f is
, , i
i
people s ntere ts
’
s .

The obj ect of thi paper s is s

to how that per uas ve defini t on s i i s
i s
are often used n philo ophy and that th e widespread failure to
,

recognize them for what they are —the temptation to consider

them as definitions which merely abbreviate or which analyze , ,

common concepts — has led to important philosophical confusions .

Before considering philosophical exam ple however i t w ll be s , , i

s s
helpfu l to consider ome impler one whi h wil l erve to make s , c s
clearer what persuasive definition are s .

A s an initial example le t u take a defin tion of the word s . i

culture It will be convenient to nvent pure fiction abou t
. i s
the linguistic habits o f th e people to whom the definition ad is
dressed ; for this will typify the actual situation in a way that
is free from complicating irrelevan e L e t u cons ider then a ci s . s , ,
 P ER S UA S VE DE I FI N I I O N S T 1 61

hypothetical communi ty in which cu lture began by having an

almost p u rely conceptual meaning L e t us sketch the development .

v
of its emoti e meaning show hy the emotive meaning led certai n, w
peop le to redefine the word and exami ne the ay in hich this , w w
redefinition achieved its purpose .

w
There as once a community in hich cultu red meant w id e ly w
re a d a n d a c
q u ain te d w i th th e arts .

I n th e co u rse of time these qualities came into high favor If .

w
one man anted to pay another a compliment he o u ld d ell
“ ”
, w w
at length u pon his culture It became unnatural to use c u lture .

in any b u t a laudatory tone of voice Those ho lacked c u lture . w

u sed the w w
ord with a e and those who possessed i t used the word
,

w ith self satisfaction or perhaps with careful modesty I n this way

-
, .

w
the ord acq u ired a strong emotive meaning It a akened feelings . w
not only because o f i ts conceptual meaning but more directly in , ,

w
its o n right ; for i t recalled the gestures smiles and ton e of voice , ,

w hich so habitu ally accompanied i t A public speaker for instance .

, ,

w v
as ne er introduced as a man idely read and acq u ainted ith w w
the arts . H w “
e as described rather as a man of culture The , , .

latter phrase had no different conceptual meaning than the former ,

b ut w as more s u i table for a akening i n the audience a favorable w

attit u de .

A s the emotive meaning of the ord grew more pronounced w ,

the conceptual meaning gr e more vague This as ine i table w . w v ,

v
for the emoti e meaning made th e ord suitable for u se in meta w
p h ors . en M ho were no t c w
u ltured literally were often called , ,

“
w
so partic u larly hen they were admired for having s o m e of the
defining q u alities of cu ltu re A t first people readily distin .

u i s h e d these metaphorical compliments from literal statements ;

g
b u t as the metaphors gre w
more frequent the distinction became ,

less clear People eren t quite s u re

. whe ther a person m us t
’
w
w
kno about the arts in order to be li terally cultured Perhaps some .

w
other kind of kno ledge o u ld serve as a substitu te w .

L e t u s n o w suppose that one member of the community had no

wholehearted regard for mere reading or mere acquaintance wi th ,

the arts b u t valued them only to the extent that they erved
, s
v
to de elop imaginati e sensitivi ty v
e felt that they were not al . H
w ays a reliable means to that end and on no acco u nt the only ,

w
means I t as his constant so u rce of regr et that such mechanical
.

proced u res as reading or visiting muse u ms should win n tant, , is

praise and that sensitivity should scarcely be not ced For thi
, i . s
1 62 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
reason he proc eeded to give culture a new meaning I know . ,

“
he insisted that so and so is widely read and acquainted with
, ,

w
the arts ; b u t hat has that to do wi th cult u re ? The real meaning
of cult u re the tr u e meaning of c u lt u re is im aginativ e s e ns itiv ity
‘

,
’ ‘

,
’
.

H e persisted in this statement in spite of the fact that cultu re “

,

v
had ne er before been u sed in exactly this sense .

It w w
ill no be obvious that this definition was no mere ah
b rev i atio n ; nor was i t intended as an analysis of a common concept .

I ts p u rpos e rather was to redirect people

, , interests Cultu re ” ’
s .

w
had and ou ld continue to hav e a laudatory emotive meaning .

The definiti on u rged people to stop using the laudatory term

to refer to reading and th e arts and to u e it instead to m e an , s , ,

v
imaginative sensiti ity In this manner i t sou ght to place th e former
.

qualities in a poor li ght and the latter in a fine one an d thus , ,

to redirect people s admiration When people learn to call some

’
.

thing by a n ame rich in pleasant associations they more readily ,

admire it ; an d when they learn not to call i t by such a nam e ,

they less readily admire it The definiti on made use of this fact . .

I t changed interests by changing names .

”
The past history o f c u lture facili tated the change The em o .

tive meaning of the word i t is true had grown u p because of the , ,

old conceptual meaning ; b u t i t was n o w so firmly established that

w
it o u ld persist even though the conceptual meaning as somewhat w
altered The old concept u al meaning as easily altered since it
. w ,

had be en made vagu e by metaphorical u sage The definition could .

e ff ect a chan ge in conceptu al meaning then which left the emotive , ,

meaning unaltered Thanks ag ai n to vagu eness the change seemed

.
,
“
, w
a natural one hich by es c aping the attention of the hearers , ,

did not remind them that they were b e ing influenced and so did ,

not stultify them by making them self conscious T h e effectiveness -

.

of th e defini tion lay partly in this and partly in the fact that it ,

made its re s u lts permanent by embedding them in people s very ’

lin gu istic habi ts .

The definition may be called persuasive then in a qui te , ,

v
con entional sense L ike most persuasive defini tions it was in
.
,

v
fact dou bly pers u asi e It at once dissuaded people from indis
.

cri m in ate l admiring one set of q u alities wide reading and

y ( ac

w
q u aintance ith the arts ) and indu ced them to admire another
( imaginati ev sensitivity ) The speaker wished to attain. both of
these ends and was enabled by his definition to work fo r both
, , ,

at the same time .

1 64
. AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
is induced to accept the new meaning which the speaker introduces .

O u tside the c o n fin e m e n ts of philosophical theory the importance

of persuasive definitions has often been recognized In philology .

they receive occasional stress r rather although li ttle attention. O ,

v
is given to pers u asi e definitions m u ch is said about the broad ,

heading u nder which a study of them wo u ld fall : the interplay

w
bet een emotive and concep tual meanings in determi ning lin
g u i s ti c change and i ts correlation
, with interest s .

l
L eonard Bloomfield presents us with a particularly clear exam
“
ple : The speculative builder has learned to appeal to every weak
ness including the sentimentali ty of th e prospective bu yer ; he uses
, ,

the speech forms whose content will tu rn the hearer n the ri ght
‘
i
direction In many locutions house is the colorless and home
.
’

,
‘ ’

the sentimental word Thus the salesman come to use the ord . s w
‘
home for an empty shell that has never been inhabited and the
’

res t of us follow his tyle s .

H O
ar ms ertel having stated that the emotional eleme n t greatly
,
“
influences the fate of some words points out that amica came ,

“
to have one sense which was synonymo u s wi th conc u bina 2 To .

be sure there are several rea ons for this Concubina had become s .
”

”
slightly profane too strong for delicate ears An d ami ca per
, .

m i tte d a convenien t ambiguity Any shocking thoughts cou ld al .

w ays be ascribed to those who chose to understand the ord in w

its less innocen t sense But a p ersuasive factor m u st als o have been
.

involved Tact often required people to refer to concubines ith

. w
out expressing contempt The word ami ca hich retained part
. , w
of its O l d laudatory emotive meaning in spite of its new sense ,

was useful in making concubines appear less contemptible .

P ersuasive definitions are too frequently encountered ho ever , w ,

to have been noticed solely by the philologists An extremely pene .

trating account in , s
pite of i ts cyni cal turn i given by A ldous , s
H u xley in his E e l ess in G az a:
,
y

if you want to be free you ve got to b e a prisoner I t s the

But ,
’
.
’

condi tion of freedom— true freedom ”

.

“ ”
Tru e freedom ! A nthony repeated in the parody of a clerical
“
. w
voice I al ays love that kind of argument T h e contrary of a .

’
thing isn t the contrary ; oh dear me no ! I t s the thing itself
’

, , ,

bu t as i t tru ly is A sk any die hard what conservatism is ; he ll tell -

’

w
.

you it s tru e socialism An d th e bre er s trade p apers ; they re

’ ’ ’

s O
.

fu ll of article about the beauty of true temperance rdinary .

 P ER S UA S VE D I E FI N I I O N S T 1 65

temperance is j u st gross refu sal to drink ; b u t true temperance ,

tru e temperance is something much more refined True temp er .

ance is a bottle of clare t with each meal and three double w h is

kies after dinner
w w
.

“
What s in a name ? A nthony ent on The ans er is p rac
’

v
.
,

tically e erything if the name s a good one Freedom s a ’ ’

w
.
,

marvelous name That s hy yo u re so anxio u s to make u se of i t

’ ’

Y
. .

ou think that if you call imprisonment tr u e freedom peo p le

w w
, ,

ill be attracted to the prison A n d the orst of i t is yo u re .

’

quite right .

As has been intimated th e s tudy o f persua ive defi ni tions falls

, s
under a much broader hea di ng : the correlat on bet een termi i w
n o l o gy and interes ts This correlation is highly
. omplicated A few c .

w
observations ill serve to show that o u r account o f persuasive
definitions deals with a severely limi ted aspect of i t .

A change in meaning may be ei ther a cause or an effect of a

change in interest ; and pers u asive defini tions figure only hen the w
change in meaning is a ca u se When i t is an effect as hen o u r .
, w
gr owing disa p pro al of v
present conditions in Germany ca u ses u s

to use fascis t as an epi thet there is not in this sit u ation itself ,

any element of pers u asion ; altho u gh once the word has acq u ired
its derogatory associations i t may be used in persuasion later on
, .

O ur subj ect is still more limi ted in scope than this We are .

fi
concerned with d e n itio ns which change interests An d i t is im .

portant to note that we are concerned only ith s o m e of these w

defini tions M w
any definitions hich redirect interests are not p ersu a
.

sive I nterests tend to be redirected by any definition so long as

.
,

i t at all changes the meaning of a term or selects some one sense ,

to the exclusion of others When a scientist introduces a technical

.

term in no matter how detached a manner he indicates his in

,

tere s t in w
hat he names —his estimation of the mportance of talking I
abou t i t or Of predicting its occu rrence — and he often leads his
,

readers to have a similar interest It o u ld be quite misleading . w

to call such definitions pers u asi e ow then are they to be v . H , ,

distingu ished from persuasive definitions ?

The distinction depends u pon hether the term defined has w
a strong emotive meaning and upon hether the speaker employs , w
w
the emotively laden ord ith dynamic purposes— i th the pre w w
1 66 AMER ICA N I
P H LO S O P HER S AT WORK
dominating in te n tio n of changing people s interests en some ’
. M
times say I do not care what word you use so long as you make
, ,

my distinction ; and again If you are not interested in my d is tin c ,

w
tion ell and good ; I shall confine my rem arks to the limited set
,

w
of peopl e ho are D efinitions given in s u ch a spiri t are not per
.

s u asive ; for altho u gh they indicate the speaker s interests and may ’

happen to influence the hearer s interests th ey do not u tilize emo ’

v
ti e meaning in a deliberate effort to sway interests .

S u ch a distinction is inconveniently stringent ho ever and must , w ,

be sli ghtly qualified When a defini tion is given m ai nly for the p u r
.

poses o f distinction or classification when i t is u sed to guide only ,

those interests w
hich ( like c u rios ity) are involved in making th e
class ification u nderst o od and hen it in no way s u ggests that this
, w
is th e o ne legitimate sort of classification then the defi ni tion wi ll ,

not be called pers u asive ( This is not meant to imply that p ers u a
.

v
sive definitions are ne er used in scientific writings nor that non ,

pers u asive defini tions are based on some rock foundation nor that ,

v
persuasi e defini tions are less respectable than others ) .

w
We m u st no proceed to a further p o int P ersuasi e definitions . v
redirect interests by changing only the conceptual meaning of an
emotively laden term allo ing the emotive meaning to remain , w
ro u ghly constant Clearly the opposite change is equally important
.
,

v
and pre alent : the emotive meaning may be altered the concept u al ,

meaning remaining constant This latter device is no less p ers u a .

v
si e I n fact the same pers u asive force can often be ob tained ei ther
.
,

by the one linguistic change or by the other In our initial example .

“
of cultu re for instance the speaker u sed a persuasive definition
, , .

H
“
w
e might equally ell ha e rei terated statements s u ch as this : v
Cult u re is only fool s gold ; the true metal is imaginative sensi
’

tiv i ty This proc edure o u ld have permitted culture to ret ai n

. w
its old conceptual mean ing but would have tended to make i ts ,

v
emoti e meaning derogatory ; and it ould have added to the
“
w ”
la u datory emotive meaning of imaginative sensitivity The same .

w
purpose ou ld have been served in thi s ay that as served by the w w
pers u asive definition The qualities commonly referred to by cul
.

t u re ”
w
ould still be placed in a poor light and imaginative ,

sensitivity in a fine one ; b u t this o u ld have been effected by a w

v
change in emoti e meaning rather than in conceptu al meaning , .

Cases of this last sort must be excl u ded from o u r account of

persuasive definitions A lthough persuasive they are not secured
.
,
1 68 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HERS AT WORK
,
w
definitions here persuasion however legitimate and vital I n tself ,
i ,

can so easily acquire a sp u rious appeal by masking itself n the i

gu ise of a logical analysis .

H aving explained what persuasive defini tions are let us now ,

see how they are important to philosophy .

We can readily begin by considering philosophic definitions of

w ”
the ord philosophy i tself R amsey defines i t as a system o f .

i
defin tions Van der L ee u defines i t as an attempt to penetrate
. w
behind appearances Their divergence is no terminological accident
. .

”
Philosophy is a dignified term and each man reserves it for ,

the inquiry h e most wishes to dignify .

“
w
Consider the ord R eality Philosophers often seek not reality
“
.
,

b u t R eality or rather true R eality B u t true R eality

, like true , .
,

c u ltu re is easily defined in many di ff erent ays ith m any dif

,
“
w , w ”
fere n t pers u asive effects Were the shadows in P lato s cave real
’
.

“ ”
s hadows ? Were there real shadows of horses and men as distinct ,

from the imaginary shado s of centa u rs ? It ill not do to expre ss

”
w w
it so R eal is to o imp ressive a term to be used in describing
.

shadows and fl u x ; so it m u st be given a restricted sense which makes

“
it predicable only of the eternal patterns (When R eali ty is .

used by the mystics the effects of a tacit pers u asive definitio n b e

,

come even more o b vio u s ) .

Why di d S pinoza so anxio u s to free thinking fro m anthropo

,

morphism never theless tempt his readers to anthropomorphism by

,
“
using the word God ? Why did he no t speak al ays o f The “ ”
w
O ”
O
ne S u bstance ? ne points of cour e to the political and social , s ,

forces of the times which made a semblance of orthodoxy impera

,
”
tive But ass u redly this is not all The word God arou ses as if
. .
,

by magic the very deepes t of feelings By giving the word a new

, .

conceptual meaning S pinoza as enabled to direct i ts emotional , w

w
force a ay from the old anthropomorphic fictions and center i t ,

u pon S u bst a w
nce hich he so earnestly thought o u ld be a more
, w
w
re arding obj ect for all o u r onder and h u mility ad he said w H .
,
“ ”
There is no God ; nothin g but S u bstance and its odes he o u ld M , w
v w “ ”
ha e spoken hat he believed provided God was u sed in the ,

pop u lar sense B u t this ould have been p oor economy of the emo
. w
tions I t wo u ld have taken a ay the obj ect of men s wonder and
.
’

w ’

humility providing no substitute ; and so these feelings would have

,
 P ER S U A S VE DE I FINI ION S
T 1 69

died to the gr eat impoverishment of emotional life T h e persuasive

, .

w
definition of a ord was needed to preserve emotional vi tality
“ ”
.

The change in the meaning of God was too ab rupt however to , ,

”
escape notice S pinoza the atheist was long in giving place to
.

”
S pinoza the God intoxi cated man ; for the supporters of ortho
-

w w
doxy ere not slo to see that his God was God in emotive mean
ing only .

These remarks are not to be mi sconstrued as cy ni cal To point .

out pers u asion is not necessarily to condemn i t nor to identify all ,

w
pers u asion ith that of a mob orator I t is imperative however to -
. , ,

w
distingu ish be t een pers u asion and rational demonstration .

L e t us no w
proceed to a more recent iss u e Positivism achieved .

w “
its ide appeal before Ca rnap s principle of tolerance and ’

achieved i t l argely thro u gh the statement etaphysics is wi thout , M

meaning But isn t this remark s u rprisingly like that of the nine
.
’

te en th century critics
-
“
w ”
ho said that Pope was not a poe t ? The
,

P ositivists w
ere stating an unquestionable tr u th in their sense of ,

“
meaning j u st as the nineteenth cent u ry cri tics ere in their
,
-
w ,

“
sense of poe t The tru th of such statements ho e er is u tterly
.
, wv ,

beside the point Controversy hinges on the emotive ords that

. w
are used S hall
.
“
w
e define meaning narro ly so that s cience alone ”
w ,

will receive this laudatory title and metaphysics the correspond ,

“ ”
ingly derogatory one of nonsense ? S hall our termi nology show
science in a fine light and metaphysics in a poor one ? S hall we , ,

“ ”
in short accept this p ers u as iv e definition of meaning ? This is the
,

“
, w
question though ell concealed by the di ctu m that definitions are
merely arbitrary .

But this conclu sion deserves carefu l qualification We mu st re .

member that the nineteen th century cri tics to return to the analo gy -
, ,

w ere not condemning Pope with sheer bombast They ere also
“
.

”
w
making a di stinction Their narrow sense of poe t had the .

function of s tre s sm g I n the reader s attention certain feature

,
’

, s
common to most poetry but lacking in Pope s Perhap they meant
“
,
’
. s
to say this : We have long been blind to fundamental differences
w w
bet een Pope s ork and that of a S hakespeare or
’
ilton It i M . s
because of this blindness alone that we have been content to give
P ope a laudatory title L e t u note th e difference then an d depr ve
. s , , i
”
him of the title The contention of the Positivist will easily bear
. s
“
the same interpretation Perhaps they meant to ay : We have long . s
been blind to the fundamental di fferences between the use of sen
te n ce s in science and their use in metaphys c It is because of thi is . s
1 7 0 A M E R IC A N I
PH LOS OP H RS E AT WORK
blindness alone that we have been content to dignify metaphysics
w ith such titles as meaningfu l L e t us define meaning then in
‘
.
’ ‘

,
’

w
a way that ill at once stress these fundamental di fferences and ,

deprive metaphysics of its ti tle When thus stated the P ositivistic .

,

thesis has not only heat but light and is not to b e scorned A n d
, , .

yet perhaps there is still too much heat for the amo u n t of light It
, .

is of no little service to stress the ays in which me taphysics has w

be en confused with science ; and to the exten t that Positi ists have
“
v
done this their conquest of metaphysics has not depended upon
,

exh o rtation But do their distinctions take us more than h al w ay

. f
to a full rej ection of metaphysics ? Are we l e d to go the other half
“
by the word nonsense defined so that i t may cas t its obj ection
,

able emotive meaning upon metaphysics without being predicated ,

O f i t u ntruthfu lly ?

The same question arises even hen metaphysics is denied cog

” “
w
”
nitive meaning only Cognitive is used to mean empirically
.

verifiable or els e analytic and wi th exclusive laudatory import

, .

H ence the Positivistic contention reduces to this : “

etaphysical M
statements are neither empirically verifiable nor an alytic ; hence they
are not respectable If metaphysicians answer
.
“
ur statements , O ,

even tho u gh neither empirically verifiabl e nor analytic are till s

i
,

respectable they are scarcely to be led away from the r p o sI ti o n

,

by mere exhortation .

M etaphysical imp u lse s are to o strong for hortatory treatment ;

they are inhibited by i t ithou t being removed If metaphysics w .

is wholly to give place to science in o u r esteem this can come ,

only from a closer scru tiny of both metaphysics and science I n .

u iri e s into verification and syntax make a goo d be i nning but

q g ,

they are not the only points for stu dy It ould be ell to con . w w
sider ho ww w
ords hich suggest graphic images and metaphors are
used in the sciences and contrast their fu nction there wi th their
,

fu nction in metaphysics ; or to exami ne the psychological needs an d

w
specific confusions hich lead people to think that metaphysics is
necessary S u ch inq u iries wo u ld direct o u r attitudes toward meta
.

physics in a more permanent and ill u minating fas hion ; they ould w
shape our attit u des by clarifying and au gmenting our beliefs I f .

v
an ad erse atti t u de to metaphysics were p repared for in this man
ner the word nonsense persuasively defined would be helpful
, , ,

in crystallizin g the attitu de S uch a program seems more promising

.

than that of the metaphysicians It is a pi ty then to hide its real .

, ,

complexi ty by using a persuasive definition prematurely .

 1 72 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
The persuasive character of this d e finitio n— the fact that i t forms
a part of a spirited plea for a new class system a beautiful and ,

inspired kind of aristocratic propaganda—can carcely b e denied

“ ” “ ”
s .

The usual meanings of j ustice must give place to the true one ,

to the meaning which needs the digni ty of a laudatory name .

This account would s trike P lato as decidedly unfamiliar et . Y

he would disagr ee with i t much les fundamentally than m ay at s
s
first appear L e t u follow his own account tressing u ch points as
.
, s s
bear analogy to the present one .

“
P lato wo u ld have agreed that the usual meaning of j ustice
was only a point for departure We must fashion our defin tion . i ,

not after the common conception o f j ustice but after j ustice i tself ,

— after the eternal Idea of j ustic e which we have beheld in a life ,

before birth and can now know only thr o u gh careful re co l le c tio n
, .

A definition based o n common usage would disclose merely the

imperfect recollection of the Idea as gras ped by men bound to ,

the world of Opinion .

s
Thi point of agreement seems slight and outweighed by th e ,

theory of recollection Bu t le t u s look more closely H Ow di d P lato

. .

decide whether his recollection wa correct ? D id h e con ider i t s s

correct when he reached a conception which satisfied hi deepest s ,

inmost aspirations ? D id the dialectical method serve only to cl ari fy

his mind so that his aspirations could be di rected to omething
, s
articulate ? It is difficult to think of any other answer P lato aspired .

to the Ideas ; bu t this was not a consequence of some mi raculous

power of attraction which th e Ideas possessed It wa a matter of . s
analytic necessity A nything which was not an obj ect of hi s a spira
.

tions was not called an Idea If thi s is so then our account is

.
,

again close to hi s If he had consciously been making a persuasive

.

definition he would still have selected as th e conceptual meaning

, ,
“
of j ustice th e obj ect of these same aspirations N othi ng else
, .

would have been granted the laudatory nam e We hav e retained .

the factors which led Plato to make his definition wi thout retain ,

ing the poetic re ahn of the Ideas whose function ndeed was , , i ,

only to adorn his procedu re not to alter it outcome , s .

’
s
If Plato work had been less topian more satirical he would U , ,

have had recollections not from one realm of Ideas but from two , .

The firs t realm would have been the dwelling place of the gods ,

as described in the P hae drus ; and the second the dwelling place
“ ”
of the au thor of evil who make hi unexpected appearance s s
in the ten th boo k of th e L aw s Ju t as aspiration would b e the
. s s
 PER S UA S VE DE I FI N I I O N S
T 1 73
cri teria for correct recollection from the first realm so aversions ,

would be the cri te ri a for correct recollection from the second .

The theory of defini tion would then be less closely confined to

th e laudatory terms R ecollection co u ld fu nction like ise for the
. w
. w
derogatory ones Bu t i t o u ld be of vital imp ortance in defining ,

the derogatory terms to confine the recollection to the econd

, s
realm The most serious philosophical errors ould come from a
. w
fai lure to recollect from the correct realm here the correctness ”
, w
of the realm would depend on the emotive meaning of the term
defined .

We must retu rn however to the definition of u stice Plato

, , j .
’
s
w
definition as pers u asive b u t this is far from being exceptional
i
'
.

L ater definitions o f j ust ce ith b u t fe exceptions are eq u ally

, w w ,

pers u asive They exert a different kind O f influence of course

.
, .

No t all philoso p hers are ari stocrats B u t they do exert an infl u ence . .

L e t us consider Bentham s definition J u stice in the only

’ ‘ ’
.
,

w
sense hich has meaning [ I] is an ima ginary personage fei gned for
, ,

v
the con enience of discourse whose dictates are the dictates of ,

u tility , applied to certain particu lar cases 3 ore simply stated .

”
M ,
“
This is a j ust la w
is a hypostatic ay of saying This la con w , w
”
trib u tes to the greatest hap p iness of the greatest number S u ch .

a definition may not immediately strike us as being persuasi e v

Y
,

since so many of u s are willing to be led in i ts direction e t its .

stress on mere members its stress on counting the poo r man s hap
,
’

p i n e ss side by side ith the rich w

ma n s clear ly marks a plea for
’

greater democracy The defini tion propagated the ideals of a great

.

L iberal .

By a j u st w
age for laborers i t may be s u ggested is meant , ,

w
the age that anticipates what laborers would get eventually ,

w
through operation of the la s of s u pply and demand if only there ,

w ere a perfect marke t in the economic sense This definition co n .

ce al s its persuasion quite w

ell making i t seem to have the detach ,

ment of a p u rely scientific economics B u t i t is a plea tho u gh . ,

slightly comp romised for the operation not of economic la s b u t

, w ,
“ ”
w
of nat u ral economic la s — that is to say for the operation o f ,

w
economic la s as they c o u l d be stated if the purely competitive ,

devil take the hindermost aspects of industry ere gu aranteed

, w .

S o you w
ill find this definition more pleasing to those ho thri ve w
u nder the present industrial con di tions than to those ho do not w .

“
J u stice can be defined in a great many ays al ays i thou t w , w w
shocking the lexicographers An eye for an eye and a tooth for .
,
1 74 AMER IC A N I
PH LO SOPH RS E AT WORK
’
a tooth ? The keeping of contracts merely ? The king s will ? The ,

w
distribution of soc ial eal th in accordance ith the amount of w
la b o r that each man does ? We have a wide choice of meanings and ,

freedom w
ithin wide conventional limits to invent ne ones
, , w .

w
Which meaning e choose ho ever is no trivial matter ; for e , w , w
shall di gnify that meaning by a laudatory title To choose a mean .

ing is to take sides in a social stru ggle .

I t is c urio u s to note that theo rists have all been perturbed by

the uncertainty of ethics and have ca u ght glimpses eve n in
, ,

moments of philosophical calm of the element of persuasion in ,

volved They sought to avoid this by defining their te rms hoping

.
,

v
to gi e greater rigor and rationality to their inq u iries e t iron . Y ,

i c al l y eno u gh thes e very definitions involved the same pers u asion ;

,

w
and in a ay that veiled and confused it by making it appear to ,

be p u rely intellectu al analysis .

The examples we have considered hether from metap hysics , w ,

theology epistemology or ethics indicate that pers u asi e d e fi

, , , v
mi tions are far from r ar e in philosophy and that fail u re to ,

v
recognize their pers u as i e character has been responsibl e for much
. w
confu sion B u t hat essentially is the nature of this confusion ?
, ,

L argely this : Blindness to pers u asion has fostered a mis u nderstand

ing of the k in d of d is agree m e n t that motivates many disputes ; and
in conseq u ence h as led people to support their contentions by far
too simple a m e th o d or to seek a defini tive method of proo f
, here w
none is possible .

These methodological confusions have so far been evident only

by implication an d m u st now be treated more explicitly L e t us
, .

p roceed by indicating the ac tu a l com lexity in meth o dolo y

p g hich w
ers u asive definitions introd u ce ; for th e extent to which this com
p
p l ex i t
y has been overlooked ill then become obvious wi w
thout ,

w
fu rther mention It ill be convenient to confine our attention to
.

the example of j u stice but it m u st be remembered of co u rse , ,

that the same considerations arise for any case which involves a
term that is s u bj ect to pers u as i e definition v .

The s u mmary of methodology ill be parallel to that given in w

v 4
a pre io u s pap er The pattern of analysis there exemplified by
.

g ood
“
ho
,
”
ever is w
slightly di fferent
, from the one here exemplified
by j u stice The same method ological considerations reappear but
.
,
1 76 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP HERS AT WORK
curiosity If our example is to be typical of th e maj ori ty Of actu al
.

“ ”
ones this assumption is wholly unw arr an ted The use o f j ust
,
.

and u nj u st clearly indicated that one di sp u tant a fo r the law ws ,

and the other agains t it They argued for this reason not because . ,

w
they ere statistically minded They were d is agree ing in in te res t . .

E ach had a di ff erent kind of interest in the la and neither was w ,

content to let the other s interest remain u nchanged 5 This kind o f

’
.

disagreemen t is evident more from emotive meaning than from

conceptual meaning The fact then that the concep tu al meaning
.
, ,

of the first disputant was not contradicted did not lead him to feel
that his position was unchallenged e wanted his op ponent not . H
merely to acknowledge certain conseq u ences of th e law but like ,

wise to praise it ; and his opponent would not be praising i t if he

“
called i t unj u st no matter what conceptual meaning he assigned
,

to the term .

The d isagreement in interest is most easily seen in cases like ( 3 )

b u t a moment s consideration will show that it is eq u ally present
’

“
’

in cases ( 1 ) and The use of th e l au d ato ry term j u st in the

earlier cases indicated that they too ere concerned with whether w
w
or not the law as to be favored A B an d C were involved o f .
, , ,

co u rse bu t no more so than in the third case and they were

, ,

relevant for the same reason — relevan t becau se the disa gr eement in
, w
interest hich motivated the argument was rooted in a disagree ,

w
ment in belief I n other ords th e disputant s wo u ld have the ame
.
, s
kind of interest in the law if only they resolved their op posing b e
liefs abou t these conseq u ences of it In the first cases th ese opposing .

w
beliefs ere about conseq u ences hich b o th di sputants referred to w
“
w
concept u ally by the ord j u st In the third c as e they were about .

w “
something hich only one referred to by j ust This is the main .

w
point of difference bet een the cases and i t is unimportan t The , .

w
disagr eement as of a sort that would termi nate Only hen both w
disp u tants had the same kind of interest in the law Beliefs ere . w
v
rele ant only to the extent that they redirected interests Which .

be liefs did so and whe ther they were expressed in th e initial state
,

ments of both o p ponents dete rmined merely the complexity of ,

the argu ment and not its fu ndamental character

, .

These remarks prepare u s for a fu rther c as e

“
4
( ) S u p ose
p as before that the first man , u ses j us t to, refer
to A and B and the second man ( ho denies the j u stice of the
, w
w “ ”
la ) uses j ust to refer to B an d C S u ppose further that both .
 P ER S UA S VE DE I FI N I I O N S T 1 77
have f u lly established that the law does lead to A and B and ,

that i t does not lead to C Conceptu ally speaking of course they .

, ,

have as yet located no point o f disagreement nor is there the possi ,

’
b il i ty as in ( 3 ) of one man s refuting the other even according
Y
,

to th e opponent s fa u lty conception of j u stice

’
e t they may still .

“
argue abo u t the j u stice of the law The laudatory force of j ust . ,
“
and the derogatory force of unj u st are still indi cative of a di s ,

agreement in in terest .

Wi th regard to methodology this case is of particu lar import an ce .

It re p resents a disagreement hi ch the e m p irica l m e th o d m ay b e w

w h o l ly in cap a b l e f res o lv in
o
g .

w w
This ill be clear if e agai n consider at the expen se o f partial ,

w
repetition hy the empi ri cal method w as decisive in th e firs t three
,

cases I n each of the earlier cases the initial j u dgm ent O f one dis
.

p u tan t as w
false This as guaranteed
. either w
by the la o f con w
trad i c ti o n or by expli ci t hypothesis E ach di sputant moreo er .
, v ,

w v v
o u ld ha e had a fa orable interest in the la only so long as he w
v “
belie ed that j u st in his sense as tru thfu lly predicable of it ;
, , w
w w v
for other ise he o u ld ha e used the la u datory term in a different
conce p t u al sense For these reasons the di s p utants had only to look
.

to the tr u th of their ini tial statements and this ould lead them , w
v
to ha e the same kind of interest in the la In short the disagree w .
,

w
ment in interest hich as the mainspring of the argument was
, w ,

rooted in a disagreement in belief— in some belief hich at leas t w

one of the opponen ts had fal sely expressed in his initial statement .

The emp irical method by u psetting this belief o u ld like ise re

, , w w
so lve the disagreement in interest .

I n case wv
ho e er the ini tial statements of the op p onents
,

are both true The men are disposed as above to favor or di sfa or
.
, , v
the law in accordance ith hether j u st and u nj u st in thew “
w “ ”
,
”

w
dis p arate senses hich they employ are tru thfu lly predicable of i t ; ,

b u t an empirical inq u iry w

ill se rve to s upp o rt b o th of their state
ments H
ence the first man ill con tinue to call the la
. wj u st w ,

w v
i th fa or ; and the second u nj u st wi th di sfavor Their di sagree ,
”
.

ment is not rooted in some belief hich either is expressing and w ,

may be d u e solely to their di fferent temperaments S ince the em .

p i ri c al me thod alters interests only thro u gh altering beliefs how ,

can i t be u sed to resol e this disagreement ? v

I t is immediately clear that the empiri cal me thod ha not the s
same direct application in (4 ) that it had in the earlier ca es
, s .
1 7 8 A M E R I CA N PH IL O S O P H E R S AT WORK
Yet we shall concl de too hastily if we say that there is no roo m
u

for it here a t all L e t us examine further. .

I f case ( 4 ) contin u es to be disputed persuasive definitions

“
hich , , w
hitherto have been responsible only for the ambiguity of j u st ,

w ill come to play a more overt and impo rtant role E ach man in .
,

order to influence the other s interests ill insist u pon his o w n

’

, w
definition They will argu e about whether the la is j u st in the
. w
tru e sense of
“
j u st U
ntil they agree u pon the sense of the ord
. w
they will not agree u pon their fundamental iss ue namely : whether ,

w
the la is to be described by a name that indicates their praise .

The empirical method ho ever unavailing i t may be in alter , w

ing the tru th of the conceptu al predications hich the disp u tan ts w
first made may reappear as a means of supporting their pers u asive
,

definitions The second disp u tant for ins t ance may be led to d is
.
, ,

v w
co er that C to hich he refers by u st has the fu rther cou se
,
“

j ,
”

q u e n ces F G and
, If
, he h H
as an unfavorable interest in the se
, .

conseq u ences he may no longer wish to define j ust in terms of

,

C I f he is led to discover that A has the further conseq u ences I J

.
, ,

, w
and K in hich he has a favorab le interest he may decide to u se ,

”
j u st to refer to A In other ords he may accept the definition
. w ,

u pon w
hich his opponent has been insisting Both men ill then . w
come to agree that th e law is j ust in a m u tu al ly accepted sense o f ‘

“
w
j u st This sense ill be a product of their wider empirical kno l
. w
w
edge and i t ill terminate their argument not merely be cause th ey
,

both believe that i t is tru thfu lly predi cable of the la but becau se w ,

their mu tu al acce p tance of i t indicates that they no longer disagree

in interest b u t both favor the law
, .

The argu ment in case (4 ) may be resolved then in an empirical , ,

w
fashi on ; b u t e mu st remember that i t also may not E ven if .

w
the dis p u tants kno all the relevant consequences of the law one ,

w
of them may still ish to praise i t and the other to condemn I t , .

w
They ill be led to no common conceptual sense of j u st and “
,

altho u gh neither man need be stating anything false about the law ,

w
they ill c o ntin u e to di sagree about i ts j u stice The disagreement .

w ill be one in interest not rooted in any sort of disagreement in

,

belief I f resolved at all it ill be solved only by exhortation

. w .

I t is a general tr u th that the empirical meth o d can resolve ethical

disa greement or any other kind of disagreement in interest only
, ,

w hen this is rooted in a disagreement in b e lief The p resent o u t .

line o f methodology has become complicated only i th regard w

to w h ic h beliefs are at the root of the disagreement in interest
1 80 AMER IC A N I S
P H LO OP HER S AT WORK
5 S te v l o c c it , p 2 7 ,
e ns o n, a fu ll er an al y s is o f d is ag re e m e n t in interes t

v
. . . . .

J
6 S tee ns o n, l o c c it

V
. . .

M S c h lic k , Frag e n d e r E thik ( ie n na,

7
8
.

. .
. . S p ring e r,
C O g d e n, an d I A Ri c h ard s , T he M e a ning of M e aning ( K e g an
. .
Ch ap i. .

P
au l ,

p 14 9 . .

P
”
9 C D Bro ad , I s G o o dn ess th e Nam e o f a S im p l e , No n n atu ral Q u al ity
. . .
- ?

ro c e e d ings o f th e A ris to te lian S o c ie ty , 1 9 3 3 —3 4 .

1 84 A M E R ICA N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
the problem unsolved the night before ; the writing was u nm is
w
tak ab l y his o n ; and there was only one plausible explanation : he
had got up in his sleep and written the solution do n This kind w .

of performance though not perhaps common has been made

, ,

familiar to us through Professor D L owes researches on Coleridge .

’
,

and thro u gh s u ch extended inquiries as those of orton Prince and M

Fre u d N o t that in all cases the performance is unconscio u ; some
. s
times i t occurs in a dream that can be recalled on waking ; some
times there is a process of co consciousness that is to be recovered
-
,

if at all by technical method only But the process does appear

, s .

on occasion to be genuinely unconscious Fre u d thought very fre ,

quently so If and where i t is what are we to say abou t its being

.
,

mental ? Are we to say of the elaborating o f a conclusion or the

composing of a lyric that i t is no t a mental proces s at all ? f O
course we can make the ord menta mean hat we w sh Butw w i .

i
the issue s more than verbal If w e call some processes mental .

w
and som e not i t is beca u se bet een them e find a chasm placed
, w
s
by nature S uch activities a inference and artistic invention seem
.

to belong to mind so clearly w

he ther ve ri fiable as conscio u s or
,

not that I prefer to place them there at the outset and make the
,

definition of mind c o n fo n n ra ther than to define mind inde

,

pendently and force our natu ral classification into line .

w
If e are wi l ling to start from this natural classification our ,

q u estion becomes this : Is there any characteris tic which is al ays w

s w
present and which al o ne i al ays present here mind is recog
, , w
n iz e d ? Take some case s
at random in which people would gen
e ral l y a gree that in some meas u re or other mind w as present and

active A philosopher is philosop hi zing ; a householder is making

.

a budget ; a s culptor is carving a bloc k ; a poet asleep or awake , ,

is con triving a poem ; an infant i cry ing for the moon ; a dog is s
sniffing at a hole ; a bee is hun ting or apparently hunting nect ar , , .

i
We should be less sure n the last cases than in the first that mind
w
was at ork ; but I do not think we should regard any of these
cases or level s as simply and totally mindless R e garding any such .

seri es we must ask : Is there anyth ing univer ally and exclusively s
present that we can fix o n a th e common and essential feature s
o f mind ?

M w Y
y own an s er is es : wherever mind s present there the pur i ,

sui t o f ends is present Wherever that pursui t is wholly absent

.
,

mind is absent An d when mi nd i present t is pre ent preci ely

. s , i s s
in the degree to which end are in control s .
 TH E N AT URE OF I
M ND 1 85

Let us revert to o u r c as es I should say that I n all o f them ends .

are being p u rs u ed but not in the same sense or the same ay

, w .

O w w
rdinari ly hen e speak of anyone as engaging in such purs u it ,

we imply that he takes tho u ght of what he ants and deliberately w

w
appoints his means ith reference to i t The ho useholder ho ar . w
ranges his b u dget is aiming at a targe t in fu ll Vie namely the w , ,

brin gi ng of his expenses within a li mi t that is clearly defined The .

w
poet ho is writing a sonne t has in mind a poem of a certai n
length and s tru cture and the character of this hole presides over
, w
w
his selection of ords and images It is s u ch behavior that e . w
w
commonly mean hen e speak of p u rposi e process —behavior w v ,

, , w
that is in hich the controlling purpose is definite and explici t .

B u t is the presence of s u ch p u rpose typical of behavior that pur

s u es ends ? N o i t is not O
ne thinks at once o f the lower le els of
, . v
behavior R egarding a bird for example that gathers materials
.
, ,

sui table for b u ilding i ts nest i t seems to me unreasonable to deny ,

that it is p u rs u ing an end at all and like ise unreasonable to , w

ascribe to i t an end that is consciously present The bird is p u rsuing .

an end that is no t explici t .

N o w we find this kind o f behavior not on the lo er le els only , w v ,

b u t at every level in th e scale of mind ental activity is the sort . M

w
of activity every here whose reach exceeds its grasp S o far as is .

w
now kno n h u man beings top the scale ; b u t hen a man makes
, w
a choice — say of one action rather than another as the right one
can he give any adeq u ate account of hy he choo ses it ? Q u ite pos w
s ib l y he co u ld take a step or t o ahead ; he wanted to better his w
business or home or income B u t if pressed as to hy he anted . w w
this and
, w w
hy he anted the fu rther end that this in t u rn s u b
served he would soon falter This does not imply that his choice
, .

w v
is un ise or e en that i t is not firmly guided ; the saint ho has
, w
the s u rest sort of practical j u dgment may cu t a ery poor figu re v
when he philosophizes on ultimate good Bu t e may go much . w
fu rther than this E ven in o u r cleares t cases of purposi e action
. v ,

there is a large element o f this mysterio u s kind of end seekin g -

.

When a philosopher philosophizes he is tryin g to solve a problem , ,

and he if anyone sho u ld kno hat he is about D oes he ? The ww .

Greeks had a dilemma for i t : If the man ho seeks after tru th w

w w w
kno s ha t he ants there is no u se seeking for he has i t already ;
, ,
’
w
and if doesn t kno he on t recogni z e i t hen he finds it Their
, w ’
w .

w
ans er to this puzzle of course was that he may know in general
, ,

w w
hat he ants witho u t kno ing in deta l an d that this general w i ,
1 86 A M E R ICA N PH ILO S OP HERS AT WORK
end is enough to guide his search and check it The answer is .

so u nd so far as i t goes But need even thi general end be explicit ?

. s
An d w
hether i t is or not how can so vague an end exert a control
,

so firm and precise over th e co u rse of i ts realization ?

R eflection on such problems would carry us deep I think into , ,

the nature of mind To b e sure there may seem at first to be no

.
,

problem at all When we are given the premises of a syllogism

.

and required to draw the conclusion i t may be sa d that e kn o w , i w

w
quite ell what the form of the syllogism is and that ith this , w
form or pattern before us we simply he to the line Bu t half , w .

the time this is false to fact Introspection shows that the form or .

pattern is often absent and that we he to the line ithout it We

, w w .

see afterw ard that our thought did conform to the pattern bu t the ,

pattern is a later abstraction from the process not the chart hich , w
gu ided its co u rse It may be said that such thought is not a ca e
. s
of control by ends at all but a following of the track of habi t But
, .

v
tho u ght is ne er mere habi t even on the level of yllogism ; and i t is, s
obviously more hen i t breaks ne grou nd w w .

w
From the lo est level to the highest then in the scale of mind , , ,

we find teleology not the kind of teleology that is fou nd in explicit

,

p u rpose b u t s o mething more generic Can we say hat this is ? If

, . w
w
we can e shall have caught the common and distingu ishing fea
,

t u re of mental process We must see what e can do . w .

The irred u cible facts we mu st start with are first that there is , ,

a great range of proc esses hose co u rse is determined ith referencew w

to and in some sense by an end and second that this end is not
, , , ,

consciously there to exert control These facts force us o n I think .

, ,

to the notion of an immanent end an implicit end an end that , ,

can lay comp u lsion on conscious processes w thout being cons ou i ci s

itself .

Philos o phers comm o nly shy a ay from this notion Beha ior w . v
that is express ly p u rposive they recognize and in a measure under
s tand ; behavior that is mechanical they often think they under
stand better ; b u t behavior that is p u rposive without purpose so u nds
so monstrou s that they avert their eyes and ithdra The p sy w w .

c h o l o is ts ho
g ever do, w
not Whether from, moral co u r age or from
.

meta p hysical innocence they dash in ith abandon where the , w

p hilosophers fear to tread and are soon talking in accents, heard
by all exce p t p erhaps the philosophers abou t unconscious fears
, , ,

desires and memories I f a philosopher here or there does take

, .

notice he probably remarks that these things are meaningless To

, .
1 88 A M E R I CA N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WORK
only of this A ball of putty can be conceived wi thout reference
.

to anything that in course of molding it may become What de

, ,
.

v e l o s can not be conceived except as the partial realization of that

p
w hich as fu lly actu al is yet to be
, , .

No w mind at all of its levels and in all of i ts manifestations i

,
, s
a process of this kind An d since this is hat I mean by conative
. w
process I can agree with r W
,
M
S heldon that mind is essen
. . H .

ti al l y conative M
ay o n e go further ith him and say that mind i
. w s
Y
secondarily cognitive ? es if this means that kno ing is a less
,
w
fundamental because less universal mental process than conation
, ,

is No if i t implies that cognition and cona tion are fundamentally

.
,

di fferent For in my view mind is conation ; all mental processes

.

redu ce to it .

This obviously needs defense B u t i t needs defense far more .

in respect to some processes than to others R egarding volition .

,

a ffection ; and emotion one may argue with some plausibili ty that
,

they are aspects of conation bu t to say th at co gni tio n in all it, . s

forms is a c o na tus toward an end appears less credi b le S ince I .

hold that cognition is j ust this from first to last i t may be ell to , w
v
take some central cogniti e process and show that it is u nintelligible
u nless taken as the realizing of an immanent end I should be .

willing to rest my case on any process that is clearly cognitive but ,

w
let us take one that ill not be challenged on that gro u nd and is of
g reat interest in itself the process of in ere n c e
, f .

S u p p os e a crime has occ u rred and a detective is called in to

solve it What does he d o ? N ormally he begin by gathering evi
. s
dence through Observation and inq u iry ; on the basis of this evi
dence he forms one or more hypotheses ; these hypotheses he then
tests till one of them proves satisfactory N o w none of these steps .

can be understoo d u nless the movement of thought is taken as

under control by an end The first t o steps are those of what. w
James described as sagacity and inference p roper S agaci ty con .

w
sists in seeing hat evidence bears on the case what is evidence ,

in the case I f the expert cons u lted happens to be Watson he will

.
,

make a laborious and l argely irrele ant catalogue of details ; if i t is v

the great S herlock himself his selection ill be at once narro er
, w ’
w
and broader narrower because mu ch of Watson s detail will b e
,

for him superfl u ous ba ggage broader because details o ffer them ,

selves as relevant which Watson would never have noticed Why s . i

H
it that olmes selects the ri ght things for notice hile Watson does , w
not ? It is more than a matter of pas t experience for a we alth of ,
 TH E N AT U RE OF M NDI 1 89

w
this itho u t sagaci ty may fail hile a very little of it w th sagaci ty, w i
may s u cceed We can only say that orking in and thro u gh the
. w
better observation is a more exacting ideal of relevance I n some .

instances this is perfectly clear Perhaps the main contrib u tion of .

A ristotle to induction w
as the insight that here in Observation w , ,

n o us or intellect w
as really active there as no need for i t to wait , w
to pile up instances in order by as sociation and dissoc iation to , ,

bare the nerve of a connection ; i t co u ld seize the connection di

re c tl
y as ,hen the w
schoolboy sees that str ai ghtness of line in the
triangle before him bears on its geometrical properties while red ,

ness and largeness do not The norm of rele ance that is at ork . v w
in his mind he is no do u bt unable to define ; i t may ork less w
effectively in some min ds than in others ; in even the best minds
w w
it orks variably as hen Aristotle tho u ght he saw the same sort
,

w
of connection bet een humanity and mortality that he saw b e
w
t een two fives and a ten B u t this lea es the res u lt still standing
. v
that the selective observation which is normally the base of infer
ence is under the control an d guidance of an immanent ideal of
relevance .

N o w when a certain amo u nt of evidence has been collected ,

tho u ght leaps to a hypothesis ; this is the second step in the process ;
and i t constit u tes inference proper What determines the direction .

’
of this leap ? A ccording to James s famous chapter i t is similar ,

association ; the effective reasoner is the man ho is prodigal of w

analogies goo d bad and indi fferent bet een hich once they
, , , , w w ,

ar e laid o u t before him he goes on to choose B u t s u rely this is

, .

j ust how a mi nd in comm and of i ts matter does n o t ork If the w .

suggestions turn ed up by analogy are really random tho u ght is ,

w
at sea ith no rudder ; there is no reasoning at all I f the analogi es .

are in point the connection that is being so u ght is present in all of

,

them and it is more natural to suppose that th e presence of this

,

connection within them had some thing to do wi th their arising

than th at once arisen they all di closed i t by sheer chan ce The
, , s .

w orki ng of analogy itself rests o n the orking of an implicit logic w .

H s
ence in favorabl e case J ame s paraphernalia of sim il ars can be s ’

w w
dis p ensed i th and e c an go to o u r res u lt directly When the
, .

conditions of a problem are precisely set out before a m ath em a

w
tici an he does not al ays need to go groping about for his res u lt
,

through a forest of metaphors ; if he can kee p hold o f the leading

stri ng of logi cal implication he may go straight from conditions to,

conclusion Nor does this o ccur only in reg on of high abstract

. i s
1 90 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HERS AT WORK
ness When an intelligen t detective leaps from the evidence gi ven
.

him to the solution of a crime the movement of i nference is a , s

truly under the con trol of an implici t logic as the thought that
w
deals ith n u mbers or triangles .

I t may be replied that logic is a set of timeless relations among

concep ts timeless themselves and that it never descends into the ,

fl u x of events to control or divert the current It is e ternal and .

,

w hat is eternal doe s not act I accept the first statement and re .

j e c t the second Just as the form of a. sonnet which abstractly ,

taken is eternal does hen present in a poe t s mi nd preside over

, , w ’

the work of composition so logical implication may groove the ,

channel for thought To me there is something absurd in saying

.

that when yo u present a man with the premises of a syllogism and

his tho u ght leaps on to the conclusion the fact that the pre mi ses ,

implied the conclusion had nothing to do ith its appearance The w .

concl u sion appeared precisely because he had succeeded in so su r

rendering his thought to logic that implication took control In .

w
deed i t is only hen we succeed in doing this that true inference
occu rs .

Both in the selection of evidence then and in the leap of in , ,

w
ference by hich that evidence is completed there is at ork an , w
immanen t lo gi cal end I t is at work even more clearly in the third
.

, w
step by hich the inferred suggestion is tested To test anything .

is to meas u re i t by a standard Wi tho u t such a tandard testing . s ,

w ould be meaningless When do e take a problem as solved ? . w

When the relation be t een the solution we offer and the relevant w
v w
e idence ans ers to o u r ideal of proof Present in the mind of the .

geometer whether defined or not is an ideal of demonstration

, ,

w hich forbids rest in any theorem till i t is connected systematically

w i th the postu lates of his system Present in th e mind of the de .

te c tiv e is a standard hich tells him hen the ring of evidencew w

w
has sna p p ed sh u t hich arns him that to stop earlier ould be to
, w w
fail and that to continue afterward ould for the purpose n
, w , i
hand be po intless I say for th e purpo se in h and becaus e i t
, .
”
,

w o u ld be u ntrue to say that hen e ha e satisfied o u r practi c al w w v

end or the interes t of the law we have reached th e goal of thought
, , .

w
When the la has got i ts m an there remain a hundred points at ,

w hich thought seeking to understand could still ask Why ? An d

, ,

w w
hen o u ld tho u ght as such be satisfied ? nly when i t under O
w
stood fully And hen would it understand fully ? nly when
. O
1 92 A M E R ICA N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
trol of such play This direction is shown most typically in the act
.

w
of choice A nd hat is choice ? To see i t as one competing pull
.

w
winning out in a tu g of ar or as the resolutio n of a pencil of ,

forces is to look at i t through distorting similes Choice is the

, .

election of a prospective course beca u se it is conceived to embody

an ideal of good more f u lly than alternative courses No t that the .

ideal is clearly defined ; that as w e have repeatedly seen is need , ,

less But choice is meaningless unless the ideal is there T h e act

. .

thus conforms to o u r pattern It evinces mind becaus e i t evinces .

the kind of teleology in which an unexplici t end dominates the

co u rse of its own realization .

M ind then is not a single process but a se t of processes a

, , , ,

w
q u i v erfu l of arro s of desire D o the arrows have one targe t or .

many ? The end of th e theoretic impulse does not seem to be the

same as that of th e aesthetic or either th e same as th e moral or any
, ,

of these the same as th e hedonic I t may be that there is no one .

goal of mind that achievement of the moral end might leave the
,

theoretic and aesthetic impulses unsatisfied that the purs u its ,

might even conflict and tha t the black and whi te horses of the
soul to use Plato s figu re might break with each other and tear
,
’

limb from limb their u nhappy charioteer ind h as a tragic future . M

if this is true Whether i t is true can be found only by follo ing
. w
the loadstones of th e spirit where they lead and seeing whether , ,

as functions develop they will diverge or ill s u pp ort each other

, w .

I incline to believe the latter I n the minds of the thinker poet .

, ,

s
and saint i t i not mind in three different senses that is co m ing to
,

be ; it is mind in the same sense b u t with emphases temporarily dif ,

fere n t If yo u ask
. w
hat is the end of mind as s u ch as distinct from ,

any fu nction wi thin it I should give an ans er which seems to me

, w
as inevitable in principle as it is u nsatisfactory in its lack of detail ;
th e end is an experience in which the implici t deman ds of the
di fferent sides of our natu re are all realized so far as consisten y c
w ill allow .

To sum up : mind is a set of processes disti nguished fro m o th ers

thro u gh their control by an immanent end A t its lo es t levels and . w
its highest i ts character i s veiled from us A t one extreme i t .

w
d indles into mere life which is incipient mind A t th e other ex
, .

treme it vanishes in the clouds ; i t does not yet appear what e shall w
be . M
ind as i t exists in o u rselves is on an intermediate level It .

h as achieved consciousness bu t thi s c o n s cio ri sne s s is restless ly trans

,

forming itself under th e spell of a secret end What is this end ? .

 TH E N AT U RE O F MI N D 1 93

O ur best cl e is gained from stu dying that fu nction hich of all

u w
o u r mental fu nctions h as gone farthest to w
ard i ts goal the intel ,

w
lectu al To follo that cl u e is to learn that mind is really mind
.

to the extent that achieves experi ence at once comp rehensive

and ordered .

R ep rinted with p ermission from j l

o u rn a o f P hil o s o p hy , 194 1 .
 JA M ES C O LL I NS

G od as a F u nction in Modern

Systems f
o P hi l phy
oso

From even a cursory study of the history of modern philosophy ,

i
there emerges a salient fact hav ng special significance R u nning .

throughou t the entire course of mode rn speculation is a persistent

and central interest in the problem of God A t the very ou tset
. ,

the ferment of R enaiss ance thought comes in large measure from

w
a preoccupation ith the questions of the relationship bet een w
God and the world and the extent of man s knowledge of the ’

v
di ine nature The two extreme answers of Bruno s pantheism and
.
’

M s
ontaigne s skepticism e t the stage for the grand enterpri e of
’
s
v
the se enteenth century rationalist systems in which the role of
-
,

God is cru cially important An d if the empiricis ts and Kant feel

.

obliged to make a fundamental cri ticism of rationalism they are ,

compelled to do so largely becaus e of the difficulties enco u ntered

in squaring the rationalist doctrine of God with the deliverances
of the scientific method and the implications of the scientific way
w
of kno ing the material universe The proximity of the problem
.

s
of God to th e heart of the modern philo ophical development is
1 96 AMER IC A N WORK I
P H LO S OP HERS AT

a p rely histo ical import however s inc at the s ame time they
u r , , e

define the act al speculative si tuation wi th wh i ch every theisti c

u

philosopher today must reckon if hi teaching i s to become , s

effective .

O ur
first question is a methodological one dealing wi th God s ,
’

role in the proper starting point o f philosophy This problem was .

w
one of the maj or ays in which seventeenth century rationalist -
s
formulated their doctrine o n me thod .

D escartes had proved God s existence by showing this tru th to

’

be a necessary implication of the thinking self The favorite Car .

te s i an proof was the so called ontological argument based on the

-
,

idea of the infinitely perfect being an idea hich he likened to , w

the workman s stamp upon his product S pinoza now s u ggested
’
.

that the human mind is m u ch more intimately related to the

v
di ine substance than the simile of the artisan and his product
su ggests For the human mind is an expression o f God in the
.
,

pregnant sense o f being a moda l development under the divine

attribu te of thought The probative force of the ontological argu
.

ment de ri ves precisely from viewing the human mind and i ts ideas
as modal expressions of the a ffirmat ve power o f the unique in i
”
. s
finite s u bstance The specific ense in which the human self 1 m
plies the existence of God was radically redefined by S pinoza .

The thinking self is implicated as one finite stage n the pantheistic i

relationship between God and i modes Hs
ethodology merely . M
requires th e philosopher to pattern the order o f his ide as after
the order of things : this means to begin philosophy wi th God ,

w s
ho is the purely i mm anent cau e and substantial principle of the
finite self .

There is a his torical as well as a doc tr nal ense in which

, i , s
S p inoza regarded the C ar tesian order of demonstration as a com
promise To begi n philosophy wi th the existence of the self is to
.

w
occ u py an unstable half ay station between theistic realism and
a pantheism of subs tan ce S pinoza recognized three alternate start
.

ing points fo r philosophy : the sensible world the intelli gi ble fini te ,

self and the infinite substance of G od

, e looked upon the medi . H
v
e al realists as sens u al and deluded mi nds because they accepted
th e sensible world as the real st ar ting po nt of philosophi zing and i ,

s s
trusted the sen es as indispen able an d generally re l able ource i s s
 G OD A S A F UN C ION T IN MODERN SYS T EM S OF I
PH LOSOPHY 1
97

w
of kno ledge In repudiating the sensuous basis of kno ledge
. w ,

S pino z a sided w
ith D escartes against theistic realism But he felt .

that the recession from the senses had not been carri ed through
far eno u gh The thinking finite self is not s u ffic ently removed
. i
w
from the senses to ithstand every skeptical doub t Above all the .
,

finite existent does no t enj oy a s u fficiently p o erful ontological w

stat u s in a theistic outlook to provide the atershed for a meta
, , w
physical ded u ction o f the real For both these reasons S pinoza .
,

w as compelled to expand the Cartesian cr tique of the senses to i

incl u de a critiq u e of the finite self taken a a distinct substantial , s
w
being There as nowhere else for S pinoza to make hi s philo
.

sophical beginning than with a p an theistically conceived God .

When Thomi sts encounter this S pinozistic position they are re ,

minded sharply o f the intellectual sting behi nd certain remarks in

S t Thomas which they may previously have treated as harmless
.

comm onplaces S t Thomas has a clear cut way of distinguishing

. .
-

w w
bet een theological isdom and philosophical isdom or h u man w
philosophy ( u nderstanding the latter term simply as the p erfec
tion of natural reason rather than as a counterposition to the
,

Christian doctrine on creation and beatit u de ) From the standpoint

of order theolo gical wisdom begins with a consideration of God
,

and then proceeds to a s tudy o f creat u res insofar as they are re ,

lated to God and bear the divine likeness In philosophical isdom . w

or human philosophy however a start is made with sensible
, ,

created things themselves which are studi ed in their own proper

,

causes and only at the end of the investigation is God reached S t

, . .

Thomas main interest is to how that the theological approach

’
s
is superior since i t is similar to God s primary inspection of is
,
’
H
w
own essence in the kno ledge of whi ch e kno s all other things H w
Y
.
,

et S t Thomas adds that there is no basic conflict bet een these

. w
w
t o orders of stu dy since the principles of both kinds of isdom
, w
are derived from the unity of the di ine tru th I n our o n day v . w ,

we should not forget this positive Thomistic confidence in h u man

philosophy .

One conse q u ence of the modern rej ection of realism as that w

the Thomi stic description of the order of human philosophical
wisdom no longer seemed to be indisputable D escartes asked .

w w w
hether e should begin ith sensible finite things or ith a p u rely w
intelligible finite thing the thinking self S pinoza challenged the
,
.

w w w
vie that e should start ith finite created things at all whe ther ,

they be sensible or p u rely intelligible What S t Thomas held to be . .

1 98 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S P HER S O AT WORK
th e characteristic order of theological wisdom became in the ,

S pinozistic perspe ctive the proper order of philosophical wi s dom

,
.

Thereafter this reversal became the watermark of all forms of

,

rationalistic idealism It was read into the very meaning of a

.

philosophical system since th e idealis ts ai med to provide a strictly

,

v
ded u cti e typ e of spe c ulation To do so they were obliged to .
,

transfer from sa cred to human wisdom the prescription that one

must take G od as th e s tarting point .

A nother cognate distinction of S t Thomas u n derw ent a simi lar .

transformation The entire Ari stotelian tradi tion had wav ered b e
.

tween regard ing metaphysics as the science o f being as such and

as the science of the first s u bstance A quinas resolved this issue .

by maintaining that the proper subj ect of metaphysics is being

considered as s u ch or in respect to the act of existi ng which is ,

not confined to matter God is studied by meta physics or philo

.

sophical theology not as the subj ect o f th e science bu t only as the

u ltimate principle of the subj ect of this science i e insofar as e , . . H
is the causal so u rce of being and s u bstance act and potency But , .

sacred theology does have God as i ts proper s u bj e ct and exte nds ,

to the various finite realizations of being and s u bstance only in

the degree that the latter hel p us to understand G od O nce agai n .
,

S p i noza unwittingly transferred the trai ts of Thomi stic sacred

w
theology to his o n philosophy in regard to its proper su bj ect as ,

well as its p o m t of departure e made G od the pro p er s u bj ect

. H
of metaphysics and s tudi ed the principles of being and the fi ni te
,

w orld only in reference to God I n order to maintai n this c o n cep .

tion of metaphysics however S pinoza had to provide a naturalistic

, ,

v
counterpart for re elation This he found in the claim that the .

human mind h as an intu itive insight into the divine essence i t s elf .

A n d to back up this claim in turn he had to suppos e a pantheistic

, ,

merger of the h u man mind with th e divine intellect against the ,

background of a monism of s u bstance and i ts modes .

A s a conseq u ence of these fu ndamental changes S pinoza claimed ,

a go o d deal more for metaphysics than did A q u in as In the S pino .

z i s tic metaphysics there can be an a pri ori ontological proof of

, ,

God s existence bas e d on our intuitive knowledge of the divine

’

es sence A deductive demonstration of the stru cture an d exi stence

.

w
of th e fini te orld is also possible in virtue of our wholly non ,

empirical knowledge o f the unique divi n e substance For A q u inas .

,

on the contrary the beginning is made ith being precisely as

, w
gr asped by the intellect in the things presented to the sens e s .
2 00 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HERS AT WORK
ence somehow signifies incorporation of the obj ect in the actual
order E xistence effects an absol u te positing of the essence along
. ,

w ith all its predicates in the field of actu ality The index of this
, .

existential incorporation is the establishment of some real con

n e c tio n between the obj ect in question and the totality of our
exp erience .

Kant recognized at once that these t o conclusions had an w

important beari ng u pon the question of speculative proofs o f
God s existence ( 1 ) God is no exception to the ru le that analysis
’
.

of the concep t of the essence can ne er yield th e real kno ledge of v w

existence H
ence the ontological argu ment is invalid : i t tries to
.

w
dra ou t o f the concep t of th e most perfect being something hich w
is not contained therein as an analytic property or predicate A l l .

that the purely a p ri ori approach can do is to invoke the principle

of contradiction This may p rove that there is no intrinsic in co m
.

p atib i l i t
y bet een the wconstit u ent notes of the essence bu t i t w ar ,

rants no assertion abou t the thing s real existence The ontologi cal ’
.

argumen t remains in the logical order and does not determine

anything about God as an existent being .

( )
2 H
aving eli m inated the a priori approach in the light of his
criticism of L eibniz Kant then employed u me s vie of existence
, H ’
w
to u ndermine any a posteriori proof of God s existence In an ’
.

w
a po steriori inference e mus t appeal to th e principles of ex p eri
,

ence in addition to the principle of contradiction No w Kant laid

, .
,

down three conditions for de termining what is an obj ect of e x p e ri

w
ence or a arranted inference from experience The pres u med ex .

e ri e n ti al obj ect m u st be s u bj ect to tempor al process ; i t must be

p
fini te and capable of representation under some pattern of imagina
tion ; finally i t must belong to the field of appearances proportioned
,

v
to o u r appercepti e consciousness Clearly enough the reali ty sig .
,

n i fie d by the idea of the most perfect being cannot fulfill any o f

these indis p ensable conditions For God is e ternal infini te or .
,

beyond imaginative representation and a thing in i ts elf rather ,

- -

than an appe ar ance Kant concluded that therefore God can

.

neither be a direct obj ect of experience nor be inferred wi th sp e c u

lative validity from what doe s belong to the realm of experience .

The a poste ri ori proof is j u st as lack ing in existential content as

is the a priori .

With some aspects of Kant s analysis a philosophical realist can ’

O
agree ne major point in common is th e doctrinal connection b e
.

tween the problem o f existence in general and that of God s exist ’

 G OD AS A F UN C ION I N MODERN SYS T T F I
EM S O PH LOSOPHY 2 01

ence An inadeq u ate conception of existence may lead to an inv alid

.

argument for God s existence F u rthermore Kant and Thomistic

’
.
,

realism concur in their criticism of the rationalist theory of exist

ence as the culminating predicate in the line of essence itself This .

provides a solid reason for rejecting any p roof hich deri es God s w v ’

existence from some p rior affirmation of the po er of the di ine w v

essence We cannot import self ca u sality into the di ine essence
.
-
v
withou t simultaneously threatening God s transcendance an d free ’

dom in creation S pinoza s determ inistic m On i sm of s u bstance is

.
’

w
the pure position to ard which every metaphysics based o n the
strict ontological argument and i ts presuppositions abo u t existence
inevitably gravitates .

Y w
et Kant s ay of saving the d ivine transcendence and freedom
’

involves the sacrifice of every speculative demonstration of God s ’

exi stence H
is position is not dictated by any direct examination
.

o f th e realistic a poste ri ori proo fs ho ever but by his theory of , w ,

w
existence There are t o maj or characteristics of the Kantian vie
. w
of existence First i t is not a doctrine o n existence but on the con
.
,

di tio n s for a certai n type of exi stential k n o w le dge Kant s chief

’
.

instrument of inquiry is a theory of kno ledge which is u nregu w

lated by a metaphysic of being in its ultimate act A ccepting s .

H ’
ume s account of the purely phenomenal ch ar acter of the Obj ect
of knowledge he mu s t deny that the human mind can gain any
,

genuine knowledge of things in their o w n intrinsic principles of

b eing . H
ence the paradox that the Kantian doctrine on existence
s
sup p lies no pecu lative insight into the act of existing on the part
of the existent thing This accounts for the remarkable divergence
.

between the Thomistic a posteriori ay of making the demonstra w

tion concerning God s existence and Kant s reformu lation of the
’ ’

cosmological argument A l though both A quinas and Kant agr ee .

that the divine essence cannot be the starting p oint of the argu
ment they disagree fu ndamentally conce rning the pro p er starting
,

point in the finite order A quinas be gi ns w th finite beings kno n . i , w

w
in their o n essence and its distinct act of existing whereas Kant s ,
’

only possible point of depar ture is the contingency of obj ects of

appe arance prescinding entirely from the essential nature and
,

existential act of the thing in itself Kant s criticism holds good only - -
.
’

for a proof which accepts his o n phenomenalis tic star ting point w .

w
The second note orthy featu re o f the Kantian teach ing on ex
i s te n ce is its re la tio na l or syste mi c basis nce again the para . O ,

H
mount influence o f ume over Kan t is unmi stakable Both men .
2 02 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S O P HER S AT WORK
w
hold that what e know in an existential ay is only the coherent w
and s table connectedness of phenomenal obj ects in the field of
experience Kant traces this system of phenomenal reality to the
.

necessary and u niversal struct u re of consciousness rather than to ,

H u me s psychological la
’
w
of association N evertheless Kan t con .
,

tin u e s the H
umean tradition of characterizing the kno able ex w
i s te n t in terms of something else —its reference to the connected
w hole of appearances — rather than in terms of i ts intrinsic prin
c i l e s of being
p hich remain
, w
unknowable E xistential kno ledge . w
thus becomes a process of fitting a presumed obj ect of perception
into the set of relations constituting the system of possible ex p eri
ence But such a relational or systemic concep tion of existence
.

misses the very act in virtue of hich a thing can be said to exist w .

H ence i t provides no basis for demonstrative kno ledge about w

God s act of existing What prevents Kant from achieving this
’
.

demonstration is not so much the transcendence of God to e x p e ri

ence as the thoro ughly nonexistential character of the Kantian
doctrine on experience and the obj ect of kno ledge w .

Fu rthermore the p u rely contextual theory of existential kno l

, w
edge is unavoidably univ o cal since the thre e conditions of ex p e ri
,

ence en u merated previou sly are themselves uni ocal formal aspects v ,

of consciousness E ven before he inspects th e a po ter ori proofs for

. s i
God s existence Kant is commi tted to the posi tion that existential
’

inferen ce can move only within th e confines of the fini te field of

homogeneou s appearances Th at is why he presents th e cos .

m o l o gic al argument as tho u gh one mus t abandon the existential

terrain entirely and make a purely deal adj u stment of th e idea i
of necessi ty to the idea of th e most perfect being This proc edure .

is certainly ille gi timate but i t is a proce dure required only b y th e

,

relational notion of existential kn owledge and i ts univocal

conditions .

The very careful statement which S t Thomas makes abou t th e .

nat u re of th e demonstration in question serves for critical ev al u a

tion of both L e ibniz and Kant What w e prove is not pre c isely .

God s existence bu t the truth of our propo ition that G od exists

’
s .

The negative part of this statemen t is relevant for L ei b niz whereas ,

v
the a ffirmati e part bears upon ume an d Kant Taken in itself H .
,

the divin e act of exis ting is infinite and identical i th the divine w
essence . H
enc e i t tran scends the i n tellect of man in his tempo ral ,

H
condition so that G o d in is own being remain in s o me fashion
, s
2 04 . AMER IC A N I
P H LO S O P HER S AT WORK
3

O nly the briefest mention can be made of our hird mai n prob t
lem The purpose of inq i i ng abo t h relation between God
. u r u t e

and the H egelian A bsol te is to underline the si gnificance of the

u
“ ”
word f nction as applied to the modern treatments f God
u , o .

M odern philosophers have taken a thoro ghly functional approach u

to God attempting to use the doctrine on God as a means of

,

strengthening their o w n systems Th s S p inoza s God performs . u ,

’

the systematic o ffi ce of gu aranteeing th e obj e ctive tru th of ideas ,

securing the con tinuity of deductive reasoning and overcoming ,

the inconveniences of Cartesian du alism Kant s God h as a negative .

’

ro le in the speculative order and a positive role in the practical .

The ide a of God is the supreme test case proving the impotence ,

of pure s p eculative reason to determine existence in a nonempirical

w ay an d hence to constru ct a metaphysics In the moral sphere .
,

God does not provide the fou ndation of Kan tian obligation b u t
H e does render obligation more meaningful by making th e fini te , ,

intelligible self free and immortal and by harm o ni zing natu re an d ,

. H
du ty I t is in the egelian God ho ever that the instru mentalist , w ,

or systematist approach is brought to the clim ax of subordinating

the God of realism and religion to something higher .

H egel lauded religion for ma ntaining the u ni versal actuality i

of the s u preme being But he deplored the fact that the religi o u s
.

apprehension of the s u preme being as expressed under the im w

perfect form o f faith and feeling R elying upon a mere pictorial .

representation of th e relation between man an d God religion pre ,

vented the empirical individu al from asserting his dialectical iden

w
ti ty i th the supreme actuality egel s o n philosophy intervened . H ’
w
at this point to dissolve th e illusion that the finite mind and the
v
di ine spiri t are irreducibly distinct is philosophy became the . H
final j u dge of th e tru e import of religious convictions The God .

of reli gi ous belief and theistic phi losophy was sublated into the
H
absolute of egel s idealism With n the philosophy of the absolute
’
. i ,

v
the finite indi idual was considered valu able only as b eing a di a
l e c ti c al aspect of the absolute spiri t itself Thus egel used the . H
concept of God as a means of demons trating the uncondi tioned
tru th of his doctrine on the absolute and hence the unquestionable
primacy of his phi losophy over every other ph losophical and reli i
g i o u s expla n ation of being .
 G OD AS A F UN C ION I N MODERN SYS T T F I S
EM S O PH LO OPHY 2 05

From the time of Fe u erbach onwards it has been fashionab l e ,

“
for naturalistic humanism to protest a gainst the tyranny of the
absol u te This protest is certainly ell made if it is meant as a
. w ,

s H i
cri tici m of egel s d alectical monism o f the absolute spiri t B u t
’
.

i t is often expanded to incl u de a rej ection of God and theistic

religion in which extended usage the original p rotest loses its
,

historical bearings For nat u ralistic h u manism forgets that the

.

H egelian absolute is i tself at odds with the reli gi o u s view of God

as the supreme personal being who is the free c reator of finite ,

persons an d respects their integrity of personal being and freedom .

The tyranny of th e H
egelian absol u te is even more intolerable
to the theist than to the nat u ralistic humanist since it sub erts , v
both real term s in the creator creature relationship That is hy -
. w
there is an ultimate convergence bet een religion and theistic w
metaphysics in the d u al a ffirmation that we can gain some demon
s tra tiv e kno w
ledge abo u t God s existence and that God s o w n ’ ’

bein g is irreducibly distinct from the orld The divine act of w .

existing is reserved from o u r nat u ral vision and can never properly
s erve an instr u mental f u nction in philosophy .

The negative character of this concl u sion may thro some light w
upon one development in contemporary philosophy We have seen .

that each of our representative thinkers mi sconceived the role of

God in p hil o sp hy S pinoza redu ced God to a first dedu ctive prem
.

ise in a monistic determinism Kant fo u nd no ay to kno God in. w w

v
the speculati e order and hence employed im as a postu late of H
H
moral harmony An d egel s u bordinated God to the exigencies
.

of his dialectical absol u tism The unsatisfactory consequences of

.

these typical approaches to God migh t s u ggest that the problem

of God should be eliminated entirely from philosophy This is .

w H
precisely hat eidegger in Germany and Merl e au Ponty in France -

are now advocating Their standpoint amo u nts to a philosophical

.

neutralism w
hich refrains in principle from making any philo
,

sophical prono u ncements abo u t God They claim that both theism .

and antitheism are nonphilosophical doctrines belonging solely ,

to the theological sphere ( in the sense of a revealed theology) .

They recognize no properly philosophical ay of dealing with th e w

q u estion of God s existence nat u re and govern ance of the universe
’

, .

B u t i t does not seem to me that there are s u fficient historical

”
grounds for accepting this neutral methodological a theism ,
-
,

w hich seeks to prescind completely in philosophy from the con

fli e t be tween theism and an ti theism From the experience of four .
2 06 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
cent u ries of mo dern spec u lation abou t G o d t can only be con , i
cl u ded that many philosophers have exploited the concept of God
un w w
arrantedly for their o n systematic purposes The trouble doe s .

not lie in the fact that they concerned themselves philosophically

w ith the problem of God b u t rather in the manner in which they
,

p o sed this probl e m and regarded i ts position within the total

system of their philosophy H
ence the historical evidence do es not
.

s u gges t that philosophers shou ld refrain from studying abo u t God

b u t only that they should refrain from making G o d a mere tool of
w w
their o n S pecial vie of things M
ore posi tiv e ly expressed p h il o so
.
,

p h e rs m u st come to recogni z e both that e can w

demonstrate the
tru th abo u t God s existence and nature and also that God is the
’

c u lmination of all o u r philosophical demonstrations and th e goal

of our practical stri ings v U
ndoubtedly this region of inq u iry
.
,

contains more than the average amou nt of doctrinal p i tfalls But .

to examine thes e historical di fficulties patiently and ill u minate the

philosophical ro u te to a sound k n o w l e dge o f God is surely one s

of the maj or responsibilities laid upon those philosophers ho are w

trying to c ultivate the re sources of S t Thomas wi thin the give n
.

context of o u r age .

Presidential Address , re p rinted with p e rrn is s io n ,

'

Pro c e e dings o f the

Ame ric an Ca tho lic P hilo s o p hic al Ass o c ia tio n, 1 9 5 5 .
2 08 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
most but partially j ustified I shall therefore not reply to them .

at any length but simply indicate at this point in a general way

,

how the matter seems to me really to tand s .

I believe then that although some of the problems m e tap hysi

, ,

c i an s have discussed are indeed pse u do problems and that some ,

others altho u gh genuine do not belong to philosophy at all never

, , ,

th e l e ss certain others of them are or contain genuine problems , , ,

w hich are philosophical and are perfectly capable of solution .

I believe moreover that these genuine problems of metaphysic

, , s
are connected wi th cert ai n of the plain man di fficulties as int ’
s i
mately and in m u ch the same manner as are for instanc e the , ,

problems of theoretical physics wi th certain others of his di fficultie s.

For the plain man every day passes j udgm ents o f approval o r d s i
approval o u s u ndry concrete issues in the fields of morals o f art , ,

of social policy of reli gi on of reasoning and s o on ; and when

, , ,

the validi ty o f these j udgm ent is challenged and th e clash of ap s

rai s al s does not arise from mi sinformation as to the concrete
p
facts j u dged the plain man finds that he can defend his appraisal
,

of those facts only by ap peal to a philosophy of the ubj ect th ey s

concern .

The philosophy of i t which he improvises at such times may

seem to him independent of th e more techn ical problems p h il o s o
p h ers discuss B u t i t is bound to be ambiguous
. fragmentary and , ,

inconsistent ; an d if he were to try to purge i t of thes e defects he

wo u ld find that the more careful and thoroughgoing refl e c tro ns
necessary for this wo u ld face him ooner or later ith the very s w
problems stu died in the abstract and theoretical p ar ts o f
philosophy .

The problems of theoretical physics i t would be granted have , ,

remote but practical implications for the task of putting into the
hands of the pl ai n man means to attain th e physical ends h e chooses
to pursue An d th e problems of theoretical philosophy have like
.

wise remote yet also practical bear ing on something still more im
portant namely on the discernment of w isdom from folly in the
, ,

choices man makes of ends to p u rs u e and of m e ans to reach them .

H ence as Professor G P A dams remarked on a certain occasion

, . .

not long ago philoso p hy need not try to b e practical ; i t is practical

,

inherently But it takes already some wisdom to perceive how this

.

I s true .

, w
Finally a ord concern ing the allegation that one s metaphysics ’

is a matter of one s temper am ent rather than of tru ths o ne ha

’
s
 TH E MET H OD O F KNO WLEDGE I N P H LOSOP HYI 2 09

di scovered The fact seems to me to b e as I shall try to show later

.
, ,

that certain metaphysical q u estions call an d q u ite properly for , ,

w
an ans er expressing n o t a hypothesis b u t a basic choice or ru ling
interest O
n the other hand the ans ers called for by certain
. , w
other metaphysical q u estions are gen u inely hypotheses ; and if
these are but clear and specific eno u gh they are as capable of ,

being tested and either confirmed or disproved as are hypothese s

in any other field .

I believe th u s that metaphysics o r more generally theoretical

, , , , ,

inquiry in philosophy can reach res u lts having title to the name
,

w
of kno ledge B u t I also believe that for this the modes of in
. , ,

v e s ti ati o n u sed m u st be purged of the defects

g hich have to o w
often made philosophical inq u iry heuristically barren and th u s
tended to bring i t into disre p u te These defects have been such .

as looseness o f inference ambi guity of terms confu sion of issues , , ,

inadeq u ate testing of hypotheses ; and they seem to me traceable

in the main to t o so u rces w .

O
ne of these sources is the assumption idespread even among , w
philosophers that in philoso p hy i t is possible to reach kno ledge
, w
through reasonings carried o n in the vague terms of ordinary
language wi tho u t bothering to use a technical a p p aratu s of
thought B u t the truth is that as soon as inq u iry hether in phi
.
, w
w
l o so p h y or else here comes to questions more di ffi c u lt than those
,

which everyday experience or cas u al reflection is ab le to answer ,

a technical termi nology becomes a s ine qu a n o n of fruitfu l think

ing For a technical term is simply a term hose meaning is known
. w
exactly ; and hence not to bother to use techn ical terms is not
,

to bother to think ith precision w

ne can easily ima gi ne how . O
far chemistry or geometry for instance o u ld ha e pro gr essed if
, , w v
chemists had not bothered to u se more exact conceptions of alco
hol of acid or of e ther ; or mathematicians of points planes or
, , , , ,

v
circles ; than the agu e conceptions those ords stand for in w
ordinary langu age The situation of p hiloso p hy is no different
. .

U
n p opular as a p lea for technical language in philosophy is s u re
to be today the fact must be faced that at the p oint here one
, w
ceases to be s u p erficial there technical langu age far from maki ng
, , ,

for unintelli gi bility is on the contrary th e only means of being

,

intelligible and of making dependable inferences Thi s is true in .

the sciences and eq u ally so in philosophy .

Technical terms however must not be confused w th j argon

, , i
2 10 WORK
AMER IC A N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT

terms A j argon term is not necessarily precise It is merely one

. .

which i s not understood by most persons because i t desi gnate s

things with w hich only a comparatively few persons occ py them u

selves Thus every trade art and craft a s well as every science
.
, , , , ,

has i ts o w n j argon But the j argon te rms of the .

—
sciences unlike
most of those of the trades or the crafts —get defined exactly ; and
therefore in addition to being esoteric like the latter they become
, ,

technical .

O n the other hand even terms in common use— s u ch as alcohol , ,

acid and circle ; or in philosophy property truth substance

, , , , , ,

proposition and so o u —become technical terms as soon a their

, s
meaning is stated exactly .

i
Ph losophers i t is true have sometimes defined their terms and
, , ,

sometimes although more rarely defined them with some pre cision
, ,
.

This brings me to the second of the two sources of defective me thod

in philosophy to which I alluded a moment ago It is tha t to .

specify exactly th e meaning of a term is not enough to insure

w
that i t ill be an effective implement for the winning of knowl
edge For this what is needed besides is that i ts meaning shall not
.
,

be assigned to i t arbitrari ly but shall represent characters which ,

there is reason to believe are possessed b y the things the term is

used to think about .

Unfortunately the definition o ffered by philo sophers have ofte n

, s
failed to satisfy this capital requirement and have then represented ,

mere speculations f course speculation hi ch is b u t the making . O , , w

of hypotheses is j ust as legitimate and indeed necessary in p hil o so
,

h
p y as in the natural sciences ; bu t before any conclusions can be
based on a speculation adequate testing of i t is as indispensable ,

in p hiloso p hy as else here w .

Why then have philosop hers so often failed to test adequately ,

or at all the hypotheses that consti tuted the definitions they gave
,

of their terms ? The chief reason I believe has been that they have , ,

not realized clearly enough the nat u re of the facts by which these
hypotheses could be tested empirically Beca u se of this the testing .
,

has too much been limited to a checking of th e m u tual consistency

of the variou s hypotheses entering into a system—the system as a
w hole however being then left more or less hanging in the air
, ,

for lack of emp irical verification of its hypotheses .

But every gen u ine problem has data that is facts not themselves ,

q u estioned abou t which the problem I s and by reference to which

,

any p roposed solution of i t can be empirically tested A nd since .

2 12 A M E R ICA N PH IL O S O P H E R S AT WORK
samples of real being with concrete sample of merely apparent s
or unreal being and Observe what characteristics differentiate the
,

former from the latter But that the problem is not of this logical
.

type is perhaps su ffi cien tly sho n by th e fact that S ince some phi w
l o so p h ers are idealists some materialists and others adherent of
, , s
S till o ther doctrines samples of real being could not be picked
,

withou t begging in th e very act what the contending philosophers

would regard as the question at issue :
To avoid this the data to which we loo k as t ar ting point must
, s
be of qui te a di fferent kind I sub mi t that they can con is t only o f
. s
concrete examples of the manner or manner n which th e word
“ ” “ ” “ ”
si
real or i ts co gnates really and reality are used predicatively
, ,
.

i
That s o u r data will have to consist o f s tatem e n ts such a th at a
, s
s
certain ubstance which seems to be paper
, really as bestos ; o r , is
that me rm aids do n o t really exist ; or that tree far away appear s
blue but in reality are green ; and o on S uch con cre te instance s . s
v “
of the predicati e use of the word real o r it cognates consti tute ”
s
th e fact u al data which a hypo thesis as to the meaning of those
w ords must fit and by reference to which i t tenability can b e em s
p i ri c al l
y tested ; for the problem then is a to what those words s
mean as app lie d in th e giv e n ex amp les .

O f course I take i t that what w e are interested to an alyz e is

,

examples which like thos e given illustrate commonly accepted

, ,

usage ; but i t is worth noting that if example s o f some freak usage

o f those same words were given instead then if i t interes ted us to , ,

w
do so e cou ld analyze equally well th e meaning those words had
,

there T h e essential point is that either n o applications of those

.

words are given us and then we can make them mean anything
,

we please ; or else concrete examples of s o m e applicative usage of

them are fu rnished and then we have data by which to tes t e m
,

i ric all the so u ndness of any proposed definition of what they

p y
mean in that particular sort of context A defini tion of them so .

reached will b e a s o— called real or obj ective definition a distin , s

g u i s h e d from an arbitrary merely verbal definition
, .

O ur second maxim o f method i t will b e recalled enj oins us , ,

w
to state explicitly what e are seeking to discover abou t the data
th e first maxim req u ires us to list In the present case then what .
, ,

w e wish to discover is th e meaning the word real or ts cog ”

i
nates have in the sample statemen ts we take as data Any hypoth esi s .

as to this w ill therefore have the form of a definition of the word

concerned ; and since a defini tion is good if and onl y if it i exactly s
 THE MET H OD O F KNO WLEDGE I N P H LOSOP HYI 2 1 3

equivalent to th e term defined th e test of th e adequacy of any ,

w
definition that oc curs to us ill consist in the possibili ty o f rep l ac
ing the term defined by the defini tion proposed in any o f the ,

sample statements taken as data .

B u t what will be the tes t of that possibili ty i tself ? It will be I ,

submit that this replacement S hall not res u lt in making false any
,

of the statements that were true nor in making true any that ,

w ere false nor in altering the tru th or the falsity of any other
,

statement i mplying or implied by the gi ven ones For this test .

will be met au tomatically if a definition expresses a genuine e qu iv a

, w
lence and ill not be met unless i t doe s .

The nature o f the method I propose having now been des r bed ci
in general let us next apply i t in particular to the problem o f
,

the nat u re o f reality and see hat i t will do for us

, w .

A s soon as in complianc e with it, e be gi n listing statements , w

“
w
in which the ord real o r one of i ts co gnates is used predicatively ,

the s u spicion forces itself u pon us that the ord may mean o ne w
thing in some of them and some thing else in certain Others We
, .

are therefore led to divide o u r sample statements into everal s

gro u ps and to scru tinize each gro u p separately .

w
The first may ell consist of examples in which the adjective
”
real is evidently used in some special purely technical sense In , .

w
la for instance real property is contr as ted ith personal o r por
,
“
,
”
w
table property and real therefore means nonpersonal o r im
,

movable In mathematics certai n n u mbers are called real numbers

.
,

and con trasted wi th imaginary numbers although both kinds are ,

real enough in an ordinary sense of the term to be accurately

, ,

described and frui tfully employed by mathematicians Again n .

, i
log ic real definitions are con trasted with verbal or nom nal d e fin i i
tions although words are j ust as real in an ordinary ense as are
, , s ,

w
things o ther than ords It is cle ar that no problem involving the
.

s
di tinction between reality and appearance arises in connection
wi th these o r possible o ther equally technical uses o f the word
“
real We may therefore di smi ss them from considerati on
. .

The group we come to next s much more si gnifican t It consi t i . ss

of statements such as that a certain dog looks or seems or appears
ferocio u s but is not so really o r in reality ; or th at a certain seem
,

in gl y valid argument is really fallacious ; o r that the stone in a

certain ring althou gh i t appe ar to be glass 1 8 a real diamond ;
, s ,
2 14 . AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
or that a certain substance seems to be paper but is in reality as
b e s to s ; and so on A ll these let i t be noted are descriptive s tate
.
, ,

ments That is in each some entity for example a substance is

.
, , ,

v
gi en and the hypothesis is o ffered that i t is of a certain kind fo r
, ,

example of the kind called paper For the sake of generality

, . ,

le t u s call E the entity given in any of them and call K the kind ,

w
to hich i t is claimed to belong ; and le t us note that whatever ,

the kind K may be there is always some set of characters a b c d , , , , , ,

s u ch th at if and only if a given enti ty possesses a ll of them i t is

, ,

of kind K This simple analysis puts u s in posi tion to descri be

.

exactly the occasions which give rise to the question as to whether

v
a gi en entity E really is or only appears to b e of a kind K , , .

They are o ccasions on hich o n ly s o m e of the characters of E w

are manifest to observation and on which the e manifest charact e rs , s
w
— hich constitute the a
pp e aran c e of E at the time — hap e n to
p
be the same characters as would be manifest in th e exi sting cir
c u m s tan c e s if E sho u ld hap en to be of kind K
p .

For example u nder present circumstances the color shape tex

, , , ,

ture and flexibili ty of the shee t I hold are mani fest to observation ;
,

they are i ts present appearance ; whereas the comb u stibility of i t ,

if it be comb u stible is not now manifest But fu r ther the col or , .

, ,

flexibility and other now manifes t characters of the sheet are the
, ,

s a m e characters as w
ould be manifest under presen t circ u mst ances
if the sheet w e re of the kind called paper .

N o w if the things hich in our past experience manifested this

, w
same color flexibility and so on did later turn ou t in most cases
, , ,

to possess als o comb ustibili ty and the remaining characters of

w
paper then hat we natu rally say in the pre ent case is that this
, s
sheet s e e ms or app e ars to be paper ; that is its present appearance ,

is the same a that of paper s .

F u rthermore if on applying the proper tests e find that this

, , , w
sheet do es have als o those remaining char acters of p aper then ,

w e express this by saying that i t not only appears to be paper but ,

re a l l
y is paper ; hereas if it t u w
rns o u t to lack some of them hat , ,
w
w e say is that althou gh it appears to be paper i t is n o t really so
, , ,

or is not real paper .

Thus in terms of an entity E and of a set of ch ar acters a b c

, ,
'

, , ,

d a ll of
, w
hich must be possessed by it if i t is to be of kind K ,

b u t o n ly s o m e of which are at th e time manifest in it we have ,

defined exact ly the type of si tuations whi c h govern the use of s

i s
the not on of appearance and reality in a e where th e nature o f css
2 16 A M E R ICAN I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WO R K
in th e descriptive statement we have considered That is in ex is s . ,

te n ti al s tatements too i t import is to assert that the statement in

, s
which the word enters is tru e notwithstan di ng ome doub t or item s
of evidence to th e contrary .

For example the s o rt of occ as ion o n which one would naturally

,
“ “
say mermaids do no t really exist o r mermaids are not real , ,
“
instead of simply no mermaids exist would b e one on which , ,

perhap s a child had been reading a tory abou t mermaid or had

, s s
seen a moving picture representing some For the simple t explana . s
tion o f such a story o r picture would naturally be that there are
s
mermaids and th e tory or picture therefore constitu te an i tem
, s
of circumstantial evidence that mermaids exist The import of the .

statement that mermaids do not re a lly exist wo u ld thus b e that

that evidence is mi sleading— that in spi te of it the truth is that , ,

mermaids d o not exist .

I n such examples realnes i thus not a character di ff erentiat ng

, s s i
s
one specie of existenc e from another and infe ri or specie called s
s
unreal o r eeming exis tence ; any more than i n our earlier exam ,

ple realness di ff erentiated o n e pe e s of paper from an inferior

, s ci
one called seeming or unreal paper In both groups o f examples .

”
alike what the word really o r ei ther of i ts cognate qualifies i
, s s
i
the statement tself in whi ch t occur and t force is th e ame i s , is s
“ ” “
as that o f the adverb s truly or certa nly i .

Let us now re turn to th e sort of a ertion n which I S rea l s si ss ”

i
used simply as synonymou wi th exist “ ”
ur task here i th e n s O . s
“ ”
to analyze the meaning o f to ex t Thi s will not only m ake ex is .

p l i i
ci t the mean ng o f thes e ass ertion bu t al o clar fy by contra t s s , i s
s
that o f a sertions—such as thos e j u t di cu sed an d certa n others s s s i
ye t to b e considered— in which the notion o f real ity s added to i
that o f existence .

s
The question a to what exactly t m eans to say that ome i , s
thing o f a given kind K exists i be t approached by li mi ting at , s s
s
tention at fir t to cases where what n v ew i specifically physic al is i i s
, s
existence a distingu shed from for example ma thematical or i , ,

psychological existence .

I n all such cases the assertion that there exi t omething of a ss s

i
kind K is I subm t exactly ynonymou w th the as ertion that
, , s s i s
i
something of that k nd is s o m e w here; that s occupie ome p lace i , ss
s
in space at ome time It is important to notice h o wever th at an .
, ,

assertion of existence may be more or le s determinate s .

 TH E ME T HO D OF KN OWLEDGE I N I
P H LO SOP HY 2 1 7

For example least determinately one might assert that there are
, ,

s
black wans or which is the same thing that black wans exist ;
, , , s
that is are at s o m e place not specified
, , .

,
w
But some hat more determinately the assertion made might ,

be instead that there are black s ans s o m e w h e re w ithin a sp ec i e d w fi

re io n— fo r instance in A ustralia
g , .

O r thirdly and now quite determinately the assertion made ,

might be that there is a black swan h ere n o w ; that is at the specific ,

place to which one is pointing at the time .

”
These examples make evident that in the phrases there is ,

“
or there are one is using the word there not in some idiomatic
,

sense b u t literally that is as indicative of spatial location hether

, , w
completely indeterminate or partially or holly determinate In w .

these phrases moreover temporal location also is indicated like

, , ,

wise more or less determinately a t least by the past present or , , ,

fu ture tense of the verb and often thro u gh specification by date ,

of some period or particular moment also .

Physical existence thus is essentially s p atiotemporal ubiety ; and

, ,

that which has or lacks ubie ty that is is or is no t present at some , ,

place in space at some time is al ays some w hat or k in d— hich , w w

may be a kind of substance or o f property or of relation or of , , ,

activi ty or of change or of state and so on

, , , .

When existence other than physical is in view— for nstance i ,

mathematical existence — the meaning of existence is closely analo

go u s The difference is only that the place concerned is a place
.

in some order other than the space time order -

.

Thus for example the assertion that a square root of 9 exists

, , ,

b u t no square root of 3 means that the character being sq u are ,

”
roo t of 9 characterizes a certain place in the order of the hole w
numbers namely the de terminate place called 3 ; wherea the
“
,
”
, s
character being sq u are root of 3 characterizes none of the places
in the series of hole numbers w .

In any assertion of exis tence thus no matter whether i t be , ,

more particularly one of physical existence or of mathematical , ,

or psychological or mythological or other existence t o com

, , , w
p o n e n ts al ays are w
essentially in ol ed namely a w h a t and a w h ere v v , , .

An d generically a w h e re or place is the sort of thing sp e c ifiab l e in

terms of o rd in al relations ; that is of relations such as bet een , w ,

next to beyond among o u tside of and so on

, , , , .

This analysis i t should be noted incidentally res u lt n maki ng

,
“ ”
, si
explicit also the meaning possessed by the word reality when it
2 18 A M E R ICA N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
is used no t as an abstract term synonymou s with realness but as ,

a concrete d e no tativ e term ; as for example in su ch statements as

, , ,

that reality is excl u sively material or exclusively mental or of , ,

both these kinds or of th e natu re of ill and so on When the

, w , .

w “ ” “
ord reality is so u se d i t means everythi ng that exist s I t is
,
.

v
ob io u s that reali ty in this se ns e is not the o p p o site of appear ance ,

b u t of nonexistence or n o thing , .

A t this point i t may he remarked in passing that wh e n the word

,
”
reality is used thus denotativ e ly then that if any th ing hich it , , , w
, w
denotes 1 5 kno n to us that is known to us to ex is t only if our
, , ,

existential j udgments or other existential apprehensions are tru e .

H ence if their tru th ( or erroneousness) is to be some thing ascer

,

tain ab l e at all it cannot possibly be defined as correspondence ( or

,

noncorrespondence ) to reality that is to some thing known at , ,

all to exist only if those very apprehensions or j udgm ent of exist s

ence happen to b e true .

We shall now examine next a use of the word really or its cog
nates radically different from any we have so far considered An .

w
examp le of it o u ld be the statement that the oo d of the table w
is really a cloud of minute particles at relatively vast distances fro m
one another ; and another example that water is really a compound ,

of oxygen and hydrogen .

When this is asserted about water the word re ally cannot have ,

the same meaning as when e say that the liquid in a given glass w
w
is really ater For the statement that water is really H O evidently
.
,

w
does not me an that ater only seems to be water b u t in tru th is
something else ; nor doe s i t mean that i t only seems to have the
familiar pro perties of liquidi ty tastelessne s s capa city to quench , ,

thirst and fire and so on b u t has ins te ad of these the property of

,
.

being analyzable into oxygen and hydrogen ; nor does i t mean sim
ply that i t is true that the composition of water is H O Z
.

What i t means I submit is that fo r ce rtain p u rp os es such as

, , , ,

some of those of chemi sts the property of bei n g analyzabl e into and
,

sy n th e s iz ab l e out of hydrogen and oxygen is th e im o rtan t o r

p
re l e v a n t property ; w
hereas for such p u rposes the other more fa ,

miliar prop erties of water are irrelevant .

In statements of this typ e then the definition of realness which , , ,

at the time they are made tacitly governs the use in them of the ,

w ”
ord really is that to b e re al is to b e re lev an t to th e p u rp os es o r
in te re s ts w hic h ru le a t th e tim e In su c h cases the Oppos ite of to .
,
2 2 0 AM R E IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
sumed by th e assertion that water really s H Z O That taci t pre m e i . is ,

w
i t ill be recalled was that to be real is to be relevant to certain
,

of the p u rposes of che mi sts No w to adopt thi or any similar .

, s
maj or pre m ise for one s activities through a given time is to tak e
’

“
os i tio n as to what for the time one will mean by being real
a
p , ,
.

A nd to be governed even if unawares by such a maj or premise at

, ,

a given time is to be then o cc upy ing a p os itio n as to what it i to s

be real That is the statement of s u ch a maj or premise is the state
.
,

ment of an ontological posi tion It is alway of the form to be . s

real is to have uch and such a character s ”
.

A n ontological pos ition thus is essentially of the nature of an , ,

exclusive or basic interest in the things which have a cert ai n char

i
acter ; t is a ru le one adopts as to what thi ngs o ne will regar d
as alone of interest or will rank as bas c or primary For ex am e
, i .
m ,

the ontological posi tion that to b e real i to have a cert ai n char s

acter C would consist in interest exclusively or basically in things
having this character ; i t wo u ld be the rule of admi tting to con
sideration only the things having ch ar acter C o r at least of po iting , s
them as fu ndamental and absol utely prior in interest or importance .

No w an ontological posi t on may be consciou ly embraced or

, i s ,

i t may be occupied unawares It may be occupied by many persons .

,

or by few It may be congenial to one person and repugnant to

.
,

another It may be occu pied at a certain moment and relinquished

.
,

the next in favor of a different one But j ust because an ontological .

position is not a contention at all but essentially an interest at the

time ruling an ontological position cannot be true or be false ;
,

nor therefore can it be shown more o r less probably true than an

other o r be refuted or be proved The e possibilities exist only
, , . s
in the case of hypotheses .

The ontological position for example which natural sci entists , , ,

while functioning as such occupy is that to be real is to be per , ,

c e tu al l
p y public or implici t in hat s so But i t is evident that w i .

these words do no t form u late a hypothesis as to properties em

p iri c all s
y discoverable in ome concretely given enti ty called reality ;
for no empirical facts one might add u ce could prove or disprove
what those words expressed or render i t probable dou b tful or , , ,

improbable P lainly they d e scrib e n o hypothesis at all bu t simply

‘

.
, ,

the criterion by which th e things in which the natural sciences i n

te re s t themselves are disting u ished from the things these sciences
I g nore .

Truth falsity and probab li ty are thu catego ri es logi cally in

, , i s
 TH E MET HOD O F KNO WLEDGE I N P H ILO S OP H Y 2 2 1

congruous to ontologi cal position s—as inapplicable to them

as
would be the predicates thirs ty o r bitter to logari thms or to al
g e b raic equation s O
ntological
. posi tions may only be occupied or
not occupied be embraced or abandoned This analysis of their
, .

nature and logi cal status I may say seems to me in essential agree
, ,

ment with conclusions reached by Professor J L o ew e nb erg in a .

”
pene trating article entitled The Q u estion of Priority whi ch he
p u blished some years ago ;2 and I therefore look to him hopefu lly
for moral support in a concep tion of th e nature of ontological
positions which I realize is likely to shock many philosophers
, , .

A dditional instances of ontological positions that have been held

or might be held would be that to be real is to be introspectively
i w
observable or implic t in hat is o ; that to be real is to be i n s
di vidual ; that to be real is to be unique and changeless ; that to be
real is to be free from contradictions ; that to be real is to be a
coherent whole ; and o on s .

There is one ontological posi tion however worth special mention , ,

here It is the one occupied by any ontologist— and therefore by our

.

selves here now—at the time he s engaged in an nquiry as to i i

the nature of reality Thi position is that to be real i to be
. s s
relevant to the problem of th e nature o f reali ty appearance and , ,

. v
unreality E idently i t is a posi tion di fferent from the idealistic
, ,

or materialistic o r other conclusion as to th e nat u re of reali ty

, ,

whi ch an ontologist may believe hi reflection o n the ubj ect even s s s

tu al l y dictate .

w
But this very remark no leads us to ask whether o u r inventory
of the variety o f statements in which th e notion of reali ty fi gures
has been complete Is there any problem as to th e nature of reali ty
.

which is a genuine not a pseudo problem bu t which we have

, ,

i
not yet considered ? It m ght be contended that uch metaphysical s
s
doctrine as idealism materialism volunt ari sm and so on purport
, , , ,

to be answers to a question about reali ty d tinct from all those e is w

have examined An adequate scru tiny of thi contention wo u ld
. s
require more time than I c an now dispose of but I can in di ca te ,

w
briefly hy I believe i t to be mist aken .

The s ta tement for example that reality is exclusively mental

, ,

may be construed in either one of tw o ways First i t may be taken .

,

w
as b u t ano ther ay of saying that to be real is to be either a mind
or a mind s idea If so i t is evidently the statement o f what we
’
. ,

i
have called an ontolog cal p os i tion not of a hypothe s ; and as , si ,
2 2 2 AMER ICAN I
P H LO SOP H RS E AT WORK
pointed o u t it is then not the sort of thing whi ch ei ther is true
,

or is false It only declares the primacy for the idealist of minds

.
, ,

and the ir ideas and his intent to construe everything in terms of

,

them .

B u t the statement that reality is exclusively mental may b e inter

“ ”
re te d o therwise In i t the word reality may be tak e n denota
p .
,
“
tiv e l y that is
, taken to mean everything that exists The state
, .

ment that reality is mental then means that only minds an d their
ideas exist .

I n ordinary usage however the words mental things denote

, ,

only s u ch things as feelings thoughts voli tions hopes memory , , , ,

images and so on or th e minds comprising them ; whereas such

, ,

w
things as the oo d of the table which beyond question also exists
“
, , ,

are normally deno ted by the words material things I s u bmit . ,

therefore that the statement that reali ty is exclusively mental as

, ,

meaning that everything hich exists is minds and ide as — o r simi w

l arl y that reality is exclusively material — cannot possibly be true
,

u nless some meaning at variance wi th the c u stoma ry is forced ,

“
a d h o c by means o f the qualification
, really either on the verb ,
” “
to exist or else o n the adj ective mental or material
, , .

A materialis t for ex am ple might say that what he contends is

, ,

w
that nothing hich is not material has re al existence B u t the n .

w
this ould be bu t saying that the realm of material existence is
—
the only one he chooses to ackno ledge th e only one of interest w
to him Th u s because he ould be restricting his assertio n to a
.
, w
particu lar realm O f existence which he elects to rank as alone o r ,

s u premely interesting to him he would in fact again not be stating ,

a hypothesis as to the nature of everything that exists bu t agai n ,

only declaring the ontological position he chooses to take .

B u t instead of using the

“
“ ”
ord really to limit arbitrarily t h e
”
w -

scope of to exist one m igh t u se it instead to stretch equally,

A

,
“ ”
arbitrarily the denotation of the terms mental or material
, .

A n ideal ist for example might say that, hat he main tains is , w
v w
that e erything hich exists is rea l ly mental that is real ly consists ,

of minds and their ideas B u t then since beyond q u estion the .

, , ,

w ood of this table can be sa ed scraped sandpap e red soaked in w , , ,

, , w
oil and so on i t o u ld au tomatically follo that minds or their w ,

ideas can in some cases be sandpapered soaked in oil used as a

, , ,

table and so on B u t these are the very kind of op erations we

, .

mean when e speak of material operationsw .

I submit therefore that to a sert that the wood on w h ch u h

, , s i sc
2 2 4 . AMER I CA N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
words occur be not j ust alluded to bu t be unambiguously pe ified s c
s
by concrete examples ha thereby furnished the ve ry facts by
,

reference to which the correctne s of those analyses can be em s

p i ri c all
y tested and the analyses rectified
, if need be .

, w
I hope ho ever that the results we have ob tained by that
,

method in our discussion of the ancien t problem a to the nature s _

o f reali ty may be j udged su ffi ciently sound and substantial to rec

o mm e n d the use of the same method in de al ing wi th o ther philo

sophical proble ms .

Howison Lec ure for 1 9 4 4 Originally p rinted in U niversity of Cali

t .

f i P blications i Phil osop hy V l 1 6 N

orn a u n 7 R p rinted
,
o .
,
o . e

i h p ermi ssion
w t .

A B T ay l or, E l e m e nts of M e tap hy s ics , p 4

2
1 .

.
J
. .

L o ew e nb erg,
1 3 , p p 3 7 69
.
.

-
Uv
ni ers ity o f C al ifo rni a

.
.

P
.

u b l ic ations in P hi l os op hy , Vol .
 C H A R LES H A RT H O R S NE

S ome E mpty Th ugh I mp ta nt

o or

A P re fac t M taphy i s
e o e s c

S cience , defined as inductive study of facts can scarcely be co ,

w w
extensive ith kno ledge ; mathematics for instance is not induc , ,

v
ti e The very p rrn cip l e of induction i tself is not obviously a
.

product of induction : at any rate there is an appearance of cir ,

c u l ar i ty in trying to establish i t inductively S peaking vaguely we . ,

w
may perhaps say that kno ledge of the c o n cre te or of ac ts is , f ,

v w w
ind u cti e ; hile kno ledge of the a b s trac t p rinc ip les of kno l w
edge or at least of the m os t a b s trac t principles is noni nductive
, , , .

v w
The pre ailing vie today seems to be that such nonindu cti ve
w
kno ledge is analytic tautologous ”
or empty in that i t
, , ,

merely el u cidates the import of cert ai n terms occu rring in our

langu age Tru ths of this empty sort excl u de nothing except n o n
.
,

s ense
“
. w w
T o and t o are fo u r seems to exclude that they are
v
fi e or some number o ther than four bu t since for example t o
, , , , w
w v ”
and t o are fi e distorts hat e ish to mean by the term w w w s
, w
employed in rejecting i t e excl u de only a misuse of terms By .

“
contrast there are no more than a million men living exclude
, s
“
there are more than a million men li ing and th e one tatemen t v ,
”
s
2 2 6 A M E R I CA N I
P H LO SOP H RS E AT WORK
is as meaningful and cons tent a th e other Factual truth it is is s . ,

i s
widely agreed s alway exclusive of meani ngful alternatives and
, ,

in this sense contingent .

Y i
e t this w des pread agreement a to the contingen y of fact s c
conceals an important possibili ty o f di sagreement For there is a .

common ass umption by which the do ctrine of the exclusivenes of s

s
factual tru th is trivi alized This the a umptio n that th e ex . is ss
cluded alternative can be merely negative Thus : there are ele .

p h an ts,
there m ight have been no ele p han ts ; there i a world s ,

there mi ght have been no world What the po itive fact necessari ly . s
excludes then is only a priv ation : in short i t may exclude literally
, ,

n o thing But to exclude nothing s not really I uggest to exclude

. i , s , .

R eal transactions are not concerned with nonentity and exclusi o n ,

is in some sen s e a real transaction If I am j u t here I p revent . s ,

you from be ing here If elephants exi st then in certai n portions

. , ,

of the world at a given moment other large animal cannot exi t , s s ,

for th e space they might occupy is otherwise oc cu p ied The non .

i
bei ng of w ld elephan ts in N orth A mer ca i a partly p os itiv e fact i s ,

for i t means ( for one thing) that every portion of the land sur
“
face o f that continen t ( outside of zoos i covered ei ther by so me ”
s
solid obj ect different from an elephan t or by empty air , .

We have arrived at the oft debated question of negative facts 1 -

.

The partis ans of negative facts soun dl y argue th at every positive

fact entai ls negative ones If X i round then not square
. s , X is .

Bu t is i t less true that every negative fact entails po sitive ones ?

I f X is not square then i t has ome other ha p e or character
, s s .

N egative aspects of fact are one thing exclu vely negative facts , si
w ould be another .

An example of an allegedly p u re ly negat ve fact is this

“
there i ,

was not a sound or he heard nothi ng Is the datum of su ch

, .

a perception S imply th e absence of ound ? S urely we must distin

“
s
guish between he he ard nothing i e he observe d the fact of
, , . .
,
“ ”
silence and he did not he ar for example becau se he was asleep
, , ,

or uncon scious The perception of silence eems to involve posi

. s
tive characters b o th in the ituation an d in the ub j ect s experience s s ’
.

The air particles are arranged othe rw se than n th e wave patterns i i

w hich can cause sensations of sound and the subj ect s nonauditory ,
’

experiences have a kind of intensity and coh erence which ould w

b e so mehow disrupted w
ere there the d istraction o f perceivable
. w
sounds When e detect the ab se n ce of foo d in the ice b o x we ,

do not detect the presence of nothing there : the ab e nce of foo d s

2 2 8 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
trate them If then they are called empty we should beware
.
, , ,

o f a ra di ca l ambigui ty in thi term A l l empty truths are uch s . s

that noth ing can illus trate them negat vely ( for they exclude only i
s
nonsen e ) bu t some empty truths ( hich we may call m e tap hy si
, w
cal) are such that they are bound to be illustrated positively ow . H
c an we recogni z e truth o f thi s character ? The cr terion i that s i s
positive illus tratio n o f the p ropo itio n would not exclude anything s
i
posit ve If for example th e idea of a world o fluid or ontinu
.
, , s c
o u s that i
t totally prevent counting of tems i really a p os i s i s
“
tive idea the n even two and two are four
,
”
only negat vely is i
ii “
s
a pri or n th e e n s e n wh ch two apple and tw o apple s are i i s
four apples ”
i
s only n egat vely a pr ori Bu t if on th e other i i .
,
“
hand there is nothi ng posit ve i n uch complete fl ui d ty ( I do
,
”
i s i
not here try to decide this) then arithmetical truth is positively ,

and uncondi tionally a priori But th e di fficulty of deciding as to .

i
the pos tive meaning o r la k of it of pure fluidi ty warns u , c ,
”
s
“
i
that the cri ter on of positive or metaphysical a p ri ori truth namely , ,

can be positive wi thou t excludi ng anything posi tive may b e in ,

capable o f clear and certai n application by our cogni tive powers .

Y e t metaphysical tru th cannot be unknowable in any ab olute s

sense For what is common to all possibl e worlds is included n
. i
the actual one an d in any meaningfu l conception It is b u t a
, .

matter of ab s traction and analysis to find i t there .

E rnest N agel in his essay

“
L ogic wi thout
, ntology 2 argue , O , s
brilliantly that there need be nothi ng common to all pos i b le s
worlds corres p onding to logical laws — for instance to the law of ,

noncontradiction H
e seem to me to mi ss the point almost as if
.
“
s ,

by magic O
f course there is no ac t common to all pos sible
.
, f
w o rlds But i t is a comm on principl e that any possibl e world will
.

s
actualize ome possibilitie and thereby exclude the actualizatio n s
of certain ot her p o ibili ties “
ss
ou cann ot eat you r cake and have . Y
i ”
t too is a max im wi th ome valid application in no matter what s
i s
sphere Th s i if you will an element of tr agedy nh erent n al l
. , , i i
existence As Goe the said E nt agen s oll t d u s oll t entsage n
.
”
, s s , s
( renounce thou shalt renounce) Thing ( and good thing ) are
, . s s
i
possible d sj unctively which are not pos sible conj unct vely ; there i
are incompo ssi b l e p o ss ibilities Thi s i a pri nciple not merely of . s
language or of tru e belief bu t of action also It expre e s the , . ss
nature of existence its e lf as a proces s of exclus ve actualiza tion i
M s s s c ss
.

etaphysic we may now define a th e e arch for n e e ary

and categorical tru th—nece ary in that unli ke e mp rical tru ths ss , i
 E MPTY T HOU H G IMPOR T ANT T RUT H S 2 2 9

or facts i t excludes no positive po sibility and thu impo e no

, s , s ss
restriction upon the process of actu alization and categor ca l in that , i
( unlike mathematics interpre ted as deduction fr om unasserted
postulates) i t applies posi ti ely to any actuality v .

M
etaphysical truths may also be described a such that no s
expe ri ence can contradict them bu t also such that any experience ,

“
must illustrate them L e t us take thi as an example : The present
. s
s
i always influenced by the past Could any experience conflict .

i s
w th this ? We urely annot know that we are u n in fl u en ced by c
, w
the past for to kno the pas t is n one s state o f knowledge to , i ’

be influenced by i t By the p as t we m e an something which in

.
,

fl u e n ce s th e present and one mi gh t ve ry well define

,
“ ”
fact a s
whatever influences e ents s u bsequent to a gi ven date v .

What is th e u se of a metaphysical formula such as : Every

event is influenced by i ts predecessor ? It i certainly not a pre ”
s
s
diction i n the normal ense If an ex p ert pred ct that the recent . i s
w
un u sual eather is going to make for a small wheat crop astute ,

farmers politicians and bankers will t ak e this into account in

, ,

w
their plans They ill act in some respects as they ould not act
. w
w
if the prediction ere for a large cr0 p But if the metaphysician .

“ ”
predicts that the future is going to be influenced by hat is w
now going on people ill say , w
f co u rse but hat of i t and , O , w ,
”

w
tu rn to their a ff airs hile if the metaphysician says that the fu ture
:

w I
will be in no ay nfl u enced by hat is no going on they ill w w , w
stare at him to see if he be mad and again tu rn to their a ffairs , .

N o p ractical conseq u ence ( excep t as to his sanity) w ll be dra n i w

in either case that would other ise not be dra n for no matter w w ,

w w
hat anyone says e al ays expect the fu ture to be infl u enced w
w s
by hat i now going o n E very animal qualifies i ts striving i th . w
respect to the future by hat i t is ex p e ri encing now It needs no w .

metaphysician to tell i t to do this Thus if metaphysics has a func .

tion i t must be very different from that of sc ence and technology

, i .

What then is this function ? The ans er as I see it has everal w , , s

aspe cts .

( )
1 I S i t not conceivable that an affirmation hi ch cannot
“
be w
falsified or reasonably denied and is thus perfectly truistic
, , ,

may yet be worth mak ing simply to re m in d ourselves of something

w hich is satisfying to contemplate and not less so because it must ,

w w
al ays be there and e ha e only to think abou t i t to enj oy ts
“
, v i
value ? Take th e saying L ife has a mean ing or There are real , ,
!

“
values or S ome ways of thinking and act ng are be tter than
, i
2 3 0 AMER ICAN PH ILO S OP H ER S AT WORK
others In no cas e can the e affirmation rightfully be denied
. s s ,

s
for if life i tself i never worth while then nei ther is the denial -
,

of life s worth w hil e ne ss ever worth while since thi denial it elf is
’
- -
, s s
a piece of life an act of a living b eing An d to say that no way
, .

of thinking is better than any other is to say th at the way of think

s ss i
ing thu expre ed s no be tter than the contradi ctory way and ,
“
such a manner o f talki ng nu ll ifie s itself But yet the aying there . s ,

are real cases of be tter and worse may be si gni fican t as a re ,

m in d er that the power to make compari sons of valu e s a power i

with a si gnifican t use a power which we share with all men and , ,

i
in a way w th all entient b e ngs at lea s t There is something s i , .

satisfying in this reminder s omethi ng shall we ay at least slightly , , s ,

inspiring No w I hold that all metaphysical truisms have this

.

inspiring character ere i s the argument . H .

Contemplation like every life function must always achieve

, ,

some value But wi th matter of fact p art of th e value may b e

. s ,

the realization that what h as occu rred could and should have , ,

been prevented This realizat on h as posi tive pragmatic value In

. i .

matters of fact there are rea ons for being realistic for facing
, s ,

things as they are no matter how much we may wish they were
othe rw ise But in truth that c o u l d not have be en o therwise ne ce s
. s ,

sary tru ths i t me an noth ng to say

,
“
h that they had be en s i , O ,
”
otherwise ! Therefore i t me an no thing to say th at they are evil s .

E vil is that which in each particular c as e hould have been and

, , s ,

could have been unrealized No w i t m ght appear that good m u st

, . i
similarly b e defined as that which o u ght to be or to hav e be e n , ,

realized and this appears to mply that it nonrealization was

, i s
possible . O
f concrete go od s properly correlative to concrete evils , ,

th is is quite corr ect Both are contingent in the same sen e But . s .

there is this difference be twe e n the ideas of good and of evil : that
s
wherea the contemp lation of goo d things is tself a good thi ng i ,

and in so far need s no fur th er jfis tificatio n the contemp lation of ,

v
e il things is i tse lf at least in part an evil and hence i in need
, , , s
of further j ustification With contingent evils such j ustification .
,

can b e given ; wi th necessary evils i t co u ld not b e E ither th en .

, ,

they c o u ld not be contemplated which implie th at reference , s

s
to them is nonsen ical or they must be intrinsically rewarding to ,

contemplate and since contemplation is the only possi b le act in

,

regard to the necessary they are then by definition good i n what ,

ever sense they could be ei ther goo d o r evil Necessary goods are .

not indeed good in the sens e that they could b e positive goals of
2 3 2 A M E I CA N
R
‘

PH ILO S OP H ER S AT WORK
th o ught H
e wil l not have to wa te h energy on such pseudo
. s is
factual S tatements as that all motivation is entirely selfish .

4
( ) M
etaphysical truisms though not factual may never theless
, ,

incl u de the principle that there must be s om e contingent facts or

other on a level above that of ordinary imperfect experiences such ,

as ours I have sought elsewhere to show that a kind o f perfecti o n

.

is conceivable which inev ita b ly or infallibly actualizes itself n ap i

ro ri a te contingent states of consciousness 3 E ach particular such
p p .

state being contingent can b e known only by empirical intui tion

, , ,

and i t must b e known as matter of fact i e as something to wh ch , . .

, i
there were meaningful altern atives But i t does not follow that .

to the n o ne mp tiness of th e c lass of perfect states of consci ousne ss

there was any meaningful alternative ( E very metaphysical truth .

can be stated as th e necessary n o n em p tiness of a class or as th e ,

“
necess ary emptiness of certain pseudo classes such as world s with ,
“ ”
out order o r worlds without disorder The principl e here i
,
. s
akin to that expressed in the formula That accident s happen , ,

some accidents or other i s not itself an accident bu t is necessary

, , ,
”
inevitable S im il i arly that th e Perfect should be embodied in
.
,

some accidental state or other may turn out to b e necessary and ,

this necessity may be metaphysically knowab l e S uch kno ledge . w

will encourage us to consider what light our factual experience s
can shed upon the question Which among possi b le accidental state , s
of the perfect natu re is i n fact actual ? No doub t we can n e ver
know clearly anything remotely like the full answ er to this que s
tion for to d o so wo u ld amo u nt to achieving perfect consci ousness
,

ourselves But some very limi ted approach in the righ t direction
.

may yet b e possible and the more so if our metaphysi s ha told

, c s
us that there is s u ch a direction to lo o k for .

Presupposed in the foregoing is a view of deity as on both s ides

of the contrast necess ary contingent Were God merely on one side
,
-
.
,

he would no t be the su p reme reali ty For the contingent i s also .

real and hence so i s the totality inclusive of th e necess ary and

,

the contingent God must b e this totality rather than ( the sole
.
,

alternative ) a mere consti tuent of i t Besides as w e have seen his .

, ,

knowledge that the contingent exists must itself be contingen t ( had

the con tingen t t hi ngs not existed, he had not kn o wn them as .

existent for his knowledge cann ot err) N evertheless merely that

, .
,

God exists cannot be a con tingent or fa c tual p roposi tion Factual .

w
existence is al ays alternative this or that ins tead But G o d or , .

X “ ”
instead is not a valid alternative There i s n o instead in thi s .
 E MPTY T HOU H G IMP OR T ANT T RUT H S 2 3 3

case There is no place which if God does not occupy t ome

.
, i s ,

s
thing el e could A person may worship an dol nstead o f God
. i i ,

but the alternative here is in respect to state s of mi nd ex sting i

in the pe rso n not in respect to the exi tence or nonexistence of
, s
God There may also ( there must also) be divine acts or decisions
.

whi ch exclude otherwise positive possibilities of fact ; bu t the e s

can only be free factual de sion not inherent in the mere exist
, ci s ,

ence of G od .

Yo u can of course argu e a follows : the existence of G od me ans

, , s
i
a div nely ordered world ; the nonex stence of G od means e ther i i
no world or a poorly ordered world B u t th line of thought pre . is
s upposes that a particular sort of order follow logi cally from the s
bare conception of God Thi plausible perhaps if one holds a. s is , ,

i
metaphysics n which th e dea of freedom taken to mean creative i ,

, i
choice s no t held to b e a b asic requirement of creaturely existence .

i
For the n t seems reasonable to infer that the world as divinely ,

created ough t to be a p e r e c t order n which every item is exactly

, f i
i is
n t place Bu t o n the view hich I should oppose to this that
.
, w ,

any possible world mu t consist of more or less free in di viduals s

otherwise they would not even b e individuals ) th e ordering of
( ,

these in di viduals can only consi t in setting limits to their exercise s

of freedom that is in the partial restr cting of th e chaotic aspect
, , i
i
inherent n individuali ty A ccordi ngly th e divine ordering does .
,

not exclude elements of conflict evil and di sorder ; hence no , ,

world ordered enough to mak e kno ledge po sible could con w s

tradi c t the statement There is a divine orderer An d a world
, .

which could not be known is rrelevan t or meaningles i s .

I once knew a young m an who s ai d I want to be lieve in a ,

’
s ,
”
man world not one coddled by a deity H e w as supposing .

that the divin e existence would exc l ude something posi tiv e But .

if he meant a world in which much depends on human efforts ,

w
and in which e are not told al l th e answer to our question but s s
are permitted and indeed more or le compe lled to think for
, ss ,

ourselves then only an arbitrar ly defined de ty exclude thi G o d

, i i s s .

might perhaps c h oos e to coddle us bu t hi mere exi tence would , s s

not re q u ire that he do o An d if coddling i bad and God i s . s , s
conceived as wise and good then God would i t eems be requ red , , s , i
by his nature to avoid coddling man .

M y suggestion then i that the mere ex stence of deity nter

, , s i i
feres with no thing whatever that is positively conceivable 4 What .

w
follo s ? S ome would say that i t follow that the tatement D ei ty “
s s ,
2 34 A M E R IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S W O R K AT

exists is meaningles s But then the statement S omething exis ts

,
”
.
, ,

is also meaningles for i t too interfere s wi th nothing that is posi

s,

i l y conceivable ! A d s o far from being mea i ngless

“
t ve n S omething n ,
” “
exists is obviously true A ccordingly There is a reali ty which .
,

is divine althou gh i t excludes nothing particular is not fo r tha t

, ,

re as o n w
ithout meaning Its proper statu is not that of a fact . s ,

b u t of a clai man t to metaphysi c ally necessary truth The alternative .

to accep ting the clai m is indeed the contention that i t s mean i

in gl e ss or contradict o ry That this is the issue w as A nselm great.
’
s
discovery .

It is strange how few have remarked that th e statement There ,

is one who infallibly knows all facts and who if other facts had , ,

ob tained would have known these instead cannot i tse lf stand

, ,

s
for a fact It affirm rather a u n iv ers al corre late of fact implying
.
, , ,

this : to be a fact and to be known to one who also kno s all

, w
other facts are bu t two aspe cts of the same thing The inevi tability
, .

of the divin e knowing means the inevitability of facts being kno n w .

To be is to be known to God ( Better : to be i s to fe el one s v al u e .

’

as appreciated by God 5 ) S ince God is conce ived as having self .

knowledge he also is bu t not solely in th e same fact u al sense For

, , .

whatever the facts God knows his o w n existence

, is knowledge . H
H s
that e exis t is not one of th e factu al alternatives bu t the com ,

mon featur e of them all that f actual they are kno n to im , i , w H

who inevitably is self known Thu s th e existence of an all knowing
-
.
-

or divine being is affirmed in a tatement factual ly empty telling s ,

us not a single one of th e facts whi ch the all knowi ng being knows -
.

But although empty the tatement i not insignificant For i t pro s s .

vides a correlate to every factual statement which enables us to be

con scious of its deeper meaning S uch and such is fact then means .
, , ,

such and such is known to one who knows also all other things If .

the fact is tragi c then e do not face this tragedy alone If there
, w .

is need that this tragedy be taken accoun t of in the orde ring

of the world then supe ri or wisdom wi ll respond to this need ith
, w
s
some uitable action We cannot know what this will be for our
.
,

notion of what in particular is suitabl e is not b inding in the case ,

w e not being s u premely wise concerning the par ticular situation .

w
But e can take legitimate comfort in the s ense that hat o u ght w
to be done for the world w ll be done and that hat ought to i , w
be left to creatu rely freedom will be left to i t Is this comfort .

s
emp ty ? In a sen e yes For i t says no more than what every animal
, .
,

in i ts fashion affirms by th e very act of living To live and to

, .
,
 S I DNE Y H O OK

Na tura lism a nd

s
In this paper I propo e to raise and d c u s wh at I regard a th e is s s
most fundamental problem in the intellectu al ente rpri e which goe s s
s
by the name of philo ophy v iz wha t t mean fo r human behav or
, . i s i
to be reasonabl e or rational S ome phi losop h ers have referred to
.

i
i t as th e nature o f ntelligibility I have be e n led to thi s quest on
. i
i s c
pr marily becau se of ome recent ri tic s ms of naturalism which i
i
charge that th s philosophy arbitrarily impose s i t own canons of s
ration ali ty or intelligi b ility on existence and therefore denies c er
tain importan t truths about the world and hum an exper ence on i
a pri o ri ground s .

A s i mi lar question h as al s o been r ai sed b y ome fashionable s

s oc iologi cal views of knowledge according to which there are r i
reducibly di fferent modes of knowing i llustrated i n different cul
tures so that there is no such thing as a u ni versally o b j ective valid ,

method of determining rationality or intelligibili ty independent ,

of time o r socie ty or class or even of p arty

, n thi latter view it . O s
s
is ometimes argued that moral social an d poli tica l confl i cts ar e
,

s
th e re ults of conflicting logics of inquiry S ometime th e converse . s
 N AT U RAL S M A N D I FI R S T PR N I CI P L E S 2 3 7

is argued i e irreducible social confli cts give ri s e to rredu bly

, . .
, i ci
di fferent cri teri a of truth In either cas e no o ne me thod can claim
.

universal an d exclusive validi ty Indeed to clai m that any o ne .

,

method of establishing truths is be tter than another is to be guilty

of philosophical imperialism almost in the same ay that the clai m w
of superiori ty for the institu tions of modern western democratic ,

s ociety evinces cultural imperialism .

M w
y argument ill make — I do not say es tablish the following -

points : ( 1 ) that despite all the basic confl icts over first principles
of thinking or evidence there are orking tru ths on the level of, w
w
practical living hich are everywhere recognized and which eve ry
where determine the pattern o f reas onable condu ct in secular af
fai rs v iz the effective use of means to achi eve ends R ationality
, .
,
.

“
on this level is not merely as Charles Peirce s u ggests being gov
”
erned by final causes b u t o using the mean s and materials o f s
the si tu ation in whi ch final cau e are purs u ed as to achieve ss
a maximum of functional adaptation between means and ends .

2
( ) S econd this concep
, tion of rationali ty is not limi ted to our
c u lture and to our ti me but is supported by the available an
th ro o l o ic al evidence The mind of primitive man medieval m an
p g .
, ,

co m mu nist man for all the clai ms that have been made about
,

their di fferences is no di ff eren t from our o n This is not in

,
w .

w
comp atible i th believing that i n respect to discovering new tru th
one or another gro u p of men in virt u e of h is to rica l perhaps gen e
, ,

tic reasons at a given time may be in possession of superior power

, s .

3
( ) Third scientific
, me thod is the refinement of the can ons of
rationality and intelligibility e x hibited by the techniques of b e
havior and habits of inference involved in the art and crafts of s
men ; its pattern is everywhere d is cem ab l e e en hen overlaid wi th v w
myth and ri tual ( 4 ) Fourth the sys tematization of what is in
.
,

v
vol ed in the scientific method of inquiry i hat we mean by sw
natu ralism and th e characteri stic doctrines of natural ism like the
,

de ni al of disembodied spiri ts generalize the cumulative evidence

won by the use of this me thod ( 5 ) Fifth that the cri ticisms of .
,

naturalism from which the paper takes its point of departure

w
can be me t by sho ing that al though the ass u mptions of natu ralism
are not necessarily true they are more reasonable than their alterna
“
tiv e s . 6
( ) S ixth E very reasoning, itself holds o u t some expecta
”
tion ( Peirce ) U
ltimately the ru les of logic are instruments of
.

disco u rse which enable u s to avoid the shocks and surprises the ,

disasters and disappointments in attemp ting to understan d th e

2 3 8 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
w
nature of the orld and our own intentions and purposes ne . O
method of reasoning i s more valid than ano ther beca u se i ts use
w
enables us to make the kno ledge we have today more coherent ,

and more e as ily facilitates adding new kno ledge to i t w .

This is the ground plan of the essay S pace permi ts the develop .

ment here of only the first five points .

That first principles must be j ustified before we can achieve

ass u red knowledge is a view seemingly held by some philos ophers
bu t rarely by an yone else S cientists for example have satisfactorily
.
, ,

w
solved prob lem after problem ithout feeling called upo n to s olve
the problem of j u stifying their firs t principles N o t only scientists .

but people of ordinary affairs generally know when some thing is

tr u er than something else withou t kno ing or even claiming to w ,

know what is a b s o l u te ly tru e To say that we do not have to know

, .

what is u ltimately or absolutely true or goo d in order to know

what is tru e r or better sounds dialectically impossi b l e B u t I sub
, .

mi t that this is actu ally the way common sense and science operate .

E ven the mos t rationalist of p hilosophers in their nonprofessional

capaci ty make effective use of everyday kno ledge long before they w
reach their uncertain conclusions abou t the validi ty of first princi
’
ples It isn t necessary to assert that e know what is absolutely
. w
true abou t the cau se of tu bercu losis to kno that a c e rtain germ w
w
has more to do ith i t than climate S imilarly few people know .
,

what their ultimate values are and yet almost e eryone ill claim
, v w
w
to kno that i t i s be tter for human beings to d o prod u cti e labor v
for a living than to b e recipients of chari ty D eny propositions .

of this sort and insist that declarations of the truer or b e tter mu st

wai t up o n knowledge of th e tru e or the goo d and the whole of ,

w
human inquiry any here would cOm e to a halt .

This is not to assert that there is no problem concerning the

j ustification of first principles or of those rules of procedure which
we follow when we reach the kno ledge about which there i s a w
maximum of agreement am ong human beings What I am assert .

ing is that the j u stification of rules of procedure is not of a dif

.

fere n t logi cal order possess ing so to speak an other or higher type
,

of necessity than the actions of which they are the rule ore spe . M
c i fic al l
y what I am asserting is that there i s no such thi ng as
strictly logical j ustification of first principle in cience or com s s
2 4 0 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
categories of any philosophical position cannot b e recognized Thi s .

is a tautology That these categor es are restrictive follows from

. i
their claim to be meaningful since a necessary condition of a
meaningfu l statement is that i t should be incompatible wi th its
opposite The only legi timate question here is whether they are
.

narrowly restrictive whether there are matters o f knowledge in

,

common experience which they exclude or whose existence they

make unintelligible .

S ince every p h i l OS Op hic position must start somewhere and make

some preliminary or initial assumptions that can be challenged
s
at least verbally by other p hi lo o p hers i t is always possible to level ,

the charge of circularity Bu t what shall we therefore concl u de ?

.

That thes e assumptions are mere s tipulations or arb trary postula i

tions which express nothing but the res o l u tio ns of philosophers .

w
This ould be voluntarism gone mad Philosophers might j ust a . s
well close u p shop insofar as they claim for their position some
obj ective validity in reporting or interpreting the facts of ex p eri
ence For even voluntari sm could not su tain itself against th e
. s
charge of circ u larity .

The natu ralist does not despair because he cannot demonstrate

what is by definition indemonstrable No r can he rely upon in .

tuitions or revealed dogmas because of their irredu c ble plurali ty i .

H e believes he can show that althou gh not demonstrable his as

“ ”
,

s u m tio n s can be made r easonable to r e asonable men A n d the

p .

“ ”
mark of a reasonable man is his w llingness to t ake responsibility i
for his actions to explai n hy h e proceeds to do one thing rather
, w
than another and to recogniz e that i t is h is conduct insofar as t
, , i
i s voluntary which commi ts him to a principle or belief rather
,

w
than any form of ords where the two eem at odds with each s
other The naturalist does not speak as one of i ts c r tic doe s i n
.
, i s ,
“
large terms of j ustifying philosophical categorie as rati onally and s
comprehensively as possible and then fail to tell u s in what ,

specific ways philosophical rationali ty an d comprehensiveness d f i

fer from sci entific rationality and comprehensivene s Are the law s . s
of log ic and the canons of evidence and relevance any different in
philosophy from w hat they are in science and common sense?
To every cri tic of nat u ralism ho has ch arged i t wi th ci rcularity w ‘

w
I propose the follo ing Consider someone who comes to you and
.

proclaims on the basis of some speci al personal expe ri ence that an

all p ervasive R substance exists It is neither physical nor psychical
-
.

i
nor s oc al neither natural nor divine nor can i t be identified by
, , ,
 N A T I
URAL S M AN D FI R S T PR NI CI P L E S 2 4 1

sense of reduction to any physical , ,

It is subj ect so you are told to no ma , ,

rrnin a tio n hatsoever The very request w .

indicated is brushed aside as revealing a

l incapaci ty or blindness to grasp this u nique entity
sorts of edifying qualities are attributed in an ana
incl u ding a tri u ne gender It is granted by the believer .

existence cannot be logically inferred from hatever w

he is q u ick to add that i ts existence cannot
ass u mi ng a question begging philo -

out the possibility of this unique

reports personal contact with
analogical father and the day ,

d fa th e r and so on until even the most

, ,

finds himself confronted with an embarrass

iches .

w
the fancy as you ill It is obvious that he can repeat
.

for word the points in the indictment of those who

al is ts with circ u lar reasoning .

philosophical positions are au o n d q u estion beggi ng f ,

u ld still remain the task pursued by all p hi losophers of

,

w
determi ning hich of all q u estion beggi ng positions is more ade -

quate to the facts of exp erience E ery philosopher ho serio u sly

. v w
s w
attempt an ans er does ass u me in ac t that there is some comm on f
w
me thod of determi ning hen a position is adeq u ate to the facts
w
of experience and hen not The contention of the natu ralist is
.

that this common method is in principle continuou s ith the w

w
me thod which e ordinarily u s e to hold indi idu als to responsible v
utterance about the existence of things in the orld—a method w
which is pre eminently ill u strated in the ays in hich men eve ry
-
w w
where solve the problem of adaptation of material means to ends .

w
The proc edures hich are th e matrix of reasonable conduct
everywhere seem to me to be clearly involved in what broadly
w
speaking e may call the technolo gi cal as pect of human cultu re .

I t is not necessary to maintain that tool using is the only char

w
ac teri s ti c hich di fferentiates human society from animal soc eties i
to reco gni z e that whereas only some nonhuman animal occa s
s io n all y u se natural obj ects as tools all human an mals wherever , i ,
2 42 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
they are found m ak e their o n too ls What distinguishes modern
, w .

society from primi tive soc iety is not the presence of invention but s
the organization of inventiveness .

A nthropological evidence leaves no doub t that primitive man

w v s
here er fo u nd olved tremendous problems of adj u stment and
survival Wi th a little imagination we can appreciate that starting
.

from scratch s u ch things as the invention of fire and the wheel ,

the c u ltivation of plants domestication of cattle and the smelting

, ,

of me tal represent inventive feats of a high order There is an .

v w
ob ious continuity bet een our o n technology and that of our w
v “ ”
primiti e ancestors The sapling says A A G o ld e nw e iser bent
.
, . . ,

o u t of its nat u ral position to provide the dynamic factor in a primi

tive trap is the remote fo rerunner of a spring which runs untold

,

w
millions of atches and performs numerou s other tasks in mod ern
technology The achievement of A lexander the Great in cutting
.

the Gordian knot though dramatic did not equal that other
, ,

achievement— the tying of the first knot An d this knot in the .

,

-
w
midst of an ever gro ing family of knots is still with u s ”
1
, .

O ne can multi p ly illustrations indefini tely of the ingeniou ways s

w
in hich primitive man every here choo ses be tween alte rnate w
v
means to achie e the particular end impro ves upon these means ,

and tests them by their relative e fli c acy in achieving de terminate

results What stands o u t in my mind particularly is the impre i e
. ss v
functional economy of the E skimo s composi te harpoon that mar ’

v e l o u s contrivance by w
hich he spears s e al walru s and whale and , , ,

w
especially the ay in which the precio u s point is recovered un . H
dreds of decisions mu st ha e been made and tested by their conv
sequences before the instru ment finally took shape .

The pattern of rationality does not extend of course to all as

pe e ts of primi tive life any m o re than t does to our o n life but i w ,

it points to a u niversal p attern of intelligi b ility understo o d by

everyone who grasps the problem which th e too l or technical proc
ess is designed to solve Where religion or myth doe not influence
. s
technology the indefini te perfectability so to speak of the par
, , ,

tic u l ar instrument is recogn ized or another one is substi t u ted which

gives more reliable res u lts Thus for example the E skimo will.
, ,

abandon his ingeniou s harpoon for a gun when he can procu re one .

The contention of L evy Br u hl that primi ti e man thi nks pre

-
v
logically that he denies the la of contradiction that he is unable
, w ,

to isolate and distingu ish logically u nrelated things or ideas that ,

“ ”
he understan ds by a kind of participation is not borne out by
2 44
. AMER IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WORK
What all modern anthropologists seem to agree I interpret o n , as

them is that the religious or mystical elements in p rimi tive ex p eri

,

ence wi th their myths an d religious ri tes arise no t in competition

, ,

wi th the secular knowledge of technology or as a substi tute for

“ ”
such knowledge but as a complement in situations in hich all w
the available technical means and know how are no t adeq u ate to -

a desired end or where events do not clearly or always prosper

,

when the proper instrumentalities are employed In a world full .

of dangers and s u rprises in a world of time pa n and co n tinge n , , i

is
c e it i s not hard to u nderstand the psychological place of re
,

l igio n It is a safe generalization to say that the depth of the

.

i s
relig ous ense is inversely proportionate to the degre e of reliable
control man exercises over his environment and cu lture In this .

sense reli gi on is a form of fa th emotion not knowledge : hen i , , w

i s
t i some thing more than this and competes ith science or tech w
n o l o gy it becomes superstition .

We may restate this a little di fferently S cience or tech n ology and .

i
relig on represent two different atti tudes toward th e mysterious :
one tries to solve mysteries the other worships them T h e first , .

s
b elieve that mysteries may be made less mysterious even when
they are not cleared up and admi ts that there will always be
,

myste ri es The second believes that some specific mysteries are final
. .

s
Thi relation between technology and reli gi on is no t restricted
to primi tiv e societies S omewhere in the Talmud it is wri tten that
.

’
s
if a man son is ill the correct thi ng for him to do is not merely
,

to call a doctor or merely to pray to God but to call a doctor an d

pray to God An d in our o n cultu re this seems to b e the function
. w
of n o ns u p ers ti tio u s religion The theology comes as an afterthought . .

E ven thos e who do not believe in God often look around for im H
to thank or to blame some hat like the atheist in the well kno n w -
w
story who when asked hy he nailed a horsesho e over his doo r
“
w
replied I really don t believe in it b u t I v e heard i t brings luck
,
’ ’

”
even if you don t ’
.

In mod ern societies our attitudes are more complex There is .

religion and religion If yo u p ray to God expecting rain or a baby

.

boy that is o ne thing It is bad science although if R hine estab

, .
,

lishes the existence of psychokine sis ( the PK effect) a po er w

which some s u bj ects allegedly have to infl u ence the ay dice will w
fall by wishing or willing this kind of praying may not be bad ,

science If you pray in order to relieve your mind that is another

.

thing It is goo d psychology al though th ere may be better p sy

.
 N AT URA L S I M AND FI R S T PR NI CI P L E S 2 45
ch o l o gy
If you pray wi thou t any purpo e at all bu t o u t of a sen se
. s
of relief gratitude aw e or fear—that is not cience at all bu t pure
, , s
“
religion or art If scientific statement are to b e called truth
. s s ,

s
religious statement S hould b e called omething el e — o mfort s s c s ,

pe rhap 5”
s .

i
I tu rn now to a br ef con ideration of th e nature of technology s
and technological behavior Al l technological behavior is purposive
.

i
behav or ; the pu rpose provide a te t of relevance and th e achieve s s ,

ment of purpose a test of the adequacy of alternative mean sug

, s
gested Its eve ry feature take note of the compulsion o f th e eu
. s s
v i ro nm e n t as well as the much more limited powers of man over

the environment Its knowledge s a form o f ac k nowledgment—ah

. i
acknowledgment of the nature of materials the effect of motor ,

action on the redistri bu tion of materials the mportance of se , i

q g s
u e n tial order and patial confi uration It is obv ou ly reconstru e . i s
tive in intent and makes of a natural order o n e that s al o
, i s
s
reasonable It discount the immediate quali t es of use and e u
. i
jyo m e n t for the sake of anti c pated consequences Wherever e i . w
have a tool or technique i t refers not to a unique situation but
,

a class of si tuations so that t has a k nd of implicit universal i i

import not separable from ultimate individual applications The .

b e tter ins trument recommends i tself to us to the extent that it

enables us to mak e a more reliable pre di ction of o b s erv ab le effects
that bear on the purpose in hand— the resolution of the problem .

s
L earning from these imple inductions of experience is us u ally
the first manifestation of intelligence The violation or rather the .
,

attempted violation of established inductions like walking off a ,

roof or o u t of a window is ometimes the first evidence of nsanity

, s i .

Technological behavior may be overlaid with all sorts of p ro

p i ti ato ry ri tes but it is usually p o sible to distinguish bet een the s w
i
fu nctional and r tualistic aspects of the use of instruments In its .

purely fu nctional aspect every feature of the techniq u e can be

i
j ustified by i ts normal fru ts or consequences In time th e proces s .

of adaptation tends to give us s tructu res that are as s mple an d i

bea u tifu l in their economy as th e ax h an d l e and oar turbine and ,

j et plane .

An analysis of the implici t logic of technology an d the common

sense operations i t involves reveals that no hard and fa t l ine , s
2 46 A M E R I CA N PH ILO S OP HERS AT WORK
of sep aration can be drawn be tween the general pattern of scien
ti fic method and reasonable procedure in the prim ar y kn o wledge s
getting activi ties of men stru ggling to control their env ronment i .

Wi th the development o f new ins truments of discovery and meas

u re me n t and the use of mathematical notation
, s cience becomes ,

more abstract more systematic more precise more complex Bu t

, , , .

wherever a man has had an idea suffi ciently clear to enable hi m to

draw a valid inference from i t the truth of which he so ught to test
,

by some controlled observation or expe riment he was proceeding ,

no matter how primi tively—in a scien tific way The continuity b e .

w
t een reasonable procedures in reaching conclusions about matters
of fact of everyday concern and the procedures by which we make
th e most esote ric discoveri es in the advanced science cannot be s
breached without making the whole enterpris e of science a mystery ,

s
for every cience star ts from and returns to some of thes e rea , ,

sonable proc ed u res If the common sense world is radically u nre

.
-

liable o r illusory every theoretical construction which is ba ed

, s
upon it or which it tests is no more credible , .

What w e might call the first order facts of science are dra n w
directly from th e world of comm on sense experience — e g that a -
. .

sponge holds more water than a cloth that a polished surface is ,

a be tter r e flector than an opaque one that white clothi ng is coo ler ,

than black— all o f w w

hich ere once discoveries In the development .

w
of science no matter hat the succession of theories these first
!

order facts are the last to be challenged Whether the wave theory .

or corpuscular theory o r any other theory of ligh t is defe nded ,

w
the la which states the inequali ty of the angles of incidence and
refraction when a ray o f light passe s from one medium to another
is not questioned For the class of phenomena i t characterizes must
.

v
be acco u nted for irrespecti e of hat other predi ctions are made w .

From thi s point of View th e la s of nature may be plausibly w

interpreted as instrumental devices to bring wi thi n the larges t ex
p l an ato ry scheme our empirical knowledge of first o rder facts and

successfu lly to predi ct future experiences which then become first

order facts for all other theories .

S cience differs from technol o gy in t o important resp ects First w .

in generality and second in purpose Technology is restri cted in

, .

its practical reference to useful res u lts ; wherea the practical pur s
pose o f science if we choos e to u se this language is the advance
, ,

ment of knowing apart from concern with other practical a ffairs ,

. .
, i
i e the build ng up o f a systematic body of kno ledge 6 w .
2 4 8 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HERS AT WORK
i
more firmly conv nced of th e genetic theory of hered ty than o f i
the theory o f organic evolution They would be less surp ri sed f . i
the genera l theory of relativi ty were abandoned than th e pecial s
theory The de gr e e of confirm ation whi ch a theory mu t pas
. s s
muster at any time seems to be a func t on of the frui tfulne o f i ss
i
previous theories n the field w th similar degree o f confirm atory i s
s trength in extending our knowledge o f the unknown In add tio n . i
the S trength of an hypothesis is a function of the number of
alternative hypo these s that are availabl e a explanat ons As a rule s i .

s
th e more n u merou th e con fir ming instances the stronger the hypo
thesis But if there are no alternative hypothese present
. e may s , w
be satisfied wi th far fewer confirming instances than where alter
i s
nat ve hypo these are present 7 Further th e bearing of an hypo.
,

s
thesi upon the di rection of inquiry th e leads i t opens up to new ,

ways of experiment must be taken into account

, .

s
To use a di tinction of P eirce in science a v a lid reason for b e ,

lieving a theory may not be a concl u sive rea s on or even a strong

rea ons M
y contention is that what makes any reason in s ence
. ci
a v alid reas on for believing an hypothesis is not histo ri cal but
i
,

i
invar an t for all historic al per ods n the growth of s cience Buti .

whether a reason is a strong reason for believing an hypothesi s

s
vari es wi th the pre ence or absenc e of other leads and the evidence
for them This is an historical matter s ince n o one can pre di ct
.

how many creative compe ting insight wi ll b e current when an

, s
s
hypo thesi presents its credentials for confirmation I therefore do .

not believe that the variations i n th e degree of confirm atory com

p l e te n e s s which entificsci
hypotheses hav e had to meet at di ff erent

s
times relativize in any way th e logic of scientific method .

In passing i t should be noticed that even in the history of

mathematics standards of rigor seem to have varied and for cen ,

ci
tu rie s mathemati an s believed proposi tion s which were only con
e lusively proved I n th e nineteen th and t entieth centuries N O one w .

would i nf er from this that th e notion of ma thematical validity is

historically conditioned for despi te the vari ations in rigor they
,

pro gress ively illustrate o n e underlying logical pattern of proof to

which no alternative h as ever been formulated .

If the foregoing i s sound then I think i t constitutes some reason

for believing that there is only o ne reliable me thod of reaching
th e tru th abou t the nature of things an ywhere and at any ti me that
i
,

this reliable me thod come s to full fruition n the me thods o f

s s
cience and that a man normal behav or in adap t ng mean to
,
’
i i s
 N A T URAL S M I AND FI R S T PR N I CI P L E S 2 49

ends belies his words whenever he de n ies t N aturalism as a ph i . i

l o so p hy no t only accepts th i s method but also the broad generaliza
w
tions hich are established by the use of it ; v iz that the occurrence ,

of all qualities or events depends upon the organization of a ma

teri al system in space time and that their emergence de elopment
-
, , v
and disappearance are determined by changes in such organ ization .

“
Common sense takes the ord material as loosely equivalent w ”

w
to the m a te ria ls wi th hi ch men deal as they go from problem
to problem ; natu ralism as a philosophy takes it to refer to the
subj ect matter of the physical sciences N either th e one nor th e .

other as serts that only what can be observed exists for many ,

i
th ngs may be le gitimately inferred to exist ( electrons the expand ,

v
ing uni erse th e past the other side of the moo n) from hat s
, , w i
observed ; but both hold that there is no evidence for th e assertion
of the existence of anything hich does not res t upon some o h w
served effects .

The obj ections that have recently been urged against naturalism
sometimes proceed from the notion that a philosophical position
mu s t j ustify its general assumption in some absol u tely unique ay w .

, w
This is as e have seen a blind alley N aturalism makes no as
, .

s u m tio n s over and above those that ha e been made every time
p v
s
the border of our kn owledge have been pushed back I t therefore .

has th e cumu lative weight of the historic achie ements of common v

sense and science behind i t I f e want to acq u ire ne kno ledge . w w w ,

w
the naturalis t asserts e should follo the basic pattern of inqui ry
, w
, s
—recognize the problem tate the hypotheses draw the inferences , ,

perform the expe ri ment and make the observation There is no

, .

l ogical necessity or guarantee that we will achieve ne k no ledge w w

w
thi s ay bu t i t is reasonable to act on the as s u mption If one .

ch oo ses to call this faith i t is certainly of a different order from

,

w w
the faith th at ne kno ledge ill suddenly be on in some o ther w w
way— as different as the fai th that if I so reap mill and b ake
“
w , ,

w ” “
the heat I shall get bread is from the faith that m an na w ill
,

fall from heaven This di fference o u ld remain e en if men de

. w v ~

cided not to reach for new knowledge and depressed by iroshima , H ,

w “ ”
ere to cry S ufficient unto the day is the kn owledge thereof The .

w
connection bet een th e method that one co u l d follo and the w
concl u sions that depend u pon i ts bein g followed remai ns unaffected ,

w
by hat one wants or does not want .

It is al l the more surprising therefore to hear from one cri tic

that th e most fundamental obj ection to th e naturalist procedure ’
s
2 5 0 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
s i
i that n Peirce s word t blo ck the path’
sithat t
‘
s of i nqu i ry i n’
i
s eeks to settle by stipulation the very issue that we need to b e
reasonable abou t if we can Why ? Because he answers having . , ,

committed themselves in advance to a pos ition which identifies

’
re as onable proc edure with tha t which doe s not di ffer sharply from ‘

that of the more developed sciences they ( the naturalists) ill , w

li mi t the scope of reasonable inq u iry to W hat can be e ttled by the s
methods the se s ences employ 8 ”
ci .

u u —
This charge rests pon a double conf sion one of interpretation
and one of observation It is not reasonable procedure — hat D e ey
. w w
calls the basic pattern of inquiry— o f which the naturalist says that
i t does not differ sharply from th e more developed sciences It is .

the techniq u es and body of knowledge which enable us to control

everyday a ffairs of which he say that they do not differ sharply s
s
from the techniqu e an d bo dy of knowledge that the s ciences have
developed For some of the techniques and parts of the body of
.

knowle d ge of the former are al ays incorporated in the latter The w .

reasonable procedure —which according to naturalis ts is em p h at

ic al l y n o t a special technique of any special cience — s id e n tica l s i
in every formal as pe ct in every field in which we can lay claim
to tested and universally agreed on kno ledge abou t the world w .

Hw o then can i t serve as an obstacle to further inquiry unl ess

, , ,

i t is held that some disciplines have a basic pattern of inquiry

i
quite d fferent from that employed by critical common sense and
science What are these disciplines ? What is this pattern ? A n d hat
. w
tested and universally agreed upon kno ledge ab out this orld or w w
any other has be en won by it ? We are not told .

The error of observation der ves from the failure to note that i
v
the dri ing motivation of modern naturalism h as been not to
block but to open up the paths of inquiry into whole fields hich w
w
until no have not been investigated s cien tific ally— espe cially the
social disciplines If this criticism of th e danger threatened by
.

w w
naturalism ere j u st e should expect to find naturalists opposing
,

attempts to employ scientific me thod in anthropology history and ,

economics on the gro u nd that the meth o ds and techniqu es of

mathematical physics — the more fully developed sciences —were
“ ”

not applicable to them But i t is preci s ely the naturalists who by

.

w
distinguishing bet een the basic pattern of inquiry and the sp e ci al
techniq u es applicable to d i fferent subj ect matters have been trying
to banish method ologi cal purism .

I t is tr u e that there have been occas ons n the past when those i i
2 5 2 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ERS AT WORK
of God and man s immortal soul i t s alleged becaus e its first
’

, i ,

pri nciples and categories of explanation are such as to make the

very assertion of their existence meaningless If true this charge .
,

w o u ld be seri o us indeed for the natu ralist professes to be open

,

minded about the possibilities of existence in a world n which i

his gr eatest e fforts seem so modest in the cosmic scale .

There are many conceptions of God and the soul whi ch are
unintelligible because they involve the attri bution of contradictory
H
q u alities to im ; and there are other conceptions which are s o
vagu e and inde terminate i n meani ng that n o thing S ignificant can ,

b e affirmed or denied of them B u t i t is no t di ffi cult to find con

.

ce tio n s that are sufficiently meaningful to make the contention of

p
the imp o ss i b ility of their existence arrant dogmatism Are natural .

is ts guilty of this kind of do gmatism ?

I do not believe this to be th e cas e For o ne thing this would .

remove the sting from naturalism Its cri ticism s of the belief in .

D ei ty have not been based on semantic consideration s b u t on what

i t presumed to be the weight of scientific discovery S ome th e o l o .

g ians and e ven some Catholic scientists like D u h e m have sought to

bolster the beliefs in God precisely on the ground that in relation
to the cate go ries of nat u ralistic science the a ffirmation as ell as , w
the denial of God s existence would be meaningless S uch a view
’
.

of naturalism is more devastating to atheism than to theism because .

the atheist does not profess to have any other categories at the
disposal of his understanding while the theist emphatically doe s .

S econdly , w v
here er declared natu ralists assert that the existence
w
of God is impossible i t ill u s u ally b e found they are using the
,

te rm impossible not in the lo gi cal or mathematical sense bu t in '

w
the physical or medical sense in hich we say that i t is impos si b le
for any thing to burn or for a man to bre ath e wi thou t oxygen ,

N either Professor D u casse in his recent discussions of i m mortal ity

w
nor Professor E ing in his discussions o f th e body and i ts mental
attrib u tes have established anything more than hat a so phisticated w
natu ralist is p repared to gr ant them to b egin with v iz that God s , .
,
’

existence and personal su rv ival are synthetic propositi o ns and that

therefore their denial cannot be contradicto ry or a matter fo r
logic alone to se ttle G E . . . M
oore Once obse rv ed that the fact that
‘

one needs one s eyes for seeing is an empirical discovery and this
’

v
is ob io u sly true for more re condite matters like the role of the
brain in thinking and of th e nerves in feeling To see i th ou t eyes . w
is physiologically impossibl e bu t every believer I n I mmortali ty
 NA T I
URAL S M A N D F IR S T I CIPLE S
PR N 2 5 3

known to m e is convinced that in h i s

di sembodi ed stat e h e will
s
se e at least a well as he sees now The t o as e rtion . are not l og w s s
ica l ly incompatible for obviously the believer i n immorta l i ty ex
w s
pe e ts the la s o f physiol o gy to be uspended in the hereaf ter Thi . s
is not logi cal ly impossible bu t th e absence of a logical impossibili ty
s c
doe not constitu te a s intilla of evidence agai nst the usual validity
of physiological law as we know it E very reaso nable per o n in hi
. s s
behavior denies th e as sumption that e have no right to di s w
i w
believe n anything hich cannot be logi cally di sproved 9 .
”

The histo ry of naturalism i t seems to me has been mar ked by

, ,

w
t o main tendencies The first ha in terpreted G od in th e s am e
. s
w ay as the great historical religions ; v iz as an omni poten t personal .
,

w w i
po er ho guides the destin es of th e orld e has created and — w H
concl u ded that the evidence does not arrant belief in the existence w
of anything corresponding to this conception The econd ha re n
“
. s ”
s i
terp re te d the conception of God and used the term God to sig
ni fy a principle of order in the universe the totality of all thing , s ,

w
the possibility of good in the orld or the obj ect of human alle ,

g i an c e Karl
. M
arx once observed that e en the profession of belief v
w
in deism on the part of scien tis ts as motivated by a desire to in w
freedom to contin u e scientific inquiry and to e s cape molestation
from those whom we would today call religio u s fu ndamentalists .

B u t in most cases the attribution of such moti es seems to be v

entirely gratuitous even though a greater freedom from interference
v
by re ealed reli gi on may have been among the e ffects of the pro
fes sio n of deism .

v
Whate er the hi storical facts the charge of dogm atism agai ns t
,

naturalism on the ground that i t rules ou t by defi ni tion the possi

ble existence o f G od and the soul has often been made R ecently .

it has been renewed and fortified by quoting from an essay by

M r D ennes some ambiguous passages which are interpreted to
.

mean that all things in the world m us t ultimately b e described and

explained in terms of the categories of q u ality relation and e ent , , v .

O ne critic then asks “

H w
ow do e kno that the orld consists
, w w
v
of e ents qu ali ties and relations and nothing more ? We kno that
, , w
w w
e m u st so des cribe i t if e are commi tted to b asic categories of
a natu ralistic philosophy B u t would the natu re of a spiri tual
.

”
substance be so determi nable ? 1 0 A nother cri t c referring to the i
“
s am e point wri tes If everything has to b e an e ent the idea of
, v ,

a timele ss God is excl u ded from the ou tse t an d ithout argument w .

The wri ter asserts that his li st of categories mak e s no demand

2 54 A M E R I CA N PH ILO S OP HER S AT WORK
upon the me taphysical commitment of the reade r as though g v i
i
,

i
ng up one s be lief n God were noth ng 1 1
’
i .
”

These questions seem to me to mi sconceive bo th the meaning of

s s
the text cri ticized a well a the position of naturalism 1 shall .
,

w
ho ever discu ss only the latter
, .

( )
I N aturalism not com is
m i tted to any theo ry concern ng whi c h i
i
categorial te rms are rreducibl e or bas c in explana t on N atural ts i i . is
s
di ffer amon g themselve about thi s in the same way that sc entists i
may differ among themselves as to what terms n the language i
of science S hould be taken as pr m ar y What all naturalists agree
“
i .

on is the irreducibility of a certain method by which new knowl

s
edge is achi eved and te ted The analysis of this me th o d may be
.

made in terms of categories like thing structure function po er , , , w ,

act cause relation quantity and event T h e choice of which cate

, , , .

g o ri e s to take as basic in descri bing a method depend upon the s

degree to which they render coherent and fruitful what w e learn
by th e use of th e method . H
istorically and up to ve ry recently , ,

the most wi dely used category among naturalistic philo sopher s

s
has be en matter or u b stance It is a complete n o n se q u i tu r to a
. s
s
sume that because one asse rt that th e fundamental categor e of is
des cription are and X Y
and Z and that they hold u ni versally he
, ,

i
is therefore assert ng th at the world cannot be significantly de
i
scribed e x cep t n terms of X Y
and Z o r as so many r tic as
, , , ci s
“
sume that the world consist of nothing but s and and Z X Y .

O s
ne may use categorial te rm A and B and C that are not funda
mental and maintai n ei ther— hat mos t naturalist do n o t—that w s
they are logically definable in terms of X and Z o r—what most , Y ,

s
naturalist d o —that th e conditions under which any existing th ng i
is significan tly describable in term of A B an d C are such that s , ,

w
they are al ays describable in terms of X and Z , Y , .

i
This gives us two possib li ties in respect to a term l ke ub i s
s
stance I t might be defined a a constellation of even t in tead of
. s s
w ic
a substratum in hich pred ates inhere and all tatements ab out , s
s
substance translated without lo s of meaning into statement abou ts s
organized sets of events or processes r econd an attemp t mi ght . O s ,

be made to show that whatever else a ubstance is t manifestation s , is s

or appearances can always be de cri be d n terms of activi ties or s i
w s
operating po ers th e m selve definable as events o r power This
, s .

does not req u ire that substances whether mater al or sp ri tual have i i
to be directly observed bu t i t does requ re that their pre u me d
, i s
s i s
manife tat ons or effec ts mu t be ob e rvable in o ur expe r ence e l se s i ,
2 5 6 AM R E IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
s
the re must be ome disclo ure n time of what is pres umed to be s i
outside of time as a tart ng point o f the argument s i r D emos , M .

must admi t else the whole concep t of God is useless for the pur
,

M
poses for which r D emos and orthodox theology invoke him
. .

( )
3 If God and man s immortal soul are so conceived th at they
’

i
have no empi r cal e ffects then there is nothing to prevent anyone ,

from impu ting any se t o f logically consistent attribu tes to them .

They would then take their place wi th other imaginary reatures c

in the realm of mythology I can very well understand the refusal
!

of historical religions to take such conceptions of God and the

s o u l seriously since it makes them completely otiose in understand
,

i ng th e world superfluous entitie s that can be haved away w th

, s i
a flick of ccam s raz or O ’
.

i
It s of course true that in modern philo sophy the term G od
has stoo d for many differen t ide a —natural structure the order of s ,

cau se an d conseq u ence the principle of concre tion or logical limi

,

tatio n the experience of val u e and righteou ness Avowed atheis ts

, s .
,

like M i
orr s R Cohen have described their dedication to tru th
.
, ,

and not only out of pie ty to th e memory of S pinoza as th e in ,

”
te l l e c tu al love of God N aturalists are under no more compulsion
.

to Observe te rm inological taboo s than other philosophers although

w
one ould expect them to be more c areful o f t h e context of
familiar te rm s u sed to convey new meanings If an yone gets par .

tic u l ar satisfaction o u t of the use of the term God then fortunately ,

or unfortunately he can find it in the ritings of mo s t naturali s t

, w
philosophers N aturalism as a p hi losophy how ever has nothing
. , , ,

w
to do ith such l inguistic matters importan t as they may be in
other respects N at u ralism as a p hi los ophy is co ncern e d o n l y wi th
.

those assertions about existence from which so me thing empirically

observable in the world follows that would not b e the ca se if
w
existence ere denied An d i t p roposes to treat a ssertions about .

God s existence in the same ge n e r c way th at i t treats assertions

’
i
abou t the existence of invisible stars or hidde n motives or af ter
images or extras ensory perception Critics of naturalism ho regar d . w
this as dogm atic might put their charge to the test by fu rnishing
the reasons or evidence which th ey hold warrant belief in the
existence of G o d or gods cosmi c purpose or personal survival ,

af ter death .

S ome b eliefs are reasonable even if we can not finally confirm

or di s co n firm them B u t if we take technological and practical
.

behavior as the matrix of the reasonable then beliefs in the exist ,

 N A T UR AL I S M A N D F I R S T PR N I CIPLE S 2 5 7

s
ence of upernatural enti ties are not rea sonable They are not .

warran ted even if they turn out to be true j us t a a guess is not , s

w
warr anted kn o ledge even when i t turns ou t to be true S antayana .

s omewhere suggests that the reaso n most people believe in im

mortali ty is that they cann ot imagi ne thems elves dead Thi s r ai ses .

s
an intere ting me thodological point since only if we are immort al
w
can e prove it whi le the naturalists who deny the imm ortality
,

i
of the soul w ll never have th e satisfaction of saying We were
” “
“
,

ri ght
. Wouldn t natur ali sts b e su rprised a critic of the position
’

,
“
once observed if after they died they woke up in th e presence
,
”
of God They certainly would be su rprised The degree of their
. .

s i
urpr se would be th e meas ure of the unreasonableness of the belief .

U i
nreasonable behav or or conduct may sometimes turn ou t right
if I gave s ix to one odd on the toss of a ell made coin s w
s
bu t i t i no less unre as onable for all that An d what is true for .

conduct is true for belief Consequently i n respect to the avail .

,

able evidence in our po e ssion the naturalist is reasonable in his ss ,

belief even if i t turn ou t he i wrong abou t God and survival s s ,

while the supernaturalist in respect to the same data is unreason

able even if i t tu rns ou t he i r ght Fai th in the supernat u ral ”
s i .
,
“
s
says S antayana i a desperate wager made by man at th e lowest
,
”
ebb o f his fortune T h e scienti t who predict that life ill dis ap
. s s w
pear because o f the second law of thermod yn am i cs will never be
w
aroun d hen th e last flicker of life di m s The logic of the argu .

ment is no di fferent in th e case of mmortali ty i .

In conclusion the naturalis t believes th at hi s as sumptions are

,

s
reasonable be cau e they express n a more gener al way no more , i ,

s
than what i expressed by any nonphi losopher as ell as by all w
p hi losophers whatever their chool in thei r ucces sful orki ng
, s , s w
i
practice on so lv ng problems concerning th e nature of things An d .

by s u ccessful is meant here something independent of the categori al

s
term of naturalism o r any other p hi loso phy something as simple , ,

na ive an d indefeasible a di scovering a substance that o n friction

, s
will burst into flame buil di ng a house that ill wi ths tand an earth
, w
, s
quake producing a eed that will yield a better harvest N aturalism .
,

as a philos ophy is a systematic reflection upon and elaboration of

, , ,

s
the procedure man employs in the successful resol u tion of the
problems and difficulties of human experience To use a phra e o f . s
Peirce wi tho u t giving i t necessarily his special interpretation i t
, ,
“ ”
is cri tic al c o mm o n sens ism Bu t i t is more than this It is a p ro . .

s
po s al It i a propos al to conti nue to follow this general pattern
.
2 5 8 A M E R ICAN PH ILO S OP H ER S AT WORK
of proc edure in all field of inqu ry where t has enabled u to s i i s
build up a body of knowledge and to extend i t to field where , s
we have not satisfactorily se ttled que tion of ac t of any k nd As s s f i .

a propos al i t seems hardly les reasonable to th e naturalist to fol s

l o w than w i
hen th rsty under normal circumstance to loo k for
, , s ,

some liquid to quench one s thirst Could any other proc edure be ’
.

more reasonable or as reas onable ? r mu t we olve the prob lem O s s

of induction first ? Bu t to raise th e problem of induct on no less th an i
to solve i t assumes that we are already in po ess ion of und puted ss is
knowledge An d to facili tate the transi tion from the problemat c
. i
to the undisputed in human affair ha been one of the under s s
lying purposes o f all hi stor cal forms of naturali m i s .

v
Thi s p ap er not p re iously p ublished as read before a mee ting of
, , w
i
the Ph l osop hy Cl u b of Ne w ork at the en s Faculty Clu b of Co Y M ’

lumb a n versity i Ui ay 195 0 ,

M , .

2
3
1 .

. .
. .

P
A A G o l d e nw eiser, A nthrop o l o gy , N Y , 1 9 3 7 , p 1 3 4
F Bo as , M ind of rim itiv e M an, N Y , 2 nd e ditio n, p 1 3 1 ;
B Mal ino w s ki, S c ie nc e, R e lig io n a nd R eality , N Y , 1 9 2 9 , p 3 5
. .
.
.

.
.

.
.

.
.
.

. .

4 G o l d e nw e is e r, o p c it , p p 4 2 0—2 1
. . . . .

5 W Craw shaw William s, T ru e T ru th : o r the Higher the D e ep er, R a

. .
-
“

tio nal is t A nnu al ( L o n do n ) , 1 9 4 8 , p 2 8

6 .
J P
D ew e y , in J o u rnal of hil os op hy , 1 9 4 5 , p 2 06
.

e irc e , C o ll e c te d Wo rks , Vo l I I , Par 2 , p

P . .

. .

7 C . . 780
8 Arth u r Mu rp hy , in j o u rnal of hil os op hy , Vo l XL I I , p 4 1 3
.

9 C raw sh aw -Will iam s , l o c c it

.

P . .

.
.

. .

P
. . .

1 0 A E Mu rp hy , in Jo u rnal of hil os op hy , Vo l XLI I , p p 4 1 1 , 4 1 2

2 71
.

1 1 R D em os, in
.
.
.

.
.

P
hil os op hy and Phe no mino l og ic al R es e arc h, Vo l V I I , p
. .

.
.

.
2 60 M ICAN
A ER I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
ground that these latter are not physical data An d obj ect on to . i s
mathematical concep tions uch as th e geometr cal point o r the nul l s i
class on the ground that all phy cal point have ome ize and si s s s
all physical classes have some members an i mi larly b e rej ected , c s
s
on the ground that the e are n o t mathematical con ideration an d s s
fall outside the mathema tical field S o w th all res tr cted field and . i i s
ss
restricted hypothe e A nd the great bulk o f human knowledge
.

proceeds along such restricted and pe alized channel s ci s .

B u t a metaphysical theory as above defined cannot rej ect con , ,

i s
s deration of this kind in this way It cannot ex cu s e i t elf from . s
i
tak ng any fact comment or cr ticism into consideration on the
, , i
ground that thes e lie outside i ts field or i ts scope of inquiry for , ,

the simple reason that by the defini tio n of it en terp rise there s , is
. O
no outside of its field r in word more commonly heard though , s ,

not often fully understood metaphysic i s general theory n con , s i

trast to specialized theory omewhat as a general practice n , s i
s
medicine is contra ted wi th a pecialized practice s .

This analogy incidentally sugge ts th e oc i al importan ce of m eta s s

physics Just as a specialist n med c ne ometime mis e a d ag
. i ii s s ss i
nosis because o f his restricted attention to hi s spe c al field o wi th i , s
specialists in cogni tion in genera l There i need of the gener al . s
practi tioner in cognition a special st n no ns p e ci al iz atio n to keep
, i i ,

a proportion and balance among spec a l zed field to d agno e i i s , i s

ambiguous cases to have h eye ou t for undeve l oped field to
, is s ,

s
direct problematic case into th e prop er pe ial field where the e s c s s
exist and to institu te these fields if they do not already exist
, .

i
But this med cal analogy i s not qu te correct for there s nothi ng i , i
in the practice of a general practitioner corre pond ng w th the s i i
s
unique ta k o f metaphysics n drawing u p an unrestr cted theory i i .

s
It is freq u en tly asked I there an y difference be twee n a sc entific
, i
and a metaphysical theory ? I should reply Non e ex ep t th e differ , c
ence between res trictedness an d unrestri ctedne etaphysic h as ss M . s
no special or private realm of data excep t as th e re s tri cted th eorie , s
may have failed to cover cert ai n kind of data It h as no spe al s . ci
methods except as the re tricted theories may have fa le d to u e s i s
some U i
nquest onably there s a greater var ety among meta
.
, i i
physical theories than among cien tific theor es But this would be s i .

expected in the natu re of the ente rprise for clearly th e body of ,

unrestricted theories would include all the discrepan ies that the se c
exh ibited among themselves together w th wh atever dis crep ancies , i
of method
 M E A P H Y S ICAL
T M ET H OD 2 61

all cogni tion and the sum of the ucce es of the restricted fields
, s ss
of cognition does not j ustify the uncri tical extension of those re
strictions into unrestricted co gnition For instance the su ccesse .
, s
s
of the physical cience do not j ustify the uncri tical extension of s
the data and methods o f the physical sciences over all cogni tion .

w
The only ay to find ou t he ther the methods and data of the w
i
physical s c ences can be indefini tely extended is to try them out
u nrestri ctedly We get an interesting metaphysica l theory when we
.

do that Bu t there i not ufficient evidence yet to j ustify us n

. s s i
rej ecting other metaphy cal theo ri es developed o n o ther b ases si .

M w
ore over hen the me thod s of cien c e are given unrestricted ex
, s
“
tension i t becomes unclear j us t what is cientific method so that
, s ,
”

we see incidentally that w thou t dictating to science metaphysic i , s

automatically become a cri tique of sc enc e In general there s i .
, is
no difference be tween a cientific and a metaphysica l hypothesis s ,

except that the former s restricted and the latter i not i s .

N o w i t might b e said that th e very conception of an unrestricted

s
hypothesi is fantastic For is there not an infini te number of facts
.

and an infini te numb er of possible methods ? Perhaps bu t the ,

h isto ry of philosophy ndi cates that the human mind has been i
undismayed We find a certa n uniform i ty of me thod in spi te o f
. i
s s
countles variation in the enterpr se o f constructing unrestricted i
hypo these s .

i
First there s a general fund of mater al hich philosophers
, i w
c
recognize as ritical material to be handled n any serio u s u n i
restricted theory This fund has grown somewhat in the course o f
.

cognitive history b u t i t is not s tri kingly larger no than i t as

, w w
s
among the Greek even th ough the mass of detail that has sprou ted
,

from many of th e i tems has grown prodigiously I am going to be .

s
r a h enough to make a list of the m ai n items in this fund dividing ,

them into me thodological and evidential i tems They ill be recog . w

n i z e d as a typical table of contents for any extens ive ork on w
metaphys c is .

l . I nfal lib l e Au th o rity .

2 . C e rtainty , th e ap i i, s e lf e v id e nc e ,
r or -

imm e di ac y , in tu itio n .

Me tho d ol o gic al I tems

a . Mu l tip li c ati v e : n u m eri c al
ind u c tio n, e tc .

3 C o rro b o ratio n

v fi
.

b . S tru c tu ral : h yp o th e sis and

eri c atio n .
 A M E R I CAN P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WO R K
My s tic exp erie nce .

S e lf .

C o ns c io u s n ess .

S e ns atio ns , s e nsa, im p ress io ns, e tc . as anal y tic al ele

m e nts
v
.

Will ,
i
o l it o n, p u rp o se .

Fe elin gs , satisfac ti o ns , d es ire s , in te res ts .

Me aning s, refere n tial c o nn ec tio ns, internal rel atio ns,

8 .
G es tal te n .

S im il arity , rep e titio n, re gu l arity, l aw s, u ni e rs al s , u ali v q

v
E i d e ntial I tems tie s , ab s trac t rel atio ns
S p ac e .
.

T im e

P
.

j
T h ing s , o b ec ts ( s u c h as tre e s , h o u s es, d o gs )
h y s ic al m atte r, atom s , el e c trom ag ne tic el d s, e tc fi .

Life .

S o c ial s tru c tu re s .

fi
S p irits , g h o s ts , go ds , e tc
E f c ie nt c au s ality .

C h anc e , in de termim sm, p rob ab ility , e tc

.

C h ang e , b ec o mi ng .

B as ic o r u l tim ate s u b s tan c e or G o d .

The next step in the con struction of an unrestr cted hypoth esis
“ ”
i
is to select among these i tems for what I shall call the b as e of
w s
the orld theory The election of this bas e predeterm ines th e
.

structure of the unrestricted hypothesis Naturally I do not mean .

,

to say that this i s the way the metaphysic an o f the pa t brought i s s

forth their theories They brought them forth in truggl e and
. s
pain in di sappointm e nt and with the j oy of illuminati on But
, s .

looking back calmly over their result and examining the cogni tive s ,

significance of what they did I find that they made s elections ,

among alternative possible me thods and among alternative po s sible ,

materials .

s —
Their election among the me thodological alternative infallible s
a u thority certainty or corroboration —was in one respect decisive ;
, ,

in another of no material importance whatever The way in which

, .

the selection of a meth o d was decisive is that if a metaphysician ,

chose either th e method of infallible authori ty or that of certainty ,

then whatever constructive items he elected by ei ther of those s

methods became frozen and incapab le of further cruti ny or e ri ti s
c i s m A man
. w
ho feels he h as divine authority for the ultimacy of
, w
any item— say self ill space e ffi cient causali ty or indeterm inism
, , , ,

— is not prepar ed to s u ffer the se to be mauled by doubts and cri ti

c i sm s except for the pleasure of refu ting the obj ections The
, .
2 64 E ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S
AM R WORK AT

the method of autho i ty is almo s t a s empty a s that f certa i nty I

r o . t
i s of course Open to riticism by both the other methods But
, , c .

for this presen t discu sion all I w is h to show is that the method of
s ,

authority and the method of certainty have had very little e ffect
in the long ru n on the structure of metaphysical theories li ttle ,

more than to seal th e election philosopher had made among thes s s

evidential i tem s .

The main work of building up metaphy ica l theor e h as always s is

been done by th e method o f corroboration which s nothi ng more , i
than the method of gatheri ng and organizing evidence T h e very .

fact that philosophers hav e always argued and reasoned wi th one

another is i
implic t reco gnit on of the fa t that they have been i c
constructing theories hypotheses and not creeds manifestos ukase
, , , , s ,

or dictatorial commands That philosopher should frequently . s

s
have tried to li p into their evidence tag of author t arian com s i
pulsion w as only human and some time wa nevitable under th e s si
cultural pressure o f their time Just at th momen t in Amer ca . is i
s
i t i still unnecessary to consider anythi ng but th e weight of evi
dence in the construction of hypothese s
.

We shall consider a me taphysical hypo thesi then a based s , , s

entirely on its evidence It follows that the vari ati on among orld
. s w
theories depend primarily upon the election of bas ic evidence s .

The variations depend upon what I called the b a e of th e s

hypoth esis .

Two pertinent questions will be asked at thi point First do not s .

,

the variations depend equally on the construct ve proc e es follow i ss

s
ing the election of a base ? S econd why t neces ary to elect , is i s s
a base ? Why is not all evidence th e ba e of an unre tr ted hyp o th e s s ic
sis ? Isn t i t a self contradiction to s peak of a re tri cted selection
’
-
s
of evidence for an unres tricted hypothe is ? s
The answer to the first question is that th e pro esse of con c s
s w “
truction ( hat is often called the l o gic of a world theory)
constitu te part of the evidence selected as a base or wh at amount s
i
,

to the same thing follow directly from the elect o n of a bas e Thi
, s . s
point is most strikingly exhibited in the traditional organistic
H
theories of the egelian typ e The concrete uni vers al s elected as .

basic empirical evidence carried i th i t th e constructive principle w s

v
for the de elopment of the whole system The same I believe is .

tru e thou gh not q u ite so obviously wi th all other type of world

, , s
theory se t up on other bases .

I t follows from this situation a the vigilant r ti wi l l al ready , s ci c

 METAP HYS I CAL M E T HOD 2 65

have noticed that different world theories have d fferent logi

, i cs
( in th e sense of modes of rational construction ) I do not say that .

s
there are as many logic as there are basic types of world hy
p o th e s e s Bu t clearly there are many
.
“
logics ”
( in this s en e ) a n d s
i t wo u ld be unlikely that di fferen t b as es of world hypotheses ould w
lead to exactly identical modes of con truction for the hypothe e s s s
generated .

s
These remark of course have no effect upon the validity of
, ,

w
the specialized ork done by professional logi cian s The point is .

s imply that the sort o f work done by logicians as specialists is

s
j u s t a much subj ect to criticism and interpretatio n ithin the w
framework of unres tri cted hypothesi a the work of m ath em a s s
tic i an s and physicists To make further cla ms for pecialized logic
. i s
s
would am ount to lifting thi logic out o f the sphere of criticism
and appealing to the me thod of certainty It ould amount to . w
claiming an a p rio ri s tatus for special ized logi c No t that a meta .

s
physician in hi s capaci ty a a metaphysician would be likely to
question th e validi ty of a logical proof certified by a consensus of
ss
speciali t in logic but he is sure to look for the relati on of such
,

a proof to all the other things he finds in the world I t is o f course . , ,

merely a matter o f historical record th at some metaphysicians have

i i
given th e p r nc ples of formal logic ( or of its successors mathe ,

m atic al and symbolic logic) a place of ultimacy in their s ystems and

s
other have given them a derivative place I n o ther ords in some . w ,

unrestricted th eories these principles are included i n the base

,

of th e hypo thesis and in some not They are of course included in . , ,

all relatively adequate unrestricted hypotheses either as basic or

derivative for o the rw ise the hypothesis would be restri cted by
,

the exclusion of them .

s
Whether to call the ba ic procedures for the constru ction of an
s “
unre tricted hypothesis a logic when the se are not the pro ,

c e d u re s of Aristotelian form al logic or i ts modern developments in

s s
ymbolic logic i a matter of mere definition as they say—that is
, ,

a mere matter of agreeing in the designation of a word L ogi c a a . s

special ized discipline refers to a body of material such a that in s
P rin c ip ia M a th e m a tica The term logic is sometim e s equated wi th
.

this specialized discipline But logic has also been tradi tionally u sed
.

to desi gnate any rati onal me thod for handling evidence I perso n .

ally prefer the wider usage . O

n thi s ider usage i t is clear thatw ,

s
th e election of th e base of a world theory carrie wi th i t a lo i c
g s
for th e extens ion of that base to unres tricte d proportion and that s ,
2 66 AMER IC A N
WORK I
P H LO S OP HER S AT

the expectan cy is f the l ogic va y wi th h va i a i on s f the

or to r t e r t o

base .

To the first question we rai sed followi ng our a s ertion that the s

differences among unre s tricted hypotheses depended upon h s e t e

lection of a base — the question n mely whether the se do not also , a ,

depend upon the procedures employed in expanding from hat t

base our answer is that the pro edure s are themselve s i ncluded
,
c or

entailed in the selection of the base .

This brings us to the second question we raised : Why make any

H
selection ? ow can one honestly choose among facts —accept these
facts an d rej ect those — in the construction of an unre tricted hy s
o th e s i s ? Is not a fact a fact ? S o practically every philosopher
p
has asserted But the difficulty the a areness of which also fur
.
, w
s
nishes our an wer to o u r second question is that each ph losop her , i
( or rather school of philosophers ) indicates a d ifie rent elect on s i
of i tems as the facts that are th e facts The doctrine of the elf . s
c ertific atio n of fact is a myth For those who require to be per .

s u ad e d of thi s
statement the few paragraphs in which I could
,

present some evidence in this paper would scarcely s u ffice Al l .

I can do here is to explain the lines of argument I should employ .

w i
E s sentially there are t o l nes First the exhibi tion of co n tradi c .
,

tions and incompatibili ties in the offerings of ultimate facts and

s
tru th by different philosophers of generally ackn o wledged in
te gri ty . M
istakes have to the best of man s j u dgmen t been made
,
’

in the assignment of factuality or of ultimate truth to i tems of , ,

experience O
n the evidence of these mistake I u bmi t that the
. s , s
act of j u dging i tems of experience as ultimate in any of the vario u s ,

w w w
ways i th hi ch e philosophers are famili ar is s u bj ect to error , .

That is my di rect line of approach to the issue .

M y second h u e I s to exam ine the grounds offered by philosophers

or schools of philosophers in assigning u ltimacy of fact or tru th
to any item These alway resolve into ome form of infallible
. s s
authority or incorrigible certainty These methods as methods of .
,

philosophical procedure can be shown to have frequently led to

,

error or uncertainty A ccordi ngly as methods they are unreliable ;

.
,

and if moreover they are supported by corroborative evidence

, , ,

they are s u perflu o us This is an indi rect line of approach to the

.

I ssue .

To the objection that past errors never imply a present error ,

and that accordi ngly any pres e nt candidate for ultimacy on th e

grounds of infallibili ty certai nty or what you will may well be a
, , ,
2 68 AMER ICA N I
PH LO S OP H RS E AT WORK
p h e rs s
and school of philosophy have accepted a b a c fact or s si s
truths shows that m u tual corroboration ei ther n a positive or n
, i i
s
a negative sen e fails to appear among these i tem The more s .

experienced the philosopher in th e ssues involved in these tem i i s ,

w
the more a are he is of the conflict that have appeared T h e only s .

way of handling these items in the construction of unre tricted s

hypotheses is to make a selection among them of ertai n tems that c i
will be accepted as basic and to make adj ustment or what we , s
generally call interpretations of the rest S uch a election what . s is
I call th e bas e of an unrestricted hypothesis .

O nce we rej ect the method of infalli b le author ty and of s i ,

ce rtainty and note the evidential conflicts resident among the ev

, i
dential items no alternative i s open to us in the cogni tive enterpr e
, is
o f b u ilding up an unrestricted hypothesi other than that o f e l ect s s
ing a base and proceeding to make adj ustment s among th e remain
i
ing tems in the search for a maximum of corroboration This I .
,

v
belie e has actually been th e philo oph c enterprise from the b e
, s i
i
ginning Th s enterpris e has frequen tly been diverted from the
.

direct line by cultural and au thori tarian pressures coming from

religious and political source o that there is ome j u tification for ss , s s
the view that a metaphysical theory i simply th e re fl ection or the s
systematization of the conviction of a contemporary culture Even s .

so a base of selected i tem for the metaphysical theory i im

, s s
p l i c i tl
y admitted The cogni tive strength of
. th e theory still depend s
on i ts corroborative powers What th e philosopher w anted w as .

cogni tive support for hi cultural conv ctions reli gious or other s i ,

wise I t is always possible for other p hilosopher to consider h o w

. s
successfully he got i t An d once more barring th e fu til e type of
.
,

c ri ticism which consists i

n putting one dogma face to face w th i
an other wi th nothing but brute forc e or vociferation to settl e an
,

issue ( in the manner of the me thods of infallible authori ty and

certainty) the only criteri a of cognitive success av ai lable and th e
, ,

criteria regularly employed are tho e for th e marshalling of evi , s

dence or corroboration
, .

We therefore re turn to our ori g nal thesis that the method of

, , i
constru cting an u nre stricted hypothesis consists in selecti ng a ba e s
and seeking the maximum corroboration of al l available evidence .

A philosophically adequate base is one that lead to a l arge s

amo u nt of corroboration in the handling of th e totality of ev i
dence ; an inadequa te base one that fail s to do thi , s .
 ME AP H YS ICAL ME
T T HO D 2 69

s c
It fo l low that in haracterizing a metaphysic the most illu s
i
mi n ating procedure s to reveal i ts base If thi s is di fficult to do . ,

w s i ci
e have a seriou cr ti sm of the theory at once It becomes prob .

able that the man is merely verbalizing and has no clear conception
of th e relation o f evidence to his words I am not referring to the .

ki nd of di fficult philosophy where a new vocabul ar y must be

learned o r where a man has uncovered a new phase o r body of
,

evidence for which no well understood vocabulary has been de

v el o ed
p .I am refe rri ng to the difficulty not o f mastering ords w
w
and concepts ( hich any philosopher may demand of ano ther)
i si
but of finding eviden t al gni ficance for the words For instance I .
,

would never or at least very rarely accuse Whitehead of v erb aliz

, ,

ing but I suspect many VVhiteh e adi an s of having lost all contact
,

with an evidential b as e .

No w th e base may be very w de or qui te narrow It mi ght seem i , .

that th e best results would oc c ur n taking a very wide base : that i s i ,

i
in accept ng a large number of i tems at whatever e may con w
sider their face value and then noting their independence of o n e
,

i
another or trac ng ou t their positive corroborative connections .

M s
any perhaps mo t philosopher think that this is their method
, , s ,

and that they have taken no liberties w th hat o ther philosophers i w

regard as the face values of evidential i tems and have performed
no in terpretations o r red u ctions of p ro fl ere d evidence They think .

they are j ust describing the e idence in the common sens e way v -
.

E ven Berkeley w s
i th all hi paradoxes apparently had this illusion .

But the illusion becomes manifest hen you notice hat one gro u p w w
o f ingen u ous philosophers says abou t the descri ptions of i tems

made by ano ther group of ingen u ous philosophers nless I am . U

much mistaken most of the notable philosophers S how a tenden y
, c
to seek a very narrow base .

The reason for this I believe s the search for precision of

, , i
co rroboration O w
ne ay in which corroboration may break do n
. w
is the discovery of a number o f mu tu ally incompatible conclusion s
all equally compatible wi th some given interpretation of an i tem
of evidence This failure of corroboration can generally be cor
.

re c te d by reater precision in the original inter retation There is

g p .

thus a strong cognitive dr ve to ard a maximum of precision i w

i n basic evidence for the sake o f maximum corroboration For a .

v
precise intensi e interpretation of one or a fe i tem o f e idence w s v
ordinarily leads to a compatible pre i sion in the interpretation of c
2 7 0 A M E R I CAN P H I L O S O P H E R S WORK AT

many other i tems of ev i dence and i n general these interpretations ,

do not correspond wi th common s ense idea nor wi th certain other -

s

precise interpre tation s .

S uch intens i ve analysis of a rather narrow base for h p

an t e ur
“
pose f extensive corroboration I have called a ro t metaphor
o o .

I might s eem as though

t i ndefinite number of root metaphors an

wo u ld develop and that there wo u ld be very little to choos e

,

amo ng them A ctually I believe they are not many S ince the
.
,
.

purpose of a root metaphor i to b ri ng about a maxi mum of s

i
mutual corroborat on the me thod turns out to be highly controlled
, .

s
The procedure is trictly bounded on two sides n th e o ne side . O
an unrestricted hypo thesis cann ot totally ignore or exclude any
proposed i tem Philosophers frequently try to do this by calling
.

“ ”
recalci trant items unreal so that an appeal to unreality is an ,

excellent symptom of inadequa cy in an unre stricted theory It .

si gn ifies inadequacy of scope It means that in terms of that roo t .

s
me taphor an d i t de tailed mode of co rroboration the unreal ite m s , s
cannot be fitted in ei ther as independent or as connected fact s
w i thin that hypothe is s O
n the other side an unrestricted hypo .
,

thesis must gi ve an unequivocal descr ption of any i tem o ff ered ( or i ,

at least show how such a description could be theoretically o h

,

tain e d if further evidence were availabl e F ai lure in this respect

) .

si gnifies inadequacy of precision ; and means that the me thod of

corroboration employed lacks su ffi cient refinement to give defini te
w
ans ers to cognitive q u es tions A nswers that are mutually con .

tradi c to ry or incompati ble appe ar .

, w
This deman d ho ever for p recrsro n I n an un res tricted h y ,

o th e s i s does not of course imply that indete rm inism vagueness es

p , , , ,

fu sions etc are u nacce p tabl e i tems w thin an hypothesis E very

, .
, i .

w orld hyp othesis m u s t be able to handle them ince in some sen se , s

w
or other e frequ ently come acros them They may be handled s .

as u ltimate or they may be analyzed into components Bu t hat

, . w
w
ever is done ith these items m u st be decisively done otherwise ,

they cannot be corroborated There is nothing i llegi timate in the .

demand that a philosopher describe an indeterminate or vague

w
event i th precision and one way to do i t is to designate the event
,

as irred u cibly indeterminate or vague ‘

w
These t o demands for adequacy o f scope and adeq u acy of
p recision in an unrestricted hypothesis thu s c o ntrol the corrobora
w
tive p roced u re ithin narro limits and keep the numb er of roo t w
me ta p hors that have yielded a relatively high degree of adequacy
2 72 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP H RS E AT WORK
of Vitalism b u t so far as I know this ha never been s er ously pu t
, , , s i
forward as an unrestricted theory ( unless one ished so to classify w
B e rgso n i an ism ) S o far as we see i t wo u ld not acq u ire much scope ,
.

Conscio u sness # 1 is another evidential i tem that every u mre

, ,

s tric te d hypothesis has to cope w th but whic h never itself expand i , s

as the fertile base of a theory .

These examples are su fii cien t to show that the evidential items

listed are by no means on a par in their capaci ty to generate u n
restricted hypotheses The examples also show that there is no
.

foundation for the fears some men expres that in gi ving up s ,

claims of certainty for these i tems we may be gi v ng up the con , i

trol of facts over cognition E vidence still guide theory along . s
co rroborative chan nels and from some sources extens ve co rr obora
, i
w
tion flo s and from others none at all Indeed only when evidence . ,

is freed from the tramm els of cla ms to certai nty and infallibility i
s
doe i t S how us clearly the way i t goes .

No w to ret u rn to the relatively adequate theories and their roo t

metaphors In forcing these theorie s to a single i tem as their ba e
. s ,

we were as we intimated di storting their corroborative action

, , .

The base of these theories is really much wider and incl u de a , s

number of i tems What I mean is that there are a n u mber of
.

w
i tems hich these theories find they can take at what we might
call practically their face value tems w th regard to which the re , i i
i s a minim u m of interpretation For instance wi th space # 9 as .
, , ,

a primary base a complete mechanism I believe accepts sensa

, , ,

tion s satisfactions time and matter I

am referring here to the type of mechanism which accepts as its

categories a spatiotemporal field wi thin hich atomic or distin w

g u i s h ab l e field structures are di ff erentiated i n some sense and bu lt i
u
p into more and more complex str u ctures molecules li ing cells , , v ,

etc .
, w
hi ch are regar ded as atomically analyzable and with which ,

at a certain level of complexity are correlated mental states which

are themselves analyzable into sensory and affective elements the ,

latter being equated wi th value in terms of a hedonistic or in terest

e thics .

s
In these term typical interpretations are made of the other
evidential i tems listed It may be usefu l to suggest how The. , .

mystic experience is interpreted as a psychopathic state in

terms of mechanistic analytical psychology and its noe tic elemen t ,

of cosmic certainty is described as a neurotic illusion The elf . s

 MET PHYSA IC A L M ET H O D 2 73
i s desc ibed as a complex psychophysiological s tructure Con
r .

sc io u s n e ss regarded as a distinct datum may be ei ther ac

ce
p te d or rej ected I acq ires little corroboration in term s of the
. t u

indispensable i tems in the base of the theory and is likely to be

q u estioned Bu t i t may be accepted as virtually an independent
.

item in the base Volition is likely to be described in term

. s
of sensations and satisfactions though volition may be atom zed , i
into activities regarded as irred u cible mental elements parallel with
sensations and a ffections eanings are ordinarily inter
. M
re te d in associational terms and so reduced to sensory and physio
p
logi cal elements S imilarity .is nominalistically interpreted
so far as possible and for the res t referred to the descriptive laws
,

of the spatiotemporal materi al field Things are des cribed

-
.

s s
a perceptual obj ect and reduced to associations of sensation s ,

their reliabili ty as cues to action depending upon their psycho

physical relations L ife ( # l 3 ) is described as a complex chemical
.

structu re though an independen t element of life may be accepted

,

in the same q u estionable ay that an independent element of con w

sc io u s n e s s may be S ocial structures 4 are interpreted on the
(# )l .

biological side as interacting aggregates of individual organism s ,

and on the psychological side as sentiments analyzable n affectiv e i

volitional terms E fficient causality . as an alleged intui tive
certainty is interpreted as a psychological illusion Physical causa .

s
ti on i basically equated ith spatiotemporal material field tru e w -
s
tures S pirits . are fictions derived from dreams halluc na , i
tions etc Indeterminism and probability
, . may get either
a s u bj ective or an objective interpre tation tho u gh the tenden y , c
is to seek a determ inate base in the spatiotemporal field and thence
seek a cosmic determinism Change is ultimately analyzed
.

into motion AS for substance . this must probably b e d e

nied since there is no single entity not even the patiotemporal
, , s
, w
field hich absorbs all others wi tho u t residue et S pinoza who . Y ,

can plausibly be interp reted as a mechanist ingeniously provide , s

for s u bstance thro u gh his concep t of modes an d attributes .

v
I ha e u sed mechanism simply as an illustration — and th e con
c e tio n of mechanism I have in mind may strike some persons a
p s
something less than the most adequate that could be given If so .
,

w
there is nothing e note — no claims of certainty or infallibili ty
,

to restrain any persons from presenting th eir interpretation for s

comparison in terms of corroborative po er Bu t one importan t w .
2 74 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
point may have been ga n ed by this b r ef detailed treatment We i i .

can se e what may b e de ired of such a theory how flexi b le an d s ,

yet resistant and resilient ev dence is and how men are able to i ,

mee t one another wi thou t an imp ass e over issues nvolving u n i

res tricted evidence ur common aim O
to get a large a mass of
. is s
corroborative evidence as w e can When evidence that is organized .

s
on a chosen b as e appe ar recalcitrant to corroborat on n e ther the i i i
s i
p o it ve or the negative sense then we may either seek readj us t ,

ments wi thin the framework of that s tru cture o f evidence to take

c are of the di fficulty ; o r we may eek for fre sh eviden ce of a s
kind expe cted to clear up the difficulty ; or the m o s t radical al tem a ,

s
tive we may ee as a result o f an analy is of th e tructure of the
, , s s
s
th e ory on the chosen ba e that the difficulty l es in th e b asic cate
, i
g o ri e s of the theor
y and so be w illing and anx
, ous to discover i
what may be done in organiz ng corroborative ma e s of evidence i ss
s
on o ther ba es —that is by means of other categori es , .

s
I n most of thi paper I hav e be e n peak ing of types of u n s
restri cted hypotheses rath er than o f p ar ticular phi lo op her If s s .

the pri ncipal ai m is to seek th e organ zation the tructure or the i , s ,

possi b le orders of the world s evidence particular p hi losophers

,
’

soon come to b e regarded a o m any exper menters in thi s enter ss i

i
pr se We become interested le s n what uch a man hi torically
. si s s
s i
ai d or ntended to say than n what h e contribute d to the organ za i i
ti o n or to th e store of the world evidence s ’
.

But for a j u dgmen t of a philosopher contri bution and ( still ’

s ,

more import ant) for our o w n ability to perceive and profit from
his contribution there is no better way I bel eve than to seek ou t
, , i ,

s
as quickly a possible the base on whi ch hi s theory is co nstructed .

We are then probing into the vi tal j oints of hi s thought S tri pped .

of all authori tarianism verbalism and dogm atism what we ask, , , , ,

is th e evidence for what h e ays and having found the evidence s , , ,

w
ho we ask doe s i t hold or tand toge ther
, , s .

When we approach ndi v dual p hilos ophers n th way theiri i i is ,

personalities their language and their cultural s ett ng dri ft to

, , i s
the periphery ; but the central movement of philosophy i ts per ,

s
sistent drive for th e fac t and the tru th of the world comes clearly ,

ou t to the focus .

I will conclude wi th a comment o n ecl e cti sm This will serv e ci .

as a summ ary of my main thes e n the precedi ng di scu ssion of si

me taphysical meth o d An ec lectic n term of the preceding an aly
.
, i s
2 76 ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S
AMER WORK AT

themselve s thu s clea ly exh ib i ted a s part of the worl d s total fund
r
’

of evi dence I am eve tempted to suggest that thes corrob rative

. n e o

procedures consti tute our bes t contemporary an swer to the problem

of induction They are the means by which we thread
. way o ur

thro gh evidence
u d make rati onal j udgment s regarding the
an ex

te n s ro n of evidence .

i
R ep r n ted with p ermission of i
ed tors T he P hil os op hic al
R e v iew , 194 3 .
 H E R BE RT W. SC H NE I DE R

T0 B e a nd N ot to Be

H amle t knew perfectly clearly th e difference bet een being and w

not being ; to di stingu ish between them was not his ques tion for ,

w
he had a practical decision to make hich involved kno ing hi ch w w
of th e two “
w ”
ere better for him An d yet th e deliberations of
.

H am let as he tried to decide are among the many evidence to be s

found in human experience and reflection which show that the
distinction is not easy to make and tha t a clear and distinct d e fini
,

w
tion of being hi ch will show precisely how i t differs from non
being may be impossible Thus we have a question before us of a
.

w
very elementary sort hich we ought to explore in term of what
, s
w w
e kn o today about being an d not being and hich we ought to w
w
be able to analyze ithout draggi ng i t laboriously through it long s
histori cal career and its metaphysical philosophical and poetic , ,

as sociations In what follows I shall not ign ore th e hi story of the

.

s
que tion b u t I shall refer to the classical literature of the ubj ect
, s
only in so far as i t is conve ni ent in the course o f a factual
exami n a tion .

It isa common practice am ong s cren tis ts to ob erv e how th e s

2 77
2 7 8 AMER ICAN I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
i
th ngs they are trying to explai n come into being Follow ng thi . i s
practice I shall begi n wi th th e question of th e ge n e ratio n of beings
,

s
What doe i t mean to become ? I mu t therefore pu t aside tho e s , , s
beings which to all app e arances do not come into b eing who e , s
s
ori gi n are obs c ure or whi ch have no temporal dimension It, .

w ould be extremely dogmatic to dismiss nontempo ral unchanging ,

b eings as if there were none uch

, y excuse for beginning with s . M
i
beings that come nto being s simply that th ey are eas ier to o h i
serve Poverty for example we h ave with us always bu t when
.
, , ,

s
one be come poor then one knows distinctly that some thing has
happened that a kind of being has b e en generated ; something
,

is which w as not and whi ch may we hope p as s a i t came Thus , , s .

,

the proc ess of generation is an obvious practical point of depar ture ,

for an exploration of being of becoming an d of passing ou t of , ,

being Pas sing out is a somewhat more complicated process for

.
,

reas o ns which may be come clearer a we proceed s .

’
From an observer s point of view that is n the order of dis , , i
co v er or e mpirical disclosure there is a go od reason for beginning
y ,

the an alysis w i th events rather than wi th things for an even t is ,

a concrete example of ge n eration It is not the p res e nce of the .

given which is pri mary ; i t is not D as e in which first suggests th e

w
difference bet een being and not b eing ; t is coming and going i ,

, w
happening hich makes being problem atical In a changeless No w .

there wo u ld be no me aning in trying to distinguish being fro m

n o t being The ch ange .
“ ”
s
among things m ak e be ing and non “

”
being meaningfu l A universe at res t that s withou t re la tiv e
.
, i ,

motion in which nothi ng i generated could be a extended a

, s , s s
space may permi t could contai n di screte bo di es could even be a
, ,

pure mi lky way bu t nothing would b e in i t and ts own being if

, , i ,

w e gr ant i t one w
ould be me an ngless There would b e no indi
, i .

v id u al s ; there ar e no things where there i nothing doing A tem s .

poral perspective is necessary for a patial world to gi ve i t s igni fi s

s
c an t being Thing s tand out as di s t nc t nd vidu al not because
. i i i s
bodies are separated bu t becau e they change pos tion ence th e s i . H
“
changes or events that take p lace a we say are th e measure of , s ,

the existe nce of thi ngs A n explorat on whi h center i ts atten . i c s

tion on facts o f passage is therefore in po ses ion of a genuine , , s s
p rinc i iu m in d iv id u atio n is
p N o t matter not ub tan ce not bo dy.
, s s ,

is th e principle of in di vidual i ty atter ubst ance bod e b e c o m e . M , s s , is

i
things or ndividuals in so far as the r relative movement create i s
changes in the r re l ation to e a h oth er Wha t bod e end ure no t
i s c . is
2 80 A M E R ICA N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
qualified What happens they maintain does not really enter
.
, ,

the realm of being until i t s blessed with an ngression from i I ”

above ; an essence mus t de cend upon an existence before i t can s

claim to be ; to be implies to be omewhat This theo ry I suppose s . , ,

is a heritage from the notion that a soul must be baptized before

s
i t ha stat u s T o be sure an e ent will not ge t into a dictionary
.
, v
w
or a system o f kno ledge wi thou t some sort of verbal tag and con
c e tu al i z ati o n but i t is eviden tly generated before i t i
p , interpreted s .

To be sure an understood process is transfo rm ed to an even greater

,

extent than a baptized soul but i t i certainly a serious confusion , s

to identify the process of conceptualization i th the process of b e w
coming o r to think th at nothing is par ticular until i t is given a
,

proper name There is an opaqueness in temporal be ing which

.

usually makes i t impossibl e to de te rmine the meaning o f an event

immediately and because of thi opaqueness idealist hav e tried
, s s
to dismiss time as unreal But an observer of facts must find some
.

bet ter way of doing j ustice to the fact o f temporal obscuri ty D ark .

“ ”
ness comes before light ; God said let there be light only after
s
.

he had made sure that there was something to b e een E vents are .

w
po ers before they acquire an essence For essences are th e gen era .

tion of processes of interpre tation and these cogni tive proces e , ss

s
are intelligible only in o far as they themselves find a place among
i
the multifar ous events o r happenings or temporal power “
An s .

event s
i the presence o f an operative power ”
1 ay U sh enk o , s s .

Very well let this pass a a d e n i tio n o f an event

, s ere we have fi . H
i ts essence It is a presence ; but not a presence wh ch announces i t
. i s
“
arrival by show ing i ts ingression passport a a presence I t comes . s .

as a power ( A n operative
. power if I understand the term i nology ,

correctly is a power whi ch has come nto being ; for even powe rs
, i
must wai t their turn to act n the w ai ting roo m o f potentiali tie ) i s .

w s
Po ers are not exi tentially di st nct from th e events whi h make i c
them
”
present ; they do no t ingres into event T h e even t is the s s .

act o f generation o r the power in action ere we must be o n . H

our guard against the temptation of nterpreting event a sub i s s
s ti tu te s for bodies o r things or energies o r powers appenings are . H
certainly n o t intelligible wi thou t a world o f bodies in relative mo
tion This world is being according to what I ai d above i n so far
.
, s ,

as i t is eventful ; to attri bute being to i t in any other sens e robs

“ ”
being of its ing No w t may be that there are worlds in
-
.
, i
which th e ing is not neces ary ; but in th e world of happe ni ngs
-
s
being must i ts elf be understoo d in the context of proce s e and s s ,
 To BE AND N OT To BE 2 81

ssi
proces e n terms of relative motion among bodies or energ es or i
w s
po ers or quanta a the case may be E vents individualize the
, .

w
world of po ers ; bu t there is no reason to suppose that events are
created e x n ih ilo Events are no t generated they are generations
.
, .

( )
3 A third theory notably George , ead s theory puts th e H M .
’

whole burden of process philosophy on the theory of p res e n ce .

D espite hi s attemp t to escape the fallacies of atomism and of

assuming artifici al discontinuities ead is in danger of interpret M
ing the present (which I hall S gnify by D ase in) as a collective s i
term for individual perspectives or p res e n ts A correlation of .

s
presence may not di ffer very much from a construction of private
spaces But what makes ead s theory more realistic than R u sell
. M ’
s ’
s
is his doctri ne that though a present is the principle of individu
i
al ty these presences or presents Operate in a public domain o r
,
”
area of manip u lation This area of manipulation s really the
.

”
i
domain of facts o f passage or processes which receive individu ,

ali ty in a given perspective or interpretation but hi ch consti tute , w

”
an obj ective relational field ( a realm of D as e in) in hich pres w
e n tati o n al relativi ty and the course of e ents combine to form v
the histori al context of experience The di fficu lty may be largely .

verbal b u t I have di fficu lty in followi ng ead as he shifts from

, M
a present to th e present It seems to me that there is a danger here
.

i
o f mak ng D as e in rather than p ass a e the basic fact of individuality
g
and of being And I wish to make my own position quite u n amb igu
.

ous by regar ding th e processe and not their presentation as the

, s
facts of individu ality A t the same time I wish like
. ead to in , M
terp re t events as facts of passage in a
”
“
orld of doings or going w s
on wi thou t red u cing them ei ther to atomic or unit events or
to phases of a single world process A ccordin gly I conceive the .
,

pri mary problem of analysis to be the recognition of distinctive

“ ”
categorial types of happenings or processes I wish to distinguish .

di fferent types of being among processes In other words even ad .

,

mi tting that events o r changes are the p rin c ip iu m in d iv id ua tio n is

and as such a basic as p ect of comi ng into being an ontological ,

science canno t sto p at thi s starting point b u t must observe quali ta ,

tive di fferences among these temporal individ u als To have a p rinc i .

p i u m in d iv id u a tio n is i a mere begin s

ni ng for descriptive o r ana

l y tic al ontology .

I shall not attempt here an exhaustive exploration of the var ous i

categorial processes but be content to call attention to th ree type
,
s
w
of processes hich are important for any theory of being and ,
2 82 A M E R I CA N IL O S O P H E R S
PH WORK AT

which w l l enable me to i r mak e s ome ob servat i ons on h i sto i cal being

and historical proce es E ach of these processes creates distinct ss .

i
types of ndividuali ty and has i ts characteristic structure The .

ancient Greek name for them are still useful since Greek h as s ,

now become a technical language bu t I must try to transla te these ,

si
technical concept nto th e fami liar distinctions of men who are
not accustomed to phi losophical analysis for the processes them ,

selves to which I cal l attention are indee d very ordinary beings

, , .

They are : p hys is p o es is and n o es is ; or in L a tinesque E nglish

,
’

, ,

generation cre ation and cogni tion ; in German I suppo e one

, , , s
s
might ay : E n ts tehe n Wirk e n u nd Ve rs te he n , , .

The first process gen eration n order to make i ts E nglish nam e

,
“
, i
roughly equivalent to th e Greek we might better call natural
”
pro duction includ ng growth “
S uch generation i
nvolves the . i
s
natural ch ange through which bod es or energies are transformed i .

i
Compos ng this proce s s are such events or sub p roce sses as colli
sion comb ustion decay assimilation erosion birth death etc
, , , , , , , .

Though each such event or subproc ess is an ndividual when taken i ,

“
out of i t natural s
ts generating context i t loses itself to some
, i ,

i
extent n the product on of culminating individuals Thes e cul i .

m in atio n s of cumulative chan ge also have their being in p ro c ess s ,

i s
but they mark end ng of p articular proces se of generation For a s .

s
proces s i by definition n di vidua l ized Thus a physical individual i .
,

is a generated being ; such nd v du al ity characterize bo th the i ii s

thi ngs called happenings or event or occasions and the things s
tradi tionally known as substances Beings such as mount ai ns . ,

clouds trees galaxies animal are the same kind of being a

, ,
“
, s s s
fires collisions growths resp rratro ns ; they all become in the
, , ,

course of events endure a hile then p as s out through transforma

, w ,

ti on into other indiv duals The v ario u s attempts to conceive thisi .

s
cour e of events and ucces sive exist e nce of things this vast array s ,

“ ”
“
of natural production a phases of a single pro cess of evolu tion ”
, s ,

or natural hi s tory or cosmic development which culmi nates in

,

some single great end pro duct are mythologie that feed the imagi , s
nation bu t they can not be t ak en eriously as hypothese to expl ai n
, s s
s
the upposed uni ty of natural proces ses The need for a postu late .

of unity in nature which is st ll be ing asserted may at be st rep re

, i ,

sent a kind of fai th or trust in natural being and may b e felt as

a moral need but i t is certai nly not an intellectual need
, n the . O
contrary the first need in factual ontology is not to exaggerate the
,

i
unity or continuity n nature ; the continuitie and di scontinuitie s s
2 84 A MERI C A N PH ILO S OP H ER S AT WORK
memory and conceptual con truction The e o ther proc e se c ans . s s s
now serve a m o tiv atio n s H
ere S o crates contrast is nstruct ve
.
’
i i
w
the contrast bet een th e artist who create b u t fail to understand s s
what he has created an d how he h as done i t and the philosopher ,

who u nders tands beauty and art though he creates nei ther U n ,
.

d e rs tan di ng is necessarily th e work of a self or person but thi , s

fact does not imply that th e self precedes the process T h e e l f . s
is the fu lfillmen t of the experiencing process not a pr or being , i .

H aving di stinguished these three fam liar types of proces s I am i ,

w
now prepared to interpret hat is called the hi tor cal proce s ”
s i s .

I believe that history in the categor al sense is no proces s at all

, i , ,

b u t the field of human experience ou t o f which histories can be

taken There are careers and storie some histor cal o ther not
. s , i s .

s
These storie and careers are fin te ndividual proc esses ; in each i i ,

i
there s a beginning middl e and end Whe ther the end b e an
, , .

“ ”
abrupt terminus or as i t should b e in a good tory a culmina
, s ,

tion of a career a story is an attempt to understand a career It

, .

uni tes with the process of understan di ng either a natural career

of generation and destruction ( as for example of a ri ver valley) , ,

or a construction ( as for example of an empire) There i i n

, , . s
di v id u al i ty both in the career and in the telling of i t Bu t when .

we speak o f th e historical process and regard i t as a specia l onto

logical problem we are faced with an entirely di fferent subj ect
,

matter For history in this comprehensive sense is no t a story but

.

the matrix o f all true or false stories It is the field of human ex p eri .

ence which is no one s experience There is in i t no inh erent

,
’
.

v
perspecti e no organized structure uch a a s tory has or a is
, s s s
“
embodied in any particular course o f events It i temporal but . s ,

s
not i tself a course of event It s beginnings and end are los t in
.
’

darkness ; it cannot be grasped a a whole Pas t and future th e s .

,

i
essential categor es of his tory are relative to a S hifting present Al l
, .

events happen in the present unles they are hi storically irrelevant

, s ,

uneventfu l To take a trivial example : you know a

. ell as I d o sw
that between my birth an d death there has been taking place a
long physical process of heartbeats respirations and digestion s , , .

Very few o f these heartbeats took place in any present whatsoe ver ;
w
a some hat larger number of my respiration entered into my s
presence that of my physician or that of my acquaintances ; and
, ,

a still larger number of digestions the poorer ones were present , , .

B u t on the w
hole all this is an unhistorical proces a chai n of s ,

events that is nei ther meani ngless nor uni ntelligible but tha t i , s
 TO BE AND N OT To BB 2 85

insignifican t endured bu t not exper enced l ved but not recalled

, i , i .

The present is an ontological field by no means specious ; i t is the ,

lo c us o f hum an expe ri encing the gathering of meanings The v , .

o u s interes ts which i t generates f u rnish the perspective for all

histories and th e be ing o f th e past For th e pas t is not the um
, . s
total of events that have happened nor even th e sum total of ,

s
even t that once were present ; i t is the past of a present s u bj ect
to th e chan ges which th e presen t works upon i t o ever tho u gh . Hw ,

history begi ns in the present i t i not true that all hi stories are , s
i
histor es o f the present A history i not even m ere ly of th e past
. s ,

for in throwing th e past into perspective ith the present i t also w ,

generates a prospection I t anti cipate a future Though memory . s .

, s
be th e prim ary po i tive pole of hi story there is always an implicit ,

reference to prophecy to the negative pole o f hi story For wi thout

, .

a past no one has a future What w as and what may be are the
, .

beings that m ake o f the present a duration and w thout duration , i

s
th e pre ent would not be .

s
For these reason I canno t agree w th D onald William who i s
regar ds hi story as an ordinary temporal s tructu re based simply ,
“
on the four dimensional continuum To him th e perfect or com
-
.

”
p l e te history would be the comple te record o f human events ,

s
po sibly nonh um an even ts too Thi i a fantastic conception of , . s s
“ ”
the historical idea God s mi nd ha ometimes been pictu red as
.
’
ss
s
such a perfect torehouse for all events but I am s u re that even ,

God records only human deed “ ”

and deeds are already a highly s ,

selected se t of events revealing God s interes ts , istory is not ’

. H
chronology nor a hall o f records The hole story of human learn . w
i ng by experi ence if i t be a story at all is a very di ffi cult proces
, , s
to conceive and is continually retold istorians may be tempted . H ,

as all men are to see in i t a linear pro gr es o r a series of cycles

, s , ,

or a
g row th of reason freedom o r hat not I need
, not recall th e w .

i
h story of philosophies of hi tory But I need to call attention to s .

the fact that there is am ong ontologis ts even more than among ,

i
h storiographers a s erious effort to understand hi stori cal being and
, ,

to the fact that this e ffort meets w i th seri ous obstacles .

I t is not di fli cu l t to understand hy hum an being should regard w s

their histori cal being as the most import ant dimension o f their
being Bu t i t is paradox ical that their search for importance bring
. s
wi th i t a sense of insecu rity an understan ding of the cen tral im ,

portance of an ever s hi fting contingent present In their attemp t

-
, .

to anchor th e present and to mas ter the future men must tak e ac ,
2 86 P H IL O S O P H E R S
AME RI CAN WORK AT

co nt of all th ee types of proc s s of whi ch I have b en telling

u r e e .

But though all th ree play their rol s in hi sto y hey do not play e r , t
toge her H istorical be i ng i s not a syn hesis
t . ha m ony of pro t or r c

esses i t is a confusion not a fu s ion It s eem to b a storehouse for

; , . s e

an endless number f histo i es to understand the s t uct re of the o r ; r u

whole remains an elusive task .

The fact that the p t wi ll not s t y put i s good ev i dence that as a

i t h not p sed out f b i ng S ome events pass out and are lo t i n

as as o e . s

h
t e i rr coverable void oth rs ge t presented What was may
e ; e re- .
,

a g ai n be in s me proces other A od i ts recoverabil i ty prove s s or . n

t hat i t did not become nonb ing when i t left h present A e t e . s

memory g ows a s h s torehouse enl ges hi s to i cal unders tand

r , t e ar , r

ing become s i ncre s i ngl y comp li cated The g owi ng p t mea aa . r as ns

more problematic pre s ent and i t pu t a greater resp n s ibili y on , s o t
h historian For a hi s to i
t e is . f ee to create h pa s t he r an no t r t e ;
must d i sclose or di s ove i t i n the r s ource s f the pre sent H ec r e o .

mus t keep a doub l e perspective i n v i ew the hand he mu s t : on o ne ,

know what and the o her he must k ow what past i s

w as , on t , n
relevant N h i sto y wi hou t evaluat i on
. o d ev aluation w i th
r t , an no

o u t an l present persp ct i v
ac tu a Thu s h is to i cal understan di ng
, e e . r

is far more complicated ha phy s ical sc i en ce f temporal being t n o .

It t k e s the i magi nati on clo s e to hat d ge ou s adventurou s land

a t an r ,

of nonbe i ng I lead to the once upon a time

. t d to the utop i a
s
“ ”
an
“
.

To th s e no man s lands human b ings

e not s tranger s bu t in
’
e are ,

th m they lo se the i understan di ng B i nging h se nonb ing s i nto

e r . r t e e

the pr ent is one f man s favo i te proce se s of construction But

es o
’
r s .

th i s field of i magin ry be i ng a m o s t at acti ve field is not thea , tr ,

historian s concern and I ’

shall leave i t f a other e s ay
; , too , or n s .

1 . A . P .

197
U s h e nk o , P o w e r and E v e nts ( P rinc e to n, P ri nc e to n U ni v ers ity P ress ,

p . .
2 88 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HERS AT WORK
p eri en ce wh i ch i nh erently nc a pab l is
e o f b e ing enmeshed ni i
concep ts ? The reas on given wi ll be tha t if there b e any experien e c ,

datu m or thi ng of any ki nd hatever before th e mi nd i t mus t

, w ,

w
be related in some ay to the o ther ex periences o f th e same mi n d .

It mus t at leas t be ei ther l ik e o r u nl i ke tho s e ex periences that , is ,

i t mus t bear to them th e relatio n s o f simi lari ty o r d is s imi li ari ty It .

mus t al s o be di s ti ngui shable from them that is i t mus t bear to , ,

them the relati on of di ff eren ce Bu t whatever has rela tion is con . s

ce tu ali z ab l e sin e to kno
p a
, t hi ng s c
relation w
s is to know i ts c o n
’

cep t . M ci
ore pre s ely to h ave a concep t o f any thi ng mean n o more
, s
than to kn o w to what o ther thi n gs i t bears th e relati on of imi l ari ty s .

The concept of a tri an gle is formed by no ti ng the poin t in whi ch s

al l triangles resemble o n e an o ther nam ely in being bounded by ,

thr ee strai ght li n es Thus if th e mysti c know th e r e emblan ces

. s s
be tween th e v arious occas ions on whi h he h as th e mys t c ex p eri c i
ence and thei r di fferen ces from h s ordi n ary exper en e o f dail y
, i i cs
lif e he ha s al ready in thi s knowle dge a concep t of them Thi s is
, .

reflected i n the very fact that he us e u h words a mys ti al “

ssc s c ,
“
,
“ ”
numin ous and even exper en e of them The e are all c o n i c . s
c e ts
p They. all co nn ote resembl an ce and difference s between hi s s
mysti cal an d hi s o ther experi ence In deed even to say that hi s s .

exp erience is u n co n cep t uali z ab l e is to apply a concep t to i t in ce , s

s
i t co n no te a resemblan ce be tween di fferent oc cas io ns o f the ex p eri
en ce an d a di fferen ce bet ween t an d o ther ex p erien ces If a man
, i .

s
coul d have one e t o f experiences W tho u t an y relation to hi s o ther i
experi ences thi s woul d mean that the two e ts o f experiences could
, s
not be wi thi n th e uni ty of the same mi n d oreover if there were . M ,

a being or exi stence o u t o f all rela ti on to th e o ther being an d s

w
exis tences o f th e orld then i t co ul d n o t be part o f th e uni ver e
, s ,

si nce the uni verse s imply is th e total ty o f all nterrelated an d i i

v
We shall ha e to poin t o u t l ater that G o d not a p art of the is
s
univer e one thi ng am ong o ther thi ngs and s tanding in relati ons
,

wi th them For this woul d i nvolve Hi s o thern e to them and

. ss
woul d accordi ngly des troy His nfini ty For th e moment we may i .

w
mak e a parti al an s er to th e above cri ti i sm by po n ting out that c i
“ ”
i t reli es on a use of the ord experience whi ch is i nappli cable w
to th e cas e in han d By an experien e we ordi naril y mean ome
. c s
thi ng w
hi ch i s before the min d or pre ent to i t Thi s involve a s . s
d is tin c tion be tween the mi nd and i ts experi en ce o r obj e t Thus c .

“
s
the color or mell is there an d I who cogni ze i t am different ,
”
, ,
 T IME AND ET ER N I T Y 2 89

from i t . M
oreover one color is l ike ano ther and i unlike a mell ,
s s .

In all s u ch expe ri ences there fore the concep t come into play
, , s .

Bu t th e mystic experience is not of thi kind For there is in s .

i t no division of mind from i ts ob j ec t nor any o ther distinction ,

w
be t een this and that I t i a fla less indivisibl e uni ty which give
. s w ,
s
no foo thold for the concep t Thi s is what it is in its e l It is true . f .

, f
that if i t is looked at ro m th e o u ts id e as for example i t is by ,

th e mystic hi mself when he returns to the le el of his everyday o r v

temporal experience then i t will be different from that ordinary
,

expe ri ence and will be conc eptually distinguished as the mystical

,

from the nonmystical In short conceptualizati on implies th e dis

.
,

w
tinction bet een subj ect and obj ect as ell as o ther di stinction w s ,

and the religious experience is n o n co n cep tu aliz ab l e be cause no su h c

di stinctions exist in i t .

But i t w ill be said that all this implies a God who stands in
w
no relation to the orld at all an d for obvious reas ons this i , s
impossible We have therefore to discuss the problem of th e rel a
.

w
tio n of God to the orld No w i t follows from all that ha be en . s
w w
said that hen e speak of God ha ing some relation to th e world v
o u r lan uage m u st be symbolic only
g God is related t o the orld ”
. w
is a p roposition ab ou t God and is therefore fal se if i t is taken ,

in a literal sense That no predicates apply to G od is a statement

.

whi ch mus t be understood as incl u ding relations among predi cates .

To see that this mu st b e so we ha e only to see that th e attri b u v

tion of relations to God leads to the same sort of contradictions
and absurdities as does the at tribution of q u aliti es It is in co n .

sistent for examp le wi th God s infini ty For a relation i mplies

, ,
’
.

w w
at least t o terms be t een hich the relation holds In this case w .

w w
the t o te rms o u ld be God and the orld But if the orld is w . w
other than God then God is limited by the world and is not
, ,

infi nite H“
e is not that th an hi ch there is no other
.
”
w .

We may look at the vari ous attempts hich have be e n made in w

di ff erent religions to state or conceive the relations between God
w
and the orld We shall find th at if taken literally they are all
.
, ,

impossible and abs u rd S pace relations time relations and causal

. , ,

relati ons have be en those hich have been most commonly w

plied in the s e conceptions en began p e rhap s i th spatial rela
. M w
. w
tions God as above the sky abo e the stars or outside the , v ,

w
spherical universe I t ould be generally recogn i zed today that any
.

such conception could b e only symbolical To thi s ucceede d the

“ ”
. s
noti on that God is omnipresent This was t ak en quite literal ly .
2 9 0 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
w
by Ne ton who thought that space was God s s enso rium that ’

God is spread all through i t o that the plan ets are actually mov , s
ing through the space oc cupied by God s mind No do u b t the ’
.

metaphor of omnipres e nce has a meaning b u t it can hardly be ,

anything so crude as this We should hold tha t i t is a metap h or for .

God s infini ty according to which conception space cann o t be out

’

side of God— that i s oth e r to God— nor can any p ar t of i t b e out

,

H v
side im E ide ntly w e cannot conceive the relation between G od
.

w
and the orld as a spa tial one .

i
A t me relation bet een God and the
“
w
orld finds exp ression
”
w
in the phras e that God is before all the worlds and is also ,

implied b y the comm on conception that God created th e world at

s ome m o ment in time Hw
o ever e conceive i t a temporal relati o n
. w ,

of God to the w orld p u ts God in the time stream makes im part -

, H
of th e natural order a temp oral b eing A ccording to some th eo l o
, .

gians the conclusion that G od i s in th e time stream is not to be

,
-

dr awn b e ca u se the cr e ation of ti me w as part of the creation o f

,

th e world God created tim e along wi th the world hich exist

.
, w s
. v
in it Bu t thi s ob iously involve s contradi ctions I f th e creation .

s
wa a temporal act at all—and s o i t must be conceived if we are to
take any of these ideas literally—then there was a m oment in ti me
w
at which the orld came in to be ing and before that there w as a ,

i w
t me hen i t was not i n being .

A causal relation be tween God and th e world has been o n the ,

whol e th e most common concep tion It is implied b y the doc tri ne

, .

of creation God is the cau se the world is the effect S ince a caus al
.
, .

relation me ans a succession of cause and e ffect in time this in ,

volves th e same di ffi culties as those se t out i n th e l as t paragraph .

i
It e ther place s God in the ti me stream or i t involves co ntradic -
,

tions in i ts c o ncep t of time It also destroys th e infinity of God .

,

since in any cau sal relation th e e ff ect i s other than the cau e 1 And s .

if i t be sai d that God s causali ty is to be understoo d di fferently ’

from the ordinary causality hich e find in th e created world w w ,

as for exam ple th e causing of ice by cold this is to admi t our ,

point namely that non e of thes e re lations temporal spatial or

, , , ,

cau s al as applied to God s relation to the world can be taken

,
’

literally b u t that all s u ch language is symbolical in character

, .

H
In indu ism God s relation to th e world is not conceived a
,
’
s
cre ation b u t as manifestation This ho ever can be unders too d
, .
, w ,
”
only by the u se of some metaphor God is not then before th e .

“
world but behind i t,
”
e is that hich is behind the veil of . H w
2 92 AMER IC A N I
PH LO S PH R O E S AT WORK
between G od and the world is a symbolic proposi tion an d no t a
li teral tru th If the word relation be taken in a literal ense then
. s ,

God has no relation to the world An d thi s is what on o ther . ,

grounds w e ough t to h ave expected For if G od were related to

, .

w
the things in th e orld then e wo u ld imself be one among , H H
o ther things H
e wou ld be a p art of th e univer e a part of the
. s ,

na tural order . H
e would b e a natural not a supe rn atural being , , .

For the natural order i to be defined as the totali ty of thingss

wh eth er these thi ngs be min d s or mate rial things — hich are linked w
into a single system b y relations et though w e may say that . Y
the wo rd relation as use d of God s a me tap h o r w e are bound
, , i ,

w
unless e are to be charged ith the fau lt o f using mere meta ”
w
phor to say what this me taphor means in terms of the actual re
-

l igio us expe rience What do the metaphors of cr e ation manifesta

.
,

tion bei ng b e fore th e world or behind it me an ? An d th e answer

, , , s
s
to the e ques tions have till to b e fou nd s .

B u t i n order to develop o u r conception s w e will continue for

the moment to sp e ak in metaph o rical language We ill take our . w
metaphor from the line of T S E liot : s . .

To apprehend
T h e point of intersection of th e timeles s
”
With time is an occu patio n for the saint 2 .

There are two orders th e natural order which is th e order o f

, ,

time and th e di vine order which is the order of eternity In

, , .

th e momen t o f mystic illumin ation th e t o ord e rs inte r ect so w s ,

that that momen t belongs to both orders The image of the inter .

se c ting straight lines b reaks down in one respect Two physical .

strai ght lines intersect at only o n e point an d then diverge But , .

we have to suppo s e that in some way every moment of ti me i , , s

s
an inter e c ti o n of th e d vine order i th the natural order Buti w .

if every moment of time is thus in fact traversed by th e line of

i
the divine dime nsion t is only in the rare momen t of illumi nation
,

in th e life of th e s ai n t that th s is cle ar ly ap prehended and fully i

realized .

With in that singl e moment of time are encl o s ed all eternity and
all infinity This is the meaning of Blake s ords :
.
’
w
“
w
To see th e orld in a grain of sand
w w
,

An d a heaven in a ild flo er
H
,

old infinity in the palm of your hand ,

”
A n d e te rnity in an hour 3 .
 T IME AND ET ERN I T Y 2 93

It is a commonplace that eternity is not an endle s prolongation s

of time has nothi ng to do i th time E ternity is a characteristic
, w .

of the mystical experience The ord eternity do u b tless meant . w

originally endless ness of time hich must co u nt therefore as i ts , w , ,

literal meani ng Bu t in i ts reli gi ou s and metaphysical u se i t is a

.

metaphor for the char acteristic of th e experience For in that ex .

p erie n c e time drops a ay and is no more se en The w

same is true .

of infini ty This does no t mean the endlessness of a series The

. .

mystic ill u mination is infini te in i tself because there is nothing

outside i t beca u se there is ithi n it no this or that no li mi ting
, w ,

. w
otherness An d the ord i n finity originally and lit erally meaning ,

th e endlessness of a series is no u sed as a metaphor for this

, w .

An d that the experience is eternal that is to say timeless also , ,

w
follo s from the fact that there are in i t no divisions or relations .

For there can not b e time here there are no di visions and rela
“ ”
w ”
tions of before and after We have spoken of the i nfi nity and .

ete rni ty of the divine moment in the experience of the s ai nt Bu t .

w e may al s o s p eak in the same terms of th e infini ty and eterni ty

of G o d For these t o are identical
. w .

The eternal moment being a point of intersection can be looked

, ,

w
at ei ther from i thin or from itho u t S ince i t b elongs to bo th w .

orders i t is bo th temporal an d e ternal L ooked at in tem al ly

, .

that is as the mystic himself se es i t i n that moment—i t is infinite

and eternal L ooked at from the outside — as i t is se en not only
.
,

by all of us in our normal conscio u sness b u t by the mystic him ,

self when he has passed o u t of it into the time order and looks -
,

back u pon i t in memory— looked at thus external ly i t is a moment

. w
in time From ithin i t is God For i t is not a con sciousne ss of .

v
God a di ided con scio u sness herein the mystic as su bj ect stands
, w
v
o er agains t D eity as obj ect I t is the immanence of G od imself . H
in the so u l But as i t is looked at from th e outside its content is
.
, ,

merely a pa ss ing state of th e mind of the mystic .

N at u ralism is the philoso p hy hich as serts the sole reality of the w

natu ral order and denies the reali ty of the divine order That is
,
.
,

v
i t loo ks at the di ine momen t only externally The conten t th e .
,

inner filling of th e moment is then for i t ill u sion No t that it

,
.

de ni es that the moment occurs as a fact in time No t that i t denies .

th at the sai nt h as th e expe rience hich he says he has B u t the w .

ex p e ri ence is seen as merely s u bj ective that is illusory G o d is , , .

then an illusion .

B u t there is also necessari ly an opposi te kind of illusionism For .

2 94 . AM R E IC A N PH IL O S O P H E R S AT WORK
if w e take our stand wi thi n the momen t itself it is then the world , ,

t h natural order which is ill sion For the content of the mom nt
e , u . e

is the infini te and outside the infi nite there i s nothing The world
,
.

is therefore nothing The con ten t of the momen t is also ete rni ty
. ,

and there i s therefore outside i t no time ence arises that acos . H

mism that denial of the reali ty of th e world which i associated
, , s
w w
ith mysti cism and i th those systems of metaphysics which have
their origin in mysti cism A cosmi sm reaches i ts hi ghest poin t in .

the religiou s philosophie s of Indi a ith th e ir do ctrin e of the world w

as maya In the Wes t i t appears in philosophi e like that of Brad
. s
l ey Bradley is only dimly a are of th e mystical character of hi
. w s
own p hi lo s oph y an d supposes himself to b e in gen e ral a rationalist
,
.

Bu t his remark in th e intro duction to his boo k App e aranc e and

“
R e a lity that philoso p hy is a satisfaction of what may b e called
the mystical side of our natu re reveals th e secret source s of hi s ,
“
thought For him time and space and the world are only app e ar
.

ance not reali ty A ppearance is a word which is n o t so extreme

, .

as ill u sion . Y
e t i t is only a les ser degr ee of th e same denial o f
w
the reali ty of th e orld A l l p hilos ophie s which declare that time .
,

space and th e world are un real or half real or phenomena l or

, , , , ,

appearances or illusion have their roots in mysticism For the

, , .

w
propositi o n the orld is unreal is a mystica l propo si tion not a ”
,

factual proposi tion I t derive s from the mystical v ision of the eter
.

nal and infi ni te moment ou tside which th ere is no other and

w
therefore no o rld no space no time But for th e maj ori ty of so
, , .
,

c alled and self styled rationalistic philosophers the divin e moment

-
,

is so de eply buried in their subc onscio u s that they are only dimly
aware of i t and s u ppose that th e ir concl u sions are th e res u lt of
logical argu ment In them th e mystical ells up from th e depths
. w
to th e surface conscio u sness where it is then rationalized , .

The mystic lives in both orders that of eternity an d that of ,

time H
e p as ses from one to the o ther This is also true of other
. .

men in the degree in which the mys tic consciousness is developed

in th em B u t this d u al existence gives rise to confu sion of the one
.

order wi th the other For the p u re mystic cons cio u sness there is no
.

world at all I t is pure illusion For the pure natural consciousness

. .

there is no God and no di ine The y are entirely ill u sory B u t v . .

v
because men li e in both orders the t o extremes of illusionism w ,

atheism and acosmism are rarely met ith — tho u gh of course , w

atheism is much the com moner When the great mystic passes back .

from the order of eternity into the order of time the orld which , w
 2 96 AMER ICA N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
intersect the temporal order at eve ry moment of time and at ev ery
po int of space For this is demanded by th e intuition of the omni
.

presence o f God We c annot at present se e how this is p ossible . .

We see how the in ter e ction occu rs in th e moment of hu m an s

mystical illumination and since this moment is not only pre e nt , s
s
i n th e grea t my tic bu t in all men w e may say that we s ee at , ,
h

least dimly—how i t occurs through o u t that area of the natural

w orld which is the human mind B u t hat is to be s ai d of ani . w
mals and plants ? A n d what of inanimate obj ects such as rocks ,

”
M
and metals ? r Gandhi is reported to have said God is in the
.

stone This is of course religious language and is therefore sym

.
, , ,

b o l ic al ( To s u ppos e that i t is literally true

. ould mean that G o d w
is in th e ston e in the s ame sense as silica o r fe ldspar are in the
stone ) But if it i s n o t to be mere metaphor so me symbolized mean
.
,

ing must be given to i t A n d th e question is what meaning? f .

, O
h o w God is in th e human heart we know something from o ur own
inner experience B u t ho is G od in the stone ? ow does the . w H
eternal order intersect th e natural order at the space time poin t -

where the s tone is ?

It may be s aid that God s being in th e stone i s a pantheistic ’

doc trine not acceptabl e to Christianity Bu t thi s would be a

, .

mistake P antheism is th e error that God is o n ly in the world and

.
,

that H e is no t tran scenden t of t An d if e rej e ct pan theism i t i . w ’

should not be on the gr ound that we deny God s immanence every
wh e re and in everything b u t rather on the groun d that alth ough ,

God is i m manent e e ry here at every point of space an d moment v w ,

—
of time which is the meaning of is om pr ence H e is also
ni e — H s
transcendent An d in the concep tion of a di vine intersection of
.
,

the natural order the imm anence of God is re pre ented by th e , s

assertion that the intersecti on takes place at e very point while ,

H is transcendence is represented by the fact that the divine and ‘

ete rnal is a wholly different order or dimension from the natural .

H ence we s till have th e questi on h o w G od can be in th e stone .

We do not I believe know enough to gi ve an y sor t of confident

, ,

w
answer I ill give the ans e r which I be lieve to b e true while
. w ,

admi tting i ts speculative ch ar acter It seems probabl e that as the .

,

pan p sychis tic philoso p hy of White head has sugges ted there is no ,

di stinction except one o f de gr ee bet ween the organic and inor

, ,

ani c or be tween life and mind A lex ander s doctrine of emerge nt

’

g ,
.

evolution suppos ed th e follo ing levels of emergence — space—time w ,

in o rgan ic matter life ( found without cons ciousne in plants ) an d

, ss
 T IME AND ETERN I T Y 2 97
mi nd or con s ci ousnes s This may well be correct bu t A lexander
.
,

w
sup posed an ab solu te b reak be t een each of the levels The organic .

w
philosophy of Whi tehead ould s u ppos e on the contrary that , ,

there i s no s u ch break There is continuity The common thread

. .

running throughou t the series is life A ll things are l iving Even . .

w
an electron is a very lo grade organism a living b e ing The es
-
, .

sence of i ts being as of every be ing is feeling or experience al

, , ,

though i n th e p re an im al levels the feelings and experiences are

blind an d unconscio us This is supported by many anal o gi e and
“
. s ,

also by so me scientific considerations For ins tance i t make s possi .

,

ble an explanation of how life appe ared o n th e earth ou t of previ

“ ”
ous inorganic existences There is also the fact that in the virus
.

w w
e have a being hich exhi bi ts o me of the characteristics of the s
organic and some of the characteristics of the inorganic suggesting ,

w
that i t is not possible to dra a sh ar p line between th e tw o We .

may then well suppose that what e call the deadn ess of inorganic w
existences is b u t a dee p hypnotic lee p of their consciousness s .

I f we combine this suggestion wi th ano ther hich ha already , w s

been made in these pages we can p erhaps obtain so me light on
,

o u r problem This other sugges tion was that i n thos e men who
.
,

are not what are co m monly called mys t cs the divine moment li e i , s
in the su b conscious far dow n in some nearer to the surface in
, ,

others I n the great mystic i t has emerged into th e fu ll light of

.

conscious mentality In common m e n i t exists not far from the

.

surface so that i t stirs the surface and appear s ther e as dim religi ous
,

feeling which can be evoked and enhanced—that is draw n n e arer

, ,

to the surface— b y the symbolic l anguage of re ligion an d es peci al ly

by the language of th e mystic E xperiments in hypn o is pl ai nly
. s
show not only that there are the conscious an d th e unconscious ,

but that there are al so level s of uncon sc iousn e s We easily accept s .

the fact that there are de grees of cons ciousne ss A man m ind . s
'

may be alertly con s ciou s or only dimly a are of things A state w .

w
of dreamy or dro sy awareness pa s se s by degrees into sleep But .

w e are apt to s u ppose tha t uncon sciousness is with out de grees that ,

i t is simply a total absence of co ns ciou sness But even th e com mon .

fact that one sleep may be deeper than another should dissipate
this belie f An d the facts of hypnosis mak e i t certai n that i t is
.

false There are dee p er and deeper levels of hypnosis greate r and ,

w
.

le ss er darkn esses darkness below darkne ss It m ay ell b e th at .

w
,

what e call the life o f th e plant is but a level of th e hyp notic

ss
slee p of cons ciousn e lower than is ever foun d in th e an mal and i ,
2 9 8 AMER IC A N I
WORK
P H LO S OP H ER S AT

t hat in th e me tal and the rock the darkne s is deeper s till b

s ut that , ,

even there , a blind unconscious mentality exists P erhap s then in .

, ,

the plant and the metal the divine moment exists u tte rly s u b ,

merged The point of i ntersection is there buried in the blackness

.
,

of th e night of that me tallic conscio u sness or that plant consci ous ,

s w w
ne s hich e can only dimly apprehend as akin to hypno t c or
, i
sleep states in ourselves An d there too pe rhaps the eternal mo
.
, ,

w
ment a aits that evolutionary liberation from the d ar kness that ,

passage into th e ligh t which has already come in some degree to

,

man and in a supreme degree to mystic m an

, , , .

We may now try to answer some of th e q u estion hich as e sw , w

saw were pressing upon u s What is the me ani ng of th e metaphor
, .

s
of intersection ? This inter ection me ans precisely what th e e ternal
moment is experienced to be It is o ne and the same human con .

sc io u s n e s s w
hich experiences both th e te mporal or natural world
and that eternal and infinite order whi ch is disclosed in mystical
illumination Thus this identi ty O f e te rnity ith a temporal mo
. w
ment is an actual experienced fact and this fact is hat is me ta , w
p h o ri c all
y repre s ented by the image of intersection .

What relation does one eternal moment b ear to another

w
whe ther th e t o which we compare belong to the mi nd s tream of -

the same m an or to the mind stream s of tw o different men ? To

,
-

this as to all religious or metaphysical question there are t o

, s , w
w
di fferent ans ers according as e take our tand wi thin th e mo
, w s
men t or outside it From the outside we shall say that o n e such
.
,

momen t be ars to another the relation of res emblance and also ,

no doub t some relations of nonresemblance Thus What one mystic .

reports resembles what another reports in most ways b u t there ,

may b e some differences This result e ems to lead to embarrass

. s
ment because i t introduces relations into wha t p u rpo rts to be rela
,

ti o n l e ss and thereby renders the mystic exp e rience a proper s u bj ec t

,

matter for concepts and predicates For to say that experience A .

is like experience B is to a ssert a common e l e men t as be tween

them and therefore the poss ibili ty of a concept An d i t is in this ay
“ “
. w
that in fact we get such concepts as mystical and numino u s .

w
But Obvio u sly if e thus s tart our inq u iry from the naturalistic
w
standpoint we come o u t i th a natural istic concl u sion T h e eternal '
.

momen t is then a point in the line of time and so must be related ,

to o ther s u ch p oints B u t looked at from i thi n th e point thes e

. w ,

q u estions do not ari se S ince th e point is th e infinite and ete rnal

.

w
,

there is no o th e r point to hich i t can bear a relation But it wi ll .

,
3 00 A M E R ICAN P H I L O S O P H E R S W O R K AT

source i n mystici sm In Bradley s me taphysic s the A b s olute b ing

.
’

, e

infinite h no h i ng outsid i t T h world her fore cannot fall

, as t e . e t e

out s ide i t T h world is the A b solut Nevertheless the Ab solu te

. e e .

i s di fferent from h world for i i t there i no spac no time

t e , n s e, ,

no relation no division these being attri b u tabl e only to the world

, , .

In the Vedanta also Brah ma n bo th is and is not th e world In , , .

the philosophy of S pinoza th e attribute which are th e world s , ,

c o ns ti tu te the S ubstance A n d ye t S ubstance i s some thing o ther

.

than th e at tribute s .

We may say al so that from the standpoin t of time God is n , , i

relati o n to the wo rld H e is omnipres e nt in i t But from th e st and
. .

point o i the eternal whi ch is th e i n ner vi ew of th e divine mo ment

, ,

G o d has no relat on ei ther w thin i s ims e lf or with other beings i H ,

o r with the world .

From Walter T . S tace T im e a nd E ternity ( Princeton, Princeton

U v
ni ersity Press , pp 6 9 —8 5.
; re p rinted w ith p ermi ssion .

1 . I t is tru e th at th ere are ide n tity th e orie s o f c au satio n, ac c o rding to w hic h

c au se an d e ffe c t are id e ntic al Bu t th e y are p ate n tly ab s u rd T h e y are c om
. .

“ ” “ ”
p e l l e d to m aintain th at c au s e an d e ffe c t are d iffe re n t fo rm s o r as p e c ts o f
th e s am e id en tic al thing B u t the n th e d iff ere n c e b e tw ee n c au s e a n d e ff e c t re ap
.

p e ars as a diff e re n c e o f form o r as p e c t T h ere m ay b e s o m e int e l ligib l e s e nse in

. .

w h ic h c h arc o al an d d iam o n d are tw o fo rm s o f c arb o n , b u t th at c h ar co al is n o t

the s am e thi ng as d iam o nd w il l b e d is c o v ere d if y o u try to s e ll it to a ew e l e r
2 T S E li o t, T he D ry S al v ag es
. . . .
j .

3 . W ill iam Bl ak e .
 PA U L WE I SS

The New

This is a boo k in p hi losophy As a p hi losophi c work should t at

.
, i
tempts to articulate a vision of the Whole of thi ngs T hi means i t . s
must run counter to the temper not only of ri tic of phi loso phy c s ,

b u t of many contemporary p hi loso phers as ell E very one of us w .

,

in these last decades has often heard the compl ai nt that the world
,

w
of kno ledge has grow n enormously and that i t is no too b ig
, w
for any one to e nv isage T oo many of us have too quickly s ai d that
.

i t is fu tile to hope that the meaning of the hole or eve n of man s w ,

’

w
place ithin it can be gras p ed by anyone We mu st b e content
, .
,

i t has b e en supposed to master limi ted bran ches of kno ledge

, w ,

w
to try to le ar n exactly hat is the case here or there and should ,

v
gi e up the attempt to say somethi ng more There see med to b e .

no real fear that s u ch self res tr ai nt mi ght turn us into partial men
-
.

E ncyclopedi as an d staff conferences surv eys and texts i t

, as felt , w ,

co u ld bring all together and in harm ony We were confident that

, .

w e needed no thing more than co operation interchange an d com

-
,

m u n ica tio n to help us produce our w

ell made parts one with the
-

other and interrelate them to give us a clearer more la ting a

, , s ,

3 01
3 02 AMER IC A N PH IL O S O P H E R S AT WORK
i
better art culated account of the whole As a con s equence many . ,

today are somewhat co n tent to be community th inkers union men , ,

who know h o w to work in tandem .

s
It seem safe to say that the advances made in rece nt years
w
in me d i ci ne and ar in psychology and s o ci ology are in good
,

part traceable to the fact that we have specialized toge ther But .

i t is equally safe to say that the achieve ments dep e nded in p ar t

on our refu sal to use our cri tical powers to the full A world of .

, w
experts each concern ed i th asserting only what h e really knows ,

w
is a orld of men who must accep t without cavil wh at th e other
experts O ff er to them as data method and o u tcome or i t is a world
,

of separated items cu t off from all else S uch experts practice

, .

w w
hat non e is illing to p reach E ach n ai vely accepts what other
.

experts affirm of their di fferent specialtie s n the one side they . O

accept nothing b u t what they can themselves certify and on th e ,

other embrace with equal confidence that hich they confes e dly
, , w s
could not p o ssibly certify Bu t this is to abandon the right to
.

ask if Oth ers are wrong in result method and value to wonder , ,

w
if their frames are ide enough their methods sound enou gh , ,

s
their value rich enough for the world in hich we all live By w .

putti ng the actu al failure or inadeq u acy of o ther discipli n es out

side th e reach of real q u estioning h e deni es himself the o p p o r ,

tu n i ty of knowing w
hether o r not they are really s o und an d ,

v
whether or not they will e er be tray us To know th is much we .

must know something other than hat they report of themselves w .

s
It i fai rly safe to say that th e s u cc e sses of our mo dern ways
of thou ght depend in good part on th e chance that th e meth o ds
an d outc o mes of th e different speciali z ed inqui r i es happen for
w
the time to fit together ; hen parts are dealt i th in indep e ndence w
of one another discords sooner or later and almos t inevi tably
, , ,

ari s e among them E ven now they are sometime s found to conflict
.
,

and surely do not now form a single hole The realms of sp e w .

c i al iz e d knowledge are not yet integrated There ar e meth ods and .

results in almost e very vigorous sci e nce hich n o one has made w
cohere wi th the rest No r has anyone ever related th e a c hievements
.

and methods of all the sciences to one another o r b rou ght the ,

w
sciences into h armony ith history la and sociology ; and hat , w w
has be en di scerned by the po ets th e mystics the philosophers is , ,

w
still far from being united ith hat h as b e en learned else here w w .

But it
, w
ill perha p s be said this is as i t sh o uld be E ve ry living
, .

enterprise is incomplete ; its problems are its nerve ends i ts gro th , w

 3 04 A MERI CA N P H IL O S O P H E S WORK R AT

h di s covery of criteria and p rinci ple s b y mean s of which the

t e
e ff ort s and outcomes of h di fferen t di ci pline would be l t e s s ev a u

ated and harmonized Bold p erhaps even l i ttl arrogant and .

, a e

contemptuous of Old r ways he e thinker wer neverth l s at e , t s s e e e s

on c m d es t and cautious They did not tak hem elves to be

e o . e t s

supe ior to oth r inve s tigators Y ra her rapid l y they turned

r e . et t
them s elv s into ano her rac of spe i al ist s having h restricted task
e t e c t e
of clarifying the int nt or methodology or usage of other sp cial e s e

i They becam h ma s te s f a new di s i p lin resulting from

s ts . e t e r o c e

a fresh union of mod ern logic linguistics and methodology to be , ,

used to promo te o r clarify other inquiri es T h e gatheri n g of data .

i
they left to others ; t was not their task they thought to try to add
c
more fa ts to thos e which th e e mpirical sciences provided They .

sought only to oc cupy them elves w th a study of the structures s i ,

procedures implication s grammar that are inevitably exhi b ited in

, ,

every s o und inqui ry claimi ng that nothing w as sensibl e or l egi ti

,

mate unless i t w as so certifiab l e b y th e meth o ds so und inquirie s

endorsed .

Thes e men accomplished much But they could not do all that .

n e eds be done if knowledge is to make o n e exhaustive coherent ,

wh o l e For that th e ir specialty would have to be al l encompassing

.
,
-
.

No t only the met hods assertion structures b u t th e val u es and , s , ,

th e res ults o f the v ari o u s disciplines ne ed ev al uation E nds as , .

we ll as me an s mus t b e critically examined ne mu s t kn ow not . O

only how sound pro cedures are but what place th e results c an ,

have wi thi n a co m prehensive whole Bu t then somethi ng must .

be known of the nature of that whole O ne must n o longer be .

conte nt to b e one among many inquiries ; o ne mu st also be a

one for them over agains t them incl u ding them an d much else
, ,

b e sides .

No o n e of course knows everything N o one e ve n knows o n e .

i
l mi ted field exhaustively Ye t if we did not s omehow gras p the .

nature of all there is w e would not b e abl e to have specialties , ,

nor could w e d e al adequate ly i th th e ir different clai ms and co n w

tri b u tio n s . O
nl y if we know what i t is to be a m an can we e ngage
i n co ordinate inve stigations into hi s nature ; only if w e know hat w
i
i t s to be a m an c an w e estimate th e rival cl ai ms of doctors b io l o ,

gists psychol ogi sts anth ropologist and the rest

, nly if we kn o w
, s . O
what i t is to be to inqui re to know can w e recognize tha t we
, , ,

i i
are de al ng w th differe n t phases of the same obj ect an d c an know ,

how to bri ng togeth e r the di ffere nt re sults th at were obtai ned

 TH E NE W OUT LOOK 3 05

s
along di ff erent route of investigation Before hi le and after we .
, w ,

s p ecialize we have and must have a grasp of the whole vague

, , , ,

blurred even incoherent though i t may b e To ignore that hole

, . w
is to ignore our roots to mis u nderstand our ai ms to lose our basic
, ,

s
tes t It is to forge t that we en gaged in limited inquiries in order
.

to understan d th e whole of thi ngs from many independent and

w e trus t convergent sides It s to adopt the prej u dice that onl y . i
i
th e lim te d and piecemeal is ignificant and intelli gi ble and that s ,

w i thout any guidance i t will ne itably form one s eamless u ni ty i v .

i
It is to be so impat ent to ge t do n to ork that no time is left w w
w i
to as k hat i t s that is being ought and hy If we are to engage s , w .

i
in li m ted ente rp ri ses if we are to kno hat they di ersely seek
, ww v
and express if we are to unde rs tand hat contrib u tion they c an
, w
make to the enterprise of life an d learni ng e must somehow , w
take account of all there is and can b e known Whether e w sh . w i
i t or not we mu st e do think cos mi cally
, , w
ur choice is only . O
to do i t uncritically prec pitately mov ng to the body of some, i i
i
lim ted enterprise and vainly trying to rem ai n there al ay or w s ,

cri tically by taki ng some thought of where we start and ought to

,

end an d in a sense al ays are

, w .

N o matter ho w
mu ch th is l as t observation be softened i t can ,

I fear never b e entirely freed from the smell of paradox and d og

m atism pres u mption an d foolhar di ness and of decayed and d is
,

carded systems of th e pas t There is s omething rep u gnant in the .

tempe r of the grand philosophers the system b u ilders th e hole , , w

sale thi nkers They s ound like gods and yet are only men Even
. .

the best of them con tradi ct the m sel es and one another omit v ,

much that should ha e be en included and at crucial poin ts are v ,

most unclear and unreliable Their errors are fab u lous—b u t so is .

v
their ision They leave u w ith no al ternati e b u t to try o u rselves
. s v
to understand the real orld in a ay they cou ld not This is po ss i w w .

ble for they taught us by the r achi evements and by their fail u res i
s omething of w
hat we ought to say an d what e o u ght to a oid w v .

A n d al so w
e have at our dis p osal as they u nfortunately did not , ,

s
s u ch excellent guide and ins truments as th e hi story of later
, i
thou ght mod ern sc ence poetry m u sic painting an alysis and logi c , , , , .

There are today I think i gns of a rene ed interest in fu nda

, , s w
ment al q u es tions o n part of m any thi nkers There is a ne spirit . w
j ust begi nni ng to stir transforming the orld of ide as ,ccu pi ed w . O
primarily in getting a firm gri p on re al ity i t h as so far ignored ,

th e questio n of ho w
to j u dge an d adj udicate the various sp ecial ized
3 06 IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S
AMER WORK AT

inquiries Thes mu s t eventually look to i t and i t to them But

. e ,
.

first i t must come to cle er and mor systematic expressi ar What e on .

now seem certain i s that a

s examinatio of f ndamentals w ill re - n u

force us to entertai n a view of ourselve s and of the world which

is quite diffe rent from that entertained in th e past .

It is time for th e new spirit to pe rvade our lives We must b e .

come at once more bold and humbl e more catholic and ca u tious , ,

i
freer and more disc p lined than before For too long a time p reju .

dice has been allowed to narrow our persp e ctives ; for too long a
time imp atience h as made u s receptive to ide als and values inap
p pro ri ate to our f u ll being and the world We need a ne iable . wv
, w
systematic philoso phy hich unlike those o f the past is alert to ,

the advances in modern logic and science me taphy sics and theology , ,

history and the arts and thus can be more abre ast of the world
,

w
in hich we live
i
.

O ne of the obj e ctives of th e present ork is to outl n e the na w

ture of thi s new phi losophy nfortunately I did not myself dis . U
cern even i ts main featu res until quite late and then only after ,

I had struggled thro u gh the wri ting of three bo oks R eflections .

on th e implications of the first of the se drove me on to the second ,

and this in t u rn led to the third T h e presen t book in a way con .

tin u e s th e progress An indepe n dent venture it ystematizes while

.
, s
w
i t purges moves beyon d hil e i t take advantage of the insigh ts
, s
and achievements of th e previo u s orks w .

The first of those books R e al ity presented a systematic account

, ,

w
of hat I took to be the essential features of both kno ledge an d w
natu re It maintain e d that kno ledge an d nature presup p osed one
. w
another making the philosophic enterprise a circle b u t one large
, ,

enough to encomp ass all forms of tho u ght and existence E ve ry item .

o f knowledge and being was seen to be incomplete since there ,

was something beyond i t real and obstinate hich i t ne e ded and

, , w
s ought The book made an e ff ort also to work n o t as R ussell does
.
,

with a minimum vocab u lary or as others do wi th a m ni m um , , i

number of accep tab le ideas or beli e fs b u t with a mini mum num ,

ber of presu p positi o ns It tried i n fact to avoid taking fo r granted

.

anything ou tside the syste m exce p t of course th e w orld hi ch that

, w
system portrayed The world i t knew as not p hilosophy ; but
. w
philos ophy it also knew had to omit nothing of the essence of the
, ,

world .

I t is sou n d I still think

, to hold that philosophy i s a ci rcle
, ,

that every i tem in thou ght and in be ing is incomplete and that ,
308 A M E R ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S W O R K AT

harmony whi ch guar tees that h i ndependent adventure of an t e s

things are in accord with one another Ari stotle here reminds one .

of Kant and his attempt to tr at tim as havi g ide the e e n tw o s s,

one p rivate or ideal the other pub li c or actual which though qui te
, ,

di fferent in purp ort and i expe i enced content though som

n r , are e

how to hav h sam di visionse t e d rate of p as ag

e The one over an s e .

comes the di ffi cul ty b y a sp ci al and cosmologi cal a sumption the e s ;

other does i t by a th eological But these are exteri orly impos d o ne . e

de v ices In principle thes thinkers allow th at hings m y move

.
, e t a

in time indep ndently of one another and therefore may if con

e ,

tempor y tod ay not be contempora y tomorrow Y e t no matter

ar , r .

whe her b ings

t sluggish or quick asleep or aw ke l s t in
e ar e , a , o

pri vacies or engaged in public work all whi le living at thei r , ,

own pace live together in a common time

,
.

There are contempo rary be ings O therwise there would be noth .

w
ing to in teract i th us nothing w th hi ch w e could b e toge ther
, i w ,

nothing which could li mi t us and thus define us as ncomplete i .

An d some beings contemporary no are contemporary later Al l

, w , .

v
mo e to the next mome nt together some alte ri ng in nature or ,

position others remai ning unch anged or unm ove d O n e can i m

, .

agine all of them in the gri p of s om e singl e cosmic b ei ng ome , s

dialectical force s ome all encomp as sing p o er which both drives
,
“
-
w
th e m fo rw ar d an d ke e ps them in accord But this idea compromi es . s
th e b asic fact that i t i s individuals w h o act and act in their own ,

Ways an d at their o w n rates The time thro u gh which I live is .

my own ; if there be another time or temporal po wer keeping me

abreas t of others i t is m o re p ow erfu l than I and they and wi se
, ,

beyond belief There must of cours e be some thing comm on to

.

us all w
hi ch li m i ts and even controls us omewha t so as to e n able s ,

us despi te our independent existe nce and inde pendent ad enture

, v s
in time to be co ordinate now and later To avoid supposing s om e
, , .

thi ng like a cos mic age n t who runs alongs de or overhead and i
keeps the indi vidual thi ngs adj uste d o n e to the o ther or some ,

all embraci ng time or b eing ou t of hich the individual times

-
w
are conj ointly precipi tated— supposition s which reverse an ob vious
state of aff airs si nce they overloo k th e irre du ci b l e ultimacy of
,

si
in di vidu al n th e world an d the fact that i t is they who spend
,

energy and d ictate what the common patte rn of th e orld will w

b e —w e need attend only to the fact that things are m
,

embe rs of
v arious groups not beca u se they happe n to shar e some character
, ,

but because they all have the same Obj ective D es pi te their indi .
 TH E N EW OUTLOOK 3 09

v id u al i t
y all spatiotemp
, o ral things form a i ngle contemporaneou s s
se t the ,
gro u
p of actuali ti e s because each inevitably points to ard , w
th e very prospect pointed to ard by the rest A n u mber of them w .

may fu rther sp e ci fy that common pros p ect in common ays and w

there b y re veal them selves to be members of some more limi ted

g roup as well Wheth e r they do or not each and e ery one of them
.
, v
i
acts as a dist nct being an d thus brings the comm on obj ective ,

to realization in an in di vid u al way .

It is desirable to sho that there is and mu st b e one objective w ,

sub tending whatever li mi ted obj ectives individu als or gro u ps of

them may be directed to ard An d it is import ant to kno th e w . w
nature of that common obj ective N a tu re an d Man my next boo k .
, ,

w as w
ri tten in p ar t to satisfy the se reason able and therefore im
e rio u s demands The book stresses the fact tha t the common ob
p .

j ec tiv e is es sen ti al that i t is in s eparable from the ve ry being of

,

individ u al thi ngs N othing exis ted i t sa . solely in the present ; , w ,

each being w as partly in th e future and as governed in part w

by that common obj ective in which i t essentially termi nated This .

defined its direction and when specialized as a limi ted obj ecti e
, v ,

defined th e range of the things a being could do .

The di scove ry that all beings ine i tably point to the same com v
mon future obj ective made i t possible to show ho they could w
exi st together in time even though they acted independently and ,

s i
omet mes even came into conflict A n d an awareness that the .

common Obj ective was i tself indeterminate in nature made it

po ssible to u nderstand hy i t nee ded realization and cou ld be w
i w
rea l iz e d— quest ons hich ere unans erable by P lato and others w w
who like him reco gnize that there is a co mm on obj ecti e to hich v w
s
all be ing are inevi tably directe d b u t who mistak e nl y suppose ,

that i t is itself perfect complete wholly determinate , , .

If one avoids th e Platonic s u p p o sition that th e idea of p erfec

is
tion is t elf p e rfect that the idea O f th e good is itself the best
,

o f be ings one could safely agree wi th P lat o to call the common

,

i nevi table obj ective of all being by the grandest of titles The s ,

Good A recognition of th e nature and need s of that good makes

.

i t p os sible to o ff er ne ww
ays of understan ding the nat u re of ca u sa
i
t on inference action —al l change in fact E ery oc cu rrence i t could
, , . v ,

then b e show n is at once pre di ctable in th e abstract an d u np re

,

di c tab l e in the concre te at once limi ted and free occ u rri ng in the
, ,

p r e ent s b u t wi thi n boun ds determined by hat w as f u ture The w .

s e pa ration of theo ries of arti tic creati on and logical de ducti on s ,

3 10 AMER IC A N P H LO S OP H ER S I AT WORK
of history and physics whi ch had ruined so many phil os ophies , ,

could at l as t be avoided E very act and tho u ght N a tu re a n d M an . ,

, s
saw was pre ent concrete transi tory unpredi ctable in principle
, , ,

because produ ced only the n an d there and th u s incapable of being ,

known in advance E ery act and tho u gh t it also sa w as in addi

. v w
tion abstract fu ture fixed and as s u ch predictable becaus e e u
, , ,

tai led b y present act u alities Art and history logic and physics have .
,

both an u n p redictable an d a predictable side the first t o stress ing , w

th e one the second two the other A l tho u gh they have di fferent
, .

tarting points media obj ecti e s and go throu gh differen t processes

, , v ,

they exhibit the selfsame fu nd am ental princi p les .

N a tu re an d M a n affirmed eve n more vigoro u sly than did R e al ity , ,

that man w as not only an integral part of nature b u t a product ,

of evolution It tri ed to show that the advance hich began wi th

. w
the inan imate moved through the animate and ended w ith man
,

was the consequence of an occasional successfu l s trategy by fru s

trate d beings These to overcome grave obstacles to avoid defeat
.
, ,

and annihilation changed their directions p o inted to ne o b jec

, , w
tiv e s thereby becomi ng tr an s formed in nat u re and i n promi s e It
, .

concluded that man w as while di fferent in degree di stinct in , ,

kind from all other beings e alone i t said pos e ssed a pe rsistent . H , , s
s elf That self s too d ou t over agains t the bo dy an d the rest of
.

w
the orld becaus e i t alone was persiste ntly oc cu pied ith the reali w
z a tio n of a single all i n clusi e obj ecti e the Good Because of his
,
-
v v , .

self man had self identity an d was capabl e of self di sciplin e and
,
-
,
-

v
self cri ticism pri ileges hich ere outside the reach of any other
-
, w w
being in nature .

The position explored in N a tu re a n d M an doe s not I thi nk , ,

have to be ch anged in any fu ndamental resp e ct B u t i t has i m

‘

portan t implications hich i t did no t purs u e It was one of the w .

tasks of M an s F re e d o m to note these implications and to comp lete

’

the accou nt The book stressed the fact that the goo d as foc u sed
. w
on an d striven for by man for th e most part withou t conscio u s ,

ness but with a fre e dom pecul iar to h im That freedom as

, . w
exhi b ited primarily in three more and more effective and incl u si e v
form s as preference choice and will The e ere man s p ri mary
, , . s w ’

s w
agenci e by hich he freely adop ted and tried to realize the all
inclusive good .

M an doe s and man o u ght to try to bring th e good to its most

complete realization It is his task to do good and n o thing but .
,

goo d to ev ery being what oever But he is fini te feeble ignorant ;

, s .
, ,
3 12 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP HERS AT WORK
in the goo d and that we had presuppose d God as the uni ty in
w
,

hich both actu alities and the good can be together and in which ,

exi stence finds the u nitary esse nce i t needs in order to be in te lligi
ble Both existence and God of course are presup p o sed by a system
. , ,

w
which begins i th th e good for these sustain i t in different b u t ,

necessary ways .

An d w
e o u ght al s o to make a beginning with the goo d It has .

w
a nature of its o n as is evident from the fact that it is striven
,

for Indeed i t has power enough to attract a man and make h im

.

w
concerned ith i ts fu lfillment A correlate of actualities i t is an . ,

Ideal pos sibili ty which acts to master them b y turning them into
typ es meanings representati es of o n e an other and of itself From
, ,
v .

the standpoint of th e Ideal all that ought to b e done is done if

whatever there b e is idealized tu rned into a part of the Ideal ,
.

This action of th e Ideal o n th e actual is the reciprocal of that b y

which th e actual acts on it An d like th e actual the good p res u p .
, ,

poses materi al to work upon Just as the actual presupposes the .

Ideal the Ideal presu p poses the actual and both of them p re s u p
, ,

pose existence and God as regions in hich they can be together w .

The I deal is incomplete indete rminate It nee ds completenes , . s ,

and achi eves thi s by fractionating it se lf into more and more de

termi nate and limited forms of itself It dem ands not spe cific .
,

activi ties by actu alities bu t the prevision of opportu ni ties so that

,

i t can transform those actu ali ties from what s external to i t into i
w hat is subo rdinate By Offering th e actuali ties attractive o b j ective s
.
,

desirabl e goals commanding choices obligating good s restrain ng

, , , i
w
la s and finally a compelling destiny i t tu rns the actualities into ,

purposive preferring choosing willing kinds of beings into citizen

, , , , s
of a state and finally into beings who fulfill the ms elves while
enabling all other actu ali ties to be idealized From th e perspective .

of the go o d men are required to adop t role s to become public and

, ,

representative beings S o far as they a chieve th is sta tus the goo d

.

becomes determin ate not by virtue of the int rod u ction of ali e n
,

material but by the goo d s adoption of hat is nothing more than

,
’
w
diverse fragme ntary harmonio u s parts of i ts e lf
, an s tas k from
, . M ’

the standp o int of the good is the making of this frac tionization
easy comple te and concordant j ust as i t is th e task of the goo d
, , .

from the standpo int of man to be receptive of their efforts to m ak e

i t con crete T h e good e nnobles universalizes actu ali ties when and
.
,

as they sustain i t j ust as actuali ties enrich th e good make i t con

, ,

c r e t e when and as i t lures and guides them .

 THE NEW OUTLOOK 3 1
3

An e thical man fu lfills his obligations by accep ting as hi s o w n

the effective concordant activi ties of the re t of the world ; so far
, s
as he is one w i th the totality O f act u alities h e does all that needs ,

to b e done in order that the good be realized A p u blic man in .

,

contrast attains completen ess by fu nctioning as a representati e

,
v
of others and as an instance of the good becomi ng thereby part ,

of th e very good that ought to be .

The act u al and the Ideal even hen made one by m astery and
, w
fractionization have each their o n integrity enj oy an in d e p e n d
, w ,

ent statu s B u t they are still correlatives An ex amination of them

. .

se p arately and in relation to one another enables u s to encompa s s

w
most of hat is —bu t not all God and existence are also essential
.
,

inescapable dimensions of the universe ill u mi nating What i s left ,

dark by the j oint use of the perspective of actuality and ideali ty .

A ct u alities and the I deal both change The series of ch anges .

w
m u st someho be brought together in a unity if there is to be a
single interconnected set of epochs in time G o d is that being ho . w ,

among other things makes a unity out of hat otherwise ou ld

, w w
be a detached set of occ u rrences e sees to i t that the Ideal is
. H
v
fu lfilled in act u alities and con ersely This means that men shou ld .

I
recognize that they nevitably sub mi t the ms elves and their acts
w
to God as the being ho alone can make th em adeq u ate to the
,

demands of the good S ince men their acts and their aspirations
.
,

are part of a realm of existence Where alone they can be vi tal ,

and present no acco u nt of God c an b e complete hich forgets

, w
H
that existence is is cou nterweight the locu s of the data e sup , H
ports and interrelates .

E xistence is a restless force at once ingredi ent in and o v erfl o w

ing the borders of actu alities connecting ea c h i th every other
, w ,

and coming to a foc u s in th e good at hich all actu al ities are w

di rected M
en are ab l e to exist properly ithin thi s orld j u st
. w w
so far as they accep t the s u rging onr u sh of the orld as contai ni ng w
w ithin i t all that is of s u bstance and imp ortance n this vie . O w
actu alities and th e I deal are s u bj ect to a single cosmic fl u x i tself , ,

identical in rea c h with the li ing i mm anent God I t is a vie w v .

w hich sho u ld be s u pplemented ith accou nts where God the I deal w ,

and actu alities are recogni zed to ha e inde p endent natu res and v
w
fu nctions sinc e ithout them there o u ld be no u nified world
, w
v
of al u es no foc u sed and uni ting fu tures and no di stinct loci o f
, ,

action .

We are confron ted evidently ith a va t and compl ex e t of

, , w s s
314 . A M E R ICAN P H I L O S O P H E R S W O R KAT

i deas I t is desirable to bri ng them wi thin a small compass that

.
, so

they can be readily grasp d i n hemselves e t d in their be i ng

an ar

on one ano her The wa ming flesh of rhe tori c must be cu t away
t . r ,

and h ome w hat ugly naked muscu l ature of a systematic account

t e s ,

exposed This I must now try to do

. .

Paul i , i
We ss No des of B e ing ( in p rep arat on ) from Chap . 1 .
3 16 AM RE IC A N I
P H LO S O P HER S AT WORK
one another and the total man fold is appar ently not i sotro pic
, i .

Whereas an obj ect can pres e rve th e ame shap e whil e it is so s

shifted that i ts height becomes its breadth we cann o t easily con ,

ce iv e ho w
i t could do so while being shi fted so that its bre adth
becomes its duration .

The theory of th e ma ni fold I th i nk s th e one model on wh ch , , i i

we can desc ri be and explain the foreground of ex p er ence or i ,

can intelligibly and cre di bly constru ct our account of the rest of
the world and this is so because i n fact th e univers e is spread
,

ou t in thos e dimensions There may be P latoni c enti ties whi ch

.

are foreign to both space and time ; there may be Cartesian sp irits
i
which are fore gn to space ; bu t th e home ly realm of natural
, w
existence the total of orld history is a spatiotemporal volume ,

w
of some hat uncertain magnitude chockabl o ck w th things and , i
events L ogic with i ts law of excluded mi ddl e and i ts tenseless
.
,

operators and natural s cience wi th i ts secular world charts con

, , ,

cur inexorably wi th the vi s on of metaphysics and hi gh religion i

that tru th and fact are thus e ternal .

I believe that the uni verse consi ts wi thou t residue of th e sp read s , ,

of events in space time and that if w e thu accep t realisti c ally

-
, s
the four di mensional fabric of j uxtapo ed actuali tie we can dis
-
s s
w
pense ith all those dim nonfactual categories which h ave so
bedeviled o u r race : the po tential t h e subsistential an d the infl u e n , ,

tial the no u menal the numinous and the nonn atural B u t I am

, , , .

arguing here not that there is nothi ng outside the nat u ral wo rld
,

of events but that th e theory of the m ani fold is anyho literally

, w
true and ade quate to that world : tru e in that the world contains ,

s
n o l e s th an the manifold ; ad equate n th at i t contai n no more , i s .

S ince I thi nk that this p hi losophy o ffers correct and coherent

answers to real questions I must think that metaphysical di fficu l
,

ties raised agai ns t i t are ge n uine too There are facts logi cal and .
,

empiri cal which can be descri be d and expl ai ned onl y by th e con
,

cept of the manifo l d ; there are facts which some honest men de em
irreconci lable wi th i t Few issues can better de erve adj u dication
. s .

T h e di ffic u lties which we need not take s e riously ar e those made

by primi tive minds and b y new delibe rat e primitivists w h o tra
, ,

d u ce metap hysics in general and recommend specifical ly with , ,

respect to time that we follow ou t the A ugusti ni an clue as

, ,

A u gus tine did not that th e man who b e st feel s h e unde rs tands
,

w
time is he ho refu ses to think abou t i t .

Among philosophi cal complaina n ts agai nst the manifold some ,

 TH E M YT H O F PAS SA E G 3 1 7
w
fe r ai se diffic lties about u —
ar e subj ectivisti c e i s te m o l o
space there
p
g ists ,for exam pl e who grant more real i ty to their o
, n past and w
future than to things spatially b eyond them elves The tempo ral s .

di mensio n of the mani fold however be ar s th e principal brunt , , .

S ir James Jeans regr etted that time is mathematically attached to

“ ”
space by so weird a function as the square roo t of mi n u s one 1
,

an d th e very
“
w “
ord weird being co gnate ith w e rd e n to b e
,
””
w ,

come is a mon u ment to the uncanniness of o u r fourth dimens ion

, .

M aint ai ning that time is in i ts essence somethi ng holly uniqu e

“ ”
w ,

a flow or p as sage th e time snobs ( as Wyndh am L e w is called

,

them) either deny that the temporal spread is a reality at all or ,

think i t only a very abstract ph ase of real time Far from di sp arag .

“
ing time itself they conceive thems elves thus to be taki ng time
,
”
se ri ously in a profounder e nse than o ur party ho are content s w
w ith the v asty reaches of What is w as and ill be , , w .

The more radical opposi tio n to th e manifold takes time ith w

s ss
such S par tan eriousne that almost none of i t is lef t— only the
pulse of th e present born virgi nally from nothi ng and devouring
,

i tse lf as so on as born so that whatever pas t and fu ture there b e

,

s
are tri ctly only the memory and anticipation of th e m in thi s No w 2 .

O v
ne se t of moti e s for this vie is in the general roman tic polemic w
against logic and th e comp e tence of conce p ts The theory of the .

manifold is the logi cal account of e en ts p ar e x c e lle n ce the teeth v ,

w w
by hich the j a s of the intellect grip the flesh o f oc urrence c .

The Bergsonian who thinks that conce p ts cann ot convey the

,
“
reality of time because they are static the arxist ho thinks ,
”
M w
that proce s s defies the cadres of t o valued logic and the H e i deg w -
,

w
ger ho thinks that temp orality history and existence are leagued , ,

outside the categories of th e intellect th u s hav e incentives for ,

denying in e ffect all the temporal u ni erse beyond hat is i m

, , v w
manen t in the presen t flare and urge To co u nter their attack .
,

i t is a nice and tempting question hether and ho concepts are

“
w w
static wheth er and h o w in any case a true concep t mu s t b e
, , ,

w
similar to i ts obj ect and he ther an d how hi story and e x istence
,

are an y more temporal th an spati al B u t e cannot here un dertake . w

th e whole defense of th e intellect aga ns t i ts most violent cri tics i .

We shall rather notice such doubters as trust and use conceptu al

analysis an d still think there are cogen t argu men ts agai nst the
m anifold O ne argument to that effect is an extreme sharpe ning
.

v
of the posi ti istic argument from the egocentric pre di cament For .

if i t is impo ss ible for my concepts to tran scend experi ence in gen

3 1 8 AMER IC A N I S
PH LO OP H RS E AT WORK
eral i t may well be imp os sible for th em to transcend the mo men
,

tary experience in which they are entertained Conver ely how . s ,

ever anybod y who rej ects the argume n ts for instantaneous s olip
,

s ism as most eople do mu s t re j ect this argument for diminishing

,
p ,

the m an ifold The chief mode of argument is rather th e finding

.

of an intolerab l e anomaly in th e statement that hat w as but w

has ceased o r what will be but has not begun nevertheless is
, , .

This reflection has bee n used against the reality of the fut u re in ,

particular by philosophers as miscellaneous as Ari stotle and neo

,

S cholastics C D Broad and Professors Wei s s and

, . . artshorne , H .

In so far as i t i s an argumen t from logic charging the manifold ,

w s
i th elf con tradicti o n i t would b e as valid against th e pas t as
-
,

agai nst the future ; but I have argued elsewhere i t is by no means , ,

valid 3 S ince to deny the reality of past and future is to rej ect
.

the law of excluded middle— o r still worse to thi nk that p or n o t p ,

- - -

can b e true though p is not tru e and n o t p is not tru e —th e theory -

of th e manifold can hardly o u nd logic worse than the de nial w

of th e manifold ; b u t the theory of th e manifold does not ou n d w
i t at all The statement that a sea fight no t pre sent in time never
.

th e l e ss ex rs ts I s no more con tradictory than that o n e not pre ent

, s
s
in pace neve rtheless exi sts If i t seems so thi s is only because .
,

there happe ns to be a temporal reference ( tense ) built into o u r

verbs rather th an a spati al reference ( as in some Indian languages)
or than no locative reference ( as n canonical symbo lic tran scrip i
tions into logic) .

I am not to contend now for the re ality of the manifold how ,

ever b u t against th e extra w e ird nes s alleged for t me both by some

, i
i s
ch amp on who rej ec t the manifold out o f hand an d b y ome ho s w
contend anyhow that it is not th e whole tory bo th p ar ties agr ee
“ ” “
s ,

In
g that th e temporal dimension is not real time not the genu ,

ine creative flux If o u r tempo ralist means b y th s that the the o ry

. i
of temporal extension along wi th the spatial models p rovided b y ,

calendars k ymogr ap h s and statistical time char ts is in the last

,
-
, ,

analysis fictitious corresponding to nothing in the facts he is re

, ,

verting under a thin cloak of dissimulation to the mere re ec tion

, , j
w hich we have agreed to leave aside If he means at the other ex .
,

treme no more than that th e theory and the mode ls them e lve s ar e
,
‘

s
not identical either numer cally or qualitatively wi th the actual
, i ,

te mporal succession which they represent he is utte ri ng a triviali ty ,

w s
hich i tru e of every theory or representation If he means that .

th e tempo ral spread though real and form a l ly si mi l ar to a p a t al

, s i
3 2 0 AMER IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WORK
q u e n ce a moving were
picture film unwinding from
-
the dark reel
,

of the future proj ected briefly on the s creen of the present and
, ,

rewo u nd into the dark can of the p as t S ometimes again e speak . , , w

as if the time seq u ence were a stationary plain or ocean on hich w
w e vo yage or a variegated river gorge dow n which we drift ; or
, ,

in Broad s analogy as if i t were a row of house fronts along hich

’

“
, w
the spotlight of the present p lays The essence of now ness S an . ,

“ ”
tay an a says runs like fire along the fu s e of time 1 7 A u gu s tine
, .

p ictures the presen t passing into the past here the modern pic , w
ture s the present as invading the futu re 8 but these do not conflict
1
, ,

for A ugustine means that the e v e n ts which were present become

past whil e th e mode m means that p res e n tness encroaches o n what
,

was previously th e future S ometime s th e surge of presentne ss is

.

co nceived as a mere moving illumination b y con sc iousness some ,

s
time as a sort of v iv ific atio n and heightening like an ocean wave ,

heaving along beneath a stagnant expans e of floating seaweed ,

someti m es as no les s than the boon of exi stence i tself reifyi ng ,

minute by minute a limbo of u n thin gs .

v
The doctrine of the mo ing present has some startling a p plica
tions notably in the idea of a time machi ne T h e theory of th e
, .

fo u r dimensional manifold se emed already an invi tation to the

-

notion of time travel and th e additi o nal idea that w e move wi th

,

respect to time confirms it For if I normally voyage through time

.

in a single direction at a fixed rate I can hop e to m ak e a machine ,

which will e nable me to voyage slower or fas ter or backw ar d .

w
,

N o w th e most remarkable featu re of all thi s is that

, hi le the
modes of spee ch and tho u ght whi ch enshrine the idea of p assage
ar e universal and perhaps ineradica b le th e inst an t one thinks ,

about them one feels u neasy and th e most laborio u s e ff ort cannot
,

construct an intelligibl e theory hich adm its the literal truth o f w

any of them McT aggart was drive n to deny the reali ty of ti me
.

w
because h e b elieved that hile time mu st comb ine the dimensional
spread wi th the fact of p assage the B series with th e A series ,
- -
,

every attempt to recon cile th e t o ended in ab s u rdity Broad w .

can only cling to the hope that a bett er reconciliation may ye t be

fo u nd . M
y presen t thesi s wou ld re so lve th e antinomy by rej ecting
the extra idea of passage as spu rious alto ge ther .

v
The ob ious and notorious fault of the idea as we have n o w ,

localized it is this M
otion is already defined and exp lai n e d in
, .

the d imensional manifold as consisting of the presence of the

 TH E MY H O F PA S S AGE
T 3 2 1

same individual in di fferent places at different times It consists .

of be nds or q u irks in the orld lines or the space time orm w ,

-
w ,

w hich is the fo u r dimensioned totality of th e individu al s existence

-
’
.

Thi s is mo tion in space if you like ; b u t we can readily define a

,
“

correspon di ng motion in time It comes o u t as nothing more .

“
dramatic than an exact eq u ivalent : motion in time consists of
being at di fferen t times in different p laces True motio n then is .

“ ”
motion at once in time and space N othing can move in time .

“ ”
alone any more than in space alone an d time i tself cannot move ,

“
any more than Sp ace i tself D oes this road go anyw here ? asks .

“
the ci ty tourist N o i t stays right along here replies the co u ntry
.
, ,
“ ”
man Time fl o w s only in the sense in which a line flo s or a
. w
landscape recedes in to the west That is i t is an ordered exten .
,

sion A n d each of us proceeds through time only as a fence pro

.

c ee ds a cross a farm : that is parts of our being and the fence s ’

, , ,

occupy successive ins tants and po ints respecti ely There is passage , v .
,

but i t is nothing extra I t is the mere happening of thi ngs their

.
,
“ ”
strung along ness in the man ifold The term the present is the
- -
.

conventional way of desi gnating the cross section of events which

“
are simultaneo u s wi th the u ttering of th e p hrase and the present ,
”
moves only in that when similar ords oc cur at s u ccessi ely dif w v
fere n t moments they deno te by a t ist of langu age di fferent cross
, , w ,

sections of the manifold Time tra el p rim a a c ie then is an alyz

. v , f , ,

able ei ther as the banality that at each di fferent moment e occupy w

a different moment from the one we occ u pied before or th e con ,

tradi c tio n that at each di ff erent moment we occupy a di fferent

moment from the one which we are then o ccupying— that five
m 19
inu tes from now for example I may ,b e a hundred years from ,

now .

The tragedy then of the extra idea of passage or absolute b e

coming as a p hi losophic al principle is that it incomp rehensibly
i
, ,

do u bles i ts world by reintroducing terms l ke mo ing and b e

”
“
v ”

co ming in a sen se which b oth requires and forbids interpretation

in the preceding ways For as soon as e say that time or the . w
present or we move in the odd extra ay which the doctrine of w
p assage requires we have no reco
, u rs e b u t to suppose that this

movement in turn takes time of a pecial sort : time moves at a s 1

cert ai n rate in time , pe rhaps one second p e r one econd perhaps

, 1
s ,,

w
slo er pe rhaps faster O
r conversely the moving present slides
i
, . ,

s
over o many seconds of t me 1 in so many seconds o f time The ,
.
3 2 2 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
history of the new moving present in time , then compo se a new , , s
and higher time dimension again which cri es to be vi talized by a ,

w
ne level of p assage and so on forever , .

We hardly needed to point o u t the unhappy re gress to whi ch

th e idea of time s motion commi ts us for any candid philosopher
’

, ,

as soon as he loo ks hard at the idea mu st s e e that it is preposterous , .

”
Taking place is not a formality to hi ch an even t incident al ly w
submi ts — i t is the event s very being World history consists of
’
.

actual concret e happe nings in a temporal e q u ence ; i t is not s

necessary or possi b le that happening shou ld happen to them all
“ ”
over again The system of the manifold is thus complete in
.

somethi ng like the technical logical sense and any attempt ed addi ,

tion to i t is bound to be either contradictory o r supererogatory .

Bergson Broad and some of the follo ers of Whitehead2 0 have

, , w
tried to soften th e paradoxes of passage by supposing that the
present does not move across the tot al time level bu t that i t is ,

w
the very fountain here the river of time gushes out of nothing
s w
nes ( or ou t of the po er of God) The past then having swum .
, ,

w
into being and floated a ay is e ternally real bu t the fu ture has , ,

no existence at all This may be a more appealing figure but

.
,

v
logically i t invol es the same anomalie of m e tah ap p eni ng and s
w
m e tatim e hich we observed in the other version .

What then, w
e m u st ask
, ere the motive which drove men , w s
to the staggering p hi losophy of passage ? O n e of them I believe , ,

we can dispose of at onc e I t is the innocent vertigo which i n .

ev i tab l y besets a creature whose thinking is s trung o u t in time ,

as soon as he tries to thi n k of the time dimension itself e find . H s

v
i t easiest to concei e and u nderstand purely geometri cal structu res -

Motion is more difficu lt and generally remains vague hile time

, , w
e r s e is very di fficult indeed but being now identified as the
p ,

w
principle hich imports motion into space i t is pu t do wn as a kind ,

of quintessential motion itself The process is helpe d by the fact .

that the mere fu rther along ness of successive segments either of a

- -
,

spatial or of a temporal stre tch can qui te logically be conceived ,

as a degenerate sort of ch ange as when e speak of the flow of a , w

line or say that the scenery changes along the nion P acific U .

A rather more serious excuse for the ide a of pa s sage is that

i t is s u pposed necess ary and sufficient for adding to the temporal
dimension that intri nsic s e ns e from earlier to later in hich time , , w
is supposed to di ff er radically from any dimension of space ? A 1

meridian of longitude has only a direction bu t a r ver has a , i

3 2 4 AMER IC A N I
PH LOSOPH RS E AT WORK
immediately and poignantly nvolved n the whoosh of proces i i s ,

w
the felt flo of one momen t nto the next ere is th e focus of i . H
b eing H
ere is the shore hence the youngster watche the golden
. w s
w
mornings sw ing to ard him like e rri ed b ri ght breaker fro m the s s
ocean of the fu ture H
ere s the flood on which th e Oldster wakes
. i
in the night to shudder at i ts swollen black torrent cascading hi m
into the abyss .

It would be futile to try to deny these experi ences but their ,

correct descri ption is another matter If they are i n fact con .

sistent with o u r theory they are no e v iden e agai n t i t ; and if

, c s
they are e ntai led by i t they are evidence in i ts favor S ince the
, .

w
theory as o ri ginally cons tructed to take account of them i t would ,

w
be odd if they ere inco ns isten t wi th i t or even irrelevan t to it .

I believe that in fact they are neither and that the theory of th e ,

v
manifold pro ides the true and li teral des ri pt on Of hat the c i w
enth u siasti c metaphors of passage have de ceptively garbled .

w
The p ri n cipal reason hy we are trou b led to accomm odate o u r
experience of time to the intellectual theory of time goe very s
deep in th e philosophy of philosophy It is that we must here .

'

s crutini z e the undoctored fact of pe rcep tion o n the one h and and , ,

must imagine our way into a conceptual scheme and env sage the , i
true intrinsic being of i ts obj ect on th e other han d and then s , ,

pronounce on the numerical identi ty of th e first with the s e cond .

This is a very rare requirement Even such ap t idea as those of . s

s p ace and of physical obj ects as o on as we con template them , s
realistically begi n to embarr as s us so that we li p into th e ass u mp
, , s
tion that the real ob j ects o f the conception s f they exist at all e x ist , i ,

on a di ffere n t plane o r in a di fferent realm from the sensuou s

spread an d lumpiness of exp e rience The ideas of time and of the .

w
mi nd ho ever do not permi t of such eva on Th o e beings are
, , si . s
w
given in their o n righ t and person filling the foreground ere , . H
w
for once e must fit the fact direc tly into the intellectual form ,

wi tho u t benefit of pre ced ent or accustomed ri ter a First off c i .

,

then comp ar ing the calm conceptual scheme wi th th e turbid event

,

s w
i t elf e may be repelled b y th e former no t because t is not true
, , i
to th e latter b u t be caus e i t is not the latter When we ee that
, . s
this kind of diversity is inevitable to every concept an d i ts obj ect ,

and hence is irrelevant to the vali di ty of any we demur becau se

the conceptual sche me is indi fferently flat and thi rd pe rso n al l ike
,

-
,

a m ap whi le th e experienced re al i ty is ce n tri pet al an d perspe tival

, c ,

piled u p and palpitating where w e are gray an d retiring el e where , s .

 TH E M YT H OF A AG E
P SS 3 2 5

, s
But this of cour e affecting the spread of time no more than that
,

of space is only be cause every occasion on whi ch w e compare the

,

world map wi th experience has it self a single specific loca tion ,

confronting p ar t of the world remote from th e rest The per , .

s e c tiv i t
p y of th e view i exactly predictable from the map s The .

decep tion wi th respect to time is worse than wi th respect to space

because our memories and desires run time ise and not space w
w
wise The j erk and hoosh of thi s moment hich are simp ly the
.
, w
real oc c urre nce of one particular batch of events are no different ,

w
from the hoosh and being of any other patch of events u p and
down th e e te rnal time s tretch R emembering some of the latter-
.
,

however and anticipating more and bearing in mind that while

, ,

“
they happen they ar e all cal led the pre sent e mistakenly , w
hypostatize th e Present as a single surge of bigness hich rolls w
along th e time axis There is in fact no more a single rolling
.

No w than there is a single rolling ere along a spatial line — a H

s
standing line of oldiers for example though each of them has the , ,

vivid presentment of his o n ere w H .

L e t us hug to us as clo ely as s

e like that there is real succes w
, v w
sion that ri ers flo and winds blow that thi ngs b u rn and burst , ,

v
that men stri e and guess an d die A l l this is the con crete stu ff .

of the manifold th e reality of serial hap p ening one event after

, ,

another in exactly the time spread which e ha e b een at p ai ns to

, w v
diagram What does the theory a l lege excep t hat e find and
. w w ,

w hat do we find that is not accepted and ass erted by the theory?
s
S u ppo e a p u re intelligence bred outside of time instructed in , ,

the nature of the manifold and th e design of th e human sp ace

w
time worm i th its mnemic organization and the strands of orld
, w
w
history hich flank i t and s u ppose him incarnated am ong u s :
,

what could he have expected th e temporal expe ri ence to be like

except j ust abou t what he actually discovers i t to be ? ow in H ,

brief could processe

, sw
hich endure an d s u cceed each other along
the time line appear as anything other than end u ring and suc
c e s s iv e proce sse ? s
The theory of the manifold leaves abundant roo m for the s ensi
tive observer to record any descri bable difference he may find in ,

i
intrins c quali ty relational texture or absolute direction between
, , ,

the temp oral di mension and th e spatial ones e is elcome to . H w

mark i t so on the map The very singleness of the time di mension
. ,

v
o er against th e amalgamated three di m ens ro ns of space may be an ,

idi osyncrasy wi th momentous e ffects ; its fo u rth ness so to speak , ,

3 2 6 AMER IC A N PH IL O S O P H E R S AT WORK
so oddly and immen se ly multiplying th e degrees of freedom em
bodi ed in the familiar spatial complex was bound to seem mo ,

m e n to u s too The theory ha generally conceded or emphasized

. s
i
that time is unique n these and other respects and I have been ,

s
assuming that i t wa right to do so I n th e working ou t of this .

thesis however and in considering the very lame demurrals which

, ,

oppose i t I have come a little uneasily to th e surmis e th at the idea

,

of an absol u te or intrinsic di ff erence of texture or o ri e n tation is

superfluous and that the four dimensions of the manifold com
,

pose a perfectly homogeneous scheme of location relat ons the i ,

same in all directions and that th e oddi ty of temporal distances

,

is altoge ther a functio n of features which occupy them— a function

f
of d e ac to patter like the shape of an arrow like the difference ,

w
bet een the way in and the way ou t of a fly trap and like th e ,

terres tri al difference bet een up and down w .

E ven a person who believes that temporal distances are a cate

o ri all peculiar mode of rela tion intrinsically differen t from spa
g y ,

tial distan ce regardless of h o w they are filled must grant that

, ,

they nevertheless are filled di fferently : things pers ons an d events , , ,

as a matter of natural fact are strung along with respect to the

,

time ax is in rhythm s and designs notably di fferen t from thos e in

whi ch they are deployed sp acew is e E ntropy and the other scientific .

“ ”
criteria for the sense from past to fu ture distinguish no less
w
the hole temporal di rection from th e spatial ones T h e very
” “ ”
.

concept of things or individual substances derives from a

peculiar kind of coherence and elongation o f clump s of events in
the time direction L iving bodies in particular have a spe ci al
.

organized trend timewise a c o natus ess e c o ns erv an d i which noth

, ,

ing has in spatial section Characteristic themes of causation ru n

.

in the same direction and paralleling all these and accounting for
, ,

their importance and ob viou sness to us is th e p attern of mental ,

even ts the stream of consciousness with i ts mnemi c cumulation

, ,

and that sad anxiety to k eep go ing fu tu rew ard which co n tras ts
strangely with o u r comparative indi fference to our spatial gir th .

The sam e fact of the grain and configuration of events which ,

i f i t doe s not constitute certai nly accompanies and underlin e s

,

th e senses of space and time has othe r virtues which help to ,

naturalize experience in the manifol d It accounts for the apparent

ra te of happening for example ; for the sp an of the specious re
,
p
sent ; and for the way in which the future i s comparatively malle
able to our present efforts and correspondingly dark to our pre sent
 3 2 8 AMER IC A N P H LO S OP HERSI AT WORK
motion of passage that is the occurrence of events in contra t
, , , s
wi th a my thical reari ng and charging of time i tse lf so it account
“ ” “ “
,
”
s
for what is true in the notions of flux becoming emer , ,

gence “ ”
c reative advan ce
,
”
and th e rest aving learned the tr ck
, . H i
of mutual translation between theory and experience we see ,

where th e u tter misrepresentation lies n the accusation that th e i

“
dimensional theory d enies that time i real or that i t subs ti tute s , s
a safe and static world a block univers e a pe trified ai t acc o mp l i
, , f ,

a to tu m s im u l fo r the actu ality of ri sk and change Taking time

, .

w i
ith the truest ser ousness on the con tr ary i t calmly diagnoses , ,
“
v
” “
no elty o r becomi ng for example as the occu rr ence of an
entity or kind of enti ty at one time in the world continuu m
, ,

, ,

w hich does not oc cur at any previous time No other ort of . s

novelty than this I earnestly ubmit is di scoverable or co nce iv
, s ,

—
able o r desirable I n practice th e modern ciences o f the man
.
, s i
fold have depicted i t as a veri table caldron of force and action .

A lthough the theory entai ls that i t is tru e at every time that even ts
occu r at other times i t emphatic al ly does not entail that al l event
, s
happen at th e same time or at every time or at no time It doe s .

”
not assert therefore that fu ture thing already exi st or exi st
, , s
“
v
fore er E mphatically also i t d o es not as i frequently charged
.
, s ,
”
make time a dimension of space 2 7 any more th an i t makes spa e , c
a dimension of time .

The theory of the manifold which is thus neu tral ith respect , w
to th e amou nt of change and pe rmanence in the orld is surpr s w , i ~

in gly neu tral also toward many other to p ics often broached as
tho u gh they could be crucial be tween t and the extra idea of i
passage It is neutral so far to ar d whether s p ace and time are
.
, , w
absolute and subs tan tival in the D emocri tean an d N ewtonian
w ay or relative and adj ectival in S pencer s and Whi tehead s way
,
’
’ ’

or fu rther relativistic in E instein s way The theory of space does .

not as Bergson pretended hav e any preference for discontinuity

, ,

over continui ty and while a t me o rder in which nothing exists

, i
bu t the present wo u ld be fatal to any re al continui ty the phi ,

l o so p hy of the manifold is quite prepared to accept any verdict on

w he ther space or time o r both are continu o u o r discrete as i t is
“
s ,

also on whether they are finite or infini te I ns tead of denying .

”
histo ry i t preserves it and is equall y hospi table to all p hi l o so
, ,

phies of history except s u ch as themselves deny history by disputing

the objectivi ty and irrevoc ab li ty of historical truth It does not i .

w
care he ther events etern ally re cur o r run along forever on the ,
 THE M YT H O F PAS SA E G 3 2 9

dead level as Aristotle thought o r enact the ringi ng brief drama ,

o f th e Chri s tian episod e or s trive into th e Faustian bo u ndless It, .

is simi lar ly neutral toward theo ri es of causation and of knowledge .

The world manifold of occ u rrences each eternally dete rm ina te at ,

w
i ts o n place and date may and may not be so determ in e d in its ,

texture that what occurs at one j uncture has i ts sufficient reas on

a t others If i t does evince such caus al connections these may b e
.
,

ei ther e ffic ient ( as apparently they are) or final ( as apparently they

are not) The core of the caus al nexus it elf may b e so far as the
. s ,

mani fold is concerned either a real connection of S pinoza sort ,

’
s ,
’
or Whitehead s or the cholastic or the mere regular s ucces ion
, s s ’

, s
H
admitted by ume and R u ssell It was a mistake for S pinoza to .

infer if he did that the e te rnal manifold an d strict causation entail

, ,

one another as i t is a worse mistake for Wh tehead the cholastics

, i , s ,

and Professors U sh e n k o and Wei to infer the opposite ( as they

“ ”
ss ”
s e em to) that real time and real causa tion entai l one an
,

h
ot er The theory is imilarly noncommi ttal toward metaphysical
2 8 . s
acco u nts of individual substan ces which i t can allow to b e com ,

po u nds of form and matter or mere sheaves of properties .

The theory of the manifold makes a man at home in the world

to the extent that i t guarantees that intelligence is not affronted at
i ts first s tep into reali ty Beyond that the cosmo is as i t is If .
, s .

s
there is moral re ponsibility if the ill i free if there is reason , w s ,

ableness in regre t and hope in dec sion thes e must be a scertained i ,

by more particular observations and hyp otheses than the doc trine
of the manifold It makes no di fference to our theory whe ther we
.

are locked in an ice pack of fate or hirled in a tornado of chance , w ,

or are firm footed makers of des ti ny It wi ll accept ben gnly ei ther

-
. i
the Christian Creator or the organi c and perfect Absolute or , ,

H u me s sand pile of sensation or th e fluid melee of contextua l i m

’

, s ,

or th e structured orld process of materiali m w s .

The service which the theory performs w th respect to all the e i s

problems is other than di ctating solutions of them It is th e p ro .

vision of a l u cent frame or arena here they and their so l u tions w

can be laid out and clearheade dl y appraised in view of their special
O
classes of evidence nce u nder this kind of ob ervation for exam
. s ,

ple the theories of change hich describe becoming as a marri age

, w
of being and not being or an interpene tration of the present wi th
-
,

the fu t u re and the pas t become rep u lsive no t be caus e they conflict
, ,

w
especially ith th e philosophy of the mani fold b u t be cause if they ,

i
are not mere incantat ons they contradict them selve s Wh e n we see .
3 3 0 A MERI C A N P H IL O S O P H ER S AT WORK
that the problem h o w A chilles can overtake the tortoi se is e en ss
ti all y the same as the problem how two lines can intersect one
another obliquely we are likely to b e content wi th th e simple ,
“
mathematical intelli gibili ty of both When we see that the change .

s
of a leaf color from day to day is of the same den o minatio n as
’

s
i t change from inch to inch of its surface e are less likely to , w
hope that mysteriou formula abou t the actualization of the p o s s
te n tial and th e perdurance of a substratum are of any use in ac
counting for either o f them If then there is some appearan ce of .

s
didactic elf righteousne s in my effort here to save the pure th e o ry
-
s
of th e mani fold from being ei ther displaced or amended b y wh at
I think is the disastrou myth of pa age thi is because I believe s ss , s
that the theory o f th e manifold is the very paradigm of p hilosophic
understanding It gras p s with a firm l ogic o far as I c an see the
.
, s ,

most intimate and pervasive of facts ; i t clari fie s the obs c ure and
assimi late s th e apparently di ver e ost of the effect of the prophe ts s M
.

of p assage on the other hand is to me lt back into th e primi tive

, ,

magma of confusion an d plurali ty th e best an d sharpest i n s tru

ments which the mi nd h as forged S ome o f those who do thi . s
have a deliberate preference for th e melting pot of myste ry as
an end in i tself O
thers I suppo e hope eventually to cast from
.
, s ,

i t a finer me tal and to forge a sharper point No hope of that .

sort is alto gether chimerical But I s u ggest that if a tithe of the .

animus and industry invested in that ill omened enterprise were -

sp ent on the refinement and imaginative u se of th e in trument we s

have whatever difli cu l ties still attend t would soon be dissipate d
, i .

O riginally p blished in the j l f Phil u o u rna o os o

p hy , 195 1, and re

p rinted with the p ermission of the editors .

1 . J J
S ir am e s e ans , T he My s te rio us Univ e rs e ( New o rk , p 1 18
2 T h is I thin k is a fai r d es c rip tio n o f G H M e ad s d o c trine , T he P hil os o p hy
Y . .

P
’
. . .

o f th e re s e nt ( Ch ic ag o , S e e al s o , e g , S c h o p e nh au er, D ie e l t als Wil l e . . W

a n d Vo rs te l l u ng, B k 4 , S e c 5 4 . . .

3 D o nal d C William s , T h e S e a Fig ht T o m orrow , in S tru c tu re , M e tho d,

Y
. .

a nd M e a ning : E ss ay s in H o n o r o f H e nry M S he f e r ( Ne w

4 . W
of T ime ( B erk e l ey ,
“
o rk ,
”
illiam D e nnes , T im e as D atu m an d as Co ns tru c tio n, in The ro b l e m
.

-
P
p 1 03 . .

I s ab el S tea rn s, T im e an d th e Tim e l ess , R e v ie w of M e tap hy s ics , V o l 4

“
5 . .

p 198
Y
. .

6 G eo rg e S an tay an a, R e al ms of B eing ( Ne w
. o rk , p 25 8 . .

7 C l are n c e L e w is , A n A na ly s is o f K n o w l e dg e a n d Va l u a tio n ( L a S all e ,

.

p 1 9 T his is p re tty su rel y p h e no m e no l o gy , no t m e tap hy sic s, b u t it is

. .

to o g oo d to o mit .
3 36 AMERICAN P H ILO S OP HERS WORK AT

distrust of reason i t w ill be useful to distinguis h some— I

do not
pretend they are all —o f the kinds of activi ty we commonly dis c uss
w
as the ork o f reason .

I S cience th e exploring of events n the world outside our

.
-
i
bodies an d inside them wi th their qu al ities and relation ; the , s
sear ch for simi lari ties and di fference and for correlations be tween s
transactions of o n e kind and transactions of other kinds S uch .

w ork prompt s us to expect fur ther ins tances of o r approxi m ations ,

to th e correlations which are often mani fested or approach e d

, .

B u t nothing in the p rocedure of scienc e ever allo s us to say s w

w
that e know for cert ai n that such further instances have occu rred ,

ar e occu rri ng or will oc c ur , f our bes t hypo theses dignified by . O ,

the ti tle of laws w e can never say that i t is impos si b le that there
,

are , w
or ill b e exceptions to them—ind eed that from now on
, ,

there m ay be nothing el se b u t exceptions and no more c o n firm

ing instance s at all Y
e t w e have no better j ustified method for
.

v
de eloping and supporting beliefs abou t unexplored areas of exist
ence — past present or fu t u re fin e scale or large cale—then th o se
, , ,
- -
s
proced u res of science For beliefs so de elo p ed have be trayed us less
. v
often than beli e fs developed in any other ay and also the w ,

s
method suppli e the fullest possible opportuni ty for th e alteration
w
of beliefs ith enlargemen t of experience and extension of evidence .

S ome inde e d advise us that history s ocial studie s th e fine arts , , ,

require —and also supply us with th e basis for— a kind of explana

tion different from the s ientific and even anti thetic to i t To c .

be sure one may best form hyp o thes e abou t an historical epoch
, s
or transaction not by mani pulati ng statistics bu t by immersing
,

oneself in th e relevan t docu ments monuments literary materials , , ,

play s diari e s conversat ons and then formulating one s intuitive

, , i ,
’

and imaginative sense of the structu re and q u ality of what went

on or is going on or ill probably occur S imilarly o n e achieves
, , w .
,
'

comprehension of a person not merely by listing indexes of re ac

tion times thresholds predo mi nant Gestalten etc e tc but l argely
-
, , , .
, .
,

w
by living and orking and talking wi th him B u t these p e rfectly .

fami li ar facts do not in any ay remove us from th e orbit of w

scientific procedu re N atural sc entists themselves regularly de
. i
v elo hypothe s es int u i tively and imaginatively B u t once an hyp o
p .

thesis is thu s deve loped whether in history or in physics or in ,

geology , w
e have no serious way to confirm i t except b y ex ami n
ing fu rther materials— documen ts rocks paintings b u ildin gs pieces , , , ,

o f sc u lpture traces in cloud chambe rs sayings or doi ngs of per

, ,
 C O N F L IC T
33 7
s w
sons — to ee he ther these are as they probably would be if o ur
hypothesis were correct N either in history nor in p hysics can
.

a man satisfactorily ground or confirm hypothese by telling u

, , s s
that he has imagined them very vividly feels the gr eate t co nfi , s
dence in them or has a compelling intuition of their tru th People
, .

have told us all these things ( and wi th complete since r ty) in up i s

port o f such hypothe ses as that the earth is flat and i absolutely s
at rest that here tics should be burned and witches p ressed to
,

, w
death or that they ere themselves the master race charged b y ,

destiny with the duty to control and exploi t the rest of mankind .

I I R eason in a second sense as logic and mathematic

.
, doe s in s ,

deed give u s a kind of necessary tru ths of undeniable ( or p e rhaps ,

w e sho u ld better say unrej ectable) formulations For—to take the .

v w
ery simplest instance — herever any symbol means anything more
than nothing and les s than eve ryth ing that is whenever any entity,

or class of enti ties fu nctions as a symbol at all a formal s tructure ,

of symbolizing is entailed a structure hi ch we try to intimate

, w
( and to guide o v
u rsel es in using
) by mea n s of rules and system s
of mathematics an d logic It is imp o ssible ( to illustrate by thi
. s
simplest o f instances) that any entity should belong to the class
named by a symbol if i t does not have the character tics con is
noted by that symbol ; and necessary that i t should so belong if
i t does have the character thus meant But all who so distinguish .

formal logi cal ( or ma thematical) necessi ty and impossibili ty from

mere fact u al occu rr ences and n o no c cu re n ces are agreed that logic
s
and mathematics as uch can give us no kno ledge and no prob w
s
ability wi th respect to what ha gone o n in any universe or , is
i
going on or will go on ; although w thou t th e analyses an d tech
,

niq u es of l ogi c and ma thematics science as now developed would

,

w
hardly exceed the po ers of any men known to us .

1 1 1 S u ch phi losophical w
ork as th e analysis an d if j ustified th e
i
.
,

distinction o f logic and mathemat cs from s cientific explan ation

, ,

is work different from either logic or science as these are generally

understood ; though of co u rse there is no theoretical reason (b u t
only th e limits of me n s time and energy and capacity) to prevent
’

scientists and mathematicians from doing s u ch philosophi cal ork w

as we may thus desi gnate R e as on in sense 1 1 1 ; a there is no the o s
re tic al reason why geologists and hi stori an s should not also b e

q u i te as expert mathematicians as any mathema t cian and vice i ,

versa .

I V There is still a four th

. w
idely used and mp ortan t en e of i s s
3 3 8 A M E R ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S WO R K AT

rea on i n wh i ch we say that a rea s onab l e man i s

s , who p o ne a

p i scienc
re c a tes and log ic and
e ph i losophy and also h arts and ,
t e

techniques by which men may progre s sively satisfy the i r basic needs
for fo d and health and love and imagi nativ play a s well as
o e ,

their curiosity A man reasonabl in this fourth sense ill form

. e w
his opinion s upon evi dence at least alter them as he finds things
, or

other than he had s uppo ed—will b Open minded c operative s e -

, o ,

and friendly because othe rwis e ( among other grounds) no headway

co u ld be made in the work of R eason in senses I or II or 1 1 1 When .

we say that science and logic and philosophy are good—when we

approve reasons in these three s enses —w e are I think exp ressing
such atti tudes as make up what is meant by R eason in this fourth
s
sense—and not merely expre sing knowledge o f facts or necess i tie , s
of logic or theoretic philosophical insights For two men mi ght be
, .

equally masters of science and history and logic—theoretically ,

each migh t know all that can be known and harbor not o n e di f
ference of beli ef from the other—and ye t o ne might come to hate
all these and desire the annihilation of such activities of reason and
also the an nihilation of his companion and himse lf whil e th e o ther ,

might approve all these works o f reason and all th e persons who
take part in them For there is as S pinoza held nothi ng whatever
.
, , l
which cannot equally be loved or hated either o ne—nothing wha t ,

ever except only that s u bstance o r God or nature of which the love
is identical wi th adeq u ate kno ledge and of which no m o de n o w ,
“

p e rso n but only substance or G o d or nature itself can hav e

, uch , s
adequate knowledge since that knowledge is absolutely all of
,

i i
God s nfini te modi ficat ons as they are under the infini te attri b ute
’

o f thought .

My suggestion i s the fami liar one that far we i earnest so as are n

wi th reason i n the first three senses j ust di stinguished or even in ,

the first two s enses conflicts in belief—theoretical opposition s

,

literally cannot survi ve O ur Greek spi i tual ancestors and the

. r

dominant tradit i o of philo ophy are thus f right that reason

n o ur s ar ,

can i ndeed re s olv i mmense area of fli — fli in b

e o ne co n ct co n c ts e

l i efs But such achievement of theoretical accord canno t be said

.

ei ther strictly to entail automatically to carry with i t in fact

, or ,

the dis appearanc of practical opp sitions of di fference and

e o : s an

ta o n s
g i m of attitude
s H owever i t may do
. an immense deal ,

and in many c ases i t may do quite enough —toward removing

such differences For whenever for example human be ings are
.
, ,
3 4 0 A M E R IC A N PH LOS I O P HER S AT WORK
interrelations of factors with n and wi thou t neural proce es and i ss ,

i
spe c fying the respects in which the fusion and ynthesi s of the fac s
tors culminate in e ffects quite different from any simple minded -

me chani cal re p e tition 2 An d j ust how di fferent and in what ways ?

.
,

Precisely as di fferent as they may be found or inferred (with up , s

i s
port of ser ou induction) to be ; but n o t di fferent as or becau se , ,

some pri or mechanistic p ostulate o r field p o stulate entail differ s

e n ce s . O
n the other hand KOh l er in his D ynam i cs i n Ps yc h o logy
,

can say no more in explanation or upport of his thesis that a

” “
“
s
theory of perception must be a field theory than that the neural ,

i s s
funct on and process e with whi ch th e pe rcep tual fact are ass o s
ci ate d in ea c h case are located in a continuou medium ; and the s
s
event in one p art of this medium influence the events n other i
regions in a way that de p ends directly on the properties of both n
” “
i
their relation to each other 3 We must d ar e the postulate that as .
,

a dynami c agent i t [ the percept] extends into th e surrounding tis

”
sue 4 Well P avlov had not merely dared a postulate but had
.
,

actually traced out a few of the way in which neural processes s

are influenced by events in the r fields ; and he thus gave the only i
i s
k nd of seriou support relevan t to this section of KOh l er s field ’

theory Can we say that P avlov must therefore have abandoned

.

stimulus response investigation and be come a field theorist ? nly

-
O
if the price o f adopting an sm in psychology is to abandon intel i
l igen ce ! A n d that price P avlov was evidently not disposed to pay .

Why should any thinker imag ne he has to p ay it? i

T h e discovery of some limited regulari tie of st mulus and re s i
s o n se i
p not and could s
not be incompatible
, w ith the oc currence ,

o r w i th the di scovery of variation in both ei ther ( so far as we s ,

may know) spontaneous or fairly regularly correlated with altera,

tions found in other areas of the context whe ther neighboring or ,

remote Conflict can arise only if we abu e rea on in sense I and

. s s s
II and assert that a pattern found in one area mu s t necessarily
also be the pattern that pervades o ther areas of existence — and
thus we ei ther mi stake the nature o f hypotheses an d of th e ir
grounds or else define some term like perception le t us say by
, , ,

s
a pecific stimulus response p attern ( or equally a spe cific fiel d
-
,

configuration) an d then imagi ne we are making igni fican t de s

c
s riptive statement s when we s ay that i t i impos si b le that be s X
an instance of p e rcep tion and ye t fai l to exhi bit the timul u s s
re sponse pattern in question or fail to b e a cons ti tuent or an ,

instance of the pecified fiel d co nfigu ratio n s -

.
 C O N F L IC T 34 1

i
Where the correlat ons between stimuli an d responses o r b e ,

w ”
“
t een various s tran ds i n fie l d c o n figuratio ns have remained hi ghly -
,

irregular even after exploration ( as thorough as feasible to

date ) o f further relevant factors in the context conflicts seem ,

w
to have arisen bet een psychologi sts on the one hand who ish w
to smooth ou t th e correlations by postulating interven ng d e termi i
“
nants ( such as cortical ets traces residues synapti resistan ces s , , , c ,

i i
nhibitory and exc tatory substances inhibitory and exci tatory ,

tendencie s
valences urges abilities instincts and so o n 5 )
, , , ,
”

and p sychologists on the other hand who prefer to s tate the com
plex correlations be tween observed factors i thout benefit of such w
simplification by postulate owever there is no slightest iota of
. H ,

reason ( in any of the four senses) why these latter should deny
th e possibility of or should clo e their minds to the search for
, s ,

factors in fine scale physiology or in environment or condition ng

-
, i ,

o r anyw here else withou t li mit whi ch may be found to expl ai n ,

w s
hat eems to be arbi trary deviations from correlation which are s
o therwi se fairly regular A n d so far as evidence is found upporting
. s
the operation or the probability of the operation of any of these
, ,

factors a man needs no partisan commi tment to one side or the

,

o ther in the abo ve seeming controversy in order to develop and to ,

i
use ser ously hypo theses about such factors To nsist however
, . i , ,

s
irre pective of specific evidence that some such factors m us t be ,

operating wherever there is deviation from what have been called

“
smoo th correlations ”
w
ould be on all fours with a phy ic st s s i ’

s
in isting that there can be no j erks no gaps no di scontinuities in , ,

natural processes and that therefore here there is evidence of

, w
q u an tu m l ik e shifts e can be sure w
regardless of evidence that , ,

th ere m us t b e unknown factors regularly operating to produce the

quantum discontinuities .

Besides i t is always extremely imp ortant to not ce how far o u r

, i
talk abou t smooth o r simple correlations is actually a comment o n
the me thods and the capaci ties of interpreters For a graph of cor .

s “
relation ( to take one ex am ple ) whi ch on one se t of axes i s most
w
irregular can al ays be made as straight or smoo th or rhy th mi c
w
as e wi sh by using ano ther e t of axes And u rely today no o ne s . s
w ould allege that there is a se t of axes which i s th e right set the ,

absolute frame of reference When we skew or alter axe in order to . s

v w
make a gi en scra l smoo th or harmonious there s of cour e al , i s
ways the p ossibility that on th e new axes th e development o f the
graph required to represent the next set of data will violate th e
34 2 AMER W O IC A N
R K I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT

harmonio s pattern presently achieved B

u there i s l y pre . ut a wa s

i l y this same risk w hen on

c se
y se t of a es without exception
, an x ,

there is the prospect of developing any line which represents any

sort of evidenced correlation in order to take account of further
meas u red values .

If w
e ob j ect to complexi ty of statement as opposed to simplicity ,

w e may always correct the fa u lt by altering the notation u sed .

B u t as for the str u ctures meant by o u r statements all of them ,

however various are intrinsic al ly eq u ally intelligible There is

( ) .

not one of God s modifications of hich we can say that i t co u ld

’
w
not fall under the attri b ute of cognition that to add to i ts ,

being thou ght wo u ld in olve contradiction

, v ence when we talk . H
of the degree of intelligibility of the s tructures dealt wi th b y
theories , w
e are us u ally changing the s u bj ect of d I sc u ssro n from
those structures to biography or au to b iography and are tal k ing ,

abo u t the ease or the strain the long e ff ort or the brief e ffort , ,

w hi ch somebody experiences in dealing wi th the str u ctures in

q u estion An instance is the familiar fact that some people find
.

E insteinian formulations in mechanics m u ch simpler than N e w

to n i an and others the reverse ; as some people find a highly logi
,

c iz e d or formalized geometry much simpler than uclid and

( ) E ,

others th e re erse v .

B u t let us examine an instanc e of what seems to be theoretical

conflict in another field of stu dy There are influential pe o ple ho . w
v
insist that we cannot e en begin the explanation of social processes
w
unless e b ring to the jo b an interpre tive principl e say the arxist , M
principle that in the last analysis economic factors are al ays de w
c i s iv e of all social changes O
thers urge that e m u st b ring to and
. w ,

s
u e in o u r social studies some other fu ndamental explanatory
,

p rinciple anti thetic to arx s B u t mustM ’

e not all agree that there
. w
w
is no serious ay of determining ho influential ( or whether e x w
c l u s iv e l infl u ential economic factors or any other kinds of fac
y ) ,

tors have been or are in historical changes except by examining

,

the evidence from records and other cu ltural and technological re

mains makin g observ ations o f processes no under w ay de elop
, w , v
w
ing hypotheses ( ho ever intu itively or i maginati ely or specula v
tiv e ly) v
an d belie ing one or other of those hy otheses only so far
p
as i t is confirmed by the evidence upon whi ch it was based and by
further findings ? An d thes e finding are e q ua lly accessib l e to every s
inquirer regardless of hi s postulates as to th e influence of th e fac
i
tors in quest on or of his want of any u h postulates
, e nce i t sc . H
3 44 A M ERI C A N PH ILO S OPHERS AT WORK
tradi c tio n . An d
if the analysis h as ugge ted t then i ts rhetoric s s i ,

is very deficient For i t is almos t a truism— almost a tau tology

.

to say that if a person is to accompli h anything toward expl ai n s

ing any subj ect matter he must bring curiosity imagination p a , ,

tie n c e the di sposi tion to alter even favori te beliefs so far as the
,

evidence runs agains t them ( and usually als o th e more previously

mastered info rmation he c an bring wi th him th e better) : in a
word he must b ring intelligence wi th him to the j ob This is
, .

almost but not quite a truism since people do develop these

, , ,

v irtues in the
p rocess of inquiry and explanation A n d unles they . s
s s
posse s them a Platonic memories from th e heaven of Ideas or ,

their thinking is
guaran teed them b y Kanti an necessary forms of
s
perception and under tanding presumab ly first st e p in developing , s
such interests hab its and skills do occur sometime after the
, ,

fertilization of that ovum hich i to be come a social sc entist w s i .

There could h ar dly be a more impressi e instance of th e c limi v

nation of the appearance o f theoretic conflict mainly by the s ort
w
of work e have called R eason in sense I I I ( th e philosophi cal
analysis of meaning) than the recognition by physicists and mathe
m atic i an s of the equivalence of E insteinian and Newtonian fo rm u
s
la about moti on provided su fficient qualifications are ntroduced
, i
systematically into th e N ewtonian formulas in order to tak e ac
v
count o f de iations such as those conne cted with very high veloci
w
ties ( the evidence for hich n o ta b e ne is observed equally by , ,

Newtonians and relativists ) The only di fferences that remain

which might seem to consti tute or to s u pport conflicting hypotheses
i v w
are nvol ed in N e ton s words abou t homogene o u s absolute time
’

and the absolute motion rest and posi tions of whi ch i t is sai d to
, ,

b e a function A lthough of c o urse a N e tonian may if he like s

. w , ,

assert that these terms designate for him variou s felt qualities ( as
of utter repose) this will not give him hypotheses in conflict i th
, w
th e r elativists What he would need to do in order to make ou t
.
,

his theory as thu s in conflict wi th relativist mechanics would be ,

to show that there is some difference of theoretic content expressed

by describing changing positions by their relations to whatever
has the felt quality he calls rest as against formulations which ,

either exactly reverse that procedure or read o ff the relations by

reference to frames distinct from ei ther .

To move closer to our own b ailiw ick : Which of us h as n o t— at

‘

least in o u r sal ad days—been pur ued through the watches of the s

s
night b y th e que tion : Wh en hould we say we have a finding— a s
 C O N F L IC T
3 45

datu m upon which to b u ild beliefs and by which to check them?

Which are acceptable grounds for the belief that the bell to er w
h as a cl o ckface and hands on i ts sou th wall ? The noting o f a con
figuration o f that class which I believe that I and others have , ,
“ ”
commonly named by the term clock ? Yes But again no ; for .
,

the slips of memory and the eccentricities of perception are no

to ri o u s . H
ave I then more acceptable gro u n ds for my belief hen
, , w
the s tatement I make in the presence of the tower converges w th i
the statements of a dozen or a hundred or the maj ority of o ther
, , ,

observers ? That s be tter An d yet after all hat s hould I be doing

’
.
, , w
then b u t exactly the same s o rt of thing as before though perhaps ,

more of i t n amely n o ting the tower various pe rsons their posi

, , ,

tions motions and statements I have changed enlarged the

, , .
, ,

s u bj ect of my attention but I have achieved no different k in d of

,

finding S hall I t u rn pragm atist and say that a findi ng to be taken

.
,

seriously must be an ope ration that lea ds into proliferation and

,

growth of transform ative operations ? If I do th u s turn pragm atist ,

then on the central question whether this ope ration or that does
w
so lead and hich of the t o is the more fruitful of such growth
, w ,

I can get no relevant knowledge except by noting operation s of the

w
t o sorts and their contexts and sequelae An d after all how very
, .
, ,

odd of me to think that I can note reliably the divergences and

v
con ergence s o f the doings and sayings of a dozen or a hundred
s
people ( an d note that the e go on in the vicinity of the tower) or ,

note the operations these lead into but can not note so reliably th e ,

cloc k configuration on the sou th face of that to er ! w

B u t th e problem is not so simple as all this S chlick and Carnap .

M
and R ussell and oore ( and hundreds o f others including D ewey) ,

would scarcely have veered back and forth from one of the e posi s
tions to another if they were thus merely changing from the con
sideration of one area or sort of subject matter to the consideration
of some other area or sort There are indeed ve ry important dif .

w
fe re nc e s bet een what we accomplish when we consider merely
what is within our field of a areness hen we consider inter w w
s ubj ective communication and what I t probably involves and ,

when we consider what little we can learn of the immense opera

tio n al contexts of either of these B u t so far as e deal with these .
’

w
differences by the procedu res labeled R eason I II and I I I abo e , , v ,

all semblance of theoretical conflict be t een them seems to dis w

v
sol e Private n o tings intersubj ective convergence s of s tate ments
.
,

and mani pulations strands of op e rat ional context— all of these

,
34 6 A M E R IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S WORK AT

occur all , are worth s tudious attention bu t we have

; no serious
grounds for defending any of them as if it were the rival or Oppo
nent of th e others as evidence for or support for our beliefs For
, , ,
.

all that any of them is evidenc e for is whatever sorts of entity ,

have been found ( or inductively inferred by analogy with obse rved

w
correlations bet een entities similar n some respect) to be more i
or less regularly correlated i th the privately noted contents with w ,

i
the nters u bj ective convergences or wi th the operational strands ,

i n question This result o u ght to cure some species Of ep is temo

.

logical insomnia .

To take another nstance we all remember that some people i ,

have regarded two—valued and three valued or ( two plu s 1 1 ) valued - -

i
log cs as somehow mu tually incompatible ( and not j ust as dif
fe re n t and like all different things therefore such that if all a
,

man s attention and energy are concentrated upon one o f them it

’

is impossible that he should at the same time b e dealing with any

other of them) M
any have interpreted a third value ( in addition
.

to tru th and falsi ty) as some kind of function of frequencies of

truth ( or falsity) values in some sort of set or els e as what is ,

asserted by tru e statements to th e effect that some man ascribes a

certain intuitive weight to a proposition of a certain set e t there . Y
w
are a fe of s u ch interpreters who then surpri se us by alleging
that relations could b e expressed by the formula o f ( two pl u n) s s
valued logics which could not be express ed in the formulas of
w
t o valued logics
-
O
f course f any two valued logic contains quite
. i -
,

apart from its being t o valued some kind of self denying ordi w -
,
-

nance which restricts its development b y ruling out certain very

s
commonly treated orts of functions of tru e or false propositions ,

we might well say that the t o valued logic in question was in w -

compatibl e with some of the analyses carried out in ( two plus 1 1 )

valued logics if those lacked the self denying ordinance But even -
.

in this case the incompatibility i not an instance o f any theorem s

in the one system tak e n as in that s ys te m being incompatibl e w th i
any theorem of any o ther system tak e n as in tha t o th er sys te m but ,

only an instance of some sorts of development in one b e ing ruled ,

out by a self denying ordinance from development in the other

-
.

But why anybody hould introduce such self denying ordinances s -

,

except merely as indications of plans of concentration ( hich are w

i
in no way ncompatible with other men s di fferent plans of con ’

centration or wi th one s o n plans at other times) — that I can not ’

w
i
,

see Certainly a logic s being two valued does not requ re I ts au

.
’
-
3 48 A M E R I CAN PH ILO S OP HERS AT WORK
not in conflict wi th any of them ; or ( b ) that they are expressi ng
approvals preferences disapproval which could of course in no
, , s
sense be theoretically incompatible wi th or be ruled ou t by , ,

an
y logic even where the logic t elf might be the obj is
ect of di s

approval .

The supposed conflicts b e tween what have so metime been s

called di fferent ways of knowing is another case in point For .

we are often tempted to contras t knowledge by au thori ty knowl ,

edge by logico ma thematical demonstration knowledge b y utility

-
, ,

and knowledge by mystic intui tion as if they were conflicting al ,

te rn ativ e s Bu t if by saying that a proposition is known to be true

. ,

o ne of u s
actually mean s only that i t is enunciated by authori ties ,

and another of us means that believing i t is in some sense useful ,

and so on then we would eliminate all emblance of conflict if each

, s
s
of u would simply say what he thus mea ns —that i would sub s
s ti tu te wherever appropriate o u r respective d efinie n tes for the
d efin ie n d u m Thus we. w
ould make clear that what we mea n by our
apparently conflicting theses is only that proposi tions affirmed by
authori ties are a ffi rmed by authorities wherea proposi tions belief , s
i w
n hich is in some s p ecified way useful are prop o sitions belief in
which is thus usefu l and so on and on An d these lo c utions are all
, .

perfectly compatibl e wi th one an other .

i
But i t s plain that seriou s philosopher have meant nothing so s
s
trivial as thi They seem generally to have intended synthetic
.

statements when they have said that opinions aflirm e d by au th o ri

s s
ties o r opinion belief in which i useful or opinions promp ted by
, ,

mystic insight au t alia are true or pre eminently probable Qui te

, ,
-
.

s
generally they eem to have meant by calling a proposi tion true , ,

that i t asserts such relations and character of i ts subj ect matter s

as that subj ect matter actually possesse s ne partisan then hol ds . O
that propo si tions enunciated by authoritie are not merely tru e in s
the sense of being enunciated by authorities bu t are true in the ,

s
sense that they assert ome entitie or other to be qualiti ed and s
related as they actu ally are ; and so on of the other partis an s But .

i f this is what is intended the question of how high the correlation

,

is be tween the statements of authorities or the use fulness of b e ,

liefs and the tru th or probability of those statement or beliefs

, s ,

is not a question that can be significantly e ttled by a defini tion s ,

or by committing oneself to a postulate that th e correlation i s

highest ( or even infallible) in o ne ca e or th e other We have no s .

s erious way to approach an answer to the question excep t b y gath

 C O N F L IC T
3 49

ering evidence as to how o ften au thority X s prediction are con ’

s
firmed and so o n An d this evidence is intrinsical ly as accessible
, .

w
to the partisan of one ay of k no ing as to th e partisan of any w
allegedly opposed ay of kno ing w w O
th erwise the part san could . i s
not possibly recognize their Opi ni ons as op p o sed .

From this conclusion there are t o ays of escape w wne way is . O

for one partisan to assert that tru th really i no thing but what is s
affirmed by au thori ties another partisan that i t is really noth ing
,

b u t what is useful to believe and so on But then we are back , .

v
among the tri ial tautologies whi ch were j ust exposed I do not .

think that considerable philos opher have e poused them ; and s s

even if they had th e various tautologies could not s tand in theo
,

re ti e conflict The other way of escape is for each partisan to s ay

.

that what he re a lly means is that he is most interes ted in or most ,

hopeful of the results of believing what is afli rme d by authori ties

, ,

or of believing what in some specified ense i s u e ful to believe s s ,

a u t a lia But here again there can be no confl ict be tween any hypo
.

s
these which are supported by R eason in sen es I o r II or III s ,

b u t only manifestations of diverse temperament and cond tion s i

ings interesting to psychologist and also of very ge n eral and
, s,

i
m o ra l nterest if th e perso ns thu expres sing their temperamental s
differences happen to be influen tial in some field o f theory or o f
practice .

s
In constructing histori e of phi losophy ni neteen th centu ry ,
-

s s
scholar e t up patterns which quickly became tradi tional and
have persisted wi th remarkable stubbornness None of these pat .

terns ( o r stereotypes ) has been more rigi d than that of representing

as in dramatic ( or even melodramatic) conflict the attempts of so
“ ”
called continental rationalists to es tablish truths abo u t nature
and hi story by logico mathema tical deduction and the attemp ts
-
,

o f s o called
-
“ ”
i
British e m piric s ts to rely on sensations only re ,

j e c ti n
g necess ities of reason altoge ther et every reader of D es . Y
s
carte is impressed—indeed if he h as previously read th e available
,

histories of philoso phy he is literally s h o c k e d —to find D es cartes

insisting in the R egu lae that no deduction from other proposit on i s
co u ld possibly demonstrate th e tru th of any propos iti on al though ,

w v
i t might help us to ard con enient exposi tion of them all If th e .

proposition ca lled a conclusion i true i t can only b e true (D e s s ,

cartes argued) be cau se it is ev dent to th e natural light an d not i ,

s
because any se t or equence of o ther proposit ons is thus true An d i .

M
in letters to hi s old friend ersenne he comp la ned that he could , i
3 5 0 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
make no further progress in his tudy of vision unless he could ge t s
from the abattoirs of Paris a better supply of o x eyes to diss ect -
.

This is the same D escartes fragments from hose L e M o n d e prom, w

ised to establish by the procedures of what e have come to call w
analytical geome try a l l th e facts that make up the universe past , ,

present and to come

, .

A gain in L eibniz s accoun t of synthe tic proposi tions as all of

’

them only contingently true ( if true at all) and o f all necessary ,

s
truth as analytic we find a clearer statement than any hich
, w
H ume gives us of the View that there can be no logically necessary
connections be tween enti ties of any orts th at are distinguishable s
from one another .

If on the other hand to use general synthetic principles as self

, ,

— —
evident without empirical support as necessary truths is to be
a rationalist then both L ocke and Berkeley in their use of s u ch
,

principles as that of causation were very much more rationalists

w
than as L eibniz For the fu ll tory of this alleged maj or conflict
. s
w
the ork of S pinoza and the work of ume are especially impor H
tant ; and if anybod y ever tells that story faithf ully i t will be a
v ery long one But w
e can say confidently that the widely accepted
.

s tory of the c o nflict be tween able rationalists and able empiricists

( as dist i
nguished from the straw men of the textboo ks
) s very i
largely mythology .

S uch seeming theoretic conflicts in scientific and histor cal ex i

planation and in restricted fields of philosophic study are in
, ,

numerable and very challenging The temptation is to go through .

a great many of them and in very much fu ller detail in order to

, ,

de termine whether in fact they do yield or do not yield to th e

application o f the sorts of acti i ty distinguished as four phases of v
the work of reason B u t certain other questions press upon u s as
.

i
ph losophers q u estions which are said to cut under and to expose
,

as superficial all of our pre ent considerations s

ave we too glibly . H
and carelessly talked of findings as being evidence for o n e specific
hypothesis or another—and evidence eq u ally for al l inte rpreters ?
“
Wi th the question What is a finding? What is a datum? e have ”
w
dealt cursorily ; and also with the seeming conflict be tween i m
mediate n o tings in terpersonal convergences and agreements of th e
,

reports of several observers and operations whi ch lead into the ,

tran sformation of other operation B u t t ake any of these o r any s .

,

th ing e ls e as fin d ings—for w hat are they ev dence ? Wil l not this

, i
3 5 2 AMER ICA N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
tri b u te ) ; thing in itself fo rms of organization and phenomena ;
- -
, ,

G o d s purposes and God s act ; dynamic organic interrela tedne s ;

’ ’
s s
matter and motion ; event quali ty and relation , , .

The question whether there e xi t instan ce o f the kinds of traits ss s

or enti ties mean t by any of these terms is not settled (o r even in
any way a ffected) by an ybo d y s using the terms ( or th e kinds of ’ “

things the terms mean ) as basic categories — unle what we me an ss

by saying of anything that i t exists is imply that w e are using i t s
( or the n ame of it k nd ) a as i
basic category in s
o u r explanatory

procedures I f w e mean some thing else by existence ( and I do not

.

“ ” “ ”
pretend to impose a right o r bes t defini tion upo n that term) ,

then w e must determine whether instance of the entitie mean t s s

c
by our b asi catego ries whi ch ever they are do in that sense (wh at
, ,

ever i t may be ) exist by means of evidence not composed of nor

, ,

ge nerated by o u r u se o f th e particular categories as basic bu t by

, ,

means o f evi dence availabl e to any thinker whether he uses our

categories o r others as basic Fo r we can describ e an ything e n .

countered or imagined and ts found or supposed context and , i

operati ons w i th p re c is e e q u iv a le nc e of c o n ten t in o ur des criptions
,

( though with considera b le differences of nomenclature ) whe ther ,

we describe i t by stating i ts resembl ances and di fferences wi th re

spect to a structure imagined and so far as we know not otherwi e s
existent or by stating i ts resemblances an d di fferences wi th respect
,

to a kind of structure of which instances have been found to exist

“ ”
( in an
y specified s ense of the term existence )
We may wish to use a categories terms that name kinds of s
traits s tructures or operations which we suppose to be excep tion
, ,

ally pervasive o f nature —o r the kind of trai ts tructures or o pera s , s ,

tions so nam ed Bu t again our supposings and our choice of cate

.

g o ri e s imply nothing hatever as to whow pervasive of n a ture any

sort of trai t o r s tructure or operation may be For have w e a ny .

w
se ri ously defensible ay o f dete rmining how w despread in exist i
ence any factor is excep t by exploring areas of existence — and in
any relation whatever to those sorts of operation which we call
experiments ? People who use th e opp o sed categories of organicism
or naturalism are sometimes ( perhaps often ) more interested re
s e c tiv e l
p y in similarities or in diffe renc e s ; in fu e d dyn am ic com s
plexes o r ( some say although I know of no i mpressive supporting
,

evidence in the history of philosophy) in distinguishable i ngre di

ents of th e vario u s fu sions f course we may if we wish thus
. O , ,

change the subj ect and discus the personalities and biographi es of s
 C O N F LI C T 3 53
philosophers But if we do what w e dis cov er to be their differing
.
,

interests can hardly be taken as entailing or as supporting different

hypotheses abo u t the distribution in the world of the v ari o u s fac
w
tors ih hich they are interested It may be extremely di ffi c u lt for .

some men to discri minate traits noticed by others But thi s is not .

a conseq u ence of the traits being intrinsically co gnizable only by

— w
some say those ho employ as basic categories the kinds of traits
in question or the names of those kinds of traits If there were .

traits s u ch that only one philosopher or one sect of philosophers

co u ld cognize them or their likes and only another philosopher or ,

another sect of philosopher could cognize o ther trai ts or theirs

, w
likes then i t o u ld be impossible for such individu als or for th e ,

members of such sects to conceive that they di ffered since the

, ,

conception by each of the traits cogn ized by the others is ruled

, ,

v w
out Conflict de elops hen partisans neglect logic and science
.

and philosophical distinctions and allo enthusiasm ( or inertia) w

to prompt them to say that qualities or confi gurations found here
and here and here mus t necessarily be the fu ndamental ( or the
f
really real or merely the d e ac to ) trai ts of e erything every here
, v w .

The same story seems to hold of genetic o r causal priority We .

cannot add one iota of support to a belief that matter and motion
are in some sense primary existents hereas qualities are de ri va, w
v
ti e from them by taking matter and motion as basic cate gories
,

and discussing and interpreting all that e find or imagine by its w

resemblances to di ff erences from and its spatiotemporal corre
, ,

l atio n s w
ith specific instances of moving bodies The time h as
, .

s u rely long since passed hen anybody ould argue that causalw w
or any other kind of relatio n could imp ly or j u stify the reduction , ,

of one of the sorts of relata to an y other sort If certain grow ing .

organic stru ct u res are found to precede to follo to incl u de or , w , ,

to be incl u ded by certain approximate mechanical regu lari ties

, ,

then a scrup u lo u s acco u nt of one in terms of its relations to th e

w
other ill be exactly eq u ivalent in content to a scrupulous account
of th e second in terms of i ts relations to the first en ce th e com . H
p l e te ineptit u de of the common criticism that we are thus resolving

philoso p hical conflicts only by asking others to accept o u r cate

g o ri e s or
, to tran slate their hypo theses into terms of those c ate o
g
v
ries — as Johnny disco ers that everybody in the cro d is o u t of w
ste p with h im ; and recommends that they all get into step !
D ealing w
i th enti ties of any sort as related to one categorial frame
or another does not make the entities one whi t more o r le l ike ss
3 54. AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
( or u nlike
) the constituents of either frame or ch ange in any way ,

their relations to one another o r to anything else Choice of a se t .

of categories makes no legi timate di fference in the content of any

Opinions I f any A di ff ers in any respects from any B o r re sembles
. ,

i t in any respects then the scrupulous description or interpreta

,

tion of A as a fu nction of B will be identical i n content ith an w

eq u ally scrup u lous description or interpretation of B as a (roughly
converse ) function of A .

w
But when e go beyond the little area of find ings—in whatever
—
way the term finding is defined or used to the immense areas”

abo u t which we construct the hypotheses for which we take fin d

ings to be evidence favorable or o therwise — then surely no finding
, ,

no q u alitied and structured event or complex of events i s in an d ,

o f its e l f
evidence for anything other than i tself We are therefore
, .

often temp ted to say that whatever else than i tself anything is
,

evidence for m u st depend upon the interpreter philosophy upo n

,
’
s ,

his notion of th e general hang of things i n the orld or at leas t w ,

upon his notion of evidence But what notion of evidence c an we .

serio u sly defend excep t the notio n that an occurrence of the sort A
is evidence for an occu rrence of the sort B o far as the likes of A , s
have been fo u nd to b e accompanied by the like s of B or c o nsti ,

tu e n ts or pha ses or analogues of the one i th constituents or w

phases or analogues of the other ( proper allowance being made of ,

co u rse and b y the same procedure for all other kno n significant
, , w
relations in the field) ? We have every one o f u s at one time or
another obj ected to such an account as pedantry I n mo ving .

experiences of poe try and religion and friendship and of everyday ,

doings like saddling a hors e or felling a tree we have all felt nis u s , ,

continuities with th e p as t an d tendencies pushing into the fu ture ,

which promp t us to regard these experiences as evidence of a better

sort than the correlations mentioned That w e have such e x p eri .

e n ce s is indis utable That they ind u ce confiden t beliefs is wi dely

p .

recognized But that they are evidence for that th e belief in hich
.
, w
they induce we cannot establish by the vividness o f our feelings
,

or the strength Of our convictions en felt vividl y that the e ar th

. M
is at absolute rest ; that such and such favori te paintings and poems
m us t express to all men of all ages the most precious of all insights
or convey to them the greatest delight ; that their countries were
w
bo u nd to tri u mph in ars ( some of hich in the event they have w , ,

won some lost) that there j u st could not b e a shift i n the activity
,

of a physical system or of any part of a physical ystem without

, s ,
35 6 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
or operation An d if Jones and S mith s di fferent philosophical
.
’ ’

categories essentially reflect such di ffering approvals so far they ,

nei ther express nor entail any conflicting beliefs If on the o ther .

hand a man s evaluations are reports or hypotheses to the e ffect

’

, ,

that certain enti ties have ( or would ha e if they came into exist
“
v
ence ) the traits or structures which he means by the word val u
”
able then the de term ining whe ther his opinion i correct is a
, s
matter of ordin ary scientific fin di ng and nference and i not af i , s
fe c te d by his using as basic frames of reference in description and
“
i ”
explanation the tra ts which he means by valuabl e If hi neigh
”
. s
bor means some different class of characters by the term valuable ,

th e two ar e not thereby i n theoretical conflict ; and moreover they

w ill see that they are not if each will make clear which specific
class of trai ts h e thus means ne says that s more v al u able . O Xi
Y
than ; th e ot her reverses the j udgment Bu t if they mean di fferent
“ ”
.

sorts of traits by the term valuable the n determining h o w much ,

o f each sort of trai t X and may exhibit or how much the o ccur Y
Y
,

rence o f X
and the occurrence of may favor the manifestation in
various L s and ’
M ’ “
s and N s of what each means by val u e is ’

a problem to which exploration and evidence are relevant but ,

not dispute A nd if Jones and S mi th m ean ei ther th e same sorts

.

“
of traits or different sort s of trai ts by valuable then unless we ,

hold that there is evidence available to o ne which s intri ns ically i

incognizable by the other the two cannot be j ustifie d in holding
,

s
conflicting opinion by any of the four sorts of work of reason
w hich we have considered I f Jone and S mi th are antago ni stic . s ,

bu t nei ther we no r they are ab le to make approximately clear

w s s
hether each i expres ing emotional attitudes or is as serting that
various obj ects have ( or lack) in v arious degrees certai n so rt s of
“ ”
s
traits whi ch he mean b y valuable then nei ther J ones nor S mith ,

nor any of the rest of us i n a po sition to ay th at there is theosi s ~

re ti c al conflict here .

In reasonably mature cientific and cholarly d s p l ine s the s s i ci

h o l di ng of conflicting opinions about areas of their subj ec t matter s
is not regar ded as a vi rtu e bu t rather a a ign that th e function s s
of evidence has been neglected or that a n alysi of mean ngs h as s i
been omi tted o r confused It s in some of th e so called oc al . i -
s i
sciences in some psychological discussi o ns b u t parti cularly in
, ,

philosophy that we often find divergence of explanatory hypo

,

c
theses welcomed as su h A di st nguished economi st ha late ly . i s
written The maximum development o f di fferences o f O pinion in
,
 C O N F L IC T 3 5 7

all fields of thought is emi nently desirabl e Now if no two people .

in the world ever agreed in any Opinion and if nobod y ever agreed ,

with his own earlier opinions for five mi nutes runni ng we hould , s
only be app ro ach ing ( bu t by no means achieving) the max mum i
development of di fferences of Opinion Is that really a des rable . i
or a defensible objective ?
s
Bu t if my economist fri end mean by hi s tatement that w e hould s s
i
al l recognize that possibilit es are logically infinite
( that that the is ,

i
deni al of their nfini ty is self contra di ctory) ; that no matter how
-

much we might ever come to know the var ety of further po i , i ss

b i l i tie s of internal structure and of external context of what was
known must rem ain unlimi ted ; that as C 1 L ew s ha remi nded ,
“
. . i s
us in wri ting of postulate se ts if any o ne o f them is s u fficient
,

for a mathematical system then there wi ll be any number of

,

alternative sets w
which like ise are su fficien t 7 —if my economist
”

friend means to convey such advice by h s tatement then his cele i s ,

bration of max imu m d ifferences of Opinion is a way (b u t a m is

leading way) o f emphasizing a truism of elementary logic For .

w
what is i t of which e can say with logical necessi ty that i t co u ld
not b e ? N othi ng ; that which literally and completely is and is ,

not anything whatever An d of hat seeming proposition can

, . w s
we say that i t is logically impossible that they b e true ( or indeed
false) excep t the self contradi ctory propositions hi ch in totally
-
w ,

denying whatever in o n e part they assert assert nothing , .

w
To turn from th e possibl e to hatever is contrasted ith i t as w
s
in some sen e actu al how mu ch sho u ld e have to know of hat
, w w ,

i
among nfi ni te possibilities a ctually exists or has existed in order
,
‘

w
to kno that certain sorts of relations or qualities are ( and w ill be)
w
no here realized in events ? What we should have to kno w in
s
order to do thi is al l events and all their qualities and relations ,

and besides this the tru th of the proposition that what we know
is absol u tely all— that there was never and ill never be anything w
more or other But to know the tru th o f this latter prop osi tion
.

h as been shown by dozens o f philosophers to be logic al ly impossible .

We must therefore insist that every occ u rre nce is compatible

wi th an unlimited number of alternative explanatory hyp otheses .

B u t doe s i t therefore follow that i t is desirable or at al l defensible , ,

that men shou ld take sides one holding that one hypothesis is th e
,

most probable an d every other man holding that some other hy

o th e s is is the most pro b able and all changing their beliefs as fast
p ,

as they can? S o far as different evidence s are intrinsically inac

3 5 8 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
cessible to different interpreters they could not even imagine that
w
they differed ith respect to they knew not hat S o far as of w .
,

accessible evidence one man deals with one section another ith
, , w
another the di fferent inferences they may make
, hen geared to , w
th eir s u pporting evidence must be entirely compatible An d if the
, .

di fferent interpreters use let us say one of them one method of

, ,

reckoning probabilities another another then for both i t will be

, ,

equally true that on evidence E by prob ability method P in , I ,

ference I will enj oy thus mu ch support ; whereas on the same

1

evidence E b u t by probabili ty me thod P inference I will enj oy

, 2 , 2

so m u ch su p port An d if one asks which is the better me thod of

.

reckoning probabilities ( logical inconsistency of co u rse ruled o u t , ,

in both cases) have we any serio u s way of approaching an ans er

, w
w
except by finding hich me thod suppo rts inferences th e more com
mo u ly confirmed by fu rther exploration and observ ation ?
Philosophy considered as peacemaker as we have don e here does , ,

and can in no way limi t the possibili ties of hat may exis t of w ,

what may be meant or of the range of hypotheses that might be

,

tru e I t carries with i t no logical or theoretical restri ctions upon

.

the free play of imagination intellectu al or poetic But would our

, .

analysis if accepted nevertheless in fact remove a maj or stimu lus

, ,

to intellectual advance ? Is the strife of partisans the best seedbed

for new hyp o theses and new discoveries ? In asking these questions
we are again changing the subj ect of discuss ion from the nature
of theoretical conflict to the temperaments and psychological pro
c l iv i ti e s of thinkers — o f scientists and philosophers The s erious ay . w
to ascertain the probabilitie sw
ith respect to our changed subj ect
wou ld be not b y debate but by the fullest sort of historical and
psychological investigation I of course do not know the answer
.
, , .

But if theoretical conflict is in fact incompatible w ith th e careful

prosecution of the procedures of reason hich we have di scri mi w
n ate d then, w
o u ld i t not be a very odd thinker who understood
this situation and yet c o uld stimulate himself by participating as
a partisan in s u ch conflict ? e would be much the same kind of H
person as the man who could actu ally encourage himself by hold
ing a belief when he was convinced that he had no other ground
for the belief except that i t thus e ncouraged him ndoub tedly . U
there are some persons of such temper and even among our ablest ,

scientists and philosophers .

S uch p ac ifism of philosophical reason is not an empty gesture of

“
crying Peace peace when there is no peace It is some thing to
, , .
 E V E R E TT W H A LL
.

O ne need no t be a worshiper at the shrine of on e s intellectual ’

ancesto rs to feel a slight sense of distaste at the sight o f every author

of an elementary textbook in logic or ethic scurrying to chap ter iv s
M
of ill s U til itarian is m
’
O .

f What S ort of Proof the Pri nciple of

,

U ”
tility Is S u sceptible for examples o f fallacies sufficiently blatant
,

to be graspe d at a glance by the untrained mi nd It is j ust too o b .

” “ ”
v io u s that the relation of des irable to desired is only s u ffix al ly
“ ”
similar to the relation of audible to heard An d
w v
ho cannot s p ot the error of deri ing everyone desires th e general
“ ”
hap p iness from each desires his own happine s s ? An d so we
might go down through th e tradi tion al list B u t were we to try .

M
to u nderstand ill s argu ment as a hole an d in the s mple and
’
w i
w w
obvio u s sense in hi ch when so vie ed i t seems only fai r to take
, ,

, w
it e might find a core worth seriou s con sideration .

We mu st charge this tendency to force ill s proof of th e princi M ’

ple of u tility into a se t of the most patent fallacies to really firs t line -

p hilos o phers
. For example F , . H
Bradley in E.th ic a l S tu d ies
, ,
l
e xc u ses himself for taking time to point out the tissue of i n
 M LL S I ’ “
PROO F ”
U ILI YOF T T 3 6 1

consistencies that o he cl ai ms
“
, sI am ashamed , is M ill s argument ’
. ,

he wri tes to have to examine s uch reaso ni ng but i t is necessary

, ,

to do so since i t is comm on eno u gh 2 I shall however be m ai nly

, .
”
, ,

concerned to scruti ni ze th e cri ticis ms of another firs t rank p h il o so -

pher partly because I thi nk he is probably the most infl u ential

,

source of th e traditional di sparagement of ill s argument and M ’

partly becau se he h as stated the supposed case against ill s proof M ’

most clearly and cogently I refer to G E oore an d specific al ly to . . . M ,

chapter iii of P rin c ip ia E th ica .

L e t us see what M
oo re s cri tic sm is For purposes o f an al y is ’
i . s
w M
i t is ell to have ill s argument before u s fami li ar as that argu ’

ment is For th e momen t we shall note only hat

. oore calls w M
the firs t step an d in fact only th e first half of the first step , , ,
”
which I shall designate IA
( )
I A
The only proo f capable o f being gi en that a thi ng is v
i
v sible is that people actually see i t The only proof that a
, .

s ound is audi ble is that p e o p le hear i t ; and so of the other

,

sources of o u r experience I n like manner I app rehend the sole .

, ,

evidence i t is possible to p rodu ce that anything is desirable is

w
,

that people do actu ally desire i t I f the end hich the u tili tarian
w
.

doctrine proposes to itself ere not in theo ry and in practice

w v
, ,

ackno ledged to be an end nothing co u ld ever con ince an y

w
,

person that i t as
Of
his t , M
oo re says : Well the fal lacy in this step is so obvious , ,

that i t is qui te onderful ho w ”4

ill fai led to see i t What fallacy ? wM .

A falla c y M
oore calls the naturalistic fallacy “
ill has made .
”
M
s
a n ai ve and artless a use of th e natu ral istic fallacy as anybody
’
could desire Good he tells us means desirable and yo u can
.
‘

,
’

,
‘

only find o u t what is desirable by seeki ng to find o u t hat i w s

actually desired The important step for E thics is thi s one
.

j ust taken the step whi ch pretends to prove that good mean
‘ ”
,
‘ ’
s
desired 5 .
’

An d
j ust what is thi naturalistic fallacy that s M ill co mmi tted
so n ai vely and ar tlessly ?
It may be tru e that all th ings hich are good are a ls o some w
thing else j ust as i t is true th at all things hich are yello
, w w
p rod u ce a certain kind of vibration in the light A n d i t is a
w
.

fact that E thics aims at di scovering hat are those other proper
w
,

ties be lon ging to al l things hich are good B u t far too many
w
.

philoso phers have tho u ght that hen they named those o ther
3 62 AMER ICAN I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
properti e s they were actually defining good ; tha t these properties ,

in fact ere simply w not other b u t absolutely and entirely the

w
, ,
“
same ith goo d ness . This view I propose to call the natu ralistic
”
6
fallacy and of i t I shall now endeavor to dispose .

No w to re turn to th e iss u e I think that oore intends to accuse

. M
M ill of iden tifying tw o properties that are differen t v iz desirable , .
,

ness and desiredness and this perhaps as a step toward ide n tify
, , ,

w
ing goodness ith ple as ure I happen to believe however that ill
.
, , M
does mean to accept desirableness and desiredness as di fferent prop
e rti e s and that his ar gument makes this clear and that he doe s not

commi t the nat u ralistic fallacy .

T u rning back to step I A w e find ill saying The sole ev dence

, M , i
i t is poss ible to produce that anything is desirable is that people
actually do desire i t ”
M
oore himself correctly p ar aphras e thi s in
. s
one p lace y o u can only find o u t
, hat i s desirable b
y s e eking w
w
to find o u t hat is actually desired Bu t then later he makes the .
”
, ,

asto u nding assertion w ithout any foundation that

“
,
”
ill has p re , M
tended to prove that good means desired 1 I can only accoun t
‘ ’ ‘ ’

for this flagrant reading into ill of the naturali s tic fallacy byM
s u pposing that M
oore could not gras p any other sens e to ill s M ’

argument and so thought that ill m us t have commi tte d this M

fallacy But th ere is another and an ob ious sense to any inter
. v
w
preter not de b auched ith verbal casuistry as I hope to show , .

M
To proceed— oore continues his attack as follows :

The fact is that desirable doe s not mean able to be desired

“ “
as visible means able to be seen The desirable means simply .

what o ugh t to be desired or d e s e rv es to be desired ; j u st as th e

w
detestab le means not hat can be but hat ou ght to b e detested w
and the damn able hat dese rves to be damned w ill has then M
w
.
, ,
“
smu ggled in u nder cover of the ord de sirab le the very no
w
, ,
“ ”
tion ab o u t hich he o u ght to be q u ite clear D esirable doe s
w w
.

“
indeed mean hat i t is good to desire bu t hen this is under
stood i t is no longer pla u sible to say that o u r only test o f th a t
w
, ,

is hat is actually desired 7 .

This passage is a class ic D oes it not show the complete bankru p tcy
.

M
of ill s proof of utility ? But there is one small question What
’
.

reaso n is there to s u ppos e that ill was not perfectly aware that
“ “
M
desirable does not mean able to be desired and so in th is ,
“ ”
respect was not at all analogous to visible ? Could there be no
,

other way in which the evidence for desirab ility must be like the
3 64 AMER IC A N P H LO S OP HERSI WORK AT

alternative in eve ry choice si tuat on) by tradi -

i i n favor of livi ng
tio n al moral rules i n most situations bu t this i s only a concession ,

s
as to a tool for a certaining probable consequences an d does not ,

entail gi ving up th e pos tion that desire can b e j udged good or i s

bad only by the test of their total probably consequence s .

s
Thi leads immedi ately into a con derat on o f oo re s next si i M ’

thrust
M oreover if the desired is ip f the good then the go d so a c to ; o

is ip f
,

the motive of our actions and ther can be no q es

so a c to e u

M ill is at s ch pains to
,

tion of findi ng motives for doing it as u

do If M ill s expl ation of desirable be

,
“ ”
’
then his state
an tru e ,
f d d wi th the
.

ment that the r le of action may be u co n o u n e

motive of i t is untrue for h moti v e of action w ill then b: t e e ac

cording to him ip f i ts rul there can be no distinction

so ac to e;
be tw een the tw o and therefore no confusion and thus he has
, ,

contradicted himself fl atl y .

9

The reference here is to the following passage from chapter ii of

U ti l i tarian is m : S ome obj ectors to utilitari ani m s
say i t is exacting too m u ch to req u ire that peo ple shall al
ways act from the indu cement of promoting the general interests
of society B u t this is to mistake the very m e aning of a standard
w v
.

of morals and confound the rule of action i th th e moti e of it

w
.
,

I t i s the b u siness of ethics to tell us h at are o u r du ties or

w
,

by what test e may know them ; b u t n o system of ethics req u ires

that the sole motive of all w e do shall b e a feeling of d u ty ;
on th e contrary ninety ni ne hundredths of al l o u r actions are
,
-

don e from other motives and ri ghtly so done if th e rule of d u ty , ,

does not condemn them 1 0 .

s
Thi s i in manifest contradi ction ith the natur al istic falla y of w c
identifying good wi th desired ( on th e ass u mption probably cor ,

rect that motiv e of action refers to the ob j ect desired) —so much
,
”

so in fact that i t should have at least raised th e s u spicion that

, ,

M ill s argument for the princi ple of utili ty does no t reduce to a

’

comm ission of that fallacy .

Fin ally , M
oore formu lates his cri ticism of ills s tep I A in the M ’

form o f an accusation that ill has commi tted th e fallacy of M

ambiguous mi ddle
Well then the first step by hich ill has attempted to es tab w M
H H
, ,

lish his edonism is simply fallacio u s e has attemp te d to

w
.

estab lish the identity of the good ith the desired by confusing ,
 MILL S ’ “
PROO F ”
OF UT L I I T Y 3 65

the proper sense of desirable i n hich i t denotes that hich w w

w w w
,

i t is good to desire ith the sense hich it o u ld bear if i t

w w
,
“ ” ”
ere analogo u s to s u ch ords as visible I f desirable is to be
w
.

i den tical ith good then it mu st bear one sense ; and if i t is

w
,

to be identical i th desired then it m u st bear q u ite another

M
,

sense An d ye t to ill s contention that the desired is necessari ly

.
’

“
goo d i t is q u ite essential that thes e t o senses of desirable
, w
sho u ld be the same 1 1 .

I take it oore is saying thatM M ill s ’

argument c an be formulated
as a syllo i sm in B arb ara :
g

The good is identical with th e desirable

w
.

The desirable is identical i th the desired

w
.

Therefore the good is identical i th the desired

, .

An d in this syllogi sm says oore the mi ddle term desirable , M , , ,

is am biguo u s H
ere the natu ralistic fallacy o u ld ap p ear as the
. w
concl u sion of a fallacio u s line of proof B u t hat e idence is there . w v
M
that ill me an t to u se such a syllogi sm ? I find none f the whole . O
syllo gi sm i t is clear only that ill o u ld accep t the minor premi se
, M w ,

that the d esirab le an d the good are identical .

w
It is no time to turn to the second half of ill s first step M ’

w hich I shall name I B ”

( )
I B N o reason can be given hy the general hap p iness is de w
sirable except that each person so far as h e belie es it to be v
w wv
, ,

attainable desires his o n happiness This ho e er being the

w v w
.
, , ,

fact e ha e not only all the p roof hich the cas e admits of
w
, ,

b u t all hich i t is p ossible to req u ire that happine s s is a good : ,

that each person s ha piness is a good to that p erson and the

’

p ,

general happiness therefore a good to the aggr egate of all p er

H
, ,

s ons . appiness h as made o u t its titl e as o n e of th e en d s of

1
conduct and conseq u ently one of the cri te ia of morality 2
, r .

M oore does not specifically c i ticize this passage tho gh i t is easy r , u

to guess ho w he wo ld criticize it by reference to his method ofu

dealing w ith step I A and his discussion (without sp ecial reference

to his pa sage ) of egoistic hedonism But there is
t s need to con .
13 no

str ct a hyp o thetical cri ticism we can fill in the lacuna in M oore
u ;
by turning to Bradley w ho in thi s partic lar conflict is clearly , ,
u ,

an ally R eferring to step I B Bradley writes

.
,

Whe ther o u r great modern logician thought that by this

he had proved that the happiness of all w as desirable for each ,
3 66 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
w
I ill not undertake to say e either meant to prove this or H ,

w w w
.

has proved hat he started ith v iz that each desires his o n , .

pleasure An d yet there is a certain plau sibility abou t i t If man y .

w
.

pi gs are fed at one tro u gh each desires hi s o n foo d and some ,

w
,

ho as a con seq u ence does seem to desire the food of all ; and
by pari ty of reasoning i t should follow that each p ig desiring ,

w
his o n pleas u re desires also th e pleas u re of a ll
,
14
.

An d in a foo tnote he adds

M ill meant to argue B
E i ther e v erybody desires his e c a us e

ow n p l as re h f everybody desir s his ow n p lea re or

,

e u t e re or e e su

Because e v erybody desires his o w n pleas re h f e v eryb dy

,

u , t e re o re o

desires the pleas u re of everybody else . D isciples may take their

choice 1 5.

S om e ho w the arning that w M

ill p u t into step I B all the pro o f
that th e case admits o f — did not m ake any impressi o n Bradley
”
. ,

like M “
oore is ass u ming that o u r great modern logician as he
, ,

derisively characteri zes M

ill m us t b e presenting in his proof ,
”

of the p rin cipl e of u tility a strict logical dedu ction It is high , .

w
time that th i s hol e interpretation b e fu ndam e ntally and de
c i s iv e l challenged
y .

Ifw e tu rn b ack to chapt e r i of U ti l i tarian is m we find ill une , M

u iv o c all rej ecting any such inte rpretation :
q y

On present occ asion I shall

th e ithou t fu rther disc u ssion , , w
of the other theories attemp t to contri b u t e some thing towards
U H
,

the understanding and appreciation of the tili tarian or appi

, w
ness th e ory an d to ards such proof as i t is suscep tible of I t is .
.

evident that this cannot b e p roof in the ordin ar y an d pop u lar

meaning of th e term Questions of ultimate ends are not am en
.

able to direct proof Whatever can be prove d to be good mu s t

w
.
,

be so b y b e ing sho n to be a mea n s to s o m e th in g admitted to

‘

be goo d i tho u t proofw If then i t is asserte d that there

w
.
, ,

is a comprehen sive form u la incl u ding all things hich ar e

w
,

in themselves good and th at hatever else is go o d is not so as

, ,

an end b u t as a m e an the formu la may b e acce p ted or rej e cted

, , ,

bu t is not a s u bj ect of what is commonly understoo d b y pro of 1 6 .

An d the very first sentence of chap ter iv re e rts to this disa owal
“
v v
of any strict p roof of the principle of u tility : I t has already bee n
rem arked that q u estions of ultimate ends do no t a dmi t of strict
,

”
roof in the ordinary acce tation of th e term 1 7 N o t only doe s
p , p .

M ill thus explici tly disavo any attemp t to give a strict proof of w
 3 68 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
A ccordingto the o ne Opinion the pri nciples of moral s are ,

evident a p rio ri requiring nothing to comm and ass ent exce p t

, ,

that the meaning of the te rms b e u nderstood A ccording to the

w
.

other doctrine righ t and rong as well as truth and falseh o od

, , ,

are q u e stions of observation and experience 2 1 .

Yet M ill is cl ar that a peculiar problem marks o ff ethi cal ques

e

tions from factu al It is not possibl e to determi n e what is right or

.

w rong in individual cases by direct perception It is necessary in .

,

making ethical j u dgments to apply general principles that go ,

back to an e thical firs t p ri nciple the morality of an individual

action is not a q u estion of di rect perception b u t o f th e application ,

w ”
v
of a la to an in di idual cas e 2 2 Thu s this serious qu estion faces .

th e ethical empiricist : H
ow can one s ethical first princ ple ( such ’
i
as the p rincipl e of utili ty) b e establish e d ? S elf evidence is not ava l -
i
w
able for appeal to i t ould b e an embracing of intuitionism ; nor
,

is inductive general ization since the rightnes s or w rongn ess of in

,

i
d vidu al acts is not open to direct perception .

In this sit u ation M

ill makes u se of two consideration both s ,

w
of hich he got from Bentham not to p rov e the prin ipl e of , c
utility b u t to m ak e it acc ep ta b le to reasonable men ne of these . O
is essential ly an ap peal to men s honesty When ordinary men try ’
.

to j u stify their moral j u dgments rationally they do so by the ,

taci t use of the principle of utility When an ethicist atte mpt s to .

w
show hy his eth ical first principle ( if i t d ffers from that o f i
u tili ty
) should be accepted h e does so by u tilitari an argumen ts 2 3
, .

This is not I am convinced the old c o ns e ns us ge n tiu m argume n t

, , ,

nor does i t res t on a social agreement theory of truth If i t were -

.

and did a strict proof of utili ty ould b e possible It is rather as

, w . ,

I have said an appeal to intellectu al honesty It says

,
“
y de ar .
, M
e th icist w
henever you are caught o ff guard ei ther in e v eryday
, ,

situation s or in arguing for some ethical principle yo u find your ,

reasons go back to a taci t assumption of utili ty as the firs t princi

ple of ethics What more doe s the u tili tarian need to d o th an to
.

bring this clearly to you r attention ?

, wv
I do not ho e er think that this was the main considerati o n
,

M w
that ill ished to present in develo p ing a fav o rabl e attitude to
ward th e p ri nci p le o f u tility In the first place i t is not in any .
,

special sense emp irical In the second p lace he adverts to i t briefly

.
,

in chapter i but not at al l in chapter iv whi ch as we have seen

, , , ,
“
is devoted to the t as k of showing of what sort of proof th e pri nci
”
p l e of utili ty is s u sceptible Chapter iv is I w i sh to
. u rge simply , ,
 M LL S I ’ “
PRO O F ”
OF UT L I I T Y 3 69
an explication of a certain sort of consideratio n that an empir cist i
can use to gain accept ance for an ethical first principle the first ,

p ri nci ple in this i ns t an ce ( though i t is not used as a mere illustra

tion for, M w
ill does ish to ge t his readers to accep t i t) being ,

of co u rse that of utility

, .

L e t us recall that an empiric st cannot hold that we directly i

perceive ethical attribute of particu lar actions Thus h e cannot s .

establish hi s ethical first principle by an inductive generalization .

, w
This ho ever is tru e of any first principle 2 4
, .

To be incapable of proo f by reasoning is common to all first

princi p les ; to the first premises of our kno ledge as ell as to w , w
those of o u r cond u ct B u t the former being matters of fact may
w
.
, ,

be the s u bj ect of a direct appeal to the faculti e s hich j u dge

of fact— namely o u r senses and o u r internal consciousness Can
, , .

an appeal h e made to the same fac u lties on q u estion of p ractical

u w
ends ? O r by hat o ther fac lty is cogni ance taken of them?
z 2 5

w
It is in ans er to this question tha t ill gi es us step I A No w M v .

w
j u st hat is the analogy that he ishes to urge upon us between w
visible and se en on the one hand and desirable and desired on
, , ,

the other? I s u bmi t the following as an inte rpretation that at le as t

makes sense of ill s argu ment as a hole M ’
w .

w
In the area of kno ledge the emp iricist cannot strictly prove his
first princi ple H
e cannot prove by ind u ction or by dedu ction
.
,

from any more u ltimate principle that th ere are no isible things , v
never seen a u dible occurrences never heard and so on B u t he
, , .

“
can set i t up as a plausible principle ( as a meaning cri terion a , s
v
a later positi ist put i t) that any epistemological theory that re
quires visible o r audi ble en tities that are ne er seen or heard is v
talking nonsense The only test an yone can seriously propose that
.

a thing is visible is that it act u ally is seen A theory that conflicts .

w ith this requirement ill j u s t not be acce p ted by reasonable w

people S imi larly in e thical theory A theory that sets up as ends
. .
,

desirable in themselves goo d n o t simply capable of being de ,

sired) states of affairs th at nobody ever desires is j u st being aca

,
“
demic and u nrealistic If the end hich th e utilitarian doctri ne
. w
w
proposes to i tself ere not in theory and practice ackno ledged , , w
to be an end nothing co u ld ever convince any person that it w as
,

s o That is if no o n e appealed to the gr eatest happiness to j ustify

.
,

e thical j u dgm ents or ever in practice desired the greatest happiness ,

no considerations capable of getting re as onable people to accept

3 7 0 AMER IC A N I
P H L O S O P H ER S AT WORK
that principle as ethically ultimate could be presented L e t us c al l .

this the req u irement directed towar d any e thical first prin c iple
, ,

of psychological realism S ince a first principle is incapabl e of .

proof anyone co u ld arbitrari ly set up any ethic al first princi ple

,

w
he chose and there ould be no b asis for deciding be t een this
, w
and any other ( if we eschew the intui tionist s self evidence) unl es ’
-
s
some such requirement as that of psychological realism were set up .

S tep I B is to be interpreted in similar fashion with the addition ,

that M
ill is here assuming the truth of psychological hedonism .

, v
No w whate er one s opinion as to this latter doc tri ne ( I believe
’

i t to be false) th e design of ill s argument is not a ffected No

,
“
M ’
.

v
reason can be gi en why th e general happiness i s desirable except ,

that each person so far as he believes i t to be atta nable desires

, i ,

his own happiness L e t us remember that for . ill th e desir , M ,

ability o f the general happiness is a first principle that cannot be

proved The sentence j ust quoted therefore se ts dow n no require
.
, ,

ment as to strict proof It rather sho s hat sort of consideration . w w

must be presented to lead to the acceptance of this first principle .

O ne cannot sensibly present general hap p ines s as desirable if i t is

completely u nrelated to hat individual people actually desire w .

M ill cannot and doe s not argu e that each seeks the general hap p i
ness or that socie ty as a hole somehow has i ts o n motives over w w ,

and above those of i ts members and that these are directed to ,

ward the general happiness R ather ill simply says ( anticipating .

, M
the o u tcome of step I I and the acce p tance of the pleasure Of each
individual as a go od) that since th e pleas ure of each i s a good , ,

the sum of th e s e must be a goo d : each perso n s happine is a ’

ss
good to that person and th e general happin e ss therefore a goo d
, , ,

to the aggregate o f all pers on s 2 6 r as he explains in a letter I “

.
”
O ,
'

merely meant in this par ticular sentence to argue that since A s ,

’

happiness is a good B s a go od C s a go od 8cc the sum of all

,
’

,
’

, .
,
”
these goods m u st be a goo d 2 7 This may be incorrect ; i t may be .

that good s cann ot be added tho u gh surely i t is not j ust ob vious ,

M
that ill is mistaken in th is matter
“
owe er that may be ill is . H v , M
clearly n o t trying to prove that b e ca us e everybody desired his o w n
f
pleasure th ere o re everybody desires the pleasure of e erybody
, v
”
H
else 2 8 e is not ( if the reader will tolerate an other reiteration)
.

trying to p rov e anything e is attempting simply to present th e . H

general happiness principle in a ay that will m ak e i t seem ac
-
w
c e tab l e as an e thical first princi le to people
p p ho rej ecting elf w ,
. s
v
e idence in this matter still w i sh to be intelligent , .
3 72 AMER IC A N PH ILO S O P H ER S AT WORK
th rough a ssociation wi th pleasan t effects Thus money or virtue .

s
really are desired a ends bu t only so far as they are expe ri enced ,

as ple as an t This can then be expressed loo sely by saying only

.

—
pleas u re i s desired yet o ther things are al s o as concrete parts of
,

w
it It ould be better to say : nly thi ngs experienced as pleasant
. O
ar e desired for their own sakes No w if this be accep ted then hat .
, , w
does i t involve if we are to suppos e that the principl e of utili ty
successfully passes the test of psychological realism ? It requires that
that principle when i t says that happines is the sole goo d mean
, s ,

not that ple as antness is goo d bu t that things experience d as ple as

ant and they alone are goo d P leasure as a property is not goo d
, , .
, , ,

and certai nly not the sole good Is thi s a tenabl e interp re tation ? .

I think i t is Bu t thi s carr ies us away from the q u estion of th e

.

proof of the p ri ncipl e of u tili ty to th e natu re of that principle .

O
ne last word and I am done wi th my cri ticism of th e traditional
,

way of disposing i th ill s argument w M

oore finishes off his cri ti ’
. M
ci sm of M
ill s ste p 1 1 as follows :
’

M ill then has nothing be tter to say for hi mself han this H i t s
tw o fundamental proposi tions in his o w n words that to
.
, ,
“
are ,
thi nk f an obj ect as desirable ( unles s for the sake of i con
,

o ts
sequences) and to think of it as pleasan t are o n e and the same
, ,

thing ; and that to desire anything excep t in proportion as the

idea of i t is pleasant is a physical an d metaphysica l imp o ssi ,

b i l i ty Both of these statements are we have seen merely s u p

.
, ,

ported by fallacies The first seems to res t on the natu ralistic

.

fallacy ; th e second rests p artly on this p ar tly on the fallacy of ,

confusing ends and means an d p ar tly on th e falla cy of confusing

w
,

a pl e asan t thou ght ith the tho u ght of a pleas u re 2 9 .

It is clear agai n that M oore is thinking of M ill s argument as a ’

stri ct proof H ad he r ad i t in context e v en going back one pa a

. e , r

g aph
r h would
, hav e had to give p this whole interpretation
e u .

L et me se t dow n the pa agraph that immediately precedes h r t e

passage M oore quotes :

We hav e now then answ er to the q estion of w hat sort of an u

proof the princi p le of tili ty is susce p ti b le I f the opinion whic
, , ,

u h

I have now stated is p sychologically tr e i f h man nat re is so

.

u — u u
consti t ted to desire nothing which is not either a p t of
u as ar
hap piness or a means of hap p iness w e have other p ro f c an no o
and w e req ire no other that hese
, ,

u the only things desirable , t are .

If so happiness is th e sole end of h u man action and the promo

, ,

tion of i t the tes t by which to j udge of all human condu ct ; from

 MILL
’
s
“
PROO F ”
OF I I
UT L T Y 3 73
w
i
whence i t necessarily follo s that it must be th e cri te rion of
moral ty since a part is included in the whole ”
, .

This so i t seems to me i s j ust a su m mary of what step 1 1 purports

, ,

to do I t says that if there is only one ort of thing that i ever

.
, s s
desired then psychological realism requires one s e thi cal th eory to
,
’

square with this Thi s sort of plausi b ility s all that can be required
. i
of any e thic al theory .

Tu rning now to the paragraph hich is the immediate con

, , w
text of th e passage that oore quotes we find that ill simply M , M
summarizes his contention that there is only one sort of thing
ever desired that this is happine s that u tili tarianism alone there
, s , ,

fore is acceptable to ethicists who are honestly realistic

, o ever . Hw ,

he does fall into a loose manner of speaking upon whi ch a ca uist , s

is able to capitalize . H
e wri tes to thi nk of an object as desirable , ,

when the context makes clear that he meant to desire an obj ect .

H e has j u st wri tten in an earlier part of the same sentence de

,
“
,

siring a thing and finding i t pleasant are phenomena entirely

insep arable ”
w
hich he then rei terates in di ff erent ords to thi nk
, w ,

of a thing as desirable and to think of i t as pleasant are one ,

and the same thing A l l this means is that any obj ect desired ( for
.

i ts o w n sake) i s insep ar ably associated wi th pleas ure I find no .

evidence that this commits the naturali stic falla y

“
ill doe s u se c M .

the infelicitous term desirable here But he could have used .

“ ”
good in the same loose an d colloq u ial sen e ; i e he could have s . .

said in accordance with freq u ent pop u lar u sage to th ink of an

, ,

s
obj ect a good when he mean t to desire an obj ect .

In summary th e argumen t o f chapter iv of ill s Util z tarian z s m

, M ’
' ’

is extremely simple and ( in the mai n) ensible To an empiricist s .

w ho es chews all intuitive self evidence no e thi cal first prin c ple -
, i
can b e strictly proved Al l that one can do i s to present considera .

w
tions that ill lead honest and reasonable peopl e to accept such
. s
a principle The e considerations for an empiri cist must turn o n , ,

what people actu ally desire E ach person desires his o w n hap piness . .

Therefore a first principle tha t makes happiness good will prove

,

acceptable to honest men hen they consider i t An d if the happi w .

ness of each is goo d then th e sum of happiness of all is good , .

Thus th e prin ciple of utility is something that men con titu ted as , s
they are can honestly accept But no other e th ical first principle
, .

can meet this simple tes t of p ychologic al realism ; for ( and here th e s
s
re a o ning is not too clear) the only thi ng people eek ( for i ts s
3 74 AME RICAN I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
ow n sake ) is happiness A t least a plausible interpre tatio n of th s
. i
las t consideration is that happine ss is not a s u m of ple as ures in the
sense of an am ount of sheer pleasantness b u t is a sum of things
w
experienced ( hether by one s original natu re or through long ’

as sociation) as pleasant .

It mu s t be admi tted that thi s whole interpre tation presupposes

i i
a fu ndamental distinction a distinction hich in tu i t o n s ts like f”l
, w
M oore thinking they c an rest their cas e on the self evidence of
,
-

their first principles apparently ignore I refer to the d is tin c , .

w
tion bet een a s tatement in a theory and a statement about a
theory w
hich here takes th e form of the distinction be t een a
, w
proof within an ethical system and a proo f of an e thical system .

A first principle in an ethical system ( or in an epistemologi cal or

ontological system) obvio u sly cannot be proved in th at syste m In .

fact to say that a principle is self evident may me an j u st that i t is

,
-

a first p ri nciple ; in that system in hi ch i t is self evident i t is not w -

to be q u estioned ; the p ossibili ty of its fals ehood would j u s t be th e

possibility of a contradiction in the system In any o ther sense th e .

self evidence of a first principle takes us outside the syste m B u t that

-
.

brings u p the seriou s question of how a hole e thi cal system can w
be established a question that such an intuitionist as o ore never
, M
clear ly faced j u st beca u se he never saw this am biguity in the con
cept of self evidence -
.

M ill in his loos e commonsensical way is trying to di stinguish

, , ,

be tween proof in a system and proof of one and to answer the

“ ”
q u estion What kind of proof of an e thical syste m is poss ible ?
,

H e is saying that an ethical system as a hole ca n not be estab w

li sh e d in any other w
ay than by m aking i t acceptable to reason
able men ; and this is done j ust by showing that i t and i t alone
( in its first princi p les though not as th e oretically elabo rated) is ac
,

tu al l y accepted by men when outside the philoso her s closet

p ill ’
. M
simply asks e thicists to sq u are their profess ionally elaborated e thics
w ith the common sense ethics of every man including themselves
-
, .

O riginally p art of an article The Proof of U tili y in Bentham and ,

‘ ’
t
M ill ap p earing in E hi V l LX N 1 ( O ctober 1 9 4 9 ) R ep rin ed
,
”
t cs , o .
,
o .
, t
with p ermission of the U niversity of Chicago Press .

1 . F H B radl ey , E thic al S tu die s , 2 d e d ( Oxfo rd,

. . .
pp . 113 —2 4 .

2 . B radl e y , o p c it , p l 1 5 n. . . .

3 .
Q u o te d b y Mo ore ,Princ ip ia E thic a, p 6 6 . .

4 . I b id , p 6 7 . . .
 H O RA CE M . KA LLEN

f
o D em ocracy

E ach of the thre e words in the ti tle — h u man is tic s o urc e d e m o c racy, ,

—is a word of many me an i ngs E ach is extremely am biguous In

i
. .

usage each is rendered specific an d S ngular by th e business and

,

desire of th e u ser T h e cri tical term of th e thre e is s o u rce What

. .

do we mean b y s o u rce ? A cons e nsus of the di ctionaries would give

s
u sp ring a locus of origination or spontanei ty Wh e n this mean
, .

s
ing i transpos ed into a univers e of discours e called p hi losophy or
metaphysics o r theology s o u rce becomes an alternate for rs t caus e
, fi .

fi
The empirical equivalent for a rs t ca us e least open to challenge , ,

is probably the biologist s ge ne S o far as our knowledge presently

’
.

goes th e ge n e is the one i tem in nature whi ch co nsi s tently repeat

, s
i tself and on occasion alters i tself It not only re produ ces i tself in
, .

identical form but varies spontan eo u sly and then reprod uces the
,

variant together with i ts v ariation in identical form T h e ge ne s .

s
as cause appears to be a elf reproducing identi ty capable of change
-

wi thout self liquidation A lthough i ts altering and mutations pre

-
.

sent themselves as discontinuous they come as accre t ons to i ts o w n

, i
, s
continui ty as accretion that is to a persistent identifiable nature
, ,

an d existence .
 O F H UMAN ST I IC S OUR E S O C F DE M O RA Y C C 3 77

No w I shall take the term s o u rce as applied to h uman is m to , ,

s
mean a cau e resembling a ge n e I ass u me that hat I am to do in . w
this talk is to identify ei ther a contin u ing or recurrent cau se called ,

h u m an is m in the generation and upkeep of an e ff ect called

, ,

d e m o c racy .

s
Inquiry into cau es is today p ar e x ce l l e n ce the enterpris e of
. s
th e scientist Identifying cause is hi s vocation even when the field ,

is theology The u se of scientific method in theology and th e treat

.

ing of theol o gy as a field for the scientific vocation are I know not , ,

i
exactly pop u l ar in certain c rcles but they have their friends ho , , w
w
are a gro ing company They are a gro ing company becau e the
. w s
me thod of science has prove d i tself to be of all meth o ds the most ,

fru i tful in that bas ic phase of the human enterprise which eeks to s
sort ou t and define those events which invariably bring about
w
certain other events hich someone feels to be of great moment for
th e life of man .

An undertaking bes e t wi th haz ards and doub ts in all the s ci

e n ces the designation of causes is par tic u lar ly so in th e social
,

sciences , w
here the variables are countless an d the constants are
few if no t altogether lacking ; and here a stu dent may select any
, w
one or any gro u p of the current components of an institution or an
v
e ent attribute to them causal effica c y and s u pport hi s attribution
, ,

w ith rationalizations and statistical tables hose mathematics are w

infallible This can be done even if the elected components are in
.

fact not at all so u rces or agents ; i t can be done wi th the gr eatest of

w w
ease herever th e u ses of things hich are at once conseq u ences and
mod ifications of the natures of those things are treated as the ori
w
gins the s p rings hence their natu res have draw n o r dra their
, w
existence For example i t is well kno n that many great and in
.
, w
fl u e n ti al democratic originals such as Thomas Jefferson made, ,

considerable use of certain classical w ri ters ho s e productions are w

conventionally allocated to the humanities But hether these . w
h u manities made a d emocrat of Je fferson and ere ca u ses of the w
w
beatitu des of demo cracy which e call the D eclaration o f I n dep en d
ence cannot be decided on the basis of u se or purpose It is no .

, v
more likely that jefferson ha in g stu died the humanities became ,

a democrat than that Jefferson being a democrat chose from the

, , ,

h u m anities those utterances which ould nourish an d u s tain his w s

democratic works and ways But the d sposition to call an event
. i
3 78 AMER IC A N I
P H L O S O P ER S H AT WORK
whi ch preceded ano ther event the cause of that whi ch follow is s
inveterate and the temp tation to do so is par ti cularly strong in
,

history and the o ther social s c ences so that it is hard not to call i ,

w
certain of the humani ties hich figure in Jefferson s spi ri tual his ’

tory cau ses of his democra cy p os t h o c p rop ter h o c I shall try no t .

to be led into this temp tation ei ther i th respect to Je ff erson or , w

wi th respect to any of the diverse sequences of humanistic and
democratic ideas .

I shall also hope to bypass a n u mber of other tem ptat ons ne i . O

i
of these cons sts in declaring differen t meanings to b e one and the
same beca u se they are communicated by means of a singl e term ,

w ord or si gn It is as if o il and vinegar and water and ine and

. w
peroxide and quicksilver should be declared the sam e because they
are carried in identical b o ttles The identi ty of th e vehicle con .

tam i n ate s the diversi ty of the passengers and their varie ty and mul
ti tu d e are masked by its uni ty O
ne of the most significant ins tances
.

of s u ch co ntaminati on of meanings by symbols hich usage provide w

w
is of course th e familiar ord G o d It is a word employed by P lato .
,

by Clean thes by P lotinus by S t Augustine by S t Tho mas by S p i

, , .
, .
-
,

noza by Je fferson by Calvin by E d ar d S cribner Ames by or

, , , w , M
decai Kaplan by William James by S itting Bull and by countless
, , ,

other psychologists metaphysicians and theologians

, o ever di f . Hw
fe re n t th e language of these men the dictionaries m ake their ords , w
for God eq u al and interchangeable and translate each as the alte r ,

nate of any B u t h o w can the men s meanings b e made equal and

.
’

interchangeable w i thout terrible violence to th e integri ty of those

sep ar ate meanings ? S u ch violence can rea d ily be done to th e mean
ings of h u m an is m and d e m o cracy hen verbal illations mask fu nda w
v
mental di ergences o f intention S u ch identifications are p rodu ced .
,

w
as a ru le henever we are passionately concerned with th e survival
,

and domination of one intention regardless of th e consequences ,

to all others For example such a passionate concern is attri butable

.
,

v
to many who insist on deri ing the democra tic ide a from Thom as
A q u inas A s a matter of logic and history the derivation is to say
.
,

the least highly debatable ; as a postu late of passion i t isn t de

,
’

batable nor i s the p as sion debatable Affirm ing i tself i t involves

, .
,

v
either the ignoring or th e o e rridi n g of that hich i s di ff erent from w
i tself or the identification of the di fferent wi th itself A t i ts most .

likely i t confuses resemblance wi th sameness analogy w i th ide n tity , .

This mode of mi stakenly at tri b u ting caus e s is another one of

th e temptati o ns into which th e soc ial scientist is all too ofte n led .

H is s ciences abound in analogical thinking and a great deal of i t ,

3 8 0 A M E R IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S WORK AT

manner of a physicis t or c hemist or mathemati ci an h

t e quality of ,

cause agency or gr ound in their relations to o ne another The most

,
.

that I can honestly do is to choose o n e or more of the s e meanings ,

review their sequence their si mi lari ties their d verge nces wi th a

, , i
w s
vie to discove ri ng what is cau e and what is e ff ect and arn you , w
that the choice c an no t b u t express my o w n social p as sion and
personal interest . O
ther people make other selections a is thei r , s
right But min e is the only one ab out hich I can speak with any
. w
degre e of certain ty and over whi ch I hold such au thori ty as i t is
,

dece nt to h o ld .

i
S ince the task s to discern the nature of the relat o n be tween i
h u m an is m and d e m o cracy i t is proper to se ek firs t a meaning for
,

d e m o c racy The term appe ar s early P lato u sed it Ari stotl e used i t
. .
, ,

Jefferson used i t an d spokesmen of all so rts of interests and p re

,

t e nsions are using i t today The multi tude of meanings are not re
.

co n c il ab l e . w
That hich I ch o ose for discussion i s Jefferson s is ’
. H
meaning of democracy is uniqu e .

N o w the conventional bir thday o f d em o cracy was J u ly 4 1 77 6 ~

, .

O n that day a conception w as made flesh in an act and the course ,

of human events took a new t u rn A w ar for independence and .

w
freedom as j ustified and i ts goals were defined by the signi ng of
w
th e document kno n as the D eclaration of Independence for the ,

support of which the signers mu tually pledged each o ther their

lives their fortunes and their sacred honor S eve n propositions of
, .

this D eclaration compose the u nique b e au ti tu d e s of the demo cratic

fai th of our times Verse by verse they read as follows :
.
,

1
We hold these tru ths to be self e iden t (Je ff erson had
.
-
v
w ri tten sacred and u ndeniable bu t the phrase had been re ,

placed with self evident ) -

.

2 that all men are created equal ;

.

3 that they are endowed b y their creator

.

“
ith certai n u n al ie n
”
w
able rights ( Jefferson had written inherent and u nalienable ,
“ ”
b u t the Con gress stru ck ou t inherent and and stuck in cer

4
that among the s e are life liberty and the p u rsuit of
.
,

happiness ;
5 that to sec u re thes e rights governments are i nsti t u ted among
.

men ,

j
6 de ri ving their ust powers from the consent of the gove rned ;
.

w
7 that henever any form of government become s destructi ve
.

of these ends i t is th e ri ght of the peopl e to alter or aboli s h i t

,
,
 O F H UMAN ST I IC S O UR E S O C F D E M O RA Y C C 3 8 1

and to insti tute new governmen t laying i ts foundation on s u ch

w
,

principles and organizing i ts po ers in s u ch form as to them

, ,

shall seem most li kely to effect their safe ty and happiness .

This is the all of the modern democratic faith and a man can
learn i t as a certain gentile once anted to learn Judaism hile
, w , w
stan di ng on one leg When ho ever e come to th e business of w w
i
.
, -

interpre ting and implementing the art cles of this faith in the works
w
and ays of the daily life the case is different A great deal of co n
, .

. O
fusion ob tains ne such conf usion turns upon the meanings hi ch
“ ”
w
different interpreters undertake to give to the term equ al in th e
“
proposition that all men are created eq u al To some it is non .

sense a gli ttering generality flung obvio u sly in the face of all ex
,

erie nc e To others it expresses a metaphysical truth and is self

p .

evident alone as such ; namely that th e manifest differences b e ,

w
t een men are but appearances uns u bstantial and unimportant , ,

that in truth and in reality men are identical and not different ,

each an d every one being the same wi th each and every other and
as interchangeable as machine parts .

The first interpretation when brought to action leads to a strug

, ,

gle to pe rpetuate the modes of h u man as sociation hich th e D ec w

l aratio n challenged and denied ; i t lea d s to asserting and p re
serving invi di ous distinctions ; to di iding th e peopl e as masters v
and se rv an ts on the bas is of di fferences in fai th race sex birth , , , ,

s
occupation pos e ssions and cultu re ; to penalizing th e different
,

for being different by shutting them into th e servant cl ass and

keeping them there .

The second interpretation brought to action leads to a struggle

to bring o u t th e hidden metaphysical equality or sameness by de ,

manding of the differen t in faith race sex birth oc cu pations and , , , ,

possessions and culture that they shall liquidate their differences

and conform their being to some type or t andard defined by po er s w
and commanded with auth ori ty . M
any s o i d is tan t A mericanization -
”

v
mo ements have been enterpri es of this kind purporting to trans s ,

form the differen t into th e sam e In the actualities of the daily life .

their me thods an d results have not been di stinguishable from those

w
of the interests hich treat the idea that all men are created eq u al
as a glittering generali ty Both merely penalized the di ff erent for
.

be ing different Both made di fference a ground of the invi dio u s

.

s
di s tincti ons ess ential to e tting up and maintai ning a citizenship of
the second cla ss .
3 82 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HERS AT WORK
But i t was precisely against this invidiousness thi s penaliza ,

tion of the di fferent that the D eclaration et th e nation s ill When s ’

w .

i t was framed men and omen were being penalized for being
, w
w w w
hat they ere every here in the world Women being female and .
,

not male had no rights that their male relatives needed to respect ;
,

Catholics penali z ed Protestants and Protestants penalized Catholics

and each o ther— all b u t th e Quakers ho were penalized for being w
Q u akers by all the other Christian denominati o ns while the Jews ,

were penalized for not being C h ristians everywhere in the Chris tian
w w
orld N egroe s ere penalized for their color ; poor m e n for their
.

w
poverty ; men ho worked w ith their hands and were thus no ,

w
gen tlemen for orking i th their hands With the propos tion
, w . i
that all men are created equal the D eclaration nullified all that ,
.

w w
The men ho rote and signed the D eclaration and the men an d
w omen who fo u ght an d s u ffered and di ed for i t did not intend by
that proposition ei ther to abolish or to penalize di fferences They .

intended to vindicate di ff erences to acknowledge an d to defend ,

their e q u a l ri ght to life liberty and the pursui t of hap piness Th ey

, .

affirmed the right to be different and the parity of th e di fferent as

di fferent They did not loo k to any hidden metap hysical eq u ality ;
.

they looked to the common everyday exp er ence that people who , i
are di fferent from each can and do li e together wi th each o ther v
on th e basis that each has an equal title to th e ri ghts o f life liberty ,

an d the p u rs u it of happiness and that these rights are inherent ,

and u nalienable in each .

The D eclarants were nei ther ignorant of n or ignored the his

toric and present fact that much of such living toge ther consis ts in
mutual alienations of life and li b erty and happiness They knew .

that the family th e field th e workshop the school th e playground

, , , , ,

the hall of government the b attlefield all too often show them
, ,

v
sel es separately an d together as very much like th e j ail and the ,

w
gallo s techniq u es of s u ch mutual alienat on of the s e p u tative
,

“
i s
unalienable rights B u t th e D eclaran ts never me an t by u n alien
.

”
w
able that men and omen d d not kill and m ai m and frustrate i
each other fence each other in and fend each o ther o ff They me an t
, .

“
unalienable to be a syno nym for inherent for consti tu ti ve
”
, .
”

They me ant that th e natu re of any an d every h u man being what ,

v
e er his color sex race fai th occupation o r soc ial status is con
, , , , ,

stitu ted by these rights as a trian gle is consti tu te d by three sides

and th ree angles ; they meant that life liberty and the p u rsui t of ,

happiness make u p the substance of human nature a th e angles , s

and sides of a triangle make up th e being o f the tri an gle ; that
3 84 AMER IC A N P H LO SOP HI E R S AT WORK
of the western world including much of what is usually regarded
,

as h u m an is m Before th e insurgence of this idea of d e m o c racy

.

nei ther the ancients nor the mode m s failed to penalize thi s o r that
w
section of their o n community and all the members of eve ry other
commu nity for being di ff erent L e t alone the fact that chattel .

slavery was universal and endemic the Greeks drew invidious d is ,

tin c ti o n s between themselves and those hom they called barbari w

w w
ans ; the Je s bet een themselves and the Gentiles ; the R omans
w v
bet een themsel es and their subj ect peoples ; the Christians b e
w
t een themselves and the Jews the heretics and the in fide l s I n , .

each case the different m u st not be equal b u t subordinate second ,

rate , w
orthy only o f subj ect status and se rv le occ u pation A like-
i .
,

th e pagan and the Ju d ae o C h ristian tra d ition affirmed some s ort-

of supernatural sanction for their discrimi nations aga ns t other i

human beings John Calvin brought this sanction to the ultimate
.

height of metaphysical autho ri ty H e made a dogma of the propo i . s

tion that as Jefferson rote in 1 8 2 2 to Benj amin Waterhouse w
i
, ,

“
God from the be gi nning elected certa n in di viduals to b e s ave d
, , ,

and certain oth ers to be damned ; and that no crimes of the former
c an damn them ; no virtues of the latter save .

The attitude which this consu mmates is a componen t of the

Greek view of life no less than of the Je ish bu t the irony of his w ,
,

tory made i t wi th the Jews an automatic compensation fo r their

frustrations as a people It is to th e m that th e tradi tion attributes
.
,

not wrongly the pre tensio n of being th e ch os e n p e op le S i m ilar

, .

pretensions were and are operative among al l the people s of the

w orld b u t their expressions have not recei ved equa l importan ce
, .

T heH w
ellenes ere not les s elect to Plato an d Aris totle th an the
H w w
ebre s ere to their prophets and rabbis b u t the pagans did not ,

erect this sentiment into a dogm a of religion hence they might w

dra consolation an d reas suran ce The J ew did Th e ir God Was
w . s .

God omnipotent and j ust yet he was capable o f playing favorite , s

and choosing out of the infini te multi tude of hi s creatu res one
r o u p to be his partic u lar people an d he to be their particul ar
g
, w , w
God i tho u t ho ever any fundamental detriment to other peo
,

, w
ples who ere also declared to be God s creatu res and care If I ’
.

understand the pro p hetic and J u daist View correct ly i t was more ,

psychological tha n logical The election of Israel did not mean the
.

rej ection of the other nations ; i t meant not that th e nations were ,

rej ected but only th at Israel was preferred The Christian employ .

ment of this dogma of reassurance an d cons olation carri es its logic

 OF H U M A N I S IC T SOUR ES C OF DE M O RA Y C C 8
3 5

to the limi t Christian dogma change the status of the Jews from
. s
that of the Chosen P eople to that of the R ej ected People A ccord .

ing to i t j ust and omnipotent G o d chooses only thos e hu man

,

beings who believe on the Christ and rej e ts and conde mn s to c

s
e ternal damn ation tho e who do not believe on the Christ Calvin .

modified this clas sical view by addi ng that our finite minds cannot
kno ww hom in the Christ infinite God s omniscience and omn i
, ,
’

potence has elected and whom rej ected .

But whether we think of di vine election after the manner of

the Jews or after the manner of the Chris t an we s ee the dogma i ,

as exercising a dominating infl u ence in Ju d ae o C hri stian cu lture -

.

We see i t as a mean s of maki ng an d suppo rting invidio u s d is tin c

w
tions bet een man and man as a ru l e for penalizing the differ ,

s s
ent beca u e i t i different In th e climate of opini on here thi s
. w
dogma figures equality is the synonym for similari ty or iden ti ty ;
,

di ff erence is condemn ed and rej ected A lthough holders of this .

dogma have recently discoursed eloquen tly and at leng th abou t

“ ”
the infinite value of the human personali ty they have not really ,

me ant any and every personali ty with all i ts di fferences o n its head, .

They have really me ant personality that agrees or that i persuaded s

or that is tortured i nto agreeing and is th u s become a member o f ,

God s elect who alone can b e infinitely valuable ; the othe rwise
’

minded pers onality be ing God s rej ect is p u nished for i ts differ
,
’

ence by being only infini tely valueless and damned .

w
But this is precisely hat d e m o cracy negates D emocracy sanc .

tions and enco u rages di ff erences and confirm the equal right o f s
each and all to life li b e rty and the purs u it of happiness It a l one
, .

affirms wi thou t any fear of challenge or contradiction th e in fin

, ,

i te val u e of human pe rson ali ty The practical orki ng of its con. w

cep t of equality may be best illustr ated from the atti tudes Op inio ns ,

and conduct of Thomas Jefferson foremost of th e b u ilders of ,

w
democracy into the orks and ays of the American people NO w .

man he wrote in his N otes on Virginia has po er to let an

,
” “
, w
other prescribe his fai th Fai th is not fai th wi thou t belief
. e held .
”
H
that no church can cl ai m j u risdiction over any other nor be forced
to pay for the upkeep of any other ; that membership in a churc h
cannot be a conditi on prior to receiving civil rights or a basis of
w
th h o l din g or wi thdra ing civil rights The value of a religion .
,

he contended is to be j udged nei ther by th e origins claimed for

,

w
i t nor th e po ers i t pretended to ; the val u e of a religion as to w
s
be j udged by i ts con e quences to the liberti es and happine s of s
3 86 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
ii
men Wr t ng I n 1 803 to D r Benj amin R ush he called attention
. .
, ,

w i th ap p roval to a vote of the Pennsylvani a le gislatu re rej ecting a

,

proposal to make belief in God a necessary q u alification for public

“
o ffi ce althou gh there was not a single atheist amon g the voters
, .

S u ch a la ww o u ld violate de mocra c y by penalizing citizens for not

sharin g th e beliefs of the maj ori ty H
e opposed successfully a mi nis
.

te ri al u ndertaking to get the phrase Jesus Christ author of our , ,

holy reli gi on inse rted in the Virginia S tatute of R eligious L i b erty

,

— this not beca u se he failed to a preciate Jesus b u t because i t

,
p ,

would viol ate the very idea of th e S tatu te .

Je fferson s appreciation of Jesus as singular and un p ar allele d

’
w
its con sequence is what is called the Jefferson Bible whi c h i t would ,

repay all A mericans to s tu dy This B i b le is a d e m o cra t s re creation

.
’
-

“ ”
of the life and morals of Jesus o f N azare th an d cannot be ,

correctly understood ex c e p t i n the frame of referenc e of demo cracy .

I ts a u th o r constru cted i t by taking toge ther the Gre ek L atin , ,

French and E nglish version s of the gospels and th e gospels only e , . H

cut p ar allel pa ssages from each in order to co mpare them for ,

agreements and di fferences and h e pasted them accordingly in his

,

w
notebook The res u lt as a document hich he called the p h il o s o
.

”
w
phy of Jesus of N azareth What emerges as important in this docu
.

w
ment is not hat is regarded as importan t in Christian dogma .

Je ff erson lays no emphasis on th e death and resu rrection of Jes u s ;

he lays all his emphasis on the social teachings of Jes u s A n d sig .

n ific an tl y he brings these teachings toge ther

, i th certai n of the w
teachings of E picuru s R ej ecting all b u t the words O f Jesus that
.

v
he belie es to be authentic he wri tes to John A dam s I am a
,
“
,

real Christian a disci p le of the doctrines of Je su s E lse here .

”
w
he speaks of himself as an E picurean and sees only h ar mony in the
real Christian and E picu rean faiths is contemporaries all the . H ,

clergy and the Federalist laymen denounc ed his vie s of Jesus as , w

blas phemo u s and atheistic B u t they were views alone consiste nt
.

wi th the pro p ositions of the D eclaration of Independence vie s , w

w hich enabled him to contribute wi th eq u al generosity to the
Ep isco p al and Presbyterian churches of Charlottesville both b it ,
l

terl y inimical to him ; and to an enterprise for the purchase and

free distrib u tion of Bi b les They ere vie w s which tho u gh he
.
.
w ,

w
held a lo Opinion of J u d aism enabled him to wri te to ordecai M
Y
,
“
N oah : our sect by s u fferings has furnished a remarkab le proof
v
of the uni ers al spirit of reli gious intolerance inherent in every sect ,

w
disclaimed by all hen feeble and practiced by all when in po er
, w .
3 8 8 A MER IC A N PH ILO S OP H ER S AT WORK
h u man beings into the Con titutio n But there w as not room in s .

’
the same nation for both democra cy and slavery From democra cy s .

firs t day free men waged a war agains t lavery by tongue and pen s ,

by s tratagem and force The w ar finally became a great civil ar in

. w
which free men staked their all to set slaves free ; and hav ng done i
so wrote their victory in to the fundamental law of the l and as
, ,

w
one more step to ard the conversion of the ideals of the D eclara
tion of Independence into realitie of th e American way of life s .

No w , is
given th meaning for d e m o cracy what ha h u m an is m , s
contributed to it ? R eplies to thi question w ll depend obviously s i , ,

w '

on hi ch of th e m an y m e anm gs of h u m anis m one c hoose to con s

sider among the sources of d em o cracy Current di sc ussion gives the .

conventional mean ing a facti tious poten cy The convention al .

meaning is the academic meaning It designates as h u man is m a .

concern with the humanit es and the humani ties as th e secular i

s
li terat u re and ometimes the graphic and plas tic art o f th e
, s
“ ” “
pagan Greeks an d R omans This l terature is classical It s . i . i
written in ancient Greek and L atin It bulks large among lists of .

“
hundred best books ”
w
hich as a rule do not include anyth ing
,

H
wri tten in ebrew The empha is fall o n t be ng e cular Thereby
. s s is i s .

i t is opposed to th e Greek and L atin religiou texts of our Ju daeo s

Christian cults H
umanism began as a cultivation of tho e work o f
. s s
pagan man in preference to work p roduced b y n o npagan men a s s
glosses upon the revelations of Jud aeo Chr stian God It set those -
i .

i
h u man ties against that di v ni ty It made secular so iety th e pe er i . c
an d better than th e peer of c hurchly It exalted thi wor l dl ness over . s -
i
-
w
other orldliness prefe rri ng the disco u rse of human reas on to u kase
,

concern ing superh u man salvation By an d l arge i t was an ti .

,

cleri cal even in the church i tself Very many o f the early human ists
, .

w ere ord ai ned priests or monks They ere secre taries librar ans . w , i ,

prelates popes thers

, . O w
ere offi i als merchants cour tiers pri nces c , , , .

w
Their minds ere first all u red then liberated by the alternatives ,

to the authoritarian tradi tion which th ey encountered in the u n

dogm atic thinking varied contents and perfect expression of such
,

w r iters as Cicero as Tacit u s as id or P liny or Varr o as Qu inti

, , Ov ,

, , s
lian as Plato a Aristotle whom they had come to read at first ,

hand at last .

w
That hich the humani ts found n the S cri ptures o f th e s i
 O F HU AN ST M I IC S OUR CE S O F DE M O RA Y C C 8
3 9

ori gi nal tongues was not what au thori ty had drawn from them .

An impul e s w
hich had first been simple curiosity develop ed q u ickly
into free inq u iry chal lenging authori ty The perusal of the so u rces .

v
a t first h an d re ealed di fference and v ari ation in th e so u rces them
v
sel es The discovery o f difference and variation led automatically
.

to comparison and then to the exaltation of the free movements

,

v
of reason o er the conformi tie of fai th These fre e movemen ts s .

created in the course of time hat is today known as hi gher w

cri ticism Its te ch nique consisted in the di rect obse rv ation th e
.
,

w atchfu l analysis the carefu l compari s ons and reo rd erings the con
, ,

ti n u o u s overall s c ru tiny w
hich pertain to th e metho ds of science .

The classical instance of a humanist ac ording to this meaning c

s
of h u m an is m i o f cours e E rasmus is I n P rais e of F o l ly i s a j udg
, , . H
ment upo n all u s ers o f authority of his day— the soldiers the priests , ,

the philosophers the rhe tor cians the pedants the landlords
, isi , , . H
sense of the humani ties makes him one of th e great ironists of di
w
vini ty hose popes he regards as tyrants of the City o f the World
,

rather than se rvants of the Ci ty of God whose friar s sell sal ation , v
w
in the market place hose sc holastics find th e choice bet een kill
, w
ing a thousand men an d mending a beggar s shoe on S unday a ’

vital option ; who are so le ar ned that the apostles couldn t under ’

stand them as they argu e of how one b ody occupies t o places

, w ,

heaven and th e cross th e ri ght hand of G od the Father and the

,

consecrated wafer and as they expo u nd that ary escaped A dam s

, M ’

sin E rasmus not only read the New Testament in Greek he under
.
,

s
took to tran late i t for the us e of the common people To make s .

hi s tr anslation w
hi ch in 1 5 1 6 he dedicated to L e o X th e most
, , ,

w
accurate in his po er he collated the best av ai lable man u scri pts
, ,

comparing them verse for vers e and chapter for chapter rec o gniz ,

s
ing inconsisten cies e eking the true version instead of the au thor
,

iz e d one Willy mi lly he found himself rai sing q u estions conce rning
.
-

H w
the E pistle to the ebre s the E pistle of James th e Book of R eve , ,

lation th e second and six th chapters of John the s e cond of Pe ter

, , ,

and so on . H w
is concern as like Jefferson s th e p hi losophy of Jesus ,
’

, .

H w
e pri z ed th e spiri t hi ch is w i thout price more hi ghly than the
, ,

relics whose magi c u ses brou ght good p rices That hich defin e d . w
E rasmus as a humanist as distin guished from the champions of di
w
vi ni ty as not merely hi s delighted kno ledge o f th e classic I t w s .

w as his method of treating di fferences ith respe ct I t w as his re adi w .

ness to accep t the so called unauth ori tati ve on the same level as the
-

authorized to treat au thor ty as a la m only that must make good

, i c i
3 9 0 AMER I CA N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
by meri t an d not by rule to exalt free inqui ry and to cultivate th e
,

w
toleration hich s u ch inquiry postulates Thereby he gave ar tin . M ”
L u ther su fficien t ca u se to call him th e greates t enemy o f Christ
and to proclaim that whoever crushed E rasmus wo u ld crush a bug
that wo u ld stink even more when dead than when alive Thus he .

v
ga e the conformist churchmen s u fficient cause to brand him as a
heretic and to place all his works on the Index .

This sort of h u m an is m is the anti thesis of another kind which

has had a certain vogu e in th e academic arcana of our time Why .

its protagonists call i t humanism has never been clear to me I pre .

s u me that they do so becau se their central concern continue to be s

the h u maner letters of Greece and R ome hich excit e d and li b er w
ated the humanists of the R enaissance ; that they di sregard the
H ebr ai c ori gi nals of o u r Ju d ae o—
Christian tradi tion and fix their ,

attention on P lat o and pre Christian Platonism and to a lesser -

,

degr ee on Aristotle Their spokesmen in the ni ted S tates have

. U
been th e late M
essrs Paul E lmer ore and Irv ing Bab bi tt
. r M . M .

T S E liot is a perverse half E nglish variant and I d o not doub t

. .
-
,

w
that many o u ld associate wi th hi m our charmi ng and eloquen t
French colleague Jacques , M
arit ai n A lthough th ey call them
. M .

selves humanists their preoccupation is not however man nor th e

, , ,

h u manities b u t God as conceived and defined by certain classical

,

w w
riters of hom the foremost is Plato Their me thod far from .
,

being that of the sciences of o u r day is not even the overall s cru ,

tiny the carefu l observation the free inquiry of E rasmus Their

, , .

method is a u thoritarian and di alectical To them man s nature is .

’

du al and not one I t has a superior and an inferior par t a soul and
.
,

a body and the body is all anima l impulse and unch e cked desire
, s ,

w hile the so u l is a unitary p rin ciple of human natu re inwar dly

harmoniou s to if not a derivati e of the universal and eternal
, v ,

being of God . Ov
er agains t the m u ltiplicity the variety the this , ,

worldliness of the modern sciences of m an these soi distant h u man

, ,
-

is ts se t a hidden single indivisible eternal universal h u man nature

, , ,

w hich acts as an inner check on the phenome nal multi plici ty and ”

variety and holds them toge ther and directs their ways by its i n
falli b le force .

Prof Werner Jaeger has wri tten an illu mi nating an d very sympa
.

thetic interpretation of th e original of this sp e ci es o f hum anism as

i t too k form in the dialo gu es of P lato wi th their an tid e m oc ratism , ,

their racism their doctrine and discipline of au thori ty s tated

, ,
3 92 AMER ICA N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
not s ingular ; multi tudino u s not total tari an ; m an i s the me asure , i
of hi m not he the measure of man
,
e s the G o d of th e tradition . H i
s
of Protagor a not the God of the tradition of Plato
,
e is the . H
figu re of a humanism which te ms from the h u m an itas that during s ,

th e second century before the Christi an era came to existence ,

among certain R oman s of sensibili ty and sense after their minds

had been awakened and their hearts opened by the impact of the
p hilosophy of E picurus w th ts oc al detachment ,ts chari ti i s i
y and , i
its intellectua l freedom H u man itas was the humanism of the .

—
S cip io n ic circle It comes altoge ther accid e ntally perhap
. s — to i ts ,

high place of expression in a comedy by a member of that c rcle i ,

the A frican Terence who had been a slav e and had be en manu
, ,

m i tte d In this p lay b ased on one of Me n an d er s (H e au to n T im o r

’
.
,

o u m e n os
) trivial in plot for the most part tr vial in utteranc
,
e a i ,

character pronounces lines that have become part of th e isdom w

of aspiration of our western orld They are : H o m o s u m h u ma n i w .
,

n ihi l a me a l ie n a m p u to .

L egend has i t that th e a u di ence which firs t heard thi s line

rose in tu multu o us a p plause T h e line had stopped th e show But . .

its meaning which has hau nted the hearts of m en e ver since di d
, ,

not ge t beyond the sho u ntil th e democratic revol ution nor w ,

lightly nor witho u t blood and s eat and te ars since Thi s meaning
,
w .
.

is at the center of still another conception of h u m an is m hich w ,

being a conseq u ence and f u nction o f de m o cracy kno ingly prefer , w s

among the thinkers of classical antiquity Protagora s th e plebeian
to Plato the aristoc rat The h u m an is m is sometimes identified wi th
.

th e pragmatism of William James Its spokesman is the late F C S . . . .

S chiller one of William Jam es foremost and mos t original dis

’

c i l e s In his P la to o r P ro tag o ras S chiller throws into a fresh per

p .
,

s e c tiv e the debat e bet

p een the former A w
s i as tic self ta u ght
p orter -

and inventor fri e nd of Peri cle s and E uripides bai t o f Aristophane

, , s ,

and th e A thenian nobleman The works of Protagoras are lost to .

us S ome were bu rned by th e A thenians ; others have pe ri shed

. .

What remains are a few sentence s which ndicat e why They p oint i .

to a man centered humanism to h u m an i tas

“
- “ an wrote Prota , . M ,

goras is the measure of all th i n gs of things that are that they

, , ,
”
are of things that are not tha t they are not
, The poin t of imp or
, .

tance is that man is th e m e as u re not th e cr e ator Whate ver his phi , .

e

l o so p h y he has to take things as experience bri ngs them to him

, ,

and he has to val u e them in te rms of their b e aring on his life an d

 O F HUM N STA I IC SOUR ES O C F DE M O RA Y C C 3 93

l iberty and pursui t of happiness Before he can say that this does .

exis t or that that does not exist he must have some impression
, , ,

some idea of this and that They mu st b e present someho to be

, . w ,

declared nonexistent ; even as they mu st be present someho to , w ,

be declared existent The presence must make i tself felt and as

.
,

felt may be measured This measuremen t is a h u man art ; i t is t h e

, .

all of the method an d th e content of science ; the spring of the bod y

of knowledge Considering the Go d s as obj ects of measurement
. ,

“
Pro tagoras declares in another fra gment wi th regar d to th e Gods , ,

I cannot feel sure that they are or they are not nor what they are ,

like in figure For there are many things that hinder sure knowl
.

edge ; the obscu ri ty o f th e subj ect and the shortness of h u man ,

”
life.

These are presumably passages from Protagoras book O n T ru th ’

.

H e had read from i t in the house of E u ripides to a company of

free minds of th e Greek enlightenment To some theocentric .

humanist there present i t must have be en blasphemy Protagoras .

was denounced and condemn ed to dea th e fled A thens but the . H ,

boo k wa burned s .

A s I read the record an ultimate statement of this meaning of

,

humanism is to be found in the B o ok of Job hich is itself an , w

assimilation of Greek form to ebraic i nsight There is a familiar
“
H .
,

”
oft repeated E nglish verse Though he slay me wi ll I trust in him
-
, .

H
The ebrew ori gi nal correctly translated reads : Behold he will
, , ,

slay me ; I shall not survive ; nevertheless ill I maintain my ays w w

before him A nother verse decl ar es :
.
“
ine integri ty hold I fast M
w
and ill not le t i t go ; my hear t shall not reproach me so long as
”
w
I live These are ords whi ch the author p u ts in the mo u th of
.

J o b in reply to his the o cen tri c comforters ho arg u e that since , w

his torture mu s t be from God he can be relieved of i t only if he ,

looks upon himself as God looks upon him admits his sin and ,

w
repents But Jo b ill not repu d iate his h u man digni ty e contends
. . H
for th e i nte grity of his hum an essence even agai nst th e i nscrutable
absoluteness of omnipotent God Be tween him and that God there .

is no common measure for hat measure has man sa e his human , w v

passions and human values and ho can these b e applied to omni , w
potence an d omniscience w i tho u t limi ting and belittling i t? I n
consequence Job th e symbol of all men must s tand u p on his
, , ,

own feet alone working out hi s destiny by his o n measure rec

, w ,

o ni z i n th at a j ust and omnipotent God can not ind ulge in a

g g
3 94 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
chosen people cannot elect a favori te bu t must m ai ntain all his
, ,

creatu res wi th an eq u al providence th u s vindicating the right of ,

each to his di fferent integri ty For the claimant to election by .

omn ipotence also claims the rule of omnipotence ; i t be come s a

pretension to mastery over all mankind and thus a threat of w ar
and slave ry to the di ff erent and ultimately of di saster to the pre
,

tender himself be i t a single person a state or a ch u rch

, , .

H u m an is m in thi s m e aning has a certain ki nshi p wi th d e

m o c racy B u t i t was elici ted from the Book of Jo b after the demo
.

cratic rev o luti o n Before that revolution Jo b w as treated as a

i i
.

vindication and proof of th e authoritarian ways of an auth o r tar an

G od .

I think we may now come to some concl u sion concerning

humanistic sources of demo cracy Certain h u m an is ms provide Oh .

v io u s analogies w
ith d e m o cracy; others no matter what is claimed ,

w
for them n o r ho claims i t are altogether incommensurable An a
, .

logic h u m an is ms are such because of certain techniq u es or attitudes

w
or proces ses hich occur also in the ways of d e m o cracy B u t the .

authentic h u manists of history to whom those p e rtained su ch as ,

E rasm u s had no inkling of modern d e m o cracy and in all likelihoo d

,

would have been shocked b y it Their h u m an is m was no t a source .

of d e m o cracy because their end their goal thei r stopping place , ,

was this h u m an is m not d e m o c racy Again i t w as not a source b e

, .
,
“

w
cause whil e d e m o cracy follo s i t does no t follow from this h u m an
, .

is m The latter is chronologically prior ; only ho ever i n so far as

. w ,

certain of its aspects are a dynamic common to both i ts e lf and

d e m o cracy may i t b e designated as a so u rce Those aspects w e have
, .
,

seen are not the intellect u al or a e sthetic content of this h u m an is m ;

,

they are the methods of the humanists in the degree that they ,

consist in obse rvation free inquiry unrelaxing scru tiny of tho u ghts
, ,

and things The h u m an is m hich works by th e methods of au

. w
th o ri ty w hi ch se ts dogma above observation ration alization above
, ,

rea so n and b e lief and obedience above scru tiny and free choice
,

cannot be sai d to contribute anything to d e m o cracy .

L astly there is also a h u m an is m which may be taken as a

,

synonym for d e m o c racy B u t i t o u ld be as correct to h o ld that

. w
that d e m o cracy is the so u rce of this h u m an is m as that this h u m an ,

is m is a source of d e m o c racy For d e m o c racy is chronologi c ally

.
3 96 AMER ICA N I
PH LO S OP HERS AT WORK
missed them Bu t I do not thi nk there are ; for when humanism
.

is taken thus humanly democra cy is humani sm humani m

, , s
democra y c .

R ep rinted with
minor omissions from Fo u ndatio n o f D e mo c racy ,

F E rnest Johnson e d ( Ne w ork

.
,
.
,
Y ,
w
ith p ermission of the
author and the Institu te of R eligiou s E du cation Ne w ork N ,
Y ,
. Y .
 A B RAHA M L N
KA P A

as a n E sthetic

M y problem i s not what to do abou t obsce i ty b what to make f

n , ut o

i t Control over the arts in this country—w hether by o ffi cial power

.

or by uno ffi ial i flc n — rests largely on allegations of obsceni y

u e n ce t .

But patterns of s ocial control cannot reasonably b appraised wi h e t

out ome conception of what i t is that is being controlled Ac
s .

c o rdi n l
gy I,ask what constitutes obscenity in relation to the arts :

Can a work of art b e obscene and still be esthetic in s tatus

and function ? What part if any does th e obscene play in the
, ,

esth etic experience ? What characteri stics of the art obj ect mark
i ts occurrence ?
These questions are meant as belonging to the philosophy of
i
ar t not to its psychology or soc ology To ans er them is not to
, . w
assert matters of fact but to cl ari fy relations of ideas S uch a clari
, .

ficatio n must take facts into account of course — bu t its o u tcome if

, ,

s uccessful is a clear concep tion rather tha n a true propos i tion S till
, .

less does an answer to thes e questions ent ai l a soc ial policy or a

procedu re for imp lementing policy I do not pretend that the di s
.

tin c tio n s to be drawn in thi s ess ay can be directly applied in a

3 9 8 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
w
court of la I shall be conten t if they thro light on the problem
. w
of obscenity for the artist his audience and th e cri tic who inter
, ,

re ts each to the other

p .

M any pe ople anxio u s to defend freedom of expression n the i

arts attack the s u p press ion of obscenity on the gr ounds that o b
scenit
y h as no obj ecti e existence v bu t is to be fo u nd only in the,

mind of the censor I shar e the conclusion hich this argument is

. w
intended to bolster— namely that censorship is to be condem ned ; ,

b u t the argu ment itself appears to me to be fallacious Its premi se .

is the undeniable proposition that j udgm ents of the ob s cene vary

with time and place B u t from this true premise the invalid i n
. ,

ference is made to a s u bj ec tivist conclusion : A ll that can be com

mon to such varying j udgm ents is simply a subj ective emotion of
disapproval .
“
O
bsceni ty exists only in the minds an d emotions of
w
_

”
those ho believe in it and is not a quality of a book or pict re u 1 .
,

To think otherwi se so this logic runs is to be guilty of a s u p ers ti

, ,

“
tion which is the modern cou nterpart of ancient w tchcr aft 2 i .
”

No w those exercised over ob s cenity do perhaps rese mble the old

prosecutors of wi tchcraft in their fanaticism and irrationali ty 3 The .

emphasis on the relativism of obsceni ty thus exposes the narro w

ness an d ri gidi ty of traditionalist morali ty B u t the b e lief in itch . w
w
craft as simply false The be lief in obscenity is false only if i ts
.

rational character is Overlooked What is supers titio u s is an ab so .

4
l tist conception alleged to apply universal ly whether i t be reco g
u ,

. v
n iz e d or no The alternati e to absolutism is not s u bj ectivism but ,

an insistence on obj ectivity re la tiv e to a sp e c i e d c o n tex t The fi .

rationali ty of a belief is similarly relative to the evidence available

for it B u t this relation is not only compatible wi th obj ectivity b u t
.
,

even defines it S uch a st andp oint has come to b e known as o h

.

e c tiv e re la tiv is m or c o n te x tu a l is m 5
j .

Judgm ents of obscenity v ary because they are con textu al I mean .

“ ”
more than that dirt is misplaced matter i e that property varies , . .

w ith circumstan ces I mean that obsce ni ty is to be found in ords

. w
or pictures only in so far as these can be interpreted to have a
certain meanin g; and mean ing itself is context u al D
“
L awrence . . H .

has protested agains t obj ectivism that i t is the mind which is the
”
A u gean stables not langu age 6 B u t lan guage has no conten t at
, .

all obsce ne or o therwise

, , w
i thou t mind It me an s what i t doe s .
4 00 AMER IC A N PH IL O S OP HER S AT WORK
context consti tu ted by the j udger h mself An d there are var ous
, i . i
s tan d ard contexts
( specified statistically or in other w ays ) which
also oc c ur an d have their uses Which context is to b e chosen .

depends on the purpose for which th e j u dgment is being made I .

w
kno of no principle of selection or eval u ation apart from such
“
p u rpo ses To the question Who is to j udge whether a work i
. s
obscene ? ”
w w
e c an reply only i th the c o u n terq u e s tl o n s What is ,

to be done with the j udgm ent when i t is made ? An d why is i t

being made at all ?
Y et I do not mea n to pre tend that th e p ri nciple of contextualism
,

w
leaves us i th no difficulties in practice n th e contrary i t allow . O , s
w
us to become clearly a are of j us t ho serious the difli cu l tie s are w .

Comp etent cri tics disagree sh ar ply among them s elves The ideal .

context is as di ffi cult to achieve as ideals usually are But i t is not .

true that from the nat u re Of the case the ide al is a hopeless one .

Beauty and obsceni ty alike are in th e eye of the beholder But if .

— as ar tists cri tics and lovers of the ar ts not as censors—w e are

, , ,

prepared to enter into i nterpretation and eval u ation in the one

case why not in the other ?
,

Contextu alism has brough t us to the position that obscenity may

be an o b je c tl v e property of a work of art provided that the work ,

i tself be recogni zed as being relative to some context of resp o nse

to the art obj ect No w many people deny that obscenity is an
.

w
attrib u te even of the o rk of art localiz ing i t in s tead i n th e mind ,
“
of th e artist by way o f his intention B u t hat are e to under
“
,
”
.
”
w w
st an d by artistic intention ? Are there not different s o rts of an
s w ers approp ri ate to th e q u estio n why a p articular art obj ect as w
created?
w
We may ans er first in term s of the artists m o tiv e : money or
, ,
’

glory or whatever ends external to his efforts h e expected to be

served by them The legal j u dgment of obscenity sometimes con
.

siders motive — apparently a work is more likely to be obs cene if

,

the artist exp ected to m ake money from his lab o rs B u t plai nl y .
,

motive as s u ch is comp letely irrelevan t esthe tically A poe t may .

write to pay for his mother s fu neral (Johnson s R ass e las ) or to

’ ’

s educe a w
o man who reminds him of his mother but neither ,

motive has much to do with w ha t h e wri tes .

“
S econd artistic intention may be construed as p u r os e : a pe
,
p s
 B C I
O S EN T Y A S AN E ST HET IC C A E G O R Y T

c ific ati o n in te rms of th e art ist s medium o f how his motive ’

is
expressed The purpose may be to satirize th e clergy to expose
. ,

the madness of chi valri c romance or to proclaim the ri ghts of ,

women . Unq u estionably p u rpose m u st be conceded an esthetic

,

w
relevance — it is hat the artist tried to do in his ork not b y i t w , .

M any ar tists accu sed of Obsceni ty have defended themselves by

insisting o n their moral purpose .

But more important than hat the artist tried to do is what w

in fact he d id do and this may be taken as a third sense of I n ten
,

”
w
tion — the in te n t of the ork itself A specification of p u rpos e may .

define an esthetic genre bu t never a particular work of art E ve ry

, .

w w
ork has its o n uniq u e intent : the pu rpose as embodied in its
w
o n specific s u bstance When J u dge Woolsey speaks of Joyce s not
”
.
’

exploi ting obsceni ty he is referri ng to Joyce s ar tistic p u rpose

,
’

perhaps also to his lack of a mone tary motive Bu t when he refers

8 .

to the absence of the leer of the sensualist i t is intent which is ,

involved 9 What is at q u estion is as m u ch an expe ri enced q u ality

.

“
of the work as is the ring of sincerity hich is to be contrasted , w
w ith sincerity itself— the latter being a matter of motive and pur
pose b u t not of intent .

M otive then helps localize obsceni ty only in so far as i t de

, ,

termines p u rpose and the latter in turn only as i t is embodied

, , ,

in intent B u t this b ri ngs u s back once more from the mind of

.

v
the artist to the percei ed characters of the ork of art itself w .

The alternative remains to be considered of localizing obscenity

in the mind of the a u dience i e in the e ff ect of the ork The , . .
, w .

obscene in the classic legal conception is hat tends to corrupt

, , w .

This criterion is tho u ght to be more obj ecti e than reference

’
v
to the artist s intention B u t such reference at leas t in the sense
i
.

of intent is inescapably in ol ed in the cr terion For the effect

, v v .

might othe rw ise have been the res u lt of a p u rely proj ecti e inter v
p re tatio n in hich
, case i twis not th a t ork hich is being j u dged w w
to be obscene To resort to the effect of the ork is to commi t
. w
oneself to distin guishing bet een i ts causal agency and its opera w
tion as a trigger mechanism i e as pro iding an occasion for , . .
, v
p roj ecting onto itself a corru p tion already presen t in the reader .

P lainly , w
hich context is selected becomes crucial The co u rts
“
.

may choose as standard context Judge Woolsey s l h o m m e m oye n ’ ’

”1
s e ns u e l 0 b u t unless this standard is ca efu lly specified by
, r
( Dr .

Kinsey ?) there is the serio u s danger that i t will be replaced u m

wittingly by the personal context of the man passing j udgment .
4 02 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
w
To comp are i t ith the standard o f the rea s onable man in the
“ ”
law of torts is to overlook the fact that re asonableness can in ,

principle be intersubj ective ly specified ( at least in part) in terms

,
-

of probabili ties and their logical consequen ces But where is the .

“
logic of sexual sensi tivi ty that corresponds to the reasonableness
of inductive and de ductive inference ? This question is especially
w
embarrassing in vie of the claim some times made that famili ari ty
w i th obscenity blunts the sensibilities ”
so that on the cri terion , ll
of effect the standard context invites a circular argument : the
,

w ork is obscene because i t w o u ld produce the effect if only i t were

not such familiar obsceni ty !
I n th e ideal context the test of effect is ,holly napplicable w I .

For the e s thetic experience require a kind o f disinterest or d e s

tach m e n t a
“
psychic distan ce
, hich is incompatible with the cor , w
ruption in question O
nly w hen e hold the work of art at arm s
. w ’

length is i t artistic at all The ork brings emotions to mind or

. w
presents them for contemplation Whe n they are act u ally felt .
,

v
we have o erstepped th e bounds of art S ad music does not make .

us li terally sad . O
n the contrary the more vividly and clearly we
“ ”
,

apprehend the spe cific q u ality of sadness of the music the less ,

w w
sorro ful our o n emotions f cour se art evokes feelings ; bu t i t s
. O , i
im agin e d feeling not w
hat is actually felt a a q u ality of what
, s
w e do and undergo An d art works agains t the translation of
.

imagined feeling into action It does so p ar tly by provi di ng us .

insight into feeling and so allo ing us to s u bj ect passion to the

, w
control of the understanding as as urged by S pinoza ;1 2 and partly , w
v
by pro iding a catharsis or s u blimation of feeling as in the con ,

c e tio n s of Ari st o tle and Freud 1 3 In sor t there is a high breath

p .
,

lessness about beauty that cancels lust as S antayana put i t 1 4 To , .

be s u re the extreme of psychic distance is also incompati b le wi th

,

esthetic experience as in the cas e of the intellectual o r—what

,

is more to the point— the philistine But to ignore altogeth er th e .

role of distance is to confuse art wi th promotion —advertising or

propaganda .

N o w p orn ograp hy is promotional : i t is the obscene res p o nded

w
to ith minimal psy chic distance Fundamentally therefore i t is .
, ,

a category of e ffect To say that a work is pornogr aphic is to say

.

something abou t the feeling and actions which i t produces in its

respondents We may of course identify i t by its purpose rather
. , ,

than by direct obse rvation of effect Its motive — monet ary or s ex u al .

w
or hatever—i t is likely to share with mos t art But as to es thetic .
4 04 A M E RI C A N I
PH LOSOPH RS E AT WORK
at bottom on i ts being u sed in order to convey an insult and it
, s
being responded to as conveying one et when thi s usage is estab . Y ,

lish e d the
, w
ord is ins u lting eve n when spoken in innocence or to
an insensible hearer ; it has been misused or misunderstood that i , s
all The question is one of the ideal context of ts occurrence not
. i ,

the personal context nor yet a standard context selected to serve

,

some extraneo u interest s .

I do not mean to say that obscenity is a matter of the occurrence

of dirty ords w O
n the contrary ! It is the work as a whole which
.

mu st be considered For i t is an important ch ar acteri tic of a work

. s
of art that i t cannot be inte rpre ted piecemeal E ach element affec t . s
the content o f all the others The work is an inte grated coherent
.
,

w hole whose expressive quality cannot be additively constructed

’
from what is expressed by i ts isolated parts Judge Woo lsey s posi .

tion is es thetically unassail able when he say of U lyss es that al

“
s ,

tho u gh i t contains many words usually considered dirty .

E ach w
ord of the book contributes like a bi t of mosaic to the
detail of the picture which Joyce i seeking to construct for hi s
”
s
readers 1 5 Indeed isolated words may easily lose their expressive
.
,

ness by mechanical repeti tion to be restored to artistic poten y , c

only by skillful exploitation of a fresh setting i n a complex work .

The obscenity that occurs in a work of art may be as shocki ng to

some as army t alk ; bu t i t is holly different in quality The onew .

is expressive ; the other marks both the fa lure of expression and i

the lack of some thing to express .

It is a further consequence of this conception that obsceni ty i n

art not only does not lie in a baldne s s of sexual reference bu t is , ,

, w
in fact incompatible wi th holly explici t s tatement E xplicitne s s .

may be pornographic but i t has no place in art Where nothing

, .

is left to the imagination th e reading of the art obj ect may s tim u
,

late an ex p erience but doe s not itself constitute one N o o p p o r .

tu n i ty is provided for that sharing in the act of creation hich w

alone makes an experience es thetic N othing is a work of art for .

m e u nless I have been able to p u t something of my deeper self

into it The art obj ect invites me to express something of tha t self
.

an d guides me in my efforts to do so ; but the effort must be

mine .H ence the populari ty of the merely pornographic : it makes

w
so fe demands Genuine expression is replaced by a spurious
i
.

consummat on .

A s an esthetic category obscenity is by contrast of the very stuff

, , ,
” “
of imagi nation In one etymology obscene is from o b s cu ru s
.
”
,
 B C I
O S EN T Y AS AN E ST HET IC C A E G O R Y T 4 05

what is concealed No w expression is concealment as well as revela

.

tion Art speaks in sym bols and at the core of e ery symbol is a
.
, v
w
secre t hich only imagination can fathom The symbol i tself thus .

takes on the mysterious quality of hat i t hides I t is experienced w .

as charged with feeling and produces tension by a t once invi ting

and resisting penetration Both art and obsceni ty have a single
.

genetic root : the infantile capacity to endow a mere sign ith th e w

affect that belongs properly to hat it signifies 6 A creature in
1 w .

capable o f obsceni ty is also incapable of art a gic too av ai ls . M , ,

s
itself of the ame capacity : words themselves be come things imbued ,

w
wi th mysterious po ers over other things Psychologically obscenity .
,

w
s tands be t een art and magi c nei ther holly make believe like th e -
w -

one nor yet wholly believing like the other In many cultures o b
,
.
,

sc e n i t
y has an important role in magical ri tuals In our ow n its .
,

magical character is betrayed in the puri tan supposi tion that ’

s
words alone can work evil and that evil will be averted if only ,

the words are not u tte red .

Because there is after all a difference bet een a symbol and

, , w
what i t symbolizes obsceni ty is a matter not of hat the ork re ers
, , w w f
to b u t rather of the e xp ress iv e substance of the work Pur tans
, . i
w
may condemn a ork for presenting certain aspects of life ; artists
w
m ay defend i t because hat is presen ted are certai n aspects of li e f .

Tru th is used bo th as a mark of obs enity and as a mark of its c

absence In fact i t can se rve as nei ther The question he ther
.
, . w
the world is as art (referentially) presents i t to be i irrelevant s
to es thetic quali ty in general and to the quality of obsceni ty in ,

particular Art is not obscene by virtu e merely of its s u bj ect nor

.
,

does i t cease to be obscene merely because ts subj ect is irtuous i v .

A verse attri buted to D L awrence complains . H

Tell me what s .
,
’

w r ong with words or with you that the t hi ng is all right but the ,
”
word is taboo ! B u t there is nothing wrong wi th reco gnizing that
words and things are di fferent and that properties of the o ne ,

cann ot necess ari ly be imputed to the other Words are public for .
,

instance and e asy to produce and can occur in contexts here

, , w
w
the things they refer to o u ld not be appropriate and could not
“
occur The S toics argued that there being nothi ng dishonest in
.

th e conj u gal duty i t could not be denoted by any dishonest word

, ,

and that therefore the word used by clown to denote i t is as goo d s

 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
as any o ther .
”
17
The q u estion is however whe ther clown ng is not , , i
di fferent from conj u gal life as the S toics themselves conceived i t ,

and whether the lan guage used is n ot in fact par t of the clown ing .

In short obsceni ty like art i tself is not a matter of referential

, , , ,

v
b u t of expressi e meanings What is relevant is not su b j ect but . ,

s u bstance ; not an isolable message but an embodied conten t The , .

artist does not bod ily translate a subj ect into the work bu t trans ,

forms i t— h e selects from i t and gives i t form Thereby the work .

becomes more than merely an instrumen t of communication ; i t

commands intrinsic interest because of i ts o w n inherent qualities .

No subj ect as such can be ob scene ( one can al ays talk abou t i t in w
L atin ! ) To be sure the subj ect of a work of art contri b u tes to
,

i ts s u b stance —reference enters into the service of expression —and

so has an indirect rele a nce 1 8 v
But the in di rectness is crucial A. .

sex u al subj ect ( or simi lar reference ) is a necessary condi tion for
obscenity b u t not a sufficient one ; only for pornography as for ,

propaganda does the referential mess age suffice

, .

Th u s tho u gh censorship may extend to theme as well as treat

, s
men ts obsceni ty does not The immorality of the actu al ch ar acters
, .

w
and conduct hich provide the novelist ith his material is alike w
irrelevant to the charge of obsceni ty and to the defense agains t i t .

For words are not the things they mean ; art i s not life Art supple .

ments life and doe s not merely duplicate i t The question of .

obscenity is a question of hat the no elist is b ringi ng on thew v

scen e and the first ans er to that question must be a novel a
, w
“

f
sequence of incidents w ith o rm an d e xp res s ion The qualitie of . s
the work are not determi ned by the tr ai ts Of its subj ect matter .

Tr u th therefore in the sense of depicting life as i t is nei ther

, , ,

prod u ces nor precludes obsceni ty .

O bscenity then is an exper enced quali ty of the work of art

, , i
and can no more be localized in the subj ect matter of th e work
than in its intention or effect But w hat quality is it ? There are .
,

in fact several species of the obscene hich mu st be distinguished

, , w
from one an other because they differ so widely I n their esthetic
status and fu nction .

w
First is hat I call c o nv e n tio nal o b s ce n ity : the quali ty of any
,

w w
ork hich attacks established sexual patterns and practices In .

s c i s
es en e i t s the pre e ntation o f a sexual heterod oxy a rej ection Of
, ,
4 08 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
message not i ts expressive content ; and art does not convey m es
,

sages As S idn ey long ago pointed out in his defense of poesi e 2 1

. ,

the poe t does not lie because he asserts nothing e therefore does . H
not assert that sexual conventions must be changed but at most ,

presents for imaginative contemplation the orkings of our o r w

other conventions S ome artists however consciously adop t a p rop a
.
, ,

g an di s ti c stance e t conventional obscenity

. Y does
, not depend upon
a literalistic approach to ar t b y way of ubj ect reference and mes s , ,

sage rather than substance expression and embodied mean ing , , .

Both puri tan and propagandist overloo k the more s u b tle morality
w
in th e content o f a ork of art in terms of which convent onal , i
obscenity is not limi ted to a reformist purpose but plays an im ,

portant role in all artistic intent .

The artist s integri ty requires that h e present the world a he

’
s
sees i t ; his creativity that he sees i t afresh in his own terms The
, , .

new vision is bound to be different and as different is j u dged to , ,

be wicked by the conformist morali ty of the o ld The ays produ c . H

“ ”
tion code requires that correct tandards of life be presented s ,

subj ect only to the requirements of dram a and entertainment

But if they are s u bj ected also to the requirements of honest and
“ ”
creative ar t their correctness is likely to be ch allenged Again
, .

and again in the history of art the creative artis t has had to take ,

his stand against the A cademy as the repository o f tradition not ,

merely in art but in life as well Clive Bell is carcely exaggerating

, . s
w “
w
hen he arns that of all the enemies of art culture is perhaps
”
,

the mos t dangerous 2 2 T h e academic artist is likely to be free of

.

conventional obscenity but also to be innocent of esthetic quali ty

, .

The artist who creates new forms and exploits ne techniques w

w ,
— w
ho develops in a ord a new style does o because he has some , s
thing new to say ; and in art hatever s said needs ts own lan , w i i
guage The very ne w ness is then felt as an attack on established
.

“ ”
patterns The hostili ty to modern art evinced by the pillars of
.

ch u rch state and soc iety s not a product of insensitivi ty

, , n i '

. O
the contrary i t displays a realistic awareness of the threat which
,

art has always posed to sheer conformity The charge of obsceni ty .

directed against th e ar ts i s tri ctly comparable to the moral de

“
s
pravi ty regularly ascri bed to hereti cal religi ous sects Thou shalt .

have no other G od s before me ! and a ne v 1 s I o n of God— so says ”

w
the p ri esthoo d — can only be a visitation of the D evil .

Art in short is a matter of ins piration as well a of kill An d

, , s s .
 O S B CE N I IC C A E G O R Y
T Y AS 4 9AN ES T H ET T 0

i nspiration from the s tandpoint of the conventional i s a demonic

— —
corruption of the l d rather than a new revelation of the divine
o .

The geni s is one who is possessed and hence dangero s M ann

“
u
”
u .
’
s

Fa u s tusembodies a recurrent myth of the artist he has sold his :

soul to the D evil to enj oy the frui ts f the s i n of h b i committed o u r s

in imitating the Creator A vicious circle is thus engendered The

. .

philistine distrust of the artist lead s to hi rej ection by established s

society which provokes a counterattack that in turn is taken to

,

j ustify the ini tial reaction The si tuation then is not that we can
.
, ,

generalize from sexual heterodoxy to a wholesale radicalism It .

w
is rather that e c an particularize from the artist s rej ection of ’

convention —because for hi m i t is s tale flat and u np ro fitab l e— to a , ,

sexual heterodoxy and thus to conventional obsceni ty The re p re

, .

se n tati o n of pubic hair for instance is commonly regarded as

, ,

obscene But this is largely because i t did not appear in the classic
.

nude ; and it did not appear there beca u se the pre ailing custom v
was to remove the hair from the body 2 3 This is not our c u stom ; bu t .

i t is the c u stom in our art and to depart from i t is therefore to

, , ,

be obscene .

No w i t is easy to exaggerate the danger to established patterns

from art We have already seen that there is no ground for s u p
.

posing the e ffect of art on life to be immediate and direct n . O

th e other hand i t is easy to exaggerate also the contribution to
,

w
society hich conventional obsceni ty makes Traditional morali ty .

may be so u nd even if conformist and in many respects s u rely is ,

sound S ociety needs s tability as well as change ; some cha n ges are
.

w
for the orse S tability cannot be identified ith stagn ation and
. w
death a, sH
erbert R ead has rashly claimed in defense of the artists
as a dv o ca ti d ia b o li 2 4 The part of reason i t seems to me is to
.
, ,

rej ect both the sterile conformism which condemns art for i ts
conventional obscenity and th e destructive indi idualism which
“
v
takes pride in standing above the law of the herd .

A second type of obsceni ty I call D io nys ian o b s ce n ity I t consists .

w “
in hat society regards as excessive sexualism Familiar examples .

are provided by Aristo p hanes Boccaccio R abelais and the E liza , , ,

b e th an s A s a q u ali ty of the
. w
ork of art i t is an expression of an ,

exuberant delight in life D ionysian obscenity is present in its .

4 10 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
clearest form in the old Greek comedy where i ts connection with
fertili ty rites and phallic ceremonies is obvious It has played a .

part in s u ch ri tes and ceremonies in many cultures .

I ts occurrence in art forms is eq u ally widespread For art rests .

above all on a delight in color sound texture and shape The , , , .

appeal of art is first sens u ous ; and be tween the sensuo u s an d

sensual the di fference is only in the suffix no t the root T h e art .

obj ect presents for enj oymen t an esthe tic s u rface in which formal
and expressive values are present to be sure b u t only as fu se d , ,

w ith an immediate sensory appeal The ork of art may lead us . w ,

as P lato and P lotin u s hoped 2 5 to the world beyond sen se ; bu t i t c an

,

do so only th ro ugh sense A n d sense must delight u s in th e p assage

. .

w
This fact as at the bottom of the iconoclastic controversy and has
led some strict puritans to condemn all art as essentially i mmoral .

The premise from which the condemnation springs is a so u nd one ,

even if the concl u sion is not We cannot consistently orshi p beauty . w

an d despise the pleasures which the bodily senses can a ff ord at . M
w “
the A rnold was distressed at the v u lgari ty of some of Keats ” ’

letters to Fanny B raw ne ; bu t more realistic cri tics have recognized

w
that if he ere incapable of s u ch le tters he wo u ld not have wri tten ,

T h e E v e o f S t A gn es 2 6 D ionysian obsceni ty in art is of a piece

. .

w w
ith the enthusiasm hich the artist displays over the delightful
q u alities of his medium .

B u t the artist is not merely celebrating the j oys of esthe tic per
c e tio n
p . e H
is also provid i ng a symbolic cons u mmation for the

entire range of h u man desire I t is th e ar tis t ho can tru ly say . w

that being h u man nothing human is alien to him H e is forever
, , .

w
dra ing th e circle which takes in what man an d nat u re rej ect e . H
w
himself is ounded by such rej ection and in comforting himself he ,

v
pleases e eryone I t is scarcely acciden tal that so much art in all
.
,

cu ltu res and in all media has to do wi th love The h u man interest
, .

of love in all i ts p hases and manifestations is th e inexhaustible

, ,

w
riches from hich art unceasingly dra s beauty Can anyone doub t w .

that if the h u man m am mal gave birth in li tters painters and ,

w
sculptors ould find in multiple breasts the exq u isite fo rm s that
the female n u de now provides them ? Whate er art to u ches i t v
tran s figu re s B u t though the poe t makes of love the divi ne passion
.
,

w
i t remains p ass io n An d hen he presen ts i t for hat it is in i ts
. w ,

fu ll bodied vigor e call him obscene

-
, w .

Whatever else art may be i t is an intensificat on of emotion And

, i .
4 12 AMER ICA N I
P H LO S OP H ER S WORK AT

life : the indomi table creative impuls e . Thi s s ame impuls e find s
expression in art In D ionysian obscenity art . , an d life i
j o n in
vigorous unrestra ned laughter
, i .

Completely different in quali ty is a third kind of ob cenity whi ch s ,

I call th e o b s ce n i ty of th e p e rv e rs e nlike conventional obsceni ty . U ,

it is not an attack on accepted standards nor is i t like D ionysian , ,

obscenity an a ffirmation of impulse despite restrai nts It is rather

,
.

a rebellion against convention which at the same time ack no w l

edges the authority o f received standards In th e obscenity o f the .

perverse the artist accepts the common code only to flou t i t ;

,
‘
conscio u s of sin he makes sin attractive ; his theme is the flowers
,

”
of evil 2 7 Baudelaire hi mself as he claimed does make sin
.
’

, ,

hideous The truly perverse finds sin attractive b e caus e i t is sin

.

H
uysmans de S ade ) H
is obsceni ty lack th e nai ve t e of the
, . s
D ionysian ; i t is likely to be lewd i n a ophisticated fashi on The s .

effect i s that of calcu lated indecency .

D ionysian obsceni ty celebrates sex ; conventional obscenity is

neutral toward sex being concerned primari ly ith the s o cial
,
w
evils of particular sex patterns ; for perverse obsceni ty sex is ,

dirty and i t occupies i tself ith sex for th e sake of th e dirt In

,

“
w .

viewing all obsceni ty as smut and filth the puritan only b e ,

w
trays his o n perversion There is here a profo u nd ambivalence .
,

w
a rebellion hich is also a s u bmission S atan is not a free spiri t . ,

bu t a rebel divided against himself I n freedom there is vigor and .

,

forthrightness an enlargement of the soul which is the antithesi

, , s
of evil I n perverse obsceni ty e have th e pathetic spectacl e of the
.
, w
Black M w
ass — orshi pers without a God seeking in hatred and ,

w
rej ection hat they are incapable of accep ting in love .

A t bottom the obsceni ty of the pe rverse is sheer hypo crisy ; i t i

, s
not so black as i t paints i tself Whi l e pretending to rise above .

morality it abj ectly s u bmits to i t and only thereby becomes tru ly

,

immoral in playing false to i ts own di gnity and freedom While

, .

pretending to deligh t in sex in fact it abhors sexuality being , ,

convinced of its sinfu lness and seeking i t out only for the sin For .

the p erverse sex is desirable only because i t is forbidden ; b u t i t

,

remains in the end a bitter frui t Paradoxically i t is the p u ri tan .

,

who creates Su ch obscenity For its fou ndation is secrecy and shame . .

The obscene is what i s off the scene hidden cove red An d shame , , .
,
 O S EN B C I T Y A S AN E ST HET IC C A E G O R Y T 4 3 1

as e thnol o gists have l ong rec o gnized is not merely the cause o f ,

covering b u t the e ff ect 2 8 The secret becomes shameful because

, .

of its secrecy To be perverse is to uncover i t merely because i t

.

is hidden This is the obscenity of the leer and innuendo The

. .

asterisks and dashes of the supposed p u ritan serve in fact to convey

unambiguo u sly the perverse con tent .

Basically what perverse obsceni ty expresses is fear— fear of the

,

w
great po er of the sexual imp u lses It is because of this power that .

prohibitions and constraints have been imposed upon t in all i

societies But j u st beca u se i t is hidden i t loo ms larger and more
.
,

threatening What is per erse is not the concern ith being over
. v w
whelmed by brute desire ; i t is the part of reason to look to the
defenses of rationali ty The perversion consists of p u rchasing free
.

dom from anxiety by assuming a burden of guilt selling one s so u l ,

’

to the D evil for fear of being rej ected by God Perverse obsceni ty .

tri es to cope wi th the forces of sexu ality by a symbolic denial of

their potency It plays with fire in a childish effort to convince
.

i tself that i t cannot be burned But hat i most manifes t in i t i . w s s

only the futility and the fear By contrast D ionysian obscenity .

i
tr umphs over imp u lse by freely yieldi ng to I t while conventional ,

obscenity resolutely sets i tself to canalize mpulse more effectively i

than custom permi ts .

There is thus a close connection between the obscenity of the

perverse and bl as phemy . H
istorically indeed i t was only o n the , ,

basis of this connection that the early s trictures against obscenity

proceeded 2 9 The obscenity of th e perverse simu ltaneo u sly makes
.

too much of sex and too li ttle ; j ust as the blasphemer acknowledges
God by denying H
im profanes th e holy to dam n hi ms elf
, .

D iabolism after all is j u st another reli gi on Perverse ob sceni ty

, , .

does not w ish to profane love in order to remove the tabo o from
i t Just the contr ary ; i t pretends to i gnore th e taboo so as to
.

w
destroy hat is for it the fe arful holiness of love It is perver e
, , . s
obsceni ty no t the D ionysian
, hich is li kely to b e exploited in , w
pornography ; for porn ography as D L awrence has noted is , . H .
,

s
th e attempt to insult ex to do dirt on i t 3 o In the obsceni ty of
, .
”

the perverse sex is no more than a disgusting necessity ; the per

version lies I n finding pleasure n the dis gust i .

S u ch an atti tude is plai nly foreign to art and could enter into
esthetic experience only to drai n i t completely of es thetic quali ty .

i w
It s approximated ho ever by a ty pe of ob s cenity whi ch lies b e
, ,

w
t een the D ionysian and th e perver e —what mi ght b e called ro s
4 4 1 AMER ICA N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
m an tic yo b s c e n it
This is the category
. exemplified in S inburne , w
“ ”
w
and th e fl e sh l y school hich pre serves the sense of in ye t cele
, s
brates sex u ali ty in spite of i t It lacks the pagan innocence of the .

D ionysian bu t also the lust for evil of the perverse It is romantic .

,

as expressing a felt need to cover the nakedness of se x w th senti i

ment and estheticism This need is nowhere more apparent than
.

in the strident insistence on being unashamedly sens u al T h e art .

in which romantic obsceni ty is to be found has some thi ng of

the pathos of adolescent bravado .

In one of i ts e tymologies the word ob cene is given the sense , s ”

of the inauspicious and ill o m en ed 3 l This i s the sense appropriate

;
.

to the obsceni ty of the perverse for i ts conten t is hate not love , , .

w
It seeks in sexuali ty only hat is life denying finding in sinfulness -
,

the great N ay which i t struggles to express Its imp u lse is to .

destroy i tself though i t con tents i tself wi th a stylized gesture toward

,

the self castration which some fathers of the church performed in

-

fact . O
bscenity may thus become linked wi th symbols of violence .

A ggr essi o n is as much repressed and controlled by socie ty as are

li b idinal impulses u rder M i s
s a universally c o ndemn e d as incest
.
,

hostility as rigidly patterned as sexuality Aggressive impul ses .

,

therefore also seek expression in the symbol s of art Correspond

, .

i
ing to the sexuali ty of D onysian comedy is the violence of Greek
tragedy The impulses of love and hate may become confused and
.

intertwined and sex patterned into sado masoc hist c perversion -

i .

In the expression of this content psychic distance can no longer ,

be maintained but is submerged in emphatic identifications both

,

w w
i th br u tality and i th i ts victims A new category of the obscene .

emerges : the p o rn ograp hy of v io le nc e .

In this type of obsceni ty e xual desire finds symbolic release , s

only as transformed into acts of aggre sion 3 2 A phenomenally s .

popular series of novels is constru cted according to a ri gi d pattern

of alternation of violence and sex which coincide only at the climax
w v
hen the irile hero is allo ed to sh o ot the wicked beau ty w ore (
. M
sophisticated in style and structure bu t essentially the same in ,
“
s u b s tan c e i s the work of the
, realistic school sometimes assoc i ated
w H
,

ith the name of emingway D eath in the afternoon prepares for .

i s
l ove at m dnight There i no question that wri ting of thi s genre
.
4 16 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
i t is despised and condemn ed An d alway art rem ai ns a challenge . s ,

to evil and death forcing endur ng human val ue o u t o f th e adly , i s

deficient and evanescent mater al o f experience i .

In this conception conventional and D ionysian obsceni ty and , ,

perhaps also romanti obscenity all play their p ar t in the perform c ,

ance of the es thetic function ; but not pornography not the o b ,

sc en i t of the perverse and especially not the pornog r aphy o f vio

y ,

lence For these are in the service of death not of life They belong
.
, .

to that monstro u s morality and ta te of the bur al ground where s i

death is glorified and the culp ture of ichelangelo is given a s M
fig leaf The god of s u ch obscenity
. not E ro b u t Th an atos No t is s , .

the wages of sin bu t in i t elf i death , s s , s .

O riginally p
blished in L aw a nd C o nte mp o rary Pro b l e ms ( D u rham
u ,

N C Fall
. . and reprinted ith p erm ission of the D u ke ni
, ,
w U
versity S chool of L aw .

1
. T h e o do re S c h ro e d er, F re e d o m of the
.

“ ”
res s a n d

O b s c e ne L ite ratu re and C o ns titu tio n al L aw ,

O b s c e ne Lite ratu re , P
p 4 2 ; an d .
pp .

1 3 —1 4
.
.

2 Mo rris L E rns t an d il l iam S e agl e , T o the

. u reW A S tu dy of O h P
s c e n ity a n d th e C e ns o r,

3 S ee
. ilfre d o V p x
P
are to , T h e M in d a n d S o c ie ty , ( L i i ng s to n c d ,
. .

Vo l v . .

2 , p 1 01 0

5
.

4 S e e M ortim er
.
.

J Ad l e r, A rt a n d ru d e n c e ,
S ee o h n D e w e y , A rt as E x p e rie n c e,
.
J .
p 12 6 P . .

6 D . H L aw re n c e , S e x L ite ratu re a n d C e ns o rs hip ,

.

7 S e e K ap l an an d Kr
.
.

“ ”
p
is , E s th e tic Am b ig u ity , in E rn es t K ris , s y c ho analy tic
5 9
P . .

8 . U
E xp l o ratio n in A rt, c h ap

nite d S tates v O n e B o o k C all e d

10
l y ss e s , 5 F S u p p
.
. .

U . .

1 8 2 , 1 8 3 , afi d, 7 2 F 2 d ( 2 d Cir
J J
p 7 05 ( th e c o u rt s d e c is io n is
’ ’

pp . . . .

. J
re p rin te d as a p re fa c e in

9 o y c e , o p c it , p 183
am es o y c e , Uly ss e s ( R an d o m H o u s e c d , 1 9 3 4 )

. . . .
.

11
.

. U
1 0 I b id , p 1 8 4 .

ni te d S tate s v H arm o n, 4 5 Fe d
. .

( D K an .
p p 4 14 , 4 2 3 . . . . .

1 3 S e e T he
.

du c tio n to s y c ho analy s is P P
1 2 S e e B e n e dic tu s S p ino z a, E thics , p as s im
.

o e tic s of A ris to tl e , p as s im ; S igm u n d Fre u d , A G e ne ra l I n tro

3 7 —
.

pp 2 28 . .

15
.

. U
1 4 G eo rg e S antay an a, R e as o n in A rt
ni te d S tate s V O n e B o o k C al l e d
“
p 171
.
”
ly s s e s, 2 F S u p p
S e e al so am e s T Farre ll,
U . .

. .

J
p p 1 8 2 , 1 8 4 , afi d, 7 2 F 2 d 7 05 ( 2 d C ir
’
. . . .

”
T e s tim o ny o n C e n s o rs hip , i n R efle c tio ns a t Fifty p 2 12 . .

1 6 S e e S an dor Fe re n c z i,
.
“
O n Ob s c e n e o rd s , i n S ex in Ps y c h o analy s is W
17 .
c h ap

P 4 . .

i e rre B ay l e , T he D ic tio nary H is to ric a l an d C ritic al

1 8 S e e K ap l an , R e fe re n tial Me aning in th e Art s , p 1 2 ; ]o u rn al of A es
.
“ ”
p 85 0
.
. .

th e tic s a n d A rt C ritic is m ( 1 9 5 4 ) p 4 5 7 . .
 O S EN B C I T Y AS AN E ST HET IC C A E GO R Y T 417

1 9 S ee H e rb e rt R ead, A n O b s c e nity S y m b ol, 9 Am e ri c an S p e e c h

.

p p 2 64 , 2 6 7
. .

2 1
.

Pv
2 0 S ee A L H aigh t, B anne d B o o ks ,
. .

h ilip S id n e y , T h e D efe n c e of o es ie
.
c h ap 8

P .
. .

2 2 C li e B e l l , A rt 2 6 7
.

2 3 S e e H av e l o ck E l l is, S tu d ies in the s y c h o l o gy of S ex

. P V o l I V, .

p 94
. .

j
2 4 S e e M ar o rie B o w e n , E thics in M o d e rn A rt ix ( 1 9 3 9 )
.

P P
2 5 S e e T h e S y mp o s iu m o f l ato p as s im ; l o tinu s , O n the O ne a n d G o o d,
.

b e in g th e tre atis e s of th e s ix th E n n ead p as s im .

2 6 E g ,
. B e.ll ,
o p
. c i t s u p ra no t e 2 2
.
,
a
. t 2 7 1 —72 .

—
A f A
’
2 7 A l.b ert G u er ar d ,
r t o r r t s S a k e pp 1 8 9 90 . .

2 8 S e e , e g , E dw ard We s term arc k , T he H is to ry of H u m an M a rriag e ( 3 d e d

. . . .

p 2 11 . .

2 9 S e e , e g , Alp ert, J u d ic ial C e ns o rs hip of O b s c e n e L ite ra tu re , 5 2 H arv L

. . . . .

R e v 4 0, 4 3 —
. 44
3 0 D H Law re n c e , o p c it s up ra n o te 6 , at 7 4
v v
. . . . . .

3 1 S e e H a e l o c k E llis , Th e R e al u atio n o f Ob s c e nity , in M o re E ss ay s of

“
.

L o v e a n d Virtu e p 99 . .

3 2 S e e g e n e rall y G e rs h o n L e gm an , L o v e an d D e ath ( 1 9 4 9 ) G e o rg e O rw e ll ,
.

R affl es an d Mis s B l an d is h , i n C ritic al E s s ay s ( 1 9 4 6 ) p 1 4 2

”
. .

3 3 M ill e r,
“
. O b s c e nity an d th e L aw o f R e fl e c tio n , T ric o l o r, Fe b 194 5 , .

p . 4 8 , re p rin t e d in H e nry Mil l er, T he A ir C o n ditio n e d Nig htm a re ( v o l 2 , -

.

R e m e m b er to R e m e m b e r ) 2 7 4 , 2 8 6
3 4 S e e H L M e n c k e n, T he A me ric a n L a ng u ag e S up p l e me nt O n e , 64 4
. . .
 C HA R LES M O RR I S

i
In 1 9 3 9 at the Fifth Internat onal Congress fo r the
, U
ni ty of
S cience held at
, H U
arvard ni versi ty I read a paper with the
,
“

”
,
-
H
title S emiotic the S o cio umanistic S ciences and th e , nityU
of S cience 1 This paper suggested that the theory of signs
.

( semiotic) furnishes th e key to th e incorporation of th e so io

”
c
humanistic sciences in the structure of unified science The
.

propo sal made was to develop the theory of signs upon a biologi
cal base to use this theory in the construction of a biologically
,

based theory of value and then to approach the whole domai n

,

of man s cultural activi ties in terms of semiotic and axiology s o

’

constructed In this way i t might be possible to build a bridge

.

w
bet een the natural sciences and the science of man ; both of
w hich would then fall within a single system of knowledge .

S uch a program may be represented in the followi ng diagram :

4 2 0 A M E R I CA N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
not itself decide be tween various theories of meaning ; hence t i i s
w
compatible i th a biologically grounded semiotic Further evidence .

for this compatibility may be found in the work o f Charle Peirce s

especially vol u mes II and V O f his C o lle c te d P a e rs since eirce
( p ) P
too u ltimately viewed the interpretant of a sign as a disposition to
respond ; in Book II of C I L ewis A n A na lys is of Kn o w le dge an d
. .
’

Va l u a tio n w
hi ch grounds the ult mate di tinctions needed by ym
, i s s
b o l ic logic upon their Peircean view o f meaning ; and n an i H s
R eichenbach s E x p e rie nce an d P re d ic tio n which find n o onflict
’

, s c
w
bet een the pragmatist s theory of meaning and the analyse made
’
s
by the logical empiric sts i H
ere at a cr tical p o nt in theory the ap
. i i
ro ach e s of th e pragmatic and logis tic wings of th e unity of
p
science movement seem to have converged th rough the devel
o m e n t Of a
p tudy of sm e an ng i .

s
A mong the many teps t o ard a cientific semiotic which are w s
taking place today three may here be noticed The basing of lin
, .

g u i s ti cs upon the theory of si gn as in the work of R oman s ,

Jakobson locates lingu istic wi thin e mi otic and thi s taken to

, s s , ,

gether wi th the simi lar movement in respect to formal logic augur , s

closer c o operation between the lingu ist the logician and the
-
, ,

semiotician . H
ans R eichenbach attemp t in E le m e n ts of Sy m b o lic ’
s
s
L ogic to apply ymbolic logic to th e analysis of th e everyday
language is an instance of the di rection of such co o p eratI o n -
.

The application of quantitat ve me thods to content ana lysis i

H sw
by arold D L as ell and his co worker while at present re
.
-
s ,

s tri c te d to political discourse is o f sufficient generali ty to pro ,

v ide a model for the quantitative analysis of all types o f discourse

( see L an u
g g a e of P o l i tics by ar old D L asswell, N athan L H
eites .
, ,

s
and as ociates) Con tent analysis so conceived falls wi thin the
.
, ,

empirical or descriptive part of sem otic and m ake more precise i , s

its methods of s tudy .

The elaboration of the theory of commun cat on by mathe i i

m atic al physical and en gi neeri ng techniques ( as n Norbert
, , i
Wiener s Cy b e rne tics ; Claude S hannon and Warren Weaver
’ ’
s
M a the m a tica l T h e o ry of C o m m u n ica tio n) i further e v dence s i
that se mi otic has now been linked to th e basic cientific and s
technological di sciplines It i possible th at the concep t o f feed
. s
back mechanisms stressed by Wiener and his a so ciate may pro s s
v ide in the form of circular neural process es an approach to a
, ,

fundamental problem of se mi otic : the nature o f the interpretan t

of a sign 3 .
 TH E S CI E N C E O F MAN AND U N I FIE D S CI E N CE 4 2 1

T h e S c ie nce o f Va lu e
A w
central stimulus to ard building a science of value on a
behavioral basis has been the work of John D ewey In hi s .

T h e o ry of Va l u a tio n4 he envisaged the task of the theory of value

as th e study of the nat u re and relation of prizing and appra s al i .

“
In his article The Field of Value n Valu e : A Co op era
‘

,
’
i
tiv e I n q u iry
“
( edited by R a
y L epley ) D ewey use the term s
selective rej ective behavior to characterize the general field of
-

w w
behavior i thin hich th e st u dy of val ue to be carried on s is
and in this article he mainta ns that an appraisal ( or ev al u a i
tion ) does not differ in kind from a statement and hence is ,

controllable by scientific me thod s In an article in the ame . s

, w
book follo ing the general direction se t by D ewey s ork I sug ’
w ,

gested that axiology mi ght be regarded as the sc ence of pref i

e re n tial behavior S ince a stu dy of such behavior
. ould of w
course include th e way i t a ffects and is affected by igns thi s , s
characterization of axiolo gy embraces th e study of preferences
(p ri z i n s
g
, selection rej ections ) appra
-
i sals ( evaluations j udg ,

ments of val u e ) and their interrelations S o conceived the field

, .
,

of val u e is Open to scientific s tudy .

A s exam ples of studies of p ri z in gs in line with this approach

reference may be made to the monograph by enry A urray H . M
and Christiana D “
M
organ A Clinical S tudy of S entiments 5 ”

i
°
.
,

s
and to the variou papers by Jerome S Bru ner and his assoc .

ates 6 For some years th e au thor has been making a tudy of

. s
the preferences of various kinds of persons in various cu ltures .

s
While the tudy has been mainly concerned with preferences
among v arious possible way to live some attention has be en s ,

s
given to preferences a to paintings and philosophies and to the ,

interrelation of these three se ts of preferences It is possible .

i
in this way to isolate empir cally vario u s value patterns to ascer ,

tain their n u mber to study th eir relative strengths in various cul

,

tures and to investigate hat kinds of persons accept hich

,
w w
patterns under what condi tions The detai led res u lts of this .

stu dy have not ye t been p u blished b u t an indication of the ,

methods and the type of results can be fo u nd in an article

“ ”
Individual D ifferences and C u ltural Patterns in the vol u me
P e rs on a l ity edited by Clyde Kluckhohn and
, e nry A urray H . M ,

and in my book T h e Op e n S e l 7
, f .
4 2 2 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
The empirical study of appraisals h as been slower in getting
under way since i t required a theory of signs ufficiently de
, s
v e l o e d to handle such signs and to compare them with other
p
kinds of signs It is my belief that the analyse given in S igns
. s ,

L ang u age an d B e hav io r i n Book I I I of C 1 L ewis A n A n alys is

’
. .
, ,

o f K n o w le d e an d thics
’

g Va l u a tion and in C L S tevenson s E , . .

a n d L an ua e
g g hav e gone a considerable
, ay toward meeting w
this need and hence to prepare the ground both for the scientific
,

study of appraisals and th e scientific making of a p praisal s .

The si tuation seems to me to be something like this : appra sals i

are signs the evidence for who se ap p licability is in the last
analysis found in p riz ings A s such appraisals are cogni tive .
,

( true o r false
) since they make predictions whic h can be tested ;
b u t they differ from certain other kinds of si gn s whos e applica
v
b il i ty d o es not in olv e the occurrenc e or nonoccurrence of p ri z
ings as evidence I t i s true as S tevenson mainta ns that conflicts
.
, i ,

of p riz ings are no t necessarily resolved by the increase of knowl

edge ; i t is even true that a certain die t or way of life good with re
spect to some persons may be bad wi th re sp ect to others But these .

facts force us only to qualify our appraisal s wi th respect to

certain p e rsons under certain condition and to admit that s ,

w
kno ledge of val u e s does not insure their attainment ; they do
not force u s to abandon the vie that appra sals are empirically w i
meaningful and capable in p rinciple of being co ntrolled by
scien tific metho ds 8 .

If p riz ings an d ap p raisals are subj ect to s cientific s tudy then ,

so is th e problem of their relation It i s pos sible to investigate .

the infl u ence of certain p riz ings in the form atio n or accep tan ce
of appraisals and the reverse effect upon p riz ings of a p p raisals
,

form ed by an individual or known to b e held b y other individuals .

S imilarly the relation of p rrz rn gs and appraisals to n o nev al u

,

ative knowledge is open to experimental determination y study . M

s
of painting has touched u pon these matters but serious work ,

on such problems is ye t to be done .

I t is often maintained that preference s are not values and ,

that consequently a study of preferences has nothing to do wi th

the study of values To admi t the first part of this thesis doe s.
‘

, w
not ho ever req u ire an acceptance of the conclusion I t is true
, .

w
that hen we ascribe value to some thing we often mean that i t
is value able i e able to u pport a prizing or able to support
-
, . .
, s ,

continued prizing or more able to do either of these than is,

424 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
proach requires that data on physiques and physical environment
be included in the study of human traits The science of man is .

in this w
ay linked methodologically with th e biological and
physical sciences to form a single scientific system .

O ne of the meri ts of William H

S heldon important work ( a
.
’
s s
reported in T h e Varie ties of H u man P hys iqu e T h e Varie ties of ,

T e mp e ram e n t and T h e Varie ties of D e lin q u e n t Yo u th)

,
s that i
s s
his constitutional empha is ha forced u to take accoun t of the s
biological differences in the individuals whose trai ts are being
stu died . H
e has supplied consti tutional data on many of my
s u bj ects and at a later time det ai led reports ill show how thi
, w s
research on psychoses ways to live and painting n variou
, , s i s
cu ltures has confirmed his basic thesis as to the importance o f
considering di fferences of physique in the s tudy of h u man beings .

H ere i t is only necessary to add that S heldon s work is of signifi

!
‘

cance in helping to bridge the gap be t een the biological and w

the human sciences by reinserting th e physiqu e into th e total
field The same service with respect to environmental factors
.

w
has been performed by E lls orth untington hose lifework was H , w
bro u ght to a focus in Mainsp rings of C iv il iz atio n .

The consti tu tional and environmental factors l ink th e c ence si

of man wi th the biological and physical c ences A t the same si .

time the recognition in personali ty development of the role of

,

s ocial f actors and the role of s

ymbols which individuals prod u ce ,

ensures us that nothing distinctively human ill be lost The w .

science of man is linked w ith the bi o logical and physical sciences

but not red u ced to them For as si gn process e th e ideas and
. s ,

ideals of individuals enter as formative factors in the total field ;

they are the way in whi ch man in a genuine sense is one factor
in the making of his own future tran sformi ng hi body hi s , s ,

physical environment and his culture 1 0 .

,

C o nc l us io n

S u ch
are some of the ways in which the work of the last decade
has advanced the program of integrating the science of man and
w
bringing i t within th e frame ork of unified ci ence F u rther . s .

and rapid developments in this direction may be expected in the

next decade S u ch developments will not be of scientific interest
.

alone ; they a re of importance for th e integr ation of man as man .

They help to destroy at the root the opposition of man s sc entific ’

i
 S C I EN C E O F M A N AND U N I FIE D S CI E N C E 4 5
TH E 2

and humanis ti c concern s In i n g ati ng sci en ce at h s ame . te r we t e

time i nteg ate d l i be a e ou se l ve s
r an r t r .

Thi s a i cle originally ap p eared in h P

rt di g f h A m i t e ro ce e n s o t e e r c an

A d my f A
ca e d S i o V l 80
rts an 3 7— 4 4 and is
c e n ces, o
pp . .
,

rep ri d wi h p ermi ssion

n te t .

1 .

c anc e o f th e U
An ab s trac t of thi s p ap e r w as p rinte d as p art o f th e artic l e T h e S ig ni fi
ni ty o f S cienc e Mo em e nt,
R e s e arc h, Vo l 6 ( 1 9 4 6 ) p p 5 08—
. 15 .
”
v
hil os op hy an d
.
P
he n o m e no l o g ic al P
2 R efere nces to c riti cis ms of th is ap p ro ac h , an d m y rep ly to th e s e c ritic is m s ,
.

“
m ay b e fo u nd in S igns Ab o u t S ig ns Ab o u t S igns ,
—
hil os op hy an d h e no m e na P P
l og ic al R es e arc h, Vo l 9 .
pp 1 1 5 3 3
3 S ee th e p ap ers b y Warre n S Mc c ul l o ch and Wal ter itts , B u l l e tin of
.

Mathematic al B iop hy s ics , Vo l 5 —

.

3 3 ; Vol 9
.

P
pp . 1 1 5 .
pp 12 7 . .

4 7 Al so , D O H eb b s b ook , T h e Org aniz atio n of B e h a v io r

’
. . . .

5 . PV
4 I n I nternatio nal E ncy c l o p e d ia of Unifie d S c ie n c e , Vo l I I , No 4
.

G e ne tic s y c ho l o gy M o n og rap hs , Vo l 3 2 pp 3 1 4 9
.
,
1 5 3 — 3 11 .
.

P
-
. .

P P
“

V
6 S u ch as
.

of A b no rmal a n d S o c ial
al u e an d Ne e d as O rg aniz i ng Fac tors in

al u es as S el e c ti e Fac to rs in v
s y c h o l o gy Vo l 4 2
e rc e p tio n ,
”
i b i d Vo l 4 3
pp
erc e p tio n ,

, 3 3 —.44;
1 4
J o u rnal

2
e rs o n al
—5 4
. P
pp
v
. . . .
,

7 An articl e , C o m p arati e S tre ng th o f L if e Id e al s in E as tern an d We s tern

“ -

v
.

C ul tu res , is to ap p e ar in a o l u m e o f p ro ce e ding s o f th e s e c o n d E as t We s t
P
” -

hi l o so p h e rs C o nfe re nc e , to b e e d ite d b y C h arl es A Mo o re [ T hi s v o l um e h as

P
’
. .

sinc e b e e n p u b lishe d un d er th e titl e E s s ay s in E as t We s t

U P hil os op hy ( H o no l u lu , -

niv e rs ity o f H aw aii ress ,

v
8 T h is is s u e is o f su c h b as ic im p o rtanc e th at it d es e r e s to b e m ad e a c e ntral

i ti
.

to p ic o f dis c u s sio n b y th e I ns titu te for th e

n i n R l a ti v it
ni ty o f S c ie n c e
— A R ic he r T ru th seem s in ac c o rd w ith th e o s itio n tak e n
U
h ilip p Frank s . P ’

p os o e y p ;
b u t I am n o t s u re th at R eic h e nb ach o r S te e ns o n w o u ld ag re e v .

P 9 This p o in t o f v iew p ro v i d es th e b as is o f o rg aniz atio n o f th e antho l o gy ,

.

e rs o nal ity , e d ite d b y Kl u c k h o h n an d M u rray

“
thi s th e m u l tifo rm m e th o d
”
Mu rray h as so m e tim es c al l e d
L au ra T h om p s o n h ad c om e to a s imi l ar m e th o do
.
.

l o gic al p o sition as a re s ul t o f h er w o rk o n th e Ho p i I ndi an s ; s e e h e r b oo k ,

C u l tu re in C ris is I h ad b e e n l e d to th e s am e resu l t in th e s tu dy o f s ig n s an d
v
.

al u es This View fac ili tates th e in te g ration o f th e s cie nc e o f m an, inc l u ding
v
.

th ere in th e s o cial s cie n c e s A c o m p re h e ns i e attem p t at s u c h i n te g ratio n is

v
.

fo u n d in th e ol um e, T o w ard a G e ne ral T he o ry of A c tio n, b y m em b ers o f th e

v
v U v P P
Har ard D ep artmen t o f S o cial R e l atio n s an d th e ir c o ll ab o rato rs [Th is b oo k .

ap p e are d in 1 9 5 1 , H ar ard ni ersity re s s , w ith T al c o tt ars o ns an d Edw ard

v
.

’
P
A S hil s as e di to rs ] Th e p oint of i ew is an e xt e ns io n and e l ab o rati o n o f th at
fo u nd in T al c o tt ars o ns T he S tru c tu re of S o c ial A c tio n
f
1 0 S ee T he Op e n S e l ; G H M e ad s M in d, S e lf, and S o c ie ty ; F S C
.

fi
’
. . . . . .

No rth ro p s I deo l o gic al Man in His R el atio n to S c ie nti c ally Kno w n Natural
’ “

Man in I de o l o g ic al D ifie re nc e s and Wo rld Order, of w hi c h h e is the e ditor

”
.
 A RT H U R MU R PHY

Tb e Com mon

T he problem I propose to investigate in thi s paper s p rima ac ie a i f

modest one fo r i t concerns th e meaning of a ell known expression
, w -

w
in a use i th which both practical men an d philosophers are fa
”
miliar The express ion is the common good as i t occurs in state
.

“ ”
ments which aflirm that the common good the public interest
, ,
”
or the welfare of the communi ty requ ires or warrants o n e sort
of action o r another The context of such use i that in which
. s
reasons are asked for and gi ven in support of orders issued claims ,

presented or policies recommended and in hich a distinction is

, w
made between go o d reasons and bad In raising th e q u estion of
.

meaning here I have no special analytic or metaphysical ax to

grind . M
ost of us on many occasions have considered and dis
c u ssed claims th u s supported as if we understood them and have
accepted some and rej ected others on hat we took to be good
‘

w
gro u nds I t is di fficult to see how the intelligent di sc u ssion of soc i al
.

p olicies co u ld go on if we did not ur

. present O
trou b le is that on
fundamental iss u es the discussi o n of s ocial policies is b y no means
as intelligent as i t ought to be S ome part of this failure is due
.
,
4 8 2 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S WORK
AT

and in each the language u ed i to be th e li ght s s under s tood in

of that dis tinctive int erest and intent S o far the procedure are .
’

s
s
alike and the ame rule o f nterpre tation should apply to bo th s i .

i s
This authentic f omewhat rudiment ary n ight i a genuine is s
s
contribution to our ubj ect It helps u l ocate th e mean ing o f a . s
questionable term by trac ng t to the oc al ne ghborhood n i i s i i i
which i t works and it call our attent on to ome of its le s genteel
, s i s s
i
relat ons to whom i t bears a fami ly resemblance S o far so goo d But
, . .

s s s
there are per ua ion an d per uasion and for some of our purpo e s s , ss
the di fferenc e be tween them may be at le as t a important as their s
s i ss
imilar ty A n analy i that gnore or undere t mate the e di ffer
. i s si s s
e mees through i ts reiterated n istence that words de gned to in is si
fl u e n ce our practi al de c cis
ion are all al ke persua ve in ntent s i si i
will advance o u r understanding at o n e point on l y to ob t ruct t s i
“
at another I believe that current inquirie into the emot ve uses
.
”
s i
of language are frequently in this way obs tructive ur pre sent con . O
cern however is not to refute these th eor e bu t accurate l y to
, , is
s i
describe the ituat on o f wh ch we have o far given an adequate i s
account H i
av ng therefore duly noted in the fa hi on o f t me that
.
, s i ,
“
appeals to common goo d are and are mean t to be per ua ve , , s si ,

s i
let u now nquire more pec fically what k nd of per u a on th s i i s si is
is and what sort of agreement i requ red f t properl y to do s i i i is
i ts work .

s
It is at le a t and essentially a per uasion o ffered to upport and
, , s s
is
j ustify a dec ion or comm and It is pre ented as a rea on why . s s
i
some th ng or other ought to be don e or left undon e and i ts ap ,

s
parent cogency a thu understood is ntrins c to t effect venes s i i is i s
i
in elic ting agreement in attitude from tho e to whom t ad s i is
. is s
dressed Th doe not mean of cours e that those w h o understan d , ,

and are moved by i t will stop on each occasion to ask for ev dence i
s
of the genuinene s of the good i t promises or the good fai th of
thos e who claim to spe ak for i t But i t doe s mean that talk o f this .

s
sort function like paper money in terms of confidence and credi t
, , .

The question o f i ts warranted validity can mean ngfully ar e i is .

w
When i t does ari se the ans er wanted is in term s of the t igh tne ss of
,

is f
t cl ai m not of the d e ac to e ffica y of i ts emotive use An d until ts c . i
cogency l s re established it w ll not for the questioner b e persuasive
-
i
as it was before That is hy the masters of totalitarian propaganda
. w
are at such pains to see to i t that such question s do not ari e A man s .

aged credulity is
th e only proper atmos p here in wh ch to pre e rv e i s
the emotive efli cacy of words that ound or look like re a ons bu t w ll s s i
 TH E COM MON GOOD 42 9

not bear th e exami nation of an inqui ri ng mi nd Even here h ow . ,

ever th e words mu t o und o r look like rea on for t

, s s only a s s , i is s
s
thu understood and accep ted that they can pe rform the r di s ti nc i
tive function .

What is thi s function and how are reas on relevan t to t ful , s is

fil me n t? T o eli ci t agreement to be sure Bu t to elici t a greement by , .

reference to goo ds whi ch those addre ssed will recognize as wor th

having for who s e atta nmen t they ackno ledge a sh ar ed resp o n
, i w
i
s ib il i ty and w th respect to which
, ome decisions are warrantable s
s
a reasonable an d right whi le o thers can properly be rej ected as
arbi trary or unwise The language in hich an approval thus sub
. w
s tan tiate d is expressed is that of shared ideals of loyalty and fa r , i
dealing of goods au thentically worth the e ff ort that is called for
,

to secu re them Thi s is

a normative use of l an guage ; i t ans ers
. w
s
question abou t excellence and ri ght and j ustice in term of hat s w ,

i
by relevant cri te r a is reliably accredi ted as excellent o r right or
,

v
j u st There are ad anced thinker who find this usage esoter c
. s i
w
and occult If e would only tell them hat we me an in te rm
. w s
that tr ansform a j us tification nto a description a command or a i ,

verbal enticement if we would j ust say plai nly and wi th no

,

w i
nonsense hat k nd of an is an o ugh t is supposed to be th e n they ,

w w
ould know hat we were talk ng abou t an d we could do meta
”
“
i
e thics together .

Bu t in that case we hould not any longer be talking abou t the s

subj ect that here concern us For a j u tification is not a d ecri p s . s
tion nor a comm and nor a verbal enticement and to talk abou t
, , ,

w
i t as though it ere is to talk ho ever meticulously an d elaborately
, , w ,

about someth ing else wi th which for analytic purposes i t ha been

, s
mi stakenly identified Fortunately the more discerning analysts .

are comi ng to see that this is so an d to d rect their formidable i

w
po ers in consequence to the elucidation of th e logical stru cture
, ,

of specific s u bj ect matters to hich particular types of re as on are w

v
rele ant rather than to the imposition upon all alike of a pre
“
fabricated clari ty borrowed from ma thematical l ogi c and the
preconception of a posi tiv tic epi temol o gy 2 I propose w thin is s .
, i
i
th e lim ts of my competence to follow their example , .

w
In hat sort of si tuation then would a question about the
ii
,

re as o n s for a practical dec s on phrased in terms of common ,

good significantly arise and how in such a situation could a rele

, , , ,

v w
ant and cogent ans er be identified ? It would be a question about
w hat ough t to be done asked by men who were capable of recog ,
43 0 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
n iz i ngsome ob ligations and we re concerned in th e ir comm on b e
havior to see to i t that these obligations were me t It would refer .

to the condi tions that made moral sense o f their shared social con
v
ce r ns to benefi ts recei ed or an ti cipated and responsibi l i ties in
,

w
curred an d i t ould as k that a par ticular decision on hi ch agree
, , w
men t was sough t b e j u s ti fied by i ts con trib u ti on to some good they
,

w ere thus j oin tly concerned to secure If th ere ere no di s agree . w

ment wi th respect to s u ch go ods and ob l i ga tions th e request for
j u s tifi cation wou ld not save rhe torical ly arise If there w ere no
, , .

w
agreemen t there ould be no common gro u nd on whi ch i t could
be reasonably di scu ssed The offering an d testing of pract ical .

reas ons th e reasons that j u s tify a decision wi th respect to right

,

and good presuppo se a tension of di s agr eemen ts mediated by th e

,

shared commi tmen ts of a worki n g understanding A common goo d .

is the ideal conten t o f thi s pres u p p osed un ders tan di ng fu nctioni ng

as a s tandard for the adj udi c a tion of co n fli cti ng cl ai m s an d th e
j us tificati on of q u es tionable de cisions The lan guage that i n okes . v
i t is signi fi can tl y addressed to men ho in s u ch si tu ations ask w , ,

for reas ons an d for whom an au then tic obligation in a caus e or th w

servi ng is a good an d s ufficien t reas on for the action cal led for in
i ts name T o pers u ade in thi s us age is to convince and th e cri teri a
.
, , ,

w
that di s tin gui sh a arran ted from a spurious c lai m are pres u pp osed
i n the determi nati on of th e moral relevan c e and cogen cy of lan
gu age used .

There are then as e noted persuas ion an d persu asions an d

, , w , s ,

the diff erences between them are im portant The agreement in .

atti tude evoked by th e successfu l adverti ser of ci gar ettes is c as u al ,

mi n dl ess an d irresponsible It may appropriately be a chi eved by

, .

an
y mea n s cond u cive to thi s e n d Those ho shar e a preference for . w
Ch es terfiel ds for ex amp le need a gr ee on li ttle el e to respo nd ap
, , s
v
propriately to the erb al bai t presented to them N o r is i t e s sen .

tial to their enj oyment or the advert i ser s profit that they j u dge or ’

j us tify their ap p roval of hi s product tho u gh even here a form of ,

w ords is u sed that p an ders to man s i ns atiable des ire for reas ons ’

w
.

P erhaps Ch e s terfi el ds real ly are mi lder an d thi s is someho a go od ,

thin g of , w
hi ch a di s crim i nati ng smoker o u gh t to take acco u nt .

N o r fin al l y does their shared ad di ction carry wi th i t any further

, ,

commi tments that they need b e erious ly con cerned to respect s

w
.

A m an may sw i tch hi s bran d of ci gar ettes or hi skey with out

p rej u d ice to his po si tion as a man of di s tinc tion .

The requir emen ts for the agreemen t in atti tude in hi c h the w

43 2 A ME RI CAN W O R K
PH ILO S OP HERS AT

ce d of practical reason Thi s con fi m the i r po si ti v is tic p

u re s . r s reco n

ce
p i rules
t o ns , out hard questions with which the i r metho d s are
not competen t to deal and send s them rej o i cing on the i r way
,
.

S ince our aim is to make s ense of ethical agreement in h u s e and t e

on the terms appropriate to it s specific natur and intent their e

‘
,

way cannot be our way .

We must therefore look elsewhere for the unders tanding w hich ,

b y the very nature f their method and intent they cannot give u s
o , .

N oris there longer any doub t a s to where we are to look Follow .

ing the well known semantic directive to point to th e referent we

-
,

have to the best of our ab ility pointed And what we are now
, , .

s
.

plainly pointing at are the proc esse of communication in which

moral autho ri ty is invoked supported and used as an nstrument , i
of control in the ordering o f group behavior A community what . ,

ever else i t may b e is at least a social nexu wi thin hich uch

, s w s
s
processe occur and are to some degree effective ere at last o ur . H
idealistic terminology appears to make connection wi th sub s tan
“ ”
tial fact and the ough t of ethical language to find ts locu i s
s
in the exi tential context of an identifiable oc al process From s i .

now on we should at least know what we are talk ng abou t and i

where to look for reliable answer to our quest on s i s .

O ur inqu i ry has so far specified the context i n wh i ch the claims

of common good arise and can significantly be discussed but i t ,

ha s not sho n us how they can properly be tested The language

w .

here employed i s normative i t speak s f j ustification and makes ; o

pretensions to validity If we are to understand i ts cogency we

.
,

m st distinguish be tween its right and wrong use f m l p

u or o ra ur

p w
os e s ,hen both are soc i al fact N can we s imply appeal s . or to
society to make this distinction for us for any s uch appeal yields
”
,

morally equ i vocal results .

The gist of our diffic lty i s this When we addr ss men i n the
u . e

morally authoritative langu age o f community we speak to them

as if our mutual behavior were to be governed by the co m mon
p u rposes and responsibili ties which g ve our cla ms a moral mean i i
ing and as if they would so understand and respond to them In
, .

“
fact however this is often not even approximately the cas e S o
i
, , .

ci e t
y as such 1 3 not community in the ense n which community , s
“
is a term of j ustification or he c laims and nterests of common ‘
i
 TH E CO MMON GOOD 43 3

goo d a valid moral reason George erbe rt ead used to illustrate

. H M
i ” “
the w de range of sociality by instancing the conversation of ges
”
w
tures of a dogfight in hich each participant adapts its behavior to
the other in car rying ou t the social act in hich they are mu tually w
involved 3 It is hardly necessary to stress the point that the sociality
.

thus identified is not commu ni ty nor the conversation involved in

s
i t the basi for a common unders tanding No r is this merely b e .

cause the gestures are nonverbal Words too can be weapons and .
, , ,

the political eq u ivalent of the dogfight on the human level is not

made more irenic by the capacity of the participants to verbalize
their animosities A conversatio n of verb al gestures can be used
.

ei ther to fu rther moral understanding or to defeat i t by trading

on i ts authority for selfish and divisive ends In the societies that e . w
know both these uses do patently occ ur and the latter is no less
s ocially effective than the former .

The c u rrent manner of speaking of society as a hole as a w ,

loc u s of moral au thority sounds promi sing but is as i t tands , s ,

misleading An act u al soc ial gro u p is not made a moral whole a

.

community by its n u mbers o r po er or by the orthodoxy of o p m

, w
w
ion that prevails i thin it I ts members are united by some loyalties
.

and interests antagonistic with respect to others It i j ust b e

, . s
ca u se they disagree o n s ome issues that an appeal to ethical agree
ment is needed to elicit a kind of c o o p e ration not otherw ise -

i
atta nable A socie ty becomes a moral whole to the extent that the
.

i deals that articulate this pres u pposed agreement are embodied o n

the whole and for essential purp oses in the proced u res of i ts cor
p
“
o rate life ence
. i t H
is not “
socie,ty as a hole that defines the w
ought i t is the ought of ethical agreement as exemplified in pro
c e d u re s of good faith and fair dealing that consti tute a society a

“
w
whole for hich moral au tho ri ty can si gnificantly be claimed The .

reference to society as a gro u nd for valid moral judgm ent m u st ,

if it is to be rationally discerning be a reference to soc iety as moral

, ,

to communi ty An d Whether th e claims of any given society are

.

genuinely entitled to such respect will have to be decided not on

“
merely social but on moral gro u nds .

“ ”
s
If socie ty a a whole is unavailing here the group mind is
“
,

no better case For the group for moral purposes is mindless

.
!

s ave as its members achieve some kind of ethical understanding

and know how to use it O

ne of the most impressive attempts ye t
.

made to work out a moral theory i n s uch terms is ead s social M ’

is s i i
behavior m As a de cr pt on of the manner n which the current
. i
43 4 .
AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
norms of group approval are carr ed over a the voice of the i s ’

generali z ed other into the socially conditioned individual s re

s o n s e s to his o w n b ehavior this theory is remarkably illuminating
p
.
,

A s an account of the moral authori ty of a communi ty as embodied

in the behavior of individu als who respond to it as sel es or per v
sons i t is patently inadeq u ate When the generalized other w h is
,
.

“ “ ” “ ” “ ”
pers 10 thou must th e me repeats I m u st But the me that
, ,
.

th u s responds is so far not a moral self at all nor is the group whose ,

standardized responses it reflects a commu nity N either the one nor .

“ ”
the other has a mind of its own for the self has only what the ,

group h as given i t and the group made up of other si mi

,

l arl y conditioned had none to give A society thus constituted is

, .

more acc u rately characteri z ed as a lonely cro d in which each w ”

individual vainly loo ks to others to supply him ith a selfhood w

none of them has got 4 .

N o r does the addition in ,

“ ”
M
ead s theory of an I an e m erg ’

, ,

”
v
ent factor in indi idual behavior which may conflict i th and w
resist group pressures really help 5 For if as he insists the only
, .
, ,

w
principles by hich the individ u al can j u dge his conduct ethically
“ “ ”
are those of the group then the I has nothing to j udge i th
,
”
w ,

no moral standpoint from hich to make a j u dgment w orality at . M

this level is simply conformity to the internalized pressure of
standardized gr o u p opinion and hile the aberran t indi idual may w v
rebel against these standards and in tim e remake them his re ,

bellion is not moral until it has s u cceeded in imposing i tself on

w “
others as a ne gr oup pressure and is ri ght then only as it as w
“
w ”
rong before b y reference to the generalized Opinion that in fact
,

prevails .

S tripped of the generous liberalism of ead s o w n personal M ’

'

philosophy this doctrine can be u sed to rationalize b u t not to j u stify

a prevalent contemporary state of mind S o acc u stomed have we .

g ro wn to the nat u ralistic fallacy in its sociological form to the iden ,

tific atio n of th e moral o u h t with the is of grou approval or aver

g p
w
sion that e hardly understand hat else than s o cially dominant
, w
Op ini on ( in o u r grou p of co u rse ) moral authority mi ght b e S u rely
, .

w
the man ho presumes to set his private j udgm ent against the
“ ”
verdict of his peer group m us t b e rong for is not that j ust w ,

what being wrong consists in at least for those of us ho have ,

”
w
learned like S idney We b b to think in communities ?6
, ,

N O i t is not if , w
e know what we are talking abo ut hen we w
s p eak of a community in which moral authori ty has an honest
43 6 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S O P ER S H AT WORK
terms of equity that apply to all the term of ethical agreemen t , s
that di sti nguish a community from a manipulated crowd To m am .

tain the ethical agreement vital to u ch community i t is indeed

“
s
”
essential that i ts members think alike on fundamentals That does .

, w
not mean ho ever that they must hold identical opinions on
,

controversial issues opinions maintained by indoctrination in all

,

the varied media of managed mass credulity That not to think . is

alike for so far it is not to thi nk at all It is rather the w ay
,
. , ,

i w
n hich men agree when they do not think when their minds are ,

the passive instruments of social forces that they do not under

stand T O think alike where doub t has ar sen and a j ustification
.
,
i
is called for we must first of all think and to think is to j udge
, , ,

s
to ubmi t divergent cl ai m and Opinions to the test of examinable s
reasons and to decid e not arbitrarily but fairly on the merits
, , ,

of the case An agreement thus maintained is an ethical agreement

.

an d the society that preserves and defends i t a comm u nity Claims .

based upon it are addressed to men as indi idu als at the level v ,

of s o cial behavior at which they recognize a valid claim a a s

practical reason and respond to i t as su h The morally au th o ri ta c .

tive verdict Of the comm u ni ty is the co n cens u s maintained and

s
validated in thi process Where there are no uch nd v dual there
. s i ii s ,

is no such community .

A ll this we shall be told once more

, far too good to be true , is .

O f co u rse if communi ty i defined in moral terms then only a

, s ,

society that satisfies those terms will be n this queer way o f speak , i
ing a community B u t act u al societies are not like that S tr p away
, . . i
the unscientific verbiage and what is left o f ocial behavior in a s
clearheaded last analysis is custom credu lity and conflicting inter ,

ests held in balance in some areas by organi z ed po er The rest w .

is talk S o speaks the enlightened realist ho looks for facts not

. w ,

theories and is determined not to be imposed upon by ords S ince

, w .

w
there is some truth in hat he says tho u gh little understan di ng he , ,

w
deserves an ans er here It is at this stage in our inquiry not .
, ,

di ffi cu lt to give .

Of c o u rs e i t is the case that if we c u t away all deal language i ,

and all that lan guage stands for and evokes in human behavior ,

we are left in a world in hich such langu age has no cogency and w , ,

indeed no sense For i t is on l y through the processes of communi

, .

w
cation in hich men come to understand their social life as serving
common ends and relate their ills responsibly to a good thus w
shared that they consti tute the community which is the referent
 TH E COMMON GO O D 43 7

and j ustification of their ideal clai ms As jo ah R oyce was fond . si

of insisting a society thu con ti tuted s and must be a com
, s s i
munity of interpre tation 7 T ake away the interpretation the atti
. ,

tude of will involved in i t and the conduct in which i ts claim are s

s
embodied and there i nothing left to wh ch in actual social b e i
havior the des cription we have given would h teral ly apply Where
, .

such comm unication is rudimentary there s but rudimentary com , i

mu ni ty Where i t is perv erted to divis ve ends o u r talk of common
. i
good becomes as emp ty of rational cogency as the cynics take i t
to be An d where i t break down altogether we are left in th e
. s ,

state of nature which the realist s las t analysis sufficiently describes ’

.

That is j ust what I have been insist ng on ; i t is the same fact seen i ,

w
as it ere from the under side An d that from where he stands
, .
, ,

is all th e social realist can see o f t i .

No r is i t d ifli c u l t to see why th e temptation recur to speak of s

his as in some ultimate and privileged sense the last analysis These .

are di sillusioning times O

ver w de areas of what we used to call
. i
w
the civilized orld communication at this level simply doe not
, s
exist and we have come to look on the liberal philosophers
,

of our tradition as nai ve in supposing that i t ever did or could .

The trust and tru stworthiness that make community a fact require
an act of faith a faith too often disappointed in the recent past
,

to leave much room for hope and chari ty We do not propose to be .

v
decei ed again and therefore look wi th growi ng favor on p hil o so
p h ers how ask us to retreat to a posit on invulnerable to decep t on i i
because from the standpoint t define there no longer anything
, i s , is
of moral import to be deceived abou t That is one way after all .
, ,

to be secure in our minds and we now place a high value on ,

securi ty .

N othing however could be more unrealistic than the notion

, ,

that a language free of moralistic implications could pro ide a v

working basis for effective social action In times of crisis men do .

not s u rrender the lan guage of ideals ; they go on using i t ith in w

creased urgency and vehemence ur present di sillusionmen t is full . O
of righteous indignation ; th e h Op e of a better orld e say has w , w ,

been betrayed by evil men and we appe al to the j udgment of the

,

w ”
free orld to justify our cause aga nst them This too is moralistic i .
, ,

talk Is i t mere talk that mask a drive for power in the persuasive
. , s
w
rhetoric of high so u nding ords ? We emphatically rej ect that sug
gestion not as an analytic inaccura y bu t as slander But hat
, c . w
then ? What truthfulness is there n our l ai m and what s the i c s , i
43 8 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
reality behind them ? It can only be th e reality embodied in proc
esses of rationally self controlled behavior in professedly common
-
,

purposes faithfu lly maintained in pledges kep t and hoped for ,

goo ds achieved in coo perative action Where these processes o p .

c rate and are e ffective there is community and thos e who speak its

lan guage need deceive neither their fello s nor thems elves for i t is w ,

precisely b y these means that they achieve a kind of understanding

not elsewhere or otherwise attainable Where these processes fail .

“ ”
there is still tall talk and i ts emotive use b u t the means of
, ,

determ ining i ts veraci ty are gone ence those who look for the . H
j ustification of a langu age of ideals outside the commi tment and
w
proc edures in hich that j u stification can in fact be made will
assuredly not find i t There is no s u b m o ral or metaethical sub
.

s ti tu te for moral understanding and i t is only in terms of such ,

understanding that the distinction bet een go o d fai th and d e cep w

tion can intelligibly be made out .

The processes that constit u te a community are real and ult , i

mately real not at all in th e sense that they are existentially ubi
,

u i to u s or soc ially uncondi tioned or guaranteed to prevail in

q
“
U ltimate R eality against confu si on and ill ill They are real in w .

th e quite simple sense that they sometimes do Operate in actual

human a ffairs that th ere is no better way of d o ing the w o rk they
,

do than in the way they do i t and that this is a work which for ,

essential human purposes e cannot do withou t There s a level, w . i

w
of human behavior at hich men ask for j ustifying reasons and ,

s
to the q u e tion th u s asked nothing but a reason can b e an an
sw w
er In the asking and ans ering of such que t 1 ons they sometimes
. s
achi eve an understanding that makes moral sense of their social
. s
relations They peak then in terms of common goo d and in so
, ,

spe aking they are not or need not be deceived For the common
, , .

good is the good of a communi ty and community is actualized in

w
the lives of men ho seek and find a common good I t is through .

the proced u res of communication in which ideals are invoked as

reasons and claims j ustified on their au thori ty that th ey do thus
seek and find it .

There is then for those ho ould use with moral cogency th e

, , w w
v
persuasi e language of a common good no escape from th e commi t ,

ments and the risks that use entails The commonness of the com .

mon good is not like that of the comm on cold a contagion spread ,

w
in cro ds by indiscriminate ass oc iation It is shared as ideals are .

shared by those who honor them and kept if i t s ell kept at , i w

 F
. S C N O RT H R O P
. .

E th ica l R ela tivis m in the L ight

o
f R ecent L ega l Science

An thropology s
and s ociologica l j uri prudence have extended the
s s
tudy of e thic to the cultures of the entire world Two thi ng re . s
sult : ( l ) th e relativi ty of e thics and philosophy to culture and ,

( )
2 the relati vi ty of cu lture to philosophy The distinction n e ce s . s
s s s
s ary to clarify the e two conclu ion are the concern of th s paper i .

s
It approach is
through thre e develop ments n A merican legal i
s ciences They are ( 1 ) L egal Posi tivism ( 2 ) S oc iologi al Juri
.
, c s
prudence and ( 3 ) N atural L aw Jur prudence
, is .

L egal Pos itiv is m

L egal i i is
posit vism rece ved t fullest American expression in
Thayer L angd e l l and Ames It i exemplified today in
, , . rs M .

J u stice Frankfurter an d Judge Emeri tus L earned and Philo H .

s ophically i t de r ves i s
econdari ly from Wr ght Peirce an d J ame s 1 i , ,

s
and primarily from A u tin Bentham and ume supplemented
, , H ,

i H s H si
w th obbe From obbe t take i ts cr teri on of th e e ffe t ve
. s i ci
s i
nes and s anction o f l aw —nam ely n th e p ower o f th e sovere gn i .
 E HICAL
T RE LAT V S M I I IN LE AG L S CI E N C E 44 1

From H
ume Bentham and James t receives i ts psychological
, ,
i
ethics and i ts positivism .

Its positivism means that one need study only the positive law
to make correct j udi cial decisions o r to practice properly By .

w
positive la is meant the statutes and j u dicial decisions The
’
.

positive law being decl ar ed ethics is foreign to the j u dge s j udg ,

ment H
is duty is to accept the ethical content of the positive
.

law not q u estioning hy E thics s assigned consequently to the

, w . i
theory of legislation .

This assi gnment of ethics to the private citizen expressing ,

himself thro u gh legislation derives from th e s u bj ectiv sm of any , i

psychologi cal e thics s u ch as that of u me A ustin James and
, H , , ,

L e ar ned H ”
and 2 Its only meaning for the social goo d is the
.

”
pooling of the private goods in the legislative market place .

Were the j udge therefore to introduce his ethical j udgment into

, ,

his legal decision he would be guil ty of confu sing private i th

, w
public j ustice 3 .

T hi s leaves no basis for the j udicial revie of legi slation w .

H
Judge L earned and d raws th is co nc l u sio n interp reting the Bill
'

of R ights merely as counsels of moderation to the legi slat u re 4 .

Justices D o u glas and Black ho e er in accord ith L ocke Je ffer , wv , w ,

M i
son and arshall nterpret the Bill of Ri ghts in civil liberty cases
, ,

v
as positi e law which the j udge mu s t use to measure both the
executive and the legi slatu re 5 This is to afli rm a meaning of .

“
i
soc ally goo d other than the pooling of p ri vate goo ds in the
le gi slature and to rej ect both ethical subj ectivism and legal
p o s1 t1 v 1 5 m .

But where is this trans legislative meaning of socially good -

to be fo u nd ? An obvious ans er s : In an empi ri cal stu dy of the w i

norms of social behavior In short the basis of law is not intro .

s e c tiv e psychology but empirical social science This is the point

p .

of the legal philosophy of S avi gny E hrlich 6 R oscoe Po u nd 7 and , ,

U 8
M
nderhill oore and of th e ale L aw S ch oo l s policy initiated in Y ’
,

w M w
,

th e 1 9 2 0 s
’

hen r ( no Justice) D ougla s was a professor there

.

of calling n o n l egal l y trained social scientists 9 and even a p h il o so

pher of culture to i ts faculty Thus legal positivism gave way to : .

S o c io l o gica l j u ris p ru d e nc e
Its thesis is that positive law cannot be understood apart from
s “
the ocial norms of the living law Ehrlich defined th e latter .
44 2 AMER I ICA NWORK P H LO S OP H ER S AT

as th e i nner order of the a s ociations of human b ings

s e and de
”
10
“
scribed i t as the law which domi nates life i tself even though t i
has not been posited in legal proposi tions the positive
E hrlich s
“
inner order of associations is equivalent to hat the
’

“ ”
w ’
1
anthropolog ists call th e pattern of a culture 2 Thus E hrlich s .

theory might equally appropriately be called anthropological j u r s i

prudence 3 1 .

s
For both the ociological j urist and the anthropologist the ,

inner order or pattern which is the living law is emp irically and
, ,

inescapably e thical Thus in su m marizing an appraisal of their

.

science by some fifty anthropologists Professor Kroebe r wri tes : ,

“
V alues evidently are intimately associated wi th the most basic
S i mi
”
and implici t patterning of the phenom na of culture
e 14 .

l arl y E hrlich speaks o f the

,
“ ”
soc al norms of th e inner order ”
i
w
of soc iety hich provide the sanction for and determine the e f
,

fe c tiv e n e ss of the positive la 1 5 w .

N ote that H
obbes is dropped The sanct on for posit ve law . i i
and the criterion of i ts effectiveness is not po er bu t th e cor w ,

w
respondence bet een its ethical content and that of the li ing law v .

When as wi th the Prohibi tion A mendm ent or Chiang Kai sh ek s

,
-
’

Western constitution applied to Confucian China 1 6 the norms o f ,

the positive law fail to correspond to those of th e living law th e ,

v
posi ti e law fails even though plenty of po er is at hand Thus w .

instead of positive la w
deriving i ts sanction from something
e thical ly neutral s u ch as po er both power and posi tive law
, w ,

v
deri e their sanction and effectiveness from the ethical content of
the living law .

S ociological j u risp ru dence also provides a standard for j udgi ng

legislation there b y validating j u dicial review of maj ority le gi sla
,

tion E thics is not consign ed to the theory of legislation hich is

. w
outside the j u dge s province ’
.

“
Furthermore the social good that measures maj ority legi sla
,

tion is neither vacuously abstract after the manner of the neo ,

Kantians nor subj ectively arbitrary I nstead i t is given by the

, .
,
’
anthropologist s or sociologist s o bj ective de termination of the
’

norms embodied in the inner order of associations or pattern of

the culture in qu es tion H
ence social ethics is a cognitive cience
.
, s .

“ ”
The sentences descri b ing the normative is of the living la
, w ,

w hich sociological j u ris p rudence uses to j u dge the goo dn e ss or

badness of the posi tive l aw being empirically testable are not , ,

hortatory .
444 A M E R IC A N P H I L O S O P H E R S W O R K AT

however only for soc i eties conta i ning a small number of per s on s
,
.

A lso i t is not clear that the spatiotemporal differe ces in the

,
n

observable behavior of H ind s and M uslims in Bri tish India would

u

be subtle eno u gh to distinguish the living law norms of the two

g r o u ps
. et Y
these norms were so different that the people found
i t necessary to di vide into Pakistan and Free India S ome other .

method is req u ired .

C u ltural anthropology and the comparative philosophy of cul

t u res reveal this way Both disciplines have shown that the spatio
.

temporal social habi ts and ordering o f people in any cu lture and

i ts Obj ective buil di ngs art form s and positive legal procedures for
, ,

settling disputes are th e deposit of an implici t or explici t com mon

set of meanings for descri bing integrating and an ticipating the
, ,

raw data of human experience A s Professor Kluckhohn has wri tten :

.

The p u blication of P a u l R adin s P rim i tiv e M an as a P h il o s o

’

w v
.

h er did m u ch to ard destroying the myth that a cogniti e ori

p
e n ta tio n to w w
ard experience as a pec u liarity of literate S o c I e ti e s
“
.

E very people has i ts characteristic set of primitive p ost u

“
lates A s Bateson has said : The h u man individ u al is endlessly
w w
.

simplifying and generalizing his o n Vie of his e nvironmen t ;

he constantly imposes his o n constr u ctions and meanings ;w
these constr u ctions and meanings are characteristic of one c u lture
”
as Opposed to another 8 1 .

When these primi tive postulates or meanings were discovered or

learned by a people ini tially in the distant past the anthropologists ,

w
call that philosophy i mp licit ; hen the philosophy is discovered o r
bro u ght to the conscio u sness in the present they call i t explicit 9
1 .

The method of anthropological j u risprudence for determining

w
the norms of the living law i thout ap p eal to the posi tive law is
that therefore of specifying the implici t or explicit philos ophy o r
, , ,

complex of philoso p hies of the society hose positi e law is being

, w v
j u dged Professor Kl u ckhohn has sho n ho this is done in a
. w w
homogeneo u s culture w
here th e p hilosophy is implici t 2 0 The .

writer has indicated how i t is to be done in a heterog eneous cul

tu re s u ch as contemporary Western Continental E u rope whose
, ,

w
living la is a complex de posit of several diverse and even con
flic tin g explicitly recorded p hilosophie s ?! 1 The latter study shows
,

that in s u ch cases the method m u st be both qualitative and q u an

ti tativ e Qualitatively it mus t specify the philosophy incl u ding
.
,

religious economic an d cultural assumptions of each maj or a

, , , s
 E H ICA L
T RE LAT V S M I I IN LE AL SG CI E N C E 445

sociation of individuals Quantitatively i t must determine the .

w
number of adherents hich each q u alitative philosophy enjoys 2 2 .

When one approaches the living la of the entire orld in this

‘

w w
manner one fact becomes clear : It is heterogeneous and pluralistic
,

in its no rmative content The living law norms of one people are .

not those Of another This fact has important implications

. .

First i t reveals why traditional positive international law

,

is so weak The reason is not as the legal positivists ass erted

.
, ,

f
because there is no d e ac to s u pranational po er The reason in w .

s tead is that being modeled o n the homogeneo u s living law of late

,

medieval E u rope its norms failed to correspond sufficiently to the

,

chan gi ng and pluralistic li ing la of the orld to dra unto v w w , w

itself the e thical Vitality and po er necessary to be effective w .

Conversely this means that a more effective positi e international

, v
w v
la is possible pro iding e so formulate i ts normative content w
w
that i t dra s upon the ethical he terogeneity and pluralism of the
entire world s living law 2 3 ’
.

The latter fact also points u p the sense in hich each philosophy w
and i ts partic u lar e thics is culture bo u nd Why are there so few -
.
,

if any nondualistic Vedanta philosophers in our Am erican Philo

,

sophical A ssociation and so many in i ts Indian co u nterpar t ? Is

i t not because the Indians have been born in indu c u ltu re and e H w
in A nglo American cultu re ? To many exicans viewing us from
-
M ,

w
their culture i th its S panish phi losophy Of indi idualistic u n v
compromising passion and i ts R oman Catholic religious and Con
tin e n tal R ationalistic sec u lar tradition mos t A nglo American cul ,
-

ture seems simple m nded mediocre ethically and devoid of

-
i , ,

, s
serio u sness spiri tual ub tlety an d dep th— all the consequence of ,

the unfortunate accident of having been born in a culture hose w

living la ww
as formed by the rather poverty stricken set of me an -

ings provided by n o rm al is tic Bri tish empirical philosophy I f e . w

w
ans er that such M
exican j udgments are the accident of the
culture of their birth w
e may ans er truthfully but in doing so
, w ,

are we not like the pot that calls the kettle black ?
w
Is there any ay out of thi s predicame n t ? This question brings
u s to th e third development in contemporary legal science .

N atural L aw E th ics an d J uris p ru d e n ce

What forces us to take this development ser ously is not merely i
that legal scientists of R oman Catho l ic religious fai th an d L atin
44 6 AMER ICAN PH IL O S O P H E R S AT WORK
E uro p ean legal training such as Professor A P d E n trev e s of
, . .
’

O xford are ably defending i t 2 4 bu t also that those of Protes tant

,

w
or Je ish religious background tra ned in law schools teach ng , i i
only legal positivism or sociological j urisprudence are turni ng to ,

ward o r to i t— men such as Professor L o n L Fuller and D ean .

E meri t u s R oscoe Po u nd of the H

arvard L aw S choo l 4 5 Professor ,
‘
’

Fri edrich Kessler2 6 and D ean E meritu s R obert utchins of the H

Y ale L aw S chool D r , . M
ortimer A dler2 7 of th e Columbi a and
U niversity of Chicago L aw S chools and S ir Arthur L G o odhart , .
,

R egius Professor o f Jurisprudence E meri tus at the niversi ty of U

O xford , w
ho initially was a staunch Au s t i an legal posi tivist
i n 2 8 .

The maj or reason is clear . O

ne must j u dge the living as well
as the positive law The living law o f itler s Germany forced
. H ’

us to do this ; that of Comm u nist R ussia is now requiring i t agai n .

, v
In fact e erywhere especially in A sia an d A frica people are re
, ,

forming their domestic living as ell as their traditional posi w

v
ti e la w A ny theory of ethics and law which cannot provide a
.

meas u re or st andard for j u dging and reforming the living law is ,

therefore inadequate Is there such a s tandard ? Clearly socio

, .

logical j u risprudenc e alone cannot give the answer since one ,

“ ”
cannot find the standard for measur ng the is of the living law
“ ”
i
in the is of the living l aw itself
Y
.

et j udge the living law

, w
e m u st The urgent ques tion .
,

therefore arises : Is there any standard obj ectively determinable

, , ,

and hence an is other than the po si tive and the living law
, ,

w
against hich the goo dness and badness of the living law can be
“ ”
measured after the manner in which the is of the living law
,

meas u res the goodness o r badness of the po sitive law ? N atura l

law e thics an d j urisprudence is the thes is that there is such a
standard .

w i
The cle to i t s already impl ci t n the aforementioned method i i
of soc iological j urisprudence This me thod consi ts in making. s
explicit the meanings or concep ts he l d in common by the people
of a given socie ty for conceiving remem b erm g ntegr ating and , , I ,

w
anticipating the ra data of their experience and ordering their
social associations an d behavior In short the living law of a .
,

g iven society is the deposit in cultural artifacts and i n social hu

w
man habits of a specific ay of conceptualizing the raw u nco n
’
c e tu al iz e d data of anybody s exper i ence This conclusion has
p .

w
t o components A ttention to th e firs t generates sociological
.

u n s ru d e n c e and th e relativity of each philo s ophy an d i ts par

j p
448 A M E R IC A N PH IL O S O P H E R S AT WORK
this theory as the standard for guiding their behavior in the crea
tion of second order artifacts is called art or practical wisdom .

Where the initial theories of first order facts d iffer there are
i
,

different artifacts and hence different living laws and cultures .

The discipline by whi ch men discover and verify the theory of

second order facts is social science It presupposes both art o r . ,

practical wisdom and natural science when i t does not commi t the
, ,

error of confusing second order with firs t order facts T h e opini o n .

that all philosophical and ethical j udgm ent are culturally rela s
tive is the result of the latter error .

S tated more precisely therefore natural law j u ri sp rude nce is

, ,
“ ”
the thesis that scientifically verified theory of the is of first order
facts provides the cogni tive s tandard for measuring the goodness
”

or badness of second order artifacts Th u s j u st as sociological j uri

“ ”
. s
rudence uses the scientifically verified theory of the is o f the
p
living law to j u dge bo th legislation and the cases of positive law ,

“ ”
w
so nat u ral la j u rispru dence uses the empirically verified theory of
t he is of first order facts to j u dge the goodness o r badness of the
v
li ing la w .

N atural la w
j u rispru denc e recognizes with sociological j uri , s
prudence that contemporary man observes the second order facts
,

w
of culture as ell as the first order facts of nature It affirms how . ,

ever that i t is possible and necessary if a cognitive s tandard for

, ,

j u dging and reforming the living la is to be found to push the w '

artifacts of c u ltu re aside and to use only first order facts o f nature
and natural man in formul ating and verifying a se t o f basic
w
assumptions hich since they d o not de ri ve from the i s of the
, ,
“ ”

v
li ing law can be used to j u dge and reform the living law
, .

S u ch a procedure is possible for t o reasons First there was a w .

,

time before h u ma n beings and hence before any cultu re Th is , , .

would be impossible were there only cultural facts or were all fact s
cu ltu rally conditioned S econd all science invol es specialization
.
, v .

S p eciali z ation means neglecting certain facts to concentrate o n

others N atural philosophy and its ethic is therefore bo th pos
. , ,

sible and scientific .

A dditional distinctions are necessary if certain misconceptions

are to be avo ided N atu ral law ethics is freq u ently described as
.

the thesis that condu ct and i ts fr u its are good whe n they express
“
man s essential natu re P u t thi s way a di ffi culty ari ses S ince
’
.
, .

man s essential nature is what i t is how c an man or anyth ing

’
,

else avoid expressing its essential nature ? Clearly unless one di s ,

 ET H ICAL RE LAT V S I I M IN G
LE AL S CI E N C E 449

ti ngu ish e s w s
t o different enses Of the essential nature o f any
w
thi ng there is no ans er to th i q u estion No t having made such
, s .

a d is tin c ti o nr m any critics have concluded that natural la e thics w

entails a re d u ctio ad a b s urd u m : Were i t true men would be go od ,

automatically and there ould be no possibility and hence no w ,

problem of good or evil We ould be like th e initial A dam and

, . w
E v e in the Garden of E den entirely innocent of either go o d or ,

evil in o u r natural be havior .

i
To meet this m sconception many defenders of natu ral law ,

s
have fallen into the econd mi sconception of supposing that this
theory entails a teleological physics and metaphysics of becoming
w
in hich potential enti ties are being mo d ified by their ideal final
causes Were this so natural law philosophers s u ch as
.
, obbes , H
and L ocke who do no t a ffirm such a physics and metaphysics could
,

not have an e thics This is clearly fal se

. .

Both o f these mi sconceptions evaporate hen t o addi tional w w

distinctions are made : ( 1 ) between the essential nature of firs t
order facts q u a fact and their essential nat u re q u a theory and ,

( )
2 be tween ( )
a those nat u ral entities whose behavior is com

p l e te l y the expression of their essential nat u re

q u a fact and ( b
) ,

those natural entities w

h os e j udgm ents and behavior are in part a t
least the expression of what they think all first order facts are
q u a theory S tones .are examples of natural entities hose b e w
havior is completely the expression of their essential nature q u a
fact This is the case beca use they do not have the capaci ty to
.

frame theories o f what they and other first order facts are q u a
theory H
uman beings are natural entities hich have an e s
. w
s e n ti al nature both u a fact and q u a theory This is the case b e
q .

ca u se they have the capacity to frame theories of their essential

nature qua theory This they do by appeal to first order facts
.

alone .

The thesis of natural law e thics and j urispru dence therefore , ,

is not that any first order natural entity is good if i t expresses i ts

essential nature q ua fact It is instead the thesis ( 1 ) that there
.
, ,

are certain natu ral enti ties nam ely human beings whose j udg , ,

ments and behavior are in part at least the expression of what they
t h i nk all first order facts ar e q u a theory ! 1 and ( )
2 that s u ch
j u dgments and behavior are good hen the theory in q u estion is w
s
true a tested empirically by reference olely to first order facts q u a s
fact .

s
Concre tely what thi mean i that any per o n confron ted with s s s ,
45 0 A MERI C AN PH IL O S O P H E R S AT WORK
the countless first order facts from within and from without him
self selects probably with hypothetical trial and error cert ai n
, , ,

facts as elementary and the key to th e defining remembe ring , ,

ordering and anticipating Of all the others Then the explici t or

, .

implicit set of symbols or ideas designating the totali ty of hum an ,

s
knowledge a thus understood constitutes that person s o r people s ,
’

,
’

system of meanings To look at all the first order facts which are
.

s
taken thus a elementary and fundamental is to evaluate in the ,

manner of natural law ethic Consequently i ts evaluations are s .

good or bad to the extent that its implici t or explicit et of mean s

ings is tru e or false .

It is to be emphasized that the symbols can ob t ai n their meaning

by pointing to ex 1 3 ten ti al intui t ve factors uch as a particular
, i s
s
pain or passion a well as b y axiomatically expressing formal ra ,

tio n al is tic relations The contention that natural law theory s

. i
excessively rationalistic is therefore erroneous , , .

, , w
The question also hether first order facts q u a human theory
entail a particular physics and metaphysics or any metaphysics ,

at all is an empirical question for natural sc ence to decide In

, i .

the days of Aristotl e i t seemed to do so There i nothing how . s ,

ever in the meth o d of natu ral law e thics to require such a conclu
,

sion . M
oreover there is considerabl e evidence in contemporary
,

i
mathemat cal physics to th e contrary A l l that natural l aw ethics .

requires or assumes in its me thod is that there is an empirically

verified theory of first order facts with ome specifi c content s .

The importance of the distinction be tween th e essential na

ture of first order facts q u a fact and their es se ntial nature q ua
theory is that where as first order facts q ua fact merely are and
,

can be nei th er tr u e or fals e nor goo d or b ad th e o ries of first order ,

facts are true or false and hence may be in error Consequently .

v
beha ior which is in part at least th e conseq u ence of primi tive
ass u mptions concerning first order facts q u a theory may be in
error also This is why A dam and Ev e had to eat of the tree of
.

w
human kno ledge and gu ide th eir behavior in creating second ,

order artifacts by this kno ledge before there was any meaning
, w
, w
for them to b e or kno good or evil This meaning is that the , .

second order artifacts of human behavior are good or b ad if the

h u man theory guiding this behavior is true o r fals e as tested
empirically by appeal to the first order fact s of anyone s ex p eri ’

ence O f three natural law theories wi th di fferent theoretical

.

”
content that one is the best which accounts for ( 1 ) all the first
45 2 IL O S O P H E R S
AMER WORK IC A N PH AT

( )
a account s for any fir s t order fact s accounted for by any trad i
i l theo y and ( b ) i s the only theory accounting for the first
t o na r ,

order facts of all theorie s i l difig those of contemporary mathe , nc u

m i l physics This to be sure i s a di ffi cult though not an im
at c a .
, , ,

possible undertaking Bu t one should not expect an easy solu

, .

tion of the problem of the ultural relativi ty of e thical v l ue s c a .

S uch an approach thro u gh th e comparative philosophy of cu l

ture and th e phil osophy of contemporary natural sci ence is e s
s e n ti al for two additional reas on s We are children o f culture as .

well as nature S econd order facts and their meanings not merely
.

impress us daily bu t are also built into our habits and personal ty
, i
s
s tructure A s ociol ogical j urisprudence shows to act as if tradi
.

tion does not exist is to fail A lso the maj or nfluence transform . I
’
s
ing today living law the world over i cientific technology , , s s .

This transformation is a much a liv ng law fact as is the tradit onal s i i

w
living la i tself Technology de r ve from th e p rimi tive concepts
. i s
and the mentality of mathemat cal physics ence only by com i . H
bining the explici tly tated philo ophical assumptions of both ap s s
p g s
ro ach e s can ociolo ical j uri sp ru dence make i ts own contemporary

subj ect matter intelligi ble or find the tandard for measuring what s
to preserve and what to modify in that subj ect matter .

“
It remains to specify the distinction be tween goo d and ough t
“ ”
in natural law e thics Good is the nam e for th e empirically .

verifiable theory o f first order fact when thi the ory is taken a s s s
s
th e theoretical tandpoint for guiding human behav or and ev al u i
“
ating its artifacts The good therefore not a p ri m tive concept
.
, , is i ,

b u t is a predicate applicable only to second order artifacts that is

, ,

s
defined in term of cientifically true theory of first order facts s .

“
O i
ught s the fo r m e n es s o f such theory The making o f a true
- -
.

theory mine occ u rs hen by appeal to first order facts hich are w , w
m in e I find the theory to be empirically veri fied b y or fo r m e In
, .

short goodness calls merely for emp r c al ly ver fied theory of fir t

, ii i s
order facts whereas o u ghtness require in additi on th e for me ness
, s - -
,

w s
by ay of di covery or rediscovery and verification of that tru th , , .

N atural law ethics because o f t distinction between firs t and , is

second order facts and its thesis that second order facts are the
,

deposit by way o f art of implici t or explic t theories Of first order

, , i
facts entails sociological j u risprudence and t living law The
, is .

living law however with i ts second order facts can bri ng its nner
, , i
norms to bear in deci di ng concrete dispu te e pec ally in a tech s s i
,
 E HI CAL R EL A I I S M I N L E G A L S CI E N C E
T 45 3 T V

l gi l la w of contract s oc i e ty
no o ca only if i ts inner order i s given ,
34

Operational defi i tion in terms of a positive cons ti t tion a Bill of

n u ,

R ights legislative stat tes and posi tive legal procedures H ence
, u , .
,

j u st as understanding of legal positivism leads to sociological j uris

pru dence which in turn leads to natural law j urisprudence so the
, ,

latter needs first the living law of sociolo gi cal j urisprudence and
then the positive law of legal posi tivism to make i tself e ffective .

R ep rinted with p e m ission of the editors of T h

r e j o u rnal o f P h il o s

o
p hy ,
19 5 5 .

1 . J ero m e
Frank ,
”
P
A C o n flic t w i th O b l iv i o n : S o m e O b s e rv atio n s o n th e
Fo u n d ers o f L e g al ragm atism , R u tg e rs L a w R e v ie w , V o l 9 , p p 4 2 5 —6 3
Y
. . .

2 L e arn e d H an d, T he S p irit of Lib e rty , 2 n d c d , ( Ne w

. o rk , Al fre d A . .

Kno p f, p p 4 1, 5 8 . .

3 H and , o p c it , p p 5 1 , 5 4 , 2 09 —1 9

R e v ie w
.

.
.

.
.

.
.

4 H an d , o p c it , p 7 3 S ee al s o : T h ay er, am e s B , V o l 7 , H a rv ard L a w
. .
.

J . .

p 12 9 . .

“
5 .B e au h arn ais v s I l lino is , U n ite d S ta te s S u p re m e C o u rt R e p o rts , V o l 3 4 3
. .

—
p p 2 5 0 3 06 , e s p p p 2 6 7 6 8
— “
Adl e r v s B o ard o f Ed u c atio n o f th e
Y
. . . . .

” —5 1 2 e s —9 7
C ity o f Ne w o rk , i b id , Vo l 3 4 2 pp 4 8 5.
, p pp 4 8.5 ,
4 9 6 ,
. . .

5 08—1 1 .

6 E u g en Eh rl ic h , F u n dam e n ta l
.

L M o l l , trans l ato r, ( C am b ri dg e , H ar ard

rin c ip l es o f th e S o c io l o gy o f L a w , Pv Uv
al t e r

P W
.

“
P n i ers ity
”
res s ,

7 R o s c o e o u n d , L aw and th e S cie n c e o f L aw , V o l 4 3 , Ya l e L a w j o u rnal,

5 2
.

5 — 3 6 ; A n I n tro d u c tio n to the hil o s o p hy of L a w ( al e niv ers ity PP .

Y UJ P
pp . res s ,

pp
— .
“
1 1 4 3 ; T h e S c o p e an d u rp o s e o f S o c io l o g ic al u ris p ru d e n c e ,
”

U
H arv ard L aw R e v ie w , V o l 2 4 , p p 5 9 1 —6 1 9 ; V o l 2 5 , p p 1 4 0 6 8 , 4 8 9 5 1 6 - -
. . . . .

8 . n d e rh ill Mo o re , an d o th e rs , Ya l e L a w j o u rn al , V o l 3 8 , p p 7 03 —1 9 ; . .

V o l 4 0, p p 3 8 1 —
. 4 00, 5 5 5 —7 5 , 7 5 2 —7 8 , 9 2 8 5 3 , 1 05 5 —7 3 , 1 2 1 9 —5 0; V o l 4 2 , p p
.
-
. .

8 1 7 —6 2 , 1 1 9 8 — 1 2 3 5 ; Vo l 5 4 , p p 2 6 0—9 2 ; Mo o re and Ch arl es C C al l ah an,

. . .

L aw an d L earning T h e o ry , i b id , V o l 5 3 , p p 1 —1 3 6 . . . .

9 T h e e c o no m is t Wal to n H am il to n an d th e s o c io l o g is t H aro l d D L assw e ll

. . .

1 0 Eh rl ic h , o p c it , p 3 7
. . . . .

1 1 I b id , p 4 9 3
. .

1 2 C l y d e Kl u c k h o h n,
.
. .

n iv ers al C ate g o rie s o f C u l tu re ,

T o day , p re p are d u nd er A L Kro e b e r ( ni e rs ity o f Chic ag o res s ,
U
in A n thro p o l o gy
Uv P Uv
. .
pp .

P
5 07 2 3 ; al s o Kro eb er, A L , C o nfig u ra tio ns o f C u l tu re G ro w th ( ni e rs ity o f
-
. .

C alifo rn ia re s s , Be rk e l e y an d L o s An g e l e s , 1 9 4 4 )
13 F S C No rthru p ,
. . .
“
.

a c tio ns o i T he Ne w Yo rk A c a d e my o f S c ie nc e s , S e r I I , V o l 1 4 , p p
P
h il o s o p hi c al An th ro p o l o gy an d Wo rl d L aw , T ra ns
1 09 —1 2
v
. . . .

Uv P
“ ”
1 4 A L Kro eb e r, C o n c l u din g R e i ew , in T ax , S o l , e tc , e d ito rs , A n Ap
. . . .

p rais al o f A nthrop o l o gy T o d ay ( ni e rs ity o f C h ic ag o res s , p 3 73 . .

E h rlic h , o p c it , p p 3 9 —1 3 6
15 .

1 6 C h iang Mo nlin , T ide s fro m the Wes t ( al e

.
. .

1 3 7 4 0 Cf No rth ro p , T h e T a m ing of the Na tio ns ( h e re afte r T /

-
. .
ni ers ity
.

ress ,

N ) ( New o rk ,
.

pp Y Uv P Y
.

Macm il l an , pp 1 08 —
48 . .
45 4 AMER ICAN PH IL O S O P H E R S AT WORK
17 . U
n d erhill Mo o re an d C h arl e s C C all ah an, o p c it , p p
“
6 1 ff
”
hil o so p hy Of th e Na ah o I n dians , in F S C P .

v
. . . .

1 8 C l y d e K l u c k h o h n, T h e
. . . .

W W
( Y
a l e n
”
i v ers U
No rthro p , c d , I d e o l o g ic al D ifie re nc e s and
i ty re ss , p
.

3 5 6 C f i tiriP
o rld O rd e r ( h ereafter I D G

m A S o ro kin s
’ “
l o g i co m
d O)
e aning . .

P P . .

Y
-

c au s al ity in h is S o c ie ty , C u l tu re , a n d e rs o nal ity ( New o rk , H arp e r Bros , .

19 . .

c e p ts a n d D efin itio ns ,
.

ap ers o f th e P
A L Kro e b e r an d C l y d e Kl u c k h o h n, C u l tu re , a C ritic al R e v ie w o f C o n
e ab o d y Mu s e u m o f Am e ric an Arc h ae o l o gy

v U v
P V
an d E th n o l o gy , H ar ard ni ers ity , Vo l XL II p 18 1 . . .

2 0 C l y d e K l u c k ho h n , o p c it s up ra n o te 1 8 , p p 3 5 6—84
.

2 1 F S C No rth ro p , E u rop e an U nio n a n d Unite d S ta te s F o re ig n o l icy , a

. . . .

S tu dy in S o gio l o g ic al J u risp ru de n ce ( h ere after E U S F ) ( Ne w

.

o rk ,
. . .

U P P Y
M ac mil l an, p p 75 1 3 7
P
-
. .

v U v P
2 2 I b id , p p 1 2 6 , 1 3 3 ; se e al so E Ad am s o n H o e b e l, T he L aw of rim itiv e
. . . .

M an, ( C am b rid g e, H ar ard ni ers ity ress, C h ap I , es p e ciall y p 1 4 . . .

2 3 Fo r s u gg e s tio n s o f h ow th is is to b e d o ne , s e e F S C No rthro p , Yal e

. . . .

P
L a w j o u rna l, V o l 6 1 , p p 6 2 3 5 4 , an d T/ N, p p 2 5 9 3 09
Uv
- -
. . . .

D E ntrev e s , Natu ral L aw ( L o n d o n, H u tc h ins o n s n i ers i ty L i

’
24 A
’
. . .

b rary ,
.

R o s co e o u nd ,
“
P
2 5 L o n L Fu l l e r, T he L aw in Q u es t of I ts e l ( Chic ag o , Fo u n d atio n res s ,
.

T o w ard a New Ju s G e ntium , in No rthro p , I D GJ WO,

” ’
f P
pp 1 4 7
J
-
. .

2 6 Fri e dric h K ess l er, Natu ral L aw , u s tic e an d D e m o cracy , T u l ane L a w

.

R e v ie w , V o l X I X, p p 3 2 6 1 ; al so U n iv e rs ity of C hic ag o L aw R e v ie w , Vo l 9 ,
. .
-
.

pp 98 1 12
J
-

Y
. .

2 7 Mo rtim er
. A d l er, What M an H as M ad e of M an ( New
. o rk , L o n g

m an s , G ree n an d C o , .

2 8 S ir Arth u r L G o o dh art, E ng l is h L aw and the M o ral L a w ( L o n do n ,

v
S te e n s
.

the T h e o ry of Na tural L a w ( ni ers ity o f C hi c ag o

.

S o ns, L td , 1 9 5 3 No te al s o : o hn Wil d, l ato s M o d e rn E ne mie s an d

.
’

re ss ,
.

Uv J PP
2 9 K arl Mannh eim , I de o l o gy an d Utop ia ( L o n do n, R o u tl e d g e
P .

au l , L td , and M an a n d S o c ie ty ( L o n d o n, R o u tl e d g e
.

J q J
Ke g an
Keg an au l ,
M a u e t, Th e S oc io l o gy of K no w l e dg e ( Bo s to n, B e ac o n q P
P
L td ,
ress ,
. ac u es .

V fi
3 0 F S C No rthro p , T h e T h eo ry of T yp e s an d th e
. . . . e ri c atio n o f E th ic al

T h eo ries , in C h arl es A Moo re , c d , E s s ay s in E as t- es t hil os o p hy , ( H o n o

lulu , Uv
n i ers ity Oi H aw aii res s , 1 9 5 1 )
.

P fi . W P
p p 3 7 1 82
-
. .

3 1 For c o n te m p o rary s cien ti c th eo ri es o f h o w this c an b e, s e e : Northro p

.

I D GJ ’
WO, p p 4 07 2 8 .
-
.

P U
3 2 Cf E dw ard F B arre tt, c d , U niv e rs ity of No tre D ame Natu ral L aw
V
. . . .

I ns titu te ro c e e d ing s 1 9 5 1 , niv ers ity o f No tre D am e, Vo l ( 195 3 ) an d .

J
No rth ro p s re vi ew in No rthw e s te rn Uni v e rs ity L a w R e v ie w , Vo l 4 8
’

pp . .

3 9 6— 4 00; al so o s e p h Ne e dh am , H u m an L a w an d the L aw s of Na tu re in C hina

a n d th e W
e s t ( O x fo rd ni e rs ity
fi res s , Uv
Fo r a d es c rip ti o n an d an al y s is P
o f th e s c ie n ti c m e th o d b
y w hi c h th e no rm s o f c u l tu re are re l ate d to th e
p hi l o s o p hy o f n atu re , s ee No rth ro p , T h e L o g ic of the S c ie nc e s an d the H u m an i
ties ( Ne w o rk , M ac mill an, Y pp 3 2 8 —4 7
Y
. .

3 3 F S C No rth ro p , T he M e e ting of E as t a nd
. . . . e s t ( Ne w o rk , Ma c W
m il l an, pp 3 1 2 —4 04 . .
 CH A R N E R M P . E RR Y

The R a tiona le f
o l
P o itica l D iscuss ion

D emocratic government is sometimes characterized as government

s
by discu ssion This ch ar acterization is a much a reflection of hope
.

as a statement of fact ; but as some mixture of ideal and fact i t

indicates basic asp ects of democ ratic politics The two p ar ts of the .

phrase qualify each other The ideal O f discussion requires a ki nd

.

of government an insti tu tional context

, w
ithin which discu ssion
,

may occu r and be e ff ective ; and democratic government requires a

kind of di sc u ssion the kind namely that will eventuate in ocial
, , , s
decisions ideally in Wise or reasonable decisions Though my
, , .

concern is with the characte ristics of political discussion and

w
es p ecially ith the factors which might move i t to ard reasonable w
or j u st decisions let me e m p h as rz e b y brief comment th e importance
'

of the problems I am here disregarding .

The character and fru itfulness o f political discussion depend on

th e i nstit u tions wi thin which i t occ u rs on the abilities and habits
,

, w
of mind of the p ar ticipants on kno ledge available Graham as .

serts not too pessimistically that “

H
istory reveals no society
is
, ,

w hi ch has gained a consciousness o f the mechan c and dynamics

 TH E I
RAT O N ALE O F POL I IC A L D I S C U S S I O N
T 45 7

of s s i
i t institu tion u ffic ent to prevent their Operation to ends quite
di fferent from those for which they ere devised and q u ite alien w
to any comprehensible purpose ”
Certainly we do not know much . l
w
that e badly need to know abou t the conditi o ns necessary for
successful political discu ssion ; but several important rules of
thumb have bee n stated .

One of the most important is found in obbes obbes basic H . H ’

insight briefly translated into my own ords is that whe n an

, w ,

established order— government an d la s — is inadequ ate to enforce w

agreements discussion becomes ine ff ectu al What is reasonable
, .

and prudent for one man to propose or to do depends in large part

w
on his estimate of hat other men w ll do ; and unless es timates can i
be based on operating insti tutions or custom discussion d e terior s ,

ates because Of uncertainty .

A nother fund am ental consideration is tated in th e F e d e ra l is t s

P ap e rs U s
nles existing institutions keep factions broken up into
.

many small ones disc u ssion is likely to be ended by a dominan t

,

faction or frustrated by the sharp opposi tions of interest and ideals

w w
bet een t o or th ree large groups .

It has been also plausibly suggested that po l itical di scussion has

s
most chance o f s u cces when i t occurs in an institu tional order
which se ttles most problems especially those involving conflicts of ,

interests by nonpolitical processes channeling only the residual

, ,

and general proble m s to the j urisdiction of politics This suggestion .

s
is one of th e trongest arguments for so called laissez faire economi c -

organization .

H owever these rules of thumb may be evaluated they se rve as ,

reminders that political dis c ussion does depend on an institu tional

order perhaps a complicated and fragile one as ell as on intel
, , w
lectual and moral virtues and that e kno very little of hat , w w w
w
we need to kno abou t the minimum and optimum condi tions for
poli tical discussion H
aving emphasized these problems I now
.
,

leave them .

With respect to poli tical di scussion itself th e questions I w sh to i

examine are those arising when we consider hat reasons e may w w
or sho u ld present to o ther people in poli tical argument how e ,
w
should evaluate arguments directed to us and by what process or ,

pattern these argu ments and co u nterarguments are or sho u ld be , ,

combined to move toward political decision ideally to decisions ,

that are in some sense w

ise reasonable or j us t These in general
, , .
,

s
,

are th e questions ; but there are so many mi sconception and false

45 8 AMER IC A N PH ILO S OP HERS AT WO R K
i s
or partially fals e assum pt on abou t rea on rea on ng and di cu s s s , s i , s
sion that i t is di fficult to state th e question clearly and properly s .

The manner of stating a problem provides at least par t of the

cri teria for evaluating sol u tions S ome specification if not removal
.
, ,

s
of misconception will at least throw ome light on my own pre s
conceptions and thus clarify my remarks if not my problem .

The misconcep tions to which I refer run through popular

thought bu t they may conveniently be specified in terms of
philosophical doctrines First le t me remind you that both
‘

.
,
“
philosophers and small children ask why at most inconvenient
“
times ; and that the asking of why can be and frequently is
continued indefi ni tely Children fortunately outgrow this bu t
.
, ,

philosophers usually do not .

Man y philosophers especially since th e seventeenth centu ry have

, ,

attempted to fi n d for their theore tical constructions a base or

w
s tarting point hich wo u ld in some ense be certain o r beyo n d s
question that is an absolute begin ning n regard to which i t
, ,
“
i
would be impossible or improper to ask why S uch a firm be gin .

ning might be simple ideas or impressions or sense d ata or proto

, , ,

col sentences or a completely formalized l o gical structure S uch

, .

an attempt does in some way involve a mi sconcep tion ; and i t is

, ,

misleading as well as frustrating T o b e sure w e should examine .

x
,

i
cri t cally both o u r beliefs and our methods ; but i t is j u t a fact s
w s w
that e must tart from here we are in th e middle of things ; and ,

s s
a we search for teady footing and test hat seems available we are w
already using and dependent on complicated in tellectual equip
ment We cannot answer reasonably many of a child s
.
“
hys b e ’
w ”

cause his knowledge and reasoning are not su fficiently developed If .

a philosopher attempts to become a child again di vesting himself ,

of his acq u ired ideological equipment his q u estions become unan ,

s w e rab l e .

The problem of reasons in political discussi o n should not then , ,

b e thought of as a search for an absolute beginning for a reason ,

such that no further question could be asked abou t i t The problem .

is rather how beginning in th e middle herever we happe n to be

, , w ,

w e can find relatively dependa b le stopping points

w
T o related misconcepti ons may be suggested by the general re
mark that philosophy in recent times has had a strong topian U
orientation F S C N orthrop ass u res us that professors of E nglish
. . . .

have displaced philosophers as the uno fficial chaplains of the

4 60 A M E R IC A N I
PH LO SOP HERS AT WORK
to know how far we are departing from what is actua l o r po ss ble i .

M oreover many processes vanish o r lose their distinctive char

,

ac te ri s ti c s as an ideal limi t is reached or approached Consider .

discussion for instance p u rged of all i ts impurities and freed of

, ,

i ts obstacles R emove prej udices conflicting interests coercion

.
, , ,

ignorance and ass u me a gr oup of men who are open mi nded

,
-
,

skilled in expression and understanding impartial an d possessed , ,

s
of all possible wi dom and knowledge In s u ch a case o n e par .
,

ti c ip an t might briefly sketch a problem or perhaps giv e a bare hi nt

of i t ; and then everyone wo u ld see all the pros and con and the s
resolution of them ; and the sense of the me e ting would be reached ;
or perhaps if there really are altern ative logi cs the w se men
, , i
might talk indefinitely each eq u ally cogent in hi s own way but
, ,

never really to u ching each other In either ca e d scussion would . s , i

have become useless or impossible o r both .

Political discussion certainly is an impure mi xture It involve

, , . s
i gnoran ce prej udice conflicting interests and varying amounts o f
, , ,

coercion It can hardly be thought of as mu h like philosoph cal

. c i
disc u ssion which is in some sense directed to tru th or an ap p ro x i
,

mation thereto ; but there is some similari ty too , .

Finally and perhaps most important there is n bo th popular

, , , i
tho u ght and philosophy an extreme assumption about the separa
,

tion of facts and values This assumptio n i reflected n the di s. s i

j u nction between ethics and social cience S uch separation and s .

disj u nction are perhaps examples of misuse of an ideal limi t “

Within reason the separation between philosophy and soc al i

science has some utili ty and sen e ; but taken too er ously i t s s i
creates insuperabl e problems for both philoso p her and so al s ci
scientists If social philosophers or ndeed philosophers of any
.
, i
brand do not have some subj ect matter some data some facts
, , , ,

, i
then their reasoning if t can be called that must be a priori in a ,

b ad sense An d if there is one proposi tion that is true a prior I

. i
i
s u ggest that t is this that when o n e has nothing to t alk abou t
,

there is nothing to say .

The abs traction which the ocial scientist attempts i different s s

but equally unfortunate The attemp t to des ribe action in ab s trac
. c
tion from the ends and values hich gi ve i t direction and organiza w
w
tion ould cut off and i gnore Whatever lies beneath the su rface of
v
o p aq u e e ents S ocial sci entists do not usu ally go very far in this
.

direction What they do when they push beyond modest limit

. s
their intention of ach iev rng a value free de cr ption o f ocie ty i -
s i s ,
s
 TH E R A IO NALE O F
LI IC A L D I S C U S S I O N
T 46 PO T 1

to u s e wi hou t acknowledgment or c i t i cal exami nat i on va ious

t r r

dist i nctions and princi ple s .

S i nce values do occur i n acti on as effect i ve patterns prin or

c ip l esof organi zati on and since action wi ho t organization or t u

di ection cannot be des c i bed a s fact ques tions abou t cogent rea
r r ,

sons i poli tical di scussions should not be construed a s postulating

n
a region of pure nonfactual value s , the o her hand as , o r, on t ,

directing our attention to fact s which value free bu t h ar e -

n ev ert e

less adequate g ounds for political de isions N doub t both of

r c . O

these extremes are in s ome go d sense truly there bu t they are

, o , ;
i deal limi ts lying far to ei ther si de of what we
, g asp and can r

exami ne in poli tica l di scu s sion .

The reasons then hat I seek are not ini tial certai ntie s nor a
, , t ,

residuum to be hoped for af ter the acids of skepticism have dis

s olved everyth ing brough t into contact wi h them nor yet h high t , t e ,

thin reasons which we di ml y s ee as we thi nk such processes as

dis ussion th rough to ideal limits They are rather h reasons
c .
, , t e

which have firmne s s compo nded perhaps of cogency and effective

, u

ness to support arguments directed to others and to move us to

,

ward a greement when presented in arguments of other people .

S uch reasons are to be sought by plun ging so to speak into the , ,

i
middle of d scussion and then looki ng and feeling around us for
,

some thing that will give us direction and help us mo e for ard v w .

That political discussion begins in the middle of things involves

that i t takes for granted as given a great deal that does not enter
explicitly into the disc u ssion What is given and taken for granted .

is not explicitly stated ; and hat is not explici tly stated is not w
acc urately known and is to some extent ndeterminate i .

To philosophers i t may seem intolerable that hat is gi ven

”
w
should not be laid on the line as explici tly stated ass u mptions .

That this demand cannot be fully met is one of the maj or theses
I am presenting What e can explicitly kno or even explicitly
. w w
assume is like the small part of an iceberg sho ing above the w
w
surface of the ater We know th e base is there be ca u se i t supports
.

what is
above the surface ; bu t e do not kno j u st hat are its w w w
shape size and composi tion A ny plausible and u nderstandable
, , .

statement o f some assumptio ns depends on a large remainder that

is merely given .

It is not only impossible to meet fu lly the demand that hat is w

taken for granted should be translated into explici t ass u mp tions ;
i
i t is mprudent at leas t in poli t cal discussion to p u sh the demand
, i ,
4 62 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
very far because a precise and explicit tatement of what is given
, s
becomes an ass u mp tion raises issues and i no longer taken for
, , s
granted .

What is given for political discussion may be somewhat arti

fici al l y divided into two main parts Figuratively e may say that .
, w
discussion is bounded on one side by the results of past actions ,

for brevi ty the status q u o and on the o ther by principles Because,

.

poli tical discussion always starts from and takes for given the , ,

exis ting order the status q u o it must al ay be to some extent

“
, , w s
conditioned by the vested interests by mi stakes that have be en ,

made and by a distribution of power resulting in part from luck

, ,

force and fra u d E ven after a revolution (which is of course not

, .
, ,

a discussion) dis c ussion o u ld have to be resumed from the posi w

tions advantageous or disadvan tageous which people then oc c upied
, ,

by reason of chance or shre dness I t must be remembe red how w .

,

ever that the status quo though gi ven is to some extent unknown
, , ,

and indeterminate .

O n the other side political discussion s b o unded by principle i s ,

w hich also are given and cannot be brought fully to explicit state
,

ment L e t me here ackno ledge a problem whe ther or not I can

. w ,

dispel i t The notion of p rinciple is difficult and p erhaps not very

. s
w
fashionable no adays Principles lie at or near an ideal limit They
. .

w
are hat o u r ru les and patterns of thinking and action ould be w
if they could be brought completely to explicit statement and ab
s trac te d from irrelevan t content To sp e ak of principles as I do is .

to assert that r ules are developed from an underlying matrix part ,

w w
of hich al ays underlies and gu ides the explici tly stated rules .

That political discussion depends on principles is easy to see but

di ffic u lt to prove L e t me a m at attaining moderate pla u sibility by
. i
a few e x am ples .

i
The participants n politica l discussion I pres ume must to some , ,

extent know what they are trying to d o They take for granted .

th e principles of relevance and evidence hich they use in dis w

criminating facts relevant to their p u rposes and in eval u ating
evidence as to what alternative actions are possible and what mean s
are available of shap ing them tow ar d their own obj ectives S ome .

of these principles may be emb o died in explici t rules b u t not

w
mu ch ; most of them ill be embedded in skill and j udgm ent .

S ome of the principles of the partici p ants may also be said in a ,

sense to be principles of or for the discussion The principles of

,
.
4 64 AMER IC A N PH IL O S O P H E R WORK S AT

disc u ssion and scientific inqu i ry does not hold If i t di d

experts . ,

w o u ld sooner or later assume the fu nctions of government and

w
discussion o u ld be replaced by public information and ac qu ies
cence . U
tilization of scientific results for political action requires
some p rior consens u s ; and because of basic conflicts of interests and
conflicts of ideals in society and between societies uch agreement , s
cannot be achieved or bypassed by scientific inquiry .

Consider now whether the movement of political discussion may

, ,

be tho u ght o f as similar to the deduction of a conclusion from

“ ”
w
premises hether a se t of practical premises or a combination of
,

”
prescriptive and descri p tive ones This also has been a per .
, ,

sistent and misleading analogy It corresponds perhaps to a vulgar .

, ,

conception of natural la w
tho u gh none of the maj or exponent,
”
s
of natural law with the possible exception of L oc ke had qu te
, , i
such a simp le doctrine In any case the deductive analogy is clearly
.
,

wrong E ven in legal reasoning here the Constitution and tatute

.
, w s
w
la seem to provide premises deduction h as only a limi ted ap p l i ,

cation ; and outside this fa orable region the deductive analogy v

breaks down completely ; and e have th e familiar and insoluble w
puzzles as to how significant value premises may be established and
the less familiar bu t even more d ifii cu l t problem as to how indi
v i d u al s and groups diversified by their different histories faced in ,

s
vario u s dire ction by their customs interests ideals and commit , , ,

ments co u ld from timeless premises deduce solutions to their

,

problems This View persists despite i ts obvious difficulties because

.

i
there are indeed princ ples which are give n Pr nc ples however . i i , ,

w
are how e reason not hat we reason from When made into
, w .

premises they are empty ; they can never be made fully explic t a i s
premises or rules ; and a residue al ays remain unstated for use w s
and interpretation of the rules Political discussion is not d ed u c .

tion tho u gh ded u ction does on occasion appear within it

, .

If we ru le out j ust one more possibility the rem ai ning te rri tory ,

is so limi ted that the ans er to our problem can be pl ai nly seen w .

The p ossibility to be ruled out is that political discussion has no

rationale no movement even in ideal to ard decisions that are
, , , w
better than they might have been witho u t it This possibili ty i . s
contrary to experience since all of u from time to time engage in
,
‘

s
political discussions large or small wi th the intention of in fl u
, ,

e n c in them to some extent in the direction of reason prudence

g , ,

good sense or fairness , .

 THE R A IO NALE O F
T POL I IC A L D I S C U S S I O N
T 4 65

What we actually do in practice and should sooner or later

recognize in theory is to c u t o u t and cons truct reasons some more , ,

some less com p elling from hat lies on either side of p 0 11 t1 cal
, , w
disc u ssion and in the middle of it .

From the existing body of insti tu tions cu s toms and prior agree , ,

ments gi ven in indeterminate fashion as the stat u s q u o e take w

i
, ,

what has been made or may be made explici t as law and tradi t on, ,
.

L aw and tradition may be appealed to as good though not al ay w s

s u fficient gro u nds for present decisions Tradition is the less .

determinate part of this complex It incl u des precedents and heroe s . ,

M
the onroe D octrine Je fferson and L incoln ; and both precedents ,

and heroes may be sq u eez ed into ar gumen ts pointing in different

directions .

From principles by making them partly explicit and adding,

material from insti t u tions and from contexts in hich the principles w
have been u sed , w
e constru ct ideals — liberty equali ty j u stice de , , ,

m o cracy Ideals are colored by the socie ty in which they

. ere w
develo p ed ; and they are to some extent changeable in response to
new sit u ations institu tional changes and e en the exigencies of
, , v
an argu ment They nevertheless ha e a comp onent not easily
. v ,

identifiable which persists thro u gh time and across c ultural

,

bo u ndaries .

In the middle of discu ssion because i t has partic pants ho are , i w

w
agents and ho contribute to the shap ng o f action are interests i , .

Interests are channeling of malleable and shifting impulses by

c u stom precept example and previo u s action They reflect plans
, , , .

that have been made and are a p roj ection of action into an u n cer
tain fu t u re in terms of obj ectives and means believed useful to
attaining the objecti es v .

L aw and tradi tion interests and ideals pro ide the reasons which
, , v
fu nction in political disc u ssion Tho u gh discriminated for speci .

fic ati o n these factors are interde enden t and interactin Interests

,
p g
w
.

are sha p ed by tradition and by ideals ; la s and traditions are

molded by and embody interests and ideals ; and ideals are given
part of their content by tradition and interests A n d th e process .

of interaction continues as all of them are reshaped by poli tical

discu ssion and recei e ne deposi ts of i t v w .

Again I notice an obj ection

, hich I may not be able to remove w
v ’

to e eryone s satisfaction Granted i t might be said that la for .

, ,
w ,

instance does constrain people should it has i t any right so to

, , , ,
4 6 6 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S O P H ER S AT WORK
speak to claim moral au thor ty ? N ot ce at least that law and
, i i , ,

existing institutions embody as much of our interest and ideals as s

we have so far been able to pu t into them Consider also that .

po litical discussion would be a silly eam continuously unraveled as s

s
fast as ewn if the results of past decisions lost their claim on us as
fas t as they are made U n d ertan d too that I am not saying that .
, ,

l aw presents a compelling or c o n c l u sw e reason ; bu t merely tha t i t

provides a good reason hich may or may not be met by re as ons w ,

s
perhaps tronger drawn from interest or ideal, s .

s
This introduce the point which is mos t important Po l itical .

discussion is not and cannot be a linear process I t mo ves back and

, , .

forth be tween law interests and ideals none of which contai ns the
, , ,

sole or the soundest or the most compelling set of premises An y .

sound or coge nt poli tical argument would contain a minimum of

all three comp o nents and in th e high points of political argument
,

s
a tatesman may b ring them into a dramatic uni ty D e pending .
,

w
ho ever on the problem and the si tuation emphasis may fall here
, ,

or there When interests are in stubborn conflict tradi tion an d

.
,

ideals may b e utilized If there is conflict of ideals participants may

.
,

look for real o r apparent way of harmoniz ng interests In general i .

,

political discussion succeeds by achieving a partial or temporary

equilibrium among th e thre e components T h e equilibrium is .

never or hardly ever stable ; its mai ntenance always depends at

, ,

least in par t on coe rcion and the inertia of custom nless however . U , ,

the equilibrium move however slowly and irregularly toward s , ,

w isdom and j ustice government by discuss ion is no t likely to be a

,

successful experiment .

If now I have given you a plausible account you may agree

i
, ,

that poli t cal discussion h as th e elements I have ndicated Bu t I i .

suspect that you will still be asking despite my ass u rance Is i t , ,

moral ? is i t right ? is i t ethics ? y answer is yes ; and the only con M

c l u s iv e test I can conceive is that political discussion coin des point ci
by po int wi th the deliberation by which the individual decides his
w
o n problems What indeed could political discuss ion as a mixt u re
.
, ,

of ideal and fact b e excep t a proj ection on a large canvas ith its , w
w
o n texture an d coarseness of the reasoning hich the individual , w
w
kno s as his own ?

Presidential Addressdeli ere d before the fifty third annual mee ting v -

of the Western D ivision of the American Philosop hical Asso c iation at

 WI L M O N H . S H EL D O N

H ow wrongheaded and time w as trng are the refutations

-

hedonism that spot and blot the pages o f the history of e thics !
There is no better example of the needless antagonisms of p hil o so
p h ers .

i i
For o f co u rse n ethics as n metaphysics there are sch o ols that
disagree ; but there is more of emotion in the moral ist s atti tude ’

w
less o f the cool s u rvey hich might appropriate fro m all the school s
whatever truth they have gleaned . M
orality is a practical a ff air ;
w
the opposition bet een moral systems has direct conseq u ence I n s
the lives of men consequences leading to fights b tw ee n individuals
,

w w
and be t een groups and wars bet een nations Whereas meta .

physic— in the West if not in the E ast— is usually conceived in a

more theoretical spirit and Witho u t immediate effect on man s life ’
.

The moralist s vision is the more l ikely to be obsc u red by ndigna

’
i
tion at what he deems the immoral co u nsels of his Opponent .

w
N o w of all the oppositions i thin the field of e thics the chiefest,

and sti ffest is the opposition to hedonism the gospel of plea ure
, s .

s
A lways there in the past to be ure this antipathy has I ncreased
,
 TH E B
A S OLUTE T RUTH OF HEDO N S M I 4 69

an d multiplied wi th the ncreasingly so a l zed mentali ty of modern i ci i

man until today there is scarcely a self confessed hedonist to be
,
-

found For pleasure the hedonist s moral good is cle arly an in

.
,
’

dividual matter O
ne directly enj oys his o w n pleasures only ; if
.

as a good neighbor he is pleased by the pleasures of hi fello s that s w ,

enj oyment is still hi alone Whence the hedonist is called self s .

seeki ng egotist—the worst of vices for our time

, es hedonism . Y ,

is in bad repute today the underdog of ethi cs Could we pos bly , . si

expect to persuade the sincere moralist in respect of the claim here s
to be made ?
s
True ome of our moralists do claim to include a degree o f
,

hedonism in their codes They are a little more ynthe tic than . s
the moralists of the past If Kant for instance declared all de .
, ,

s ire for pleas ure immoral probably few today would go o far , s .

R emember that F H
Bradley pr nce of rationalists aid he would
. .
, i , s
“ ”
accep t an intelligen t hedonism An d most of our e thical treatise . s
assign pleasure a place in the scale of moral values though a ra ther ,

low place What we have now to see is that t deserves no t only

. i
the highes t place bu t the only place —ye t trangely enough in a , s ,

s ense which admi ts o ther cr teria of moral goodness as well Indeed i .

,

s
for conscious being of hom alone we are here treating all good , w , ,

be i t moral aes thetic ontological or hatever is identical wi th

, , , w ,

its pleasan tness As A quinas says o f beauty the cogni tive good that
.
, ,

w w
i t is hat pleases hen seen q u o d v is u m p lace t so we should s ay , ,

of any and all good : i t is hat pleases when experienced That w .

’
is hedonism s thesis : the goodness of the goo d is th e plea antness s
of i t pleasantness explici t at the moment or mplic t for the
, i i
future In fact as we are to ee hedonism s a tau tology An d i t
.
, s , i .

is wa aste of time to try to refute tautologies For all that they have .
,

their uses in reminding us of what we are commi tted to An d the .

present remi nder is much needed to quie t this quarrel o f the

schools .

N aturally pleasure is n o t to be under tood as en ual p l ea ure

, s s s s
only There lies the danger of hedonism for the common u nre
.

fl e c ting man even more for the youth whose more delicate and
, ,

enduring pleasures have ye t to be developed An d no doub t the .

moralists have felt this danger and modeled the r teaching ac i

cord in l
gy But i t is one t
.hing to say that a certain doctrine hould s
not be taught to everybody and another thing to say i t s false , i .

“
I have many things to ay unto you said Jesus to the disciples s , ,

but ye can not he ar them now e t even o w e may come to . Y s ,

4 70 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
see that hedonism clearly understood can safely be taught to all
w
who really ant the truth No r on the other hand is pleasure to.

be tho u ght of as a q u I e s ce n t state wi th n o contents bu t the in

d e fin ab l e pleasure quality A ple as ure is the experience of a.

’
pleasant obj ect even if sometimes the obj ect be some thing in one s
,

own ego ; happy self consciousness is a contradiction only to the

-

s
ab tract dialectician Nay more pleasure is never a quite pass ive
.
,

state A n anticipated or hoped for plea sure belongs to an obj ect

.
-

which we wish to gai n and wish i incipient action L ike ise a

, s . w
contemplated future pain belongs to an obj ect which we wish to
avoid A n d a pres e nt pleas u re applies to an obj ect which hile
. w
experiencing i t we wish and tend to re tai n a present pain to an ,

obj ect which while we have i t we would remove E nj oying weet . s

c
m u si we would say with Fau st h moment stay tho u art so , O , ,
”
s
fair ; uffe ri ng the pain of a harsh di scord we quirm or ej aculate , s
si
a f to dodge or ej ect 1 t Pleasure co n tains desire desire satisfied
.
, ,

realized but none the less present T h e very go o dn ess of the

, .

i
pleasure lies n the fact that we want the obj ect while we have i t .

Then there is no longer the single state of the want— where want
means lack— nor merely the present act u ali ty of the goal ; we have
the marriage of the two both equally present n the realizing
, i
moment The realization is good only as e w ant it ; which mean
. w s
that we tend to retain it We have o u r cake and eat i t too True
. .
,

many pleasures come unso u ght : the gift from a friend the native ,

health of the young But these are anted hile they are e n
. w w
, w w
j oyed e d ell on them roll them u nder the tongue if only for
, ,

. s
an ins tant Plea ure is th e w an te d ne ss of the present obj ect .

w
A l ays we want our happy moments to last— until they b e gin to
pall on us as so frequently they do For i t eems to be a con . s
i ’
dit on of man s make u p that his common plea ures usually ev ap o
-
s
rate rather quickly ; fatigu e se ts in the beau ty of the lan dscape ,

diminishes for the contin u ed gaze the j oy of a task accomplished ,

fades all too soo n N one the less would e keep them if e could
. w w .

S ee then that the pl e as u re pain quality is definable in terms of

-

w
wish or desire toward or a ay from ome obj ect future or present s , ,

possible or actual ; and as wish is incipient action or tenden cy to

ac tion definable in te rms of action or tenden cy there to The
, .

— —
go od and not merely the moral good is that which e seek to w
ob tain and retain the bad that which we strive to avoid or remove
, .

80 i t is then w
i th volun tary behavior the subject matter o f e thics ;
is
-
,

reflex ac tI On o u t of the picture except a i t may be voluntarily s

4 72 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
a thousandfold more pleasure those intrin ic to intelligent h u s -
s
mani ty— than the pig can have That i the hedonist doctrine : . s
the s u mm u m b o n u m for morality is maximum intensi ty and ex
tensity o f pleasure M
aximum beca u se f something is good
.
, i ,

more of i t is better and the maximum the best Quantity e l u ci

, .

dates quali ty in respect of good True indeed o ther things may . ,

interfere To eat is goo d to eat more is no t always good to eat

.
, ,

i s
most s bad Thu i t i with man s conditioned pleasures But
. s ’
.

that doesn t deny the upreme goodnes of the maximum attain

’
s s
able ; i t sh o ws only that with us men th e max imum o f one ple as ure
often interferes with other pleasures as eating too much inter ,

feres wi th the pleasures of health A ll the same what we want .

,

s
is th e greate t p oss ib le n u mber and intensi ty of pleasure now s
and forever Th at is the direct and observable trai t of man
.
’
s
natural quest for pleasure : we all d o want a much a we can ge t s s
rov id e d n o h arm is d o n e th e re b —which provision itself con
p y
firms the hedonism as harm means inj ury p ai n An d as greater
, , .

s
intensi ty of plea ure is of i tself goo d o is greater extensity , s .

Variety is the spice of life ere number of different pleasures . M

is a good in i tself a pleasure added to the collection a ummation
, , s
w hich is a de gree of consummation There is the insight o f the .

process m e tap h yic of Whitehead Bergson D ewey ; the rolling

-
, , ,

snowball increase progress such that the fu ture contain the pa t

, , s s ,

life more an d more abundant Greatnes s maj esty magnani mi ty .

, , ,

—do we not ascribe these to D ei ty ? Quantity i of th e essence of s

the good An d if the good is ple a ure that essence mean quan ti ty
. s , s
unlimited maximum pleasure
, .

N o r need we distinguish be twe en pleasure happine j oy bliss , ss , , ,

satisfaction and th e like The blissfulness of bli s the s atisfac tori

, . s ,

ness of satisfaction and s o on is precisely the pleasan tness of

, ,

pleasure ; what we here mean by pleasure is j us t the common e l e

ment in all these the gratification they a fford We use th e term
, .

beca u se i t is so unassuming The moralist keen for the digni ty .

,

of morality must have h o no rific names ; they enlis t man s emotion

,
’

and desire for them a noble ends Which s to ay that th e re s . i s

ward o f attaining them is esteemed deeper greater than f th ey , , i
w ere m e re pleasures S o Well nigh inevi tabl e i t is that we thi nk
.
-

of pleasure in terms of our common sensual gratific atio ns S o hard .

it is to realiz e that the pith and marrow of all these ends i s ever
one and the same ; plain home l y simple childlike pleasure j oy
i s
, , , ,

happ nes —call it what you will in pos sessing them the more -
,
 THE B
A S O LUTE T RUT H O F HEDON S M I 4 73

i
noble be ng the more durable more productive of further pleasures , ,

and such The very fact that the typical moralist stresses nobility
.

reveals his basic hedo nism e a p peals to man s love of the. H ’

s
higher : what i this love but ardent longing for the b liss of
possession ?
S ome may perhaps un i ttingly confess their hedonism by
, w ,

their very words ; certainly most would n o t admit Take an .

example or two When the A dvaita Vedantist declares that Brah

.

man A tman is maxim u m bliss he i a professed hedonist even if

-
, s ,

w
he ould repudiate the name S o though witho u t profession are .
, ,

all the o ther E astern systems ; their practical animus drives thereto .

w
For the B u ddhist of hatever ect the goal is escape from the pangs s
of the wheel of existence for ind u ism the like a also the attain
, H , s
ment of the blessed peace of A tman for the N eo Confucianists of ,
-

i
Ch na the happiness of a balanced life in one s s tation If some
,
’
.

B u ddhists and even some Vedantists assert that N irvana or Brah

, v
man is abo e the distinction of bliss and misery their cond u ct in ,

w
purs u ing these goals sho s that they seek the j oy of attainment .

R elief from misery is itself a positive j oy There is no separation .

w
bet een the two motives claimed by hedonism the p ositi e motive , v
of pleas ure and the negative motive of release from pain There .

is only a distinction in the ay of gaining the pleasant experience ; w

w
the one ay is to seek i t directly and by itself the other way is ,

to seek i t as the happy release from pain What these good ri . O

e n tal s long for is certainly not nothingness : i t is impossible to

desire m e re extinction To desire nothing is not to desire What

. .

the disciple craves is to e x p erie n c e nothingness if that ere pos , w

sible ; or at least nothingness in the sense of release from the
miserable conditions that make up man s mortal existence We ’
.

j udge him by his deeds rather than his ords ; he acts as if the w
ex p erience he calls negation were a maximum satisfaction An d .

v w
surely i t is ob io u s that hat makes satisfaction satisfactory is the
w
ha p piness hich attends the fu lfillment o f longing .

R eally the position of the hedonist seems so simple that it needs

b u t to be s tated to be believed No t only is it the instinctive vie . w
of the nat u ral man ; we verify i t constantly in everyday life .

M
en d o seek things that bring pleasure avoid those that give pain , .

The hopes of mankind embodied in religion —religion t ae treas u ry

of man s u ltimate goods—verify i t when they picture the bliss of
’

heaven and the torments of hell an s invincible sense of j ustice . M ’

assi gns pain as the reward of sin happiness as the reward of virtu e , .
4 74 AMER ICAN I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
S ignificant it is that Kant arch o p p o ne n t of hedonism affirmed , ,

as a postu late of morali ty that God reward with happines those s s

who follow th e exclusive imperative o f duty for duty s sake S o ’
.

l u rks hedonism in the bo som of the enemy Indeed the intri nsic .

value of di sciplin e self control self s acri fice of every one of the
,
-
,
-
,

sterner virtues lies in their soul satisfying po er to overcome the

,
-
w
s
seduction of the le ser more ephemeral pleasures pleasures that, ,

whi le tasted cloy pleasures that will be followed by pains to

, ,

overcome i t for the sake of the dee p and durable happines s of a

balance that cannot be u p se t— a happiness which itself transmutes
the pangs of di sci p lin e into posi tive j oy S toicism is at he art s.

hedonism .

True enough th e good man who choose the hard way doesn t
, s ’

usually pu t i t thus to himself D oes the martyr submi t to be .

b u rned becaus e he anticipates pleasure therein ? No more often ,

than not nine times o u t of ten perhaps the moral conflict is rather
, ,

between repe lling pains than luring j oys n th e o n e hand the . O

pains that follow the righteous course on the other hand the tor ,

tu re for the good man a greater torture o f a consc ence that knows
, , i
its guilt : such is th e alternative Where the moral issue stands out
“
in its nakedness I canno t do otherwise
. s ai d L uther God , ,
”
i
help me ! S uch s man s moral handicap that he mu st o often ’
s
fail to sense th e proper lure of th e right and choo se i t only becau e s
s
he is terrified of his e lf torturing conscience E ven so he i hedon-
.
, s
ist throu gh and through .

’
Whatever be one s theory i t is in practice impossible for him ,

s
to avoid the e arch for pleasure and remo val of pai n And the .

re ason is of th e most elementary : whenever we want some thing ,

be i t d u ty for du ty s sake or knowledge for i ts elf al o n e o r j ust

’

, ,

a tasty mors e l we want the j oy of ge tting it ; whenever e dislike

, w
anything we hope for th e j oy of i ts absence We wish for the .

fu lfillment of our desire ; fulfillment of desire w e anticipate as a

j oy ; we wish for a j oy This is in fact a tautology nothing more
.
, .

No t of course that in seeking a nything

, , e al ays thin k of the w w
pleas u re i t will confer though sometimes e do The underlying, w .

v
moti e is u sually behind the scene the lure of pleas ure is the po e r , w
behind the throne H
edonism does not say that every man is con
.

scious of his hedonism ; only that h e acts i t The athlete s triving .

,

w
his hardest to in the race isn t thinking of the pleas u res of vic ,
’

tory ; he is thinking of the tap e the s p eed he needs the cl o sene s , , s

of his rival But what is th e motive power forgotten during the
.
,
4 76 S WORK
A M E R ICA N P H LO S OP H ERI AT

of time to try to persuade men not to s eek happines s They will .

inevi tably do i t The only caution needed i s seek the plea sure s
. :

which will permi t or gi ve rise to other pleasures not those that ,

lead in o u r sorry world to the exclusion of other pleas u res or to

, ,

pains . H
ow does the parent persuade the growing mind of th e
yo u th really persuade him and not j ust compel him by fear of
,

punishment to do what is right to play fair not to lie cheat

, , , , ,

steal an d such ? N ever by saying in the bas voice of authority

, s ,

“
I t is wicked !
”
Why asks the youngster s t w cked? An d the , , i i i
wise p ar ent shows him that i t is wicked because i t leads to trouble
—tro u ble for others trouble for himself Then only s th e you th, . i
genuinely persuaded for hi intelligence i satisfied A uthori ty , s s .

is needed only where intelligence is lacking edonism banks o n . H

intelligence In brief man goal . maximum pleasure and mini ,
’
s is
m m pain and his task is to discover
u , th e mean —
thereto maximum s ,

of co u rse as said in the sens e of th e greates t pos ible in te ns ity of

, , s
pleasantness and also the greate t possible e x te ns ity or number
, s
of di ff erent pleas u res A s i t is often pu t man wants the fullest .
,

and richest possible life No r can he help wanting i t su b co n .

,

s c io u s l
y if not conscio u sly edoni m s b u t man the w i sher co mi ng . H s i -

s
to elf consciousness -
e t though he may become quite aware of
. Y
this his wish in a general way he will not necessarily do th e deed , s
which lead to the goal Too often he ill o f hi own free choice . w s
persuade himself that some particular pleasure condu ces to the
w
goal hen such is not th e case E thic al hedonism b anks on man .
’
s
freedom .

H i
edonism s tru e so far as man s concerned absol u tely true , i ,

w
true itho u t q u alification everywhere and always never denied , ,

in any degree P leasure — experience of things events obj ects

.
, ,

which are desired— that is the only good the only valu e in an d ,

, w
for i tself kno n to man o r animal E verything else which we call .

good is good j ust so far as i t tends toward pleasure leads to

Y
,

happiness et while this is absol u tely true i t is not in p rac tic e

.
,

eno u gh for morali ty morality being practical What are the , .

means the rules of conduct which will guide us ignorant mortals

,

to this final goal and end ? For s u rely in this la abiding un w -

i
verse there are some fixed prin ciples o f conduct following hich
, , w
w e approximate abandoning w e frustrate our dearest wants ,
.

, .

There lie the contrib u tions of th e other type of ethical theory s ,

th e rigorists self reali z ers and o on L e t us now consider some

,
-
, s .

of these and see ho they verify the truth o f hedonism yet at th e

, w ,
 TH E B
A S OLUTE T RUTH OF HEDO N SI M 4 77

same time add tru ths of their o w n hi ch hedonism by itself does , w

not discover even though i t gives the imp u lse to their discovery .

Take first the one that appeals most to the modern socialized
consciousness th e creed of altr u ism : live for Others for all man
, ,

kind for animals too let no selfish pleas u res interfere Grant i ts
, , .

ri ghtness P leasure this vie

. correctly sees is an individual affair ;
, w ,

as no one man is another man his pleasure is not another s ,

’

pleasure Then the concl u sion is dra n : the cult o f pleasure is

. w
inevi tably selfish No w e might answer that hedonism doesn t
. w ’

imply e x c l us iv e self keeping It might be th e case as -

erbert .
, H
S pencer argued that the egotist can enj oy the fullest and deepest
,

happiness only by coming to delight in the happiness o f all

creatures and actively working therefor
, edonism doesn t con . H ’

trad ic t altr u ism But the altruist makes a good practical reply
. .

H w
uman nature is eak and corrupt and if th e egotist is told to ,

s eek his o w
n happiness he ill not make the tremendo u s effort re w
quired to realize that his happiness does depend on the happi
ness o f all men still less on the happiness of animals
, e ill . H w
perhaps work for the good o f the limi ted circle on whom his pros
e ri ty obviously depends ; as the politician tries to please his con
p
s ti tu e n ts in order to be kept in O ffice Bu t that is very far from .

the morality of altruism an needs more than counsels of p ru . M

dence ; he needs an imperative an u ght an authori tative u rge and , O ,

drive Wi th human nature as i t is the pleas u re motive simply ill

.
, w
s
not u ffice S o speaks the altrui t An d no doub t this is true
. s . .

M an is bu t a child in respect of ultimate good ; as a child needs the

guidance of a parent adult man needs authori ty of one sort or ,

another If not of ano ther person or gro u p of persons then at

.
,

s
lea t of the law o f the land and above all human la s of the moral , w
law wi thin But of co u rse the question is : what is this moral
.

w
la ? The al tru ist flaming wi th indi gnation against the se l fish
,

w
ness of avo ed pleasure seekers goes to the exclusi e extreme and , v
declares the happines motive intrinsically inadequate Inadequate s .

indeed i t is for much of our human nature ; but hy not because w

we weaklings tend to interpre t the pleasure motive itself in an
w
exclusive ay ? It is not the motive that is wrong ; i t is the radical
evil o f our natu re th at we w il l take i t in the excl u sive sense of
’
a search for one s own pleasure or the pleas u re of one s gro u p ’

i
,

regar dless of o thers As j u st sai d that s no imp licate of hedonis m

. ,

But we may go fu rther much fur ther edonism sees that , . H

every wish finds i ts good n th e j oy of fulfil l ment its evil in the i ,
47 8 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
frustration thereof No matter what bad consequences may later
.

follow th e j oy of fulfillment is s o far goo d and i ts goodness consist

, , s
in i ts pleasantness This holds of every wish of any man or any
.
,

. w
animal To ish m eans to look forward to its fulfillment as a j oy ,

i ts frus tration as a pain This is again as said a tautolo gy ; there .

, ,

is no escaping i t A s s u ch i t is a universal tru th For every con

.
, .

scious being it holds and must hold The good of the fulfillment .

is the j oy of the realized ish But the good i that whi ch ought to w . s
be That is the axiom of morality tself a tau tology S ee then
.
, i .
, ,

th e consequence : ev e ry w is h o ug h t to b e u l l le d A n d as wishes f fi .

w
are al ays wishes of individuals ev e r
y in d iv id u a l o u h t to h av e
g ,

f fi
his o w n w is h es u l ll e d as b e ing jus t h is o w n p riv a te p e rs o na l
w is h es s
To be ure in this vale of tears many wishes when ful
.
,

filled prevent the realization of o ther wishes ine fulfilled may . M

prevent yours being fulfilled E vil as S t Thomas teaches is .
, .
,

privation frus tration The good for man as S t Thomas also

, .
, .

teaches is the fulfillment of his natural wants T h e means of fu l

, .

fil l m e n t co ns ti tu te the moral law But th e point to b e s tre sse d i s .

this : hedonism is intrinsically inevitably universal ou as a , . Y

reflecting hedonist see that in the absence of evil consequences from
either my pleasure ought to be realized j ust as your own should
,

be wherefore you adop t i t int o the system of ends for whi ch you
,

live To be sure the obj ector here asks : how do y o u come to wish
.
,

w
for my pleasure hich j u st is no t you r pleasure ? ou ee that my Y s
pleasure is my good ye t that is far from seeing that i t is y o u r good
, ,

obj ect of y o ur wish for which you ill work But the obj ector w .

i
fa ls to see that o ugh t and w is h e d fo r are identical When you .

com e to understand that my happiness o ught to be b e ca us e it is ,

wanted b y m e you have een a universal truth : whatever i

, s s
wanted ( other thi ngs not interfering) should come to be and no ,

matter w h o brings i t abou t ou hope i t ill be brought abou t . Y w ,

i w
and to hope s to ish Thus do you come to ish for my happiness . w .

It all turns o n the absolute identi ty of goodne s or ou ghtness s

wi th w ante dn ess The minute we realiz e that some th ing is good
.

and ought to b e do e to the degree of o u r appreciation of its

, w
w
good ness ish i t to exist There is no need here of an organic .

theory of interlocking huma n interests though the theory may be ,

true N o r is there need to posit i th some of our natu ralists the

.
, w ,

sharing of experiences be t een fellow men your enj oyments and w ,

mi ne you r wishes and mine shared in common ego istic pri vacy
, ,

denied A p rivate mind may see a universal tru th a rule o f con

.
,
4 80 A M E R IC A N I
PH LOS OP H RS E AT WORK
declared that th e only unqua l ified good a good w l l firm an d is i ,

unyielding in the performance o f duty for duty ake S urely s s ’

.

th e O s
ught i above all natural wishes with t unshakable nde , is i
p e n d e n c e S till independence
. trength
, and who ays we do not is s , s
enj oy being tro ng ? D u ty “ ”
s
wrote Kant “
thou ublime and , , s
mighty name We love we want to have and to own the sub
.
, ,

lime and mighty T h e re lies the secre t o f the appeal the appea l
.
,

which indeed we all feel of the Kantian and the S toi ethic T h ere , c .

is i ts lure We sens e a deeper going j oy n the au tere beauty

.
-
i s
o f the s tern dau hter o f the voice of God than
g n th e pleasant i
g r aces of th e sirens o f th s world e t even ad m tting so i
much to . Y i
the hedonist th e rigoris t will not be per uaded
, e will return to s . H
the charge declaring that however tru e be the above there is st ll
, , i ,

there must be something in the notion of ught which defie de

, O s
s s
crip tion in term of th e pleasan t something too high and go od to ,

be reduced to the level o f the common commod ty p l easure e i . H

will ask : o ugh t we to follow duty for duty sake becau e we love ’
s s
the sublime independence o f i t ? An d he w ll reply : No l We i
should put away that emotion and follow th e cal l of du ty because ,

i t is righ t No t because of i ts au tere beauty not fo r i t aesthe tic

. s , s
refinement not even becau e of th e l onging for a consc ence at
, s i
peace wi th itself still less for the con equence to human happine s
, s s s
j u st do the ri ght because i t is right no arriere
p e ns e e no ullying ,
'

, s
of the puri ty of motive S uch th e lofty tea hing o f th e idealist . is c .

H ow then do we know what r ght ? No tes t i given u ; not is i s s

even the Kantian (really pragm at c) test o f work ng as a uni ver al i i s
r u le in man s soc ial life should be permi tted n thi perspective
’
i s .

But no te t s is
needed we are told Value are d rectly felt We
, . s i .

know the right by intu tion if o ur mi nd is fre e from e arch for i s

pleasure and s u ch A dapting the p o e t s word .
’
“

s
R ight is
an angel o f o lovely mien s
As to be worshi ped need but to be een s s .

If we are pious we shall ay God reveal s t to us ; f not pious w e s i i ,

shall j u st call i t a pure intuition But the right is n o t deducible .

from the facts of nature from th e ways o f the natural man It is , .

self gu aranteeing T h e ught cannot be defined in terms o f natu ral

-
. O
process Value moral value at least is in d e fin ab l e underivable
. , , , ,

u ltimate A n d we are warned against th e

.
“ ”
naturalist c fallacy of i
deriving the goo d from the facts the ideal from the actu al ri ght , ,

from might .
 TH E AB S O L U T E T RUT H OF HEDON S M I 4 8 1

S uppo se
then that men d sagree n the r int u i tions of what is
, , i i i
i
r ght Cer tainly to an exten t they do A Nie tz ch e as serts that
. . s
is
power the moral good a i tler that the German race and it way , H s
of life i s the moral good a S ta l in that the rule of the prole tariat ,

and the ensuing classle ss so iety is the ideal an Am eri ca n that i t i c , s

sc
democ racy In u h a situation there i bound to be a pragmatic
. s
tes t Which mode of life will survive ? A nd as survival is the dearest
.

wish o f each type th s i hedonism Bu t these are political or , i s .

s
social ideal ; perhap there i more agreement in respect of the s s
in di vidual in relat on to other individuals ost men would agree i . M
s
that i t i wrong to lie to steal to murder and so on unless pos ibly , , , , s
the se acts are required for the ake of some gr eater good to come s .

E ven here to be ure as the qualification j ust added suggests

, s , ,

ss
there i ome disagreement The pacifist believe it is n ev er right . s
to fight no matter what ; the ri gor st that i t i nev e r right to lie ;
, i s
s
by no mean would all moralis ts agree to these e t on the whole . Y
s
there i a fairly w despread agreement on general principles ; i t i
i s
s good to cure ickness to promote fellow feeling to cultivate the ,
-
,

s cs
arts an d ci en e and so on S ee then the s igni ficance o f this , .
, ,

agreement It h u m an b e ings that

. is
agree — and why do they a gree ?
Because they are alike of the same nature a human Which means , s .

i
that their intu tion of the right is in accord ith human nature w .

It is not an insight into some value whose meaning has nothi ng

to do with the natural wants of man It i the expression of thos e . s
wan ts Fund amental not ephemeral wants to be sure ; tho e j us t
.
, , , s
s
named are ba ic needs conditions required for man s life and life ,
’

more abundant M
oral valu e for us men at leas t are the obj ects
. s , ,

s
of our deepe t and most inclusive needs What no one ever desires .

or would desire if he kn ew o f it h as and can have no value for ,

him No value no good of any sort wi thou t desire actual or p o

.
, ,

ten ti al Indeed the very imperative of duty for duty s sake impli e s
’
.

the same That mperative mean s the performance of duty u ch

. i s
i
that i t w ll gi ve opportunity for continued performance of duty ,

and in more an d more ways If it is a universal rule binding upon .

,
”
man forever and no t self defeating i t demands the continuation -
,

and broadening of man s life that h e may more and more realize ’

this absolute i mp erative It was th e meri t of the rigorous moralis t .

Fi chte in his lectures on the Vo catio n of M an to emphasize this

, , .

But such continuation an d enrichmen t is preci se ly what th e hedon

ist urges There is there can be no separation between moral values
.
, ,

s
and the sati faction of m an s natural craving for a full and r h ’
ic
 8
4 2 A M E R ICA N P H I L O S O P H E R S WORK AT

and conti nued life f h j oyou s exerc i se of hi facultie —always

, or t e s s ,

of course so far not i nterfering with their further exercise in

, as

one s s elf or fel l ow s A d this after all i through and through

’
. n , , s

h pragmatic test whi ch te s t is surely hedonist N

t e , moral values . o;

are not w h o lly in de fin ab l e They are to b e defined i n p ractical .

terms as means of fulfilling our basic needs For that matter noth .
,

ing is wholly in d efin ab l e or holly definable ; any description is w

some degree of definition and no definition includes all to which
s
the term i l iab le Thu s th e moral law is p ragrnatically defined as
.

that which would if obeyed help us to adapt ourselves to our

, ,

human and natural environment so as to gratify our deepest wants ,

and to the maximum A nd if tho e wants are ummed up a life . s s s ,

liberty and the pursui t of happiness notice that life an d liberty

, ,

are the indispensable means to the p ursui t of happiness hap p iness ,

th e goal of all human endeavor .

i
But certa nly the axiologi st who asserts that valu e is in d e fin ab l e
i s
n term of actual being is right in this : nothing is good unless ,

actu al ly or pote ntially an obj ect of desire and desire i not to , s

be defined in term of what is being typically an urge to what iss ,

n o t R ight for us human beings can never b e der ved from m ght
.
, , i i .

The Thomist ethic has seen clearly thi s unison of obj ective values
wi th our subj ective de 5 1 res well brought out of late in Fr Walter , .

s
Farrell C o mp an io n to the S u mma Vo l I a commentary on the
’

, .
,

ethics in Part II of th e S u m ma T h e o logica A s thi s writer says . ,

m an w an ts w h a t h e w an ts ; behind thes e wants he cannot go If .

the Thomist see s them implanted by th e Creator i n the very esse nce
, s s
of man his ub tantial form matter no les should the naturalist -
, s
who views them as product of a long and low evolution see them s ,

to be essential to th e species h o m o s ap ie ns E ven the idealizing .

Germans Kant and Fichte had to ap p eal to man s desire for a

, ,
’

continued and prosperous society to discover the content o f th e

moral law—a sH
egel so clearly saw Bu t have the other types of .

ethi cal theory seen th e same ?

O n th e o n e hand the idealist witnessing the ideal goo ds eternal ,

in the heavens fears their eternal validity will be los t to view if

,

they are defined as objects of our desire : we change our wish e s so

, w
often we i sh for so many bad things thi ngs that defeat other ‘

desires S o he declares that desire merely of i tself gives no clue

.

to the right ; the right is what e o ugh t to desire Tru e indeed ; w .

but that doesn t involve the irrelevance of de sire to the ideal goods
’
.

What he should say is : we all inevitably ine capab ly at least sub , s ,

 8
4 4 A M E R IC A N PH WORK ILO S O P HERS AT

good fso S Thoma s s ay s that h mu dere s blow i s good

ar . t. t e r
’
r

in so far as i t s hows the s trength f h murderer b d i n h effect o t e , a t e

o f destroying life E qual l y may . s ay that there is no ple sure we a

whi ch m ly by i tself i s bad The rule of hedonism i s never broken

e re . .

S then as regards the cla i m s of the se opponent s h obj ecti ve

o, , , t e
and the subj ective v i ew s bo h are ri ght ach i s w ong It i s s ense
: t , e r .

less to s ay that we desire a th i ng b i t is good i t is j u t as e c aus e ; s

s enseles s to say a thing is good b we de ire i t Good and e caus e s .

desire for us hum n beings for all consciou s beings presumab l y

, a , ,

are h tw o sides or pha se s of one and the same event or s tat or

t e e

entity N either phase generates the other N

. are our de s ir s . or e

arbitra y they are ingrained i n our gi ven natur which

r ; did e we
not make It i s not we who make a thing good by want i ng i t for
.
,

what made u s want it ? The lure of h ob j ect b i t health wealth t e , e , ,

kno w ledge power ,what ver is not pu t there by our lves Wh

, or e , se . o

could wish to commit sui cide j ust for the fun of i t? O ur part i s
only to choose be tween lures de s ire s For what is lu e wi th
, or . a r

out our desire ? The alluring obj ect would not d aw u s did not r ,

someth i ng i n nature respond

o ur co re s pond to i t To repeat or r .

then a s is s o often the case each cl aim is i ght i n respect of the

: , r

positive assertion that i ph s i s pre s ent wrong when i t in s i t s

ts a e , s

th t the other is generate d by i pha s

a h is p ha s a l one being ts e, t e

h e s sence of h matter
t e t e .

O riginally p ublished in Th j l f Phil phy 1 9 5 0 rep rin ed

e o u rna o os o , ; t
with p ermission of h editors S ome omissions have been made here
t e . .
 T . V . S MITH

E ve ryone is
aware that abo ut some things we are agreed ,

whereas about other thing we differ s hen anyone speaks w

o f j ustice and goodness we part company and are at odds with
o ne another and wi th our el e s s v
PL T O P hae d rus 2 6 3
-
A .

O f h th ee great s tages for the theater of life two body forth the
t e r ,

di s tinctively human show First howeve there is the more l

.
, r, e e

mentary behavior of man —the s tage of animal urgen y Then there c .

is action guided by ends— the stage of p oli tical endeavor Finally .

,

there is contemplation of ideals or of whatever else—the stage of

philosophic wonder and worth O ur presen t pre ccupation is w ith
. o

the political and h philosophic The low er s tage f purely animal

t e . o

b havior is here remarked for per sp ctive and as a reminder that

e e

the human spirit h no final immuni ty from the heats of bod y

as

and h fume s of earth The vocation of man advances th ough

t e . r

p litical s ublimation of animal urgency to contemplation a s cath

o ar

sis for acti on political or animal

, .

Wi hout prej udgi ng other mea s han the natural for this d
t n t a

vance le t us focus attention upon man predicament at it s worst

,
’
s

4 85
4 86 AMER I CA N I
P H LO S O P HER S AT WORK
s
to ee whether ideal poten ci es
of real promi se may not lie sub
merged in the mud and s cum of things m erely mortal L e t me .

ask yo u graciously to bear though not necessarily to share the , ,

assumption that our human j ourney is from elemental nescience

through moment ary prescience to ultimate nescience The lights .

that flash a cross our little day of dim reason are lurid but lost
‘

in a sky of primeval and of eventual darknes s istoric afterimages . H

i
get confused w th premo ni tory gleams from a future ri sing ou t of
w
the unkno able like dawn from a night that is spent ; and neither
,

s
the after nor the fore image can clearly and surely be distinguished
-

from th e vagu e bu t indigenou glo s of our own animal heat s w s .

This inability finally to distinguish is the propaedeutic for

promotion from animal impetuosity to civilized forbe arance It .

marks the firm e s t foundation for the tolerance which is char

ac te ri s ti c of democracy al one A nimals heated w th the scent of . i
the prey brook no o p position withou t compulsion and abide no
delay short o f bo ndage When such urgenc es o f action inter. i
sect battle ensues ; and the fittest for the q uarry is merely the
,

s u rvivor from the fray That is the story of man the anim al
. .

M i
an the polit cal animal permit a biography that i s better s ,

withou t reaching the level of the st o ry that i be st is po litical s . H

s
career line ri se highest where i t turns de mocratic ; but the line
passes from be tter to best as the demand for political action
tran sforms itself into the contemplation of norm as self j usti s -

fyin g eidola .

This is indeed a convenien t divis on bet een politics and phi i w

s
l o so p h y Politic is concerned with ideals as agencies of action
.

p hilosophy is concerned ith ideals as obj ect for w

inner celebration s .

D emocracy is the po litical form which requires and feeds upon

some p hil O SOp hic flair among its c tizens This is the core of what i .

is now to be clothed with argument and subdued to rhetoric .

1 F rus tra tio n

. o f th e I d e a l in A c tio n

P oliticalknowers and politica l doers are bo th alike often

heard to talk of truth of goodness and even of b eauty— the e
, , s
anciently nominate d representatives of the whole d o m arn of the
ideal But the atmos p here of action al w ays hovers over such
.

poli tical talk Truth is something to b e caught and p roclaimed ;

.

goo d ness so mething to be achieved ; beau ty a thing to b e created

or a body to be embraced E ach is something that a man can
‘

.
4 88 A M E R IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK
truth —idealism realism pragm ati m—are severally and j o ntly u n
, , s i
able to promote any of o ur certitudes nto obj ective certainty i .

l T h e c o h e re n c e th e ory of tru th ofiers n o ad e qu ate tes t fo r

.

tru th - O
nly an absolute po nt of Vie w to give vision to all thing i s
as a whole can reveal adequate coherence and such a po int of ,

view is not available to man What is not available can nei ther .

test nor be teste d b y finite frailty f coherence then I remark . O , ,

simply that i t is only when men k now not wha t to tru t that they s
trust they know no t what .

2 . T he co rres
p o n d e n ce theory ofiers n o ad e q u ate tes t of tru th .

O ne must already know what true before he can know what . is

beyond his ideas correspond to his ideas s
f correspondence th en . O , ,

I remark simply that i t s only when men mus t say s ome thing i
that they say some thing which they themselves do no t understand .

3 T h e p re d ic tio n th e o ry is n o ad e qu a te tes t of tru th —I f truth

. .

is prediction then no dea ever s bu t merely alway s to be

, i i , si ,

true ; for prediction cannot b e what i t i of wi thout co nfounding s

confusion of hop e and the hoped for f thi s theory I re mark . O ,

finally that i t is only men who despair of truth w h o call pre di c

,

tion of truth truth itself , .

NO o n e o f these theories can adequately test tself much les i , s

anything else H o w indeed can coherence tes t the coherence
.
, ,

theory ? An d to what pray does the correspo ndence theory corre

, ,

s o n d ? A n d what solvent pre di ction validates the prediction theory

p
of truth ? T h e uns p oken reliance of all schoo l s alike no les so , s
than th e relianc e of the plain man is so me feeling of certi tude , .

An d that we have seen is not enough ; i t is logically rrelevant

, , i
to certainty This doub tful reliance i t is which s usta ns the faith
. i
in tru th of the idealis t short of the absolute unity which s his
, i
ever unav ailable official tes t of coherence ; of th e realist short o f ,

the ubiq u ity which wo u ld be th e necessary condition for hi s corre

s o n d e n c e ; of th e
p ra
p g m atist short of either o c ial un ver ality or
, s i s
of temporal infini ty which t o are j ointly or alternative ly re
, w , ,

q u ired but vainly sought to save his th e ory from olipsism Certi, s .

tude is the reliance of hich all thes e are rationalization s ; andw

certitude I repeat is not enough It more eas ily m arks th e begin
i
, , .

'

n ng of coercion than the end of demonstration The cowardly .

will ass u me certitude s ufficien t for actio n ; the intellectual ly u n

scru p u lous will fei gn a cer titude ; the ignorant will s tub b o m ly feel
a certitude ; the conscientious will coin a certi tude of their mora l
impe tuosi ty ; and all alike though w th motive diverse will risk , i s ,
 I
PH LOS OPHY AND DE M O RA Y C C 8
4 9

i
a battle leaving th e consc entious an d the stubborn to s hed their
,

blood in the name of a cause which in pa thetic re tros pect may

well appear only a case of p ri vate belief lifted to specious certain ty
by one s poor ani mal heat or by the pridefu l mi stake of some
’

supe rior giving orders of the day S uch certi tude ho ever is all .
, w ,

that men inten t upon action require to j ustify s u ppression of

fellow men in the name of and for the sake of truth S u ch vali .

s
dation i clearly not eno u gh to save action from inf amy .

Comm uni sm has taught u ane w an d fascism has enforced thi s s ,

lesso n that self admi tted truth s not enough for poli tical action
,
-
i .

i
The only ns urance the m od ern world has against the recurrence
of the age old debacle of persecution for opinion is the presence
s
in i t of a ufficien t number of men of uch character as ill mollify s w
s
as ertions of tru th wi th the restr ai nts of tolerance The p ri mary .

s
te t of such character is a su p erp h iIOS Op h i c caution in identifying
certitude wi th certainty in asserting self evidence a a test of truth
,
-
s .

The development of civilization has mean t among o ther things , ,

th e disciplining of character into such cau tion nly good men . O

s
can and will practice uch forbe arance Generosity becomes thus .

i
the sav or of Tru th bu t i ts salvation is conditioned upon a certain
,

categorical obscuration the m e tarno rp h o sing of truth into good

,

ness U
nabashed assertions of truth short of the general agreement
.

which alone bespeaks certainty are suicidal to mankind A gree .

ments however in many important matters upon the scale re

, ,

i
qu red and at the dep th necess ary have so far proved impossible .

Catholics and Comm unists are not likely for instance to agree , ,

upo n a philosophy o f history ; nor are Fascists and D emocrats u p on

the meaning and value of libe rty S omething more therefore than .
, ,

motivation to truth is required to prevent short of impossible ,

agreement the assumption of certainty and the menacing gestures

,

w
wh ich tend to follo therefrom Beyond tru th lies good ness and .
,

civilization req u ires the advance Generosity of spiri t is the in .

di s p e nsable condi tion for this advance ; for only the generous actor
will mi tigate wi th mercy hi s ani mal heat precipitated as political
c o nv 1 c t1 0 n s .

But le t th e s crup u lous man beware of premature fixation upon

the new galaxy of goodness if he o u ld contin u e to lessen the , w
pen al ty constantly invited by a mi nd ho u sed in an animal bod y .

Though the Good saves Truth i tself i t can not save from the ,

urge of action A s by envelo p ing Tru th Goodness somehow o b

.
,

s s
cure i t so it in turn darkens the vision of him who admiringly
,
4 9 0 A M E R I CA N PH ILO S OP H ERS AT WORK
beholds it Whe n this narrowing has grown chronic i t reinforces
. ,

th e drive for truth w

hich threatens civilization i tself through the
premature substitution of certi tude for certai nty and furnishes ,
’

an impenetrable rationalization of righteousness for animals deeds

steeped in infamy Truth fix atio n su ffused and s u ccored by vision

.
-

of the goo d may easily become th e moral bigotry which among

all bad things m o dern m e n have rightly come to deem the worst .

Worship of the Good too easily generates a i ts earthly active frui t s

s
an inversion of spiri t emi pathological A developing lov e of di c . si
plin e for i ts own sake marks the spread of this moral paralysis and ,

i
asce tic sm is the end result o f a love of goodness which insists upon
burying its ideal goal in the living tomb of action .

, w
If ho ever generosity lifts its wings toward the empyrean the
, ,

so u l finds i tself mounting to magnanimi ty ; and borne above on

these spreading plumes i t l an d at last o n the threshold of Beauty , s .

A ll d ross purged by this ar duous pa sage the soul migh t no lose s , w

w
the narro ness acquired n th e first realm and all impe tuosity i ,

assertive or regressive hanging over from i ts soj ourn in th e second

,

realm of ideal being .

But if still pu shed by animal heat th e soul though dee p n the , , i

domain of the philosophic may ye t count ideal a prescriptions s s
i
,

and still ins st like po litical reform er upon doing something

, s , .

Then Beau ty succ umbing to th e fate of Truth an d Go o dness will

, ,

s
be turned into a sale slogan or cru mpled into the puerile p u l chri
tude of some o ther prosti tution of ideality to action The danger .

here is indeed twofo ld a in the case of Goodness For to this s .

exp loi tation o f Beauty rs to b e added a too l u stfu l embrace of i t .

There is an inversion of action hich takes the form not of asceti w

ci s m but o f volup tuousness I f in adoration of Beauty the oul . s
grows infatuated and sinks sighingly do n until accu stomed to w
amorous indolence the effu lgen ce of the ideal grows gray through
,

w ont l u x u ry begets so ftness and the soul l o sing i ts orientation

, , , ,

w
be gi ns to doub t he ther there is any supporting goodness and
i
proudly to proc la m that there is no tru th b u t beau ty Inspirati o n .

s u rvives as intoxication and inebriation leads to madness Beauty , .

,

the catalyzer o f go o dness and tru th is redu ced to impotence by ,

this demand upon her and the Soul is then left only ith her , w
discontents feeding upon their o n fu m ings This is the di rest w .

vengean ce self in fl ic te d upon a soul rendered alien to ideality by

-

v
her own o erdevotion to action — to have successive reliefs from
previous narrownes ses culminate in the ennui that is orse than w
4 92 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP HER S AT WORK
is not enough for the animal an A ction goes awry for mere M .

animals ; action goes sour for political animals Poli tics as end .

guided endeavor req u ires some ideality a re treat from action s

and as s u ccor in action The philosophic mind concern i tself wi th
. s
this surplusage of ideality over action : i t finds in the contempla
tion of ideals both relief and replenishment To fai l to ee the . s
problem generated for man by this plethora of the deal i the i s
final stupidity To declare th e problem beyond remedy s cynicism
.

’
i ,

that hum an vice which leans least toward virtue s side To come .

directly to te rms with the problem will almos t certainly involve

some half concealed acceptance of frustration as the final fruit
-

of man s efforts to make thro u gh action the best of th e worst Thi

’
. s
s
latest fr u tration can be lessened— can even be well ni gh cured a , s
w e hope to show—b y a conspiracy o f will and wi t to promote the
heroism involved in this making through politics the best of the
worst to some high magnanimity of maki ng through p hi losop hy the
bes t of the best .

S o far I have spoken as th ough poli tics were concerned w i th

one set of norms and philosophy with another s e t S uch ha t . s i
,

appears been all too often the historic conviction An d such may
, .

be the case for all that I know for certain S uch however s not
, .
, , i
my best guess There is I dare ay one set of ideal n o t two ;
.
, s , s ,

bu t the one set may be taken in these t o ays : as patterns for w w

practice and as Obj ects of appreciation Fate which when taken .
,

wrongly becomes frustration w

hen taken rightly Offers vocation
,

and opportunity for th e wise . O

nly citizens innocent of p hilosophy
will take ideals wrongly and thereby re ap frustration Ci tizen s .

intent upon p hi losophy kn o w that ideal whi ch for a ni mal are s , s

mere prescriptions may become self re ardi ng o bj ect of contem
,
-
w s
p l a tio n for spirits who know a worth tran cen di ng use P olit c s . is
is preocc u pation wi th norms as programs o f action ; philosophy
is preoccu pation with n o rms as producers of s ereni ty T h e proper .

preface to philosophy and the wise propaedeutic to politics is

, ,

i “
acquaintance w th and apprec ation o f th e law of nature as i
”
,

Plato called i t
“
that performance can never hit the truth as clo ely
, s
as theory .

“
Poli tics need not hi t the tru th at al l as Plato con ceived tru th , .

What the politician wants he goes and ge ts—o r learns Why : learn
, s
, w
who stands in his way hat hi s price is and then pays th e price ,

of compromise necessary to give both a part of what ea h wanted c

altoge ther If the p o litician rises above the economic i t
. usually , is
 P H I L O S O P H Y A N D D E M O C R AC Y 4 93

to broaden only to s uch oth r ki ndred mo ti ve s as safety then

ou t e ,

to s ecuri ty and perhap s at l st to deference

, the price of i a as un

versal pride S u h motive s mark the very outer reach of politics

. c .

Bu t he s e motiv s even when exploited to the full h rdly touch

t e , , a

the periphery of p hi losophy concerned as i t is w ith ideals as such , ;

and wi th ha dly any ide l level lo w er than Tru th The utility
r a .

motif of politi cs ends i ts que s t for truth by grabbing i t and then

passing it out as poli tic l patronage wrapped in cellophane of a

palaver or under s ufficient provocation h rling i t like a brickbat

, , u

at the head of Opponents Thi s is to take the kingdom of p hil

s . o so

phy by violence in a fit of frenzy for action prescribed by the ideal

of Tru th Thu s has ro m been made for the c stom b ilt tr ths
. o u -
u u

of N azi Germany and the action assi mi lated tr ths of Fascist Italy
,
-
u .

N or i s America i thout hi storic and present wi tness to the w

i ndigenous presence of this impetuous will For eve y R oger Wil . r

liam who wri tes h tenet of blo dy persec tion against i

s t e o u
”
n
“
tolera ce there is
n , John Cotton to indite the tene t of blo dy a o

persecution washed and made w hi te in the blood of the L amb .

“
N o, houted Cotton to Williams w e did not drive you from
”
s ,

M assachusetts because y follow ed yo r conscience b because ou u , ut

you refused to follow yo r conscience in doing what y well knew u ou

to b e i ght ! S u ch is the final offen e of all political isms that

r s

prostitute philosophy to rgency whether they a p pear as bro w n u , ,

black or red If m an s res p onse ho w e v er be a more reticent not

, .
’

, , ,

to say a more reverent appropriation of th e pure ideal and a more ,

s trategic approach in proper season to i t from and from i t to , ,

the li fe of action —then he may wi th some reason expect o u t o f

“
w
what Words orth has called wi se pas si ene ss some purgation v
from the passions of politics and some recreation in action from
th e much too much for any anim al of incessant contem p lation of
- -

pure Beauty Indeed from the aes thetic zenith of ideality a so u l

.

that has lovingly communed w i th Bea u ty i tho u t desire to battle w

abou t i t may come down the dialectical ladder w i thou t recession
s
of the lu ter beholden on th e topmost ru ng e may preoccupy . H
himself wi th Good ness once more b u t now i th lessened desire w
to break somebody s head ou t of deference to some moral u ght ’
O .

Indeed still far ther down the ladder whi ch connects al l normati e
, v
levels of being he may halt unhu rr ied before the ideal of Tru th
,

wi thou t too much temptation to yell e ery opponen t do n wi th v w

“
the shrill an imal cry of self evidence hen all that is evident -
, w
is that the issue is n dispute i .
4 94 AMER IC A N I
P H LO S OP H ER S AT WORK

3 . D e m o cracy as P o li tics T rans f or med

b y P h i l os op hy

s
It is here and thu that the political enterprise is transformed
into the democrati c process D emocracy is poli tics no longer in .

nocent of philosophy The democ rat will not announce poli tical .

tru th short of achieved agreement e will not publicly call action . H

goo d which is goo d merely for him A n d in the ocial field he will . s
not denominat e beautiful what arrives oth e r than through consent .

s
D emo cra c y is uch reverence for persons and such respect for tolera
tion as will suffer all things short of coerc on i .

S uch forbearance is t appears not possible for those who b e

, i ,

lieve that tru th for action goodnes in action b e au ty th rough ac , s ,

tion is all the ideali ty there is for man Too little of p erfe ction .

is collectively achievable for that fai th ever to flourish To b e .

i
lieve that s so to affron t the hungry h u man spi ri t as to humiliate
man into the desperation of trying for ideality through coercion .

If all is lost by wi th holding action then all must be forgi ven action ,

to the u ttermost The democ rat ho ever has le arned or is leam

.
, w , ,

ing that opportunities for action lost not all of ideality is lost
, , .

There remains th e Tru th for me the Goodness for me the Bea u ty - -

,
- -
,

for m e These are not invidious forms of the ideal as so many

-
.
,

timid mi n ds think They are on the contrary the most abs ol u te

.
, ,

forms of the ideal e er ye t vouchsafed to man S uppression of v .

beliefs dis crepant from Truth for me coe rcion of fello men into - -
, w
acceptance o f Good ness for—me disdain of differences from the -
,

Beau tiful for me — these animal proced u res do not enhance ideals
- -
,

nor obj ectify them S uch procedu res indeed degrade s p iri ts into
.

w
animals and poison ith motives of co u nteraggression th e springs
,

of generosity from which and from hich alone persuasion can , w ,

i
enlarge the bo u ndar es of the second best type of obj ecti i ty that -
v ,

created through agreement .

D emocracy as a go ernmental form is primarily concerned v ith w

maintaining the conditions under hich citizens may try for some w
obj ectification of the ideal in and throu gh action I t encou rages .

and implements wi th sanctions that narro b u t su b stantial meet w

w
ing of mi nds kno n at law as contract It encoura ges by ithhold .
,
w
ing sanctions that larger meeting of mi nds called free a ssocia
,

tion It even perm its hierarchies to fl o u rish — economic religious

.
,

s
,

c u ltu ral : permi t them to pe rpetuate themselves through esoteric

4 96 IL O S O P H E R S IC A N
WORK
AMER PH AT

there are self f avor s A

d what favor s do s the s elf not b stow
-
. n e e

upon i tself in that no man s land of u tter priva cy ! Publicly we ’

bl sh to remember how pa tial we have b en to ourselves i n that

u r e

retreat Every man a king— there clothed in the habiliments of

.
,

royal purple ! E very man his own pope — there spe aking to hi mse l f ,

w ith finality upon fai th and morals ! E very man hi o w n log cian s i
there relying for tru th at l a t upon certitude w thout the j eopardy
,
s i
which attends the conversion of certi tude into cert ai nty thro ugh
claime d but di sputed self ev dence ! What a world open and free
, ,
-
i ,

to every h u mblest demo crat ! How eas y th e acce s ! nly engage in s O

the acti on abnegating action of putting your hin n your hand ;
-
c i
and presto you have crossed the thre hold from the mediocr ty
, , s i
of ideals compromised in action to th e domain of pure ideality ;
- - -

s
and your progre s once in i limited only by your cap a ty to , , s ci
concentrate attention upon what nature freely furnishes to the
humbles t mi nd .

s
If ome candidate hardly enter this br gh t doma n of su p remes i i
worthfulness they abst ai n from choice If ome once n are not
, . s , i ,

promoted to the inner sanctu ary of the trinity Tru th Goodn es -

s
s
Beauty it i becaus e in the e cre t ballot ing they blackball them
, s
s
selve Those who elect to enter beyond the periphery o f dle reverie
. i
and who promote their pro gr ess among th e é li te of th e self cho en -
s ,

spreading the mantle of i maginat on over eve n action itself by i

i
m as tering th e tr ck of arresting any an d every immedi ate these ,

b e come for thei r very aristocra c y the h Op e of democracy For those .

who have soj ourn ed for even a season n th e prese nce of the ideal i
will have li ttl e en ough avidi ty as Plato saw for the deni z enshi p , ,

of the dark They have tasted the pleasures of th e ar tocra y of

. is c
the light A n d ye t when they return to action as they sea onally
.
, s
s
mu t out of d eference to their animal natu re they bring with them ,

the memory of mortal experience at i ts mos t maj estic and retain

sensitization to the lure of a gold too prec ou s to gli tter For i t i '

s
is thes e devotee of i mag nation and they alone who have d i , , is
covered and loved possessions hich for some to have mo re of w
does not mean for others to have less of ere then is th e most . H
fertile field for democratic equality to blossom into flower Here
“

is the chance at last for liberty without the limi t elsewhere impo ed s
by the eq u al ri ghts of others ere is fruition for fratem i ty—a . H
fraternity of the equal and the free .

i
N o t only s the tr u est democracy found in this aristocracy of
the imagination b u t this ari s tocracy makes i t po ssi b le to have a
,
 I
PH LO S OP HY AND DEMO R C AC Y 4 97

semblance of democracy in the world of action through th e in ,

s tru m e n tal i ty o f poli tic s

D evotee of the ideal can as polit cal
. s , i
s
actors arrange compro mi se be t een those who till find the mean
, w s
ing o f life in competi ti on feeling little lust the m elves for the
, s
s
gold whose di vi ion among men i t s their privilege to facili tate i .

They can budge the education o f the young toward th e philosop hi c

mind They can b ecome self respecting buffers to protect again t
.
-
s
fate tho se doomed to frus tration in action And by being what .

they are more than by anything they ay o r do they can be ar

, s ,

steadfas t wi tness to the superiority of the imagined ove r th e actual

w
for animals who ant above all wan ts imply to become sp ri t s i s .

Whether these be contri te spirits of historic piety o r s c ent fic i i

i s w
sa nt of the ne er secul ari ty they con t tute the ar tocracy o f , si is
c w
dem ocra y D isdaining po er aristocracie of the past this é li te
. s ,

is fed and furnished wi th such deality a leaves i t pliable w th i s i

reference to own ership of the mean s of product on of al l external i
goo ds It is the business of p hi losophers good s hepherds as they
.
,

are of their o w n thoughts to exemplify to celebrate and to p ro

, , ,

v
mote the noncompetiti e life by devotion to goods themselves not
v
competi ti e The beginning of this wi sdom i for p h l l OS Op hCI S to
. s ‘

w w
be hat they o u ld have others to become Civilization represent . s
w
man s slo ly maturing aspiration to universalize s uch an ari to cra y
’
s c
s
of the piri t as cause of and cure for the democratic w ll i .

R ep rinted with p ermission of the editor ,

and U niversity of Chicago
Press , from the I n te rnatio nal jo u rnal of E thics ,
193 7 .
 A M E R I CA N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WO R K
195 3 Hon Litt D LL D Autho r o f T he Na ture of Tho ught
f
. . . . . .
,

( 19 3 9 ) 2 VOl ; co autho r, Pre ac e

.
-
to Phil o s op hy Phil os op hy in
Am eric an E duc atio n e tc .

UD O LF CARNA , b o rn May 1 8, 1 89 1 , P u p p ert al , G erm any S tu di e d at W

P
R
U v
.

ni ersiti e s o f Jena and Freib u rg i Br , D r hil , Jena, 19 2 1 ;

Uv Uv
’

H v
. . . .

ni ersit y, 19 3 6 I ns tru c to r, ni e rs ity o f Vi enna, 19 2 6 3 1 ; Pro

P P Uv
ar ard -

U v
.

fesso r o f hiloso p hy, G erm an ni e rs ity o f ragu e , 1 9 3 1 3 6, ni ers ity o f -

U v
ni e rsity Of Cal i fo rni a at Lo s An ge l es , 1 9 5 4 e m b e r, M
P
Chi c ago , 1 9 3 6 5 2 , -

Instit ut e for Ad an c e d S tudy, v

ri nc eto n, 1 9 5 2 5 4 Au tho r Of D er R aum -

f
.

Phys ikal is c he B egrifis b ild ung D e r l ogis c he Au b au der

W e lt A b riss der L ogis tik L ogis c he S y ntax d er S p rac he
En glis h T rans l , L ogical S y ntax of L anguage. I tali an
trans l in p rep aratio n; Fo undatio ns
. o f L ogic Mathe matics
and

I ntro duc tio n to S e mantic s Fo rm aliz atio n of L ogic

Meaning and Necess ity
2 nd enl arge d e d L og ic al Fo unda .

tio ns of Pro b ability The Co ntinuu m of I ndu c tiv e Me tho ds

Einfiihrung in die s y m b o lis c he L ogik ( 1 9 5 4 )

JAME S O LLI NS Ju ly 1 9 1 7, Ho lyok e,

E du c at ed C atho lic Mass
Uv
C b orn 12
w
, , .

ni ersity o f Am eri c a, A B , A M , an d Ph D , 19 4 4 R e s e arc h Fe llo

P P P
in
v U v
. . . . . . .

hil o so p hy, Har ard ni ersity , 19 4 5 hil o so p hy , S t Lo uis

P
ro fess o r Of

U v M
. .

em b e r o f Phi B e ta Kap p a, Am e ri c an

P
ni ersity, 19 4 5 hi losop hi c al
As so c iation, and p as t p resi d ent, Am e ri c an C atho lic hil o so p hic al As so c i a
tio n ( 1 9 5 3 Au tho r Of The E x is te ntial is ts : A Critic al S tudy ( Chi c ago , .

R egne ry , The Mind of Kie rk egaard ( Chic ago , R egn ery , A

His to ry of M o d ern E urop ean Philos op hy ( Milw auk e e, Bru c e , an d

arti c l es in p hilos o p hi c al jo u rn als .

WILLIAM R AY DE NNES , b o rn Ap ri l 10, 1 89 8, He al dsb u rg, C ali fo rni a

Uv
.

A B , 19 19 , M A , 19 2 0, O
Y Uv P P
ni e rs ity O f C al ifo rn ia ; D Phil , 1 9 2 3 , x fo rd

U v
. . . . . .

ni ers ity ; LL D , 19 5 1 , New o rk ni e rsity ro fe sso r o f hiloso p hy and

v U v
. . .

fo rm e rly D e an o f the G radu ate D i is ion, ni ersity of C ali fo rni a, Be rk el ey

P P Y Uv V
.

S om etim e Asso ci ate ro fe sso r o f hilo so p hy at al e

P Uv
ni e rs ity an d isiting
ro fe s s o r at Har ard and S tanfo rd v ni e rs ities Au tho r o f The Me tho d

w
.

and Pres upp os itio ns of Gro up Ps y c ho l o gy; ith o th ers : T he Phil os op hy of

G e o rge S antayana; Na tural is m and the Hu m an S p irit; e di to r and con
trib utor: t enty w v
o l um es o f the Univ e rs ity of Ca l i o rnia P u b lic atio ns in f
Phil os op hy .

U O U
RT J HN D CAS S E , b o rn July 7 , 1 88 1 , Ango u l em e, Fran c e A B , 1 9 08,
Uv Uv
C
v
. . .

A M , 19 09 , W
as hingto n ; Ph D , 19 1 2 , Har ard

P P
ni e rs ity o f ni e rsity
P
. . . . .

P
I nst ru c to r in hi l oso p hy and
P Uv
s y c ho l o gy , 1 9 1 2 1 6 , As s is tant ro fesso r o f -

W
P
hil oso p hy , 1 9 1 6 2 4 , As s o ciat e ro fe s so r, 1 9 2 4 2 6, as hing

P
-
ni e rs ity o f -

to n Ass o c iate
. ro fes so r, 19 2 6 2 9, ro fe ss o r, 19 2 9 -
Bro n ni ersity w U v .
 BI O G R A P H IC A L N OT S E 5 01

P p re si dent, Am eri c an P
hi loso p hi c al Asso c i ation ( Eas t ern
P
ast As so
c iatio n fo r S ym b o li c Lo gi c , Am e ric an S o c i e ty fo r Aes t he tic saul C aru s

P
.

Le c tu rer, Am eric an hi loso p hi c al Asso c iatio n Au thor o f Caus atio n and the
P P
.

T yp es of Ne c es s ity, 1 9 2 4 ; The hil os op hy o f Art 1 9 3 0; hil os op hy as a ,

S c ienc e, 19 4 1 ; Art, the Critics and Yo u 19 4 4 ; Nature Mind, and D e ath,

P ,

1 9 5 1 ; A hil os op hical S c rutiny of R e ligio n, 1 9 5 3 Al so c h ap ters c ontrib ute d

, ,

v v
.

to s e e ral b oo k s ; and num e ro u s artic l es , d isc u s sio ns, and b oo k re i ew s in

p hi l oso p hi c al jo u rnals an d in m agaz in e s .

NELS O N G OO DMAN Ph D Har v S Army, Mili vi U

P P
. . .
,
ard, 19 4 1 . tary S er c e, . .

I ns t ru c to r in hil oso p hy , T ufts Co l l ege , 1 9 4 5 4 6 ro fes s or o f

P P
19 4 2 4 5- -

U v v
. .

hilo so p hy, ni ersity o f Au tho r o f The S truc ture

v U v P
e nn s y l ania, 1 9 4 6

o f Ap p e aranc e ( Har ard

P Uv P
ni e rs ity ress , Fac t, Fic tio n and Fo re
cas t ( At hl o ne ress , n i e rs ity o f Lo n do n , 19 5 4 , Har ard ni e rs ity ress , v U v
and num e ro u s arti c l es in p hi l o s o p hic al p erio dic al s .

EVE R ETT W
HALL, b o rn Ap ri l 2 4 , 1 9 01 , Janes i l l e , Wisco nsin A B , 1 9 2 3 , v
Uv P
. . . .

Law ren c e Co l l ege ; A M , 1 9 2 5 , Ph D , 1 9 2 9 , Co rn e l l ni e rsity

P
ro fes so r

U v
. . . . .

Of hilo so p hy an d Head o f the D ep art m ent , S tate ni e rsity Of I o w a,

P
1 9 4 1 5 2 ; Kenan ro fesso r an d C hairm an o f the D ep artm ent Of hilo s o p hy ,
- P
U v
ni e rs it y o f No rth C aro l in a, 19 5 2 Au tho r o f T w e ntie th Ce ntury Phi
l os op hy ( c o autho r ) , D agob ert R un es , e d ( New
-
o rk , hilo so p hi c al Li . Y P
W
hat I s Va lu e ? An E ss ay in Phil os op hic al Analys is ( Lo ndo n
Y P P
b rary,
and Ne w R o u tl e dge an d Ke gan
o rk , au l , Hum ani ties res s ,

Mo dern S c ie nc e and Hu m an Valu es : A S tudy in the His to ry f I deas ( New

Y
o

o rk , Van Nos trand, 19 5 6 )

O
C HAR LE S HART S H RNE, b orn 189 7 , in enn s y l ania Ha erfo rd Co ll ege , P v v
v U
.

1 9 1 4 1 7 ; p ri at e in S Arm y Me dic al C o rp s , 1 9 1 7 19 ; A B , 1 9 2 1 , A M ,
v U v
- -

v
. . . . . .

19 2 2 , Ph D , 1 9 2 3 , Har ard ni e rsi ty S he l do n T ra el ing Fe llo w in G er

v U v
. . .

m any, 19 2 3 2 5 I ns tru c to r an d res e arc h fe l l ow , Har ard ni ersity, 1 9 2 5 ;

P P Uv P
-
.

hi lo s o p hy, ni ers ity o f Chi c ago , 1 9 4 3 5 5 ;

P Uv Y Uv
ro fe s so r o f ro fe s so r Of -

ni ersity , 19 5 5 T erry l ec tu re r, ni e rsi ty,

P
hiloso p hy, E m o ry al e

1 9 4 7 ; Fu l b right l e c ture r in Melb o u rn e, Austral ia, 1 9 5 2 resi dent, Am e ric an

P
.

hilo so p hic al As so ciatio n ( West e rn

P
1 9 4 8 4 9 ; p re si dent , C h arl e s -

M
S o ci ety o f Am eri c a,
P P
e irc e S o c iety, 1 9 5 0 5 1 ; p re si dent ,
-
e tap hy si c al

19 5 4 5 5 Autho r Of T he
-
. hilos op hy and s y c ho l ogy of S e ns atio n
The D iv ine R e lativ ity R e ality as S o c ial Pro c es s Philos o
p hers S p eak of Go d ( w ith illiam L R ees e ) W an d o ther b o o k s

P w P
. .

Edito r o f The Co ll ec te d Pap e rs of Charles S e irc e ( ith aul eiss ) . W

m
4”

w
( 19 3 1 -
Lu
A!
w
e4 ?
z

S I DNE H Y OO K, b o rn D ec em b er 2 0, 19 02 B S City Co llege o f New Y

Uv P
. o rk ; ,

M A , Ph D Co lum b i a ni ersity ro fes sor and C h airm an, D e p artm ent o f

v P
. . . .
, .

Phi lo so p hy, W ashingto n S qu are Co llege ; Head, Di ision o f hil o so p hy an d

5 02 A M ERI C A N I
PH LO S OP H RS E AT WORK
P l Gradu ate S c hoo l o f Arts and S c i enc e, New
s yc ho o gy, o rk ni e rs ity Y Uv
w
.

Autho r, am o ng o ther o rk s , Of M e tap hys ic s of Pragm atis m; Fro m He ge l to

Marx; jo hn D e w ey; R e ligio n, S o c ial Myths and D e m o c rac y; The H ero in
His tory; He res y, Yes —Co ns p iracy, No ; e dito r ( ith Ko nv itz ) , E xp erie nc e w
a nd Free d o m, an d Jo hn D e w ey, P hil o s op he r o f S c ie nc e and D e m o c racy .

HO RACE M KALLEN, b orn 188 2

P P
. . Ph D
Litt D R e s e arc h Pro . .
,
. .

fesso r in S o c i al hilo so p hy ; ro fes so r E m e rit u s , G radu at e Fac u lty o f

P o liti c al an d S o c i al S c i e n ce , New S c hoo l fo r S o c ial R e s earc h Visiting
P Uv
.

ro fe sso r, C l arem o nt Co l l ege , su m m e rs , 1 9 3 8 4 0, 1 9 4 7 ; ni ersity Of is -

W
c o nsin , sum m er, 1 9 4 3 ; Harv ard ni ersity, summ er, 1 9 5 5 ; taught at U v
v U v
Har ard ni e rsity, rinc eton ni ersity, Cl ark P Uv
ni ersity, ni e rsity o f U v U v
W isc o nsin ; so m etim e m em b er, Mayo r s Co mm ittee o n City lanni ng O f P
Y P
’

New o rk City, re si dent s Co mm i ssio n o n Highe r E du c atio n, and o the r

’

p u b li c b o d i es Au t h or
.
, am o ng o th e r w o rk s,
o f il l ia m [ a m es a nd He nri W
B e rgs o n, Chap te r in Crea tiv e I nte llig e nc e; T he B o o k of Jo b as a Gre e k
T ragedy; The S truc ture of Las ting Pe ace; Cu l ture and D e m o c rac y in the
Unite d S tates ; The Phil os op hy of il lia ]am es ; W
hy R e l igio n; I ndi m W
v idual is m, An Am eric an W f
ay o f Li e; A Fre e S o c ie ty; T he D e c l ine a nd

R is e of the Co ns u m e r; T he Fu ture of P e ac e; T he Lib eratio n of the Adu l t;

Fro ntiers o f Ho p e; T he E d ucatio n of Fre e Me n; I d eals and E xp e rie nc e;
Art and Free do m; T he Lib eral S p irit .

ABRAHA M P
KA LAN, b o rn June 1 1 , 1 9 1 8, des s a, Russi a; Am eri can citiz en O
sinc e 1 93 0 B A , 1 9 3 7 , Co ll ege O f S t T ho m as ; gradu ate s tu dy , ni e rs ity Uv
U v
. . . .

o f Chi c ago , 1 9 3 7 4 0; Ph D , 1 9 4 2 , -
ni e rsity o f C alifo rni a at Lo s An ge l es

v
. . .

R es e arc h As so ci ate , Di ision W

artim e C o mm u ni c atio ns , 1 9 4 2 4 3 ; G uggen -

heim Fello w , 1 9 4 5 4 6 ; Co nsultant , R an d C o rp o ration, Di i sio n o f S o ci al v

P
-

S c i enc e and Mathem ati c s, 19 4 7

P
R e se arc h Asso c i ate , R o c k efe ll er ro je c t
is iting ni ersi ty o f V
U v
P Uv
o n La ngu age and S ymb o lism , 1 9 5 1 5 2 ; ro fe s so r, -

V
Mic higan, 1 9 5 1 -5 2 ; isiting ro fe sso r, Co lum b ia ni e rsity, 1 9 5 5 ; Pro
U v
ni ersity o f C alifo rni a at Lo s Ange l es, 1 9 4 6 P
Y Uv P
fessor, Au tho r o f o w e r
a nd S o c ie ty ( w ith H D Lassw e ll ) ( al e ni ersity res s , 1 9 5 0, Kegan

M P
. .

Paul,
“
u s t T he re Be ro o sitio ns
p
”
( w it h I C o p i ) M in d ( 1 9 3 9 )
w w
.
,
“ ”
A Fram e o rk fo r Em p i ri c al Ethic s ( ith B Ritc hie ) , Phil os op hy of
M
.

“ ”
o ral Ju dgm ents As s e rti o ns,

P
S c ie nc e Are Phil os op hical R e v ie w
D efini tion and S p ec ific ation o f Me ani ng, j o urnal of hil os o p hy
“ ”

and o ther arti c l e s .

V
CLAR ENCE I R ING LE I S ,b o rn Ap ri l 1 2 , 1883 , S toneham , W M
Uv
as s A B ,

v U v
. . .

19 06, Ph D , 1 9 1 0, Har ard ni ersity ; ni ersity o f C hi

P P P
. . 1 94 1 ,
c ago ; As sistant Pro fesso r, Asso c i ate ro fes so r an d ro fe s so r o f hil o so p hy,
v U v
Har ard ni ersity, 1 9 2 1 5 3 ; Carus Lecturer, 1 94 5 ; Pro fes sor o f hilo s
-
P
5 04 . A MERI C A N PHILO S OP HER S AT WORK
F S C N RT HR O O P N v
s co nsin B A , vill Wi
Yl U v
, b
o rn o e m b er 2 7 , 1 8 9 3 , Jan es e,

v
. . . . . .

1 9 1 5 , Be lo it Co llege ; M A , 1 9 1 9 , a e ni e rsity ; Ph D , 1 9 2 4 , Har ard

U v
. . . .

ni e rsity Ho no rary d egrees : 1 9 4 6, Be lo it Co ll ege ; LL D ,

U v w P
. . .

19 4 9 , ni e rsity o f Ha aii ; 19 5 5 , R o llin s Co lle ge ; ro feso r Ex

trao rdinario , 1 9 4 9 , La U v
ni ersi dad Nac io n al Au teno m a d e ex i c o G uggen M
U v
.

heim Fe llow , 1 9 3 2 3 3 , T rinity Co llege, C am b ri dge, and the

-
ni ersity o f

G Ottingen, G erm any Als o s tu di e d at ni e rsity o f Fre ib u rg, G erm any ;

. U v
Trinity Co ll ege , C amb ri dge ; and I m p eri al C o llege o f S c ien c e and T e ch
no l o gy , Lo ndon T aught at al e Y Uv
ni ers ity s inc e 1 9 2 3 : Mas t er o f S i lli m an
P P
.

Co l lege , 1 9 4 0 4 7 ; S t e rling ro fes sor o f hi lo sop hy an d Law , Law S cho o l

-

and G radu at e S choo l , 1 94 7 Au tho r o f S c ienc e and F irs t Princ ip l es

The Me e ting of E as t and es t T he L og ic of the S c ie nc es W
and the Hu m anities The T am ing of the Natio ns
P
E urop ean
Unio n and Unite d S tates Fo re ign o lic y

S T EPHEN C PP
E PER , b orn Ap ril 2 9 , 1 89 1 , New ark , N J ; fathe r, Charl e s
Ov P
. . .

e p p e r, an artis t, m o ther, Franc e s C o b urn , b o th o rigin al l y fro m

P
ey

v
Maine Li e d in Paris until 189 9 arents then s ettl e d in Co nco rd, as s M
w v v
. . .

T ak en aro un d th e o rld, 1 9 01 02 , isiting Jap an, China, Ja a, I ndia A B ,

Uv
-
. . .

19 1 3 , M A , 1 9 1 4 , Ph D , 1 9 1 6, Harv ard ni e rs ity ; 1 9 5 0, Co lb y

U
. . . .

Co llege T aught at W
el l es l ey C o ll ege , 1 9 1 6 1 7 S Army, 19 1 7 1 8 At
Uv
- -
. . . . .

ni ersity o f C aliforni a s in c e 1 9 1 9 as t e ac hi n g As sis t ant , Ins truc to r, As si s t

P ro fe s so r, Asso ci at e P
rofes s o r; C h ai rm an Of Art D e p artm ent, P
P
ant ro fe s s o r,

1 9 3 8 5 3 ; Chai rm an Of hil oso p hy D e p artm en t, 1 9 5 4

-
Au tho r o f Aes the tic
Q uality; W
o rl d Hyp o thes es ; A D ig es t of P urp os iv e Va l ues ; T he B as is of

Critic is m in the Arts ; Princ ip l es of Art Ap p rec iatio n; The Wo rk of Art .

CHAR NER M U P Y
arc h 1 5 , 1 9 02 , Fran k lin , T ex as ; M
P
AR Q I S E RR , b o rn
W
illiam Ch armer an d O l a Cox e rry B A , 19 2 4 , M A , 19 2 5 , Uni
P
son o f

v U v
. . . . .

e rs ity o f T e x as ; Ph D , 19 2 6, ni ers ity o f Chi c ago I ns tru c to r in hilo s

U v P P
. . .

o p hy, ni e rs ity o f Mi c higan , 1 9 2 6 2 7 ; Adjun c t ro fess or Of hiloso p hy , -

U v
ni e rsity o f T ex as , 1 9 2 7 3 3 ; Fe llo w , S o c ial S c i ence R e s earc h Co un c il,
P P
-

19 3 1 3 2 ; rofessor, 1 9 5 1 Ac ting Chai rm an, D ep artm ent o f hilo so p hy ,

P
-

1 9 4 0 4 7 , Ch airm an, D e p artm ent o f

-
hilo s o p hy, ni ersity o f Chi c ago , U v
194 8 E ditor, E thics, 19 3 4

WILLARD O M
VAN R AN Q INE, b orn June 2 5 , 1 9 08, Ak ron, hi o A B , U O . . .

19 3 0 ( s umm a in m athe m atic s ) , O

b e rlin C o l lege ; A M , 19 3 1 , Ph D , 1 9 3 2 ,
v U v Uv
. . .

O O
.

Har ard ni ersity ; M A , 1 9 5 3 , x fo rd ni ersity ; Litt D , 1 9 5 5 , b erlin

. . . .

Co llege Li eu tenant an d Lieutenan t Comm ander, U S NR , 1 9 4 2 4 6 R o c k e

P
-
. .

fel l e r o s tw ar Fe llow , 1 9 4 6 4 7 Co nsult ant, R and Co rp o ration, 19 4 9 Ch air

P
-

v U v
. .

m an , D ep artm ent Of hilo s o p hy , Har ard

P
ni e rsity, 19 5 2 5 3 G eo rge -

V O U v v
.

E as tm an ni ersity, 19 5 3 Har ard Uni

P P
isiting ro fe ss o r, x fo rd

ve rs i ty s in c e 1 9 3 6, ro fe ss o r o f hi l o so p hy and S enio r Fe l lo w o f S o c ie ty Of
Fello w s, 194 8 Mm e b e r, I ns titut e fo r d anc eA vS tu dy, 19 5 6 5 7 ; Vic e
d -
 I G
B O R AP HI C A L N O T ES 5 05

P sident Am eric an
re ,
P il
Asso ci ation ( Eas tern
h 19 5 1 ; resi
oso p hi c a l P
,
S ym b o lic Lo gi c , 1 9 5 3 5 5 Co ns ultin g E dito r, jo urnal
dent As so ci ation for -
.

of S y m b o lic L ogic, 1 9 3 6 4 1 , 19 4 6—
5 2 Author o f A S ys te m of L ogis tic
-
.

Mathematic al Logic ( 1 94 0 and later e di tio ns ) ; E l ementary

Logic 0 S entido da No v a L ogic a Me tho ds of L ogic ’

Fro m a Logical Po int of Vie w

WALLACE
S CHNEID ER, b o rn M
Uv
RT arc h 1 6, 1 89 2 , Berea,
O
hio A B , 1 9 15 , Ph D , 1 9 1 7 , Co lum b i a
P P
ni ersity ; 1 9 4 8,
U
. . . . .

nion Co ll ege ro fes sor Of hilo so p hy an d R eligio n, Co lu m b ia Uni

v
.

ersity , R es e arch Fellow , I t aly , 1 9 2 8, 1 9 3 7 ; Fulb right Fello w ,

U P P
19 3 1
France, 19 5 0; S e cretari at, nesco , 1 9 5 3 5 6 resident, Am eri c an hi l o -
.

so p hi c al As so c i ati on ( East ern 1 9 4 8 Author o f Making the Fas c is t

Y Y
.

S tate ( New The Puritan Mind ( New Me di

Y
o rk , o rk ,

tatians in S e as o n ( New His to ry of Am e rican Phil os op hy

P
o rk ,

l i it U v
v U v P
( C o um b a n i e rs y re ss ,
R e lig io n in T w e n tie th Ce n tu ry

Am erica ( Har ard ni e rsity T hre e D ime ns io ns of Pu b lic

U v P
res s ,

Mo rality ( Indi ana ni e rsity re ss, 1 9 5 6 )

S ELLARS , b orn May 1 2 , 1 9 1 2 , Ann Arb o r, Mi c h Attende d Ly c ee

Uv
.

Lo ui s l e G ran d, 1 9 2 9 3 0; B A , 1 9 3 3 , ni ers ity o f Mic hig an ; M A , 1 9 3 4 ,

-

U v v U v
. .

O
. .

ni ersity o f Buffal o ; 1 9 3 7 3 8, Har ard ni e rs ity ; M A , 1 9 4 0,

-
x fo rd

U v U v v
. .

ni ersity T aught at S t at e ni ersity o f I o w a, 1 9 3 8 4 6 ( o n l e a e, 1 9 4 3 -

U v
.

ni ersity o f Minn e s o ta, 1 9 4 6 Co e dit o r o f R ead ings in Phil os op hic al

Y
-

w
Analys is ( ith Herb e rt Feigl ) ( New
Y
o rk , Ap p l eto n Centu ry Cro fts , - -

R eadings in E thical Theo ry ( ith Jo hn Ho s p ers ) ( New w

o rk , Ap p l et on

C entury C ro fts , -
Fo un der an d co e ditor ( w ith He rb ert Feigl ) , -

Philos op hic al S tudies, a jo urna l p ub lishe d b y the ni ersity o f inne sota U v M

Press .

WILMON H S HELD O N b o rn 18 75 , Ne t on MA, w M

v U v P Uv
. ass BA , 1 89 5 , . . .
, ,
. .

1 89 6 Ph D 189 9 Har ard ni e rs ity Ass i s t ant in

Uv
,
. .
, , hi l o so p hy ni e rs ity .
,

of W is c onsin 1 899 19 00; Austin T eaching Fellow Harv ard ni ersity

P Uv P
-
, , ,

1 9 00 01 ; As sistant in hilo so p hy , Co lu mb ia ni ersi ty, 1 9 01 05 ;

P P Uv P P l
-
re c e p tor -

in hi loso p hy , rinc eton ni ersity, 1 9 05 09 ; S to ne ro fess o r o f hi o so p hy ,

P P Y Uv
-

D artmo uth Co lle ge, 1 9 09 2 0;

P P
ro fes s o r o f hilo so p hy, al e
-
ni ers ity,
1 9 2 0 4 3 , Em eritus, 1 9 4 3 resi de nt, Am eri c an hilo s o p hic al Ass o ci atio n,
P
-

1 9 2 0 2 1 Autho r o f S tri e of S ys te ms and f

P P
ro duc tiv e D ua lit
y
-
.

P
Am erica s
’
rogres si v e hil os op hy Pro ces s and Po larity
Go d and o larity S ex and S al vation

T V S MI T H, b o rn 1 89 0, Bl ank et, T ex as B A , M A , ni ersity o f T ex as ; U v

Uv P P U v
. . . . . . .

ni e rsity o f C hi c ago hi lo so p hy , ni ers ity o f

w P P
Ph D , 1 9 2 2 ,
. . ro fes s o r o f .

C hic ago , 1 9 2 7 4 8 ; Max ell ro fesso r o f Citiz enshi p and hilo so p hy , S yra
Uv P
-

c u se ni ers ity, 1 9 4 8 5 6, Em eritus ro fe ss or, 1 9 4 6 5 6 E dito r, I nterna -

.
5 06 A M E R I CA N P H I L O S O P H E R S AT WORK
tio nal E thics ) fo r a dec ade and a half S t at e S
jo urnal of E thics ( no w
U v
.

to r, ni e rsity o f Chi c ago di s t ri c t, 1 9 3 4 3 8 ; I llino is Co ngress m an at L -

1 9 3 8 4 0 A fo under o f the
-
U v
ni ersity o f Chic ago R o un d T ab l e o f the
v
.

and Of C B S b oo k p ro gram , I n it atio n to Le arning

f
.

Way of Li e; Philos op hic ay of W

Pro mis e o f Am eric an Po litics ; D is c ip l ine fo r D e m o c rac y; B e y o nd
s c ie nce; The E thics o f Co mp ro mis e and the Art of Co ntainm e nt; Po

a nd Pu b l ic S erv ice ( ith L D w . . W

hit e ) ; Fo undations of D e mo c racy
S enato r R o b ert A T aft ) . .

WALTER T S TACE, b orn 1 886, Lo ndon, Engl an d B A , Litt D ,

v v
. . . . . .

Co ll ege , Dub lin I n Britis h c i il s er i c e in C ey lo n, 19 1 0 19 3 2 ,

.
-

p osts as m agistrat e, distri c t ju dge , m ajo r o f Co lo m b o , e tc Lec tu

P P P U v
.

ro fes s o r O f hilo so p hy , rinc e to n ni e rsity , 1 9 3 2 5 5 -

.

Autho r o f A Critic al His to ry of G re e k Philos op hy

of Hege l T he Meaning of B eauty The T heo
e dge and E x is te nc e T he Co nc ep t o f Morals
of W
es te rn Man ( 19 4 2 ) T he Nature of the o rl d 1 9 4 6 ) T ime a W
E ternity R e ligion and the Mo dern Mind The Gate
S ile nce

V O
CHARLE S L S T E E NS N, b o rn 19 08, Cinc inn ati, hio Undergradua O
w Y U v
. .

o rk , al e ni ers it y, 1 9 2 6 3 0; s tu di e d at C am b ri dge , Engl and, 1 9 3 0 3

- -

v U v
and at Har ard ni e rs ity , 19 3 3 3 5 T aught fo r s ev
Y Uv w Uv
-

U v
.

ni e rs ity and al e ni ersity ; ith ni ersity O f

P P hi lo so p hy Au tho r o f E thics
U v P
no w as a ro fe sso r o f .

ni ersity res s , also a nu m b er o f ess ays o n

“
v ”
Inte rp re t atio n and E alu ation in Aes the tics , in Phil os op hic al An
U v P
Max Black , e d ( Co rnell ni ersity ress, 1 9 5 0)
.

PAU W S S b M
L EI 27 orn ay City Co llege of New
19 , 1 9 01 19
H v U v i v
.
, ,

AM S ears T ra e ling F
P Yl
2 .
, D 1 9 8 , Ph
. 2 , 19 9 , ar ard
. . ni e rs ty .

21 9 9 3 0; -
ro fe s so r at a e s in ce 1 9 4 6 Fo under and e dito r, R e v ie w of
A vi
.

M ph i ( i
e ta y cs s n ce
s d d s o ry Bo ar o f Philos op hy of S c ienc e Con .

trib u to r to Am eric an Phil os op hy T o day and T o m orro w Moral

Princ ip l es of Ac tio n App ro ac hes to Wo rld Pe ac e P e rs p e c
tiv es o n Tro u b l ed D ec ade CO e ditor, Co llec ted Pap ers of Charl es
-

S Pe irce; c o nt rib uto r to te c hni c al p e rio di c als

. .

D O NALD CAR YW
ILLIAMS , b o rn May 2 8, 189 9 , Crow s Landing, C ali
O
P
fo rnia AB in Engli sh, 1 9 2 3 , c c i d ental Co l l e e , Lo s An e l es ;
g du ate
P
g g ra

v U v
. .

stu d ent o f hilo so p hy and English, Har ard ni ers ity , 19 2 3 2 4 , o f

P
hi lo s -

U v
P
o p hy an d s y c ho lo gy, n i e rsity o f Cal ifo rni a, Be rk el e , 1 9 2 5 2 7, an d o f
y
-

hilosop hy, Har ard v U v

ni e rs ity, 1 9 2 7 2 8 ; A M , 1 9 2 5 , Ph D , 19 2 8, in-
. . . .
 I ndex

J
Ad am s, G P , 2 08
A dam s , o hn, 3 8 6
. . B e n tham , J ere my , 1 7 3 ,
3 63 ,
3 68,

A d l e r, Mo rtim er
v
A d aita, 4 7 3 S e e als o .
J V
4 1 6 n, 4 4 6
e d anta
B e rgs o n, He nri, 7 6 , 8 4 , 2 7 2 , 3 1 7 , 3 1 9 ,
3 2 2 , 3 2 8, 4 7 2
Al e x an d er, S am u e l , 2 9 6 9 7 -
B erk e l ey , G e o rg e , 2 6 9 , 2 7 1 , 3 5 0
Am b ro se , Al ic e , 1 7 - 3 8 , 4 9 9 B e rlin, I s ai ah, 2 9
Am e ric an Ac ademy Of Arts an d Bl ack , Hu go L , 4 4 1 .

Bl ac k , M ax , 3 9 5 7 , 4 8 9
S cie n c es , 4 2 5
P q
-

Am eri c an C ath o l ic h il o s o p hic al Bl ak e, W illiam , u o te d, 2 9 2

P
As s o c iatio n, 2 06
fi
Bl ans h ard, Bran d , 1 8 3 9 3 , 4 9 9
q
-

Am eric an h il o s op hic al As s o c iatio n, Bl oo m e l d, L e o nard, u o te d, 1 64

5 7 n, 4 3 9 , 4 4 5 , 4 4 7 , 4 66 B o as , Franz , 2 4 3
v
J
Am es , E dw ard S c rib ner, 3 7 8
Am es , am e s B arr, 4 4 0 j
B o c c acc io , G io anni, 4 07 , 4 09
B o w e n, Mar o ri e , 4 l 7 n

q
Ap o ll o niu s o f T y an a, 2 4 7
A u in as S ee T h om as A u in as , S ain t
.

Aris to p h an es , 3 9 2 , 3 9 9 , 4 09
q
Brad l e y , F H , 2 9 4 , 2 9 5 , 3 00, 3 6 0-6 1 ,
. .

q
3 6 5 6 7 , 4 6 9 ; u ote d , 3 6 5 66
-

B rahm an, 2 9 1 , 3 00, 4 7 3

-

Aris to tl e , 3 4 , 1 8 7 , 1 8 9 , 1 9 8 , 2 65 , Braw n e , Fanny , 4 1 0

3 07 - 8 , 3 1 8 , 3 1 9 , 3 2 8 , 3 5 1 , 3 8 0, 3 8 4 , Britis h E m p iric is ts , 9 1 , 3 4 9
3 8 7 , 3 8 8, 3 8 9 , 4 02 , 4 5 0 B ro ad, C D , 2 0, 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 6 - 2 8 , 2 9 ,
. .

Arn o l d , Matth e w , 4 1 0
Asso ciatio n fo r S y mb o lic L o gic , 1 05
A tm an, 4 7 3 S e e als o B rahm an
.
q J
3 3 , 3 4 , 1 7 9 , 3 1 8 , 3 1 9 , 3 2 0, 3 2 2 ;
u o te d , 1 9

Bru n er, ero m e S , 4 2 1 .

J
Au g u s tine , S aint, 3 1 6 , 3 7 8
Au s tin, o h n, 4 4 0, 4 4 1 , 4 4 6
Bru n o , G io rd ano, 1 9 4
B u dd h is m , 4 7 3
B u rc h , G eo rg e , 3 3 l n
’

B ab b itt, I rv ing, 3 9 0
C alifo rnia, Uv ni e rs ity o f, 2 2 4

q
B ar-Hill e l , Y 73 n- 7 4 n

J Uv
C al l ah an , C h arl es C , 4 5 3 m, 4 5 4 m
.
,

William
.

B ate s o n, u o te d ,
,
C al v in, o h n, 3 7 8 , 3 84 , 3 8 5 , 3 8 7

P
B au d e l aire , Ch arl e s , 4 1 2 C am b rid g e , ni e rs ity o f, 4 4 7
B ay l e , ie rre , 4 1 6 n C an to r, G e o rg, 1 2 5

v q
B e hm an n, H e inric h , 1 3 4 C arn ap , R u d o l f, 5 8 - 7 4 , 7 5 9 2 p as s im, -

B ell, Cli e, u o t ed , 4 08 1 2 4 , 1 3 0- 3 3 , 1 5 3 , 1 6 9 , 3 4 5 , 5 00
 I NDE X 5 09

arr, Wildo n
arro ll , L ew is , 1 2 4
,
q u o te d, 1 19 E ro s , 4 1 6
E u c l i d, 7 8 , 8 3 , 9 0, 1 2 5 1 4 0-4 1 , 1 5 8 n,
,

ar te sians S ee D escartes , R ené

. 3 42
ath o l ic s ( R o m an ) , 3 8 2 , 4 4 5 4 6 -
E u rip i de s , 3 9 2 , 3 9 3
E w in g , A C , 2 5 2
. .

h iang
hi c ag o ,
Mo ulin
Uv 45 3 n ,

ni e rs ity Of, L aw
S ch oo l , J
Farre ll , am e s T , 4 1 6
Farre ll , Wal ter, 4 8 2
.

446
hi na, 4 4 2 , 4 7 3 Fau s t, 2 4 7 , 3 2 9 , 4 7 0
hi s ho l m , R o d e ric k , 7 3 n Fere n c z i, S and o r, 4 1 6m
hris tiani ty , 2 9 6 , 3 2 8 2 9 , 3 5 1 , 3 8 2 ff
J
Fe u e rb ac h , L u dw ig Andre as , 2 05
-
.

ic ero , 3 88 Fic h te , o h ann G o ttl i eb , 4 8 1 , 4 8 2

oh m, Mo rris R .
, 25 6 JP
Fitz g eral d, F S c o tt, 3 2 7
Frank , e ro m e , 4 5 3 n
.

J
C o l e ridge , S am u e l T ay l o r, 1 8 4
C o l l ins , am es, 1 9 4 2 06 , 5 00
C o l um b ia L aw S c h o o l , 4 4 6
-
Frank , hi lip p , 4 2 5 n
Frankfu rt er, Fe lix , 4 4 0
Fre g e , G o ttfrie d , 1 2 6
C omm u ni s m , 3 9 1 , 4 4 6, 4 8 9 Freu d, S igm u n d , 1 8 4 , 4 02

J
C om te , Au gus te , 2 5 1
C o tto n, o hn, 4 9 3
Craw s h aw -Wil l iam s , W , 2 5 8 n
Fu ll e r, L o n L , 4 4 6

G an dhi, Mo h and as K , 2 9 6
.

Creigh to n, E , 5 6n J . .
.

J
G ay , o hn, 3 7 1
.

D em o critu s , 3 2 8
D e m o s , R , 2 5 5 -5 6 ; u o te d, 2 5 3 - 5 4 q P J
G e rm any , 1 65 , 4 4 6, 4 8 1 , 4 8 7 , 4 9 3

J
G o e b b el s , au l o s e p h , 4 8 7
G o e th e, o h ann Wo l fg ang v o n,
q
.

D enn es , W
illi am R , 2 5 3 , 3 1 9 , 3 3 5 -5 9 , u o te d , 2 2 8

q
.

5 00 G o l d e nw eis e r, A A , 2 4 3 ; u o te d, . .

D E n trev es , A P , 4 4 6 242, 243

’
. .

D e s c arte s , R e n é, 9 - 1 0, 1 06 -7 , 1 9 6 - 9 7 , G o o dh art, S ir Arthu r L , 4 4 6 .

J
2 04 , 3 1 6 , 3 4 9 5 0 G o o dm an, Nel so n, 7 5 9 2 , 5 01
q
- -

D ew e y , o h n, 2 5 8n, 3 3 5 , 3 4 5 , 4 1 6 n, G rah am , Frank D , u o te d, 4 5 6 5 7 .

-

4 2 1, 4 6 3 , 4 72 G re e k s, 3 3 8 , 3 84 , 3 8 8 ff , 3 9 9 , 4 1 0, .

D is ney , W a l t, 4 1 5 4 14 , 4 7 1
D o u gl as , W il li am O , 4 4 1 . G re en, T h om as Hil l , 4 7 1
D ries c h, H ans , 1 06 G rii nb aum , Ad o lf, 3 3 l n

P
D u c as s e , C J , 2 07 - 2 4 , 2 5 2 , 5 00- 1

Uv
.

D uh em , i erre , 2 4 7 , 2 5 2
. G u é rar d, Al b ert, 4 l 7 n

Hai ght, A L , 4 l 7 n
J
D uk e ni e rs ity S c h o o l Of L aw , 4 1 6 . .

Hal d ane, S , 119

v
. .

E d ding to n , A , 3 1 9 , 3 2 3 Hal l , E ere tt W , 3 6 0 7 5 , 5 01 -

q
. .

Ehrli c h , E u g e n, 4 4 1 -4 2 u o te d, 4 4 2 Hamil to n, Wal ton, 4 5 3 n

E ins te in, Al b ert, 3 1 9 , 3 2 8 , 3 4 2 , 3 4 4 , Han d, L e arne d, 4 4 0, 4 4 1
45 1
U
Hartshorn e, C harl es, 2 2 5 3 5 , 3 1 8 , 5 01 -

E liz ab e th an s , 4 09
E l io t, T S , 3 9 0; u o te d, 2 9 2
. .

E lli o t, Hu gh S R , 3 7 5 m
q Harv ard niv ersity , 4 1 8 , 4 2 5 n ; L aw
S c h oo l , 4 4 6
Hay s, W H , 4 08
v
. . . .

E lli s, Ha e l o c k , 4 l 7 n
E ntrev es , A d , 44 6
’

E p ic u ru s , 3 86 , 3 9 2
. P .
H eb b , D O , 4 2 5 n
He g el , G eo rg
. .

F 1 9 5 , 2 04 - 5 , 2 64 ,W .

2 95
Eras m u s , 3 8 9 - 9 0, 3 9 4
Erns t, Morris L , uo te d, 3 9 8 . q Heidegg er, Martin, 2 05 , 3 1 7 , 3 1 9
H emi n gw ay , Ernes t, 4 1 4
 5 10 INDEX
Hind u ism , 2 9 0 9 1 , 4 4 4 , 4 4 5 , 4 7 3
Hitl e r, A d o lf, 4 4 6 , 4 8 1 , 4 8 7
-

q
J
K e y n es ,
u o te d ,
45 9
o hn M ay n ard , 2 9, 5 7n ;

H o b b es, T h o m as , 4 4 0, 4 4 2 , 4 4 9 , 4 5 7 King, H u gh R , 3 1 9 .

Ho eb e l , E Ad am s o n, 4 5 4 n
.

v
Ho lm e s , O l i e r W , u o te d, 4 8 7
”
. q Kinse y , Alfre d C , 4 01
K l u c k h o h n, C l y d e, 4 2 1 , 4 2 5 n, 4 5 3
q
.

n;

q
“
Ho l m es , S h erl o c k , 1 8 8 u o te d , 4 4 4

H o o k , S id n ey , 9 1 3 , 2 3 6 5 8 , 5 01 2 - - -
KOh l e r, W
o l fg an g , 3 4 0; u o te d, 1 9 1

q
H o p i I n dian s, 4 2 5 n Kris, E rn es t, 4 l 6 n
o u s m an, A E . .
,
q u o te s , 491 Kro e b e r, A L , 4 5 4 n ; u o te d, 4 4 2
. .

H o w iso n, W , 2 07 .

Hu ll , C l ark , 4 4 3 L ang d e ll , C h ris to p h er C , 4 4 0

v
.

H u m e , D a id , 1 8 , 1 9 , 2 2 , 1 4 5
1 9 9 2 03
-
,
3 2 9 , 3 5 0, 4 4 0-4 1 ; q , 1 5 7,
u o te d ,
L as sw e l l , H aro l d D , 4 2 0, 4 5 3 n
L aw ren c e , D H , 3 9 8 ; u o te d , 3 9 8 ,
4 05 , 4 1 3
. .
.

q
19
Hu nting to n, E llsw o rth , 4 2 4 L az ero w itz , Mo rris, 2 0
Hu tc hins, R o b e rt M , 4 4 6 L e eu w , A V an d e r, 1 6 8
q
. .

Hu x l e y , Al d o u s, u o te d , 1 6 4 6 5 L e gm an, G e rs h o n, 4 l 7 n
J
-

Hu y sm ans, o ris Karl , 4 1 2 L e ib ni z , G o ttfri e d il h e l m, B aro n v o n, W

5 7 n, 1 9 9 2 00, 2 02 - 3 , 3 07 , 3 5 0
-

I ns titu te o f R e l igio u s E d u c atio n, 3 9 6

I b s e n , He nrik , 4 07
I n dia, 2 9 4 , 4 4 4 , 4 4 5
P
L e ites , Nath an , 4 2 0
L e o X, op e , 3 8 9
L e p l ey , R ay , 4 2 0
I taly , 4 9 3 L e v y Bru hl , L u c ie n, 1 2 2 , 2 4 2 4 3
- -

JJ
L e w is , C l are n c e 1 05 , 1 3 8 , 1 4 8 -

Werner
q
ae g e r, 3 91 , 4 9 , 1 5 8 n, 3 3 0n, 3 4 7 , 3 5 7 , 4 2 0, 4 2 2 ,

JJ
ak ob so n, R o m an, 4 2 0 5 02 3 ; u o te d, 7 3 n
-

am e s ,
S aint, 3 8 9 L e w is , W
y n dh am , 3 1 7
W
il l iam , 1 2 , 1 8 8 , 18 9 , 3 1 9 ,
q
am es , Lew y , C , 2 6 2 7 , 3 4
.
-

JJ q
3 7 8, 3 9 5 , 4 4 0, 4 4 1 ; u o ted , L in c o l n, Ab rah am , 4 6 5

JJ 23 9 L o c k e, o hn, 5 7 n, 3 5 0, 4 4 1 , 4 4 9 , 4 6 4

J J
ap an, 3 9 1 L o e b , ac u es , 1 07

J am es , 3 1 7
e an s , S ir L o ew e nb e rg , 22 1

q
e ff e rs o n, T h o m as , 3 7 7 - 88 , 3 8 9 , 4 4 1 , L o w es , D , 1 8 4 .

L u th e r, M artin, 3 8 7 , 3 8 9 , 4 7 4
JJ 4 6 5 ; u o te d , 3 8 4 , 3 8 5 , 3 8 6 - 8 7
e s u s , 3 8 7 , 3 8 9 - 9 0, 4 6 9 , 4 8 7

ew s , 3 8 2 , 3 8 4 ff , 4 4 6 , 4 8 7 . M c C u l l o c h Warren S 4 2 5 n .
, ,

Mc G ilv ary E B 3 3 l n
JJ
J ob , 3 9 3 -94

o h n, S ain t, 3 8 9 Mc Ta gg art 3 19 3 2 0
Main e S ir He nry S 4 5 5 n
,

, J
. .
,

JJ o h n so n, S am u e l , 4 02

os ep h , H

J . W
B , 5 7n . .
,

Malinow sk i B 2 4 3 ; u o te d 2 4 3
Mann T ho m as 4 09
, .
,
.
,

q ,

J oy c e , am es , 4 01 , 4 04

u d aism , 3 7 8 , 3 8 4 3 S ee als o ew s . J q JJ qq
,

M annh e im Karl 2 4 7 4 5 4 n
Ma u e t ac u es 4 5 4 n
,
,

, ,

, ,

K al l e n, Ho rac e M , 3 7 6 9 6 , 5 02 M ari tain ac u e s 3 9 0 3 9 1

J
-
.
, , ,

K ant, I mm anu el , 1 3 6 , 1 9 4 , 1 9 5 , 1 9 9 Marsh al l o h n 4 4 1, ,

2 05 , 3 08 , 3 4 4 , 3 5 1 , 4 4 2 , 4 6 9 , 4 7 4 , M arx K arl 2 5 3 3 17 3 4 2
4 8 0, 4 8 2
-
Mary
,

,
th e V ,

irgin, 3 8 9
, ,

Kap l an, Ab rah am , 3 9 7 4 1 7 , 5 02 -

May a , 2 91
Kap l an, Mo rd e c ai , 3 7 8 Me ad
K e ats, o h n, 4 1 0J
Kes sl er, Frie dric h, 4 4 6
43 3 3 4
,

-
G eo rg e H

Meino ng, Al exiu s , 1 5 8 n

.
, 2 8 1 , 3 3 0n, 4 2 5 n,
 5 1 2 m u

q
S ad e , Mar u is de , 4 1 2

qv
S an tay an a, G eo rg e, 2 5 7 , 3 3 0n, 3 3 1 n ;
u o te d , 2 5 7 , 4 02

S a ig ny , Frie dric h Karl v o n, 4 4 1

S c h il l e r, F C S , 3 9 2
. . .

S c hl ic k , Mo ritz , 1 7 9 , 3 4 5
S c h n eid e r, H erb e rt , 2 7 7 -
86, 5 05 W .

S c ho p e nh au e r, Arthu r, 3 3 0n
S c hro e d e r, T h eo d o re , uo te d, 3 9 8 q
S c ip io nic c irc l e , 3 9 2
S e agl e ,
S e ll ars ,
W
W
il liam, u o te d , 3 9 8
ilfrid, 1 3 5 -5 9 , 5 05
q
S ex tu s , 1 5 7
S h ak es p e are , 1 6 9 , 2 1 5 , 2 7 7 , 3 9 9
S h anno n, C l au de , 4 2 0
S h aw , G eo rg e B e rn ard, 4 07
S h e ff e r, He nry , 9 9 - 1 00
S h e l d o n, W il li am H , 4 2 4 .

S h e l do n , W ilm o n H , 1 88, 4 6 8 - 8 4 , 5 05 .

S h il s , E dw ard A , 4 2 5 n .

P
S id gw ic k , H e nry , 3 7 5 n
S id ne y , h il ip , 4 08
S itting Bu ll , 3 7 8
S m art, H R , 5 6 n
. .

S mi th, T V , 4 85 9 7 , 5 05 6
. .
- -

P
S o crates , 1 7 1 , 2 8 4 , 4 7 1
S o rokin, itirim A , 4 5 4 n .

S p e nc e r, Herb e rt, 3 2 8 , 4 7 7
S p engl e r, O sw ald , 2 4 7
S p ino z a, B aru c h , 1 6 8 6 9 , 1 9 5 - 2 05 p as -

s im, 2 5 6 , 3 00, 3 2 9 , 3 3 8 , 3 5 0, 3 7 8 ,

4 02
Wal ter T
J
S tac e , , 2 8 7 - 3 00 5 06
,
.

“ S tal in o se h 4 8 1 4 8 7
, p , ,

S te arns , I sab e l, 3 3 0n
S te b b ing, L S , 5 7 n
v
. .

S te ens o n, C h arl es L , 1 6 0- 8 0, 4 2 2 .
,

4 2 5 n, 4 3 9 n, 4 8 3 , 5 06

P
S toic s , 3 8 7 , 4 05 6, 4 7 4 , 4 8 0 -

S traw so n, . F .
,
5 7n
S w inb u rne , Al g erno n, 4 1 4

T ac itu s , 3 8 8
T ay l o r, A E . 2 11 .
,

T ay l o r, Ric h ard, 2 3 5 n

T ere n c e , 3 9 2 , 3 9 5
T h an ato s ,
T h ay er, V .
, 440