164. (10) Filamer Christian Institute vs.
IAC circumstances, even if the trial court did find Allan guilty of negligence, such
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 16, 1990 485
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 75112. October 16, 1990.*
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, HONORABLE ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and the late
POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR., as substituted by his heirs, namely: LEONA
KAPUNAN TIANGCO, CICERO KAPUNAN, JESUS KAPUNAN, SANTIAGO
KAPUNAN, POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, JR., PAZ KAPUNAN PUBLICO,
SUSA KAPUNAN GENUINO, and ERLINDA KAPUNAN TESORO,
respondents.
Torts;  Quasi-Delict;  Even assuming that an employer-employee
relationship exists between Filamer and Funtecha, still, Filamer can-
_________________
*
 THIRD DIVISION.
486
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals
not be made liable for the damages sustained by the victim, considering
that at the time of the accident, Funtecha was not acting within the scope of
his employment.—But even if we were to concede the status of an employee
on Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be
imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the
accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within
the scope of his supposed employment. His duty was to sweep the school
passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes. Taking the
wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening
and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries
to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. In
other words, at the time of the injury, Funtecha was not engaged in the
execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed, but for some
purpose of his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full
brunt of his tortious negligence. Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for
the damages he had caused.
Civil Procedure; Parties;  A person who was not impleaded in the
complaint could not be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man
shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger.—Private
respondents' attempt to hold petitioner Filamer directly and primarily
answerable to the injured party under Article 2180 of the Civil Code would
have prospered had they proceeded against Allan Masa, the authorized
driver of the Pinoy jeep and undisputably an employee of petitioner. It was
Allan's irresponsible act of entrusting the wheels of the vehicle to the
inexperienced Funtecha which set into motion the chain of events leading to
the accident resulting in injuries to Kapunan, Sr. But under the present set of
conclusion would not be binding on Allan. It must be recalled that Allan was
never impleaded in the complaint for damages and should be considered as
a stranger as far as the trial court's judgment is concerned. It is axiomatic
that no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger.
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Jurado, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Aquilina B. Brotarlo for petitioner.
     Rhodora G. Kapunan for the Substituted Heirs of the late respondent.
487
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 16, 1990 487
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals
FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 14
in Civil Case No. V-4222 which found petitioner Filamer Christian Institute
and Daniel Funtecha negligent and therefore answerable for the resulting
injuries caused to private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr.
Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-twoyear old
retired schoolteacher (now deceased), was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned
by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha, as
Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the
evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr.
suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty
(20) days.
Evidence showed that at the precise time of the vehicular accident, only
one headlight of the jeep was functioning. Funtecha, who only had a student
driver's permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the
authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him. The two fled from the scene
after the incident. A tricycle driver brought the unconscious victim to the
hospital.
Thereafter, Kapunan, Sr. instituted a criminal case against Funtecha
alone in the City Court of Roxas City for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Kapunan, Sr. reserved his right to file an independent
civil action. The inferior court found Funtecha guilty as charged and on
appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the then Court of First Instance of
Capiz.2
Pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for
damages3 before the RTC of Roxas City. Named defendants in the complaint
were petitioner Filamer and Funtecha.
______________
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Desiderio P. Jurado and concurred in by
Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon. Associate
Justice Crisolito Pascual did not take part.
2
 Annex E of Petition, p. 49. Rollo.
3
 Civil Case No. V-4222.
Page 1 of 4
 488
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals
Also included was Agustin Masa, the director and president of Filamer
Christian Institute, in his personal capacity "in that he personally authorized
and allowed said Daniel Funtecha who was his houseboy at the time of the
incident, to drive the vehicle in question despite his knowledge and
awareness that the latter did not have the necessary license or permit to
drive said vehicle. His son, Allan Masa, who was with Funtecha at the time of
the accident, was not impleaded as a co-defendant.4
On December 14, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment finding not only
petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa, a non-
party. Thus:
"WHEREFORE, finding the averments in the complaint as supported by
preponderance of evidence to be reasonable and justified, and that
defendants Daniel Funtecha, Filamer Christian Institute and Allan Masa are
at fault and negligent of the acts complained of which causes (sic) injury to
plaintiff, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, namely: Daniel Funtecha and Filamer Christian Institute, the
employer whose liability is primary and direct, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff the following:
1. "(1)to pay the sum of TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P2,950.50) as
medical expenses (Exh. 'A');
2. "(2)to pay TWO HUNDRED FORTY ONE PESOS
(P241.00) as doctor's fee (Exh. 'C');
3. "(3)to pay THREE HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (P390.00)
as additional expenses incurred for thirty-nine days at
P10.00 a a day, for remuneration of plaintiffs helper while
recuperating;
4. "(4)to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) as
Court litigation expenses;
5. "(5)to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) as
loss of earnings capacity;
6. "(6)to pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) pesos as
moral damages;
7. "(7)to pay FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P4,500.00) as attorney's fees;
8. "(8)to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as
insurance indemnity on the policy contract;
_________________
4
 Records, pp. 1 and 3.
489
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 16, 1990 489
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals
and without prejudice to the right of defendant Filamer Christian Institute to
demand from co-defendant Daniel Funtecha part-time employee and/or Allan
Masa a full time employee reimbursement of the damages paid to herein
plaintiff.
'The defendant Agustin Masa as director of defendant Filamer Christian
Institute has also failed to exercise the diligence required of a good father of
a family in the supervision of his employee Allan Masa, being his son.
However, the court absolved defendant Agustin Masa from any personal
liability with respect to the complaint filed against him in his personal and
private capacity, cause he was not in the vehicle during the alleged incident.
"For failure to prove their respective counterclaims filed by the defendant
Daniel Funtecha, Dr. Agustin Masa, and Filamer Christian Institute, as
against the herein plaintiff, same are hereby dismissed.
'The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant has failed to
prove that there was a policy violation made by the defendant Filamer
Christian Institute which absolves them from liability under the aforesaid
insurance policy. The record shows that the defendant Daniel Funtecha while
driving the said vehicle was having a student drivers license marked Exh. '1'
and accompanied by Allan Masa who is the authorized driver of said vehicle
with a professional drivers license as shown by Exh. '3'.
"This Court finds that defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said
vehicle is considered as authorized driver in accordance with the policy in
question marked Exh. '2-Masa and FCI.
"Finding the averments in the third party complaint filed by defendant
Filamer Christian Institute as supported by preponderance of evidence as
shown by their exhibits to be reasonable and justified, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the said defendant and third party plaintiff Filamer
Christian Institute as against third party defendant Zenith Insurance
Corporation.
'The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant is hereby
ordered to pay in favor of the defendant and third party plaintiff, Filamer
Christian Institute, the following:
1. "(1)to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as
third party liability as provided in the Zenith Insurance
Corporation policy (Exh. '2');
2. "(2)to pay TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as moral
3. "(3)to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) as
Court litigation and actual expenses;
4. "(4)to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) as
attorney's fees;
490
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals
"The defendants Daniel Funtecha, Filamer Christian Institute and third party
defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation are hereby ordered jointly and
severally, to pay the costs of the suit."5
Page 2 of 4
Only petitioner Filamer and third-party defendant Zenith Insurance
Corporation appealed the lower court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and
as a consequence, said lower court's decision became final as to Funtecha.
For failure of the insurance firm to pay the docket fees, its appeal was
dismissed on September 18, 1984. On December 17, 1985, the Appellate
Court rendered the assailed judgment affirming the trial court's decision in
toto.6 Hence, the present recourse by petitioner Filamer.
It is petitioner Filamer's basic contention that it cannot be held
responsible for the tortious act of Funtecha on the ground that there is no
existing employer-employee relationship between them. We agree.
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter."
"Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
"x x x      xxx      xxx.
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
"xxx      xxx      xxx.
"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage." (Italics supplied).
The legal issue in this appeal is whether or not the term
_________________
5
 Records, pp. 572-573.
6
 Rollo, pp. l77 and 21.
491
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 16, 1990 491
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals
"employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with
reference to Funtecha.
In disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer has invoked the provisions of the
Labor Code,7 specifically Section 14, Rule X of Book III which reads:
"Sec. 14. Working scholars.—There is no employer-employee relationship
between students on the one hand, and schools, colleges or universities on
the other, where students work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to
study free of charge; provided the students are given real opportunity,
including such facilities as may be reasonable, necessary to finish their
chosen courses under such arrangement." (Italics supplied).
It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law, petitioner Filamer
cannot be considered as Funtecha's employer. Funtecha belongs to that
special category of students who render service to the school in exchange for
free tuition. Funtecha worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a
week. He was assigned to clean the school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to
6:00 a.m. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As
admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the
company payroll.8
The wording of Section 14 is clear and explicit and leaves no room for
equivocation. To dismiss the implementing rule as one which governs only
the "personal relationship" between the school and its students and not
where there is already a third person involved, as espoused by private
respondents, is to read into the law something that was not legislated there in
the first place. The provision of Section 14 is obviously intended to eliminate
an erstwhile gray area in labor relations and seeks to define in categorical
terms the precise status of working scholars in relation to the learning
institutions in which they work for the privilege of a free education.
But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha,
still the primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to
petitioner Filamer for the plain reason
________________
7
 Presidential Decree No. 442.
8
 Records, p. 569.
492
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals
that at the time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha
was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. His duty was to
sweep the school passages for two hours every morning before his regular
classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at
6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner
resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within the
ambit of his assigned tasks. In other words, at the time of the injury,
Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for
which he was employed, but for some purpose of his own. It is but fair
therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence.
Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused.
Private respondents' attempt to hold petitioner Filamer directly and
primarily answerable to the injured party under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
would have prospered had they proceeded against Allan Masa, the
authorized driver of the Pinoy jeep and undisputably an employee of
petitioner. It was Allan's irresponsible act of entrusting the wheels of the
vehicle to the inexperienced Funtecha which set into motion the chain of
events leading to the accident resulting in injuries to Kapunan , Sr. But under
the present set of circumstances, even if the trial court did find Allan guilty of
negligence, such conclusion would not be binding on Allan. It must be
Page 3 of 4
recalled that Allan was never impleaded in the complaint for damages and
should be considered as a stranger as far as the trial court's judgment is
concerned. It is axiomatic that no man shall be affected by a proceeding to
which he is a stranger.9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision under review of the
Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. The complaint for damages 10 is
ordered DISMISSED as against petitioner Filamer Christian Institute for lack
of cause of action. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Bidin and Cortés, JJ., concur.
_______________
9
 Church Assistance Program vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 76552, March
21,1989.
10
 Civil Case No. V-4222.
493
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 493
Reas vs. Bonife
     Gutierrez, Jr., J., I concur but limit my concurrence on the employee-
employer relationship to labor law situations.
     Feliciano, J., On leave.
Decision set aside.
Note.—Res judicata cannot be invoked by employer even if his driver
was acquitted in the criminal action wherein the filing of a separate civil
action was not asserted. (Gula vs. Dianala, 132 SCRA 245.)
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