Stephen Jeane V. Legaspi Atty.

Neil Guzman
BSLM-3A September 13, 2020

People of the Philippines vs. Bernardino Gaffud

G.R. No. 168050 September 19, 2008

FACTS:

This case is to review the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 31, 2005 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00060 finding the accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. guilty of the
complex crime of double murder and sentencing him to death, affirming with modification the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dated August 28, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 1125.
Accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr., along with two John Does were indicted for Double
Murder for the killing of Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador. That accused-appellant in the
evening of May 10, 1994 about 8:00 o’clock at Sitio Biton, Barangay Wasid, Municipality of
Nagtipunan, Province of Quirino, Philippines went to the house of Manuel and Analyn Salvador
with the intent to kill and motivated by long standing grudge, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, shot and burn Manuel and Analyn Salvador which caused their instantaneous
death. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ferdinand Orias resolved that charges for double murder
by means of fire be filed against herein appellant and two John Does, when appellant Gaffud, Jr.
failed to appear despite being subpoenaed to submit his counter-affidavit.

The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses against appellant Gaffud, Jr., namely Dominga
Salvador, common-law wife of Manuel Salvador and mother of Analyn Salvador, Orly Salvador,
nephew of Manuel Salvador, Potado Ballang, Barangay Captain of Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino,
Dan Dangpal, a neighbor of the deceased, SPO2 Dominador Tabal, the investigating police, and
Dr. Teodomiro Hufana who conducted the autopsy on the deceased Manuel Salvador. In the
statement of Dominga Salvador, it was stated that Bernardino Gaffud, Jr., was their neighbor
and she went to its house to see him about the share of her husband in the construction of
barangay hall which was contracted to him. Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. stated that he will go to her
house to introduce his in-law Balbino Bravo to her husband. Thereafter, she went home, and
left again at around 11:00 AM, leaving behind her husband Manuel Salvador and their daughter
Analyn. And Later that night, she was at Natipunan, Quirino attending a seminar for "hilot."In
the testimony of Orly Salvador, he was about to fetch his uncle Manuel for a wedding, but saw
the house of his uncle burning with three men within the vicinity leaving towards the Cagayan
river. He was able to identify one person which is Bernardino Gaffud which is the one who was
holding the flashlight In the testimony of Barangay Captain Potato Ballang, he said that he saw
Gaffud, Jr., on the same day along the riverbanks and when he asked him it told that he was
looking for his boat. However, Potado knew that the appellant did not own a boat. After a few
minutes, Potado left to attend the wedding party being held at the barangay hall. Another
testimony that was dispensed but agreed upon was the testimony of Dan Dangpal. It was said
that in the same date at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening he saw the deceased’s house burning
about 200 meters away. He heard persons laughing and saw the light of a flashlight and persons
moving away from the burning house. He could not recognize any of them. The testimony from
the police investigator, SPO2 Dominador Tabal illustrated that the bodies were hanged in the
Melina tree so that the dogs couldn’t reach it. It was also said that from the pictures taken, the
victim had a fractured head, and the other one had wound on the side. The last testimony was
from Dr. Teodomiro Hufana which was also dispensed, it stated the contents/ findings of his
autopsy which was the bodies were cremated charcoaled, about 3 ft. long, stomach and
intestine (Large) protruding from the abdomen. There was the presence of semi-burned rattan
about 1 inch long about 1 cm. in diameter on the burned hand. Also, the presence of a peculiar
hole from the thoracic cavity directed downward to the body, probably gunshot wound.

Appellant denied the accusation leveled against him, and testified that the approximate time of
the burning of the victims’ house, he was at home, entertaining his in-laws, Balbino Bravo and
Rufina Bravo, who was there for a visit. After eating dinner, he and Balbino Bravo talked. At
around 7:00 to 8:00 PM, he and Balbino Bravo saw a blaze coming from the other side of the
Cagayan River, about 50 to 80 meters away from the house of the Bravos. They did not mind
the blaze, and instead went to sleep. The next morning, they heard news about somebody
being burned, and because of this, he and Balbino Bravo hiked to the place of the incident.
That’s where he found that his "pare" Manuel Salvador and his daughter were burned in their
house. After seeing the dead bodies, appellant went home. He went back later, and was even
designated by the Barangay Captain to guard the bodies of the deceased. Thereafter, he was
forced to evacuate his family from Nagtipunan, because the Ilongot tribe was forcing him to
testify against someone but he didn’t want to. He was told that something might happen to his
family if he didn’t leave. Death penalty was imposed by the Regional Trial Court and was
transferred to Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition per Resolution.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not there was a conspiracy?

(2) Whether or not accused-appellant should be held liable for two (2) separate counts
of murder or for the complex crime of double murder?
RULING:

(1) No, there was no conspiracy. It was ruled in this case that the failure of the Court of
Appeals to prove conspiracy was not fatal. he rule is that in the absence of evidence
showing the direct participation of the accused in the commission of the crime,
conspiracy must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order to convict
the accused.13 In the case at bar, however, we hold that the direct participation of
accused-appellant in the killing of the victims, Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador,
was established beyond doubt by the evidence of the prosecution. Hence, a finding
of conspiracy in this instance is not essential for the conviction of accused-appellant.

(2) Yes, it was held by the court that under the Revised Penal Code there a was a
complex crime of double murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed
by means of fire. Since the maximum penalty imposed for murder was death, when
the case was pending in the CA, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of death for
the complex crime of double murder instead of the two death penalties imposed by
the RTC for two counts of murder. The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in
the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the
accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The
rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes with single criminal
impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by
different acts and several criminal resolutions. In view, however, of the passage of
Republic Act No. 9346 (otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines"), we reduce the penalty of death to reclusion
Perpetua with no eligibility for parole. It sustained the award by the CA of moral
damages in the amount of P100,000, or P50,000 for each victim, in view of the grief
and sorrow suffered by the heirs of the victims. It likewise affirms the award of
nominal damages in the amount of P10,000 for the value of the burned house as
sufficiently explained by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. The civil indemnity for the
death of the victims is increased to P150,000, or P75,000 for each victim; and
accused-appellant is ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000,
or P25,000 for each victim.
 United States vs. Carson Taylor
G.R. No. L-9726 December 8, 1914

FACTS:
On 25 September, 1913, the case of Carson Taylor, the manager of Manila Bulletin for
being criminally liable for libel was disputed. Carson Taylor was the acting editor and
proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, of a certain
daily bilingual newspaper, edited in the English and Spanish languages, and known as the
’Manila Daily Bulletin,’ a paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as
in the United States and other countries in all of which both languages are spoken and written,
having as such the supervision and control of said newspaper. He was being accused of libel for
willfully, feloniously, maliciously, and with intent to impeach the honesty, virtue, and
reputation of one Ramon Sotelo as member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as a private
individual, and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, compose, print, edit,
publish, and circulate and procure to be composed, printed, edited, published, and circulated in
said newspaper’s issue of the above mentioned date, September 25, 1913.

The content of the newspaper which the plaintiff petitioned for the being the grounds
for libel contains phrases such as, “‘OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE. —
CRIMINAL CHARGES FOLLOW CIVIL SUIT.” "‘Conspiracy divulged in three sworn statements
made by members of the party after a family disagreement. Sensational statement sworn to.
Mystery of Calle O’Donnell fire solved and papers served” and many more. The conspiracy as an
offense was being pertained to Ramon Sotelo, Vicente Sotelo and, and Eugenio Martin. The
article also contains this paragraph “Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the
name of the attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and
against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original owners,’ by
which the said accused meant to refer and did refer to the said Ramon Sotelo, who then and
there was the attorney for the plaintiff in the case aforesaid, No. 10191 of the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, and so was understood by the public who read the same; that
the statements and allegations made in said paragraph are wholly false and untrue, thus
impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of the said offended party as a member of the
bar of the Philippine Islands and as a private individual, and exposing him to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule. Contrary to law."

Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, plead not guilty, was tried,
found guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced by the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge, to
pay a fine of P200. The defendant in his response appealed that there were errors committed
by the court. There were many errors as to the defendant, but those deemed to be necessary
after examination was that “the court erred in finding that the defendant was responsible for
and guilty of the alleged libel.” And “The court erred in finding that the defendant was the
proprietor and publisher of the ’Manila Daily Bulletin.”

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not, Carson Taylor as the manager of Manila Bulletin committed the act
of libel?

RULING:
(1) No, it was ruled that Carson Taylor as the manager of Manila Bulletin cannot be held
liable for the act libel. As provided by Section 6 of the Libel Law (Act No. 277), it only
provides a punishment only for the "author, editor, or proprietor," for the
publication of a libel in a newspaper. By an examination of said article, with
reference to the persons who may be liable for the publication of a libel in a
newspaper, it was ruled that it only provides for the punishment of "the author,
editor, or proprietor." It would follow, therefore, that unless the proof shows that
the defendant in the present case is the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the
newspaper in which the libel was published, he cannot be held liable. It was also said
by the Solicitor General in his brief that “We might, by a series of presumptions and
assumptions, conclude that the manager of a newspaper has some direct
responsibility with its publication. We believe, however, that such presumptions and
assumptions, in the absence of a single letter of proof relating thereto, would be
unwarranted and unjustified.” Therefore, there being no proof whatever in the
record showing that the defendant was the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of
the newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower court must be reversed, the
complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged from the custody of the law, with
costs de officio.
 The United States vs. Andres Pablo
G.R. No. L-11676 October 16, 1916

FACTS:
On 21 October, 1915, Andres Pablo, a police officer from the municipality of Balanga
went to Barrio of Tuyo to comply with the order of his chief, Jose D. Reyes. Andres Pablo went
to the place mentioned to raid a jueteng game but before he arrived the player ran away and
left. However, at a vacant lot the defendant there found Francisco Dato at a short distance
away, a low table. Notwithstanding that the officer had seen the men Maximo Malicsi and
Antonio Rodrigo leave the said lot, yet, as at first, he had seen no material proof that the game
was being played, he refrained from arresting them, and on leaving the place only arrested
Francisco Daro, who had remained there. Thereafter, Andres presented a memorandum to his
chief containing the following statement: "In the barrio of Tuyo I raided a jueteng na bilat game,
seized a tambiolo and bolas, and saw the cabecillas Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and
the gambler Francisco Dato. I saw the two cabecillas escape." On October 22, 1915, the chief of
police, Jose D. Reyes, filed a complaint charging Rodrigo, Malicsi and Dato for violating
municipal ordinance no. 5. As a result, the accused were arrested but afterwards admitted to
bail.
The hearing of the case held that Francisco Dato pleaded guilty. The other two accused,
Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, pleaded not guilty; therefore, during the trial the chief of
police presented the memorandum exhibited by the policeman Andres Pablo, who testified
under oath that on the date mentioned he and Tomas de Leon went to the said barrio to raid a
jueteng game, but that before they arrived there they saw from afar that some persons started
to run toward the hills; that when witness and his companion arrived at a vacant lot they saw
Francisco Dato and a low table there, and the table caused them to suspect that a jueteng
game was being carried on; that in fact they did find on one side of the lot a tambiolo and 37
bolas, but that they did not see the accused Rodrigo and Malicsi on the said lot, nor did they
see them run; and that only afterwards did the witness learn that these latter were the
cabecillas or ringleaders in the jueteng game, from information given him by an unknown
person. In view of this testimony by the police officer who made the arrest and of the other
evidence adduced at the trial the court acquitted the defendants Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo
Malicsi and sentenced only Francisco Dato, as a gambler.
On December 1, 1915, after preliminary examination, the provincial fiscal filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Bataan charging Andres Pablo with the crime of
perjury, under the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1697. The extract of the complaint stated
Andres Pablo, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affirm and swear in legal form before the
justice of the peace court as follow: `We did not there overtake the accused Antonio Rodrigo
and Maximo Malicsi, nor did we even see them run,' the said statement being utterly false, as
the accused well knew that it was, and material to the decision of the said criminal cause No.
787. The case came to trial and on December 28, 1915, the court rendered judgment therein
sentencing the defendant to the penalty of two years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P100 and,
in case of insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The
defendant was also disqualified from thereafter holding any public office and from testifying in
the courts of the Philippine Islands until the said disqualification should be removed. From this
judgment he appealed.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the respondent is guilty of the crime of perjury or of false testimony
under art. 318 to 324 of the Revised Penal Code?

RULING:
(1) Yes, it was held that Andres Pablo is guilty of the crime perjury under Article 318 to
324 of the Revised Penal Code. From the moment that Act was repealed by the
Administrative Code, the needs of society have made it necessary that the said
articles 318 to 324 should be deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the Administrative
Code, in repealing the said Act relating to perjury, has not explicitly provided that
the said articles of the Penal Code have likewise been repealed. It was also stated
under Law 11, Title 2, Book 3, of the Novisima Recopilacion, that “All the laws of the
kingdom, not expressly repealed by other subsequent laws, must be literally obeyed
and the excuse that they are not in use cannot avail.” Therefore, in consideration of
the fact that in the case at bar the evidence shows it to have been duly proven that
the defendant, Andres Pablo, in testifying in the cause prosecuted for gambling at
jueteng, perverted the truth, for the purpose of favoring the alleged gamblers,
Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, with the aggravating circumstance of the
crime being committed through bribery, there concurred the aggravating
circumstance of price or reward, No. 3 of article 10 of the Code, with no mitigating
circumstance to offset the effects of the said aggravating one; wherefore the
defendant has incurred the maximum period of the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum degree to prision correccional in its medium degree, and a fine. For the
foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed was reversed and Andres Pablo was
sentenced to the penalty of two years four months and one day of prision
correccional, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and, in case of insolvency, to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, which shall not exceed one-third of the
principal penalty. He shall also pay the costs of both instances.
 People of the Philippines vs. The Sandiganbayan and Ceferino S. Paredes
G.R. No. 101724 July 3,
1992

FACTS:
Teofilo Gelacio with the Tanodbayan filed two letter-complaints on October 28, 1986
and December 9, 1986. Gelacio is a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of
Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of Agusan del Sur. The letter-complaints were filed shortly
after the private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial governor of Agusan del
Sur in March 1986. Gelacio’s complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he
was still the provincial attorney in 1976, of a free patent title for Lot No. 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an
area of 1,391 sq.m., more or less, in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan
del Sur.
On February 23, 1989, the City Fiscal of Butuan City instigated by the Tanodbayan,
subpoenaed Governor Paredes. However, the subpoena was served on, and received by, the
Station Commander of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, who did not serve it on Paredes. Despite
the absence of notice to Paredes, Deputized Tanodbayan/City Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy
conducted a preliminary investigation ex parte. He recommended that an information be filed
in court. His recommendation was approved by the Tanodbayan who, on August 10, 1989, filed
the following information in the Sandiganbayan where it was docketed as TBP Case No. 86-
03368. The information mainly contains the action of Governor Paredes when he was still a
provincial Attorney. It states that “the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, having been duly appointed and qualified as such, taking
advantage of his public position, did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully persuade,
influence and induce the Land Inspector of the Bureau of Lands, by the name of Armando L.
Luison to violate an existing rule or regulation duly promulgated by competent authority by
misrepresenting to the latter that the land subject of an application filed by the accused with
the Bureau of Lands is disposable by a free patent when the accused well knew that the said
land had already been reserved for a school site.”
Through the warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan, Paredes was arrested. On April 5,
1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent Motion to Quash Information and to
Recall Warrant of Arrest" alleging that: he is charged for an offense which has prescribed; the
preliminary investigation were invalid for lack of notice to him; and his constitutional right to
due process had been violated by the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, an amendatory law which increase
prescription from 10 years to 15, is applicable to the case at bar?

RULING:
(1) No, it was ruled under the law that it cannot apply to the case at bar as it would be
prejudicial to the accused. It was held that Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was
approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by increasing
from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment
of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given
retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January
1976 yet, for it would be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the
substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11,
R.A. 3019 which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed
it. To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would
alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that
had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. Since
an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article III, 1987
Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that
Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in
1976, six (6) years before B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new
prescriptive period under that law should apply only to those offenses which were
committed after the approval of B.P. Blg. 195.
 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto
G.R. No. 145184 March 14, 2008

FACTS:
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee vs. Hon Aniano A. Desierto is case
concerning a review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Order of the Ombudsman
dated July 6, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Administrative Order No. 13 on October 8, 1992, which created herein petitioner
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). On March 6, 1996
and June 28, 1996, Orlando S. Salvador (Salvador), in his capacity as PCGG consultant, executed
three separate Sworn Statements stating that among the loan accounts referred by the Assets
Privatization Trust to the Committee for investigation, report and recommendation are those of
the following corporations: P.R. Garcia and Sons Development and Investment Corporation
(PRGS), Golden River Mining Corporation (Golden River), and Filipinas Carbon and Mining
Corporation (Filcarbon). The loan account of PRGS, Salvador alleged that the said corporation
obtained from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) an initial loan guarantee of
₱26,726,774.72 and a straight industrial loan amounting to ₱29,226,774.72. As to Golden River,
Salvador claimed that the corporation obtained loan accommodations from DBP beginning
from 1975 until 1982 and that as of October 31, 1986, it had a total obligation of
₱43,193,000.00; that out of its five loan accounts, only the first two loans of Golden River
obtained in 1975 and 1977 were sufficiently collateralized, leaving three other loans without
any sufficient collateral, to wit: refinancing loan obtained in 1980 for the amount of
₱14,724,430.00; refinancing loan obtained on March 13, 1982 for the amount of
₱5,551,000.00; and refinancing loan obtained on December 1, 1982 for the amount of
₱7,118,656.52. As to the loan account of Filcarbon, Salvador averred that the said corporation
applied with the National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) a loan guarantee of
P27.4 Million on January 17, 1977. The loan of Filcarbon was recommended and approved by
PNB's Board of Directors on August 17, 1977.

Salvador alleged that, based on the evidence submitted to the Committee, these three
corporations did not have sufficient collaterals and adequate capital to repay the loans they
obtained, except with respect to the loans obtained by Golden River in 1975 and 1977. The
complaint against respondents PRGS and members of the Board of Directors of DBP, was
docketed as docketed as OMB-0-96-2643. The complaint against Golden River and members of
the Board of Directors of DBP was docketed as OMB-0-96-2644. Lastly, the complaint against
officers and stockholders of Filcarbon, was docketed as OMB-0-96-2645.

Subsequently, the three aforementioned cases were consolidated by the Office of the
Ombudsman. In his assailed Order of July 6, 1998, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation
of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, dismissed the complaints against herein
respondents. The Ombudsman ruled that, except with respect to the two loan transactions
entered into by Golden River in 1982, all the offenses alleged by the Committee as having been
committed by herein respondents had already prescribed under the provisions of Section 11 of
R.A. No. 3019. As to the two 1982 transactions of Golden River, the Ombudsman found that,
contrary to the claims of herein petitioner, the loan accounts obtained by the said corporation
have sufficient collaterals. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Ombudsman
denied it in its Order dated August 31, 1998.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion for dismissing
the complaints without requiring respondents to file their counter-affidavits?

RULING:
(1) No. It was held that under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint outright for want of palpable
merit. At that point, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary
investigation upon receipt of a complaint. The Ombudsman has discretion to
determine whether a preliminary investigation is proper. It is only when the
Ombudsman opts not to dismiss the complaint outright for lack of palpable merit
would the Ombudsman be expected to require the respondents to file their counter-
affidavit and petitioner, its reply. Lastly, the Court finds nothing erroneous in the
Ombudsman's act of consolidating the three complaints and of issuing a single order
for their dismissal considering that, with the exception of the complaint regarding
the two 1982 loan accounts of Golden River which was separately discussed by the
Ombudsman on their merits, the dismissal of all the other complaints was based on
a common ground, which is prescription. However, in the remand of the complaints
against respondents, orderly administration of justice behooves the Ombudsman
not to consolidate the three complaints, as the respective respondents therein
 would inevitably raise different defenses which would require separate presentation
of evidence by the parties involved.

People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Simeon Ferrer

G.R. No. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

FACTS:
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion
Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On
March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima
facie case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding
information. Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder. Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same
court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. On July 21, 1970
Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of
attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title
thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws. Resolving the constitutional
issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void
on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the
informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. It resolved to treat its appeal
as a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder?

RULING:
No. It was ruled under Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of
attainder or ex port facto law shall be enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which
inflicts punishment without trial. In the case, if Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder then it
would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more,
would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to
be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined
the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its
subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective. The ingredient of
specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15This
constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The
former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the
latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA) vs. Hon. Margarito B. Teves
G.R. No. 181704 December 6, 2011

FACTS:
The former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 on January
25, 2005 and took effect on February 11, 2005. RA No.9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status. The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR
and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development
Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules
and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and
procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection
falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the
Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions,
including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to
promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA No. 9335, to be approved
by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose. The Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee approved the assailed IRR on May 22, 2006. Subsequently,
the IRR was published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation. Petitioner
Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), an association of rank-and-file employees
of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) and the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and represented by its National
President, Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan (Pagulayan), directly filed the present petition before this
Court against respondents Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Finance (DOF), Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales (Commissioner Morales), in his capacity as
BOC Commissioner, and Lilian B. Hefti, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR).
Officers of BOCEA were summoned and required to sign the Performance Contracts but
they also refused. To ease the brewing tension, BOCEA claimed that its officers sent letters, and
sought several dialogues with BOC officials but the latter refused to heed them. In addition,
BOCEA alleged that Commissioner Morales exerted heavy pressure on the District Collectors,
Chiefs of Formal Entry Divisions, Principal Customs Appraisers and Principal Customs Examiners
of the BOC during command conferences to make them sign their Performance Contracts.
BOCEA further claimed that Pagulayan was constantly harassed and threatened with lawsuits.
BOCEA assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, particularly in: the employees’
right to due process because the termination of employees who had not attained their revenue
targets for the year is peremptory and done without any form of hearing to allow said
employees to ventilate their side; R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’
right to equal protection of the law; violated employees’ right to security of tenure because
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR effectively removed remedies provided in the ordinary course of
administrative procedure afforded to government employees; violated the 1987 Constitution
because Congress granted to the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) the unbridled
discretion of formulating the criteria for termination; and R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder
because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees
without trial.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEA’s members to:
(a) equal protection of laws, (b) security of tenure and (c) due process?

(2) Whether or not R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder?

RULING:
(1) No. It was ruled under the law that equal protection simply provides that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause
is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by
its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. In other
words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. It was also
held that with respect to RA [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the
 optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and
the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating
revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs
duties, fees and charges. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They
principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which
the State exercises one of its great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law.
Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA
[No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

(2) No. It was ruled that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a
legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular
group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of
certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal
or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the
elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a
judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a
BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The
democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the
concerned employee are amply protected. On a final note created by the court it
was held that R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and
to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.50 We have
so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are
constitutional.
 Rene V. Saguisag et. al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
G.R. No. 212426 January 12, 2016

FACTS:
The case in dispute was to question the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA) as its constitutionality. The agreement was between the Republic of the Philippines and
the United States of America (U.S.). Rene V. Saguisag et. al. allege that respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they entered into
EDCA with the U.S. Petitioners stated that the instrument or agreement violated multiple
constitutional provisions. The respondents in their response, invoke the 1987 Constitution,
treaties, and judicial precedents and even argue that petitioners lack standing to bring the suit.
The petition led to the laying down of the constitutional powers and roles of the President and
the Senate in respect of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). It was stated
under the Law that the powers of the President are: The prime duty of the Government is to
serve and protect the people; The duty to protect the territory and the citizens of the
Philippines, the power to call upon the people to defend the State, and the President as
Commander-in-Chief; The power and duty to conduct foreign relations; And the power to
defend the State and to act as its representative in the international sphere. The responsibility
of the President when it comes to treaties and international agreements under the present
Constitution is therefore shared with the Senate. This shared role, petitioners claim, is bypassed
by EDCA.

EDCA was entered by the Republic of the Philippines and U.S. in order to authorize the
latter’s military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain "Agreed
Locations" in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's
understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. Accordingly, in June 2014, the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic notes
confirming the completion of all necessary internal requirements for the agreement to enter
into force in the two countries. As to the government of the Philippines, the conclusion of EDCA
was the result of intensive and comprehensive negotiations in the course of almost two years.
After eight rounds of negotiations, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador
to the Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014.President Benigno S. Aquino III
ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014. It was clarified that Philippines and U.S. had yet to agree formally
on the specific sites of the Agreed Locations mentioned in the agreement.

Two petitions for certiorari were thereafter filed before us assailing the constitutionality
of EDCA. They primarily argue that it should have been in the form of a treaty concurred in by
the Senate, not an executive agreement. On 10 November 2015, months after the oral
arguments were concluded and the parties ordered to file their respective memoranda, the
Senators adopted Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105.91 The resolution expresses the "strong
sense"92 of the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and effective, it must first be
transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the essential requisites for judicial review are present?

(2) Whether or not the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as
well as with existing laws and treaties?

RULING:
(1) Yes. It was ruled under the law that that this case is a proper subject for judicial
review. While this Court has yet to thoroughly delineate the outer limits of this
doctrine, it was emphasized that not every other case, however strong public
interest may be, can qualify as an issue of transcendental importance. The factors to
consider in brushing aside the essential requisites for exercising its power of judicial
review are: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the
presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by
the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack
of any other party that has a more direct and specific interest in raising the present
questions. An exhaustive evaluation of the memoranda of the parties, together with
the oral arguments, shows that petitioners have presented serious constitutional
issues that provide ample justification for the Court to set aside the rule on standing.
The transcendental importance of the issues presented here is rooted in the
Constitution itself. Section 25, Article XVIII thereof, cannot be any clearer: there is a
 much stricter mechanism required before foreign military troops, facilities, or bases
may be allowed in the country. The DFA has already confirmed to the U.S. Embassy
that "all internal requirements of the Philippines x x x have already been complied
with." It behooves the Court in this instance to take a liberal stance towards the rule
on standing and to determine forthwith whether there was grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Executive Department.

(2) Yes. It was held that EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. That as an executive
agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to
implement. It was ruled that the fear that EDCA is a reincarnation of the U.S. bases
so zealously protested by noted personalities in Philippine history arises from a
genuine desire for self-determination, nationalism, and above all a commitment to
ensure the independence of the Philippine Republic from any foreign domination.
Mere fears, however, cannot curtail the exercise by the President of the Philippines
of his Constitutional prerogatives in respect of foreign affairs.

According to Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9 -Authority of President to Enter into

Agreement with US under Republic of the Phil. Military Assistance Act (1946) : "The
President of the Philippines is hereby authorized to enter into agreement or
agreements with the President of the United States, or with any of the agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government of the United States, regarding military
assistance to the armed forces of the Republic of the Philippines, in the form of
transfer of property and information, giving of technical advice and lending of
personnel to instruct and train them, pursuant to the provisions of United States
Public Act Numbered Four hundred and fifty-four, commonly called the 'Republic of
the Philippines Military Assistance Act,' under the terms and conditions provided in
this Act."