Vote for your energy: a market mechanism for local

energy markets based on the consumers, preferences

Bent Richter, Esther Mengelkamp, Christof Weinhardt
Institute of Information Systems and Marketing
Karlsruhe, Germany
Email: bent.richter@kit.edu

Abstract—Local energy markets (LEMs) are a highly discussed
topic in the academic community. In this paper, we address
one of the most critical challenges for these markets. In recent
years the valuation of energy sources by the consumer became
more differentiated. Today many consumers prefer various en-
ergy sources (e.g. PV or Wind) in different degrees. Taking
this distinction into account causes several challenges in the
market design as energy becomes a heterogeneous good. We
show that already existing auction mechanisms cannot provide a
satisfactory solution to represent these differences. As a result,
we propose a two-step mechanism specifically tailored for the
differing consumer valuations. It introduces a merit-order based
market for each type of energy. Thus, each separate market
deals with one source of energy and is cleared separately. With
that, the determination of the chronological order of the different
markets becomes essential. The proposed mechanism aims at
taking the various preferences of all consumers into account
by using the Borda count voting mechanism. The theoretically
presented market mechanism is supported by a real-life data case
study with data from the Landau Microgrid Project.
Index Terms: Local energy markets, Market mechanism, Re-
newable energy sources, Household preferences
I. I NTRODUCTION
Along with the ongoing energy transition from a fossil-
based energy supply towards renewable energy sources, sev-
eral challenges arise for the energy sector. Traditionally, big
conventional power plants provide large amounts of energy,
and the transportation and distribution networks carry the
electricity to the households, small business, and industry.
With the rise of renewable power plants, the structure of the
supply changes, and becomes more and more decentralized
[1], [2]. Driven by subsidies, the amount of renewable power
plants in Germany increases in 2010 from • • ,• • •• • to• • • ,2•
•• •
in 2018 [• ]•. Most of PV power plants in Germany are small
and located in the distribution network. Today, about • 2 • ,• • •
of all PV power plants are installed on rooftops and structural
systems [4].
As a result, the demand side becomes more involved in
the generation process. Consumers with installed PV panels
become temporary producers as they fed the surplus into the
grid. These so-called prosumers are a new emerging group in
the energy system. The traditional market structure is unable to
cope with the changing conditions. Economic incentives and
specific regulation prevent the overall market structure from A. Local energy markets & Auction design
adapting to the emerging decentralized technical structures.
Up to now, once the subsidy in Germany ends, most of these first decade of this century. [• ]•, [1], [2] approach this area
small operators w ill not be able to sell their energy directly.
They have to increase their self-consumption or w ill rely
on commercial aggregators. Local energy communities and
markets are one of the proposed solutions to this challenge.
They represent alternative market structures which allow small
producers and local consumers to trade or share locally
produced energy within neighborhoods. This local exchange
between neighborhoods or local energy communities can be
done by different models, like peer-to-peer, sharing, or a local
market. In these markets, local consumers can buy energy
from the local supply, e.g. a neighbor household who also
installed a PV panel on its roof. In addition, locally produced
energy and green energy happens to become higher valued
than conventional for a growing number of consumers [• ]•, [• ]•.
For consumers, a LEM can enable the possibility to choose a
specific energy source. This choice allows consumers to adjust
their energy mix according to their valuations. Also, producers
of favored energy sources can sell their energy at a higher
price. For producers, these LEMs represent an alternative sales
channel.
Yet, with the distinction between different energy sources,
well-known market mechanisms can not directly represent this
new heterogeneity of energy and preference shift. Specifically,
we address the following research question: What kind o f LEM
market mechanism can, firstly, take the different valuations of
the consumers into account and secondly, can obtain a well-
known market mechanism like the merit-order?
In the further course of this paper, we w ill discuss the
market mechanism only focusing on electricity sources. The
paper is structured as followed. First, we w ill describe in
the chapter II the relevant literature for market mechanisms
on LEMs, different voting schemes, and changing consumer
•preferences. In the third chapter III the market mechanism
w ill be described, and we w ill illustrate the problem created
by the distinction between different energy sources showing
why existing auctions like combinatorial and multi-attribute
auction cannot be applied. In IV we w ill present a real-world
implementation of the market mechanism. Finally, section V
concludes the work.
II. Re l a t e d w o r k
Ongoing research on the topic of LEMs started in the

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 and examined the benefits of LEMs in the context of rising
renewable generation. More recent literature like [8] pro-
poses frameworks for LEMs and discusses different market
approaches like peer-to-peer or platform markets.
LEMs in the context of upcoming smart grid and de-
centralized information systems (e. g. blockchain technology)
are considered by [9], [10] and [11]. Most authors discuss
electricity trading on LEMs; however, capacity markets are
also considered in some research (e.g. [12]). They discuss
the possibilities of LEMs to allocate local reserve energy.
The research focuses on different market forms, not a market
mechanism. Otherwise, [1• ]• developed an auction mechanism
for local reserve energy where small prosumers can sell their
capacity to the balancing group manager. The proposed market
mechanism minimizes the overall costs for the balancing group
manage by selecting suitable bids.
Since LEMs have similar properties to conventional mar-
kets, the repertoire of different auction designs is very diverse.
The double auction is, by its properties, very popular and
used e.g. by [14], [1• ]•, [1• ]•, [1• ]•, [10], [18]. [14] apply a
combinatorial approach to create bids for heat and electricity
at the same time. A continuous double auction design is used
by[1• •] and [1• •].[1• •] sets up discrete time intervals in which a
continuous double auction takes place. [19] presents a discrete
double auction with a single clearing price in each period. [20],
[8], [21] use the merit order mechanism. This auction type can
be classified as a discrete double auction and is widely used
in energy wholesale markets around Europe.
B. Changing consumer preferences
The change of preferences and willingness to pay for
renewable energy is actively investigated. It is often con-
ducted by differentiating between ‘green’ renewable energy
and conventional energy. For example, [22] examine the extent
to which the willingness to pay spreads for different energy
sources (regardless of whether they are renewable or not) and
the impact on willingness to pay according to the regionality
of the consumer. [2• ]• investigates the social acceptance of
renewable energy sources and their attitudes to investing in
renewable energy sources. [24] explore the consumer prefer-
ences of different electricity mixes and their preference for the
support for different renewable energy sources. [2• ]• conduct
a meta-analysis of consumers’ willingness to pay according
to energy sources. They conclude that the willingness to pay
differs by source, and increases if its substitutes conventional
energy. [2• ]• also examined the willingness to pay for different
energy sources. They show that consumer prefers solar over
wind or biomass. In addition, [2• ]• analyzes the preference
heterogeneity for renewable energy technologies and shows
that preferences over solar power are more heterogeneous as
wind or biomass.
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III. D e v e l o p in g a p r e f e r e n c e -b a s e d m a r k e t
M ECH ANISM
A. Problem description & Existing approaches
One of the main challenges of LEMs is the differentiation
between the valuations of di^erent energy sources. The en-
ergy can typically be distinguished by its generation types
(PV, Wind, Water, Biomass), the geographical distance (local,
regional, national), or both of them. Thus, energy can be
split up into several subgroups. Within these groups, energy
is still a homogeneous good, yet individuals value these
groups differently. These differences depend on the individual
consumer and their personal preferences. This change creates
an impression of heterogeneity, yet the ‘different’ goods are
perfect substitutes. Setting up a LEM and considering these
diverging, individual preferences cause a challenge. Well-
established market mechanisms in the energy sector like the
merit order cannot directly levy the differing valuations of
heterogeneous goods.
In a first analysis, we consider existing mechanisms which
take different valuations into account or combine heteroge-
neous goods. The former one is called ‘multi-attribute auc-
tions, the latter combinatorial auctions. Combinatorial auctions
are an auction type which combines different goods in a
bundle. A bidder can bid on each bundle. As energy is a
continuous good, and the demand of each user is fixed, the
‘optimal’ supply composition by sources depends on the pref-
erence, seller bids, and availability. This condition increases
the number of possible combinations of bundles, and it is
likely, that an optimal market outcome cannot be computed
fast and easily. Likewise, a multi-attribute auction relies on
the assumption that an exact (uniform) valuation across all
attributes exists [28]. This means the preference order (e.g.
PV over Wind) must be equal for each bidder. This uniform
valuation is not given as each consumer can prefer the sources
in a different order. Energy from a PV panel is not always
strictly higher valued than energy generated by wind turbines
by all consumer in the market.
B. Preference based voting mechanism
We developed a two-step market mechanism which consists
of the above-discussed merit order auction and a preference-
based voting system. This idea allows to obtains a well-
known and researched auction mechanism and at the same
time, take the different preferences into account. In its core,
the mechanism interprets the different electricity sources as
different goods. Each good w ill be traded on its own market.
This approach rules out the problem linked to heterogeneous
goods. It also allows to maintain the properties of the well-
known and researched merit-order auction to allocate the
demand and supply for a specific source.
The following question is how to determine the chronologi-
cal order of these several markets. We assume that even if the
valuation over all participants is not consistent, the individual
preference order is consistent and can be represented on an
ordinal scale. For example, one consumer prefers wind over
 Consumer/Source PV Wind CHP
Bids for PV
Consumer 1 •• 2 1
Consumer 2 2 1 ••
Consumer • • 2 •• 1
Sum •• •• ••
TA Bl e I
B ORDA c o u n t sc o r es

10
PV and PV over combined heat and power (CHP). Another 03/15 04/01 04/15
Date
consumer is in favor of CHP, then PV and the wind is the least Bids for CHP
favored. It becomes clear that consumers w ill prefer to be part 30
of the market which they favor the most, then the second, and
25 •
so on. Without consistency over all participants, we cannot
easily set up a market order. Yet, the order has an impact on g 20 [| !— ~ |

the overall outcome.

This problem can be solved by a voting system in which
each participant can vote for a preferred market order. For
the presented mechanism, we choose the so-called Borda
count. This voting mechanism was introduced in 1• • 0 • • by
Jean Charles de Borda as an alternative voting concept [29].
Most common voting systems focus on a single winner but
ignore the preference distribution on all other alternatives,
which leads to strategic voting. Especially voters who favor a
candidate who is less likely to win, have an incentive to vote
strategically and not according to their preferences [• 0 • ]. In
contrast, the Borda count system allows each voter to rank all
choices aligned to its preferences. The most preferred choice
gets the highest score and the next alternatives in descending
order a decreasing lower score. The last choice w ill only get
one point. The scores for each alternative are summed up, and
a rank order is determined [29], [• 1• ].
In the context of the proposed market mechanism, all
participants on the demand side are voters. Every consumer
submits a bid for each market. We assume that the individual
preference order represents the willingness to pay for each
source (bid). For example, in a LEM are three different kinds
of electricity sources: PV, Wind, and CHP. The ‘hidden’
preference order of an individual household is PV over Wind
over CHP. Following this preference order, the level of each
bid represents this rank order (bPV > > b HP) and
can be used as a vote. The individual prefers a market order
starting with the PV market, then the Wind market, and in the
end, the CHP market. Therefore, PV has • •points, Wind 2 and
CHP 1.
Table 1 shows an example of the LEMs with the above
mentioned three energy sources and three different consumers.
The consumers differ significantly in their assessment of the
energy source. The proposed market mechanism works as
follows: Each participant issues a bid for each energy source.
A ll individual bids are ordered according to the bid price. The
source with the lowest bid price gets 1 point, the second 2 and
the third, the source with the highest bid, gets • •points. This
rank represents the preferred market schedule of the consumer.
A ll rank votes w ill be collected and in a subsequent step,
the corresponding score numbers of each energy source are
added up. In the example, PV has the highest score, wind the
10
0%/15 04/01 04/15
Date
----Consumer 1 ---- Consumer 4 ---- Consumer 6 .... . Sell Price
----Consumer 2 Consumer 5 ---- Consumer 7
Fig. 1. PV bids of one month
second and CHP the least which can be seen in the last row of
Table I. Therefore, the market order starts with the PV market,
followed by the wind market, and in the end, the CHP market
is cleared. In the event of a tie, randomness decides.
Assuming new participants join the market with, e.g. a
higher preference for wind, the mechanism w ill quickly adapt
and can change the order. Also, if the preference order of a
consumer changes and with that the bid prices, the mechanism
w ill be able to take this preference shift into account. The pro-
posed market mechanism divides the local energy market into
several markets, one for each energy source. It interprets the
bids of each participant as a vote for a specific chronological
market order. In a subsequent step, the Borda count voting
system determines the order which is favored by most of the
participants. In the end, each market is cleared according to
the previously determined order.
IV. Ca s e St u d y : LAMP
The market mechanism explained in section III-B is im-
plemented in a real-life implementation of a LEM named the
Landau Microgrid Project (LAMP). LAMP is a prototypical
LEM implemented in Landau, Germany between 11 household
consumers, one PV system of 20kWp and a CHP of • •0kWp
[• 2
• ]. A trading period has 1• • minutes. The agents, i. e. the
household consumers as well as the owners of the PV and
CHP system (which are owned by the energy utility so far),
can enter their price preferences for PV and CHP energy over
a (smartphone) app. These are converted into bids for each
trading period and the mechanism calculates the market order
using the Borda count.
The consumers got an introduction into the market mech-
anism before they started trading. Thus, they should be able

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 to anticipate their future transactions based on past market Consumer 7
prices. Figure 1 shows the bidding process over one month of
six consumers from the Lamp project. The top graph shows PV
bids and the bottom graph shows CHP bids. One can clearly
see that the bidding behavior is different for each participant
and that the bidding levels differ for the two energy sources.
For example, consumer • •shows a high bidding activity as his 0 -----L
0• /•1• • 0• /•1• • 0• /•1• • 0• /•18 0• /•19 0• /•20
preference order changes over time. In contrast, consumer • • Date
does not change the bids at all and strictly values PV more Consumer 6
than CHP. Likewise, consumer • • strictly prefers energy from
the CHP over the PV source and consumer 2 is indifferent.
As a remark, the price is changing due to bid changes on the
supply side and consumer 4 cannot be found in the second
graph as his bids are equal to consumer • .•
Figure 2 shows the LAMP consumer 2, • ,• • ,• and • •over five
0 -----L
days. Their bids for PV and CHP electricity, the sale prices of 0• /•1• • 0• /•1• • 0• /•1• • 0• /•18 0• /•19 0• /•20
the PV and CHP generators and the individual average price Date
of the consumer in the LEM are represented as dashed/dotted Consumer 5
• 0•
lines. The prices paid by the individual consumer for the grid,
PV and CHP are represented as big points. The distribution of
buy/sell bids and the paid prices shows that all four consumers
still fulfill part of their overall demand from the grid (grey
points) but differ in the consumption of CHP and PV.
Consumer C• •buys mostly from the CHP as his preference 0• /•1• • 0• /•1• • 0• /•1• • 0• /•18 0• /•19 0• /•20
for PV energy is always below the PV sell bid, and he prefers Date
CHP energy over PV according to his bids. The use of grid Consumer 2
energy is a result of the increased sell bids for CHP, which • 0•

exceeds C• ’•s buy bid.In comparison, consumer C• • uses PV c

and CHP energy at about the same rate (PV during the day,
CHP during the night). His preference for PV energy is,
^ __1___ I_______ _______________ _______
0 20 -----r- '-------------------

as mentioned above, always higher than the PV sell price.

However, on the second day (0• /•1• )• C• • still has to consume
0• /•1• • 0• /•1• • 0• /•1• • 0• /•18 0• /•19 0• /•20
grid energy as not enough PV energy is available and the Date
sales bid of CHP increased too much. Consumer C• •receives - BuyBidsPV --- AveragePrice
a small part of PV energy and most CHP. It can be seen that — BuyBidsCHP • PaidPricesforGrid
PV and CHP alternate in one area. This is partly because C• • - Sell BidsPV • PaidPricesforPV
is raising its bid for CHP and changing its preference order,
— Sell BidsCHP • PaidPricesforCHP
but also because its bid for PV electricity is also higher/equal
Fig. 2. Bids and prices of three consumers in LAMP for five days in March
than the bid price. From this, it can be concluded that in these
periods PV had the highest score and started the market order
as more participants favored PV over CHP.Consumer C2 uses in LAMP pay an average electricity price below 20 c€/kWh.
mostly CHP energy, as his PV bid is always below the PV Thus, the LEM allows them to receive an individual electricity
sell bids and also consumes grid energy as a result of the CHP price more than 1• •• • cheaper than the usual grid tariff of
price peak. As the data from Figure 2 is from March 2019, PV 2• •c€/kWh.
generation is pretty low due to the weather conditions. Thus, it
is expected that the share of PV generation in the consumers’ V. Co n c l u s io n

energy mix w ill rise during the summer. As most consumers
value PV generation higher than CHP (represented by a higher
buy bid price), this prediction is already confirmed in current
data (May/June 2019).
Figure 2 also shows the changes in buy and sell bids as
well as the average prices the consumers pay over the week.
The changes in price bids are relatively low. Usually, only 1-• •
changes occur for one agent. As preferences should represent
(closely) the true preferences, this low change rate is to be
expected. Further, the case study shows that the consumers
In this paper, we proposed a two-step market mechanism for
LEMs to differing valuations between green, local, and overall
energy sources. A well-known mechanism like the merit
order cannot adequately represent these differing valuations.
Obtaining the characteristics of the merit-order auction the
proposed preference-based market mechanism differentiates
between energy sources. Each source is traded on its own mar-
ket using the merit order. The chronological schedule of the
markets should directly reflect the distribution of preferences
of all consumers. Therefore, the order is calculated with the

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 Borda count voting mechanism. Each consumer sets a bid for
each market. We assume that the individual preference order
is represented by the willingness to pay. The Borda count
assigns a score to each energy source based on the amount
of the bid. The scores of all participants are summed up and
determine the chronological order in which the markets are
cleared. This market mechanism is implemented in a pilot
project in Germany. We show that different energy sources
feed participants according to their willingness to pay, supply,
and market situation. This circumstance also results in a dif-
ferent average price for each consumer. Thus, the preference-
based market mechanism can represent the different customer
valuations and directly translate them into preferences on the
market. Like this, every customer can adjust his allocation
of electricity source mix. Future research should address
whether the market mechanism creates incentives to behave
strategically under more extreme conditions, such as market
power, grid congestion, or a large supply. A high supply in one
of the markets may mean that the last market in that order is no
longer needed. I f participants who prefer a different sequence
anticipate this, they can change their bidding behavior to
influence the sequence. Also, market power is an ongoing
issue of local energy markets, as these markets are small and
geographically limited to a specific area.
Ac k n o w l ed g men t
This work was supported by the German Research Founda-
tion (DFG) as part of the Research Training Group GRK 21• • :• •
Energy Status Data - Informatics Methods for its Collection,
Analysis and Exploitation.
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