Telematics and Informatics 35 (2018) 2376–2386

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Telematics and Informatics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tele

How informed are messaging app users about politics? A linkage of

T
messaging app use and political knowledge and participation
⁎
Masahiro Yamamotoa, , Matthew J. Kushinb, Francis Dalisayc
a
Department of Communication, University at Albany, State University of New York, SS 331, 1400 Washington Ave., Albany NY 12222, United States
b
Department of Communication, Shepherd University, PO Box 5000, Shepherdstown WV 25443, United States
c
Communication and Fine Arts Department, College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, University of Guam, UOG Station, Mangilao, GU 96923,
United States

A R T IC LE I N F O ABS TRA CT

Keywords: Mobile messaging apps, such as Snapchat, Facebook Messenger, and WhatsApp, were unique
Messaging apps campaign and information platforms in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. This study assesses
Mobile how using such apps for campaign information is related to political knowledge and participa-
Political knowledge tion. Data from an online survey conducted prior to the election indicate that using messaging
Political participation
apps for news is positively related to knowledge miscalibration. Knowledge miscalibration is
positively related to offline and online political participation. Findings are discussed in terms of
the role of messaging apps in the political process.

1. Introduction

On Election Day 2016, 77% of Americans owned a smartphone, up from 35% in 2011 (Rainie & Perrin, 2017). This rise has been
accompanied by a rise in mobile messaging app use. In 2017, there were about 180 million active monthly U.S. adult users on the top
three mobile messaging apps: Facebook Messenger, Snapchat, and WhatsApp (Statistica, 2018). In early 2018, 27% of U.S. adults
used Snapchat and 22% used WhatsApp (Pew Research Center Internet & Technology, 2018). Such apps have emerged as a unique
platform for news and campaign information. During the week of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 30% of adult Snapchat users
followed political figures, 69% watched political speeches or debates on Snapchat, 67% watched live news events on Snapchat, 60%
watched live election coverage on Snapchat, and 30% watched a political event or rally on Snapchat (Knight Foundation, 2017).
With the emergence of messaging app use for news and election campaigns, greater understanding is needed of what role these
apps may play in politics. While studies have shown the political utility of mobile-based news consumption and communication
activities (Campbell & Kwak, 2009, 2011; Kim, Chen, & Wang, 2016; Kwak, Campbell, Choi, & Bae, 2011; Martin, 2015; Rojas & Puig-
i-Abril, 2009), limited research has extended this inquiry to messaging apps (Yamamoto, Kushin, & Dalisay, 2015; Yoo, Zheng, Jung,
Chen, Lu & Johnson, 2016). Such research is important as a growing body of literature indicates the rise of so-called echo chambers or
filter bubbles on social networking sites whereby individuals coalesce around like-minded individuals (Pariser, 2012). Messaging
apps may extend this trend by enabling communication selectivity among trusted ties in a closed online network architecture (Bayer,
Ellison, Schoenebeck, & Falk, 2016). Also, other research points to the potential disadvantages of using messaging apps as a news
distribution platform (Rowlett & Harlow, 2016). The unique affordances of messaging apps for news and political communication
may thus present an important implication for democratic citizenship.
The present study examines the role of messaging app use for campaign information in politics. This study has two specific goals.

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: myamamoto2@albany.edu (M. Yamamoto), mkushin@shepherd.edu (M.J. Kushin), fdalisay@triton.uog.edu (F. Dalisay).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2018.10.008
Received 16 April 2018; Received in revised form 24 October 2018; Accepted 25 October 2018
Available online 26 October 2018
0736-5853/ © 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
M. Yamamoto et al. Telematics and Informatics 35 (2018) 2376–2386

First, we examine a linkage of messaging app use for news and three forms of political knowledge – factual, subjective, and mis-
calibration of knowledge. Second, we assess whether messaging app use for news is related to offline and online political participation
directly and indirectly through political knowledge. To answer these questions, we analyze data from an online survey conducted in
the two weeks before the 2016 presidential election in the United States. With an emphasis on news specific to mobile-based
messaging apps, we add a unique insight to the literature on the political utility of mobile media.

1.1. Messaging apps and news

Messaging apps refer to online platforms that enable the exchanges of messages, such as text, photos, videos, and calls. These apps
run on mobile devices and do not require conventional computer devices (e.g., desktops, laptops). Common examples include
Snapchat, Whatsapp, and Facebook Messenger. Messaging apps provide opportunities for dynamic multimedia sharing between pairs
or small groups of users. Compared to major social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, messaging apps provide an intimate
closed system of communication with an emphasis on privacy (Karapanos, Teixeira, & Gouveia, 2016). Content on messaging apps
cannot be re-posted or rated publicly. Communication can be playful with the use of emojis, text-based captions, and filters that
modify the face or voice of persons in a photo or video. In the U.S., messaging apps are particularly popular among young adults aged
18–29 (Pew Research Center Internet & Technology, 2018).
Messaging apps offer unique opportunities for news consumption and information sharing beyond a user’s ability to share links to
news articles via direct messages. For example, Facebook Messenger allows users to react to messages on both the Facebook website
and the app itself, share videos, images and current location, and make phone and video calls (Black, 2018). Media organizations,
such as The New York Times and CNN, experimented with the use of Facebook Messenger bots to distribute automated messages and
updates during the run up to the 2016 presidential election (Lichterman, 2016).
WhatsApp, acquired by Facebook in 2014, increases a sense of presence in communication by affording users the ability to craft
and archive personal messages that are highly emotional and experience and share events in near-real-time (Karapanos et al., 2016).
Similar to Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp allows users to share videos and images and make phone and video calls. A survey of 34
countries conducted by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2017) found that among all the markets surveyed,
WhatsApp was the most widely used messaging app, particularly for news consumption and sharing.
Snapchat allows users to post photos and videos that are visible to all of the user’s contacts for a 24-hour period. Snapchat’s
“Discover” feature allows news and entertainment outlets to publish text or brief video clips. Snapchat’s move towards news is
evidenced by CNN political reporter Peter Hamby’s transition to Snapchat as Head of News (Byers, 2015). In July 2017, NBC News
launched the first daily news show on Snapchat, “Stay Tuned,” which features two to three minute episodes twice daily, with four to
five segments per episode (Perez, 2017). Other news organizations also use Snapchat, including NPR and Washington Post. Snap-
chat’s Live Stories feature aggregates user-submitted content around events, such as campaign rallies, making it viewable to all users
(Rucker, 2015). Further, political candidates used Snapchat in the 2016 election (Chittal, 2015). For example, a promoted filter by
the Clinton campaign enabled users to add an “I’m with her” filter overlay to their photos and a promoted link by the Trump
campaign drove users to a donation page (Curtis, 2016).

1.2. Political knowledge

Political knowledge is conventionally defined as factual information about politics retained in memory (Delli Carpini & Keeter,
1996). According to Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), there are three types of political knowledge. The first concerns knowledge about
political institutions and processes, such as the job and responsibility of the Congress and the Supreme Court. The second concerns
knowledge about specific issues and events, such as climate change, poverty, and gun ownership. The third concerns knowledge
about political actors, such as the name of a vice president, a candidate’s issue stance, and a party’s position on issues.
Political knowledge, defined in the above way, taps a citizen’s ability to recall and recognize political facts. While this con-
ceptualization is common, political knowledge can be studied in terms of subjective evaluation. Subjective political knowledge
concerns how much people think they know about politics (Brucks, 1985). Subjective and factual political knowledge are related to
each other yet conceptually distinct. People may think they know a lot about politics when actually they do not know relevant
political facts, and vice versa.
A concept tapping both factual and subjective political knowledge is calibration of knowledge, which refers to the match between
“objective and subjective assessments of the validity of information” (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000, p. 123). Research shows that
knowledge miscalibration, or a gap between subjective and factual knowledge, tends to occur when people are overconfident about
what they know when in fact they do not know as much as they think they do (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000). Knowledge miscalibration
can also take the form of under-confidence when people know a lot but underestimate how much they actually know.
A rich body of political communication research has shown that variations in factual political knowledge are partly accounted for
by news media use (e.g., Eveland, Hayes, Shah, & Kwak, 2005). However, this line of work has not investigated how news con-
sumption through messaging apps influences political knowledge factually and subjectively. To address this issue, we examine how
messaging app use for news is associated with factual and subjective political knowledge, and miscalibration of knowledge.

1.3. Political participation

Political participation refers to acts that are intended to steer government action “either directly by affecting the making or

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implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies” (Verba, Schlozman, &
Brady, 1995, p. 38). It includes direct (e.g., campaign volunteering, campaign contributions, voting) and indirect forms of engage-
ment (e.g., contacting local media to voice opinions, persuading others to participate in politics) (Verba et al., 1995).
While political participation has conventionally taken place in face-to-face or offline settings, the rise of online media has forged
opportunities for citizens to perform political acts exclusively online. Citizens today can contact news media, candidates, and political
groups via email, social media, or messaging apps. Donations can be made through campaign websites and mobile phones. Appeals
can be made to government through online petitions. The prevalence of online participation has warranted empirical attention
separate from offline political participation (e.g., Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014).
Studies have demonstrated that online information gathering facilitates political participation (e.g., Skoric, Zhu, Goh, & Pang,
2015). Likewise, news consumption via mobile devices has been found to promote offline political participation (e.g., Campbell &
Kwak, 2009, 2011; Rojas & Puig-i-Abril, 2009; Yamamoto et al., 2015; Yoo et al., 2016). Yamamoto et al. (2015), for example, found
that consuming campaign information via mobile apps was related to offline political participation. Although limited, research also
has shown that informational use of mobile devices is related to online political participation (Yoo et al., 2016).
With the above conceptual discussions in mind, below we examine why and how using messaging apps for news may influence
political knowledge and participation. Specifically, existing literature suggests two possible factors – filter bubbles that could be
formed on mobile-based messaging apps and the nature of news content commonly found on messaging apps.

1.4. Filter bubbles in messaging apps

Scholars have debated whether social media expose users to like-minded or cross-cutting viewpoints. Some have argued that
social media foster the creation of filter bubbles. In these echo chambers, individuals wall their social networks off from those with
whom they disagree and only expose themselves to people and content that support their viewpoints (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010;
Pariser, 2012; Sunstein, 2001). Such selectivity reduces wider exposure to information that counters one’s views (Baumgartner &
Morris, 2010), which may prevent users from getting information and knowledge needed to construct informed attitudes and opi-
nions.
Other scholars have argued that social media help expose users to cross-cutting opinions (Manjoo, 2015). A recent study by
Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic (2015) showed that approximately 25 percent of Facebook users reported having friends with opposing
viewpoints and roughly the same percent of users chose to click on news in their feed that crossed ideological divides. Although some
have pointed to a rise in “unfriending” in recent political cycles (Selyukh, 2016), survey reports show that only about 13% of
Americans have blocked or unfriended for political reasons (Roberts, 2016).
Although little is known about the potential of messaging apps in this respect, their unique features provide support for a possible
filter bubble effect. For example, social networking site users may be exposed to diverse information because of the diversity of their
networks, yet may have to deal with “context collapse,” a phenomenon on social networking sites where users need to imagine the
diverse viewpoints of their audiences before sharing news (Beam, Child, Hutchens, & Hmielowski, 2017). Such perceived diversity
may cause greater tension and a tendency to self-censor (Child & Staracher, 2016). By contrast, messaging apps allow users to
circumvent context collapse as users exercise greater levels of privacy over whom they interact with. On messaging apps, interactions
tend to be one-to-one or one-to-few among trusted ties (Bayer et al., 2016) and can be more personal in nature. Thus, such apps may
offer users a greater ability to predict that interlocutors will be like-minded. Given the homophilous nature of social networks in
which people tend to select associations with those of similar backgrounds (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001), messaging app
users likely exchange political content with a close network of people with whom they already agree.
There is evidence that supports this reasoning. Studying motivations for sharing news online, Lottridge and Bentley (2018)
uncovered that sharing political news stories to push one’s political views was least common on messaging apps. They explained that
messaging app users tended to share political news in order to express shared views among, and “hate together” with, trusted,
ideologically-aligned friends. Studies also reported that people used instant messaging services for relationship development and
maintenance and intimate communication, whereas social networking sites satisfied surveillance and information gathering
(Karapanos et al., 2016; Quan-Haase & Young, 2011), supporting the possibility of filter bubbles. Moreover, Coppini, Duncan,
McLeod, and Wu (2017) showed that when news selection choices were publicly visible, people were highly motivated to manage
identity and opinion expression.

1.5. News in messaging apps

The U.S. news landscape continues to evolve alongside technological innovations. As of August 2017, 67% of U.S. adults obtained
news on social media, with Twitter, Reddit, and Facebook as the top three news sources (Shearer & Gottfried, 2017). While the use of
messaging apps for news and politics was low in 2012, 17% of social media users got news on Snapchat in 2016 (Shearer & Gottfried,
2017). In August 2017, 29% of Snapchat’s users and 23% of WhatsApp’s users got news on the respective apps (Shearer & Gottfried,
2017). Further, mobile messaging app users tend to receive news on Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram (Grieco, 2017) as well as
traditional media such as radio and local and cable television (Knight Foundation, 2017; Shearer & Gottfried, 2017).
Although sparse, research suggests that news on messaging apps is different from other sources. Rowlett and Harlow (2016), for
example, conducted a visual analysis of multimedia – photos, video, and text overlay – in Snapchat’s Live Stories section, a section
that aggregates user-submitted stories for viewing by all Snapchat users. They found that political events, such as debates and
primary votes, were covered in a sensationalized manner. Coverage of hard news, or issue-focused news perceived to be of impact and

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importance to the audience, represented less than half of the total snaps (the term for Snapchat posts) analyzed. The majority of posts
were soft news stories such as interactions between candidates and the public. Rowlett and Harlow (2016) argued that the platform
limitations of the 10-second length of a single snap decontextualizes news. As such, the viewer only sees a slice of a larger story that
lacks context or necessary background information important to understanding the news. Moreover, Rowlett and Harlow (2016)
found that content on Snapchat Live Stories tended to contain users’ political biases, leading to incomplete coverage of candidates
and issues, which may diminish factual knowledge gain.
Although Rowlett and Harlow (2016) focused only on the Live Stories feature of Snapchat and did not examine the Discover
feature where organizations publish news shows lasting two to three minutes with greater depth of content, these brief shows are still
fast paced, quickly cutting between several topics (Perez, 2017). Thus, they may still limit factual knowledge gain. Indeed, a report by
the Knight Foundation indicated that the top cited dislike of political content on Snapchat was that it was not informative or
contained bias (Knight Foundation, 2017).

2. Hypotheses

Based on the above literature, we first examine the association between messaging app use for news and political knowledge. If
filter bubbles exist on messaging apps, they may limit learning of political facts, as exposure to news and opinions within a
homogeneous online social network can demotivate skepticism and reduce fact-checking. Indeed, recent work revealed that Facebook
use for news was negatively associated with factual political knowledge (Cacciatore et al., 2018). However, as people consume news,
their perception that they have learned about politics, or their subjective political knowledge, may increase. Coupled with image-
centered news on messaging apps, users may also think they are informed about politics when they actually do not know important
political facts and details. Although not all news exposure on messaging apps occurs within a closed network of like-minded people,
the above evidence and possibilities lead us to formulate the following hypothesis:
H1. Messaging app use for news will be associated negatively with (a) factual political knowledge and positively with (b) subjective
political knowledge and (c) knowledge miscalibration.
While research on messaging apps and political participation is limited, it is reasonable to predict that getting political news on
messaging apps will be positively associated with political participation. Filter bubbles and a perceived closeness to, and contact with,
candidates may foster a willingness to be part of a campaign (Jensen, 2013). Also, messaging apps may expand and accelerate access
to timely information, transforming how users receive and interact with political information (Martin, 2014). Thus, we formulate the
following hypothesis:
H2. Messaging app use for news will be positively associated with (a) offline and (b) online political participation.
Finally, we investigate potential indirect associations between messaging app use for news and political participation through
political knowledge. Existing literature indicates that factual political knowledge positively predicts political participation (e.g.,
Jung, Kim, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2012; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999). If messaging app use for news is negatively related to factual
political knowledge as we hypothesize above, using messaging apps for news would have an indirect negative relationship with
political participation through factual political knowledge. In other words, messaging app use for news is negatively related to factual
political knowledge, which in turn has a positive relationship with political participation. Therefore, we formulate the following
hypothesis:
H3. Messaging app use for news will have an indirect negative association with (a) offline and (b) online political participation
through factual political knowledge.
Although an examination of subjective, and miscalibration of, political knowledge in relation to political participation is limited,
if using messaging apps for news is positively related to subjective, and miscalibration of, political knowledge, it might have indirect
positive links with political participation through the two dimensions of knowledge. Thus, we formulate the following hypotheses:
H4. Messaging app use for news will have an indirect positive association with (a) offline and (b) online political participation
through subjective political knowledge.
H5. Messaging app use for news will have an indirect positive association with (a) offline and (b) online political participation
through subjective political knowledge.

3. Method

Data came from an online survey administered by Qualtrics during the two-week period immediately before the U.S. presidential
election on November 8. 2016. A total of 630 completed surveys were obtained. Qualtrics is an online research panel sample
aggregator that partners with online panel providers. A majority of Qualtrics’ samples comes from these online panel providers. To
ensure the quality of samples, Qualtrics uses IP address checks and digital fingerprinting technology (Qualtrics, 2014). Qualtrics’
partners randomly select participants who qualify for a project. A sample selected from a particular panel is proportioned to the
general population and randomized before a survey is fielded (Qualtrics, 2014). Potential respondents receive an email invitation
from Qualtrics inviting them to participate in a study.

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Because online panel members tend to be skewed in terms of demographics, we specified quotes by age, gender, and race and
matched our sample with the U.S. Census population data. The survey was approved by the Institutional Review Board prior to its
launch. Caution should be exercised in interpreting results, as data from opt-in online panels are not generalizable to a target
population. However, given our focus on messaging app use, it is at least permissible to turn to online panels for data collection.

3.1. Measures

3.1.1. Messaging app use for news

Four items, adapted from previous research (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014), were used to measure messaging app use for news.
Respondents were asked on a 5-point scale (1 = never; 5 = very often) how often they used messaging apps (e.g., Snapchat, Facebook
Messenger, WhatsApp) to get news about the election; stay informed about the election; learn others' opinions on the election; and get
election news from traditional news media. Responses were averaged on a 5-point scale (M = 1.74, SD = 1.13, α = 0.97).

3.1.2. Factual political knowledge

Seven multiple-choice questions were developed to measure factual political knowledge about the two candidates of the 2016 U.S.
presidential election. The questions asked about (1) the name of Hillary Clinton’s running mate, (2) the name of Donald Trump’s
running mate, (3) their stance on the death penalty, (4) Hillary Clinton’s healthcare policy proposal, (5) Hillary Clinton’s minimum
wage proposal, (6) Donald Trump’s stance on climate change, and (7) Donald Trump’s tax plan proposal. The survey did not include a
“don’t know” response option. Responses were recoded so that correct responses were coded as 1 and incorrect responses as 0 and
then added to form a composite index (M = 4.26, SD = 1.27). The items did not have missing data. As is often the case, the factual
knowledge items had low internal consistency (α = 0.27). It might be due to the ad-hoc nature of the questions mostly tapping the
candidates’ policy proposals in varied domains with a small number of items (Eveland & Hively, 2009). Indeed, the data revealed low
inter-item correlations, with the highest at 0.449 between the relatively easy first and second items concerning each candidate’s
running mate and the second highest at 0.210 between the second and sixth items.

3.1.3. Subjective political knowledge

Five items were adapted from prior work (Flynn & Goldsmith, 1999). Respondents were asked to indicate how strongly they
agreed or disagreed with the following statements (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree): I know a lot about this election; I classify
myself as an expert in this election; compared to most people, I know more about candidates’ issue positions and policy proposals; I
am knowledgeable about candidates’ issue positions and policy proposals; when it comes to this election, I am quite knowledgeable.
Responses were averaged on a 5-point scale (M = 3.45, SD = 0.92, α = 0.92), with higher scores indicating greater subjective
knowledge. The correlation between subjective and factual political knowledge was not substantial (r = 0.14, p < .01).

3.1.4. Knowledge miscalibration

Knowledge miscalibration was measured using factual and subjective political knowledge. We first standardized factual and
subjective political knowledge measures and subtracted standardized factual knowledge scores from standardized subjective
knowledge scores. This measure assesses the agreement between respondents’ perceptions of how knowledgeable they were about the
election and their actual knowledge about the election. Scores close to 0 indicate close matches between subjective and factual
political knowledge. Respondents were able to accurately estimate how knowledgeable they were about the election. Scores away
from 0 toward the positive end indicate that respondents overestimated how much they knew about the election when in fact this
perception was not accurate based on our measure of factual political knowledge. Scores away from 0 toward the negative end
indicate that respondents underestimated how much they knew about the election when in fact they were actually knowledgeable
about it (M = 0.00, SD = 1.30).

3.1.5. Offline political participation

Offline political participation was measured using eight items (e.g., Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014). Respondents were asked on a 5-
point scale (1 = never; 5 = very often) how often they engaged in the following activities offline: attend a political meeting, rally, or
speech; encourage someone to register to vote; wear a campaign button, hat, or t-shirt; display a campaign bumper sticker or yard
sign; work for a political party or candidate; circulate a petition for a candidate or issue; contribute money to a campaign; and try to
persuade other people to vote (M = 1.96, SD = 0.96, α = 0.93).

3.1.6. Online political participation

Six items were used to measure online political participation (e.g., Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014). On a 5-point scale (1 = never;
5 = very often), respondents were asked how often they engaged in the following activities: send an email to an editor of a news
organization; use e-mail to contact a politician; sign an online petition; make a campaign contribution online; try to persuade other
people to vote online. Responses were averaged on a 5-point scale (M = 1.90, SD = 0.92, α = 0.89).

3.1.7. Control variables

Several variables were used as statistical controls to assess the unique relationship between messaging app use for news and the
dependent variables. Age was measured by a 6-point category item ranging from 18 to 24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64 to 65 and
over (Median = 4: 45–54). Gender was coded with females as 1 and males as 0 (female = 51.9%). Education was measured by a 10-

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point category item ranging from less than high school to postgraduate or professional degree (Median = 4: Some college, no degree).
Income was measured by a 10-point category item ranging from under $10,000 to $200,000 or more (M = Median = 5: $35,000 to
$49,999). Race was coded with Whites as 1 and all others as 0 (White = 73.2%). Political interest was measured by a 7-piont scale
item ranging from not interested at all to very interested (M = 5.43, SD = 1.77). Party affiliation was measured by a 7-point scale
item ranging from 1 = strong Republican to 7 = strong Democrat (M = 4.21, SD = 1.95). Political ideology was measured by a 7-
point scale item ranging from 1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal (M = 3.79, SD = 1.73).
In addition, news users of messaging apps and other sources such as traditional and social media tend to overlap (Grieco, 2017;
Shearer & Gottfried, 2017). To assess the unique association between messaging app use for news and our dependent variables, we
thus controlled for attention to traditional media and social media use for news. Attention to traditional media was measured by six
items asking respondents, on a 5-point scale (1 = no attention; 5 = a lot of attention), how much attention they paid to public media
(e.g., NPR, PBS), network TV news (e.g., CBS, ABC, NBC, local affiliates), a print newspaper (e.g., New York Times, USA Today), a
website of public media, a website of network TV news, and a website of a print newspaper to learn about the election. Responses
were averaged on a 5-point scale (M = 2.54, SD = 1.01, α = 0.85). Eight items were used to measure social media use for news.
Respondents were asked how often they used Facebook and other social media sites, respectively, in each of the following ways: get
news about the election; stay informed about the election; learn others’ opinions on the election; and get election news from tra-
ditional news media (M = 2.37, SD = 1.18, α = 0.95).

3.1.8. Statistical analysis

To test hypotheses, we first estimated ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models whereby factual and subjective political
knowledge and knowledge miscalibration, respectively, were regressed on messaging app use for news and all other control variables.
Next, we estimated OLS regression models whereby offline and online political participation, respectively, were regressed on mes-
saging app use for news and all other control variables. We then introduced factual and subjective political knowledge to the models
for offline and online political participation. Although knowledge miscalibration is conceptually distinct from its constituents (i.e.,
factual and subjective knowledge), because of the way it was measured, introducing the three knowledge variables in the same model
would eliminate variation in the miscalibration variable (Parker & Stone, 2014). Therefore, we introduced knowledge miscalibration
to the models for offline and online political participation in place of factual and subjective political knowledge. Collinearity statistics
showed no signs of multicollinearity. VIF and Tolerance values were below conventional levels of concern, with, for example, VIF
values below 2.55 in all regression models. Indirect associations between messaging app use for news and political participation
through political knowledge were assessed using the SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013).

4. Results

H1 stated that messaging app use for news would be associated negatively with (a) factual political knowledge and positively with
(b) subjective political knowledge and (c) knowledge miscalibration. The first column in Table 1 shows that messaging app use for
news had a negative relationship with factual political knowledge (β = −0.284, p < .001). The second column in Table 1 shows that
messaging app use for news was not significantly associated with subjective political knowledge, whereas the third column shows
that its influence on knowledge miscalibration was significant and positive (β = 0.230, p < .001). Thus, the data supported H1a and
H1c, but not H1b.
H2 predicted that messaging app use for news would be positively associated with (a) offline and (b) online political participation.

Table 1
Predicting Factual and Subjective Political Knowledge.
Factual Subjective Miscalibration

Age 0.067 0.088* 0.015

Gender (female) −0.061 −0.122*** −0.046
Education 0.084 0.060 −0.018
Income 0.055 0.026 −0.023
Race (White) −0.055 0.068 0.094*
Political interest 0.111* 0.453*** 0.261***
Party affiliation −0.091 −0.031 0.045
Political ideology 0.172*** −0.020 −0.147**
R-squared (%) 5.9*** 35.2*** 17.5***
Traditional news −0.131* 0.138** 0.206***
Social media news 0.187** 0.176*** −0.009
Messaging apps −0.284*** 0.015 0.230***
Incr. R-squared (%) 6.2*** 5.4*** 10.1***
Total R-squared (%) 12.1*** 40.6*** 27.6***

Notes. Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. N = 629 for objective factual knowledge. N = 628 for subjective political
knowledge and knowledge miscalibration.
*** p < .001,
** p < .01,
* p < .05.

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Table 2
Predicting Offline Political Participation.
Offline Political Participation

Model1 Model 2 Model 3

Age 0.004 −0.018 0.000

Gender (female) 0.013 0.048 0.025
Education 0.024 0.013 029
Income −0.008 −0.010 −0.002
Race (White) −0.008 −0.037 −0.032
Political interest 0.263*** 0.123** 0.195***
Party affiliation −0.013 −0.012 −0.024
Political ideology 0.008 0.035 0.047
R-squared (%) 23.1*** 23.1*** 23.1***
Traditional news 0.219*** 0.157*** 0.165***
Social media news 0.079 0.041 0.082
Messaging apps 0.307*** 0.269*** 0.247***
Incr. R-squared (%) 18.7*** 18.7*** 18.7***
Factual knowledge — −0.113*** —
Subjective knowledge — 338*** —
Knowledge miscalibration — — 0.261***
Incr. R-squared (%) — 7.0*** 4.9***
Total R-squared (%) 41.8*** 48.8*** 46.7***

Notes. Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. N = 628. *p < .05.
*** p < .001,
** p < .01,

This set of hypotheses was supported. Table 2 shows three OLS regression models for offline political participation. Model 1 shows a
direct relationship between messaging app use for news and offline political participation (β = 0.307, p < .001). Model 2 introduces
factual and subjective political knowledge. It shows that factual political knowledge was negatively related to offline political par-
ticipation (β = −0.113, p < .001), whereas the influence of subjective political knowledge was positive (β = 0.338, p < .001).
Even after factual and subjective political knowledge are taken into account, messaging app use for news remained significantly
related to offline political participation (β = 0.269, p < .001). Model 3 shows that knowledge miscalibration was positively related
to offline political participation (β = 0.261, p < .001). Messaging app use remained significantly associated with offline political
participation (β = 0.247, p < .001).
Table 3 presents three OLS regression models for online political participation. Messaging app use for news had a significant and
positive relationship with online political participation across the three models. Whereas factual political knowledge was negatively

Table 3
Predicting Online Political Participation.
Online Political Participation

Model1 Model 2 Model 3

Age 0.032 0.010 0.029

Gender (female) 0.005 0.040 0.017
Education 0.079 0.066 0.082*
Income −0.020 −0.022 −0.014
Race (White) 0.029 0.001 0.006
Political interest 0.165*** 0.026 0.102**
Party affiliation 0.052 0.054 0.041
Political ideology 0.009 0.032 0.045
R-squared (%) 19.6*** 19.6*** 19.6***
Traditional news 0.194*** 0.136*** 0.145***
Social media news 0.132** 0.092* 0.135**
Messaging apps 0.381*** 0.349*** 0.325***
Incr. R-squared (%) 25.7*** 25.7*** 25.7***
Objective knowledge — −0.094*** —
Subjective knowledge — 329*** —
Knowledge miscalibration — — 0.240***
Incr. R-squared (%) — 6.5*** 4.2***
Total R-squared (%) 45.3*** 51.8*** 49.5***

Notes. Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. N = 627.

*** p < .001,
** p < .01,
* p < .05.

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related to online political participation (β = −0.094, p < .001), the influence of subjective political knowledge was positive
(β = 0.329, p < .001). Furthermore, knowledge miscalibration had a significant positive relationship with online political partici-
pation (β = 0.240, p < .001).
H3 predicted that messaging app use for news would have an indirect negative association with (a) offline and (b) online political
participation through factual political knowledge, whereas H4 expected that it would have an indirect positive association with (a)
offline and (b) online political participation through subjective political knowledge. When factual and subjective political knowledge
were specified as mediating the relationship between messaging app use for news and offline political participation, messaging app
use for news had an indirect positive relationship with offline political participation (unstandardized point estimate = 0.027, CIs
[0.013, 0.051]) and online political participation (unstandardized point estimate = 0.022, CIs [0.008, 0.040]) through factual po-
litical knowledge. However, messaging app use for news was not indirectly related to offline and online political participation
through subjective political knowledge. Thus, H3 and H4 were rejected.
Finally, H5 stated that messaging app use for news would have an indirect positive association with (a) offline and (b) online
political participation through knowledge miscalibration. When knowledge miscalibration was specified as a mediator in place of
factual and subjective political knowledge, messaging app use for news had an indirect positive relationship with offline political
participation (unstandardized point estimate = 0.051, CIs [0.028, 0.079]) and online political participation (unstandardized point
estimate = 0.045, CIs [0.026, 0.071]). Thus, the data supported H5.

4.1. Additional analyses

Additional analyses were undertaken to examine possible moderation effects. Considering the popularity of messaging apps
among young adults, we examined whether age would moderate the relationship that messaging app use for news had with political
knowledge and participation (model 8 of the SPSS PROCESS macro). Results from this analysis, however, showed no significant
interaction effects involving messaging app use and age, suggesting that the above results are invariant across different age groups.

5. Discussion

The results reported above offer interesting insights into the political utility of mobile media. First, with all other variables
simultaneously accounted for, messaging app use for news was related negatively to factual political knowledge and positively to
knowledge miscalibration, suggesting that using messaging apps for news does not promote learning of political facts. Rather, it
contributes to the misperception of knowledge. Users think they know a lot about politics when actually they do not. Why might
using messaging apps for news foster knowledge miscalibration? A plausible explanation is that messaging apps may constitute a
closed network of like-minded individuals that exposes users to information and opinions favorable to their preexisting views. Filter
bubbles formed by the user selectivity may limit factual learning while fostering the overestimation of how much one knows about
politics. The superficial nature of news on messaging apps may also contribute to this phenomenon (Rowlett & Harlow, 2016).
Second, messaging app use for news was positively associated with offline and online political participation. This result is con-
sistent with past studies (e.g., Campbell & Kwak, 2010, 2011; Rojas & Puig-i-Abril, 2009; Yamamoto et al., 2015). Yet, such parti-
cipation did not seem to be driven by factual understanding of politics, as messaging app use for news was negatively related to
factual political knowledge, which in turn had a negative relationship with offline and online political participation.
The negative relationship between factual political knowledge and offline and online political participation is surprising in that it
is contrary to the normative value of factual knowledge in politics (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Gastil, Rosenzweig, Knobloch, &
Brinker, 2016). For example, Gastil et al. (2016) found that the efforts to provide digestible factual information to citizens helped
encourage voting behavior on state ballot initiatives. Although this finding could be ruled out as an anomaly, similar findings have
been reported (Chen & Chan, 2017; Gil de Zúñiga, Valenzuela, & Weeks, 2016). It might be that fact-based understanding of politics is
not as important as it was once perceived to be. The current political landscape, sometimes characterized as a post-truth era in which
facts are subjective and beliefs constitute knowledge (Pazzanese, 2016), may be posing a challenge to the importance of facts in
politics. There also might be unexplored factors moderating the association between factual political knowledge and political par-
ticipation. For example, research on political disaffection shows that cynicism and exposure to negative campaigns dampen parti-
cipation in politics (e.g., Pinkleton, Um, & Austin, 2002). It might be that the effect of factual political knowledge on political
participation is negative for cynics, yet is positive for citizens who trust the political system to perform normatively expected
functions. Addressing these possibilities might help reconcile the contradictory findings and advance our understanding of the role of
factual knowledge in political participation.
Third, knowledge miscalibration was positively related to offline and online political participation both directly and indirectly
through messaging app use for news. Similar to the findings for factual political knowledge, the results imply that it is not how much
people know about political facts. Rather, people’s confidence in political knowledge relative to how much they actually know carries
more weight in explaining political participation, and news consumption through messaging apps seems to contribute to this phe-
nomenon. Research commonly takes a cognitive approach to political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). This approach rests
on the assumption that knowledge is objective and exists independently of any single person’s beliefs. However, knowledge can be
subjective and socially constructed among people with common beliefs (Hindman, 2009). Given these different epistemological
approaches and the results observed in our study, it appears important to consider both factual and subjective political knowledge in
understanding why some people are more politically engaged than others. Furthermore, as research indicates that news media use
facilitates political participation by increasing political knowledge (e.g., Jung et al., 2012; McLeod et al., 1999), a simultaneous

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examination of factual and subjective political knowledge would help clarify of the role of news media use in the political process.
Our findings have a practical implication. Although prominent news organizations have started using messaging apps, particu-
larly Snapchat, to deliver news, such apps may not be an adequate delivery platform to facilitate learning of political facts. Rather,
this platform may contribute to perception-based engagement that is not factually grounded. The decision news organizations have
made to use messaging apps as a news delivery channel is understandable, as they struggle to find ways to cultivate new markets and
given the popularity of messaging apps among younger segments of the population (Pew Research Center Internet & Technology,
2018). However, our study suggests that news delivery via messaging apps is not as normatively effective as practitioners might wish.
The above statements must be qualified with consideration of several limitations. First, the cross-sectional data analyzed in our
study limits causal inferences among the variables of interest. This limitation also prevents us from eliminating the possibility of
alternative models. It is likely, for example, that those who knew a lot about the election did not use messaging apps to get news. To
address this limitation, future research might consider a pre-test post-test control group design in which participants are instructed to
read the same set of political news articles via different channels (e.g., Snapchat, print newspaper, radio), with factual and subjective
political knowledge and political participation measured at the beginning and end of the experiment. Such a design might help
establish if the results observed in our study are in fact due to the messaging app medium. Second, our data came from a web survey
of online panel members who opted in to participate in our survey. Thus, our results cannot be projected to the larger population.
Third, the results might have been contaminated by social desirability bias. As our survey was conducted right before the election,
it is possible that respondents answered survey questions to make it look as though they paid close attention to election news, knew a
lot about the election, and actively engaged in election-related activities, when they did not do so as much as they answered they did.
Fourth, we measured messaging app use for news broadly to capture people’s usage patterns of this growing technology for news-
specific purposes. As messaging apps are more widely used for news, future work could focus on a specific app. Fifth, although our
factual knowledge questions did not include a “don’t know” response option, the absence of this option might have forced blind
guessing and led to inaccurate coefficient estimates (Sturgis, Allum, & Smith, 2007). Finally, given that knowledge miscalibration was
measured as the gap between subjective and factual knowledge, one might argue that the associations between miscalibration and
offline and online political participation were to be expected by looking at the results regarding the two knowledge variables that
constituted it. Therefore, our study may have failed to substantiate the theoretical value of this concept that has been shown in other
disciplines (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000; Parker & Stone, 2014; Pillai & Goldsmith, 2006). As we note below, future work should
examine the unique role of knowledge miscalibration, if any, in the political process.

6. Conclusion

These limitations should be balanced against the unique insights presented in our study. In the context of the 2016 U.S. pre-
sidential election, it appears that messaging app use for news promoted participation that was not based on factually accurate
understanding of the candidates. Instead, news consumption via messaging apps seems to have driven participation based on mis-
calibration of knowledge. A democratic ideal holds that citizens cast a vote with reason, and news and information play a key role in
informed electoral decision making (Gastil et al., 2016). Yet, such might not be always the case. Our study suggests that campaign
news consumption via messaging apps did not live up to this ideal in the 2016 U.S. election.
Miscalibration of knowledge bears significant conceptual relevance to the current political landscape and could serve as a new
explanation for political participation. For this purpose, it is important to show the unique value of this concept independent of
factual and subjective political knowledge. Future work might use an experimental design to manipulate knowledge miscalibration
(Razmdoost, Dimitriu, & Macdonald, 2015). For example, a study might first measure participants’ levels of messaging app use for
news, miscalibration of political knowledge (based on factual and subjective political knowledge as measured in our study), and
political participation. Participants would be divided into overconfident, calibrated, and underconfident groups using their messaging
app use and miscalibration scores. All participants would then be randomly assigned into either a control group in which they remain
miscalibrated or an experimental group in which they are made aware of issues with messaging app news as well as discrepancies
between their factual and subjective political knowledge scores. Political participation would then be measured again at the end. This
type of design, by contrasting between calibrated and miscalibrated subjects within the over- and under-confident groups, would
allow examining the unique effect of knowledge (mis)calibration on political participation. While the present examination of
knowledge miscalibration was limited as we acknowledge above, we posit that this concept offers researchers a vehicle to achieve a
greater understanding of the role that the interrelationship between facets of political knowledge play in political media use and
participation in the political process.

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Masahiro Yamamoto (Ph.D., Washington State University, 2012) is an assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University at Albany, State
University of New York. His research interests include communication in community contexts, civic and political participation, and social media.

Matthew James Kushin (Ph.D., Washington State University, 2010) is an associate professor in the Department of Communication at Shepherd University. His
research interests include the political and civic utility of online and social media.

Francis Dalisay (Ph.D., Washington State University, 2010) is an assistant professor in the Communication and Fine Arts Department of the College of Liberal Arts and
Social Sciences at the University of Guam. His research looks into the role of communication and culture in fostering civil societies.

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