DIWATA RAMOS petitioner desires to adopt the children;
LANDINGIN Petitioner, the minors have given their written
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos
Landingin, a citizen of the United States
of America (USA), of Filipino parentage
and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a
petition3 for the adoption of minors
Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on
August 31, 1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos,
who was born on September 7,
1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who
was born on August 5, 1989. 6 The
minors are the natural children of
Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and
Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her
petition that when Manuel died on May
19, 1990,7 the children were left to their
paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc
Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia,
went to Italy, re-married there and now
has two children by her second marriage
and no longer communicated with her
children by Manuel Ramos nor with her
in-laws from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption; the minors are
being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives
abroad; as Maria passed away on
November 23, 2000,
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the
Department of Social Welfare and
consent8 to the adoption; she is qualified
to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a
57-year-old widow, has children of her
own who are already married, gainfully
employed and have their respective
families; she lives alone in her own home
in Guam, USA, where she acquired
citizenship, and works as a restaurant
server. She came back to the Philippines
to spend time with the minors; her
children gave their written consent9 to
the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s
brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns
substantial income, signified his
willingness and commitment to support
the minors while in petitioner’s custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered in her favor, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully
prayed to this Honorable Court that after
publication and hearing, judgment be
rendered allowing the adoption of the
minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos,
Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon
Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering
that the minor children’s name follow the
family name of petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs,
just and equitable under the premises.10
Development (DSWD) to conduct a case
study as mandated by Article 34 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, and to submit a report thereon
not later than April 4, 2002, the date set
for the initial hearing of the
petition.11 The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) entered its
12
appearance  but deputized the City
Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its
behalf.13 Since her petition was
unopposed, petitioner was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte.14
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She
also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest
of the adoptees, to testify on the written
consent executed by her and her
siblings.15 The petitioner marked in
evidence the Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children
Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley,
all surnamed Landingin, and notarized
by a notary public in Guam, USA, as
proof of said consent.16
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao,
Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD,
Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a
Child Study Report, with the following
recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned
finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all
surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption
because of the following reasons:
1. Minors’ surviving parent, the
mother has voluntarily consented
to their adoption by the paternal
aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in
view of her inability to provide
the parental care, guidance and
support they need. An Affidavit of
Consent was executed by the
mother which is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for
adoption have also expressed their
willingness to be adopted and
joins the petitioners in Guam,
USA in the future. A joint
Affidavit of consent is hereto
attached. The minors developed
close attachment to the petitioners
and they regarded her as second
parent.
3. The minors are present under
the care of a temporary guardian
who has also family to look after.
As young adolescents they really
need parental love, care, guidance
and support to ensure their
protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby
respectfully recommended that minors
Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and
Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their
maternal aunt Diwata Landingin.
Trial custody is hereby further
recommended to be dispensed with
considering that they are close relatives
and that close attachments was already
developed between the petitioner and the
3 minors.17
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during
her interview, as follows:
The mother of minors came home
together with her son John Mario, this
May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is
to enable her appear for the personal
interview concerning the adoption of her
children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by
their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was
conceived after the death of their
paternal grandmother and guardian. The
paternal relatives including the petitioner
who attended the wake of their mother
were very much concerned about the
well-being of the three minors. While
preparing for their adoption, they have
asked a cousin who has a family to stay
with minors and act as their temporary
guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted
about the adoption plan and after
weighing the benefits of adoption to her
children, she voluntarily consented.
She realized that her children need
parental love, guidance and support
which she could not provide as she
already has a second family & residing in
Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners &
her children have been supporting her
children up to the present and truly care
for them, she believes her children will
be in good hands. She also finds
petitioners in a better position to provide
a secured and bright future to her
children.18
However, petitioner failed to present
Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence
the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos
to the adoption; petitioner, likewise,
failed to present any documentary
evidence to prove that Amelia assents to
the adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court,
finding merit in the petition for adoption,
rendered a decision granting said
petition.
The OSG appealed20 the decision to the
Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002.
In its brief21 for the oppositor-appellant,
the OSG raised the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF
CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED
ADOPTEES’ BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF
THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE
PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AS
REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONER’S
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE
IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a
decision22 reversing the ruling of the
RTC. It held that petitioner failed to
adduce in evidence the voluntary consent
of Amelia Ramos, the children’s natural
mother. Moreover, the affidavit of
consent of the petitioner’s children could
not also be admitted in evidence as the
same was executed in Guam, USA and
was not authenticated or acknowledged
before a Philippine consular office, and
although petitioner has a job, she was not
stable enough to support the children.
The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed decision dated November 25,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION
SHOULD BE GRANTED.
RULING:
NO.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to
adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in
Malkinson v. Agrava,28 that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, hold
the interest and welfare of the child to be
of paramount consideration and are
designed to provide homes, parental care
and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family in the
person of the adopter as well as to allow
childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and
give them legally a child in the person of
the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts.
Every reasonable intendment should thus
be sustained to promote and fulfill these
noble and compassionate objectives of
the law.29
However, in Cang v. Court of
Appeals,30 the Court also ruled that the
liberality with which this Court treats
matters leading to adoption insofar as it
carries out the beneficent purposes of the
law to ensure the rights and privileges of
the adopted child arising therefrom, ever
mindful that the paramount consideration
is the overall benefit and interest of the
adopted child, should be understood in
its proper context and perspective. The
Court’s position should not be
misconstrued or misinterpreted as to
extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
Thus, the discretion to approve adoption
proceedings is not to be anchored solely
on best interests of the child but likewise,
with due regard to the natural rights of
the parents over the child.31
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to
the Adoption. - After being properly
counseled and informed of his/her right
to give or withhold his/her approval of
the adoption, the written consent of the
following to the adoption is hereby
required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years
of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the
child, if known, or the legal
guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which
has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted
sons/daughters, ten (10) years of
age or over, of the adopter(s) and
adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate
sons/daughters, ten (10) years of
age or over, of the adopter, if
living with said adopter and the
latter’s souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the
person adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and
notice to the natural parents is intended
to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure
the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the
proposed adoption.32
Clearly, the written consent of the
biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of a decree of adoption.
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his
child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and
duties may be terminated and re-
established in adoptive parents. In this
case, petitioner failed to submit the
written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao
declared that she was able to interview
Amelia Ramos who arrived in the
Philippines with her son, John Mario in
May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in
the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to
interview her, it is incredible that the
latter would not require Amelia Ramos
to execute a Written Consent to the
adoption of her minor children. Neither
did the petitioner bother to present
Amelia Ramos as witness in support of
the petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the
written consent of the biological mother
is no longer necessary because when
Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left
for Italy and never came back. The
children were then left to the guidance
and care of their paternal grandmother. It
is the paternal relatives, including
petitioner, who provided for the
children’s financial needs. Hence,
Amelia, the biological mother, had
effectively abandoned the children.
Petitioner further contends that it was by
twist of fate that after 12 years, when the
petition for adoption was pending with
the RTC that Amelia and her child by her
second marriage were on vacation in the
Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social
worker, was able to meet her, and during
the meeting, Amelia intimated to the
social worker that she conformed to the
adoption of her three children by the
petitioner.
Petitioner’s contention must be rejected.
When she filed her petition with the trial
court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in
effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if
the written consent of the biological
parents cannot be obtained, the written
consent of the legal guardian of the
minors will suffice. If, as claimed by
petitioner, that the biological mother of
the minors had indeed abandoned them,
she should, thus have adduced the
written consent of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to
justify the adoption of his child without
his consent, is a conduct which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental
duties.33 The term means neglect and
refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. If a
parent withholds presence, love, care, the
opportunity to display filial affection,
and neglects to lend support and
maintenance, the parent, in effect,
abandons the child.34
Merely permitting the child to remain for
a time undisturbed in the care of others is
not such an abandonment.35 To dispense
with the requirement of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have
existed at the time of adoption.36
In this case, petitioner relied solely on
her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos
to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos
had abandoned her children. Petitioner’s
testimony on that matter follows:
Q Where is the mother of these three
children now?
A She left for Italy on November 20,
1990, sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left
for Italy, was there an instance where she
communicated with the family?
A None, sir.
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did
she reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about
Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was
already married with another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she
has children by her second marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified,
thus:
Q Where is your mother now?
A In Italy, sir.
Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother
left for Italy in 1990?
A Two years old, sir.
Q At the time when your mother left for
Italy, did your mother communicate with
you?
A No, sir.38
However, the Home Study Report of the
DSWD Social Worker also stated the
following:
IV. Background of the Case:
xxxx
Since the mother left for Italy, minors
siblings had been under the care and
custody of their maternal grandmother.
However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an
uncle, cousin of their deceased father
now serves as their guardian. The
petitioner, together with her children and
other relatives abroad have been
supporting the minor children
financially, even during the time that
they were still living with their natural
parents. Their mother also sends
financial support but very minimal.39
xxxx
V. Background Information about the
Minors Being Sought for Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a
role model to her younger siblings. She
helps them in their lessons, works and
has fun with them. She also encourages
openness on their problems and concerns
and provides petty counseling. In serious
problems she already consult (sic) her
mother and petitioner-aunt.40
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they
begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia
recalled that they had a happy and
comfortable life. After the death of her
husband, her in-laws which include the
petitioner had continued providing
support for them. However being
ashamed of just depending on the
support of her husband’s relatives, she
decided to work abroad. Her parents are
also in need of financial help as they are
undergoing maintenance medication. Her
parents mortgaged their farm land which
she used in going to Italy and worked as
domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November
1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the
care & custody of her mother-in-law who
returned home for good, however she
died on November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun
Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They
became live-in partners since 1995 and
have a son John Mario who is now 2
years old. The three of them are
considered Italian residents. Amelia
claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to
file an annulment of his marriage and his
wife is amenable to it. He is providing
his legitimate family regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support
ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month
through her parents who share minimal
amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his
(sic) children. The petitioner and other
paternal relatives are continuously
providing support for most of the needs
& education of minors up to present.41
HOWEVER,
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had
not intended to abandon her children, or
to permanently sever their mother-child
relationship. She was merely impelled to
leave the country by financial
constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she
did not surrender or relinquish entirely
her motherly obligations of rearing the
children to her now deceased mother-in-
law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself,
she consulted her mother, Amelia, for
serious personal problems. Likewise,
Amelia continues to send financial
support to the children, though in
minimal amounts as compared to what
her affluent in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that
the adoption of the minors herein will
have the effect of severing all legal ties
between the biological mother, Amelia,
and the adoptees, and that the same shall
then be vested on the adopter. 42 It would
thus be against the spirit of the law if
financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding
whether to deprive a person of parental
authority over his/her children. More
proof has to be adduced that Amelia has
emotionally abandoned the children, and
that the latter will not miss her guidance
and counsel if they are given to an
adopting parent.43 Again, it is the best
interest of the child that takes precedence
in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provides that the Court shall
consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified.
The offer of evidence is necessary
because it is the duty of the Court to rest
its findings of fact and its judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by
the parties. Unless and until admitted by
the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which such document is
offered, the same is merely a scrap of
paper barren of probative weight. Mere
identification of documents and the
markings thereof as exhibits do not
confer any evidentiary weight on
documents unless formally offered.44
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence
Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint
Affidavit of Consent purportedly
executed by her children; the authenticity
of which she, likewise, failed to prove.
The joint written consent of petitioner’s
children45 was notarized on January 16,
2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated
by the Rules of Court in the same way as
a document notarized in this country it
needs to comply with Section 2 of Act
No. 2103,46 which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document
acknowledged and authenticated in a
foreign country shall be considered
authentic if the acknowledgment and
authentication are made in accordance
with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be
made before (1) an ambassador,
minister, secretary of legation,
chargé d affaires, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting
within the country or place to
which he is accredited, or (2) a
notary public or officer duly
authorized by law of the country
to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that
the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known
to him, and that he is the same
person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his
free act and deed. The certificate
shall be under his official seal, if
he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate
shall so state. In case the
acknowledgment is made before a
notary public or an officer
mentioned in subdivision (2) of
the preceding paragraph, the
certificate of the notary public or
the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall be
authenticated by an ambassador,
minister, secretary of legation,
chargé de affaires, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting
within the country or place to
which he is accredited. The officer
making the authentication shall
certify under his official seal that
the person who took the
acknowledgment was at the time
duly authorized to act as notary
public or that he was duly
exercising the functions of the
office by virtue of which he
assumed to act, and that as such
he had authority under the law to
take acknowledgment of
instruments or documents in the
place where the acknowledgment
was taken, and that his signature
and seal, if any, are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of
petitioner’s legitimate children did not
comply with the afore-cited law, the
same can at best be treated by the Rules
as a private document whose authenticity
must be proved either by anyone who
saw the document executed or written; or
by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the makers.47
Also
Since, in the instant case, no further
proof was introduced by petitioner to
authenticate the written consent of her
legitimate children, the same is
inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the
CA ruled that petitioner was not stable
enough to support the children and is
only relying on the financial backing,
support and commitment of her children
and her siblings.48 Petitioner contradicts
this by claiming that she is financially
capable as she has worked in Guam for
14 years, has savings, a house, and
currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of
not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her
children and siblings have likewise
committed themselves to provide
financial backing should the need arise.
The OSG, again in its comment, banks
on the statement in the Home Study
Report that "petitioner has limited
income."
Accordingly, it appears that she will rely
on the financial backing of her children
and siblings in order to support the minor
adoptees. The law, however, states that it
is the adopter who should be in a
position to provide support in keeping
with the means of the family.
Since the primary consideration in
adoption is the best interest of the child,
it follows that the financial capacity of
prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered.
Certainly, the adopter should be in a
position to support the would-be adopted
child or children, in keeping with the
means of the family.
According to the Adoption Home Study
Report49 forwarded by the Department of
Public Health & Social Services of the
Government of Guam to the DSWD,
petitioner is no longer supporting her
legitimate children, as the latter are
already adults, have individual lives and
families. At the time of the filing of the
petition, petitioner was 57 years old,
employed on a part-time basis as a
waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips
of around $1,000 a month. Petitioner’s filing a new petition for adoption of the
main intention in adopting the children is herein minors.
to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She
has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being petition is hereby DENIED.
amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that
the limited income might be a hindrance SO ORDERED.
to the adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed
doubtful whether petitioner will be able
to sufficiently handle the financial aspect
of rearing the three children in the US.
She only has a part-time job, and she is
rather of age. While petitioner claims
that she has the financial support and
backing of her children and siblings, the
OSG is correct in stating that the ability
to support the adoptees is personal to the
adopter, as adoption only creates a legal
relation between the former and the
latter. Moreover, the records do not
prove nor support petitioner’s allegation
that her siblings and her children are
financially able and that they are willing
to support the minors herein. The Court,
therefore, again sustains the ruling of the
CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that
petitioner has only the best of intentions
for her nieces and nephew, there are
legal infirmities that militate against
reversing the ruling of the CA. In any
case, petitioner is not prevented from
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION
OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION
OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
Petitioner Mona Lim is an optometrist by
profession. On 23 June 1974, she
married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents
were unknown, were entrusted to them
by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban).
Being so eager to have a child of their
own, petitioner and Lim registered the
children to make it appear that they were
the children’s parents. The
2
children  were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim
(Michael). Michelle was barely eleven
days old when brought to the clinic of
petitioner. She was born on 15 March
1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when
Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s
clinic. His date of birth is 1 August
1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the
children as if they were their own. They
sent the children to exclusive schools.
They used the surname "Lim" in all their
school records and documents.
Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998,
Lim died. On 27 December 2000,
petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario),
an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt
the children by availing of the
amnesty5 given under Republic Act No.
85526 (RA 8552) to those individuals
who simulated the birth of a child. Thus,
on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed
separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial
court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos.
1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time
of the filing of the petitions for adoption,
Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was 18 years and
seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their
consent to the adoption as evidenced by
their Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael
also gave his consent to his adoption as
shown in his Affidavit of
8
Consent.  Petitioner’s husband Olario
likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle
and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the
Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle was
considered as an abandoned child and the
whereabouts of her natural parents were
unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar
Certification for Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court
rendered judgment dismissing the
petitions. The trial court ruled that since
petitioner had remarried, petitioner
should have filed the petition jointly with
her new husband. The trial court ruled
that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c),
Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of
the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision but the
motion was denied in the Order dated 16
June 2005. In denying the motion, the
trial court ruled that petitioner did not
fall under any of the exceptions under
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552.
Petitioner’s argument that mere consent
of her husband would suffice was
untenable because, under the law, there
are additional requirements, such as
residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who
was not even made a party in this case,
must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are
already emancipated and joint adoption
is merely for the joint exercise of
parental authority, the trial court ruled
that joint adoption is not only for the
purpose of exercising parental authority
because an emancipated child acquires
certain rights from his parents and
assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court
raising the sole issue of whether or not
petitioner, who has remarried, can
singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
NO.
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint
adoption must be relaxed because it is
the duty of the court and the State to
protect the paramount interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted.
Petitioner argues that the legal maxim
"dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to
adoption cases. She argues that joint
parental authority is not necessary in this
case since, at the time the petitions were
filed, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was
already 18 years of age. Parental
authority is not anymore necessary since
they have been emancipated having
attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She
filed the petitions by herself, without
being joined by her husband Olario.
We have no other recourse but to affirm
the trial court’s decision denying the
petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed
lex. The law is explicit. Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following
may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in
possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not
been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for
children, at least sixteen (16) years older
than the adoptee, and who is in a position
to support and care for his/her children in
keeping with the means of the family.
The requirement of sixteen (16) year
difference between the age of the adopter
and adoptee may be waived when the
adopter is the biological parent of the
adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s
parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same
qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country
has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she
has been living in the Philippines for at
least three (3) continuous years prior to
the filing of the application for adoption
and maintains such residence until the
adoption decree is entered, that he/she
has been certified by his/her diplomatic
or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the
legal capacity to adopt in his/her country,
and that his/her government allows the
adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided,
further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt in his/her country
may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse;
or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino
citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity
of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward
after the termination of the guardianship
and clearance of his/her financial
accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt,
except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her
own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated
from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt,
or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the
spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-
quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory.
This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child
to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the
spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for
ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried
at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
petitions for adoption were filed only by
petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was
correct in denying the petitions for
adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of
the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7.
First, the children to be adopted are not
the legitimate children of petitioner or of
her husband Olario. Second, the children
are not the illegitimate children of
petitioner. And third, petitioner and
Olario are not legally separated from
each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to
the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are
certain requirements that Olario must
comply being an American citizen. He
must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he
must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of
the Philippines; (2) he must have been
living in the Philippines for at least three
continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must
maintain such residency until the
adoption decree is entered; (4) he has
legal capacity to adopt in his own
country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to
enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s
adopted child.
None of these qualifications were shown
and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and
certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoptees are not relatives within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the
adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental
authority is not anymore necessary since
the children have been emancipated
having reached the age of majority. This
is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and
rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the
development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being.13 The
father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children.14 Even
the remarriage of the surviving parent
shall not affect the parental authority
over the children, unless the court
appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the
children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the
age of emancipation — that is, when he
attains the age of majority or 18 years of
age16 — emancipation terminates
parental authority over the person and
property of the child, who shall then be
qualified and responsible for all acts of
civil life.17 However, parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption. Article V of RA 8552
enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V adoptee as a legitimate child of the
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in
cases where the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter, all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the
adoptee shall be severed and the same
shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall
be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all
intents and purposes and as such is
entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end,
the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance,
and support in keeping with the means of
the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and
intestate succession, the adopter(s) and
the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights
of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. However, if the
adoptee and his/her biological parent(s)
had left a will, the law on testamentary
succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects:
(1) sever all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee,
except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and
adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including but not limited to: (i)
the right of the adopter to choose the
name the child is to be known; and (ii)
the right of the adopter and adoptee to be
legal and compulsory heirs of each
other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation
terminates parental authority, the adoptee
is still considered a legitimate child of
the adopter with all the rights19 of a
legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the
surname of the father and the mother; (2)
to receive support from their parents; and
(3) to be entitled to the legitime and
other successional rights. Conversely, the
adoptive parents shall, with respect to the
adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to
which biological parents are
entitled20 such as support21 and
successional rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, hold
the interests and welfare of the child to
be of paramount consideration. They are
designed to provide homes, parental care
and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family, as well
as to allow childless couples or persons
to experience the joys of parenthood and
give them legally a child in the person of
the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these
noble and compassionate objectives of
the law.23 But, as we have ruled
in Republic v. Vergara:24
We are not unmindful of the main
purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children.
Accordingly, the law should be
construed liberally, in a manner that will
sustain rather than defeat said purpose.
The law must also be applied with
compassion, understanding and less
severity in view of the fact that it is
intended to provide homes, love, care
and education for less fortunate children.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position
to affirm the trial court’s decision
favoring adoption in the case at bar, for
the law is clear and it cannot be
modified without violating the
proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however,
that the law on the matter is amended, we
cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’
petition for adoption. (Emphasis
supplied)1avvphi1.zw+
Petitioner, being married at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, should
have jointly filed the petitions with her
husband. We cannot make our own
legislation to suit petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists
that subsequent events would show that
joint adoption could no longer be
possible because Olario has filed a case
for dissolution of his marriage to
petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior
Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for
dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It
is not equivalent to a decree of
dissolution of marriage. Until and unless
there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. We reiterate our ruling above
that since, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner was
married to Olario, joint adoption is
mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15
September 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in
SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B.
Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26,
1994;2 that her mother is Gemma
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been
using her mother’s middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower
and qualified to be her adopting parent.
He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her
mother’s surname, and that her surname
"Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his
surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court
rendered the assailed Decision granting
the adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the
evidence presented by the petitioner, and
in the absence of any opposition to the
petition, this Court finds that the
petitioner possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualification provided
for by law as an adoptive parent, and that
as such he is qualified to maintain, care
for and educate the child to be adopted;
that the grant of this petition would
redound to the best interest and welfare
of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. The Court further holds that the
petitioner’s care and custody of the child
since her birth up to the present
constitute more than enough compliance
with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to
be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.
Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia is hereby freed from all
obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural
mother, and for civil purposes, shall
henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate
child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article
189 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the minor shall be known as
STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the
same be entered in the Local Civil
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99
of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished
the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.
SO ORDERED." 4 erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a
motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of
her natural mother (GARCIA) as her
middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child
to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the
issue of whether an illegitimate child
may use the surname of her mother as
her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural
father.
ISSUE:
May an illegitimate child, upon
adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her
middle name?
RULING:
YES.
Petitioner submits that the trial court
name as a consequence of adoption
because: (1) there is no law prohibiting
an adopted child from having a middle
name in case there is only one adopting
parent; (2) it is customary for every
Filipino to have as middle name the
surname of the mother; (3) the middle
name or initial is a part of the name of a
person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and
best interest of the adopted child, hence,
her right to bear a proper name should
not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie
to use the middle name "Garcia" (her
mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of
her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued
use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not
opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia
families.
The Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with
petitioner that Stephanie should be
permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother for the
following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and
maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189
of the Family Code, she remains to be an
intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to
prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or
proof of that relationship with her natural
mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly
prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle
name. What the law does not prohibit, it
allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to
have a middle name, which is ordinarily
the surname of the mother. This custom
has been recognized by the Civil Code
and Family Code. In fact, the Family
Law Committees agreed that "the initial
or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the
father so that the second name, if any,
will be before the surname of the
mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –
For all practical and legal purposes, a
man's name is the designation by which
he is known and called in the community
in which he lives and is best known. It is
defined as the word or combination of
words by which a person is distinguished
from other individuals and, also, as the
label or appellation which he bears for
the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or
dealing with him.8 It is both of personal
as well as public interest that every
person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts:
(1) the given or proper name and (2)
the surname or family name. The given
or proper name is that which is given to
the individual at birth or at baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals.
The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he
belongs and is continued from parent to
child. The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child, but
the surname to which the child is entitled
is fixed by law.9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil
Code provides the substantive rules
which regulate the use of surname 10 of an
individual whatever may be his status in
life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or
illegitimate, an adopted child, a married
woman or a previously married woman,
or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear
the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the
decree annulling a voidable marriage
shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname
and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her
husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but
prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of
marriage, and the wife is the guilty party,
she shall resume her maiden name
and surname. If she is the innocent
spouse, she may resume her maiden
name and surname. However, she may
choose to continue employing her former
husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married
again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been
granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before the
legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased
husband's surname as though he were
still living, in accordance with Article
370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names
and surnames, the younger person shall
be obliged to use such additional name or
surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and
surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be
used only by a son. Grandsons and other
direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's
surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and
so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties,
there is no law regulating the use of a
middle name. Even Article 17611 of the
Family Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To
Use The Surname Of Their Father," is
silent as to what middle name a child
may use.
The middle name or the mother’s
surname is only considered in Article
375(1), quoted above, in case there is
identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, in which
case, the middle name or the mother’s
surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to
what middle name an adoptee may
use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely
provides that "an adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter." Also,
Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter,
thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall
be deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising
from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to
use the surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the
OSG, the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees that drafted the
Family Code recognized the Filipino
custom of adding the surname of the
child’s mother as his middle name. In
the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees,
the members approved the suggestion
that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is
a difference between the use by the wife
of the surname and that of the child
because the father’s surname indicates
the family to which he belongs, for
which reason he would insist on the
use of the father’s surname by the
child but that, if he wants to, the child
may also use the surname of the
mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the
child chooses to use the surname of the
mother, how will his name be written?
Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to
him but that his point is that it should be
mandatory that the child uses the
surname of the father and permissive
in the case of the surname of the
mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice
Caguioa’s point is covered by the present
Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many
names change through no choice of the
person himself precisely because of this
misunderstanding. He then cited the
following example: Alfonso Ponce
Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since
the mother’s surname is Enrile but
everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice
Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is
Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is
David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the
proposed Article (12) be modified to
the effect that it shall be mandatory on
the child to use the surname of the
father but he may use the surname of
the mother by way of an initial or a
middle name. Prof. Balane stated that
they take note of this for inclusion in the
Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the
proposed Article (10) they are just
enumerating the rights of legitimate
children so that the details can be
covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic
in the simplification suggested by Justice
Caguioa that the surname of the father
should always be last because there are
so many traditions like the American
tradition where they like to use their
second given name and the Latin
tradition, which is also followed by the
Chinese wherein they even include the
Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree
in principle that in the Chapter on the
Use of Surnames, they should say that
initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the
second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane
added that this is really the Filipino
way. The Committee approved the
suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law
provides that "the adopted shall bear the
surname of the adopters."13 Again, it is
silent whether he can use a middle name.
What it only expressly allows, as a
matter of right and obligation, is for the
adoptee to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of
adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child –
Adoption is defined as the process of
making a child, whether related or not to
the adopter, possess in general, the rights
accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a
juridical act, a proceeding in rem which
creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results
from legitimate paternity and
filiation.16 The modern trend is to
consider adoption not merely as an act
to establish a relationship of paternity
and filiation, but also as an act which
endows the child with a legitimate
status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in
1989, when the Philippines, as a State
Party to the Convention of the Rights
of the Child initiated by the United
Nations, accepted the principle that
adoption is impressed with social and
moral responsibility, and that its
underlying intent is geared to favor
the adopted child.18 Republic Act No.
8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these
rights and privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the
adopted is deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopter for all intents and
purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the
Family Code and Section 1722 Article V
of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of
her adoption, it follows that Stephanie
is entitled to all the rights provided by
law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother, as discussed
above. This is consistent with the
intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees as
earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino
custom that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both
parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her
mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle
name will maintain her maternal lineage.
It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the
Family Code and Section 1824, Article V
of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide
that the adoptee remains an intestate heir
of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her
hereditary rights from her natural mother
in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie
and her mother are living together in the
house built by petitioner for them at 390
Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan.
Petitioner provides for all their needs.
Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them
"Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are
one normal happy family. Hence, to
allow Stephanie to use her mother’s
surname as her middle name will not
only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also
eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption –
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes,
being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The
interests and welfare of the adopted child
are of primary and paramount
consideration,26 hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code
provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code
Commission, "is necessary so that it may
tip the scales in favor of right and justice
when the law is doubtful or obscure. It
will strengthen the determination of the
courts to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law."28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting
an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as
middle name her mother’s surname, we
find no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
partly MODIFIED in the sense that
Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her
middle name.
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously
referred to as "DR. MELVIN S.
LAHOM"), respondent.
The bliss of marriage and family would
be to most less than complete without
children. The realization that family
would be less than complete could have
likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado
Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into
their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin
Sibulo and to bring him up as their own.
At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin
enjoyed the warmth, love and support of
the couple who treated the child like their
own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs.
Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose
Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple
decided to file a petition for adoption. On
05 May 1972, an order granting the
petition was issued that made all the
more intense than before the feeling of
affection of the spouses for Melvin. In
keeping with the court order, the Civil
Registrar of Naga City changed the name
"Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin
Lahom."
HOWEVER, A sad turn of events came
many years later. Eventually, in
December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga
City. In her petition, she averred —
"7. That x x x despite the proddings and
pleadings of said spouses, Melvin
refused to change his surname from
Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of
petitioner particularly her husband until
the latter died, and even before his death
he had made known his desire to revoke
respondent's adoption, but was prevented
by petitioner's supplication, however
with his further request upon petitioner
to give to charity whatever properties or
interest may pertain to respondent in the
future.
xxx             xxx             xxx
"10. That respondent continued using his
surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of
the feelings of herein petitioner, and his
records with the Professional Regulation
Commission showed his name as Jose
Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in
1978 until the present, and in all his
dealings and activities in connection with
his practice of his profession, he is Jose
Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxx             xxx             xxx
"13. That herein petitioner being a
widow, and living alone in this city with
only her household helps to attend to her,
has yearned for the care and show of
concern from a son, but respondent
remained indifferent and would only
come to Naga to see her once a year.
"14. That for the last three or four years,
the medical check-up of petitioner in
Manila became more frequent in view of
a leg ailment, and those were the times
when petitioner would need most the
care and support from a love one, but
respondent all the more remained callous
and utterly indifferent towards petitioner
which is not expected of a son.
"15. That herein respondent has recently
been jealous of petitioner's nephews and
nieces whenever they would find time to
visit her, respondent alleging that they
were only motivated by their desire for
some material benefits from petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's
insensible attitude resulting in a strained
and uncomfortable relationship between
him and petitioner, the latter has suffered
wounded feelings, knowing that after all
respondent's only motive to his adoption
is his expectancy of his alleged rights
over the properties of herein petitioner
and her late husband, clearly shown by
his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-
4463 for partition against petitioner,
thereby totally eroding her love and
affection towards respondent, rendering
the decree of adoption, considering
respondent to be the child of petitioner,
for all legal purposes, has been negated
for which reason there is no more basis
for its existence, hence this petition for
revocation,"1
Prior to the institution of the case,
specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the
Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect.
The new statute deleted from the law the
right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No.
8552 now reads:
"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of
Adoption. — Upon petition of the
adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department if a minor or if over eighteen
(18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be
rescinded on any of the following
grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a)
repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite
having undergone counseling; (b)
attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c)
sexual assault or violence; or (d)
abandonment and failure to comply with
parental obligations.
"Adoption, being in the best
interest of the child, shall not be
subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the
adopter(s) may disinherit the
adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code."
(emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of
the petition, contending principally (a)
that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case and (b) that the petitioner
had no cause of action in view of the
aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552.
Petitioner asseverated, by way of
opposition, that the proscription in R.A.
No. 8552 should not retroactively
apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for
rescission of the adoption vested under
the regime of then Article 3482 of the
Civil Code and Article 1923 of the
Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial
court held thusly:
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of
R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this
Court, having been designated Family
Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the
test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged
in the complaint, is whether or not,
admitting the facts alleged, the Court
could render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer of said
complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs.
Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of
R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an
adopter to rescind an adoption earlier
granted under the Family Code.
Conformably, on the face of the petition,
indeed there is lack of cause of action.
"Petitioner however, insists that her right
to rescind long acquired under the
provisions of the Family Code should be
respected. Assuming for the sake of
argument, that petitioner is entitled to
rescind the adoption of respondent
granted on May 5, 1972, said right
should have been exercised within the
period allowed by the Rules. From the
averments in the petition, it appears clear
that the legal grounds for the petition
have been discovered and known to
petitioner for more than five (5) years,
prior to the filing of the instant petition
on December 1, 1999, hence, the action
if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5,
Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)
ISSUE:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed
on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or
rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's
action prescribed?
RULING:
NO.
A brief background on the law and its
origins could provide some insights on
the subject. In ancient times, the Romans
undertook adoption to assure male heirs
in the family.5 The continuity of the
adopter's family was the primary purpose
of adoption and all matters relating to it
basically focused on the rights of the
adopter. There was hardly any mention
about the rights of the
6 the Child. The Philippines, a State Party
adopted.  Countries, like Greece, France,
Spain and England, in an effort to
preserve inheritance within the family,
neither allowed nor recognized
7 underlying intent was geared to favor the
adoption.  It was only much later when
adoption was given an impetus in law
and still later when the welfare of the
child became a paramount
8
concern.  Spain itself which previously
disfavored adoption ultimately relented
and accepted the Roman law concept of
adoption which, subsequently, was to
find its way to the archipelago. The
Americans came and introduced their
own ideas on adoption which, unlike
most countries in Europe, made the
interests of the child an overriding
consideration.9 In the early part of the
century just passed, the rights of children
invited universal attention; the Geneva
Declaration of Rights of the Child of
1924 and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948,10 followed by the
United Nations Declarations of the
Rights of the Child,11 were written
instruments that would also protect and
safeguard the rights of adopted children.
The Civil Code of the Philippines12 of
1950 on adoption, later modified by the
Child and Youth Welfare Code13 and
then by the Family Code of the
Philippines,14 gave immediate statutory
acknowledgment to the rights of the
adopted. In 1989, the United Nations
initiated the Convention of the Rights of
to the Convention, accepted the principle
that adoption was impressed with social
and moral responsibility, and that its
adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured
these rights and privileges for the
adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed
the legitimate status of the adopted child,
not only in his new family but also in the
society as well. The new law withdrew
the right of an adopter to rescind the
adoption decree and gave to the adopted
child the sole right to sever the legal ties
created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that
R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely
affect her right to annul the adoption
decree, nor deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction to hear the case, both being
vested under the Civil Code and the
Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional
guaranty of due process15 that expresses
a present fixed interest which in right
reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action;16 it includes
not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created
after the right has become
17
vested.  Rights are considered vested
when the right to enjoyment is a present
interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and
perfect19 or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a
petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed
by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February
1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare
Code (Presidential Decree No. 603)
allowed an adoption to be sought
by either spouse or both of them. After
the trial court had rendered its decision
and while the case was still pending on
appeal, the Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order No.
209), mandating joint adoption by the
husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner
Republic argued that the case should be
dismissed for having been filed by Mrs.
Bobiles alone and without being joined
by the husband. The Court concluded
that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the
action. The petition to adopt Jason,
having been filed with the court at the
time when P.D. No. 603 was still in
effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the
petition, without being joined by her
husband, according to the Court had
become vested. In Republic vs.
21
Miller,  spouses Claude and Jumrus
Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt
Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the
couple filed a petition to formalize
Michael's adoption having theretofore
been taken into their care. At the time the
action was commenced, P.D. No. 603
allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree
of adoption and while on appeal before
the Court of Appeals, the Family Code
was enacted into law on 08 August 1988
disqualifying aliens from adopting
Filipino children. The Republic then
prayed for the withdrawal of the
adoption decree. In discarding the
argument posed by the Republic, the
Supreme Court ruled that the
controversy should be resolved in the
light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed
an action to revoke the decree of
adoption granted in 1975. By then, the
new law,22 had already abrogated and
repealed the right of an adopter under the
Civil Code and the Family Code to
rescind a decree of adoption.
Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now
hold that the action for rescission of the
adoption decree, having been initiated by
petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come
into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of
the statute, an action to set aside the
adoption is subject to the five-year bar
rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules of
Court and that the adopter would lose the
right to revoke the adoption decree after
the lapse of that period. The exercise of
the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection. It must also be acknowledged
that a person has no vested right in
statutory privileges.24 While adoption has
often been referred to in the context of a
"right," the privilege to adopt is itself not
naturally innate or fundamental but
rather a right merely created by
statute.25 It is a privilege that is governed
by the state's determination on what it
may deem to be for the best interest and
welfare of the child.26 Matters relating to
adoption, including the withdrawal of the
right of an adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to regulation by the
State.27 Concomitantly, a right of
action given by statute may be taken
away at anytime before it has been
exercised.28
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly
withdrawn from an adopter a
consequential right to rescind the
adoption decree even in cases where the
adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the
law. 
Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed
truism that those caught in the law have
to live with. It is still noteworthy,
however, that an adopter, while barred
from severing the legal ties of adoption,
can always for valid reasons cause the
forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child. For
instance, upon the grounds recognized by
law, an adopter may deny to an adopted
child his legitime and, by a will and
testament, may freely exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion
of his estate.