Pyrrhonean Scepticism and the Self-Refutation Argument

Author(s): Alan Bailey

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 158 (Jan., 1990), pp. 27-44
Published by: Wiley for The Philosophical Quarterly
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ThePhilosophical Vol.40 No. 158
Quarterly
ISSN 0031-8094 $2.00

PYRRHONEAN SCEPTICISM AND THE

SELF-REFUTATION ARGUMENT

BY ALANBAILEY

I
The self-refutationargument takestheformofa dilemma.The globalsceptic
aboutrationaljustificationis engagedin attacking our customary viewthat
somebeliefsand actionscan be rationally Let us suppose,then,that
justified.
thisattackis launchedbywayofovertlynon-rational considerations.These
wouldrightly be dismissedbyeveryoneconcernedto livea rationallife.But
theattemptto offer reasonswouldappearto be completely If
self-defeating.
theseputativereasonsareindeedgoodreasons,thentheywillmerelyprovide
an illustrationof the thesisthatsome beliefscan be justifiedrationally.
Whereasiftheyarenotgoodreasons,thentheywillbe dismissedin thesame
way as the overtlynon-rational considerationsalreadydiscussed.Thus it
seemsto followthattheargumentation employedbytheglobalscepticmust
be whollyincapableof providingany genuinesupportforhis scepticism.
This argumentundoubtedly a formidable
constitutes criticismof global
scepticismabout rationaljustification.Indeed its eleganceand simplicity
havelongmadeita favourite weaponofphilosophers opposedto scepticism.
SextusEmpiricusdiscussestheself-refutation argument on severaloccasions
(see PH2 130-3,PH3 19; MVII 440-4, MVIII 278-9, MIX 204-6) ; so it
is obvious that the argumentfiguredprominently in the anti-sceptical
polemicsof his period.Similarlythe revivalof Pyrrhonean and Academic
scepticismin the sixteenthand seventeenth centuriesled to a revivalof
interestin theself-refutationargument. Hume offers someobservations on
the argumentin Book One of A TreatiseofHumanNature;2and Pierre-
All references tothewritingsofSextusEmpiricusrefertoR.G. Bury'seditionoftheGreek
text (Sextus Empiricus, ed. R.G. Bury, 4 vols., Loeb Classical Library 1933-49). The
abbreviation and the abbreviation
'PH' refersto the 'Outlinesof Pyrrhonism'; 'Af refersto
'Adversus Mathematicos',with this being construedas embracingboth 'Against The
Professors'and 'Against The Dogmatists'.The number immediatelyfollowingthese
abbreviations is thebook number,and thesecondnumberidentifies therelevantpassage.All
translations are takenfromthe facingEnglishtranslation providedby Bury.
Wordand nameindicesto SextusEmpiricusare availablein theTeubnereditionofSextus'
works.See SextiEmpiriciOpera: Vol. III: AdversusMathematicos, ed. J. Mau (Indices,K.
Janacek)(Teubner, 1954).
2 David Hume, A TreatiseofHuman Nature,Book One, ed. D.G.C. Macnabb (Fontana,
1962), pp. 237-8.

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28 ALAN BAILEY
Daniel Huet's extraordinary PyrrhoneanhandbookOf The Weaknessof
Human Understanding places the argumenton a list of seven misguided
to
objections scepticism.3 Moreover the self-refutation
argumentis still
immenselypopulartoday:4 no other argumentagainstglobal scepticism
seemsto have the same air of brutalfinality.
NeverthelessI wishto arguein thispaperthatthePyrrhonean scepticism
expoundedby Sextus Empiricusis one formof global scepticismabout
rationaljustification
thatdoes havetheinternalresourcesto disarmtheself-
refutationargument. Thus thenexttwosectionswillendeavourto showthat
Sextus'useofthefivetropesconventionally ascribedtoAgrippadoescommit
Sextusto the conclusionthatno claim is everrationallypreferableto its
contradictory. And the remainingportionof the paper is devoted to
explainingwhyit is neverthelessimpossibleforSextus'dogmaticopponents
to dismissthe tropesas self-refuting.

II
CuriouslySextushimselfis preparedto sayno morethanthatthefivetropes
werehandeddownby 'the latersceptics'.However,it becomesclear from
DiogenesLaertius'accountofPyrrhonism thatthesescepticswereAgrippa
and his immediatesuccessors.5Sextusoutlinesthe tropesas follows:

thefirst
basedon discrepancy,
thesecondon regressad infinitum,
the
thirdon relativity,
the fourthon hypothesis,
the fifthon circular
reasoning.(PHI 164)

Tropes one and threeare intendedto set up theproblem.Trope one is the

one that'leads us to findthatwithregardto theobjectpresentedtherehas
arisen both amongstordinarypeople and amongstthe philosophersan
interminable conflict'(PHI 165). This confrontsus withthe problemof
settlingwhichof the competingopinionsis correct.Trope three,the one
basedon relativity,is that'whereby
theobjecthassuchorsuchan appearance
inrelationtothesubjectjudgingandtotheconcomitant percepts'(PHI 167).
Here we are facedwiththeproblemofdetermining whichof theseappear-
ances representsthe truenatureof the objectin question.It is the taskof
tropestwo,fourandfivetoshowthatthereis nowayofsolvingtheseproblems.
3 Pierre-DanielHuet, TheWeakness
Of ofHumanUnderstanding (London,1725),pp. 184-5.
4 See, for
example,Anthony Quinton,TheNatureofThings (Routledge& Kegan Paul, 1973)
pp. 150-3); JohnPassmore,Philosophical Reasoning,2nd edn (Duckworth,1970) pp. 72-4;
Hugo Meynell,'ScepticismReconsidered', 59 (1984), pp. 431-42 ;JohnF. Crosby,
Philosophy,
'Refutationof SkepticismAnd General Relativism',in Dietrich von Hildebrand (ed.)
Der PhilosophieJosefHabel, 1974), pp. 103-23.
Rehabilitierung
5
Diogenes Laertius,Lives ofEminentPhilosophers,
ed. R.D. Hicks,2 vols. (Loeb Classical
Library,1925), Book IX, sects 88-9.

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 PYRRHONEAN SCEPTICISM AND SELF-REFUTATION 29

Tropetwois that'whereby weassertthatthethingadducedas a proof of

thematter proposed needsa further proof, andthisagainanother, andsoon
ad infinitum,
so thattheconsequence issuspension, as wepossessnostarting-
pointforour argument' (PHI 166).The idea hereis thata purported
justificationofsomeproposition carriesno weight untilit hasbeenshown
thatithastruepremisses anda validinferential form. Andtropesfourand
fiveareintended toruleoutthepossibility ofanyescapefrom thethreatened
regress. The tropebasedon hypothesis is invoked when'theDogmatists,
beingforced to recedead infinitum, takeas theirstarting-point something
whichtheydo notestablish byargument butclaimto assumeas granted
simply andwithout demonstration' (PHI 168).Thedecisive objectiontoany
suchmanoeuvre is thatif thedogmatist is to be considered worthy of
credence whenhe makesan assumption, thenthescepticwillbe equally
worthy ofcredence ifhemakestheopposite assumption. Finally thetropeof
circular reasoning is relevant to thosecases'whentheproofitselfwhich
oughttoestablish thematter ofinquiry requires confirmation derived from
thatmatter; inthiscase,beingunabletoassumeeither inordertoestablish
theother, wesuspend judgement aboutboth'(PHI 169).Thisisreally justa
morecomplicated caseofthetropebasedon hypothesis for,in a circular
argument, theargument intended to establish thetruth ofthedogmatist's
claimdepends foritseffect ontheassumption thattheclaiminquestion can
alreadybe takenas true.
Thesetropes areespecially noteworthy inthatitis immediately apparent
thattheyare notrestricted in theirapplication to judgements aboutany
particular subject-matter: theyare completely generalin theirscope.
Moreover it is also clearthatthefivetropesset outby Sextuscall into
questionourclaimsto rationally justified beliefas wellas ourclaimsto
knowledge. Ifa person merely hypothesizes thatp, thenthatassumption does
notgiveus anyreasonwhatsoever to believethatit is truethatp. Thus
Agrippa's fourth tropecannotbe circumvented byretreating totheposition
thatp isprobable rather thancertain. However Agrippa's fifth tropeis,as we
havealready pointed out,nothing morethana complicated caseofthetrope
basedon hypothesis. It follows,therefore, thatifmereassumption cannot
us
give anyreasontobelievethatp,thenneither cananycircular argument.
Consequently theonlywaylefttojustify theclaimthatp necessitates the
provision ofa seriesofnon-circular arguments thatdoesnotterminate ina
setofarbitrary assumptions. Yet thesecondtropeimpliesthatthiswould
forceus intoan infinite regress ofjustification, andno onewouldwishto
argue that a non-terminating of
regress justification suffersmerely from the
limitationofnotproviding us withan absolutely conclusive justificationof
theclaimpurportedly beingjustified. An unfinished of
regress justification
doesnotprovide eventheslightest justificationforaccepting itsconclusion as

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30 ALAN BAILEY
true. It is temptingto conclude,therefore, that anyone who endorses
Agrippa's five is
tropes unequivocally committed to the radicalsceptical
thesisthatno claim in any area of discourseever possessesany rational
justificationwhatsoever.
Such a conclusionwould,however,be prematureas it overlooksthe
possibilitythatsomeonemighttake the view thatsome claims are self-
evidently true.A self-evidentlytrueclaimcouldbe rationally justifiedevenin
theabsenceofanyexternalsupportas itsjustification wouldnotdependon
anyotherclaimbeingjustified. On theotherhand,theywouldnotbe mere
arbitraryassertionsas their self-evidencewould itselfprovide all the
justificationthatis necessary. Consequentlysuch claimswouldnotonlybe
immuneto theregressive difficulties
exploitedbyAgrippa'stropes,butthey
wouldalso be capable of groundingthejustificatory chainsthatwouldbe
essentialin the case of less favouredclaims.
It appears,then,thatAgrippa'stropesdo notthemselves sufficeto deliver
theconclusionthatno claimis everrationally justified:all theyshowis that
any claim thatis rationallyjustifiedmustbe eitherself-evidently trueor
derivablefromself-evidently truepremissesby meansof inferential steps
thatare self-evidently valid.Nevertheless it is also clearthattheformer and
muchstronger conclusionwouldbe forthcoming ifAgrippa'stropescouldbe
supplemented byan argument thatestablished thatthereare no self-evident
truths;and argumentsagainstthe existenceof self-evident truthswill be
presentedin thenextsectionofthispaper.The restofthissection,however,
willattemptto showthatSextushimselfis notin a positionto countenance
thesuggestion thatself-evident truthsexist.Irrespective oftheforceof the
arguments thatwillbe broughtforward in sectionIII, Sextusis committed to
the view thatAgrippa'stropesyieldthe conclusionthatno claim is ever
rationallyjustified.And Sextus is committedto that view because any
attempton his partto evade the forceof the tropesby appealingto the
supposedexistenceof self-evident truthswould be inconsistent withhis
attitudetowardsthe epistemological categoriesemployedby the Stoics.
Sextusrepeatedly assertsthatthePyrrhonean scepticis someonewhodoes
notassentto anything non-evident (see PHI 13,PH1 201, and PH1 225).
Furthermore Sextusfrequently describesthe Pyrrhonist as eschewingall
56y,uaaa.As Sextusis at pains to stressthata personholdsa Soyluaonly
whenhe assentsto something non-evident (see PHI 13,PHI 16,and PHI
197), thatdescription is straightforwardly equivalentto the claim thatthe
Pyrrhoneansceptic does not assent to anythingnon-evident.However
althoughit is clear thatthe appeal to the evident/non-evident distinction
playsa vitalrolein Sextus'attemptto characterize thePyrrhonist's special
philosophicstance,Sextus explainsthatdistinctiononly in termsof the
classificatoryschemadevisedbytheStoics.It follows, therefore, thatwe are

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 PYRRHONEAN SCEPTICISM AND SELF-REFUTATION 31

forcedto concludethattheprinciplesunderlying theStoicschemaare ones

thatalso commandSextus'confidence.
In theStoicschemaall possiblemattersofinquiryare classified as falling
intoone of the fourmutuallyexclusivecategoriesof the pre-evident, the
occasionallynon-evident, thenaturallynon-evident, and thealtogether non-
evident.Butitis plainthata claimthatis self-evidentlytruecannotbe a claim
abouta non-evident matterofinquiry.For thetruthaboutmattersthatare
altogethernon-evident is notapprehended at all,and thetruthaboutmatters
thatareoccasionally or naturallynon-evident can be apprehendedonlywith
assistancefromsome formof sign.
Now thepre-evident objects,they[theStoics]say,do notrequirea
sign... And neitherdo thealtogether non-evident,sinceofcourse
theyare not even apprehendedat all. But such objectsas are
occasionally or naturally
non-evident are apprehended bymeansof
signs- notofcoursebythesamesigns,butby"suggestive" signsin
thecase oftheoccasionally non-evident andby"indicative"signsin
the case of the naturallynon-evident.(PH2 99)
Thus it followsthat if Sextus does thinkof some claims as being self-
evidentlytrue,thenhe mustholdthattheseclaimsare claimsaboutmatters
thatare pre-evident.Yet Sextusdoes not drawany distinctions withinthe
categoryofpre-evident mattersofinquiry:he neversuggeststhatsomepre-
evidentmattersare more securelyapprehendedthan otherpre-evident
matters.Consequently we areforcedtotheconclusionthatSextuscanbe in a
trueonlyifhe supposesthatthe
positionto regardclaimsas self-evidently
truthor falsityof any claim about pre-evidentmattersof inquiryis self-
evident.And it seemsobviousthatSextuscannotlegitimately supposeany
such thing.
The problemhere stemsfromSextus' willingnessto attackthe claims
madebythedogmatists evenwhenthedogmatists themselvesare convinced
thattheyare merelystatingthetruthaboutpre-evident mattersofinquiry.
AtPH2 95,forexample,Sextusbringsa lengthy discussionofthecriterionof
truthto a close withthiscomment:

Andsincethecriterion itis
oftruthhasappearedtobe unattainable,
no longerpossibleto make positiveassertionseitherabout those
things which (if we may depend on the statementsof the
Dogmatists)seem to be evidentor about those whichare non-
evident;forsincetheDogmatistssupposetheyapprehendthelatter
fromthethingsevident, about
ifwe areforcedtosuspendjudgement
theevident,how shallwe dare to make about
pronouncements the
non-evident?

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32 ALAN BAILEY
Furthermore the Stoics' favouriteexampleof a claim about a pre-evident
matterofinquiryis theclaim'It is day'whenthisis assertedbysomeonewho
is locatedoutdoorsand has thefulluse ofhiseyes(see PH2 97, MVIII 144
andMVIII 317). That claim,however, is a claimabouta matterofobjective
fact; and Aenesidemus'ten tropes,whichfeatureprominently alongside
Agrippa'sfive tropes in Sextus' account of Pyrrhonism, are definitely
intendedto call intoquestioneven the mostbanal of our ordinarybeliefs
abouttheobjectiveworld.AtPHI 99 we findtheassertion'But ifthesenses
do not apprehendexternalobjects (ra EKTr6s),neithercan the mind
apprehendthem.' Thus the suggestionthat there may be some non-
perceptual,purely a priorijustificationof claims about the objective
properties ofrealobjectsis explicitlyrejected.Moreovertheoverallthrustof
Aenesidemus' tropesis thatsense-perception cannotbe usedtojustify claims
about mattersof objectivefactbecause sense-impressions conflictand we
have no criterioncapable of determining whichimpressionsare veridical
(see, forexample,PHI 59-61, and PHI 112-17). But ifwe cannotjustify
claimsaboutmattersof objectivefactby appealingto sense-perception or
purely a priorireasoning,then we cannot justifysuch claims at all.
Consequentlyanyonewho endorsesAenesidemus'tropeswould have to
concludethattheclaim'It is day'is neverrationally despiteitsstatus
justified
as a paradigmof the typeof claim whichthe Stoicswishto treatas pre-
evident.
We arrive,therefore, at thefollowing situation. Ifwe are to accommodate
thenotionofself-evident truthwithintheevident/non-evident classificatory
system,then we have to suppose that all true claims about pre-evident
mattersof inquiryare self-evidently trueand all falseclaims about pre-
evidentmatters ofinquiryareself-evidently false.Howeverwearenowaware
thatSextusholdsthatmanyoftheclaimsthedogmatists makeaboutmatters
thatstrikethemas pre-evident lackanyrationaljustification. Thus a desireto
makeroomforthenotionof self-evident truthwoulddriveus to conclude
thatSextusis, in fact,committedto the view thatclaimsthatare totally
devoidof any rationaljustification nevertheless strikesome dogmatistsas
self-evidentlytrue.But it would be absurdto allege thata claim thatis
genuinelyself-evidently truecan lack any rationaljustification. Hence it
followsthatwe have to assumethatSextusholdsthatthe dogmatistsare
mistakenin theirbeliefthatthe claimsin questionare self-evidently true.
However,the suppositionthat a person can take a claim to be self-
evidently trueevenwhenit is notself-evidently trueobviouslythreatens to
maketheappeal to self-evident truthutterly uselessas a wayofproviding a
regressof justification
witha satisfactory terminus. For we are now being
askedto acceptthata personcan havetheconceptofself-evident truthand
yet be unable to distinguishbetweengenuine self-evidenceand mere

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 PYRRHONEAN SCEPTICISM AND SELF-REFUTATION 33

Butonceweacceptthatthisis a possibility,
speciosity. wearefacedbythe
of some of
problem finding way grounding a decisionaboutwhich propertyis
actuallypresent. Thusnoprogress has been made: theoriginalproblem,that
of distinguishing betweenthetruthand theapparenttruth, has simply
reappeared at a different
point in our reasoning.And thistime round wecan
hardlyappeal toself-evidence
as a means of determiningwhether something
is genuinely or merely
self-evident appearsself-evident.
We arecompelled toaccept,therefore, thatSextusdoestakeup a stance
thatprevents himfromlegitimately taking theviewthattheputative self-
evidence ofa claimcanjustifythatclaim.Consequently itisclearthatSextus
atleastcannot avoidseeingAgrippa's tropesas leading
totheconclusion that
no claimaboutanysubject-matter is everrationallyjustified.

III
In thepreceding wearguedthatSextus'endorsement
section oftheStoics'
schemaforclassifying possiblemattersofinquiryandhisattitude towards
claimsaboutmatters thatareallegedlypre-evidentmakeit impossiblefor
Sextustoacceptthatanyclaimcangenuinely havetheproperty ofbeingself-
evidentlytrue.Itisnowtime, however, toaskwhethersomeone whodoesnot
sharethoseparticular assumptions wouldbe entitledtomaintain thatself-
evidenttruthsexist.Moreover, the answerto thisquestionis of great
importance toanyone whowishestorejectradicalscepticism.Ifself-evident
truthsdo notexist,thennoclaimcouldbejustified unlesswearewrong in
thinkingthatmerehypothesis, circular andunfinished
reasoning of
regresses
cannotprovide
justification a rational fora claim.Yettheview
justification
thatsuchsupposed sourcesofrational arewholly
justification is
unacceptable
notonethatmanypeoplewouldbe willingto abandon.For mostpeople,
then,an appealtotheexistence ofself-evident
truths is theonlymeansof
Agrippa's tropesthatpossessesevenprimafacieplausibility.
nullifying
Thefirstobstacletotheclaimthatself-evidenttruthsexistisundoubtedly
thefactthatitisnotnecessary self-evident
toidentify withtrueclaims
truths
aboutpre-evident mattersofinquiry in orderto be persuaded thatpeople
cannotbeviewedas infalliblejudgesofwhatisandwhatis notself-evidently
true.Thus we find,forexample,thata spectacular instance of someone
making a mistake aboutthesupposedself-evidence ofa particularclaim
occursin Descartes''Meditations In 'Meditation
On FirstPhilosophy'. III'
Descartescalmly 'itis perfectly
states, evidentthattheremustbe atleastas
muchreality in thecauseas in theeffect'.6
However, whenweunpackthis
6 Rene Works
in ThePhilosophical
Descartes,'MeditationsOn FirstPhilosophy', ofDescartes,
Vol. 1, ed. and trans.ES. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, (CambridgeUniversityPress,1911), p.
169.

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34 ALAN BAILEY

opaquepronouncement, we discover thatDescartesis claiming, amongst

otherthings, thatit is self-evident thatthecauseofan ideamusthavethe
sameperfections as theobjectofthatidea.7Andthatclaimis unlikely to
strikeany ofus as true:
self-evidently indeed we arefarmore to
likely regard
it as obviously false.In his story'The Horla',Maupassant described an
invisiblecreature whoseconstitution was moreperfect thanthatof any
humanbeing.8 Consequently we wouldnaturally saythatMaupassant had
formed anideaofa beingmoreperfect thananyhumanbeing.Yetwewould
rightly resistthe conclusion thatMaupassanthimself had superhuman
powers.
Furthermore, another notorious instanceofthisphenomenon occurred in
thecourseofFrege'sattempt toderivetheaxiomsofarithmetic from purely
logicallaws.Fregeinitially tooktheviewthatitis self-evident thatthereis,
forevery predicate expressiblebymeansofquantification oversetsofobjects,
a set containing justthoseobjectsthatsatisfy thepredicate concerned.
Unfortunately thisso-calledaxiomof comprehension embroils us in an
alarming paradoxwhenwecometoconsider thesetofall setsthatarenot
members ofthemselves. Ifwe hypothesize thatthissetis nota member of
thenitdoeshavethequalifying
itself, property tobea member Butif
ofitself.
weswitch totheassumption thatitisa member thenitfailstoqualify
ofitself,
as a member ofitself becauseonlysetsthatarenotmembers ofthemselves
qualify.AndwhenRussellbrought thisparadoxtoFrege'sattention, Frege
suddenly recalledthathe hadalwaysbeenin somedoubtabouttheself-
evidence oftheaxiomresponsible.9
Thusitseemsclearthatevenhighly ablethinkers,concentrating intently
on a particular matter ofinquiry, can mistakenly takea claimto be self-
evidently truewhenitis not.Consequently a personcancleavetotheview
thatapparent self-evidenceprovides himwithan epistemological guarantee
onlyifheisprepared totaketheheroic linethathisintellectual
powers donot
sufferfromthe limitations whichafflictthe lesserintellects of the
philosophers namedabove.
Moreover, itis plausibletosupposethatanypersonreflecting onhisown
intellectualhistory willrecallthatthereare someclaimswhichhe now
regards as falsedespite hisformer confidence intheirself-evident
truth.And
one particularly fruitfulsourceof such renunciations is the realmof
geometrical reasoning. Whenwe firstencounter thesuggestion thattwo

7 See BernardWilliams,Descartes:TheProject PureEnquiry, (Pelican Books, 1978), pp.

of
135-41.
8 Guy de
Maupassant,Selected trans.RogerColet,(PenguinBooks,1971), pp.
ShortStories,
313-45.
9 See M. Black and P.T. Geach (eds), Translations
fromthePhilosophicalWritingsofGottlob
Frege(Blackwell,1952), p. 234.

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 PYRRHONEAN SCEPTICISM AND SELF-REFUTATION 35

straightlinesmaybe parallelforpartoftheirlength andyetsubsequently

converge without ceasingto be straight lines,we takethefalsity of this
suggestion tobeself-evident.Nordoesthissenseofself-evident differ
falsity
fromthe senseof self-evident falsitythataccompanies the claimthat
7+ 5 = 11 and the claim thatblack is a lightercolourthanwhite.
Nevertheless theGeneralTheoryofRelativity claimsthatifwe wishto
continue to thinkofa straight lineas theshortest distancebetween two
points,thenwehavetoacceptthatthesituation described aboveisnotonlya
possiblestateofaffairs butalsoa frequently occurring stateofaffairs.10
Similarly ourintuitivegraspoftheproperties oftheMobiusstripisusually
extremely poor.A Mobiusstripcanreadily be formed bygivinga stripof
papera halftwistandsticking theendstogether. Forourpresent purposes,
however, thenatureofitsphysical embodiment is irrelevant:
weneedonly
concernourselves withitspurelygeometric properties. Supposethestrip
weretobe dividedalongitscentreline.Whatgeometrical figure orfigures
wouldresult from thatoperation?Almost anyone whoattempts toreasonhis
waytoan answerwillconcludethatitis self-evident thattheresultis two
circular,twisted Theanalogy
strips. withanuntwisted stripseemsabsolutely
decisive. However, thoseofus whohaveexperimented on actualstripsof
paperwouldinsistthatthisapparently self-evident conclusionis false.The
experimental evidenceconvincingly indicates thattheresultofdividing a
Mobiusstripin thewayspecified is a singlestripwitha fulltwist.
It follows, accordingly,thatdifficulties in distinguishing genuineself-
evidencefromapparent self-evidencecannotbe dismissed as confined to
otherpeople.Anyonewhosearcheshardenoughwillinevitably uncover
examples ofoccasions whenhe himself hasfailedtoarriveat a satisfactory
decision. Yetiftheseproblematic casescanbe discerned onlyinretrospect,
thenit seemsobviousthatan appealto thesupposedself-evidence of a
particular claimcandonothing toestablish thattheclaiminquestion istrue.
However, thelastofthepresent objections to theattempt to use self-
as a of
evidence way bringing justificatory regresses to an end goeseven
the
deeperthan criticisms outlined above. It is difficult denythatit is
to
logicallypossibleforanypsychological operation to go wrongwithout the
agentinvolvedhavingany realization thatit has gonewrong.Anyone
inclined todispute thisneedonlyconsider theconsequences ofAlzheimer's
diseaseortraumatic braindamage. Moreover, a claim'sself-evidence cannot
justifythat claim is in
unlesssomeone justified thinking that he recognizes
the claimas self-evidently true.But thisprocessof recognition is a
psychological operation. itis
Consequently, logically possibleforsomeone to

10See
Hilary Putnam,'The Logic of QuantumMechanics',in his Philosophical
Papers:
VolumeOne,2nd edn (CambridgeUniversityPress, 1979), pp. 174-7.

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36 ALAN BAILEY
think thathehasrecognized a particular
claimtobeself-evident, evenwhen
theclaimis notgenuinely How,then,cananyoneeverhopeto
self-evident.
establishthatthislogically
possiblesituation
isnothisactualsituation?Yetif
itisimpossiblefora person toshowthatheisjustified inthinking thathecan
reliablyrecognize trueclaims,
self-evidently thentheexistence ofsuch'self-
evidently true'claimswouldnotenablehimto justify evenoneclaim.
Thusweareseemingly forcedtoconclude thatthepotential of
fallibility
all psychologicaloperationsmeansthat'self-evidently true'claimscannot
provide anyone witha reasontobelieveanything. However, thatconclusion
is plainlyabsurd:a genuinely self-evidentclaimmustbe capableof
furnishing someone withgoodreasontobelievethatitis a trueclaim.Thus
theconclusion thatshouldreallybe drawnfrom theabovereasoning is that
self-evidenttruthscannotexist.Andifself-evident truthscannotexist, then
itisobvious thattheycannot provideuswitha solution totheepistemological
problem generated byAgrippa's tropes.

IV
Atthisstageinthediscussion weseemtohaveestablished thatSextusviews
Agrippa's tropesas yielding theradicalconclusion thatno claimis ever
rationallyjustified.Moreover, we havealso arguedthatSextusis rightto
rejectthesupposition thatanappealtotheexistence ofallegedly self-evident
truths wouldenableustojustify someclaimsevenifitistruethathypothesis,
circularreasoning, andunfinished regressesofjustificationarenotsources of
genuine However,
justification. theself-refutation
argument maintainsthatit
is self-defeating
toattempt toarguethatnoclaimis everrationally justified.
What,then,is thestatusofSextus'sceptical arguments, andis hisglobal
scepticism aboutrational justificationevennotionally coherent?
Whenweareattempting toarrive at a correctassessment oftheforceof
theself-refutationargument, itisessentialtodistinguish between themature
Pyrrhonist's characterization of his arguments and the characterization
offeredbyhisdogmatic opponent. Untilweappreciate ofthe
thesignificance
interactionbetween thesetwoverydifferent viewpoints, to
itis impossible
understand how the maturePyrrhonist can genuinely argue with the
dogmatist without bringing forward anything thatconstitutes a goodreason
foraccepting thePyrrhonist'sscepticalconclusions as true.Butifwedoavoid
conflatingtheviewpoint ofthemature Pyrrhonist theviewpoint
with ofthe
unregenerate dogmatist, thenitis surprisingly easy to see how the mature
Pyrrhonist's arguments can be of greatphilosophical significanceeven
though theyare not rationallycompelling arguments.
Our discussion of the natureof Agrippa'sfivetropesled us to the
conclusion thattwoofthesetropes areintended toserveas reminders ofour

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 PYRRHONEAN SCEPTICISM AND SELF-REFUTATION 37
frequent needto choosebetween conflicting claimswhiletheotherthree
tropes areintended to show that it isimpossible tomakea choicethathasany
rationaljustification.For our present purposes, however, theimportant point
tonoteis thatthethreetropes thataresupposed toestablish thatnoclaimis
everrationally preferable toitscontradictory relyonprinciples ofreasoning
thatareallextremely plausible. Almost no one would wish tomaintain that
unfinished regresses ofjustification, circular arguments ormerehypothesis
canprovide a person withgoodreasontobelieve thatsomeparticular claimis
true.Furthermore, itbecameclearinthepreceding section thatthere arealso
compelling groundsforconcedingSextus'unarguedbut far-reaching
supposition thatappealstoa claim'sallegedself-evidence cannotprovide us
witha rationaljustification forassenting to thatclaim.It seemsplain,
therefore, thattheindividual components ofAgrippa's tropeswouldstrike
mostpeopleas relatively uncontroversial constraints onthenotion ofrational
justification.
Buthowwouldthemature Pyrrhonist choosetodescribe thisattack onthe
dogmatist's viewthattherearesomeclaimsthatcanbe rationally justified?
GiventhePyrrhonist's implicit commitment to a globalscepticism about
rationaljustification, he willalmostcertainly notregard himself as offering
goodreasons forrejecting thedogmatist's position. Andwefind, infact, that
Sextusprefaces hispresentation ofAenesidemus' andAgrippa's tropes with
an explicit warning thathe is notprepared to makeanypositive assertion
regarding thenumber orvalidity ofthesetropes:'foritis possible thatthey
maybeunsound orthere maybemoreofthemthanI shallenumerate' (PHI
35). InsteadthePyrrhonist wouldpresumably wishto describe himself as
simply seeking topersuade thedogmatist toabandon hisbelief thatthereare
suchthings as goodreasons foraccepting someclaimsandrejecting others.
Nowthisself-characterization obviously hasthevirtue ofconsistency. The
Pyrrhonist isnolonger engaged intheself-defeating taskofbringing forward
reasonsto showthatno claim is ever rationally justified. Nor is he
incoherently trying toshowthatthebeliefthatnobeliefwhatsoever canbe
rationallyjustified, is in somesenseitselfrationally superior to therival
positionthatsome claimscan be rationally justified.No philosophical
objectionscanbe brought tobearagainstthesuggestion thatitis perfectly
conceivable thatsomeone shouldsucceedinpersuading someone elsethatall
ourbeliefs areultimately basedonanimalfaith, andthatnoneofthemcanbe
rationallyjustified.
Whatdoesinitially remain unclear, however, is whyphilosophers should
interestthemselves inthemechanics ofsuchpersuasion. IfthePyrrhonist has
noarguments butonlyrhetorical tricks andan ability tomanipulate human
psychology, howcan hisscepticism posea philosophical challenge? Such
scepticism wouldseemto be of concernonlyto thoseinterested in the

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38 ALAN BAILEY

empiricalefficiency of the propagandatechniques thathappento be

employed. To answer thispowerful objection we need to consider boththe
particular nature of the persuasion offeredby the mature Pyrrhonist andthe
of the
type response dogmatist compelled is to make to such persuasion.
The formof persuasion utilizedby the maturePyrrhonist is quite
distinctive incharacter. He doesnotendeavour tointimidate thedogmatist
through theuseofforbidding scholasticjargonandendorsements fromthe
leadingintellectual figures of the day.Similarly, intoxicating styleand
rhetorical subtlety areconspicuously absent.In short, theresources ofillicit
opinion-manipulation are deliberatelyeschewed. What the Pyrrhonist does
offer, however, areunadorned chainsofthought thatlookverymuchlike
rational arguments.
Indeednotonlydo thesechainsofthought looklikegoodarguments, but
thedogmatist is alsocommitted to treatingthemas though theyaregood
arguments. Agrippa's secondtropeclaims, ineffect, thatitis notrational to
believethatp on thebasisofa purported proof, unlessitis alsorational to
believe thattheproof hastruepremisses anda validinferential form. Nowthe
maturePyrrhonist offersthisoracularpronouncement as a meansof
persuasion. However, whenthepronouncement isinterpreted inaccordance
withthedogmatist's code,itsstatus
rationalistic isdramatically transformed.
The dogmatist hasno option, ifhe is notto actinsincerely, otherthanto
acceptthatitis irrational totakeanunfinished regress ofproofs as affording
anyrational justificationfora disputed claim.Onefactor responsible forthis
lackoffreedom isthatthedogmatist himselfrejects attempts tofound claims
onthebasisofa non-terminating regress.Forsomeone whopartakes ofthe
dogmatist's enthusiasm for consistency, this providesa considerable
incentive fortaking thesecondtropeas a proper constraint onanybelief that
purports to be objectively justified.Andthesecondfactorthatleadsthe
dogmatist togivehisassenttothetropeinquestion is thatifherejects that
particular trope, thenhisdesiretobeconsistent inhisdecisions willforce him
toabandontheuseofthattropeindisputes withotherpeople.Butsuchan
abandonment wouldmeanthattheotherpartyin sucha disputewouldbe
able to establish, by meansof a methodthatthedogmatist is no longer
prepared tocriticize, anyclaimwhatsoever as worthy ofrational acceptance.
Hencethedogmatist is powerfully motivated to acceptthevalidity ofthe
secondtrope. Anyattempt tocircumvent itwouldbeviewedas self-betrayal:
'Ifitisnotrational toacceptthevalidity ofthesecondtrope, thenI nolonger
haveanygraspon whatitmeanstobe rational in mybeliefs andactions.'
Verysimilar considerations areapplicable totheother two criticaltropes.
Itisclearthatthedogmatist wouldnotallowhisopponent ina debatetosettle
theissuesimplybyhypothesizing thepointin dispute, or bymeansofa
circular argument. How,then,canhesincerely object to an identical refusal

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 PYRRHONEAN SCEPTICISM AND SELF-REFUTATION 39

on thepartofthePyrrhonist ? Not thatitwouldimprovemattersevenifthe

dogmatist did decideto acceptthemerehypothesis thatp, ortheprovisionof
a circularargument, as a good reasonfortakingit to be truethatp. For this
wouldmean thathe wouldbe committedto supposingthatall beliefs,no
matterwhattheircontent,are rationally Onlyby holdingthatthe
justified.
beliefthatp was rationallyjustifiedon one basis (namely,hypothesisor
circularreasoning)whilepreciselythe same basis was inadequateforthe
rationaljustification
ofthecompeting belief,thebeliefthatitwasnotthecase
thatp, wouldthedogmatist be in anysortofpositionto evaluatea beliefas
moreor less rationalthananother- surelythewholepointofthepractice!
And such a manoeuvrewouldinevitably presentitselfto the dogmatistas
completelyarbitrary and paradigmatically irrational.
Thus thedogmatist is quiteunableto avoidacceptingtheproffered tropes
as constraintson rationaljustification. But once the tropes have been
accepted,the dogmatistwill rapidlydiscoverthat these tropes,takenin
conjunction withtheproblemsassociatedwithanyappealtosupposedly self-
evidenttruths, preventhimfromsatisfactorily justifyinganybelief.Indeed
the tropes even preventhim from justifyingthe tropes themselves.
Consequentlythe dogmatistis stronglytemptedto abandon the tropes.
However,he cannotformulate any alternativeconstraintsthatpossessany
Hence he is equallyfirmly
greatercredibility. committed toholdingon tothe
tropes.
Now it is plausible to suggest that such unresolvedtension is
psychologicallyunendurable.One solutionis to turnone's attentionaway
fromthe chainof speculativethoughtthatleads to thisconflict. This can
readilybe achievedby immersing oneselfin thepracticalactivitiesofdaily
life.As Hume reportsin the Treatise:

I dine,I play a game of back-gammon, I converse,and am merry

withmyfriends;and whenafterthreeor fourhours'amusement, I
wou'dreturntothesespeculations, theyappearso cold,andstrain'd,
and ridiculous,thatI cannotfindin myheartto enterintothemany
1
farther.

Unfortunately this solutionsucceeds only if one is preparedto eschew

completely all reflectionofa distinctively
philosophical character.Otherwise
questionsconcerningjustification are bound to forcethemselveson one's
attention;and theattemptto settlethemwilllead to a freshand calamitous
engagementwiththe objectionsof the sceptic.Consequentlyanyonewho
findsphilosophical is likelyto be pushedtowards
speculationat all attractive

1 Hume, A TreatiseofHumanNature,Book One, p. 318.

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40 ALAN BAILEY
theothersolution- theacceptanceof the scepticalclaimthatnone of our
beliefs can ever be justified.This immediatelyabsolves one of the
responsibilityforselectingcriteriaofrationality. Hence one'sinability tofind
any satisfactory candidates is no longer a source of concern.
How, though,would the dogmatistdescribethe situationbeforehis
dramaticconversion to globalscepticism?Withinthedogmatist's rationalis-
tic code the Pyrrhonist's chainsof reasoninghave to be treatedas good
arguments.If theyare dismissedas mere emotivepersuasion,then the
dogmatist willeffectivelyhaveabandonedwhatlittlegrasphe everhadon the
notionofrationaljustification. The Pyrrhonist's arguments do notjustmimic
thearguments customarily employed by the dogmatist in his less reflective
moments(thoughthefactthattheydo mimicthesearguments is itselfvery
significant);theyalsorepresent thepatterns ofargument thedogmatist finds
leastimpugnable. Ifthosepatterns havetobe abandoned,thenthedogmatist
literallyhas no idea of whatmightreplacethem.No rivalprincipleshave
eventhesame degreeofplausibility, let alone greaterplausibility. As faras
thedogmatist is concerned, therefore,thescepticalarguments aretobe taken
as good arguments. But theirconclusionis thatthereis no such thingas a
good argument. If thedogmatisthad anyplausiblealternative principlesof
rationality,sucha reductio wouldbe occasionto adoptthesealternatives. In
theirabsence,however, therationalism ofthedogmatist leavesthedogmatist
in theuntenablepositionofwantingto sayboththathe has goodreasonsto
supposethatthereareno suchthingsas goodreasons,and,as thisconclusion
is clearlyinconsistent, thathe cannothavegood reasonsforsupposingthat
thereare no such thingsas good reasons.Consequentlythe dogmatist's
rationalisticpracticeno longerrepresents a workablelanguage-game;and
the dogmatistabandonshis rationalismforscepticism.
An illustration drawnfromthewritings ofPaul Feyerabendmayhelp,at
thispoint,to bringmattersintosharperfocus.Indeed Feyerabend,despite
claimingto be an epistemological anarchistratherthana sceptic,is perhaps
thetwentieth-century philosopher whomostcloselyconforms totheroleand
strategyof Sextus' Pyrrhonist. In his book AgainstMethod,Feyerabend
apparentlyseeksto discreditPopperianphilosophyof scienceby showing
that its proposedmethodologywould actuallyhave hinderedscientific
progress.12 At otherpointsin the book,however,Feyerabendspecifically
deniesthathe knowswhatconstitutes 'real' progress.But ifhe is unableto
distinguish betweenprogressand mere change,thenhow can he be in a
positionto arguethatPopper'sproposedmethodology wouldhaveretarded
scientificprogress?For it is naturalto assumethatsuch a claimcannotbe
well-founded unlessFeyerabendis able to establishthattherehasbeensome

12 Paul Feyerabend,AgainstMethod(Verso, 1978).

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 PYRRHONEAN SCEPTICISM AND SELF-REFUTATION 41

Otherwise
progress. therewouldbe nothing forPopper'smethodology to
havehindered orprevented. YetFeyerabend gloriesin the admission that he
lacksanyreasontosupposethattherehasbeenanyscientific progresssince
thedaysofthePre-Socratics. It hasseemedtomanypeople,therefore, that
we can safelyconcludethatFeyerabend's is
position hopelessly self-
contradictory. Hisargument against Popperian philosophy ofsciencecanbe
a goodargument onlyifhisclaim to lackcriteria,fordistinguishing between
and
progress change, is false.
Feyerabend's responsetothisallegation istopointoutthathiscritics have
misunderstood thefunction ofhisargument.13 Theargument isnotintended
toprovide anyarbitrary personwitha goodreasonforrejecting Popperian
philosophy ofscience.Ratheritis intended toreducethetypical adherent of
suchphilosophy toconcluding thathehasa goodreasonforabandoning his
allegiance.In thissortofcontext it doesnotfollow, fromthefactthatan
argument usesa certainpremiss, thatthewielder oftheargument accepts the
premiss,claimstohavegoodreasons forit,orregards itas plausible.
He may
denythe premissbut stilluse it becausehis opponentacceptsit and,
acceptingit, can be driveninto makinga desiredconcession. Thus
Feyerabend reaffirms thathedoesnotclaimtopossessspecialknowledge as
towhatconstitutes progress, andexplains thathesimply takeshiscuefrom
his opponents. 'THEY preferGalileoto Aristotle. THEY say thatthe
transitionAristotle-. Galileois a stepintheright direction.I onlyaddthat
thisstepnotonlywasnotachieved, butcouldnothavebeenachieved withthe
methods favoured bythem.'14 Feyerabend's argument thereforegenerates
forthePopperian
difficulties philosopher ofscience:it doesnotprovide
objectivereasonsfortaking itsconclusion as true.However, thisapparent
deficiencyis actuallyofnosignificance. The onlypeopleantecedently likely
totakeitsconclusion tobefalsearethePopperians; andtheyarecompelled,
bytheirownrationalistic practice andfirmly-held beliefs,to holdthatthe
argument is coercive.Hence,iftheyaretoactsincerely, theywillhaveto
abandontheirsuggested scientific methodology. Andthis,ofcourse,is just
theresultthatFeyerabend intended.
NowI takeitthatmostimpartial observers wouldagreethatFeyerabend
has defendedhimselfsuccessfully againstthe mootedchargeof self-
contradiction.ButifFeyerabend's positionhereis acceptable, thenso is the
positionofthePyrrhonist whoseekstoundermine theauthority ofreason.
ForFeyerabend andthePyrrhonist argueinthesameway.Neither believes
thatthearguments he happensto putforward are rationallycompelling.
Indeedthemature Pyrrhonist holdsthatno arguments giveus anyrational
13
Paul Feyerabend, withIlliterates'in hisScienceina FreeSociety
'Conversations (New Left
Books, 1978), pp. 125-217.
14
Paul Feyerabend,Sciencein a FreeSociety(New Left Books, 1978), p. 142.

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42 ALAN BAILEY
whatsoever
justification fortaking
their conclusionstobetrue.However,just
as Feyerabend offers argumentsthatthe sincerePopperian is innoposition
torejectas irrational so thePyrrhonist
persuasion, offers
arguments thatthe
sinceredogmatist is forcedtoregardas goodarguments. The soledifference
is thatFeyerabend's argumentsleavethePopperian of
withthepossibility
subsequently sincerely hischangeofmindas theresultof
characterizing
rationalargument. The Pyrrhonist, on the otherhand,rendersthe
dogmatist's practiceso unworkablethathe is subsequentlypreparedtotalk
onlyinterms ofpersuasion ratherthanreasons. Atnopointisthedogmatist
giventheoptionofretaining hisbeliefthatsomeclaimscan be rationally
and yetsincerely
justified characterizingthe Pyrrhonist'sarguments as
irrational.

V
In theprevious sectionwearguedthatthemature Pyrrhonistthinksofhis
epistemological arguments as having a purely therapeutic He does
function.
notholdthathisarguments haveanyrational force:instead heregardsthem
as instruments forbringing aboutsuspension ofjudgement inotherpeople.
However, itis important tobeawareofthefactthatthePyrrhonist's viewof
hisownarguments changesdramatically in thecourseofhisphilosophical
development. WhenthePyrrhonist beginshisintellectual journeytowardsa
globalscepticism aboutrational he is firmly
justification, committed tothe
objectivevalidity of theprinciples of reasoning thatunderliethetropes
devisedby Agrippaand Aenesidemus. Indeed,it is only the future
Pyrrhonist'sinitial confidenceinthevalidity oftheseprinciples thatenables
us to explainhis subsequent suspension ofjudgement on all nonevident
matters ofinquiry.
Atthestartofhisinvestigations thePyrrhonist hasa greatmanybeliefs
aboutnon-evident matters of inquiry. However,the maturePyrrhonist
professestohavenobeliefs aboutsuchmatters eventhough hedoesadmitto
havingbeliefsaboutevident matters ofinquiry:

positnor
It mustalsobe bornein mindthatwhat,as wesay,weneither
deny,is someoneofthedogmatic madeaboutwhatis non-
statements
evident(r- r8qA,ov);forwe yieldto thosethingswhichmoveus
to assent(UvyKaardOatv).(PHI
and driveus compulsorily
emotionally
193)

MoreoverthePyrrhonist is theresultof
assuresus thatthistransformation
hishaving
beenexposedtovarious
arguments thathaveunderminedhistrust
intherationality
ofhisformer (seePHI 31-5).Thusheis claiming
beliefs

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 PYRRHONEAN SCEPTICISM AND SELF-REFUTATION 43

thatthesearguments havepersuaded himtoalterhisbeliefs. Butitisobvious

thata personwhohasnoinclination tobelieve thata givenargument hastrue
premissesand a validinferential
structure willnotbe of
persuaded anything
bythatargument. Consequently thefactthatthePyrrhonist's beliefs
alteras
a resultofhisexposure to arguments likethosedevisedby Agrippaand
Aenesidemus can be explained onlyifwe are willingto supposethatthe
Pyrrhonist was, at some point,inclinedto acceptsuch arguments as
rationallycompelling.
OncethePyrrhonist hassuspended judgement onallnon-evident matters
ofinquiry, however, thereis no needto supposethatthissuspension of
judgement is sustainedbya continuing inclinationtoacceptthatAgrippa's
arguments orAenesidemus' arguments aregoodarguments. Theelimination
ofexistingbeliefs depends onthePyrrhonist beingpersuaded thattheclaims
in questionare lessjustified thanhe formerly supposed. In contrast, the
acquisitionofnewbeliefs bya Pyrrhonist whohasalready suspended judge-
mentonallnon-evident matters ofinquiry woulddependonhisbeingper-
suadedthatsomeparticular claimsare betterjustified thanhe formerly
supposed. Consequently thePyrrhonist's renunciationoftheepistemological
principlesthatunderpin hisscepticalarguments doesnothaveanyeffect on
thestabilityofhissuspension ofjudgement. Although thePyrrhonist is now
freetoadopta newsetofstandards, hecannotthink ofanyepistemological
principlesthatpossessanymoreplausibility thanthosehehasjustdiscarded.
Thushe is quiteunabletocometoevena provisional conclusion aboutthe
merits ofputative Andthis,ofcourse,
justifications. rulesoutthepossibility
ofthePyrrhonist eventuallyarrivingat thepositive conclusion thathedoes
havegoodreasontobelievethata specific claimis true.Yetsuspension of
judgement ona giventopicis supposed tobe a product ofone'sinability to
discern anygoodreasonforaccepting orrejecting anyclaimaboutthetopic
in question.It seemsclear,therefore, thatthePyrrhonist's suspension of
judgement will remainstableeven whenthe Pyrrhonist extendshis
suspension ofjudgement to covertheveryprinciples thatoriginally drove
himtowards a widespread suspension ofjudgement.
Thusitis nowpossibletosee thatthesameargument canhaveentirely
differentfunctions atdifferentstagesinthePyrrhonist's philosophiccareer.
The Pyrrhonist startsoutas a dogmatist whois implicitlycommitted tothe
epistemological usedin thearguments
principles putforward byAgrippa
andAenesidemus. Nevertheless,hehasnotyetrealized thefullimplications
ofthoseprinciples; so he doesnotgivehisexplicit assentto thesceptical
arguments justmentioned. In thecourseofhissubsequent investigations,
however, hebecomes increasinglyawareofthefactthatAgrippa's tropes and
Aenesidemus' tropes aremerely drawing outtheconsequences ofprinciples
ofreasoning thatalready enjoyhissupport. Moreover, hecannot thinkofany

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44 ALAN BAILEY
alternative
principleshe couldsincerely endorse. Hencehe embraces the
sceptical of
conclusions the and
tropes, finds himselfforced tosuspendjudge-
mentonanever-widening rangeoftopics. Atthisstage,then, thePyrrhonist
viewsAgrippa's tropesand Aenesidemus' tropesas rationallycompelling
arguments thathave enabled him to discover thelimitsofhumanreason.
Eventually,however, it occursto the Pyrrhonist to subjecthis basic
epistemological
principles to the
same testshehas been imposing onallother
claimsthatpurport tobe rationallyjustified.And when he doesthis,he is
forcedtotheconclusion thattheseprinciples failtomeetthestandards that
theythemselveslaydown. Thus thePyrrhonist suspends judgement the
on
objective
cogency ofthose and
principles, he ceases to regardthetropesas
good arguments. At MVIII 481, forexample,we findthe following
comments abouttheuse ofAgrippean arguments:
Andagain,justas itis notimpossible forthemanwhohasascended
toa highplacebya laddertooverturn theladderwithhisfootafter
hisascent,so also it is notunlikelythattheScepticafterhe has
atthedemonstration
arrived ofhisthesisbymeansoftheargument
provingthe non-existence of proof, it wereby a step-ladder,
as
shouldthenabolishthisveryargument.

As we havealreadynoted,however, thisreassessment of the standard

scepticalarguments does not disturbthe Pyrrhonist's suspensionof
judgement. Nor,indeed,doesthePyrrhonist stopusingthefivetropesof
Agrippa andthetentropes ofAenesidemus.Although henolonger thinksof
themas providing himwithgoodreasonsforhisscepticism, he is ofthe
opinion thatthesetropesareaneffective
meansofpersuading other peopleto
suspend judgement. Hencethetropescontinue tooccupya central placein
thePyrrhonist's expositionofhisscepticism.
Itfollows, thatwehavetoregard
therefore, thePyrrhonist as successively
embracing thetwoviewsdescribedinsection
IV ofthispaper.Andjustas itis
vitaltoavoidconflatingthemature assessment
Pyrrhonist's ofthestandard
scepticalarguments withtheassessment madebythedogmatist, so tooitis
vitalto avoidconflatingthematurePyrrhonist's assessmentwiththeone
forced uponthedeveloping The maturePyrrhonist
Pyrrhonist. genuinely
seeshisnegative epistemological
arguments as nothing morethana form of
psychological However,
therapy. thedeveloping Pyrrhonistis in thesame
situationas anyoneelsewhohasnotyetarrived ata globalscepticism about
rational he is wholly
justification: unableto avoidseeingthoseverysame
arguments as rationally
compelling arguments.
Canada
University,
Guelph

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